[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 112 (Wednesday, July 31, 2013)]
[House]
[Pages H5221-H5240]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR IRAN PREVENTION ACT OF 2013
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill
(H.R. 850) to impose additional human rights and economic and financial
sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 850
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear
Iran Prevention Act of 2013''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy.
TITLE I--HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM SANCTIONS
Sec. 101. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions
that engage in certain transactions on behalf of persons
involved in human rights abuses or that export sensitive
technology to Iran.
Sec. 102. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services and
technologies to Iran.
Sec. 103. Designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as foreign
terrorist organization.
Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or
complicit in human rights abuses, engaging in censorship,
or engaging in the diversion of goods intended for the
people of Iran.
Sec. 105. Sense of Congress on elections in Iran.
Sec. 106. Sense of Congress on designation of a Special Coordinator for
advancing human rights and political participation for
women in Iran.
TITLE II--ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
Subtitle A--Amendments to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
Sec. 201. Transfer to Iran of goods, services, or technology that would
materially contribute to Iran's ability to mine or mill
uranium.
Sec. 202. Repeal of waiver of sanctions relating to development of
weapons of mass destruction or other military
capabilities.
Subtitle B--Amendments to Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012
Sec. 211. Modifications to prohibition on procurement contracts with
persons that export sensitive technology to Iran.
Sec. 212. Authority of State and local governments to avoid exposure to
sanctioned persons and sectors.
Sec. 213. Sense of Congress regarding the European Central Bank.
Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain transactions
in foreign currencies.
Sec. 215. Sanctions with respect to certain transactions with Iran.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
Sec. 221. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the Central Bank of
Iran and other Iranian financial institutions.
Sec. 222. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ports, special
economic zones, free economic zones, and strategic
sectors of Iran.
Sec. 223. Report on determinations not to impose sanctions on persons
who allegedly sell, supply, or transfer precious metals
to or from Iran.
Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign financial
institutions that facilitate financial transactions on
behalf of persons owned or controlled by specially
designated nationals.
Sec. 225. Repeal of exemptions under sanctions provisions of National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
Sec. 226. Termination of government contracts with persons who sell
goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other
transaction with, Iran.
Sec. 227. Conditions for entry and operation of vessels.
TITLE III--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES IN
IRAN
Sec. 301. Report on implementation of sanctions against the Islamic
Republic of Iran Broadcasting.
Sec. 302. List of persons who are high-risk re-exporters of sensitive
technologies.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on provision of intercept technologies to
Iran.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on availability of consumer communication
technologies in Iran.
Sec. 305. Expedited consideration of requests for authorization of
transfer of goods and services to Iran to facilitate the
ability of Iranian persons to freely communicate.
TITLE IV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 401. National Strategy on Iran.
Sec. 402. Report on Iranian nuclear and economic capabilities.
Sec. 403. Report on plausibility of expanding sanctions on Iranian oil.
Sec. 404. GAO report on Iranian strategy to evade current sanctions and
other matters.
Sec. 405. Authority to consolidate reports required under Iran
sanctions laws.
Sec. 406. Amendments to definitions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012.
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Sec. 407. Rule of construction.
Sec. 408. Implementation; penalties.
Sec. 409. Severability.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability
would--
(A) embolden its already aggressive foreign policy,
including its arming of terrorist organizations and other
groups, its efforts to destabilize countries in the Middle
East, and its efforts to target the United States, United
States allies, and United States interests globally;
(B) increase the risk that Iran would share its nuclear
technology and expertise with extremist groups and rogue
nations;
(C) destabilize global energy markets, posing a direct and
devastating threat to the American and global economy; and
(D) likely lead other governments in the region to pursue
their own nuclear weapons programs, increasing the prospect
of nuclear proliferation throughout the region and
effectively ending the viability of the global
nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5,
1970.
(2) A nuclear arms-capable Iran possessing intercontinental
ballistic missiles, a development most experts expect could
occur within a decade, would pose a direct nuclear threat to
the United States.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapons capability.
TITLE I--HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM SANCTIONS
SEC. 101. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(F) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions
or provides significant financial services for--
``(i) a person that is subject to sanctions under section
105(c), 105A(c), 105B(c), or 105C(a); or
``(ii) a person that exports sensitive technology to Iran
and is subject to the prohibition on procurement contracts as
described in section 106.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to any activity described in subparagraph
(F) of section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (as added by
subsection (a)(3) of this section) initiated on or after the
date that is 90 days after such date of enactment.
(c) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendments made
by subsection (a).
SEC. 102. PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES
AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.
(a) Definitions.--Section 301(1) of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8541(1)) is amended by striking ``knows or has reason
to know'' and inserting ``knows, has reason to know, or
should have known''.
(b) Identification of Countries of Concern With Respect to
the Diversion of Certain Goods, Services, and Technologies to
or Through Iran.--Section 302(b) of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8542(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) that are--
``(A) items described in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy
Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and
subsequent revisions) and Guidelines for Transfers of
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related
Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy
Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and
subsequent revisions);
``(B) items on the Missile Technology Control Regime
Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and
subsequent revisions;
``(C) items and substances relating to biological and
chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the
Australia Group;
``(D) items on the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of
toxic chemicals and precursors the export of which is
controlled pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction; or
``(E) items on the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use
Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996,
and subsequent revisions.''.
(c) Destinations of Diversion Concern.--Section 303(c) of
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8543(c)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Not later than''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Additional measures.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in this section, the
President may impose restrictions on United States foreign
assistance or measures authorized under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act with respect to a country
designated as a country of diversion concern if the President
determines such restrictions or measures would prevent the
transfer of United States-origin goods, services, and
technology to Iran.
``(B) Exception.--The authority to impose sanctions under
subparagraph (A) shall not include the authority to impose
sanctions relating to the importation of goods.
``(C) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term `good' has
the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as
continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to countries identified in any update to
the report that is required under section 302(c) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 and submitted to Congress on or after such date
of enactment.
SEC. 103. DESIGNATION OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AS
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.
(a) In General.--Subtitle A of title III of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8741
et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 304 as section 305; and
(2) by inserting after section 303 the following new
section:
``SEC. 304. DESIGNATION OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall
determine if Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps meets the
criteria for designation as a foreign terrorist organization
as set forth in section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
``(b) Affirmative Determination.--If the Secretary of State
determines under subsection (a) that Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps meets the criteria set forth under such section
219, the Secretary shall designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under such section
219.
``(c) Negative Determination.--
``(1) In general.--If the Secretary of State determines
under subsection (a) that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps
does not meet the criteria set forth under such section 219,
the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress
specified in subsection (e) a report that contains a detailed
justification as to which criteria have not been met.
``(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex, if necessary.
``(d) Applicability of Sanctions to Quds Force.--The
sanctions applied to any entity designated as a foreign
terrorist organization as set forth in such section 219 shall
be applied to the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds
Force.
``(e) Committees of Congress Specified.--The committees of
Congress specified in this subsection are the following:
``(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the
House of Representatives.
``(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and
inserting the following:
``Sec. 304. Designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as foreign
terrorist organization.
``Sec. 305. Rule of construction.''.
SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES, ENGAGING IN CENSORSHIP, OR ENGAGING IN
THE DIVERSION OF GOODS INTENDED FOR THE PEOPLE
OF IRAN.
(a) Finding and Sense of Congress.--Section 401(a) of the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended to read as
follows:
``(a) Finding and Sense of Congress.--
``(1) Finding.--Congress finds that Iranian persons holding
the following positions in the Government of Iran are
ultimately responsible for and have and continue to knowingly
order, control, direct and implement
[[Page H5223]]
gross violations of the human rights of the Iranian people,
the human rights of persons in other countries, censorship,
and the diversion of food, medicine, medical devices,
agricultural commodities and other goods intended for the
Iranian people:
``(A) The Supreme Leader of Iran.
``(B) The President of Iran.
``(C) Members of the Council of Guardians.
``(D) Members of the Expediency Council.
``(E) The Minister of Intelligence and Security.
``(F) The Commander of the Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps.
``(G) The Commander of the Basij-e-Mostaz'afin.
``(H) The Commander of Ansar-e-Hezbollah.
``(I) The Commander of the Quds Force.
``(J) The Commander in Chief of the Police Force.
``(K) Senior officials or key employees of an organization
described in any of subparagraphs (C) through (J) or in the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Islamic Consultative
Assembly of Iran, the Council of Ministers of Iran, the
Assembly of Experts of Iran, the Ministry of Defense and
Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Ministry of Justice of
Iran, the Ministry of Interior of Iran, the prison system of
Iran, or the judicial system of Iran.
``(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
``(A) the President should include any Iranian person
holding a position in the Government of Iran described in
paragraph (1) on one or more of the lists of persons subject
to sanctions pursuant to section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or
105C(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(b), 8514a(b),
8514b(b), or 8514c(b)); and
``(B) the President should impose sanctions on such Iranian
person pursuant to section 105, 105A, 105B, or 105C of such
Act (as the case may be).''.
(b) Additional Finding and Sense of Congress.--Section 401
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Additional Finding and Sense of Congress.--
``(1) Finding.--Congress finds that other senior officials
of the Government of Iran, its agencies and
instrumentalities, also have and continue to knowingly order,
control, direct, and implement gross violations of the human
rights of the Iranian people and the human rights of persons
in other countries.
``(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress
that--
``(A) the President should investigate violations of human
rights described in paragraph (1) to identify other senior
officials of the Government of Iran that also have or
continue to knowingly order, control, direct, and implement
gross violations of human rights of the Iranian people and
the human rights of persons in other countries;
``(B) the President should include any such official on one
or more of the lists of persons subject to sanctions pursuant
to section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or 105C(b) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(b), 8514a(b), 8514b(b), or
8514c(b)); and
``(C) the President should impose sanctions on any such
official pursuant to section 105, 105A, 105B, or 105C of such
Act (as the case may be).''.
(c) Report.--Section 401(c)(1) of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126
Stat. 1251) (as redesignated by subsection (b) of this
section) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) In general.--Not later than'';
(2) by striking ``this Act'' and inserting ``the Nuclear
Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and annually thereafter for 3
years'';
(3) by striking ``otherwise directing the commission of''
and inserting ``otherwise directing--
``(i) the commission of'';
(4) by striking ``Iran.'' and inserting ``Iran;
``(ii) censorship or related activities with respect to
Iran; or
``(iii) the diversion of goods, food, medicine, medical
devices, and agricultural commodities, intended for the
people of Iran.'';
(5) by striking ``For any such person'' and inserting the
following:
``(B) Requirement relating to persons not included.--For
any such person''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(C) Requirement relating to financial net worth.--For
each such person described in subparagraph (A) and each such
person described in subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State
shall include in the report a description of the estimated
net worth of the person.''.
(d) Additional Report.--Section 401 of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-
158; 126 Stat. 1251), as amended by this section, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Additional Report.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,
and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
detailed report with respect to whether each person described
in subsection (a) or any family member of such person has
facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of any
person subject to United States sanctions concerning Iran in
violation of Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012 (77 Fed.
Reg. 26409; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or any other provision of
law.
``(2) Family member defined.--In this subsection, the term
`family member' includes, with respect to a person, any
relative of such person to the third degree of
consanguinity.''.
(e) Conforming Amendment.--The heading for section 401 of
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended by striking
``COMMITTED AGAINST'' and all that follows and inserting ``,
ENGAGING IN CENSORSHIP, OR ENGAGING IN THE DIVERSION OF GOODS
INTENDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.''.
(f) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by striking the item relating to section 401 and
inserting the following:
``Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for
or complicit in human rights abuses, engaging in
censorship, or engaging in the diversion of goods
intended for the people of Iran.''.
SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ELECTIONS IN IRAN.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Iranian people are systematically denied free,
fair, and credible elections by the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
(2) The unelected and unaccountable Guardian Council
disqualifies hundreds of qualified candidates, including
women and most religious minorities, while the regime
intimidates others into staying out of elections completely.
(3) Voting inconsistencies, including an absence of
international observers, and fraud are commonplace.
(4) The 2009 presidential elections proved that the regime
will engage in large scale vote-rigging to ensure a specific
result.
(5) The Iranian regime combines electoral manipulation with
the ruthless suppression of dissent. Following the 2009
elections, peaceful demonstrators were met with violence by
the regime's security apparatus, including arbitrary
detentions, beatings, kidnappings, rapes, and murders.
(6) The electoral manipulation and human rights violations
are in violation of the Government of Iran's agreed to
obligations under the United Nations International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that--
(1) the Iranian people are deprived by their government of
free, fair, and credible elections;
(2) the United States should support freedom, human rights,
civil liberties, and the rule of law in Iran, and elections
that are free and fair, meet international standards, and
allow independent international and domestic electoral
observers unrestricted access to polling and counting
stations; and
(3) the United States should support the people of Iran in
their peaceful calls for a representative and responsive
democratic government that respects human rights, civil
liberties, and the rule of law.
SEC. 106. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DESIGNATION OF A SPECIAL
COORDINATOR FOR ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR WOMEN IN IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State
should designate a Special Coordinator position in the Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs whose primary function is to
facilitate cooperation across departments for the purpose of
advancing human rights and political participation for women
in Iran, as well as to prepare evidence and information to be
used in identifying Iranian officials for designation as
human rights violators for their involvement in violating the
human rights of women in Iran.
TITLE II--ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
Subtitle A--Amendments to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
SEC. 201. TRANSFER TO IRAN OF GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY
THAT WOULD MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN'S
ABILITY TO MINE OR MILL URANIUM.
(a) In General.--Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Transfer to iran of goods, services, or technology
that can be used for mining or milling of uranium.--Except as
provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or
more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect
to a person if the President determines that the person
knowingly transferred, on or after the date of the enactment
of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, to Iran goods,
services, or technology that would materially contribute to
Iran's ability to mine or mill uranium.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 5 of such Act is
amended in subsection (b)(3), (c), and (f) by striking
``paragraph (1) or (2)'' each place it appears and inserting
``paragraph (1), (2), or (3)''.
[[Page H5224]]
SEC. 202. REPEAL OF WAIVER OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO
DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR
OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.
Section 9(c)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public
Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by striking subparagraph (B);
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B);
and
(3) in subparagraph (B) (as redesignated by paragraph (2)
of this section)--
(A) by striking ``or (B)'' each place it appears; and
(B) by striking ``, as applicable''.
Subtitle B--Amendments to Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012
SEC. 211. MODIFICATIONS TO PROHIBITION ON PROCUREMENT
CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.
(a) Application to Owners and Subsidiaries.--Subsection (a)
of section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-
195; 22 U.S.C. 8515) is amended--
(1) by striking ``goods or services with a person'' and
inserting the following: ``goods or services--
``(1) with a person'';
(2) in paragraph (1), as added by paragraph (1) of this
subsection, by striking the period at the end and inserting
and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) with respect to a person acting on behalf of or at
the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person
described in paragraph (1) or a person who owns or controls a
person described in paragraph (1).''.
