[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 112 (Wednesday, July 31, 2013)]
[House]
[Pages H5221-H5240]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  NUCLEAR IRAN PREVENTION ACT OF 2013

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill 
(H.R. 850) to impose additional human rights and economic and financial 
sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes, as amended.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                                H.R. 850

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear 
     Iran Prevention Act of 2013''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy.

             TITLE I--HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions 
              that engage in certain transactions on behalf of persons 
              involved in human rights abuses or that export sensitive 
              technology to Iran.
Sec. 102. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services and 
              technologies to Iran.
Sec. 103. Designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as foreign 
              terrorist organization.
Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or 
              complicit in human rights abuses, engaging in censorship, 
              or engaging in the diversion of goods intended for the 
              people of Iran.
Sec. 105. Sense of Congress on elections in Iran.
Sec. 106. Sense of Congress on designation of a Special Coordinator for 
              advancing human rights and political participation for 
              women in Iran.

               TITLE II--ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

          Subtitle A--Amendments to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

Sec. 201. Transfer to Iran of goods, services, or technology that would 
              materially contribute to Iran's ability to mine or mill 
              uranium.
Sec. 202. Repeal of waiver of sanctions relating to development of 
              weapons of mass destruction or other military 
              capabilities.

Subtitle B--Amendments to Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
 and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
                           Rights Act of 2012

Sec. 211. Modifications to prohibition on procurement contracts with 
              persons that export sensitive technology to Iran.
Sec. 212. Authority of State and local governments to avoid exposure to 
              sanctioned persons and sectors.
Sec. 213. Sense of Congress regarding the European Central Bank.
Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain transactions 
              in foreign currencies.
Sec. 215. Sanctions with respect to certain transactions with Iran.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

Sec. 221. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the Central Bank of 
              Iran and other Iranian financial institutions.
Sec. 222. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ports, special 
              economic zones, free economic zones, and strategic 
              sectors of Iran.
Sec. 223. Report on determinations not to impose sanctions on persons 
              who allegedly sell, supply, or transfer precious metals 
              to or from Iran.
Sec. 224. Imposition of sanctions with respect to foreign financial 
              institutions that facilitate financial transactions on 
              behalf of persons owned or controlled by specially 
              designated nationals.
Sec. 225. Repeal of exemptions under sanctions provisions of National 
              Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
Sec. 226. Termination of government contracts with persons who sell 
              goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other 
              transaction with, Iran.
Sec. 227. Conditions for entry and operation of vessels.

 TITLE III--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES IN 
                                  IRAN

Sec. 301. Report on implementation of sanctions against the Islamic 
              Republic of Iran Broadcasting.
Sec. 302. List of persons who are high-risk re-exporters of sensitive 
              technologies.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on provision of intercept technologies to 
              Iran.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on availability of consumer communication 
              technologies in Iran.
Sec. 305. Expedited consideration of requests for authorization of 
              transfer of goods and services to Iran to facilitate the 
              ability of Iranian persons to freely communicate.

                  TITLE IV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 401. National Strategy on Iran.
Sec. 402. Report on Iranian nuclear and economic capabilities.
Sec. 403. Report on plausibility of expanding sanctions on Iranian oil.
Sec. 404. GAO report on Iranian strategy to evade current sanctions and 
              other matters.
Sec. 405. Authority to consolidate reports required under Iran 
              sanctions laws.
Sec. 406. Amendments to definitions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
              and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
              2012.

[[Page H5222]]

Sec. 407. Rule of construction.
Sec. 408. Implementation; penalties.
Sec. 409. Severability.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability 
     would--
       (A) embolden its already aggressive foreign policy, 
     including its arming of terrorist organizations and other 
     groups, its efforts to destabilize countries in the Middle 
     East, and its efforts to target the United States, United 
     States allies, and United States interests globally;
       (B) increase the risk that Iran would share its nuclear 
     technology and expertise with extremist groups and rogue 
     nations;
       (C) destabilize global energy markets, posing a direct and 
     devastating threat to the American and global economy; and
       (D) likely lead other governments in the region to pursue 
     their own nuclear weapons programs, increasing the prospect 
     of nuclear proliferation throughout the region and 
     effectively ending the viability of the global 
     nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 
     1970.
       (2) A nuclear arms-capable Iran possessing intercontinental 
     ballistic missiles, a development most experts expect could 
     occur within a decade, would pose a direct nuclear threat to 
     the United States.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
     United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
     weapons capability.

             TITLE I--HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM SANCTIONS

     SEC. 101. MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS INVOLVED IN 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OR THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE 
                   TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive 
     Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
     (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) facilitates a significant transaction or transactions 
     or provides significant financial services for--
       ``(i) a person that is subject to sanctions under section 
     105(c), 105A(c), 105B(c), or 105C(a); or
       ``(ii) a person that exports sensitive technology to Iran 
     and is subject to the prohibition on procurement contracts as 
     described in section 106.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to any activity described in subparagraph 
     (F) of section 104(c)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (as added by 
     subsection (a)(3) of this section) initiated on or after the 
     date that is 90 days after such date of enactment.
       (c) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall prescribe regulations to carry out the amendments made 
     by subsection (a).

     SEC. 102. PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES 
                   AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.

       (a) Definitions.--Section 301(1) of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8541(1)) is amended by striking ``knows or has reason 
     to know'' and inserting ``knows, has reason to know, or 
     should have known''.
       (b) Identification of Countries of Concern With Respect to 
     the Diversion of Certain Goods, Services, and Technologies to 
     or Through Iran.--Section 302(b) of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8542(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) that are--
       ``(A) items described in the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and 
     Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and 
     subsequent revisions) and Guidelines for Transfers of 
     Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related 
     Technology (published by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and 
     subsequent revisions);
       ``(B) items on the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and 
     subsequent revisions;
       ``(C) items and substances relating to biological and 
     chemical weapons the export of which is controlled by the 
     Australia Group;
       ``(D) items on the Schedule One or Schedule Two list of 
     toxic chemicals and precursors the export of which is 
     controlled pursuant to the Convention on the Prohibition of 
     the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
     Weapons and on Their Destruction; or
       ``(E) items on the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use 
     Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 1996, 
     and subsequent revisions.''.
       (c) Destinations of Diversion Concern.--Section 303(c) of 
     the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8543(c)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Additional measures.--
       ``(A) In general.--Except as provided in this section, the 
     President may impose restrictions on United States foreign 
     assistance or measures authorized under the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act with respect to a country 
     designated as a country of diversion concern if the President 
     determines such restrictions or measures would prevent the 
     transfer of United States-origin goods, services, and 
     technology to Iran.
       ``(B) Exception.--The authority to impose sanctions under 
     subparagraph (A) shall not include the authority to impose 
     sanctions relating to the importation of goods.
       ``(C) Good defined.--In this paragraph, the term `good' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as 
     continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to countries identified in any update to 
     the report that is required under section 302(c) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 and submitted to Congress on or after such date 
     of enactment.

     SEC. 103. DESIGNATION OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AS 
                   FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle A of title III of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8741 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 304 as section 305; and
       (2) by inserting after section 303 the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 304. DESIGNATION OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS 
                   AS FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

       ``(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall 
     determine if Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps meets the 
     criteria for designation as a foreign terrorist organization 
     as set forth in section 219 of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).
       ``(b) Affirmative Determination.--If the Secretary of State 
     determines under subsection (a) that Iran's Revolutionary 
     Guard Corps meets the criteria set forth under such section 
     219, the Secretary shall designate Iran's Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under such section 
     219.
       ``(c) Negative Determination.--
       ``(1) In general.--If the Secretary of State determines 
     under subsection (a) that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps 
     does not meet the criteria set forth under such section 219, 
     the Secretary shall submit to the committees of Congress 
     specified in subsection (e) a report that contains a detailed 
     justification as to which criteria have not been met.
       ``(2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
     classified annex, if necessary.
       ``(d) Applicability of Sanctions to Quds Force.--The 
     sanctions applied to any entity designated as a foreign 
     terrorist organization as set forth in such section 219 shall 
     be applied to the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds 
     Force.
       ``(e) Committees of Congress Specified.--The committees of 
     Congress specified in this subsection are the following:
       ``(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     the Judiciary, and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and 
     inserting the following:

``Sec. 304. Designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as foreign 
              terrorist organization.
``Sec. 305. Rule of construction.''.

     SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS 
                   RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
                   ABUSES, ENGAGING IN CENSORSHIP, OR ENGAGING IN 
                   THE DIVERSION OF GOODS INTENDED FOR THE PEOPLE 
                   OF IRAN.

       (a) Finding and Sense of Congress.--Section 401(a) of the 
     Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
     (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(a) Finding and Sense of Congress.--
       ``(1) Finding.--Congress finds that Iranian persons holding 
     the following positions in the Government of Iran are 
     ultimately responsible for and have and continue to knowingly 
     order, control, direct and implement

[[Page H5223]]

     gross violations of the human rights of the Iranian people, 
     the human rights of persons in other countries, censorship, 
     and the diversion of food, medicine, medical devices, 
     agricultural commodities and other goods intended for the 
     Iranian people:
       ``(A) The Supreme Leader of Iran.
       ``(B) The President of Iran.
       ``(C) Members of the Council of Guardians.
       ``(D) Members of the Expediency Council.
       ``(E) The Minister of Intelligence and Security.
       ``(F) The Commander of the Iran's Revolutionary Guard 
     Corps.
       ``(G) The Commander of the Basij-e-Mostaz'afin.
       ``(H) The Commander of Ansar-e-Hezbollah.
       ``(I) The Commander of the Quds Force.
       ``(J) The Commander in Chief of the Police Force.
       ``(K) Senior officials or key employees of an organization 
     described in any of subparagraphs (C) through (J) or in the 
     Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Islamic Consultative 
     Assembly of Iran, the Council of Ministers of Iran, the 
     Assembly of Experts of Iran, the Ministry of Defense and 
     Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Ministry of Justice of 
     Iran, the Ministry of Interior of Iran, the prison system of 
     Iran, or the judicial system of Iran.
       ``(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
       ``(A) the President should include any Iranian person 
     holding a position in the Government of Iran described in 
     paragraph (1) on one or more of the lists of persons subject 
     to sanctions pursuant to section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or 
     105C(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
     and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(b), 8514a(b), 
     8514b(b), or 8514c(b)); and
       ``(B) the President should impose sanctions on such Iranian 
     person pursuant to section 105, 105A, 105B, or 105C of such 
     Act (as the case may be).''.
       (b) Additional Finding and Sense of Congress.--Section 401 
     of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Additional Finding and Sense of Congress.--
       ``(1) Finding.--Congress finds that other senior officials 
     of the Government of Iran, its agencies and 
     instrumentalities, also have and continue to knowingly order, 
     control, direct, and implement gross violations of the human 
     rights of the Iranian people and the human rights of persons 
     in other countries.
       ``(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress 
     that--
       ``(A) the President should investigate violations of human 
     rights described in paragraph (1) to identify other senior 
     officials of the Government of Iran that also have or 
     continue to knowingly order, control, direct, and implement 
     gross violations of human rights of the Iranian people and 
     the human rights of persons in other countries;
       ``(B) the President should include any such official on one 
     or more of the lists of persons subject to sanctions pursuant 
     to section 105(b), 105A(b), 105B(b), or 105C(b) of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514(b), 8514a(b), 8514b(b), or 
     8514c(b)); and
       ``(C) the President should impose sanctions on any such 
     official pursuant to section 105, 105A, 105B, or 105C of such 
     Act (as the case may be).''.
       (c) Report.--Section 401(c)(1) of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-158; 126 
     Stat. 1251) (as redesignated by subsection (b) of this 
     section) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later than'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than'';
       (2) by striking ``this Act'' and inserting ``the Nuclear 
     Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and annually thereafter for 3 
     years'';
       (3) by striking ``otherwise directing the commission of'' 
     and inserting ``otherwise directing--
       ``(i) the commission of'';
       (4) by striking ``Iran.'' and inserting ``Iran;
       ``(ii) censorship or related activities with respect to 
     Iran; or
       ``(iii) the diversion of goods, food, medicine, medical 
     devices, and agricultural commodities, intended for the 
     people of Iran.'';
       (5) by striking ``For any such person'' and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(B) Requirement relating to persons not included.--For 
     any such person''; and
       (6) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) Requirement relating to financial net worth.--For 
     each such person described in subparagraph (A) and each such 
     person described in subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State 
     shall include in the report a description of the estimated 
     net worth of the person.''.
       (d) Additional Report.--Section 401 of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-
     158; 126 Stat. 1251), as amended by this section, is further 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(d) Additional Report.--
       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, 
     and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
     detailed report with respect to whether each person described 
     in subsection (a) or any family member of such person has 
     facilitated deceptive transactions for or on behalf of any 
     person subject to United States sanctions concerning Iran in 
     violation of Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012 (77 Fed. 
     Reg. 26409; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or any other provision of 
     law.
       ``(2) Family member defined.--In this subsection, the term 
     `family member' includes, with respect to a person, any 
     relative of such person to the third degree of 
     consanguinity.''.
       (e) Conforming Amendment.--The heading for section 401 of 
     the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
     (Public Law 112-158; 126 Stat. 1251) is amended by striking 
     ``COMMITTED AGAINST'' and all that follows and inserting ``, 
     ENGAGING IN CENSORSHIP, OR ENGAGING IN THE DIVERSION OF GOODS 
     INTENDED FOR THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.''.
       (f) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 401 and 
     inserting the following:

``Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for 
              or complicit in human rights abuses, engaging in 
              censorship, or engaging in the diversion of goods 
              intended for the people of Iran.''.

     SEC. 105. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Iranian people are systematically denied free, 
     fair, and credible elections by the Government of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran.
       (2) The unelected and unaccountable Guardian Council 
     disqualifies hundreds of qualified candidates, including 
     women and most religious minorities, while the regime 
     intimidates others into staying out of elections completely.
       (3) Voting inconsistencies, including an absence of 
     international observers, and fraud are commonplace.
       (4) The 2009 presidential elections proved that the regime 
     will engage in large scale vote-rigging to ensure a specific 
     result.
       (5) The Iranian regime combines electoral manipulation with 
     the ruthless suppression of dissent. Following the 2009 
     elections, peaceful demonstrators were met with violence by 
     the regime's security apparatus, including arbitrary 
     detentions, beatings, kidnappings, rapes, and murders.
       (6) The electoral manipulation and human rights violations 
     are in violation of the Government of Iran's agreed to 
     obligations under the United Nations International Covenant 
     on Civil and Political Rights.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) the Iranian people are deprived by their government of 
     free, fair, and credible elections;
       (2) the United States should support freedom, human rights, 
     civil liberties, and the rule of law in Iran, and elections 
     that are free and fair, meet international standards, and 
     allow independent international and domestic electoral 
     observers unrestricted access to polling and counting 
     stations; and
       (3) the United States should support the people of Iran in 
     their peaceful calls for a representative and responsive 
     democratic government that respects human rights, civil 
     liberties, and the rule of law.

     SEC. 106. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DESIGNATION OF A SPECIAL 
                   COORDINATOR FOR ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
                   POLITICAL PARTICIPATION FOR WOMEN IN IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State 
     should designate a Special Coordinator position in the Bureau 
     of Near Eastern Affairs whose primary function is to 
     facilitate cooperation across departments for the purpose of 
     advancing human rights and political participation for women 
     in Iran, as well as to prepare evidence and information to be 
     used in identifying Iranian officials for designation as 
     human rights violators for their involvement in violating the 
     human rights of women in Iran.

               TITLE II--ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

          Subtitle A--Amendments to Iran Sanctions Act of 1996

     SEC. 201. TRANSFER TO IRAN OF GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY 
                   THAT WOULD MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN'S 
                   ABILITY TO MINE OR MILL URANIUM.

       (a) In General.--Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
     1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Transfer to iran of goods, services, or technology 
     that can be used for mining or milling of uranium.--Except as 
     provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or 
     more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect 
     to a person if the President determines that the person 
     knowingly transferred, on or after the date of the enactment 
     of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, to Iran goods, 
     services, or technology that would materially contribute to 
     Iran's ability to mine or mill uranium.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 5 of such Act is 
     amended in subsection (b)(3), (c), and (f) by striking 
     ``paragraph (1) or (2)'' each place it appears and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1), (2), or (3)''.

[[Page H5224]]

     SEC. 202. REPEAL OF WAIVER OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO 
                   DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR 
                   OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

       Section 9(c)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public 
     Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking subparagraph (B);
       (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (B); 
     and
       (3) in subparagraph (B) (as redesignated by paragraph (2) 
     of this section)--
       (A) by striking ``or (B)'' each place it appears; and
       (B) by striking ``, as applicable''.

Subtitle B--Amendments to Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
 and Divestment Act of 2010 and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
                           Rights Act of 2012

     SEC. 211. MODIFICATIONS TO PROHIBITION ON PROCUREMENT 
                   CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS THAT EXPORT SENSITIVE 
                   TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN.

       (a) Application to Owners and Subsidiaries.--Subsection (a) 
     of section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-
     195; 22 U.S.C. 8515) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``goods or services with a person'' and 
     inserting the following: ``goods or services--
       ``(1) with a person'';
       (2) in paragraph (1), as added by paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection, by striking the period at the end and inserting 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) with respect to a person acting on behalf of or at 
     the direction of, or owned or controlled by, a person 
     described in paragraph (1) or a person who owns or controls a 
     person described in paragraph (1).''.
       (b) Sensitive Technology Defined.--Subsection (c)(1) of 
     such section is amended by striking ``is to be used 
     specifically'' and inserting ``has been designed or 
     specifically modified''.
       (c) Presidential Determination and Imposition of Additional 
     Sanctions.--Such section, as so amended, is further amended 
     by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Presidential Determination and Imposition of 
     Additional Sanctions.--The President shall impose 5 or more 
     of the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran 
     Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
     note) with respect to--
       ``(1) a person if the President determines that the person 
     knowingly exports sensitive technology to Iran; or
       ``(2) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of, 
     or owned or controlled by, a person described in paragraph 
     (1) or a person who owns or controls a person described in 
     paragraph (1).''.
       (d) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of such section is 
     amended by inserting ``AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST'' 
     after ``WITH''.
       (e) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 is amended by striking the item relating to 
     section 106 and inserting the following:

``Sec. 106. Prohibition on procurement contracts with and imposition of 
              sanctions against persons that export sensitive 
              technology to Iran.''.
       (f) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to exports of sensitive technology to Iran 
     that occur on or after such date of enactment.

     SEC. 212. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO AVOID 
                   EXPOSURE TO SANCTIONED PERSONS AND SECTORS.

       (a) In General.--Section 202 of the Comprehensive Iran 
     Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 
     U.S.C. 8532) is amended by striking subsections (a), (b), and 
     (c) and inserting the following:
       ``(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the United States should respect the decision of any State or 
     local government to divest from or prohibit the investment of 
     assets of the State or local government in a person described 
     in subsection (c) or to impose disclosure and transparency 
     requirements on any person subject to the jurisdiction of 
     such government, except with respect to an activity that is 
     exempt, licensed, or otherwise authorized by a Federal 
     department or agency.
       ``(b) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, a State or local government may adopt and enforce 
     measures that meet the requirements of subsection (d)--
       ``(1) to divest the assets of the State or local government 
     from a person described in subsection (c);
       ``(2) to prohibit investment of the assets of the State or 
     local government in any such person; or
       ``(3) to impose disclosure and transparency requirements on 
     any person subject to the jurisdiction of such government, 
     except with respect to an activity that is exempt, licensed, 
     or otherwise authorized by a Federal department or agency.
       ``(c) Persons Described.--A person described in this 
     subsection is a person with respect to which sanctions have 
     been, and continue to be, imposed pursuant to--
       ``(1) section 104(c) of this Act;
       ``(2) section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 
     U.S.C. 1701 note);
       ``(3) section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)); or
       ``(4) sections 1244, 1245, 1246 or 1247 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 
     8803, 8804, 8805, or 8806).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 202 of the 
     Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
     Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)(4), by striking ``engages in 
     investment activities in Iran described in subsection (c)'' 
     and inserting ``is a person described in subsection (c)'';
       (2) in subsection (f), by striking ``or (i)'' and inserting 
     ``or (g)'';
       (3) by striking subsection (h) and by redesignating 
     subsections (i) and (j) as subsections (h) and (i), 
     respectively; and
       (4) in paragraph (1) of subsection (i) (as redesignated by 
     paragraph (3) of this subsection), by striking ``(determined 
     without regard to subsection (c))''.
       (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     apply to measures adopted by State and local governments on 
     or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 213. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
                   BANK.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) The Government of Iran, its agencies and 
     instrumentalities, continue to have access to, and utilize, 
     euro-denominated transactions, including for goods and 
     services that are subject to sanctions imposed by the United 
     States, the European Union and its member states and by the 
     United Nations.
       (2) The Guidelines of the European Central Bank (Article 
     39(1)) states that: ``Participants shall be deemed to be 
     aware of, and shall comply with, all obligations on them 
     relating to legislation on data protection, prevention of 
     money laundering and the financing of terrorism, 
     proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the 
     development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, in 
     particular in terms of implementing appropriate measures 
     concerning any payments debited or credited on their PM 
     accounts.''
       (3) United States and European convergence with respect to 
     United States sanctions efforts toward the Government of Iran 
     is a vital component of United States policy aimed at 
     preventing the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
     weapons capability.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should continue to closely coordinate and 
     cooperate with the European Union and its member states to 
     restrict access to and use of the euro currency by the 
     Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, for 
     transactions with the exception of food, medicine, medical 
     devices, and agricultural commodities.

     SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.

       (a) Imposition of Sanctions.--Subtitle B of title II of the 
     Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 
     U.S.C. 8721 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     220 the following:

     ``SEC. 220A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
                   TRANSACTIONS IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES.