(b) Sensitive Technology Defined.--Subsection (c)(1) of
such section is amended by striking ``is to be used
specifically'' and inserting ``has been designed or
specifically modified''.
(c) Presidential Determination and Imposition of Additional
Sanctions.--Such section, as so amended, is further amended
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Presidential Determination and Imposition of
Additional Sanctions.--The President shall impose 5 or more
of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701
note) with respect to--
``(1) a person if the President determines that the person
knowingly exports sensitive technology to Iran; or
``(2) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of,
or owned or controlled by, a person described in paragraph
(1) or a person who owns or controls a person described in
paragraph (1).''.
(d) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of such section is
amended by inserting ``AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST''
after ``WITH''.
(e) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 is amended by striking the item relating to
section 106 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 106. Prohibition on procurement contracts with and imposition of
sanctions against persons that export sensitive
technology to Iran.''.
(f) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to exports of sensitive technology to Iran
that occur on or after such date of enactment.
SEC. 212. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO AVOID
EXPOSURE TO SANCTIONED PERSONS AND SECTORS.
(a) In General.--Section 202 of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8532) is amended by striking subsections (a), (b), and
(c) and inserting the following:
``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should respect the decision of any State or
local government to divest from or prohibit the investment of
assets of the State or local government in a person described
in subsection (c) or to impose disclosure and transparency
requirements on any person subject to the jurisdiction of
such government, except with respect to an activity that is
exempt, licensed, or otherwise authorized by a Federal
department or agency.
``(b) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a State or local government may adopt and enforce
measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d)--
``(1) to divest the assets of the State or local government
from a person described in subsection (c);
``(2) to prohibit investment of the assets of the State or
local government in any such person; or
``(3) to impose disclosure and transparency requirements on
any person subject to the jurisdiction of such government,
except with respect to an activity that is exempt, licensed,
or otherwise authorized by a Federal department or agency.
``(c) Persons Described.--A person described in this
subsection is a person with respect to which sanctions have
been, and continue to be, imposed pursuant to--
``(1) section 104(c) of this Act;
``(2) section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50
U.S.C. 1701 note);
``(3) section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)); or
``(4) sections 1244, 1245, 1246 or 1247 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C.
8803, 8804, 8805, or 8806).''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 202 of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended--
(1) in subsection (d)(4), by striking ``engages in
investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c)''
and inserting ``is a person described in subsection (c)'';
(2) in subsection (f), by striking ``or (i)'' and inserting
``or (g)'';
(3) by striking subsection (h) and by redesignating
subsections (i) and (j) as subsections (h) and (i),
respectively; and
(4) in paragraph (1) of subsection (i) (as redesignated by
paragraph (3) of this subsection), by striking ``(determined
without regard to subsection (c))''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
apply to measures adopted by State and local governments on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 213. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL
BANK.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Government of Iran, its agencies and
instrumentalities, continue to have access to, and utilize,
euro-denominated transactions, including for goods and
services that are subject to sanctions imposed by the United
States, the European Union and its member states and by the
United Nations.
(2) The Guidelines of the European Central Bank (Article
39(1)) states that: ``Participants shall be deemed to be
aware of, and shall comply with, all obligations on them
relating to legislation on data protection, prevention of
money laundering and the financing of terrorism,
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the
development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, in
particular in terms of implementing appropriate measures
concerning any payments debited or credited on their PM
accounts.''
(3) United States and European convergence with respect to
United States sanctions efforts toward the Government of Iran
is a vital component of United States policy aimed at
preventing the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapons capability.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President should continue to closely coordinate and
cooperate with the European Union and its member states to
restrict access to and use of the euro currency by the
Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, for
transactions with the exception of food, medicine, medical
devices, and agricultural commodities.
SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.
(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--Subtitle B of title II of the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22
U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
220 the following:
``SEC. 220A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.
``(a) In General.--Except as provided in this section, the
President--
``(1) shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose
strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of
a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a
foreign financial institution that is a person described in
subsection (c); and
``(2) may impose sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with
respect to any other person described in subsection (c).
``(b) Exception.--The authority to impose sanctions under
subsection (a)(2) shall not include the authority to impose
sanctions relating to the importation of goods.
``(c) Person Described.--A person described in this
subsection is a person the President determines has--
``(1) knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant
transaction involving the currency of a country other than
the country in which the person is operating at the time of
the transaction with, for, or on behalf of--
``(A) the Central Bank of Iran or another Iranian financial
institution designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for
the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or
``(B) a person described in section 1244(c)(2) of the Iran
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (22 U.S.C. 8803(c)(2))
(other than a person described in subparagraph (C)(iii) of
that section); or
``(2) knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant
transaction by another person involving the currency of a
country other than the country in which that other person is
operating at the time of the transaction, with, for, or on
behalf of a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (1).
``(d) Waiver.--
``(1) In general.--The President may waive the application
of subsection (a) with respect to a person for a period of
not more than 180 days, and may renew that waiver for
additional periods of not more than 180 days, if the
President--
``(A) determines that the waiver is vital to the national
security of the United States; and
``(B) not less than 7 days before the waiver or the renewal
of the waiver, as the case may
[[Page H5225]]
be, takes effect, submits a report to the appropriate
congressional committees on the waiver and the reason for the
waiver.
``(2) Form of report.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but
may include a classified annex.
``(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to prohibit any person from, or authorize or
require the imposition of sanctions with respect to any
person for, conducting or facilitating any transaction in the
currency of the country in which the person is operating at
the time of the transaction for the sale of agricultural
commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices.
``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through
account.--The terms `account', `correspondent account', and
`payable-through account' have the meanings given those terms
in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
``(2) Agricultural commodity.--The term `agricultural
commodity' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
``(3) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign
financial institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or
any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
``(4) Good.--The term `good' has the meaning given that
term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.)).
``(5) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian
financial institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8513b(d)).
``(6) Medical device.--The term `medical device' has the
meaning given the term `device' in section 201 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
``(7) Medicine.--The term `medicine' has the meaning given
the term `drug' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
``(8) Transaction.--The term `transaction' includes a
foreign exchange swap, a foreign exchange forward, and any
other type of similar currency exchange or conversion or
similar derivative instrument.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Implementation.--Section 601(a)(1) of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8781(a)(1)) is amended by inserting ``220A,'' after ``220,''.
(2) Penalties.--Section 601(b)(2)(A) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
8781(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ``and 220,'' and
inserting ``220, and 220A,''.
(3) Termination.--Section 605(a) of such Act (22 U.S.C.
8785(a)) is amended by inserting ``220A,'' after ``220,''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 220
the following:
``Sec. 220A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain
transactions in foreign currencies.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to transactions entered into on or after
May 22, 2013.
SEC. 215. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH
IRAN.
(a) In General.--Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721
et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 225. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS
WITH IRAN.
``(a) Authorization of Sanctions.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in this section, the
President may impose sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) on a
foreign person that the President determines has, on or after
the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of
the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, knowingly conducted
or facilitated a significant financial transaction with the
Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institution
that has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for
the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, for--
``(A) the purchase of goods or services by a person in Iran
or on behalf of a person in Iran; or
``(B) the purchase of goods or services from a person in
Iran or on behalf of a person in Iran.
``(2) Exception.--
``(A) In general.--The authority to impose sanctions under
paragraph (1) shall not include the authority to impose
sanctions relating to the importation of goods.
``(B) Good.--In this paragraph, the term `good' has the
meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as
continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).
``(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to affect the imposition of sanctions with
respect to a financial transaction for the purchase of
petroleum or petroleum products from Iran under section 1245
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648).
``(b) Exception for Overall Reductions of Exports to and
Imports From Iran.--
``(1) In general.--The President is authorized not to
impose sanctions under subsection (a) on a foreign person if
the President determines and submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains a
determination of the President that the country with primary
jurisdiction over the foreign person has, during the time
period described in paragraph (2), significantly reduced the
value and volume of imports and exports of goods (other than
petroleum or petroleum products) and services between such
country and Iran.
``(2) Time period described.--The time period referred to
in paragraph (1) is the 60-day period ending on the date on
which the President makes the determination under paragraph
(1) as compared to the immediately preceding 60-day period.
``(c) Exception for Sales of Agricultural Commodities,
Food, Medicine and Medical Devices.--The President may not
impose sanctions under subsection (a) on a foreign person
with respect to a transaction for the sale of agricultural
commodities, food, medicine or medical devices to Iran.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' has the
meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
``(2) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian
financial institution' has the meaning given that term in
section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8513b(d)).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224
the following:
``Sec. 225. Sanctions with respect to certain transactions with
Iran.''.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
SEC. 221. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL
BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER IRANIAN FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS.
(a) Exception to Applicability of Sanctions With Respect to
Petroleum Transactions.--Section 1245(d)(4)(D)(i)(I) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012
(Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648; 22 U.S.C.
8513a(d)(4)(D)(i)(I)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``reduced reduced'' and inserting
``reduced'';
(2) by inserting ``value and'' before ``volume'';
(3) by inserting ``or of Iranian origin'' after ``from
Iran''; and
(4) by adding at the end before the semicolon the
following: ``, and the President certifies in writing to
Congress that the President has based such determination on
accurate information on that country's total purchases of
crude oil from Iran or of Iranian origin''.
(b) Financial Transactions Described.--Section
1245(d)(4)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648)
is amended--
(1) by striking ``(II)'' and inserting ``(II)(aa)'';
(2) in item (aa) (as designated by paragraph (1) of this
subsection), by striking the period at the end and inserting
``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new item:
``(bb) the foreign financial institution holding the
account described in item (aa) does not knowingly facilitate
any significant financial transfers for, with, or on behalf
of the Government of Iran, unless the transaction is excepted
from sanctions under paragraph (2) or is a transaction
described in subclause (I) and item (aa).''.
(c) Strategy to Reduce Crude Oil Purchases From Iran or of
Iranian Origin.--
(1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to seek to ensure that countries that have received an
exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) of section 1245(d)(4)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648) shall reduce their
crude oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin so that
the aggregate amount of such purchases is reduced by not less
than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil per day by
the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of
submission of the strategy described in subparagraph (E)(ii)
of such section (as added by paragraph (2) of this
subsection).
(2) Amendment.--Section 1245(d)(4) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81;
125 Stat. 1648) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subparagraph:
``(E) Strategy to reduce crude oil purchases from iran or
of iranian origin.--
``(i) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, the
President shall make a determination, based on the
information contained in the most recent report required
under subparagraph (A), of whether each country that received
an exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) before such date of
enactment is able to reduce its crude oil purchases from Iran
or of Iranian origin so that the aggregate amount of such
[[Page H5226]]
purchases is reduced by not less than an average of 1,000,000
barrels of crude oil per day by the end of the 1-year period
beginning on the date of submission of the strategy described
in clause (ii). If the President makes an initial
determination under this clause that the requirements of this
clause cannot be met, then the President shall continue to
make a determination under this clause every 90 days
thereafter as to whether or not the requirements of this
clause can be met.
``(ii) Strategy.--If the President determines that the
requirements of clause (i) can be met, then not later than 60
days after the date of such affirmative determination, the
President shall develop and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a strategy to seek to ensure that
the requirements of clause (i) are met by the end of the 1-
year period beginning on such date of submission.
``(iii) Future exceptions.--
``(I) Affirmative determination.--If the President
determines that the strategy described in clause (ii) was
achieved, then each country described in clause (i) shall be
eligible to receive one or more further exceptions under
subparagraph (D)(i)(I) in accordance with the provisions of
such subparagraph.
``(II) Negative determination.--Except as provided in
subclause (III), if the President determines that the
strategy described in clause (ii) was not achieved, then each
country described in clause (i) shall be ineligible to
receive any further exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) in
accordance with the provisions of such subparagraph.
``(III) Exception.--
``(aa) In general.--Subclause (II) shall not apply with
respect to a country described in clause (i) if the country--
``(AA) dramatically reduced its crude oil purchases from
Iran or of Iranian origin during the 1-year period described
in clause (ii); and
``(BB) has committed itself to continue to reduce its crude
oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin to a de minimis
level.
``(bb) Data.--The President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees all data used to make a
determination under item (aa) not later than 15 days before
issuing an exception under item (aa).
``(iv) Appropriate congressional committees.--In this
subparagraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees'
means--
``(I) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
``(II) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.''.
(d) Definition of Crude Oil.--Section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22
U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(D)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new clause:
``(iii) Crude oil.--In this subparagraph, the term `crude
oil' includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases,
distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil.''.
(e) Waiver.--Section 1245(d)(5)(A) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8513a(d)(5)(A)) is amended by striking ``in the national''
and inserting ``vital to the national''.
(f) Definitions of ``Significant Reduction''.--Section
1245(h)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(h)(3)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``price or volume'' and inserting ``price
and volume''; and
(2) by adding at the end before the period the following:
``and at least a pro rata amount totaling, in the aggregate,
not less than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil
per day by the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date
of submission of the strategy described in subsection
(d)(4)(E)(ii)''.
(g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
take effect beginning on the date that is 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 222. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PORTS,
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES,
AND STRATEGIC SECTORS OF IRAN.
(a) Findings.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 1244 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22
U.S.C. 8803) is amended by striking ``and shipbuilding'' and
inserting ``shipbuilding, automotive, construction,
engineering, or mining''.
(b) Designation of Ports, Special Economic Zones, Free
Economic Zones, and Entities in Strategic Sectors as Entities
of Proliferation Concern.--Subsection (b) of such section is
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``and Entities
in the Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors'' and
inserting ``, Special Economic Zones, Free Economic Zones,
and Entities in Strategic Sectors''; and
(2) by striking ``and entities in the energy, shipping, and
shipbuilding sectors'' and inserting ``, entities that
operate special economic zones or free economic zones, and
entities in strategic sectors (as defined in subsection
(c)(4))''.
(c) Blocking of Property of Ports, Special Economic Zones,
Free Economic Zones, and Entities in Strategic Sectors.--
Subsection (c) of such section is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Entities in
Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors'' and inserting
``Ports, Special Economic Zones, Free Economic Zones, and
Entities in Strategic Sectors'';
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by striking ``the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding
sectors'' each place it appears and inserting ``a strategic
sector (as defined in paragraph (4)(A))''; and
(B) by inserting ``, special economic zone, or free
economic zone'' after ``port'' each place it appears; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(4) Strategic sector defined.--In this section, the term
`strategic sector' means--
``(A) the energy, shipping, shipbuilding, automotive, or
mining sector of Iran; and
``(B) the construction or engineering sector of Iran if the
President determines and reports to Congress not later than
45 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran
Prevention Act of 2013 that the construction or engineering
sector of Iran, as the case may be, is of strategic
importance to Iran.
``(5) Notification and report relating to strategic
sectors.--
``(A) Notification.--The President shall submit to Congress
a notification of the designation of a sector as a strategic
sector of Iran for purposes of paragraph (4)(C) not later
than 30 days after the date on which the President makes such
designation.
``(B) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on
which the President submits to Congress a notification of the
designation of a sector as a strategic sector of Iran under
subparagraph (A), the Comptroller General of the United
States shall submit to Congress a report that contains--
``(i) a review and comment on such designation; and
``(ii) recommendations regarding the designation of
additional sectors as strategic sectors of Iran for purposes
of paragraph (4).''.
(d) Additional Sanctions With Respect to Strategic
Sectors.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``the Energy,
Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors'' and inserting
``Strategic Sectors''; and
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the energy, shipping,
or shipbuilding sectors'' and inserting ``a strategic sector
(as defined in subsection (c)(4)(A))''.
(e) Exception for Afghanistan Reconstruction.--Subsection
(f) of such section is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting
``for a period of not more than 1 year, and may renew that
exception for additional periods of not more than 1 year''
after ``economic development for Afghanistan'';
(2) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``to the extent that'' and inserting
``if'';
(B) by inserting ``or the renewal of the exception, as the
case may be,'' after ``such an exception''; and
(C) by striking ``in the national interest'' and inserting
``in the national security interest''; and
(3) in paragraph (2)--
(A) by inserting ``or the renewal of the exception, as the
case may be,'' before ``not later than 15 days''; and
(B) by inserting at the end before the period the
following: ``or the renewal of the exception''.
(f) Conforming Amendment.--Such section is further amended
in the section heading by striking ``THE ENERGY, SHIPPING,
AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS'' and inserting ``PORTS, SPECIAL
ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND STRATEGIC SECTORS''.
(g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section--
(1) take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act; and
(2)(A) with respect to subsection (c) of section 1244 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,
as so amended, apply with respect to all transactions in all
property and interests in property of any person described in
subsection (c)(2) of such section that occur on or after the
date that is 180 days after such date of enactment; and
(B)(i) with respect to subsection (d)(1) of section 1244 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,
apply with respect to the sale, supply, or transfer to or
from Iran of goods or services described in subsection (d)(3)
of such section, as so amended, that occurs on or after the
date that is 180 days after such date of enactment; and
(ii) with respect to subsection (d)(2) of section 1244 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,
apply with respect to the conduct or facilitation of a
significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or
transfer to or from Iran of goods or services described in
subsection (d)(3) of such section, as so amended, that occurs
on or after the date that is 180 days after such date of
enactment.
SEC. 223. REPORT ON DETERMINATIONS NOT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON
PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY SELL, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER
PRECIOUS METALS TO OR FROM IRAN.
Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8804) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new
subsection:
``(h) Report on Determinations Not To Impose Sanctions on
Persons Who Allegedly Sell, Supply, or Transfer Precious
Metals to or From Iran.--
[[Page H5227]]
``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and
every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on each
determination of the President during the preceding 90-day
period not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) or (c)
with respect to a person who allegedly sells, supplies, or
transfers precious metals, directly or indirectly, to or from
Iran, together with the reasons for such determination.
``(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex, if necessary.''.
SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT FACILITATE
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS
OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY SPECIALLY DESIGNATED
NATIONALS.
Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8806) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new
subsection:
``(f) Persons Owned or Controlled by Specially Designated
Nationals.--
``(1) In general.--The President shall impose sanctions
described in subsection (a) with respect to a foreign
financial institution, including but not limited to a foreign
central bank, that the President determines has, on or after
the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of
the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, knowingly
facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of
any person determined by the President to be directly owned
or controlled by an Iranian person included on the list of
specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of
the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution
described in subsection (b)).
``(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President routinely should determine on or after the date
of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013
those persons that are directly or indirectly owned or
controlled by an Iranian person included on the list of
specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained
by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of
the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution
described in subsection (b)).
``(3) Consideration of data from other countries and
nongovernmental organizations.--The President shall consider
credible data already obtained by other countries and
nongovernmental organizations in making determinations
described in paragraph (1).''.
SEC. 225. REPEAL OF EXEMPTIONS UNDER SANCTIONS PROVISIONS OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2013.
Subtitle D of title XII of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et
seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 1244--
(A) in subsection (c)(1)--
(i) by striking ``(1) Blocking of property.--'' and all
that follows through ``On and after'' and inserting ``(1)
Blocking of property.--On and after''; and
(ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and
(B) in subsection (d)(1)--
(i) by striking ``(1) Sale, supply, or transfer of certain
goods and services.--'' and all that follows through ``Except
as provided'' and inserting ``(1) Sale, supply, or transfer
of certain goods and services.--Except as provided''; and
(ii) by striking subparagraph (B);
(2) in section 1245(a)--
(A) by striking ``(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Certain
Materials.--'' and all that follows through ``The President''
and inserting ``(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Certain
Materials.--The President'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively (and by
redesignating all sub-units therein accordingly);
(C) in paragraph (3)(B) (as redesignated by subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph)--
(i) in clause (i), by striking ``subclause (I) of clause
(i)'' and inserting ``clause (i) of subparagraph (A)'';
(ii) in clause (ii), by striking ``subclause (II) of that
clause'' and inserting ``clause (ii) of that subparagraph'';
and
(iii) in clause (iii), by striking ``subclause (III) of
that clause'' and inserting ``clause (iii) of that
subparagraph''; and
(D) by striking ``(2) exception.--'' and all that follows
through ``paragraph (1).''; and
(3) in section 1246(a)--
(A) by striking ``(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--'' and all
that follows through ``Except as provided'' and inserting
``(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--Except as provided'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively (and by
redesignating all sub-units therein accordingly); and
(C) by striking ``(2) exception.--'' and all that follows
through ``paragraph (1).''; and
SEC. 226. TERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS
WHO SELL GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY TO, OR
CONDUCT ANY OTHER TRANSACTION WITH, IRAN.
(a) Modification of Federal Acquisition Regulation.--Not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to
require a certification from each person that is a
prospective contractor that the person, and any person under
common ownership or control with the person, does not sell
goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other
transaction with, Iran for which sanctions may be imposed
under this Act.
(b) Remedies.--
(1) In general.--If the head of an executive agency
determines that a person has submitted a false certification
under subsection (a) on or after the date on which the
applicable revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
required by this section becomes effective, the head of that
executive agency shall terminate a contract with such person
or debar or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal
contracts for a period of not less than 2 years. Any such
debarment or suspension shall be subject to the procedures
that apply to debarment and suspension under the Federal
Acquisition Regulation under subpart 9.4 of part 9 of title
48, Code of Federal Regulations.
(2) Inclusion on list of parties excluded from federal
procurement and nonprocurement programs.--The Administrator
of General Services shall include on the List of Parties
Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs
maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation each person that is debarred,
suspended, or proposed for debarment or suspension by the
head of an executive agency on the basis of a determination
of a false certification under paragraph (1).
(c) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be
construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the
head of an executive agency or any other official of the
Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false
certification under subsection (a).
(d) Waivers.--
(1) In general.--The President may on a case-by-case basis
waive the requirement that a person make a certification
under subsection (a) if the President determines and
certifies in writing to the congressional committees
described in paragraph (2) that it is essential to the
national security interests of the United States to do so.
(2) Congressional committees described.--The congressional
committees referred to in paragraph (1) are--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has
the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41,
United States Code.
(2) Federal acquisition regulation.--The term ``Federal
Acquisition Regulation'' means the regulation issued pursuant
to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.
(f) Applicability.--The revisions to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation required under subsection (a) shall
apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are
issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 227. CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY AND OPERATION OF VESSELS.
(a) In General.--The Ports and Waters Safety Act (33 U.S.C.
1221 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON ENTRY AND OPERATION.
``(a) Prohibition.--
``(1) In general.--No foreign vessel described in
subsection (b) shall enter or operate in the navigable waters
of the United States or transfer cargo in any port or place
under the jurisdiction of the United States.
``(2) Limitation on application.--Paragraph (1) shall not
apply with respect to a vessel described in subsection (b)(2)
on and after any date on which the Secretary of State
determines that the vessel is no longer registered as
described in that subsection. The Secretary of State shall
publish a notice of each such determination in the Federal
Register.
``(b) Vessels Described.--A vessel referred to in
subsection (a) is a foreign vessel for which a Notice of
Arrival is required to be filed under section 160 of title
33, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of
enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and
that--
``(1) is on a list of vessels published in Federal Register
under subsection (c)(2); or
``(2) more than 180 days after the publication of such a
list, is registered, pursuant to the Geneva Convention on the
High Seas (13 U.S.T. 2312; TIAS 5200; 450 UNTS 82), by a
government the agents or instrumentalities of which are
maintaining a registration of a vessel that is included in
such list.
``(c) Information and Publication.--The Secretary of
Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
shall--
``(1) maintain timely information on registrations of all
foreign vessels over 300 gross tons that are--
``(A) owned or operated by or on behalf of--
``(i) the National Iran Tanker Company or the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Line; or
``(ii) any successor to an entity referred to in clause
(i); or
``(B) otherwise owned or operated by or on behalf of Iran;
and
[[Page H5228]]
``(2) publish in the Federal Register a list of vessels
described in paragraph (1), including periodic updates of
such list.
``(d) Notification of Governments.--The Secretary of State
shall notify each government the agents or instrumentalities
of which are maintaining a registration of a foreign vessel
that is included on the list published under subsection
(c)(2), that all vessels registered under such government's
authority are subject to the prohibition under subsection (a)
if more than 180 days after such publication the government
continues to maintain a registration for a vessel that is
included on the list published under subsection (c)(2).
``(e) Notification of Vessels.--Upon receiving a Notice of
Arrival under section 160 of title 33, Code of Federal
Regulations (as in effect on the date of enactment of the
Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013) from a vessel described
in (b), the Secretary shall notify the master of such vessel
that the vessel may not enter or operate in the navigable
waters of the United States or transfer cargo in any port or
place under the jurisdiction of the United States, unless--
``(1) the Secretary has made a determination described in
subsection (a)(2); or
``(2) the Secretary allows provisional entry of the vessel,
or transfer of cargo from the vessel, under subsection (f).
``(f) Provisional Entry or Cargo Transfer.--Notwithstanding
subsection (e), the Secretary may allow provisional entry of,
or transfer of cargo from, a foreign vessel described in
subsection (b), if such entry or transfer is necessary for
the safety of the vessel or persons aboard.
``(g) Right of Innocent Passage.--This section shall not be
construed as authority to restrict the right of innocent
passage as recognized under international law.
``(h) Foreign Vessel Defined.--In this section the term
`foreign vessel' has the meaning given that term in section
110 of title 46, United States Code.''.
(b) Deadline for Publication.--The Secretary shall publish
a list under section 16(c)(2) of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act, as amended by this section, by not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Section 13(e) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33
U.S.C. 1232(e)) is amended by striking ``section 9'' and
inserting ``sections 9 and 16''.
(2) Section 4(b)(2) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(33 U.S.C. 1223(b)(2)) is amended by striking ``section 9''
and inserting ``section 9 or 16''.
TITLE III--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES IN
IRAN
SEC. 301. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BROADCASTING.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall
submit to Congress a report on the following:
(1) The current status of availability of the Islamic
Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) on international
satellites, entities that facilitate its operation by
providing services or equipment, and the technical means that
it engages in jamming.
(2) The instances, since January 1, 2012, in which the IRIB
engaged in activities that violated Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
including broadcasting forced confessions and hate speech
against minorities.
(3) The instances, since January 1, 2012, in which
international broadcasting programs originating from the
United States and Europe have been subject to disruption in
Iran, with relevant details such as which programs were
disrupted, available location information on the origin of
the disruption, and the extent of the disruption.
(b) Coordination.--In developing the report required by
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with
the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Secretary of the
Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments
and agencies.
(c) Public Availability.--All unclassified portions of the
report required by subsection (a) shall be made publicly
available on the Internet web site of the Department of
State.
SEC. 302. LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE HIGH-RISK RE-EXPORTERS OF
SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall make publicly
available and update as appropriate a list of persons who are
high-risk re-exporters of sensitive technologies in order to
seek to ensure that the Government of Iran or an entity owned
or controlled by that Government is unable to obtain
sensitive technologies through the re-export of such
sensitive technologies by third-party intermediaries.
(b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``sensitive
technology'' has the meaning given that term in section 106
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515).
SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROVISION OF INTERCEPT
TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) those that provide intercept technologies that limit
freedom of speech or expression to the Government of Iran
should be held accountable for the repression of the Iranian
people; and
(2) no person should use an existing contract with the
Government of Iran as a justification to continue to supply
intercept technologies to the Government of Iran for purposes
of restricting the free flow of information.
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Department of State should encourage the free flow
of information in Iran to counter the Government of Iran's
repression of its own people; and
(2) in order to facilitate the free flow of information in
Iran, the Department of State should promote the availability
of certain consumer communication technologies to Iranian
civil society and the Iranian people.
SEC. 305. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR
AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSFER OF GOODS AND SERVICES
TO IRAN TO FACILITATE THE ABILITY OF IRANIAN
PERSONS TO FREELY COMMUNICATE.
(a) In General.--Section 413 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8753) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Rule of Construction.--The expedited process for the
consideration of complete requests for authorization to
engage in the activities described in subsection (a) shall be
construed to also apply to the transfer of goods and services
to Iran to facilitate the ability of Iranian persons to
freely communicate, obtain information, and access the
Internet and other communications systems.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to requests described in section 413 of
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,
as so amended, that are submitted to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control on or after such date of enactment.
TITLE IV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 401. NATIONAL STRATEGY ON IRAN.
(a) National Strategy Required.--The President shall
develop a strategy, to be known as the ``National Strategy on
Iran'', that provides strategic guidance for activities that
support the objective of addressing the threats posed by
Iran.
(b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act or January 30, 2014, whichever
occurs first, and every January 30 thereafter, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
National Strategy on Iran required under subsection (a).
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under
subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
(1) A description of Iran's grand strategy and security
strategy, including strategic objectives, and the security
posture and objectives of Iran.
(2) A description of the United States strategy to--
(A) address and counter the capabilities of Iran's
conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces;
(B) disrupt and deny Iranian efforts to develop or augment
capabilities related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile
forces development;
(C) address the Government of Iran's economic strategy to
enable the objectives described in this subsection;
(D) exploit key vulnerabilities; and
(E) combat Iranian efforts to suppress Internet freedom,
including actions of the United States to--
(i) work to promote expanded Internet access for democracy
activists in Iran;
(ii) add a public diplomacy page to the United States'
virtual embassy in Iran; and
(iii) leverage multilateral organizations committed to
Internet connectivity in Iran.
(3) An implementation plan for the United States strategy
described in paragraph (2).
(d) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent
possible, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the
Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 402. REPORT ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR AND ECONOMIC
CAPABILITIES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the
following:
(1) An estimate of the timeline for Iranian capabilities to
develop nuclear weapons, including--
[[Page H5229]]
(A) an estimate of the period of time it would take Iran to
produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single implosion-
type nuclear weapon, taking into account all known relevant
technical data;
(B) an estimate of the period of time it would take Iran to
produce sufficient separated plutonium for a single nuclear
weapon;
(C) a description of the assumptions underlying the
estimates referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), and any
information about developments that might alter or otherwise
affect those assumptions;
(D) an estimate of the date by which the periods of time
referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) will be less than 45
days; and
(E) a description of any efforts by the United States to
increase the frequency of inspections by the International
Atomic Energy Agency of nuclear facilities in Iran.