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in this section, the 
     President--
       ``(1) shall prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose 
     strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of 
     a correspondent account or a payable-through account by a 
     foreign financial institution that is a person described in 
     subsection (c); and
       ``(2) may impose sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with 
     respect to any other person described in subsection (c).
       ``(b) Exception.--The authority to impose sanctions under 
     subsection (a)(2) shall not include the authority to impose 
     sanctions relating to the importation of goods.
       ``(c) Person Described.--A person described in this 
     subsection is a person the President determines has--
       ``(1) knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant 
     transaction involving the currency of a country other than 
     the country in which the person is operating at the time of 
     the transaction with, for, or on behalf of--
       ``(A) the Central Bank of Iran or another Iranian financial 
     institution designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for 
     the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); or
       ``(B) a person described in section 1244(c)(2) of the Iran 
     Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (22 U.S.C. 8803(c)(2)) 
     (other than a person described in subparagraph (C)(iii) of 
     that section); or
       ``(2) knowingly conducted or facilitated a significant 
     transaction by another person involving the currency of a 
     country other than the country in which that other person is 
     operating at the time of the transaction, with, for, or on 
     behalf of a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(d) Waiver.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President may waive the application 
     of subsection (a) with respect to a person for a period of 
     not more than 180 days, and may renew that waiver for 
     additional periods of not more than 180 days, if the 
     President--
       ``(A) determines that the waiver is vital to the national 
     security of the United States; and
       ``(B) not less than 7 days before the waiver or the renewal 
     of the waiver, as the case may

[[Page H5225]]

     be, takes effect, submits a report to the appropriate 
     congressional committees on the waiver and the reason for the 
     waiver.
       ``(2) Form of report.--Each report submitted under 
     paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
     may include a classified annex.
       ``(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to prohibit any person from, or authorize or 
     require the imposition of sanctions with respect to any 
     person for, conducting or facilitating any transaction in the 
     currency of the country in which the person is operating at 
     the time of the transaction for the sale of agricultural 
     commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices.
       ``(f) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through 
     account.--The terms `account', `correspondent account', and 
     `payable-through account' have the meanings given those terms 
     in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.
       ``(2) Agricultural commodity.--The term `agricultural 
     commodity' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of 
     the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
       ``(3) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign 
     financial institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or 
     any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
       ``(4) Good.--The term `good' has the meaning given that 
     term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as continued in effect pursuant to the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 
     et seq.)).
       ``(5) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian 
     financial institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513b(d)).
       ``(6) Medical device.--The term `medical device' has the 
     meaning given the term `device' in section 201 of the Federal 
     Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       ``(7) Medicine.--The term `medicine' has the meaning given 
     the term `drug' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
     Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
       ``(8) Transaction.--The term `transaction' includes a 
     foreign exchange swap, a foreign exchange forward, and any 
     other type of similar currency exchange or conversion or 
     similar derivative instrument.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Implementation.--Section 601(a)(1) of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
     8781(a)(1)) is amended by inserting ``220A,'' after ``220,''.
       (2) Penalties.--Section 601(b)(2)(A) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 
     8781(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ``and 220,'' and 
     inserting ``220, and 220A,''.
       (3) Termination.--Section 605(a) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 
     8785(a)) is amended by inserting ``220A,'' after ``220,''.
       (c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 220 
     the following:

``Sec. 220A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain 
              transactions in foreign currencies.''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to transactions entered into on or after 
     May 22, 2013.

     SEC. 215. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH 
                   IRAN.

       (a) In General.--Subtitle B of title II of the Iran Threat 
     Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 225. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS 
                   WITH IRAN.

       ``(a) Authorization of Sanctions.--
       ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in this section, the 
     President may impose sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) on a 
     foreign person that the President determines has, on or after 
     the date that is 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, knowingly conducted 
     or facilitated a significant financial transaction with the 
     Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian financial institution 
     that has been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury for 
     the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International 
     Emergency Economic Powers Act, for--
       ``(A) the purchase of goods or services by a person in Iran 
     or on behalf of a person in Iran; or
       ``(B) the purchase of goods or services from a person in 
     Iran or on behalf of a person in Iran.
       ``(2) Exception.--
       ``(A) In general.--The authority to impose sanctions under 
     paragraph (1) shall not include the authority to impose 
     sanctions relating to the importation of goods.
       ``(B) Good.--In this paragraph, the term `good' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as 
     continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).
       ``(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to affect the imposition of sanctions with 
     respect to a financial transaction for the purchase of 
     petroleum or petroleum products from Iran under section 1245 
     of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648).
       ``(b) Exception for Overall Reductions of Exports to and 
     Imports From Iran.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President is authorized not to 
     impose sanctions under subsection (a) on a foreign person if 
     the President determines and submits to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a report that contains a 
     determination of the President that the country with primary 
     jurisdiction over the foreign person has, during the time 
     period described in paragraph (2), significantly reduced the 
     value and volume of imports and exports of goods (other than 
     petroleum or petroleum products) and services between such 
     country and Iran.
       ``(2) Time period described.--The time period referred to 
     in paragraph (1) is the 60-day period ending on the date on 
     which the President makes the determination under paragraph 
     (1) as compared to the immediately preceding 60-day period.
       ``(c) Exception for Sales of Agricultural Commodities, 
     Food, Medicine and Medical Devices.--The President may not 
     impose sanctions under subsection (a) on a foreign person 
     with respect to a transaction for the sale of agricultural 
     commodities, food, medicine or medical devices to Iran.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Foreign person.--The term `foreign person' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions 
     Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
       ``(2) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian 
     financial institution' has the meaning given that term in 
     section 104A(d) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
     Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513b(d)).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the Iran 
     Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to section 224 
     the following:

``Sec. 225. Sanctions with respect to certain transactions with 
              Iran.''.

                       Subtitle C--Other Matters

     SEC. 221. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CENTRAL 
                   BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER IRANIAN FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS.

       (a) Exception to Applicability of Sanctions With Respect to 
     Petroleum Transactions.--Section 1245(d)(4)(D)(i)(I) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
     (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648; 22 U.S.C. 
     8513a(d)(4)(D)(i)(I)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``reduced reduced'' and inserting 
     ``reduced'';
       (2) by inserting ``value and'' before ``volume'';
       (3) by inserting ``or of Iranian origin'' after ``from 
     Iran''; and
       (4) by adding at the end before the semicolon the 
     following: ``, and the President certifies in writing to 
     Congress that the President has based such determination on 
     accurate information on that country's total purchases of 
     crude oil from Iran or of Iranian origin''.
       (b) Financial Transactions Described.--Section 
     1245(d)(4)(D)(ii)(II) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648) 
     is amended--
       (1) by striking ``(II)'' and inserting ``(II)(aa)'';
       (2) in item (aa) (as designated by paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection), by striking the period at the end and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new item:

       ``(bb) the foreign financial institution holding the 
     account described in item (aa) does not knowingly facilitate 
     any significant financial transfers for, with, or on behalf 
     of the Government of Iran, unless the transaction is excepted 
     from sanctions under paragraph (2) or is a transaction 
     described in subclause (I) and item (aa).''.

       (c) Strategy to Reduce Crude Oil Purchases From Iran or of 
     Iranian Origin.--
       (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
     States to seek to ensure that countries that have received an 
     exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) of section 1245(d)(4) 
     of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
     2012 (Public Law 112-81; 125 Stat. 1648) shall reduce their 
     crude oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin so that 
     the aggregate amount of such purchases is reduced by not less 
     than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil per day by 
     the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date of 
     submission of the strategy described in subparagraph (E)(ii) 
     of such section (as added by paragraph (2) of this 
     subsection).
       (2) Amendment.--Section 1245(d)(4) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81; 
     125 Stat. 1648) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subparagraph:
       ``(E) Strategy to reduce crude oil purchases from iran or 
     of iranian origin.--
       ``(i) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
     the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, the 
     President shall make a determination, based on the 
     information contained in the most recent report required 
     under subparagraph (A), of whether each country that received 
     an exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) before such date of 
     enactment is able to reduce its crude oil purchases from Iran 
     or of Iranian origin so that the aggregate amount of such

[[Page H5226]]

     purchases is reduced by not less than an average of 1,000,000 
     barrels of crude oil per day by the end of the 1-year period 
     beginning on the date of submission of the strategy described 
     in clause (ii). If the President makes an initial 
     determination under this clause that the requirements of this 
     clause cannot be met, then the President shall continue to 
     make a determination under this clause every 90 days 
     thereafter as to whether or not the requirements of this 
     clause can be met.
       ``(ii) Strategy.--If the President determines that the 
     requirements of clause (i) can be met, then not later than 60 
     days after the date of such affirmative determination, the 
     President shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees a strategy to seek to ensure that 
     the requirements of clause (i) are met by the end of the 1-
     year period beginning on such date of submission.
       ``(iii) Future exceptions.--

       ``(I) Affirmative determination.--If the President 
     determines that the strategy described in clause (ii) was 
     achieved, then each country described in clause (i) shall be 
     eligible to receive one or more further exceptions under 
     subparagraph (D)(i)(I) in accordance with the provisions of 
     such subparagraph.
       ``(II) Negative determination.--Except as provided in 
     subclause (III), if the President determines that the 
     strategy described in clause (ii) was not achieved, then each 
     country described in clause (i) shall be ineligible to 
     receive any further exception under subparagraph (D)(i)(I) in 
     accordance with the provisions of such subparagraph.
       ``(III) Exception.--

       ``(aa) In general.--Subclause (II) shall not apply with 
     respect to a country described in clause (i) if the country--
       ``(AA) dramatically reduced its crude oil purchases from 
     Iran or of Iranian origin during the 1-year period described 
     in clause (ii); and
       ``(BB) has committed itself to continue to reduce its crude 
     oil purchases from Iran or of Iranian origin to a de minimis 
     level.
       ``(bb) Data.--The President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees all data used to make a 
     determination under item (aa) not later than 15 days before 
     issuing an exception under item (aa).
       ``(iv) Appropriate congressional committees.--In this 
     subparagraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees' 
     means--

       ``(I) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
     Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
       ``(II) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
     on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.''.

       (d) Definition of Crude Oil.--Section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 
     U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(D)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new clause:
       ``(iii) Crude oil.--In this subparagraph, the term `crude 
     oil' includes unfinished oils, liquefied petroleum gases, 
     distillate fuel oil, and residual fuel oil.''.
       (e) Waiver.--Section 1245(d)(5)(A) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 
     8513a(d)(5)(A)) is amended by striking ``in the national'' 
     and inserting ``vital to the national''.
       (f) Definitions of ``Significant Reduction''.--Section 
     1245(h)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(h)(3)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``price or volume'' and inserting ``price 
     and volume''; and
       (2) by adding at the end before the period the following: 
     ``and at least a pro rata amount totaling, in the aggregate, 
     not less than an average of 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil 
     per day by the end of the 1-year period beginning on the date 
     of submission of the strategy described in subsection 
     (d)(4)(E)(ii)''.
       (g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     take effect beginning on the date that is 180 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 222. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PORTS, 
                   SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, 
                   AND STRATEGIC SECTORS OF IRAN.

       (a) Findings.--Subsection (a)(1) of section 1244 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 
     U.S.C. 8803) is amended by striking ``and shipbuilding'' and 
     inserting ``shipbuilding, automotive, construction, 
     engineering, or mining''.
       (b) Designation of Ports, Special Economic Zones, Free 
     Economic Zones, and Entities in Strategic Sectors as Entities 
     of Proliferation Concern.--Subsection (b) of such section is 
     amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``and Entities 
     in the Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors'' and 
     inserting ``, Special Economic Zones, Free Economic Zones, 
     and Entities in Strategic Sectors''; and
       (2) by striking ``and entities in the energy, shipping, and 
     shipbuilding sectors'' and inserting ``, entities that 
     operate special economic zones or free economic zones, and 
     entities in strategic sectors (as defined in subsection 
     (c)(4))''.
       (c) Blocking of Property of Ports, Special Economic Zones, 
     Free Economic Zones, and Entities in Strategic Sectors.--
     Subsection (c) of such section is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Entities in 
     Energy, Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors'' and inserting 
     ``Ports, Special Economic Zones, Free Economic Zones, and 
     Entities in Strategic Sectors'';
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by striking ``the energy, shipping, or shipbuilding 
     sectors'' each place it appears and inserting ``a strategic 
     sector (as defined in paragraph (4)(A))''; and
       (B) by inserting ``, special economic zone, or free 
     economic zone'' after ``port'' each place it appears; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(4) Strategic sector defined.--In this section, the term 
     `strategic sector' means--
       ``(A) the energy, shipping, shipbuilding, automotive, or 
     mining sector of Iran; and
       ``(B) the construction or engineering sector of Iran if the 
     President determines and reports to Congress not later than 
     45 days after the date of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran 
     Prevention Act of 2013 that the construction or engineering 
     sector of Iran, as the case may be, is of strategic 
     importance to Iran.
       ``(5) Notification and report relating to strategic 
     sectors.--
       ``(A) Notification.--The President shall submit to Congress 
     a notification of the designation of a sector as a strategic 
     sector of Iran for purposes of paragraph (4)(C) not later 
     than 30 days after the date on which the President makes such 
     designation.
       ``(B) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on 
     which the President submits to Congress a notification of the 
     designation of a sector as a strategic sector of Iran under 
     subparagraph (A), the Comptroller General of the United 
     States shall submit to Congress a report that contains--
       ``(i) a review and comment on such designation; and
       ``(ii) recommendations regarding the designation of 
     additional sectors as strategic sectors of Iran for purposes 
     of paragraph (4).''.
       (d) Additional Sanctions With Respect to Strategic 
     Sectors.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended--
       (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``the Energy, 
     Shipping, and Shipbuilding Sectors'' and inserting 
     ``Strategic Sectors''; and
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the energy, shipping, 
     or shipbuilding sectors'' and inserting ``a strategic sector 
     (as defined in subsection (c)(4)(A))''.
       (e) Exception for Afghanistan Reconstruction.--Subsection 
     (f) of such section is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting 
     ``for a period of not more than 1 year, and may renew that 
     exception for additional periods of not more than 1 year'' 
     after ``economic development for Afghanistan'';
       (2) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``to the extent that'' and inserting 
     ``if'';
       (B) by inserting ``or the renewal of the exception, as the 
     case may be,'' after ``such an exception''; and
       (C) by striking ``in the national interest'' and inserting 
     ``in the national security interest''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by inserting ``or the renewal of the exception, as the 
     case may be,'' before ``not later than 15 days''; and
       (B) by inserting at the end before the period the 
     following: ``or the renewal of the exception''.
       (f) Conforming Amendment.--Such section is further amended 
     in the section heading by striking ``THE ENERGY, SHIPPING, 
     AND SHIPBUILDING SECTORS'' and inserting ``PORTS, SPECIAL 
     ECONOMIC ZONES, FREE ECONOMIC ZONES, AND STRATEGIC SECTORS''.
       (g) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section--
       (1) take effect on the date that is 90 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act; and
       (2)(A) with respect to subsection (c) of section 1244 of 
     the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 
     as so amended, apply with respect to all transactions in all 
     property and interests in property of any person described in 
     subsection (c)(2) of such section that occur on or after the 
     date that is 180 days after such date of enactment; and
       (B)(i) with respect to subsection (d)(1) of section 1244 of 
     the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 
     apply with respect to the sale, supply, or transfer to or 
     from Iran of goods or services described in subsection (d)(3) 
     of such section, as so amended, that occurs on or after the 
     date that is 180 days after such date of enactment; and
       (ii) with respect to subsection (d)(2) of section 1244 of 
     the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 
     apply with respect to the conduct or facilitation of a 
     significant financial transaction for the sale, supply, or 
     transfer to or from Iran of goods or services described in 
     subsection (d)(3) of such section, as so amended, that occurs 
     on or after the date that is 180 days after such date of 
     enactment.

     SEC. 223. REPORT ON DETERMINATIONS NOT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON 
                   PERSONS WHO ALLEGEDLY SELL, SUPPLY, OR TRANSFER 
                   PRECIOUS METALS TO OR FROM IRAN.

       Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8804) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (g) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(h) Report on Determinations Not To Impose Sanctions on 
     Persons Who Allegedly Sell, Supply, or Transfer Precious 
     Metals to or From Iran.--

[[Page H5227]]

       ``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and 
     every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on each 
     determination of the President during the preceding 90-day 
     period not to impose sanctions under subsection (a) or (c) 
     with respect to a person who allegedly sells, supplies, or 
     transfers precious metals, directly or indirectly, to or from 
     Iran, together with the reasons for such determination.
       ``(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
     annex, if necessary.''.

     SEC. 224. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN 
                   FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT FACILITATE 
                   FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS 
                   OWNED OR CONTROLLED BY SPECIALLY DESIGNATED 
                   NATIONALS.

       Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8806) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(f) Persons Owned or Controlled by Specially Designated 
     Nationals.--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall impose sanctions 
     described in subsection (a) with respect to a foreign 
     financial institution, including but not limited to a foreign 
     central bank, that the President determines has, on or after 
     the date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, knowingly 
     facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of 
     any person determined by the President to be directly owned 
     or controlled by an Iranian person included on the list of 
     specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained 
     by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of 
     the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution 
     described in subsection (b)).
       ``(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President routinely should determine on or after the date 
     of the enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 
     those persons that are directly or indirectly owned or 
     controlled by an Iranian person included on the list of 
     specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained 
     by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of 
     the Treasury (other than an Iranian financial institution 
     described in subsection (b)).
       ``(3) Consideration of data from other countries and 
     nongovernmental organizations.--The President shall consider 
     credible data already obtained by other countries and 
     nongovernmental organizations in making determinations 
     described in paragraph (1).''.

     SEC. 225. REPEAL OF EXEMPTIONS UNDER SANCTIONS PROVISIONS OF 
                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                   YEAR 2013.

       Subtitle D of title XII of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et 
     seq.) is amended--
       (1) in section 1244--
       (A) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``(1) Blocking of property.--'' and all 
     that follows through ``On and after'' and inserting ``(1) 
     Blocking of property.--On and after''; and
       (ii) by striking subparagraph (B); and
       (B) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``(1) Sale, supply, or transfer of certain 
     goods and services.--'' and all that follows through ``Except 
     as provided'' and inserting ``(1) Sale, supply, or transfer 
     of certain goods and services.--Except as provided''; and
       (ii) by striking subparagraph (B);
       (2) in section 1245(a)--
       (A) by striking ``(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Certain 
     Materials.--'' and all that follows through ``The President'' 
     and inserting ``(a) Sale, Supply, or Transfer of Certain 
     Materials.--The President'';
       (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively (and by 
     redesignating all sub-units therein accordingly);
       (C) in paragraph (3)(B) (as redesignated by subparagraph 
     (B) of this paragraph)--
       (i) in clause (i), by striking ``subclause (I) of clause 
     (i)'' and inserting ``clause (i) of subparagraph (A)'';
       (ii) in clause (ii), by striking ``subclause (II) of that 
     clause'' and inserting ``clause (ii) of that subparagraph''; 
     and
       (iii) in clause (iii), by striking ``subclause (III) of 
     that clause'' and inserting ``clause (iii) of that 
     subparagraph''; and
       (D) by striking ``(2) exception.--'' and all that follows 
     through ``paragraph (1).''; and
       (3) in section 1246(a)--
       (A) by striking ``(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--'' and all 
     that follows through ``Except as provided'' and inserting 
     ``(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--Except as provided'';
       (B) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively (and by 
     redesignating all sub-units therein accordingly); and
       (C) by striking ``(2) exception.--'' and all that follows 
     through ``paragraph (1).''; and

     SEC. 226. TERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS WITH PERSONS 
                   WHO SELL GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY TO, OR 
                   CONDUCT ANY OTHER TRANSACTION WITH, IRAN.

       (a) Modification of Federal Acquisition Regulation.--Not 
     later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to 
     require a certification from each person that is a 
     prospective contractor that the person, and any person under 
     common ownership or control with the person, does not sell 
     goods, services, or technology to, or conduct any other 
     transaction with, Iran for which sanctions may be imposed 
     under this Act.
       (b) Remedies.--
       (1) In general.--If the head of an executive agency 
     determines that a person has submitted a false certification 
     under subsection (a) on or after the date on which the 
     applicable revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
     required by this section becomes effective, the head of that 
     executive agency shall terminate a contract with such person 
     or debar or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal 
     contracts for a period of not less than 2 years. Any such 
     debarment or suspension shall be subject to the procedures 
     that apply to debarment and suspension under the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation under subpart 9.4 of part 9 of title 
     48, Code of Federal Regulations.
       (2) Inclusion on list of parties excluded from federal 
     procurement and nonprocurement programs.--The Administrator 
     of General Services shall include on the List of Parties 
     Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs 
     maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation each person that is debarred, 
     suspended, or proposed for debarment or suspension by the 
     head of an executive agency on the basis of a determination 
     of a false certification under paragraph (1).
       (c) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be 
     construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the 
     head of an executive agency or any other official of the 
     Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false 
     certification under subsection (a).
       (d) Waivers.--
       (1) In general.--The President may on a case-by-case basis 
     waive the requirement that a person make a certification 
     under subsection (a) if the President determines and 
     certifies in writing to the congressional committees 
     described in paragraph (2) that it is essential to the 
     national security interests of the United States to do so.
       (2) Congressional committees described.--The congressional 
     committees referred to in paragraph (1) are--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Oversight and Government 
     Reform of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
       (e) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has 
     the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41, 
     United States Code.
       (2) Federal acquisition regulation.--The term ``Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation'' means the regulation issued pursuant 
     to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.
       (f) Applicability.--The revisions to the Federal 
     Acquisition Regulation required under subsection (a) shall 
     apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are 
     issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 227. CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY AND OPERATION OF VESSELS.

       (a) In General.--The Ports and Waters Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 
     1221 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 16. PROHIBITION ON ENTRY AND OPERATION.