(2) An assessment of Iranian strategy and capabilities
relating to development of nuclear weapons, including--
(A) a summary and analysis of current nuclear weapons
capabilities;
(B) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding
expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized
by, Iran to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities;
(C) a summary of the capabilities of Iran's unconventional
weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise
missile forces;
(D) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's
unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces
and Iran's cruise missile forces as delivery systems for a
nuclear device;
(E) a description of all efforts of Iran to design and
develop a nuclear weapon, including efforts to design or fit
warheads, and any other possible military dimensions of the
nuclear program of Iran; and
(F) an analysis of the procurement network, including the
amount and sources of funding expended by Iran on programs to
develop a nuclear weapons capability.
(3) Projected economic effects of international sanctions
on Iran, including--
(A) an estimate of the capital accounts, current accounts,
and amounts of foreign exchange reserves (including access to
foreign exchange reserves) of the Government of Iran, and
other leading indicators of the status of the economy of
Iran;
(B) an estimate of timelines with respect to macroeconomic
viability of Iran, including the time by which the Government
of Iran will exhaust its foreign exchange reserves;
(C) an estimate of the date by which the reserves of the
Central Bank of Iran will be insufficient for the Government
of Iran to avoid a severe balance of payments crisis that
prevents it from maintaining a functioning economy,
including--
(i) the inflation rate, exchange rates, unemployment rate,
and budget deficits in Iran; and
(ii) other leading macroeconomic indicators used by the
International Monetary Fund, professional rating agencies,
and other credible sources to assess the economic health of a
country;
(D) a description of the assumptions underlying the
estimate referred to in paragraph (3) and an indication of
how changes in each of those assumptions could affect the
estimate;
(E) an assessment of the effect of sanctions imposed with
respect to Iran on moving forward the date referred to in
subparagraph (C); and
(F) a description of actions taken by the Government of
Iran to delay the date referred to in subparagraph (C).
(b) Update.--The President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an update of the report required by
subsection (a) every 60 days after the date of submission of
the report that includes any pertinent developments to
Iranian nuclear or economic capabilities.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) and the
update required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in
unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, but may
include a classified annex, if necessary.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the
Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear explosive
device'' means any device, whether assembled or disassembled,
that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an
amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that
is greater than the amount of energy that would be released
from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
SEC. 403. REPORT ON PLAUSIBILITY OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS ON
IRANIAN OIL.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the
following:
(1) Whether petroleum and petroleum products originating in
and exported from Iran are refined and sold outside of Iran.
(2) Whether products that contain Iranian-origin petroleum
or petroleum products as part of their contents are imported
into the United States and, if any such products are imported
into the United States, whether such importation violates the
ban on importation into the United States of Iranian-origin
petroleum or petroleum products.
(3) Whether it is feasible to ban the importation into the
United States of products described in paragraph (2),
regardless of whether the ban on importation into the United
States of Iranian-origin petroleum or petroleum products
applies to such products.
(b) Basis of Report.--The report required under subsection
(a) may be based on publicly-available information and
classified information. The information that is not
classified information shall be made publically available.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on
Finance of the Senate.
SEC. 404. GAO REPORT ON IRANIAN STRATEGY TO EVADE CURRENT
SANCTIONS AND OTHER MATTERS.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall
submit to Congress a report that--
(1) evaluates the strategy of the Government of Iran to
evade current economic and financial sanctions; and
(2) specifically evaluates the ability of Iran to
successfully diversify its economy beyond its energy sector,
thereby lessening the impact and effectiveness of economic
and financial sanctions.
SEC. 405. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS REQUIRED UNDER
IRAN SANCTIONS LAWS.
(a) In General.--Any or all reports required to be
submitted to Congress under the provisions of law described
in subsection (c) that are subject to a deadline for
submission consisting of the same unit of time may be
consolidated into a single report that is submitted to
Congress pursuant to such deadline.
(b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect
to the initial report of any report described in subsection
(a).
(c) Provisions of Law Described.--The provisions of law
referred to in this section are the following:
(1) This Act and the amendments made by this Act.
(2) The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012
(22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.).
(3) The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.).
(4) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.).
(d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on the date
of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to
reports required to be submitted to Congress under the
provisions of law described in subsection (c) on or after
such date of enactment.
SEC. 406. AMENDMENTS TO DEFINITIONS UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS ACT
OF 1996 AND IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012.
(a) Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.--Section 14(4)(B) of the
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended by striking ``may include, in the
discretion of the President'' and inserting ``includes''.
(b) Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012.--Section 211 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate
congressional committees' includes the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate.''.
SEC. 407. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall
be construed to apply with respect to--
(1) any activity relating to a project described in
subsection (a) of section 603 of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8783) to which
the exception under that section applies at the time of the
activity; or
(2) any authorized intelligence activity of the United
States.
SEC. 408. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.
(a) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out this Act and the amendments made by
this Act.
(b) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections
(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person
that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of this Act or any amendment made by this
Act or regulations prescribed under this Act to the same
extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an
unlawful act described in
[[Page H5230]]
section 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).
SEC. 409. SEVERABILITY.
(a) In General.--If any provision of this Act, or the
application of such provision to any person or circumstance,
is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act,
or the application of that provision to other persons or
circumstances, shall not be affected.
(b) Effective Date Under Section 214.--If subsection (d) of
section 214 is found to be unconstitutional in accordance
with subsection (a), the amendments made by such section 214
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to transactions entered into on or after
such date of enactment.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition to the
motion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New York opposed to
the motion?
Mr. ENGLE. I am not opposed.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison)
each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) one-half of my time and that he be
allowed to control that time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New
York will control 10 minutes.
There was no objection.
General Leave
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, there is no higher national security priority than
preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Foreign Affairs Ranking Member Engel
and I have worked closely in a bipartisan way to bring this legislation
to the floor, and we do it with unanimous support of the members of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, all Democrats and all Republicans on that
committee. Indeed, 375 Members of the House are cosponsors of this
legislation. That's the broad recognition that exists right now, that
more needs to be done to stop Iran's nuclear program, which is a danger
not only to us in the United States, but certainly to the region and to
the world.
Today, we act with that sense of urgency, urgency because Iran's
march to nuclear weapons continues. In less than 2 years, the
International Atomic Energy Agency has told us that they have doubled
in Iran the installed centrifuges at the facilities at Natanz and
Fordo. They've doubled those from 8,500 to more than 15,700
centrifuges. And these new centrifuges, many of them are five times
more powerful. They spin much faster than those earlier models.
A key facility is buried deep below a mountain, and Iran continues to
stonewall the IAEA on its development of nuclear explosive devices. So
Iran's intent to develop this weapons capability is very evident.
New President in Iran or not, I am convinced that Iran's supreme
leader intends to continue on this path because that is what he says he
intends to do; that is, unless sanctions bite to the point where the
regime has to make a choice between compromise on its nuclear weapons
program or the consequences of the sanctions on the regime.
That is why this legislation dramatically steps up the pressure on
the regime in Iran:
It targets the energy sector by compelling countries that are
currently purchasing oil from Iran to reduce their collective total by
1 million barrels per day within a year;
It targets additional sectors of Iran's economy;
It further denies the regime access to foreign currency reserves;
It effectively targets Iran's efforts to circumvent international
sanctions against the shipping sector in the country;
Equally important, this legislation increases sanctions against
Iranian human rights abusers, making clear that it's the Iranian people
that we are siding with.
Only when the Iranian leadership truly feels a choice between
maintaining power and obtaining the bomb does our diplomacy have a
chance to succeed. And we know the Iran regime's view of the world, we
know it only too well because its support of keeping the brutal Assad
regime in power is self-evident. It has resupplied Hezbollah with
25,000 new rockets, which target Israel.
In recent years, there have been Iranian-sponsored attacks or plots
uncovered by the Europeans in Bulgaria, also in India, Thailand, in
Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Cyprus, in Kenya, and even here in
Washington, D.C. I'd hate to see an Iran emboldened by a nuclear
weapon, but that is the course we are on unless we dramatically step up
the pressure. So let's pass this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Ed Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce, I am writing with respect to H.R. 850,
the ``Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,'' which the
Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered reported favorably on
May 22, 2013. As a result of your having consulted with us on
provisions in H.R. 850 that fall within the Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary, and your
agreement to support mutually-agreeable changes to the
legislation, I agree to discharge our Committee from further
consideration of this bill so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.
The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 850 at
this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject
matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our
Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the
bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may
address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our
Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an
appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and asks
that you support any such request.
I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in the Congressional Record during Floor
consideration of H.R. 850.
Sincerely,
Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your
agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on the
Judiciary so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House
Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding
regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative
jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for
your Committee's participation in any conference committee
that may be named to consider this bill.
I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important
legislation for Floor consideration.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Darrell E. Issa,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your
agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our
mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing
Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850,
and my support for your Committee's participation in any
conference committee that may be named to consider this bill.
I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important
legislation for Floor consideration.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
[[Page H5231]]
____
House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Edward R. Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing concerning H.R. 850, the
``Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,'' which your Committee
reported on May 22, 2013.
H.R. 850 contains provisions within the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform's Rule X jurisdiction. As a
result of your having consulted with the Committee and in
order to expedite this bill for floor consideration, the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will forego
action on the bill. This is being done on the basis of our
mutual understanding that doing so will in no way diminish or
alter the jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform with respect to the appointment of
conferees, or to any future jurisdictional claim over the
subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation.
I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming
this understanding, and would request that you include a copy
of this letter and your response in the Committee Report and
in the Congressional Record during the floor consideration of
this bill. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Darrell Issa,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2013.
Hon. Hon. Edward R. Royce,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce: On May 22, 2013, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs ordered H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention
Act of 2013, as amended, to be reported favorably to the
House. As a result of your having consulted with the
Committee on Financial Services concerning provisions of the
bill that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to
discharge our committee from further consideration of the
bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor.
The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with
our mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of
H.R. 850, as amended, at this time, we do not waive any
jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or
similar legislation, and that our committee will be
appropriately consulted and involved as the bill or similar
legislation moves forward so that we may address any
remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction.
Our committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of
an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and
requests your support for any such request.
Finally, I appreciate your July 26 letter confirming this
understanding with respect to H.R. 850, as amended, and would
ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in your committee's report to accompany the
legislation and/or in the Congressional Record during floor
consideration thereof.
Sincerely,
Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your
agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on
Financial Services so that it may proceed expeditiously to
the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual
understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X
legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my
support for your Committee's participation in any conference
committee that may be named to consider this bill.
I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important
legislation for Floor consideration. Sincerely,
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Edward R. Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing regarding H.R. 850, the
``Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,'' which was favorably
reported out of your Committee on May 22, 2013. I commend you
on your efforts to make sure that the United States is better
able to address the critical threats that Iran poses.
I appreciate that in response to the concerns raised by the
Committee on Ways & Means, you have agreed to modify sections
102, 201, 214, 215, and 222 of H.R. 850 as reported out of
your Committee. As a result, in order to expedite floor
consideration of the bill, the Committee on Ways and Means
will forgo action on H.R. 850. Further, the Committee will
not oppose the bill's consideration on the suspension
calendar, based on our understanding that you will work with
us as the legislative process moves forward to ensure that
our concerns in the sections indicated above as well as other
provisions in the Committee's jurisdiction continue to be
addressed. This is also being done with the understanding
that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with
respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional
prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in the Congressional Record during Floor
consideration.
Sincerely,
Dave Camp,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
Hon. Dave Camp,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R.
850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your
agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on Ways
and Means so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House
Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding
regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative
jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for
your Committee's participation in any conference committee
that may be named to consider this bill.
I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important
legislation for Floor consideration.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 9, 2013.
Hon. Bill Shuster,
Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your consultation with the
Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran
Prevention Act of 2013, and your agreement to forgo a
sequential referral of that bill. I am writing to confirm our
mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing
Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850,
and my support for your Committee's participation in any
conference committee that may be named to consider that bill.
I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important
legislation for floor consideration.
Sincerely,
Edward R. Royce,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure,
Washington, DC, June 26, 2013.
Hon. Ed Royce,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 850, the Nuclear
Iran Prevention Act of 2013, as ordered reported. There are
certain provisions in the legislation that fall within the
Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure.
As a result of your having consulted with the Committee and
in order to expedite this legislation for floor
consideration, the Committee will not assert a jurisdictional
claim over this bill by seeking a sequential referral.
However, this is conditional on our mutual understanding and
agreement that doing so does not in any way alter or diminish
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure with respect to the appointment of conferees
or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject
matters contained in the bill or similar legislation. I
request you urge the Speaker to name members of the Committee
to any conference committee named to consider such
provisions.
Please, place a copy of this letter and your response
acknowledging our jurisdictional interest into the committee
report on H.R. 850 and into the Congressional Record during
consideration of the measure on the House floor.
Sincerely,
Bill Shuster,
Chairman.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
My colleagues come here today proposing this new, intensified
legislation on the basis that they would like to stop Iran from having
a nuclear weapon. So do we.
{time} 1700
Everything that my colleague, Mr. Royce, detailed a moment ago is
something that we are concerned about.
But we have a changed circumstance, a changed circumstance that this
legislation does not acknowledge, and that is that the Iranian people
had a choice between candidates, and they selected the candidate who
decided to reject extremism and actually campaign on the basis of
moderation. Why not? At least until Mr. Rouhani has a chance to
forestall legislation like this and engage in
[[Page H5232]]
diplomacy to reach the goals that Mr. Royce has identified.
Mr. Rouhani ran on a policy of promise to pursue a path of
moderation. He promised to pursue a ``policy of reconciliation and
peace.'' Obviously, we don't have rose-colored glasses. We don't know.
But why don't we wait and see. Why aren't we at least curious to find
out whether or not President Rouhani means that he wants to pursue this
course of peace. It is what we want--negotiated settlement. Why are we
slapping his hand down when apparently the Iranian people are willing
to support a candidate who is willing to extend a hand?
The New York Times agrees. It said:
While sanctions are an important element of American
strategy, piling on more at this time and this moment could
harm, rather than advance, the chances for a negotiated deal
with Iran.
In fact, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that additional
sanctions at this moment might undermine diplomatic efforts.
The fact of the matter is, why do we want to strengthen the hand of
extremists who will say to Rouhani, See, you thought you could work
with them. We were right all along.
I say they're wrong. I say let's accept the olive branch extended by
the Iranian people who selected a more moderate candidate.
In fact, I would like to submit this document into the Record. The
headline reads:
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Nominee for Foreign Minister,
Seen as Olive Branch to United States.
Let me also acknowledge and put into the Record this letter, dated
July 19, by 130 Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis to say
President Obama pursued negotiations in this window of time when we
have a President who won on the basis of extending a hand for
negotiation.