       ``(a) Prohibition.--
       ``(1) In general.--No foreign vessel described in 
     subsection (b) shall enter or operate in the navigable waters 
     of the United States or transfer cargo in any port or place 
     under the jurisdiction of the United States.
       ``(2) Limitation on application.--Paragraph (1) shall not 
     apply with respect to a vessel described in subsection (b)(2) 
     on and after any date on which the Secretary of State 
     determines that the vessel is no longer registered as 
     described in that subsection. The Secretary of State shall 
     publish a notice of each such determination in the Federal 
     Register.
       ``(b) Vessels Described.--A vessel referred to in 
     subsection (a) is a foreign vessel for which a Notice of 
     Arrival is required to be filed under section 160 of title 
     33, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on the date of 
     enactment of the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and 
     that--
       ``(1) is on a list of vessels published in Federal Register 
     under subsection (c)(2); or
       ``(2) more than 180 days after the publication of such a 
     list, is registered, pursuant to the Geneva Convention on the 
     High Seas (13 U.S.T. 2312; TIAS 5200; 450 UNTS 82), by a 
     government the agents or instrumentalities of which are 
     maintaining a registration of a vessel that is included in 
     such list.
       ``(c) Information and Publication.--The Secretary of 
     Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
     shall--
       ``(1) maintain timely information on registrations of all 
     foreign vessels over 300 gross tons that are--
       ``(A) owned or operated by or on behalf of--
       ``(i) the National Iran Tanker Company or the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran Shipping Line; or
       ``(ii) any successor to an entity referred to in clause 
     (i); or
       ``(B) otherwise owned or operated by or on behalf of Iran; 
     and

[[Page H5228]]

       ``(2) publish in the Federal Register a list of vessels 
     described in paragraph (1), including periodic updates of 
     such list.
       ``(d) Notification of Governments.--The Secretary of State 
     shall notify each government the agents or instrumentalities 
     of which are maintaining a registration of a foreign vessel 
     that is included on the list published under subsection 
     (c)(2), that all vessels registered under such government's 
     authority are subject to the prohibition under subsection (a) 
     if more than 180 days after such publication the government 
     continues to maintain a registration for a vessel that is 
     included on the list published under subsection (c)(2).
       ``(e) Notification of Vessels.--Upon receiving a Notice of 
     Arrival under section 160 of title 33, Code of Federal 
     Regulations (as in effect on the date of enactment of the 
     Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013) from a vessel described 
     in (b), the Secretary shall notify the master of such vessel 
     that the vessel may not enter or operate in the navigable 
     waters of the United States or transfer cargo in any port or 
     place under the jurisdiction of the United States, unless--
       ``(1) the Secretary has made a determination described in 
     subsection (a)(2); or
       ``(2) the Secretary allows provisional entry of the vessel, 
     or transfer of cargo from the vessel, under subsection (f).
       ``(f) Provisional Entry or Cargo Transfer.--Notwithstanding 
     subsection (e), the Secretary may allow provisional entry of, 
     or transfer of cargo from, a foreign vessel described in 
     subsection (b), if such entry or transfer is necessary for 
     the safety of the vessel or persons aboard.
       ``(g) Right of Innocent Passage.--This section shall not be 
     construed as authority to restrict the right of innocent 
     passage as recognized under international law.
       ``(h) Foreign Vessel Defined.--In this section the term 
     `foreign vessel' has the meaning given that term in section 
     110 of title 46, United States Code.''.
       (b) Deadline for Publication.--The Secretary shall publish 
     a list under section 16(c)(2) of the Ports and Waterways 
     Safety Act, as amended by this section, by not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 13(e) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 
     U.S.C. 1232(e)) is amended by striking ``section 9'' and 
     inserting ``sections 9 and 16''.
       (2) Section 4(b)(2) of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act 
     (33 U.S.C. 1223(b)(2)) is amended by striking ``section 9'' 
     and inserting ``section 9 or 16''.

 TITLE III--ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO PREVENT CENSORSHIP ACTIVITIES IN 
                                  IRAN

     SEC. 301. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE 
                   ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN BROADCASTING.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the following:
       (1) The current status of availability of the Islamic 
     Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) on international 
     satellites, entities that facilitate its operation by 
     providing services or equipment, and the technical means that 
     it engages in jamming.
       (2) The instances, since January 1, 2012, in which the IRIB 
     engaged in activities that violated Article 19 of the 
     International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
     including broadcasting forced confessions and hate speech 
     against minorities.
       (3) The instances, since January 1, 2012, in which 
     international broadcasting programs originating from the 
     United States and Europe have been subject to disruption in 
     Iran, with relevant details such as which programs were 
     disrupted, available location information on the origin of 
     the disruption, and the extent of the disruption.
       (b) Coordination.--In developing the report required by 
     subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with 
     the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments 
     and agencies.
       (c) Public Availability.--All unclassified portions of the 
     report required by subsection (a) shall be made publicly 
     available on the Internet web site of the Department of 
     State.

     SEC. 302. LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE HIGH-RISK RE-EXPORTERS OF 
                   SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with the Secretary of 
     State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall make publicly 
     available and update as appropriate a list of persons who are 
     high-risk re-exporters of sensitive technologies in order to 
     seek to ensure that the Government of Iran or an entity owned 
     or controlled by that Government is unable to obtain 
     sensitive technologies through the re-export of such 
     sensitive technologies by third-party intermediaries.
       (b) Definition.--In this section, the term ``sensitive 
     technology'' has the meaning given that term in section 106 
     of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515).

     SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROVISION OF INTERCEPT 
                   TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) those that provide intercept technologies that limit 
     freedom of speech or expression to the Government of Iran 
     should be held accountable for the repression of the Iranian 
     people; and
       (2) no person should use an existing contract with the 
     Government of Iran as a justification to continue to supply 
     intercept technologies to the Government of Iran for purposes 
     of restricting the free flow of information.

     SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER 
                   COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN IRAN.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the Department of State should encourage the free flow 
     of information in Iran to counter the Government of Iran's 
     repression of its own people; and
       (2) in order to facilitate the free flow of information in 
     Iran, the Department of State should promote the availability 
     of certain consumer communication technologies to Iranian 
     civil society and the Iranian people.

     SEC. 305. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR 
                   AUTHORIZATION OF TRANSFER OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
                   TO IRAN TO FACILITATE THE ABILITY OF IRANIAN 
                   PERSONS TO FREELY COMMUNICATE.

       (a) In General.--Section 413 of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8753) is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e) Rule of Construction.--The expedited process for the 
     consideration of complete requests for authorization to 
     engage in the activities described in subsection (a) shall be 
     construed to also apply to the transfer of goods and services 
     to Iran to facilitate the ability of Iranian persons to 
     freely communicate, obtain information, and access the 
     Internet and other communications systems.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to requests described in section 413 of 
     the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 
     as so amended, that are submitted to the Office of Foreign 
     Assets Control on or after such date of enactment.

                  TITLE IV--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 401. NATIONAL STRATEGY ON IRAN.

       (a) National Strategy Required.--The President shall 
     develop a strategy, to be known as the ``National Strategy on 
     Iran'', that provides strategic guidance for activities that 
     support the objective of addressing the threats posed by 
     Iran.
       (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act or January 30, 2014, whichever 
     occurs first, and every January 30 thereafter, the President 
     shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
     National Strategy on Iran required under subsection (a).
       (c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under 
     subsection (b) shall include, at a minimum, the following:
       (1) A description of Iran's grand strategy and security 
     strategy, including strategic objectives, and the security 
     posture and objectives of Iran.
       (2) A description of the United States strategy to--
       (A) address and counter the capabilities of Iran's 
     conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces;
       (B) disrupt and deny Iranian efforts to develop or augment 
     capabilities related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile 
     forces development;
       (C) address the Government of Iran's economic strategy to 
     enable the objectives described in this subsection;
       (D) exploit key vulnerabilities; and
       (E) combat Iranian efforts to suppress Internet freedom, 
     including actions of the United States to--
       (i) work to promote expanded Internet access for democracy 
     activists in Iran;
       (ii) add a public diplomacy page to the United States' 
     virtual embassy in Iran; and
       (iii) leverage multilateral organizations committed to 
     Internet connectivity in Iran.
       (3) An implementation plan for the United States strategy 
     described in paragraph (2).
       (d) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form to the greatest extent 
     possible, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
       (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, 
     the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the 
     Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

     SEC. 402. REPORT ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR AND ECONOMIC 
                   CAPABILITIES.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
     following:
       (1) An estimate of the timeline for Iranian capabilities to 
     develop nuclear weapons, including--

[[Page H5229]]

       (A) an estimate of the period of time it would take Iran to 
     produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single implosion-
     type nuclear weapon, taking into account all known relevant 
     technical data;
       (B) an estimate of the period of time it would take Iran to 
     produce sufficient separated plutonium for a single nuclear 
     weapon;
       (C) a description of the assumptions underlying the 
     estimates referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B), and any 
     information about developments that might alter or otherwise 
     affect those assumptions;
       (D) an estimate of the date by which the periods of time 
     referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) will be less than 45 
     days; and
       (E) a description of any efforts by the United States to 
     increase the frequency of inspections by the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency of nuclear facilities in Iran.
       (2) An assessment of Iranian strategy and capabilities 
     relating to development of nuclear weapons, including--
       (A) a summary and analysis of current nuclear weapons 
     capabilities;
       (B) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding 
     expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized 
     by, Iran to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities;
       (C) a summary of the capabilities of Iran's unconventional 
     weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise 
     missile forces;
       (D) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's 
     unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces 
     and Iran's cruise missile forces as delivery systems for a 
     nuclear device;
       (E) a description of all efforts of Iran to design and 
     develop a nuclear weapon, including efforts to design or fit 
     warheads, and any other possible military dimensions of the 
     nuclear program of Iran; and
       (F) an analysis of the procurement network, including the 
     amount and sources of funding expended by Iran on programs to 
     develop a nuclear weapons capability.
       (3) Projected economic effects of international sanctions 
     on Iran, including--
       (A) an estimate of the capital accounts, current accounts, 
     and amounts of foreign exchange reserves (including access to 
     foreign exchange reserves) of the Government of Iran, and 
     other leading indicators of the status of the economy of 
     Iran;
       (B) an estimate of timelines with respect to macroeconomic 
     viability of Iran, including the time by which the Government 
     of Iran will exhaust its foreign exchange reserves;
       (C) an estimate of the date by which the reserves of the 
     Central Bank of Iran will be insufficient for the Government 
     of Iran to avoid a severe balance of payments crisis that 
     prevents it from maintaining a functioning economy, 
     including--
       (i) the inflation rate, exchange rates, unemployment rate, 
     and budget deficits in Iran; and
       (ii) other leading macroeconomic indicators used by the 
     International Monetary Fund, professional rating agencies, 
     and other credible sources to assess the economic health of a 
     country;
       (D) a description of the assumptions underlying the 
     estimate referred to in paragraph (3) and an indication of 
     how changes in each of those assumptions could affect the 
     estimate;
       (E) an assessment of the effect of sanctions imposed with 
     respect to Iran on moving forward the date referred to in 
     subparagraph (C); and
       (F) a description of actions taken by the Government of 
     Iran to delay the date referred to in subparagraph (C).
       (b) Update.--The President shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees an update of the report required by 
     subsection (a) every 60 days after the date of submission of 
     the report that includes any pertinent developments to 
     Iranian nuclear or economic capabilities.
       (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) and the 
     update required under subsection (b) shall be submitted in 
     unclassified form to the greatest extent possible, but may 
     include a classified annex, if necessary.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
     ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the 
     Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 
     and
       (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
     Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (2) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear explosive 
     device'' means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, 
     that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an 
     amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material that 
     is greater than the amount of energy that would be released 
     from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

     SEC. 403. REPORT ON PLAUSIBILITY OF EXPANDING SANCTIONS ON 
                   IRANIAN OIL.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the 
     following:
       (1) Whether petroleum and petroleum products originating in 
     and exported from Iran are refined and sold outside of Iran.
       (2) Whether products that contain Iranian-origin petroleum 
     or petroleum products as part of their contents are imported 
     into the United States and, if any such products are imported 
     into the United States, whether such importation violates the 
     ban on importation into the United States of Iranian-origin 
     petroleum or petroleum products.
       (3) Whether it is feasible to ban the importation into the 
     United States of products described in paragraph (2), 
     regardless of whether the ban on importation into the United 
     States of Iranian-origin petroleum or petroleum products 
     applies to such products.
       (b) Basis of Report.--The report required under subsection 
     (a) may be based on publicly-available information and 
     classified information. The information that is not 
     classified information shall be made publically available.
       (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, 
     the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
       (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
     Financial Services, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
     the House of Representatives; and
       (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on 
     Finance of the Senate.

     SEC. 404. GAO REPORT ON IRANIAN STRATEGY TO EVADE CURRENT 
                   SANCTIONS AND OTHER MATTERS.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall 
     submit to Congress a report that--
       (1) evaluates the strategy of the Government of Iran to 
     evade current economic and financial sanctions; and
       (2) specifically evaluates the ability of Iran to 
     successfully diversify its economy beyond its energy sector, 
     thereby lessening the impact and effectiveness of economic 
     and financial sanctions.

     SEC. 405. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS REQUIRED UNDER 
                   IRAN SANCTIONS LAWS.

       (a) In General.--Any or all reports required to be 
     submitted to Congress under the provisions of law described 
     in subsection (c) that are subject to a deadline for 
     submission consisting of the same unit of time may be 
     consolidated into a single report that is submitted to 
     Congress pursuant to such deadline.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect 
     to the initial report of any report described in subsection 
     (a).
       (c) Provisions of Law Described.--The provisions of law 
     referred to in this section are the following:
       (1) This Act and the amendments made by this Act.
       (2) The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 
     (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.).
       (3) The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.).
       (4) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
     Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.).
       (d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on the date 
     of the enactment of this Act and applies with respect to 
     reports required to be submitted to Congress under the 
     provisions of law described in subsection (c) on or after 
     such date of enactment.

     SEC. 406. AMENDMENTS TO DEFINITIONS UNDER IRAN SANCTIONS ACT 
                   OF 1996 AND IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA 
                   HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012.

       (a) Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.--Section 14(4)(B) of the 
     Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 
     1701 note) is amended by striking ``may include, in the 
     discretion of the President'' and inserting ``includes''.
       (b) Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
     2012.--Section 211 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
     Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8721) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate 
     congressional committees' includes the Committee on 
     Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation of the Senate.''.

     SEC. 407. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall 
     be construed to apply with respect to--
       (1) any activity relating to a project described in 
     subsection (a) of section 603 of the Iran Threat Reduction 
     and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8783) to which 
     the exception under that section applies at the time of the 
     activity; or
       (2) any authorized intelligence activity of the United 
     States.

     SEC. 408. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.

       (a) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
     authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
     International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 
     and 1704) to carry out this Act and the amendments made by 
     this Act.
       (b) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections 
     (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency 
     Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person 
     that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or 
     causes a violation of this Act or any amendment made by this 
     Act or regulations prescribed under this Act to the same 
     extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an 
     unlawful act described in

[[Page H5230]]

     section 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(a)).

     SEC. 409. SEVERABILITY.

       (a) In General.--If any provision of this Act, or the 
     application of such provision to any person or circumstance, 
     is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, 
     or the application of that provision to other persons or 
     circumstances, shall not be affected.
       (b) Effective Date Under Section 214.--If subsection (d) of 
     section 214 is found to be unconstitutional in accordance 
     with subsection (a), the amendments made by such section 214 
     take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
     apply with respect to transactions entered into on or after 
     such date of enactment.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition to the 
motion.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman from New York opposed to 
the motion?
  Mr. ENGLE. I am not opposed.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Royce) and the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison) 
each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to yield to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) one-half of my time and that he be 
allowed to control that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from New 
York will control 10 minutes.
  There was no objection.


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, there is no higher national security priority than 
preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. Foreign Affairs Ranking Member Engel 
and I have worked closely in a bipartisan way to bring this legislation 
to the floor, and we do it with unanimous support of the members of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, all Democrats and all Republicans on that 
committee. Indeed, 375 Members of the House are cosponsors of this 
legislation. That's the broad recognition that exists right now, that 
more needs to be done to stop Iran's nuclear program, which is a danger 
not only to us in the United States, but certainly to the region and to 
the world.
  Today, we act with that sense of urgency, urgency because Iran's 
march to nuclear weapons continues. In less than 2 years, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency has told us that they have doubled 
in Iran the installed centrifuges at the facilities at Natanz and 
Fordo. They've doubled those from 8,500 to more than 15,700 
centrifuges. And these new centrifuges, many of them are five times 
more powerful. They spin much faster than those earlier models.
  A key facility is buried deep below a mountain, and Iran continues to 
stonewall the IAEA on its development of nuclear explosive devices. So 
Iran's intent to develop this weapons capability is very evident.
  New President in Iran or not, I am convinced that Iran's supreme 
leader intends to continue on this path because that is what he says he 
intends to do; that is, unless sanctions bite to the point where the 
regime has to make a choice between compromise on its nuclear weapons 
program or the consequences of the sanctions on the regime.
  That is why this legislation dramatically steps up the pressure on 
the regime in Iran:
  It targets the energy sector by compelling countries that are 
currently purchasing oil from Iran to reduce their collective total by 
1 million barrels per day within a year;
  It targets additional sectors of Iran's economy;
  It further denies the regime access to foreign currency reserves;
  It effectively targets Iran's efforts to circumvent international 
sanctions against the shipping sector in the country;
  Equally important, this legislation increases sanctions against 
Iranian human rights abusers, making clear that it's the Iranian people 
that we are siding with.
  Only when the Iranian leadership truly feels a choice between 
maintaining power and obtaining the bomb does our diplomacy have a 
chance to succeed. And we know the Iran regime's view of the world, we 
know it only too well because its support of keeping the brutal Assad 
regime in power is self-evident. It has resupplied Hezbollah with 
25,000 new rockets, which target Israel.
  In recent years, there have been Iranian-sponsored attacks or plots 
uncovered by the Europeans in Bulgaria, also in India, Thailand, in 
Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Cyprus, in Kenya, and even here in 
Washington, D.C. I'd hate to see an Iran emboldened by a nuclear 
weapon, but that is the course we are on unless we dramatically step up 
the pressure. So let's pass this bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                                         House of Representatives,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce, I am writing with respect to H.R. 850, 
     the ``Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,'' which the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered reported favorably on 
     May 22, 2013. As a result of your having consulted with us on 
     provisions in H.R. 850 that fall within the Rule X 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary, and your 
     agreement to support mutually-agreeable changes to the 
     legislation, I agree to discharge our Committee from further 
     consideration of this bill so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House floor for consideration.
       The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual 
     understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 850 at 
     this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject 
     matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our 
     Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the 
     bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may 
     address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our 
     Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an 
     appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and asks 
     that you support any such request.
       I would appreciate a response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during Floor 
     consideration of H.R. 850.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Bob Goodlatte,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your 
     agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on the 
     Judiciary so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House 
     Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding 
     regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative 
     jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for 
     your Committee's participation in any conference committee 
     that may be named to consider this bill.
       I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important 
     legislation for Floor consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Darrell E. Issa,
     Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your 
     agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on 
     Oversight and Government Reform so that it may proceed 
     expeditiously to the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our 
     mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing 
     Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, 
     and my support for your Committee's participation in any 
     conference committee that may be named to consider this bill.
       I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important 
     legislation for Floor consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
                                                         Chairman.

[[Page H5231]]

     
                                  ____
         House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and 
           Government Reform
                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing concerning H.R. 850, the 
     ``Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,'' which your Committee 
     reported on May 22, 2013.
       H.R. 850 contains provisions within the Committee on 
     Oversight and Government Reform's Rule X jurisdiction. As a 
     result of your having consulted with the Committee and in 
     order to expedite this bill for floor consideration, the 
     Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will forego 
     action on the bill. This is being done on the basis of our 
     mutual understanding that doing so will in no way diminish or 
     alter the jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and 
     Government Reform with respect to the appointment of 
     conferees, or to any future jurisdictional claim over the 
     subject matters contained in the bill or similar legislation.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming 
     this understanding, and would request that you include a copy 
     of this letter and your response in the Committee Report and 
     in the Congressional Record during the floor consideration of 
     this bill. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Darrell Issa,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                              Committee on Financial Services,

                                    Washington, DC, July 30, 2013.
     Hon. Hon. Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: On May 22, 2013, the Committee on 
     Foreign Affairs ordered H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention 
     Act of 2013, as amended, to be reported favorably to the 
     House. As a result of your having consulted with the 
     Committee on Financial Services concerning provisions of the 
     bill that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction, I agree to 
     discharge our committee from further consideration of the 
     bill so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House Floor.
       The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with 
     our mutual understanding that, by foregoing consideration of 
     H.R. 850, as amended, at this time, we do not waive any 
     jurisdiction over the subject matter contained in this or 
     similar legislation, and that our committee will be 
     appropriately consulted and involved as the bill or similar 
     legislation moves forward so that we may address any 
     remaining issues that fall within our Rule X jurisdiction. 
     Our committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of 
     an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate 
     conference involving this or similar legislation, and 
     requests your support for any such request.
       Finally, I appreciate your July 26 letter confirming this 
     understanding with respect to H.R. 850, as amended, and would 
     ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in your committee's report to accompany the 
     legislation and/or in the Congressional Record during floor 
     consideration thereof.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
     Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your 
     agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on 
     Financial Services so that it may proceed expeditiously to 
     the House Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual 
     understanding regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X 
     legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my 
     support for your Committee's participation in any conference 
     committee that may be named to consider this bill.
       I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important 
     legislation for Floor consideration. Sincerely,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Ways and Means,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Royce: I am writing regarding H.R. 850, the 
     ``Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013,'' which was favorably 
     reported out of your Committee on May 22, 2013. I commend you 
     on your efforts to make sure that the United States is better 
     able to address the critical threats that Iran poses.
       I appreciate that in response to the concerns raised by the 
     Committee on Ways & Means, you have agreed to modify sections 
     102, 201, 214, 215, and 222 of H.R. 850 as reported out of 
     your Committee. As a result, in order to expedite floor 
     consideration of the bill, the Committee on Ways and Means 
     will forgo action on H.R. 850. Further, the Committee will 
     not oppose the bill's consideration on the suspension 
     calendar, based on our understanding that you will work with 
     us as the legislative process moves forward to ensure that 
     our concerns in the sections indicated above as well as other 
     provisions in the Committee's jurisdiction continue to be 
     addressed. This is also being done with the understanding 
     that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with 
     respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional 
     prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
       I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming 
     this understanding with respect to H.R. 850, and would ask 
     that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be 
     included in the Congressional Record during Floor 
     consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                        Dave Camp,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 2013.
     Hon. Dave Camp,
     Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
     850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, and for your 
     agreement to discharge H.R. 850 from the Committee on Ways 
     and Means so that it may proceed expeditiously to the House 
     Floor. I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding 
     regarding your Committee's continuing Rule X legislative 
     jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, and my support for 
     your Committee's participation in any conference committee 
     that may be named to consider this bill.
       I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important 
     legislation for Floor consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                                 Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                     Washington, DC, July 9, 2013.
     Hon. Bill Shuster,
     Chairman, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your consultation with the 
     Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran 
     Prevention Act of 2013, and your agreement to forgo a 
     sequential referral of that bill. I am writing to confirm our 
     mutual understanding regarding your Committee's continuing 
     Rule X legislative jurisdiction over portions of H.R. 850, 
     and my support for your Committee's participation in any 
     conference committee that may be named to consider that bill.
       I appreciate your assistance in expediting this important 
     legislation for floor consideration.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Edward R. Royce,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and 
           Infrastructure,
                                    Washington, DC, June 26, 2013.
     Hon. Ed Royce,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write concerning H.R. 850, the Nuclear 
     Iran Prevention Act of 2013, as ordered reported. There are 
     certain provisions in the legislation that fall within the 
     Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure.
       As a result of your having consulted with the Committee and 
     in order to expedite this legislation for floor 
     consideration, the Committee will not assert a jurisdictional 
     claim over this bill by seeking a sequential referral. 
     However, this is conditional on our mutual understanding and 
     agreement that doing so does not in any way alter or diminish 
     the jurisdiction of the Committee on Transportation and 
     Infrastructure with respect to the appointment of conferees 
     or to any future jurisdictional claim over the subject 
     matters contained in the bill or similar legislation. I 
     request you urge the Speaker to name members of the Committee 
     to any conference committee named to consider such 
     provisions.
       Please, place a copy of this letter and your response 
     acknowledging our jurisdictional interest into the committee 
     report on H.R. 850 and into the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of the measure on the House floor.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Shuster,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  My colleagues come here today proposing this new, intensified 
legislation on the basis that they would like to stop Iran from having 
a nuclear weapon. So do we.