We don't have to do this now. We can do this when we come back after
at least Mr. Rouhani is inaugurated into the presidency of Iran.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time, and I do have a number
of speakers, when we're ready for that.
[From HuffPost World, July 31, 2013]
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Nominee for Foreign Minister, Seen as
Olive Branch to United States
(By Marcus George and Paul Taylor)
Dubai/Paris, July 29, 2013 (Reuters).--If Iranian
President-elect Hassan Rouhani wanted to signal his
determination to rebuild relations with the United States and
strike a ``grand bargain,'' he could hardly do better than
pick Mohammad Javad Zarif as his foreign minister.
Iranian news agencies reported on Monday that Zarif, a
former ambassador to the United Nations and Tehran's leading
connoisseur of the U.S. political elite, is set to be in the
cabinet Rouhani will announce after taking office on Sunday.
A source close to Rouhani confirmed Zarif will be nominated
as foreign minister.
A fluent English speaker who earned his doctorate at the
University of Denver, Zarif has been at the centre of several
secret negotiations to try to overcome 35 years of
estrangement between Washington and Tehran, diplomats said.
Those talks failed because of deep mistrust on a range of
disputes from Iran's secretive nuclear programme and support
for anti-Israeli militants to U.S. sanctions and hopes of
engineering ``regime change'' in Tehran.
Zarif's elevation, however, suggests the moderate new
president is keen to make another try at breaking the
deadlock.
``He was always trying to do what was possible to improve
relations in a very intelligent, open and clear way,'' said a
senior Western diplomat who had repeated dealings with Zarif.
``This is someone who knows the United States very well and
with all the frustrations of the past is still someone they
know in Washington,'' he said.
The usual caveats about Iran apply: under the Islamic
Republic's complex institutional set-up, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls the shots in foreign and
security policy and controls the nuclear programme, which
Western powers say is aimed at developing atomic weapons.
The foreign minister ranks roughly fourth in the foreign
policy pecking order, after Khamenei, the head of the
National Security Council, who also serves as Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator, and the president.
Nevertheless, assuming he is confirmed by Iran's prickly,
conservative-dominated parliament, Zarif's appointment would
be a strong gesture of positive intent towards the United
States.
The two countries have had no official ties since 1980
after Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran,
taking 52 diplomats hostage in protest against Washington's
admission of the former Shah after he was toppled by the
Islamic revolution.
contact book
Zarif's Washington contact book includes Vice President Joe
Biden, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and a who's who of
U.S. national security officials on both sides of the aisle.
The soft-spoken career diplomat resigned from the nuclear
negotiating team after hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
was elected in 2005.
In 2007, he returned from New York after five years as
Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations and
found himself out of favour as his country turned its back on
the notion of seeking better ties with the West and
Ahmadinejad sidelined English-speaking diplomats.
Since then, Zarif has been in a holding pattern, nominally
senior adviser to the foreign minister from 2007 to 2010,
then from 2011 international director of Islamic Azad
University, a network of educational institutions established
by ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his political
patron.
Rafsanjani, who is also Rouhani's mentor, has long favoured
a pragmatic rapprochement with the United States, but
Khamenei has stamped on all such efforts since he succeeded
the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, in 1989.
Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat who served as
President Barack Obama's top Middle East adviser until 2011,
said Zarif had shown a willingness to negotiate in good faith
and his appointment would be seen in Washington and Europe as
an indication that Rouhani wants to ``do business'' with the
West.
But he cautioned that the question remained whether this
would translate into an easing of Tehran's resistance to
curbing its nuclear drive. ``Zarif is not someone who does
favours for the United States,'' Ross said. ``He fits the
category of a sign or signal until you see Iran actually
doing something.''
Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President
George H.W. Bush, described Zarif as ``reasonable'' but said
much would depend on how much leeway he is given.
Western diplomats said Zarif was a central negotiator in
the last major effort to negotiate a ``grand bargain''
between Tehran and Washington that began after the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks on the United States and foundered in mid-2003.
U.S. newspapers published in 2007 the bare text of a draft
agreement, put together in secret talks in Paris, Geneva and
New York, that would have established negotiations between
the two countries on all outstanding issues.
While the draft fell short of an agreement on substance, it
noted both sides' expectations on issues such as assurances
that Iran's nuclear programme has no military capability, and
assurances that the United States would act against anti-
government People's Mujahideen activists based in Iraq.
``The texts are authentic,'' said a Western diplomat who
was involved in the back-channel talks, confirming that
Khamenei had given the green light for negotiations to go
ahead.
hostage negotiator
Years earlier, as a junior diplomat Zarif was involved in
negotiations to win the release of U.S. hostages held by pro-
Iranian gunmen in Lebanon, according to the memoirs of former
U.N. envoy Giandomenico Picco. Even though the United States
did not make a promised reciprocal goodwill gesture at the
time, Zarif remained committed to improving ties.
In Washington, Trita Parsi, president of the pro-dialogue
National Iranian American Council, said Zarif has been
involved in multiple U.S.-Iranian negotiations, including
talks on Afghanistan after the U.S.-led 2001 invasion, and
Tehran's 2003 proposal for a ``grand bargain'' with the
United States.
``Based on my interviews with him, (Zarif) was involved in
the drafting of it,'' Parsi said of that offer of a
comprehensive new start, which then President George W.
Bush's administration spurned.
Veteran U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, the U.S. point man at
a 2001 Bonn conference that formed a new Afghan government
after the overthrow of the Taliban, credited Zarif with a
pivotal, positive role in the diplomacy--and with a sense of
humour.
Dobbins--now the State Department's special envoy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan--recalled in 2007 testimony to the
U.S. Congress how Zarif, then a deputy foreign minister,
persuaded the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to drop its
demand for control of an outsize proportion of Afghan
ministries.
The Northern Alliance delegate ``remained obdurate.
Finally, Zarif took him aside and whispered to him for a few
moments, following which the Northern Alliance envoy returned
to the table and said: `Okay, I agree. The other factions can
have two more ministries. And we can create three more, which
they can also have.' We had a deal,'' Dobbins recalled.
``Zarif had achieved the final breakthrough without which
the (Hamid) Karzai government might never have been formed.''
____
[From the New York Times, July 26, 2013]
Iran Is Said to Want Direct Talks With U.S. on Nuclear Program
(By Michael R. Gordon)
Washington.--Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq
told the Obama administration this month that Iran was
interested in direct talks with the United States on Iran's
[[Page H5233]]
nuclear program, and said that Iraq was prepared to
facilitate the negotiations, Western officials said Thursday.
In a meeting in early July with the American ambassador in
Baghdad, Mr. Maliki suggested that he was relaying a message
from Iranian officials and asserted that Hassan Rouhani,
Iran's incoming president, would be serious about any
discussions with the United States, according to accounts of
the meeting.
Although Mr. Maliki indicated that he had been in touch
with confidants of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, he did not disclose precisely whom he was dealing
with on the Iranian side. Some Western officials remain
uncertain whether Iran's leaders have sought to use Iraq as a
conduit or whether the idea is mainly Mr. Maliki's
initiative.
State Department officials declined to comment on Mr.
Maliki's move or what steps the United States might have
taken in response. American officials have said since the
beginning of the Obama administration that they would be open
to direct talks with Iran.
``Iraq is a partner of the United States and we are in
regular conversations with Iraqi officials about a full range
of issues of mutual interest, including Iran,'' said Patrick
Ventrell, a State Department spokesman. ``As we have
repeatedly said, we are open to direct talks with Iran in
order to resolve the international community's concerns about
Iran's nuclear program.''
Gary Samore, who served as the senior aide on
nonproliferation issues at the National Security Council
during President Obama's first term in office, said that it
was plausible that Iran would use Iraq to send a message
about its willingness to discuss nuclear issues.
``The Iranians see Maliki as somebody they have some trust
in,'' said Mr. Samore, who is the director of the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard.
``From Maliki's standpoint, it would serve a number of
different purposes. He does not want to be squeezed between
Washington and Tehran.''
In a separate move on Thursday, the State and Treasury
Departments announced that the United States was expanding
the list of medical devices, like dialysis machines, that
could be sold to Iran without a license.
In a conference call with reporters, David Cohen, the under
secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said that
the move was intended to ``accelerate trade'' in these
medical devices and address humanitarian needs in Iran. The
announcement was also seen by many observers as a good-will
gesture before Mr. Rouhani prepares to take office in Tehran
on Aug. 4.
Direct talks have the potential to ratchet down some of the
pressure on President Obama over one of his greatest foreign
policy challenges, the buildup of Iran's nuclear program.
Mr. Obama has said that he will not permit Iran to have a
nuclear weapon and has asserted that the use of military
force is an option. Israeli officials have staked out a far
tougher position, asserting that Iran should not be allowed
to have the ability to build a weapon--and that the United
States should do more to convince the Iranians that its
threat to use force is credible. Israel has not ruled out
military action of its own.
International sanctions have taken a serious toll on the
Iranian economy and have helped bring Iran to the negotiating
table, but have not yet extracted significant concessions
from Iran on its nuclear program. For years, the United
States and its partners--Britain, France, Germany, Russia and
China--have met on and off with Iranian officials in a
dialogue that has become known as the ``P5 plus 1'' talks.
Nonproliferation experts continue to argue that it is
difficult to make major headway in such a committeelike
forum, and that if progress is to be made, it will have to
happen in private one-on-one discussions between Iranian
officials and the Obama administration.
Whether Iran is genuinely interested in such talks,
however, has been a subject of debate. In 2009, William J.
Burns, then the under secretary of state for political
affairs, met with Saeed Jalili, the Iranian nuclear
negotiator, on the margins of the ``P5 plus 1'' talks. They
agreed in principle that a portion of Iran's enriched uranium
could be used to make fuel for Tehran's research center,
which would preclude that material from being further
enriched to make nuclear weapons.
But that deal fell through after Ayatollah Khamenei
objected, and there have been no direct talks since. In a
meeting this month with Iran's departing president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Khamenei was sharply critical of the
American stance.
``The Americans are unreliable and illogical, and are not
honest in their approach,'' Ayatollah Khamenei said. But he
also said that he did not oppose talks ``on certain issues.''
Even if direct talks are agreed to they are almost certain
to be tough.
``The establishment of a bilateral channel is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for coming to an agreement,''
Mr. Samore said. ``They want a nuclear weapons capability,
and we want to deny them a nuclear weapons capability.
Finding a compromise between those two objectives is going to
be very difficult.''
Mr. Maliki, Western officials said, is not the only Iraqi
politician who has encouraged a dialogue between the United
States and Iran. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of a major Shiite
party in Iraq, is also said to have made that point.
During the war in Iraq, Iraqi officials also urged direct
dealings between the United States and Iran.
Talks were held in Baghdad, but they were focused on the
conflict in Iraq and Iran's support for Shiite militias
there--not the nuclear question--and got nowhere.
Mr. Maliki's government appears to have been aligned with
Iran on some issues, like its support for President Bashar
al-Assad of Syria. Iranian aircraft have ferried huge
quantities of arms through Iraqi airspace. Iraqi officials
have asserted that they do not have the means to stop the
flights, but Mr. Maliki has also been concerned that Mr.
Assad's fall will lead to an escalation of Sunni challenges
to his government in Iraq.
American officials have repeatedly said that Mr. Maliki is
not a pawn of Iran and that the United States should try to
expand its influence in Iraq, including by selling arms.
____
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, July 19, 2013.
President Barack Obama,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear President Obama: As Members of Congress who share your
unequivocal commitment to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, we
urge you to pursue the potential opportunity presented by
Iran's recent presidential election by reinvigorating U.S.
efforts to secure a negotiated nuclear agreement.
As you know, on June 14 the Iranian people elected Hassan
Rouhani president with over 50 percent of the vote in the
first round, overcoming repression and intimidation by the
Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform.
Dr. Rouhani campaigned on the promise to ``pursue a policy of
reconciliation and peace'' and has since promised
``constructive interaction with the outside world.'' As
Iran's former lead nuclear negotiator, he has also publicly
expressed the view that obtaining a nuclear weapon would run
counter to Iran's strategic interests and has been critical
of the nuclear ``extremism'' of outgoing President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad.
We are mindful of the limitations of the Iranian presidency
within the country's political system, of the fact that
previous Iranian presidents elected on platforms of
moderation have failed to deliver on promised reforms, and of
the mixed signals that Dr. Rouhani himself has sent regarding
Iran's nuclear ambitions. It remains to be seen whether his
election will indeed bring significant change with regard to
Iran's relations with the outside world. His government's
actions will certainly speak louder than his words.
Even so, we believe it would be a mistake not to test
whether Dr. Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity
for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement on
Iran's nuclear program that ensures the country does not
acquire a nuclear weapon. In order to test this proposition,
it will be prudent for the United States to utilize all
diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks. In
addition, bilateral and multilateral sanctions must be
calibrated in such a way that they induce significant and
verifiable concessions from Iran at the negotiating table in
exchange for their potential relaxation.
We must also be careful not to preempt this potential
opportunity by engaging in actions that delegitimize the
newly elected president and weaken his standing relative to
hardliners within the regime who oppose his professed
``policy of reconciliation and peace.'' Likewise, it will be
critical for the United States to continue its efforts to
foster unprecedented international cooperation on this issue
so that the international community remains united in its
opposition to Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.
We look forward to working with your Administration on this
important issue in the months ahead.
Sincerely,
Charles Dent,
David Price,
Members of Congress.
List of Cosigners (131)
Dent, Charles (PA-15); Price, David (NC-04); Barber, Ron
(AZ-02); Bass, Karen (CA-37); Becerra, Xavier (CA-34); Bera,
Ami (CA-07); Bishop, Sanford (GA-02); Bishop, Tim (NY-01);
Blumenauer, Earl (OR-03); Bonamici, Suzanne (OR-01);
Bordallo, Madeleine (GU); Braley, Bruce (IA-01); Bustos,
Cheri (IL-17); Campbell, John (CA-45); Capps, Lois (CA-24).
Capuano, Michael (MA-07); Cardenas, Tony (CA-29); Carson,
Andre (IN-07); Cartwright, Matthew (PA-17); Christensen,
Donna (VI); Clay, William Lacy (MO-01); Cleaver, Emanuel (MO-
05); Clyburn, James (SC-06); Coble, Howard (NC-06); Cohen,
Steve (TN-09); Cole, Tom (OK-04); Connolly, Gerald (VA-11);
Conyers, John (MI-13); Courtney, Joe (CT-02); Cuellar, Henry
(TX-28).
Cummings, Elijah (MD-07); Davis, Danny (IL-07); DeFazio,
Peter (OR-04); DeGette, Diana (CO-01); DeLauro, Rosa (CT-03);
DelBene, Suzan (WA-01); Dingell, John (MI-12); Doggett, Lloyd
(TX-35); Doyle, Michael (PA-14); Duckworth, Tammy (IL-08);
Duffy, Sean (WI-07); Duncan, Jr., John (TN-02); Edwards,
Donna (MD-04); Ellison, Keith (MN-05); Enyart, William (IL-
12).