                              {time}  1700

  Everything that my colleague, Mr. Royce, detailed a moment ago is 
something that we are concerned about.
  But we have a changed circumstance, a changed circumstance that this 
legislation does not acknowledge, and that is that the Iranian people 
had a choice between candidates, and they selected the candidate who 
decided to reject extremism and actually campaign on the basis of 
moderation. Why not? At least until Mr. Rouhani has a chance to 
forestall legislation like this and engage in

[[Page H5232]]

diplomacy to reach the goals that Mr. Royce has identified.
  Mr. Rouhani ran on a policy of promise to pursue a path of 
moderation. He promised to pursue a ``policy of reconciliation and 
peace.'' Obviously, we don't have rose-colored glasses. We don't know. 
But why don't we wait and see. Why aren't we at least curious to find 
out whether or not President Rouhani means that he wants to pursue this 
course of peace. It is what we want--negotiated settlement. Why are we 
slapping his hand down when apparently the Iranian people are willing 
to support a candidate who is willing to extend a hand?
  The New York Times agrees. It said:

       While sanctions are an important element of American 
     strategy, piling on more at this time and this moment could 
     harm, rather than advance, the chances for a negotiated deal 
     with Iran.

  In fact, Secretary of State John Kerry warned that additional 
sanctions at this moment might undermine diplomatic efforts.
  The fact of the matter is, why do we want to strengthen the hand of 
extremists who will say to Rouhani, See, you thought you could work 
with them. We were right all along.
  I say they're wrong. I say let's accept the olive branch extended by 
the Iranian people who selected a more moderate candidate.
  In fact, I would like to submit this document into the Record. The 
headline reads:

       Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Nominee for Foreign Minister, 
     Seen as Olive Branch to United States.

  Let me also acknowledge and put into the Record this letter, dated 
July 19, by 130 Members of Congress on a bipartisan basis to say 
President Obama pursued negotiations in this window of time when we 
have a President who won on the basis of extending a hand for 
negotiation.
  We don't have to do this now. We can do this when we come back after 
at least Mr. Rouhani is inaugurated into the presidency of Iran.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time, and I do have a number 
of speakers, when we're ready for that.

                  [From HuffPost World, July 31, 2013]

  Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Nominee for Foreign Minister, Seen as 
                     Olive Branch to United States

                   (By Marcus George and Paul Taylor)

       Dubai/Paris, July 29, 2013 (Reuters).--If Iranian 
     President-elect Hassan Rouhani wanted to signal his 
     determination to rebuild relations with the United States and 
     strike a ``grand bargain,'' he could hardly do better than 
     pick Mohammad Javad Zarif as his foreign minister.
       Iranian news agencies reported on Monday that Zarif, a 
     former ambassador to the United Nations and Tehran's leading 
     connoisseur of the U.S. political elite, is set to be in the 
     cabinet Rouhani will announce after taking office on Sunday. 
     A source close to Rouhani confirmed Zarif will be nominated 
     as foreign minister.
       A fluent English speaker who earned his doctorate at the 
     University of Denver, Zarif has been at the centre of several 
     secret negotiations to try to overcome 35 years of 
     estrangement between Washington and Tehran, diplomats said.
       Those talks failed because of deep mistrust on a range of 
     disputes from Iran's secretive nuclear programme and support 
     for anti-Israeli militants to U.S. sanctions and hopes of 
     engineering ``regime change'' in Tehran.
       Zarif's elevation, however, suggests the moderate new 
     president is keen to make another try at breaking the 
     deadlock.
       ``He was always trying to do what was possible to improve 
     relations in a very intelligent, open and clear way,'' said a 
     senior Western diplomat who had repeated dealings with Zarif.
       ``This is someone who knows the United States very well and 
     with all the frustrations of the past is still someone they 
     know in Washington,'' he said.
       The usual caveats about Iran apply: under the Islamic 
     Republic's complex institutional set-up, Supreme Leader 
     Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls the shots in foreign and 
     security policy and controls the nuclear programme, which 
     Western powers say is aimed at developing atomic weapons.
       The foreign minister ranks roughly fourth in the foreign 
     policy pecking order, after Khamenei, the head of the 
     National Security Council, who also serves as Iran's chief 
     nuclear negotiator, and the president.
       Nevertheless, assuming he is confirmed by Iran's prickly, 
     conservative-dominated parliament, Zarif's appointment would 
     be a strong gesture of positive intent towards the United 
     States.
       The two countries have had no official ties since 1980 
     after Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, 
     taking 52 diplomats hostage in protest against Washington's 
     admission of the former Shah after he was toppled by the 
     Islamic revolution.


                              contact book

       Zarif's Washington contact book includes Vice President Joe 
     Biden, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and a who's who of 
     U.S. national security officials on both sides of the aisle.
       The soft-spoken career diplomat resigned from the nuclear 
     negotiating team after hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
     was elected in 2005.
       In 2007, he returned from New York after five years as 
     Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations and 
     found himself out of favour as his country turned its back on 
     the notion of seeking better ties with the West and 
     Ahmadinejad sidelined English-speaking diplomats.
       Since then, Zarif has been in a holding pattern, nominally 
     senior adviser to the foreign minister from 2007 to 2010, 
     then from 2011 international director of Islamic Azad 
     University, a network of educational institutions established 
     by ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, his political 
     patron.
       Rafsanjani, who is also Rouhani's mentor, has long favoured 
     a pragmatic rapprochement with the United States, but 
     Khamenei has stamped on all such efforts since he succeeded 
     the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
     Khomeini, in 1989.
       Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat who served as 
     President Barack Obama's top Middle East adviser until 2011, 
     said Zarif had shown a willingness to negotiate in good faith 
     and his appointment would be seen in Washington and Europe as 
     an indication that Rouhani wants to ``do business'' with the 
     West.
       But he cautioned that the question remained whether this 
     would translate into an easing of Tehran's resistance to 
     curbing its nuclear drive. ``Zarif is not someone who does 
     favours for the United States,'' Ross said. ``He fits the 
     category of a sign or signal until you see Iran actually 
     doing something.''
       Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to President 
     George H.W. Bush, described Zarif as ``reasonable'' but said 
     much would depend on how much leeway he is given.
       Western diplomats said Zarif was a central negotiator in 
     the last major effort to negotiate a ``grand bargain'' 
     between Tehran and Washington that began after the Sept. 11, 
     2001, attacks on the United States and foundered in mid-2003.
       U.S. newspapers published in 2007 the bare text of a draft 
     agreement, put together in secret talks in Paris, Geneva and 
     New York, that would have established negotiations between 
     the two countries on all outstanding issues.
       While the draft fell short of an agreement on substance, it 
     noted both sides' expectations on issues such as assurances 
     that Iran's nuclear programme has no military capability, and 
     assurances that the United States would act against anti-
     government People's Mujahideen activists based in Iraq.
       ``The texts are authentic,'' said a Western diplomat who 
     was involved in the back-channel talks, confirming that 
     Khamenei had given the green light for negotiations to go 
     ahead.


                           hostage negotiator

       Years earlier, as a junior diplomat Zarif was involved in 
     negotiations to win the release of U.S. hostages held by pro-
     Iranian gunmen in Lebanon, according to the memoirs of former 
     U.N. envoy Giandomenico Picco. Even though the United States 
     did not make a promised reciprocal goodwill gesture at the 
     time, Zarif remained committed to improving ties.
       In Washington, Trita Parsi, president of the pro-dialogue 
     National Iranian American Council, said Zarif has been 
     involved in multiple U.S.-Iranian negotiations, including 
     talks on Afghanistan after the U.S.-led 2001 invasion, and 
     Tehran's 2003 proposal for a ``grand bargain'' with the 
     United States.
       ``Based on my interviews with him, (Zarif) was involved in 
     the drafting of it,'' Parsi said of that offer of a 
     comprehensive new start, which then President George W. 
     Bush's administration spurned.
       Veteran U.S. diplomat James Dobbins, the U.S. point man at 
     a 2001 Bonn conference that formed a new Afghan government 
     after the overthrow of the Taliban, credited Zarif with a 
     pivotal, positive role in the diplomacy--and with a sense of 
     humour.
       Dobbins--now the State Department's special envoy for 
     Afghanistan and Pakistan--recalled in 2007 testimony to the 
     U.S. Congress how Zarif, then a deputy foreign minister, 
     persuaded the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to drop its 
     demand for control of an outsize proportion of Afghan 
     ministries.
       The Northern Alliance delegate ``remained obdurate. 
     Finally, Zarif took him aside and whispered to him for a few 
     moments, following which the Northern Alliance envoy returned 
     to the table and said: `Okay, I agree. The other factions can 
     have two more ministries. And we can create three more, which 
     they can also have.' We had a deal,'' Dobbins recalled.
       ``Zarif had achieved the final breakthrough without which 
     the (Hamid) Karzai government might never have been formed.''
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, July 26, 2013]

     Iran Is Said to Want Direct Talks With U.S. on Nuclear Program

                         (By Michael R. Gordon)

       Washington.--Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq 
     told the Obama administration this month that Iran was 
     interested in direct talks with the United States on Iran's