Eshoo, Anna (CA-18); Esty, Elizabeth (CT-05); Farr, Sam
(CA-20); Fattah, Chaka (PA-02); Fitzpatrick, Michael (PA-08);
Fortenberry, Jeff (NE-01); Foster, Bill (IL-11);
[[Page H5234]]
Garamendi, John (CA-03); Grijalva, Raul (AZ-03); Grimm,
Michael (NY-11); Gutierrez, Luis (IL-04); Hanna, Richard (NY-
22); Hastings, Alcee (FL-20); Heck, Denny (WA-10); Higgins,
Brian (NY-26).
Himes, James (CT-04); Holt, Rush (NJ-12); Honda, Michael
(CA-17); Jackson Lee, Sheila (TX-18); Johnson, Eddie B. (TX-
30); Johnson, Hank (GA-04); Jones, Walter (NC-03); Kaptur,
Marcy (OH-09); Kelly, Robin (IL-02); Kind, Ron (WI-03);
Kuster, Ann (NH-02); Larsen, Rick (WA-02); Larson, John (CT-
01); Lee, Barbara (CA-13); Lewis, John (GA-05).
Loebsack, David (IA-02); Lofgren, Zoe (CA-19); Lujan, Ben
Ray (NM-03); Lujan Grisham, Michelle (NM-01); Matheson, Jim
(UT-04); McCollum, Betty (MN-04); McDermott, Jim (WA-07);
McGovern, James P. (MA-02); Meeks, Gregory W. (NY-05);
Miller, George (CA-11); Moore, Gwen (WI-04); Moran, James P.
(VA-08); Napolitano, Grace F. (CA-32); Neal, Richard E. (MA-
01); Nolan, Richard (MN-08).
Norton, Eleanor Holmes (DC); Nugent, Richard B. (FL-11);
O'Rourke, Beto (TX-16); Pascrell, Bill, Jr. (NJ-09); Pastor,
Ed (AZ-07); Payne, Donald M., Jr. (NJ-10); Perlmutter, Ed
(CO-07); Peters, Scott H. (CA-52); Peterson, Collin C. (MN-
07); Petri, Thomas E. (WI-06); Pingree, Chellie (ME-01);
Pocan, Mark (WI-02); Polis, Jared (CO-02); Rahall, Nick J.,
II (WV-03); Rangel, Charles B. (NY-13).
Roybal-Allard, Lucille (CA-40); Ruiz, Raul (CA-36); Runyan,
Jon (NJ-03); Rush, Bobby L. (IL-01); Ryan, Tim (OH-13);
Sablan, Gregorio Kilili Camacho (MP); Schakowsky, Janice D.
(IL-09); Scott, Robert C. ``Bobby'' (VA-03); Serrano, Jose E.
(NY-15); Shea-Porter, Carol (NH-01); Sinema, Kyrsten (AZ-09);
Slaughter, Louise McIntosh (NY-25).
Speier, Jackie (CA-14); Takano, Mark (CA-41); Thompson,
Glenn (PA-05); Thompson, Mike (CA-05); Tiberi, Patrick (OH-
12); Tierney, John (MA-06); Tonko, Paul (NY-20); Tsongas,
Niki (MA-03); Visclosky, Peter (IN-01); Walz, Timothy (MN-
01); Waters, Maxine (CA-43); Welch, Peter (VT-At Large);
Whitfield, Ed (KY-01); Yarmuth, John (KY-03).
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
I rise in strong support of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act
of 2013.
It's been a pleasure working with Chairman Royce to craft this
bipartisan legislation, which, by the way, passed unanimously in the
Foreign Affairs Committee. Every Republican, every Democrat voted
``yes'' on this. It now has more than 370 cosponsors. We share the goal
of preventing a nuclear-capable Iran, and I could not ask for a better
partner than Mr. Royce in this effort.
Mr. Speaker, I think all of us agree that a nuclear-capable Iran
would pose a grave threat to the U.S., a threat to our allies in the
region, and a threat to the future of the global nonproliferation
regime. All of us are aware that Iran has violated numerous U.N.
Security Council resolutions and repeatedly blocked IAEA inspectors
seeking to investigate its nuclear program.
After many years of deceit and stonewalling by the Iranian regime, I
continue to hold out hope that we can achieve a peaceful resolution of
the Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomatic means. But time is
growing short. According to the IAEA, Iran is installing advanced
centrifuges to enrich more uranium and continues to build a heavy water
reactor that could produce plutonium.
We must not allow the Iranians to play the same old game, engaging in
endless negotiations with no results while continuing to advance the
nuclear program. That's why we must continue to pursue a two-track
approach to Iran, one that incorporates both pressure and negotiations.
The legislation before us today will significantly ratchet up the
pressure and hopefully give our diplomats the leverage they need to
persuade Iran that its only viable option is to end its pursuit of
nuclear weapons.
Among other things, this bill seeks to cut Iran's oil exports by
another 1 million barrels a day, a reduction of two-thirds from current
levels. It also strengthens existing sanctions by authorizing the
President to restrict significant commercial trade with Iran.
In addition, the bill seeks to deny the Iranian regime hard currency
by enhancing efforts to cut off Iran's access to euros.
Finally, the legislation imposes new sanctions against Iranian
shipping ports and expands existing sanctions against Iranian human
rights violators.
Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues argue that we should delay
sanctions until after the new President of Iran takes office. I
respectfully disagree. I know they share the goal of preventing a
nuclear-capable Iran, but I believe we should take a different
approach.
Our efforts to impose new sanctions should not be based on the
Iranian political calendar. In my view, the paramount consideration
should be the Iranian nuclear clock, the nuclear calendar, the amount
of time it will take Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
I have no reason to believe that the results of the recent Iranian
election will fundamentally alter Iran's current course. The unelected
supreme leader, the Ayatollah, remains the one true decision-maker at
the pinnacle of the regime. And president-elect Rouhani, who was
directly involved in efforts to deceive the international community
when he served as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, made clear during
the campaign that he supports Iran's nuclear ambitions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.
If Rouhani truly has the willing authority to make a bold gesture on
Iran's nuclear program, like suspending enrichment, he has a small
window of opportunity before this bill becomes law. I think all of us
would welcome such a gesture, but I'm not holding my breath.
In closing, I would like to reiterate that by strengthening sanctions
we are not calling for an end of diplomacy. After many years of
fruitless negotiations, it is clear that talks will only succeed if the
regime feels pressure to change course. That is what we are trying to
accomplish with this legislation today.
I look forward to working with Chairman Royce to ensure that the
strongest possible sanctions are enacted into law, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Price).
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant
opposition to this measure before us today.
I have supported the repeated rounds of sanctions that Congress has
already enacted. I have supported them because of the threat of a
nuclear-armed Iran and because of the intransigence of the Iranian
Government in defiance of the international community.
These sanctions have brought the Iranian economy to its knees, they
have yet to produce meaningful concessions by the Iranian Government. I
have thus remained open to the possibility of additional sanctions as
part of a broader strategy to induce the Iranian Government to change
its course.
But the bill before us today could not come at a worse time. In 3
days, Iran will inaugurate a new President, Hassan Rouhani, elected on
promises of moderation and openness despite repression and intimidation
by the Iranian regime, trying to deny him that election.
Since his election, Dr. Rouhani has made repeated overtures to the
international community, signaling his intent to resume the stalled P-
5+1 nuclear talks upon taking office and promising greater transparency
and confidence-building measures. He reportedly intends to appoint as
his foreign minister a seasoned diplomat who favors closer ties with
the West.
Let us be clear: we do not know whether Rouhani truly intends to
follow through on these promises. We don't know if he'll be able to
overcome the resistance of Iran's hardliners. We do know that history
counsels us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change in
Iran, and Rouhani's actions will surely speak louder than his words.
But to rush through a new round of sanctions before the new President
has even taken office could slam the window of opportunity shut before
we even have a chance to test whether it is genuine.
A recent letter to the President signed by a group of respected
former diplomats and military officials--including Ambassador Tom
Pickering and the former commander of CENTCOM, General Joseph Hoar--has
warned that further sanctions ``could empower hardliners, in the
Iranian Government, who are opposed to nuclear concessions, at the
expense of those seeking to shift policy in a more moderate
direction.''
Moreover, by removing the President's authority to relax sanctions on
countries that are cooperating with
[[Page H5235]]
our strategy toward Iran, this bill risks shattering the unprecedented
international coalition which we have worked so hard to build, thus
making sanctions less effective than they are at this moment.
Some argue that we should not be concerned about the House passing
this bill, since it will be some time before the Senate follows with an
improved bill, and longer still before the new sanctions take effect. I
must say, that is not a very compelling argument for rushing this bill
to the floor right now. Why not act when we can assess the diplomatic
prospects more accurately?
Mr. Speaker, I will take a back seat to no one when it comes to my
concern about the threat posed by a nuclear Iran to our ally Israel, to
the broader Middle East, and to the United States.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional minute to the
gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I will yield to no one in my concerns
about these matters. I believe we must redouble our efforts to secure
an enforceable agreement that ensures Iran does not acquire a nuclear
weapon.
But sanctions alone are not a strategy. In order to be effective,
they must be integrated into a broader strategy that brings all other
elements of American power to bear on the challenge. The administration
is working hard to advance such a strategy, with unprecedented
cooperation from our international partners.
If the strategy fails to induce the new Iranian Government to change
its course, then new sanctions may, indeed, be warranted. But to pass
them now only undercuts our Nation's strategic objectives.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this ill-timed bill.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Cantor), the esteemed majority leader.
Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Nuclear Iran
Prevention Act.
I want to commend the gentleman from California, chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Committee, in his leadership in bringing this bill to
the floor. I also would like to commend Congressman Engel for his
leadership in working through this issue bringing forward this piece of
legislation.
The authoritarian regime in Iran is a brutal theocracy that
suppresses dissent at home and sponsors terrorism and chaos abroad. For
years, our State Department has listed Iran as the world's leading
state sponsor of terrorism, and many Americans have lost their lives at
the hands of Iranian-backed killers. In a bid to establish reasonable
dominance, Iran foments instability in neighboring countries and is a
co-belligerent in Bashar Assad's ruthless war against the Syrian
people. Despite rhetoric that may lead some to a contrary conclusion,
this is the nature of a regime that continues its headlong effort to
acquire nuclear weapons capability.
Like all Americans, I want to see Iran abandon its nuclear
aspirations through peaceful negotiations, but its leaders must
understand the path they are on now will only lead to more condemnation
and pressure.
Considering that Iran continues to flagrantly violate numerous U.N.
Security Council resolutions that call for the suspension of its
nuclear enrichment program, while denying inspectors access to
suspected nuclear sites, it is clear that Iran has negotiated again and
again in bad faith. America's policies must be based on facts and not
some hope about a new government perhaps in Iran that somehow will
change the nature of the clerical regime in Tehran. We must respond to
Iran's policies and behavior, not to its rhetoric.
This act will strengthen the sanctions already in place and provide
the President with new economic tools to pressure Iran to change course
before it is too late.
{time} 1715
Strengthening these measures will help our diplomatic efforts to
encourage Tehran to become a responsible member of the international
community and, once and for all, to abandon its pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
Again, I want to thank the gentleman from California, the gentleman
from New York, and the rest of the Foreign Affairs Committee for their
hard work on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support this
legislation.
Mr. ELLISON. May I inquire as to the time we have remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota has 12\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York has 6\1/2\ minutes
remaining, and the gentleman from California has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. ELLISON. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Moran).
Mr. MORAN. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota, my friend.
Mr. Speaker, 29 prominent policymakers and experts who understand
Iran and international relations, which includes former CENTCOM
Commander, Ambassador Tom Pickering, stated in a letter to President
Obama just 2 weeks ago: ``No further sanctions should be imposed or
considered at this time.''
There were 131 bipartisan Representatives who also urged the
President to test the opportunity presented by Iran's recent election
to avoid actions that could delegitimize the democratic election that
just took place in Iran, because the fact is that the Iranian people
rejected the very cleric of government that we have all opposed that
has been defined by hostile actions against the United States. In fact,
when Mr. Rouhani was running, the people of Iran knew he was a former
nuclear negotiator, and he promised greater nuclear transparency and to
pursue, in his words, peace and reconciliation with the outside world.
Isn't that just what we are looking for?
I can't imagine we are looking for another war of choice, that we
want to escalate the rhetoric. This is the best opportunity we have had
in at least 8 years, if not more. Why throw that away?
Now, some will say, ``Well, what we do in the House doesn't really
matter. The Senate isn't going to do anything,'' but that's a nuance.
We may understand why the House is acting, but the rest of the world
doesn't likely understand what's going on here.
The fact is that this bill empowers the very hard-liners who are the
problem. The Iranian people are extraordinarily diverse. In fact, they
used to be America's best friend in the Muslim world, and they just
rejected a government that represented all of the things we oppose, and
they did it democratically. I can't imagine that we have to operate in
such a vacuum that we are going to continue to impose sanctions, that
we are going to take away the President's ability to exercise leverage
in those negotiations, and that, in fact, we are even going to lay it
on further by taking away the exemption for necessary food and
medicine.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. MORAN. This is destructive because it punishes the Iranian people
and empowers the hard-liners. We have no problem with punishing the
clerical government and many of the people in the military. They don't
represent our values, but we want the Iranian people to seize
democracy, to represent our values, to enter into negotiations. We've
got to be able to bring about a more peaceful and productive world.
So I would strongly urge this House to hold off. Let the new
President at least be inaugurated. Let him at least take over. Let's
see what we can do. Let's not act so prematurely and destructively.
Mr. ROYCE. At this time, Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the Speaker
of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner).
Mr. BOEHNER. Let me thank my colleague from California--the chairman
of the committee--and his whole committee for their hard work on this
issue, and a special thanks to the chairman emeritus of the committee,
my colleague from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), on whose efforts we are
building today.
I also want to thank the committee chairs and the members who have
worked so hard to get this bill to the floor today.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran
Prevention Act. This legislation recognizes a stark
[[Page H5236]]
truth, and that is that Iran is a global menace, and this bill empowers
the President to act decisively to address it.
We know Iran is the world's most aggressive sponsor of terrorism,
extending now into Syria, Libya, Lebanon, even into our hemisphere. We
know that Iran is attempting to build an illicit nuclear weapons
capability in willful defiance of both the U.N. Security Council and
the IAEA, and we know the Supreme Leader and the Ayatollahs remain
committed to the destruction of Israel, one of our dearest allies.
The United States, especially its Congress, has a duty to respond to
Iran's actions, not to its rhetoric, so this bill seeks to reduce
Iran's oil exports by an additional 1 million barrels a day, which
would be a two-thirds reduction from its current levels. We are also
looking to target human rights violators, to close loopholes on access
to hard foreign currency, and we will give the President the authority
to restrict significant commercial trade with Iran. These strong and
targeted sanctions will ensure that the administration has both the
political and the economic tools to deal with this regime.
Because the American people are not interested in allowing Iran
another shot at running out the clock on negotiations while it marches
toward developing a breakout of nuclear capability, I will cast my vote
for this measure, and I would urge all of my House colleagues to join
me.
Mr. ENGEL. It is my pleasure now to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
minority whip, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in support of this legislation, but I also thank my friend
Keith Ellison for his perspective on this, and I want to speak to that
as well. I want to thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for
their leadership on this bill.
Mr. Speaker, I believe the most dangerous threat to peace and
stability in the Middle East continues to be that posed by Iran's
pursuit of nuclear weapons, which would launch this turbulent region
into a nuclear arms race that no one can afford to risk, including our
troops in the region. Time and again, Security Council resolutions
after Security Council resolutions, Iran has refused to heed the
international community's warnings, and it has, instead, continued
along a path toward the bomb, choosing isolation over integration.
We are here today to talk about how to stop Iran's pursuit. As a
government, we have many tools to use. Diplomacy is one and diplomacy
must continue. Indeed, many feel the time is right to test President-
elect Rouhani's sincerity, and I agree, but he must expect us to turn
his positive talk of a policy of reconciliation and peace into action.
We should welcome and pursue his willingness to come to the table to
negotiate. We need to test that, but delay has been too long for us not
to pursue concurrent approaches. That tool of economic pressure, which
is working, should also be pursued additionally. That is why I support
this resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I thank him for his
thoughtfulness.
Hopefully, negotiations will prove successful and such pressure can
be either moderated or removed. President-elect Rouhani campaigned on a
promise to ease the burden of sanctions on the Iranian people, and he
won. We would welcome a second victory for him and the United Nations
in seeing that objective of denuclearization realized.
I support today's bill because I believe a robust sanctions regime
could help encourage Iran to abandon its pursuit of the bomb and to end
its support for terrorist groups and human rights abuses. President-
elect Rouhani is uniquely positioned, I believe, to show leadership on
this and achieve early success in his new administration.
However, our skepticism about the Iranian leadership's action in the
past has been more than justified, but we must nevertheless continue to
work for a resolution of this challenging issue. Engaging President-
elect Rouhani in our quest for early resolution is appropriate, but
these sanctions are also appropriate. Therefore, I rise in their
support.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism.
Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, in February, I joined with our ranking member and our
chairman and others in introducing this legislation, which passed our
committee unanimously.
Congress needs to act now because, while we go on summer break, new,
faster centrifuges will be spinning 24-7-365. We are seeing Iran, as
we've seen in hearings before our committee, evade the current
sanctions. So, if we're going to keep the sanctions in force, we need
this legislation to plug the loopholes that they are exploiting.
Two facts remain unchanged by the Iranian elections: first, their
program to create nuclear weapons continues; and second, the supreme
leader, not the newly elected President, is making the decisions.
Our committee adopted many amendments unanimously, including four of
mine, and two I'd like to mention: one provides sanctions for those who
sell uranium mining equipment to Iran, and another imposes sanctions on
those who sell them dissident-suppressing technology.
Those who oppose this bill need to come to the floor and say why Iran
needs uranium mining equipment and dissident-suppressing technology.
Let's pass this bill.
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you.
Mr. Speaker, we have heard on the floor that we shouldn't base our
diplomacy on the Iranian political calendar--I agree--but we shouldn't
base our diplomacy and our foreign policy based on our political
calendar.
Recently, we enacted the most effective, crippling economic sanctions
against Iran--ever--and it was done by the hard work of the
administration, supported by Congress, to be able to mobilize an
unprecedented coalition of people who agreed with us that they wanted
to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons and sending that signal.
But sadly, you can forget about President-elect Rouhani. This weakens
President Obama. The optics now are to pull the rug out from underneath
the newly elected moderate candidate. He's not my guy, he's not yours,
but of the choices, it was a signal by the Iranian people.
Think about the future tools. Are you really going to be able to
ratchet up these sanctions much more dramatically? Do you expect China
and Japan are going to follow that path? And, if they work, what about
the dislocations to the American economy and the global economy in
moving this oil off the market? I think people ought to consider that.
Ultimately, the only solution is a diplomatic solution to try and work
this through. We're not going to go to war and nuclear bomb them. We
are not going to occupy Iran.
It's ironic. Until recently--maybe still--Iran is the only country in
the Middle East that had a positive view of Americans despite the fact
that we helped the British overthrow their popularly elected President,
Mossadegh, in 1953 and install the Shah as a dictator to rule over
them.
{time} 1730
I think there is a possibility that that recent election makes a
difference in Iran. I hope it does. But one way to guarantee that it
doesn't is to tell the Iranian people, We don't care what you do. We're
going to rachet up the sanctions. We're going to undercut the new guy.
We're going to tell you that we're just going to go down this path. It
ought to be based on facts, on reason. Let these sanctions work. Don't
undercut our President and the ability to be flexible if there is some
daylight. Don't poke the Iranian people in the eye and ignore the sorry
history we've had of fumbling the relationship with that country.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to
the Democratic leader, Ms. Pelosi.
[[Page H5237]]
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank you for
the time and for your leadership as the ranking member on the Foreign
Affairs Committee.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reiterate my strong belief that one of
the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy is to build a world free of
nuclear weapons. I applauded President Jimmy Carter at his inauguration
in 1977 on a cold January day; I saluted President Reagan when he made
his visit to Reykjavik, Iceland; and the commitment that many of our
Presidents have made, including President Obama on this score.
One of the pillars of our foreign policy must be to end the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; that is, to get rid of
them. To meet that task today, our actions must be clear and our
commitment must be unwavering. It must be to continue this policy of
the United States to prevent any country from developing a nuclear
weapons capability. That is why I offer my support for this bill today,
the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act.
This legislation recognizes that an Iran with a nuclear weapon would
be an urgent threat to regional security and to global security, and,
therefore, to the security of the United States of America. This
measure builds on the progress made in 2010 when we enacted the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. That
law imposed sanctions to companies that sell Iran technology, services,
know-how, and materials for its energy sector. It was the strongest
Iran sanctions legislation ever passed by the Congress, but we must do
more.
With President Obama's strong, clear, and effective leadership, with
broad bipartisan backing for a comprehensive strategy to halt Iran's
nuclear program, we are seeing the results of the actions we have
taken. More and more, Iran is being cut off from the financial system.
Iran's oil is coming off the market. Iran's partners are cutting off
ties of trade, business, and commerce. That's the way I think we should
get this done, with economic sanctions.
In short, Iran is feeling the bite of our sanctions, but we must keep
the pressure on. Iran's nuclear pursuits continue. Iran's leaders
refuse to change their approach and their policies. Iran's neighbors
still feel the threat of the regime's declarations and actions. So our
message must remain firm: Iran must suspend uranium enrichment, return
to the negotiating table, and abandon its reckless pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
Now I appreciate and I have listened carefully and have the highest
respect for Mr. McGovern and others, Mr. Ellison, who are opposing the
resolution and have a different idea. I think as we weigh the equities,
as they say, with all due respect to that approach, which I think is a
reasonable one if we were dealing with a reasonable country with a
reasonable leadership, but we are not.
I know that the proximity to Israel is a cause for concern for
Israel, our partner in the Middle East, and a concern for those of us
who value the Israel-U.S. relationship. Israel has proximity, but we
all have the problem. If Iran were to go farther in the development of
a nuclear weapon, who else would want one in the region? What message
does that send about our resolve to arrive at a world free of nuclear
weapons?
Anyway, I hope, as our colleagues say, a new regime is going to do
all these things. I happen to think that no matter who is in power in
Iran, that they probably would not abandon a nuclear program, calling
it one for domestic and civilian use. That may be true. I hope it is.
But I do think it is really important for us, because we have to make
this opportunity--I hope that the inauguration of a new President,
talks with the U.S. and the European allies and all the rest, can bear
fruit. We can only hope that those reports prove true. We hope that
progress is made toward an agreement that puts an end to Iran's pursuit
of nuclear weapons and advances the cause of peace and security in the
Middle East and around the world. Until that day comes, the Congress
must continue to apply pressure. We must pursue all avenues of
diplomacy and international leadership.
Again, what are the pillars of our foreign policy? To promote our
economy, the creation of jobs by promoting exports--that's on the
economic side; export our values, the commitment to freedom and
democracy throughout the world. What does that mean? To protect the
American people and our national security. An important part of that
pillar of our foreign policy is to rid the world of weapons of mass
destruction and make sure that we're not adding countries to that club.
For that reason, we must prevent a nuclear armed Iran. Let's do it
diplomatically. Let's do it with economic sanctions. Let's do it by
encouraging dialogue, engagement, and the rest. But let's do that
engagement from strength.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on the resolution.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), the chairman emeritus of the Foreign
Affairs Committee and the author of the previous Iran sanctions
legislation.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Speaker, a nuclear Iran is one of our biggest national security
threats and the number one existential threat to our ally, the
democratic Jewish State of Israel. We cannot and must not allow Iran,
who is a designated state sponsor of terrorism, to reach nuclear
breakout capability.
The Obama administration should not be mistaken. The Iranian regime
does not want peace. It still wants to wipe Israel off the map. Iran
may be able to process low-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by
next year.
Iran has agreed to offer Syria a $3.6 billion credit facility to buy
oil products to help keep Assad's murderous regime afloat. Iran
supports and fights alongside Assad's forces, brutally slaughtering
thousands of Syrians. Rouhani has no intention of changing Iran's
dangerous path, and the ultimate decisionmaker in this oppressive
regime remains the Ayatollah Khamenei, who has a blatant hatred of us
and our allies.
This bill includes my amendment that would eliminate the authority to
waive sanctions against persons who are guilty of the most egregious
activities in direct support of the Iranian regime's nuclear program.
This is a commonsense provision. This is a strong bill, and I urge
all of my colleagues to fully support its passage
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I have great respect for Chairman Royce
and Ranking Member Engel and incredible respect for my Democratic
leaders and the Republican leaders who have spoken in favor of this
bill. But I must rise in opposition to H.R. 850.
This Sunday on August 4, Iran will inaugurate a new President, Hassan
Rouhani. It is a moment that allows President Obama, Secretary of State
Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, and the international community an
opportunity to reengage with Iran on key issues of concern, most
importantly the development of Iran's capacity to develop and launch a
nuclear weapon.
This may be a very small window of opportunity for a fresh start on
dialogue and action on the future of a nuclear Iran. It may be short-
lived, depending on how Iran's new President views this moment. But it
is a time when I, for one, want to support the White House, the State
Department, and the Pentagon's ability to move forward our relationship
and dialogue with Iran on this most serious matter.
It is not the moment for Congress to increase and expand the level of
U.S. sanctions against Iran. We have plenty of sanctions right now
against Iran. If for some reason we need to increase even further the
pressure against Iran and its new President, then we have the time to
do so. It does not need to be done before the new Iranian President
even takes office. We have time to weigh his sincerity and, more
importantly, his actions to improve Iran's relations with the
international community in the weeks and months to come. If he does
not, if Iran remains intransigent and determined to develop a nuclear
weapon, then the current onerous regimen of sanctions can be increased.
But now is not the time to undermine U.S. diplomacy before it even has
a chance to take shape.
Like all my House colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I'm
skeptical that President-elect Rouhani will change the course of Iran's
nuclear development, but I am willing to give him a chance. I'm willing
to give Secretary
[[Page H5238]]
Kerry a chance. If nothing changes, then we can revisit this bill or
others at a later date. But not now.
I urge all of my colleagues to join me and vote against the untimely
consideration of this bill.
Mr. ENGEL. At this time, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.
(Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I
rise in support of the measure that is being offered.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global
Health, and Global Human Rights.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, first of all, let me thank
Chairman Royce for offering this urgent and necessary bill, and Eliot
Engel for his good cooperation on this important bill.
The Iranian government is estimated to be a little more than a year
away from developing nuclear weapons, an unprecedented and absolutely
unacceptable threat. Iran's repeated threats to annihilate Israel are
unconscionable and constitute a direct and public incitement to commit
genocide in violation of article III of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei speaks of Israel as a cancerous tumor,
calls for the annihilation and destruction of the Jewish state, and the
leveling of Tel Aviv and Haifa. These are not idle threats. President-
elect Rouhani, the past master of using negotiations as a cover to move
Iran's nuclear program forward, is now being presented as a moderate,
yet last year referred to Israel as the ``Great Zionist Satan.''
Mr. Speaker, this bill dramatically ramps up sanctions pushed so
effectively by Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen last Congress not only to
pressure Iran to negotiate, but also to mitigate Iran's emerging
capability to launch the genocidal war against Israel it has been
threatening for years.
This is a bipartisan bill, and it sends a clear, unmistakable message
to Iran that we mean business. Those loopholes need to be closed, and
Iran needs to be told that we want the sanctions to work. This tightens
those loopholes and moves us in that direction.
{time} 1745
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. McDermott)
(Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I am standing here asking: What's the
rush? The Iranian President is being sworn in in 4 days. For the first
time in years, there is a moderate who's been elected as head of Iran,
who promises us progress on the issues that are of most concern to us.
I'm not a blind optimist, and I have no illusions about the nature of
Iran's Government. I understand that one election won't ensure us
peace, but it could mean change, and we need to see what it looks like.
Experts and former military officers, including the Commander in Chief
of Central Command, warn that more sanctions right now will ``undercut
the new President and his pledged plan of moderation.'' It gives
ammunition to the hardliners who will operate against him. So the
timing of this bill could not be worse from a foreign policy
perspective.
In addition, Members have not had a chance to fully review the bill,
which is significantly different than when it was marked up coming out
of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The marked-up version became public
only a few days ago, and I know that many Members who cosponsored the
original bill are not aware of the changes made in it. For these
reasons, we sent a letter to our leadership asking, along with 15 other
Members, urging them to delay consideration until after September. We
could come back after our vacation and deal with this if it's really
needed. It doesn't have to happen now, except because we're going out
on Friday.
Passing this legislation would support the hardliners' claims that we
have no intention of negotiating; we hit the President before he even
sits down in the chair. It's a dangerous sign to send and it limits our
ability to find a diplomatic solution on nuclear arms in Iran.
There is no public support in this country for another war. We've
seen this movie before. We put sanctions on Iraq. I was here when they
put them on. I saw us squeeze them for 10 years. The World Health
Organization said 500,000 Iraqi kids died because we cut off medicine
and food and other essentials to the Iraq community. Did it end in a
change? No. We went to war with them. And if you think that this is
going to squeeze and bring us to war, and you think that what happened
in Iraq is going to happen here, remember we're 11 years in Iraq. And
we do not have a stable democracy today. We have a government that's
about to collapse.
What we think we can do by squeezing people--and you're squeezing
Iranian children today. Iranians cannot buy medicine on the world
market and pay because we have cut off all of the banking connections
everywhere so that there's no way for them to slip money through the
banking system to pay for medicine for kids.
We should delay this vote. Vote ``no.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has
expired.
Mr. ENGEL. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Schneider), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I want to thank the ranking member.
Mr. Speaker, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon through
sanctions and diplomatic pressure is one of the paramount issues of our
time, and I am appreciative that today we will continue this important
work to contain the threat.
The bill before us seeks to expand the instruments available to the
administration in implementing targeted sanctions against the Iranian
Government, while at the same time providing flexibility to relieve
undue burden on the population of Iran. I want to thank the chairman
and the ranking member and the committee for working diligently on this
bill, and I want to thank the members of the committee for joining me
in support of this bill.
Mr. ROYCE. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe),
the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation.
Mr. POE of Texas. This new so-called President of Iran is no
different than Ahmadinejad. Rouhani is no moderate; he's just slick. He
has lied to the United States in the past. Don't be deceived; he is not
even in charge of Iran.
The Ayatollah is in charge, and the Ayatollah picked all of the
candidates running for president. The Ayatollah is still running the
shots and is determined to get nuclear weapons and eliminate Israel and
then the United States. And then what? Are we going to say, Oops, we
made a mistake.
We need these sanctions. We need a regime change in Iran, a peaceful
one with the Iranian people. This Ayatollah has Hezbollah running all
over the world causing terror, including killing his own people in Camp
Liberty. We need to pass this legislation.
Mr. ENGEL. I am pleased to yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Al Green).
Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, with respect to all of my
colleagues and the various positions that are being put forth, I
support H.R. 850, a copy of which I happen to have in my hand; and I
would point to page 38, line 11, which deals with exceptions for the
sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices.
I wanted to bring some clarity to this issue.
With global security at risk, I don't think that we can take the
risk. I do believe that we can proceed with diplomacy and sanctions at
the same time. I support H.R. 850.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Arkansas (Mr. Cotton), who helped forge this legislation, H.R. 850.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. Speaker, Hassan Rouhani is no moderate. He was a
devoted follower of the 1979 revolutionary cabal in Iran. He led the
1999 crackdown on students in Iran. He's bragged about deceiving
Western nuclear inspectors. He's called Israel a Zionist Satan. He's
not even a President-elect because he was chosen in a sham democracy
and a sham election.
[[Page H5239]]
Iran isn't looking for a chance to get to ``yes'' in negotiations.
They are looking to give you a pretext to get to ``no'' on this
legislation. Stand strong and vote ``yes'' to sanction Iran to stop
their nuclear weapons capabilities.
Mr. ENGEL. At this time I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Deutch), the ranking member of the Middle East
Subcommittee.
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Chairman Royce and
Ranking Member Engel for working so hard to shepherd this bill through
the House in a bipartisan way.
This legislation before us today takes a significant step forward in
our efforts to prevent the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear
weapons capabilities. Sanctions passed by this House have had
devastating effects on the Iranian economy, and this legislation will
continue our efforts to financially squeeze the regime by dramatically
reducing Iran's oil exports and by diminishing Iran's ability to access
other currencies, all of this while ensuring that humanitarian aid will
continue to flow.
Despite claims made earlier, this does not cut off medicine for
children.
Beyond that, this bill recognizes that despite a somewhat surprising
outcome to the June presidential elections, the Iranian people are
still living under a regime that too often brutally represses
democratic ideals, and it imposes sanctions on those who aid the
regime's active violation of human rights.
To my friends who argue that this is the wrong time, I'd ask you to
consider this: newly elected President Rouhani is scheduled to be sworn
in in 4 days. He campaigned on economic sanctions relief. This relief
will only come when the Ayatollah, when the supreme leader, decides to
relinquish the nuclear weapons program. Now is the time to let
President-elect Rouhani's actions speak louder than his words. Let him
tell the supreme leader that the United States House of Representatives
has passed new, devastating sanctions, and the only way to relief is
through a negotiated end to the nuclear weapons program.
Our policy on Iran has always been dual track: sanctions and
diplomacy. Now is not the time to give up on either.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
We have to look at things as they really are, not as we wish them to
be. To my friends who say, What's the hurry? The hurry is we don't have
time to wait. While we're talking, centrifuges are spinning and Iran is
getting ever closer to having a nuclear weapon. By waiting, we're only
aiding and abetting them.
Mr. Rouhani is no moderate. Moderates were not allowed to run in this
Iranian election. He may be the least hard-core of all the hardliners;
but make no mistake about it, he was directly involved in efforts to
deceive the international community when he served as Iran's chief
nuclear negotiator. And he made clear during his campaign that he
supports Iran's nuclear ambitions.
This is a bipartisan bill, and for good reason we have over 370
cosponsors. I respectfully ask my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Speaker, the centrifuges are, indeed, spinning.
And it is Mr. Rouhani as chief negotiator who met the international
community with delay, with more centrifuges, more missiles, more
stonewalling. And as my colleagues have pointed out, during that
campaign he was the hand-picked candidate of the Ayatollah, one of
eight hand-picked candidates because reformers were not allowed to run,
was the one on the campaign who said--who boosted--about how he, as
chief negotiator in Iran, didn't suspend enrichment but instead
completed the program.
This is the individual who, when he chaired Iran's National Security
Council between 1989 and 2005, was at the table when Iran masterminded
the 1994 bombing of the Jewish center in Buenos Aires. He is the
individual who gave the order and boasted of it; the man who called on
the regime's besieging militia to attack the students in 1999 and crush
them, in his words, crush them mercilessly, crush them monumentally--a
thousand arrested; hundreds tortured; 70 disappeared; many, many
killed. This is the nature of that man. Do not misunderstand his
intentions. That's why we need this legislation.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, last week The Hill published a column
entitled ``Don't force an irresponsible vote on Iran sanctions.'' The
column started with the following two sentences: ``The House of
Representatives is under pressure to vote on a new Iran sanctions bill,
H.R. 850, before members leave town for August recess. Scheduling such
a vote would be irresponsible and highly counterproductive to U.S.
strategy on Iran.''
The authors of the column were not some peaceniks or pundits, but
experts with real life experiences in military, diplomacy and fighting
for a future of freedom for the people of Iran--Gen. (retired) Joseph
Hoar, former Commander in Chief of United States Central Command, Col.
(retired) Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to General Colin
Powell, and Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American
Council.
Today, the House of Representatives is advancing this ``irresponsible
and highly counterproductive'' bill to push Iran deeper into a state of
isolation and push the U.S. further away from a diplomatic resolution
to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Most disturbing, by severely
limiting diplomatic options for the U.S. and our international
partners, this bill advances the agenda of those who seek to once again
push the U.S. towards military confrontation. Our nation has been down
this irresponsible, dangerous and costly path before with the war in
Iraq and I completely reject the idea that war with Iran is inevitable
or a viable solution to this situation.
On August 3rd the new president of Iran, Dr. Hassan Rouhani, will
take office. Dr. Rouhani was elected as a moderate voice who campaigned
to ``pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation'' with the West. The
new president was Iran's former lead nuclear negotiator and was
critical of the nuclear ``extremism'' of his dangerous predecessor,
President Ahmadinejad. This is the absolute best opportunity and most
favorable conditions to proceed with a diplomatic course.
Just in the past month, I received over 100 calls, e-mails and
letters urging me to sign a letter to President Obama calling for a
renewed diplomatic effort with Iran's new leader.
On July 19th I joined 130 Democrats and Republicans in signing the
letter to Mr. Obama urging him ``to pursue the potential opportunity
presented by Iran's recent presidential election by reinvigorating U.S.
efforts to secure a negotiated nuclear agreement.'' Our letter goes on
to say, ``we believe it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr.
Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity for progress toward a
verifiable, enforceable agreement on Iran's nuclear program that
ensures the country does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In order to test
this proposition, it will be prudent for the United States to utilize
all diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks.''
H.R. 850 and its extreme sanctions takes the opposite course. It
sends the signal that the U.S. wishes to punish the Iranian people and
will only settle for submission, rather than a negotiated, face saving
solution that meets the security needs of the United States, Israel,
and the entire international community and the economic needs of the
Iranian people. This bill is a blunt instrument that harms U.S.
interests, undercuts President Obama, and gives no hope to the millions
of Iranians who look to the U.S. as a beacon of freedom and
inspiration.
Clearly there are no guarantees that diplomacy will work in the near
term and preventing a nuclear-armed Iran is an absolute. So, advancing
H.R. 850 and tougher sanctions can proceed at anytime in the months
ahead if Iran rejects negotiations or refuses to take tangible,
verifiable steps towards an agreement. The House could vote on this
bill in October or November, giving President Obama, our international
partners, and the new Iranian leadership a legitimate window of time to
seek peaceful progress.
This bill has 375 co-sponsors so there is absolute certainty that
this bill will pass and then Congress can go on its August recess. This
bill will not move in the U.S. Senate in the days ahead so nothing will
be accomplished by the passage of H.R. 850 other than some chest
pounding by politicians, the imposition of an embarrassing obstacle to
U.S. diplomats, and a victory for the hardliners in Iran who reject
negotiations as much as hardliners in this country.
Today, at this moment in time, this is a bill that harms U.S.
interests and I will vote against it.
Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express
concern about the decision to bring H.R. 850 to the floor for a vote
today. We must act strongly and strategically to prevent a nuclear-
armed Iran, and I believe diplomatic negotiations are currently the
best possible means at our disposal for achieving this goal.
Unfortunately, I am concerned that voting on H.R. 850 now may
undermine efforts to
[[Page H5240]]
achieve a peaceful, negotiated elimination of Iranian nuclear capacity.
At a time when a new Iranian President-elect has made statements
indicating a greater openness to diplomacy, returning this message with
a vote on tougher sanctions only serves to empower Iranian hardliners
and weaken Iranian moderates.
U.S. policy must make it clear that the goal of sanctions on Iran is
to elicit verifiable concessions from Iran that have a material impact
on its ability to develop a nuclear weapon. In order to achieve this
goal, the President must have the ability to waive sanctions in
exchange for Iranian concessions. Yet H.R. 850 places significant
restrictions on the President's authority to waive sanctions.
Mr. Speaker, while we must maintain a credible military threat
towards Iran, we must also make every effort to promote the success of
diplomatic negotiations with Iran. If we fail to negotiate a solution
that ensures the safety of the U.S. and our close ally Israel by
verifying that Iran does not have the capacity to develop nuclear
weapons, we will be left with few alternatives but military engagement.
I urge my colleagues to come together and support tough but fair
diplomacy with Iran.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 850, which
provides our diplomats the leverage they need to persuade Iran that the
only viable course of action is to suspend work on its nuclear program.
The bill restricts oil exports from Iran and cuts off various Iranian
industries from the global marketplace. It also expands sanctions on
Iranian human rights violators. Lastly, this bill provides flexibility
for the President to not apply sanctions when he deems it appropriate.
There is adequate time to test the willingness and ability of
President Rouhani to pursue good faith talks and reach an acceptable
resolution. That said, complete inaction could signal indifference or a
weakening of our resolve to pro-nuclear forces in Iran. Incoming
President Rouhani and the other regime leaders must be made to
understand that U.S. economic pressure and other sanctions will remain
in force until there is a reliable and verifiable halt to Iran's
nuclear program. Given Iran's progress in nuclear enrichment, time is
of the essence and Iran's past delaying tactics cannot be allowed to
continue.
As an original cosponsor of H.R. 850, I urge my colleagues to send a
strong, unequivocal message to the Iranian regime.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I am a co-sponsor of this legislation and I
urge my colleagues to support it today.
It is clear that the current regime in Iran poses troubling security
challenges to the world community and our allies in the Middle East.
The hateful and threatening comments made by the President of Iran
against Israel cannot be tolerated. Further, the provocative actions
taken by Iran to further their nuclear weapons program must be stopped.
A nuclear Iran would destabilize the region and threaten the United
States and our allies. Iran must alter its dangerous course, and the
United States needs to be fully involved to help bring this about.
I continue to support the Obama Administration's actions to seek a
diplomatic solution to Iran's unnecessary and unwise pursuit of nuclear
weapons. It is unacceptable for Iran to possess nuclear weapons.
However, despite having imposed some of the most stringent sanctions on
Iran ever, the United States and our international partners have thus
far been unable to compel Iran to abandon its quest for a nuclear
weapon. Accordingly, the House has no choice but to pass H.R. 850.
This bill would designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a
foreign terrorist organization, impose sanctions on specific Iranian
officials (i.e., the Supreme Leader, Guardians Council, MOIS, Quds
Force, etc.), and tie additional sanctions to human rights abuses. I
regret that the failure of Iran's government to change its course makes
this bill necessary, as many ordinary Iranians have already suffered
much as a result of the existing sanctions. We all want to see the
people of Iran freed from the tyranny and oppression of the current
clerical regime, but above all our greatest obligation is to prevent
Iran from building and fielding nuclear weapons. This bill, if enacted
into law, will hopefully bring us one step closer to that goal.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I, along with the Gentleman from Arkansas,
Mr. Cotton, recognize that this critical legislation requires countries
still purchasing oil from Iran to reduce their combined imports by 1
million barrels per day within a year. Iran's energy sector provides
the regime the resources needed to fund its nuclear weapons program. We
remain extremely concerned with the pace of Iran's nuclear program.
Some estimate that Iran may achieve a nuclear weapons breakout
capability next year.
For this reason, we remain committed to sending the toughest possible
sanctions bill to the President's desk, as quickly as possible.
Mr. GINGREY of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R.
850--the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013. As a cosponsor of this
important legislation, I would like to commend the bipartisan
leadership of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Royce of California
and Ranking Member Engel of New York on this issue.
Mr. Speaker, it goes without saying that our strongest ally in the
Middle East is the State of Israel. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us
to provide them with our unwavering support. In order to uphold this
commitment, we must stop Iran's nuclear proliferation efforts. That is
why I am pleased that from the outset of this legislation, the
statement of policy is absolutely clear when it states, ``It shall be
the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapons capability.''
Congress took an important step during 2012 to implement economic
sanctions on Iran through the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012. This important legislation punishes individuals who
knowingly sell more than 1,000,000 barrels of refined product, or
individuals that sell, lease, or provide Iran with goods, services,
technology, or information.
However, despite this effort, Iran's nuclear program has continued to
grow. It was reported today that Iran has an additional 5,000 new
centrifuges are ready to start operation to complement the existing
12,000 already in place. This comes on the heels of the International
Atomic Energy Agency's statement in June that Tehran was violating
international regulations by increasing the number of centrifuges. This
continued growth in Iran's nuclear proliferation is simply
unacceptable.
Mr. Speaker, while we took a critical first step in the 112th
Congress, it is abundantly clear that further action is needed to
curtail Iran's nuclear program. H.R. 850 today will only expand
sanctions targeting Iran's human rights violations, and--for the first
time--allow the President of the United States to impose sanctions on
any entity that maintains significant commercial ties to Iran. H.R. 850
hits Iran where it hurts the most. By strengthening existing sanctions
on 1,000,000 barrels of crude per day, this bill essentially takes
money away from the Iranian regime that it would potentially use on the
nuclear program.
Once again, this legislation will show our strong support of Israel
and its ability to remain a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. I
urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 850.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, H.R. 850, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
____________________