[[Page H5233]]

     nuclear program, and said that Iraq was prepared to 
     facilitate the negotiations, Western officials said Thursday.
       In a meeting in early July with the American ambassador in 
     Baghdad, Mr. Maliki suggested that he was relaying a message 
     from Iranian officials and asserted that Hassan Rouhani, 
     Iran's incoming president, would be serious about any 
     discussions with the United States, according to accounts of 
     the meeting.
       Although Mr. Maliki indicated that he had been in touch 
     with confidants of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali 
     Khamenei, he did not disclose precisely whom he was dealing 
     with on the Iranian side. Some Western officials remain 
     uncertain whether Iran's leaders have sought to use Iraq as a 
     conduit or whether the idea is mainly Mr. Maliki's 
     initiative.
       State Department officials declined to comment on Mr. 
     Maliki's move or what steps the United States might have 
     taken in response. American officials have said since the 
     beginning of the Obama administration that they would be open 
     to direct talks with Iran.
       ``Iraq is a partner of the United States and we are in 
     regular conversations with Iraqi officials about a full range 
     of issues of mutual interest, including Iran,'' said Patrick 
     Ventrell, a State Department spokesman. ``As we have 
     repeatedly said, we are open to direct talks with Iran in 
     order to resolve the international community's concerns about 
     Iran's nuclear program.''
       Gary Samore, who served as the senior aide on 
     nonproliferation issues at the National Security Council 
     during President Obama's first term in office, said that it 
     was plausible that Iran would use Iraq to send a message 
     about its willingness to discuss nuclear issues.
       ``The Iranians see Maliki as somebody they have some trust 
     in,'' said Mr. Samore, who is the director of the Belfer 
     Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. 
     ``From Maliki's standpoint, it would serve a number of 
     different purposes. He does not want to be squeezed between 
     Washington and Tehran.''
       In a separate move on Thursday, the State and Treasury 
     Departments announced that the United States was expanding 
     the list of medical devices, like dialysis machines, that 
     could be sold to Iran without a license.
       In a conference call with reporters, David Cohen, the under 
     secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, said that 
     the move was intended to ``accelerate trade'' in these 
     medical devices and address humanitarian needs in Iran. The 
     announcement was also seen by many observers as a good-will 
     gesture before Mr. Rouhani prepares to take office in Tehran 
     on Aug. 4.
       Direct talks have the potential to ratchet down some of the 
     pressure on President Obama over one of his greatest foreign 
     policy challenges, the buildup of Iran's nuclear program.
       Mr. Obama has said that he will not permit Iran to have a 
     nuclear weapon and has asserted that the use of military 
     force is an option. Israeli officials have staked out a far 
     tougher position, asserting that Iran should not be allowed 
     to have the ability to build a weapon--and that the United 
     States should do more to convince the Iranians that its 
     threat to use force is credible. Israel has not ruled out 
     military action of its own.
       International sanctions have taken a serious toll on the 
     Iranian economy and have helped bring Iran to the negotiating 
     table, but have not yet extracted significant concessions 
     from Iran on its nuclear program. For years, the United 
     States and its partners--Britain, France, Germany, Russia and 
     China--have met on and off with Iranian officials in a 
     dialogue that has become known as the ``P5 plus 1'' talks.
       Nonproliferation experts continue to argue that it is 
     difficult to make major headway in such a committeelike 
     forum, and that if progress is to be made, it will have to 
     happen in private one-on-one discussions between Iranian 
     officials and the Obama administration.
       Whether Iran is genuinely interested in such talks, 
     however, has been a subject of debate. In 2009, William J. 
     Burns, then the under secretary of state for political 
     affairs, met with Saeed Jalili, the Iranian nuclear 
     negotiator, on the margins of the ``P5 plus 1'' talks. They 
     agreed in principle that a portion of Iran's enriched uranium 
     could be used to make fuel for Tehran's research center, 
     which would preclude that material from being further 
     enriched to make nuclear weapons.
       But that deal fell through after Ayatollah Khamenei 
     objected, and there have been no direct talks since. In a 
     meeting this month with Iran's departing president, Mahmoud 
     Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Khamenei was sharply critical of the 
     American stance.
       ``The Americans are unreliable and illogical, and are not 
     honest in their approach,'' Ayatollah Khamenei said. But he 
     also said that he did not oppose talks ``on certain issues.''
       Even if direct talks are agreed to they are almost certain 
     to be tough.
       ``The establishment of a bilateral channel is a necessary 
     but not sufficient condition for coming to an agreement,'' 
     Mr. Samore said. ``They want a nuclear weapons capability, 
     and we want to deny them a nuclear weapons capability. 
     Finding a compromise between those two objectives is going to 
     be very difficult.''
       Mr. Maliki, Western officials said, is not the only Iraqi 
     politician who has encouraged a dialogue between the United 
     States and Iran. Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of a major Shiite 
     party in Iraq, is also said to have made that point.
       During the war in Iraq, Iraqi officials also urged direct 
     dealings between the United States and Iran.
       Talks were held in Baghdad, but they were focused on the 
     conflict in Iraq and Iran's support for Shiite militias 
     there--not the nuclear question--and got nowhere.
       Mr. Maliki's government appears to have been aligned with 
     Iran on some issues, like its support for President Bashar 
     al-Assad of Syria. Iranian aircraft have ferried huge 
     quantities of arms through Iraqi airspace. Iraqi officials 
     have asserted that they do not have the means to stop the 
     flights, but Mr. Maliki has also been concerned that Mr. 
     Assad's fall will lead to an escalation of Sunni challenges 
     to his government in Iraq.
       American officials have repeatedly said that Mr. Maliki is 
     not a pawn of Iran and that the United States should try to 
     expand its influence in Iraq, including by selling arms.
                                  ____



                                Congress of the United States,

                                    Washington, DC, July 19, 2013.
     President Barack Obama,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear President Obama: As Members of Congress who share your 
     unequivocal commitment to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, we 
     urge you to pursue the potential opportunity presented by 
     Iran's recent presidential election by reinvigorating U.S. 
     efforts to secure a negotiated nuclear agreement.
       As you know, on June 14 the Iranian people elected Hassan 
     Rouhani president with over 50 percent of the vote in the 
     first round, overcoming repression and intimidation by the 
     Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform. 
     Dr. Rouhani campaigned on the promise to ``pursue a policy of 
     reconciliation and peace'' and has since promised 
     ``constructive interaction with the outside world.'' As 
     Iran's former lead nuclear negotiator, he has also publicly 
     expressed the view that obtaining a nuclear weapon would run 
     counter to Iran's strategic interests and has been critical 
     of the nuclear ``extremism'' of outgoing President Mahmoud 
     Ahmadinejad.
       We are mindful of the limitations of the Iranian presidency 
     within the country's political system, of the fact that 
     previous Iranian presidents elected on platforms of 
     moderation have failed to deliver on promised reforms, and of 
     the mixed signals that Dr. Rouhani himself has sent regarding 
     Iran's nuclear ambitions. It remains to be seen whether his 
     election will indeed bring significant change with regard to 
     Iran's relations with the outside world. His government's 
     actions will certainly speak louder than his words.
       Even so, we believe it would be a mistake not to test 
     whether Dr. Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity 
     for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement on 
     Iran's nuclear program that ensures the country does not 
     acquire a nuclear weapon. In order to test this proposition, 
     it will be prudent for the United States to utilize all 
     diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks. In 
     addition, bilateral and multilateral sanctions must be 
     calibrated in such a way that they induce significant and 
     verifiable concessions from Iran at the negotiating table in 
     exchange for their potential relaxation.
       We must also be careful not to preempt this potential 
     opportunity by engaging in actions that delegitimize the 
     newly elected president and weaken his standing relative to 
     hardliners within the regime who oppose his professed 
     ``policy of reconciliation and peace.'' Likewise, it will be 
     critical for the United States to continue its efforts to 
     foster unprecedented international cooperation on this issue 
     so that the international community remains united in its 
     opposition to Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.
       We look forward to working with your Administration on this 
     important issue in the months ahead.
           Sincerely,
     Charles Dent,
     David Price,
       Members of Congress.

                        List of Cosigners (131)

       Dent, Charles (PA-15); Price, David (NC-04); Barber, Ron 
     (AZ-02); Bass, Karen (CA-37); Becerra, Xavier (CA-34); Bera, 
     Ami (CA-07); Bishop, Sanford (GA-02); Bishop, Tim (NY-01); 
     Blumenauer, Earl (OR-03); Bonamici, Suzanne (OR-01); 
     Bordallo, Madeleine (GU); Braley, Bruce (IA-01); Bustos, 
     Cheri (IL-17); Campbell, John (CA-45); Capps, Lois (CA-24).
       Capuano, Michael (MA-07); Cardenas, Tony (CA-29); Carson, 
     Andre (IN-07); Cartwright, Matthew (PA-17); Christensen, 
     Donna (VI); Clay, William Lacy (MO-01); Cleaver, Emanuel (MO-
     05); Clyburn, James (SC-06); Coble, Howard (NC-06); Cohen, 
     Steve (TN-09); Cole, Tom (OK-04); Connolly, Gerald (VA-11); 
     Conyers, John (MI-13); Courtney, Joe (CT-02); Cuellar, Henry 
     (TX-28).
       Cummings, Elijah (MD-07); Davis, Danny (IL-07); DeFazio, 
     Peter (OR-04); DeGette, Diana (CO-01); DeLauro, Rosa (CT-03); 
     DelBene, Suzan (WA-01); Dingell, John (MI-12); Doggett, Lloyd 
     (TX-35); Doyle, Michael (PA-14); Duckworth, Tammy (IL-08); 
     Duffy, Sean (WI-07); Duncan, Jr., John (TN-02); Edwards, 
     Donna (MD-04); Ellison, Keith (MN-05); Enyart, William (IL-
     12).
       Eshoo, Anna (CA-18); Esty, Elizabeth (CT-05); Farr, Sam 
     (CA-20); Fattah, Chaka (PA-02); Fitzpatrick, Michael (PA-08); 
     Fortenberry, Jeff (NE-01); Foster, Bill (IL-11);

[[Page H5234]]

     Garamendi, John (CA-03); Grijalva, Raul (AZ-03); Grimm, 
     Michael (NY-11); Gutierrez, Luis (IL-04); Hanna, Richard (NY-
     22); Hastings, Alcee (FL-20); Heck, Denny (WA-10); Higgins, 
     Brian (NY-26).
       Himes, James (CT-04); Holt, Rush (NJ-12); Honda, Michael 
     (CA-17); Jackson Lee, Sheila (TX-18); Johnson, Eddie B. (TX-
     30); Johnson, Hank (GA-04); Jones, Walter (NC-03); Kaptur, 
     Marcy (OH-09); Kelly, Robin (IL-02); Kind, Ron (WI-03); 
     Kuster, Ann (NH-02); Larsen, Rick (WA-02); Larson, John (CT-
     01); Lee, Barbara (CA-13); Lewis, John (GA-05).
       Loebsack, David (IA-02); Lofgren, Zoe (CA-19); Lujan, Ben 
     Ray (NM-03); Lujan Grisham, Michelle (NM-01); Matheson, Jim 
     (UT-04); McCollum, Betty (MN-04); McDermott, Jim (WA-07); 
     McGovern, James P. (MA-02); Meeks, Gregory W. (NY-05); 
     Miller, George (CA-11); Moore, Gwen (WI-04); Moran, James P. 
     (VA-08); Napolitano, Grace F. (CA-32); Neal, Richard E. (MA-
     01); Nolan, Richard (MN-08).
       Norton, Eleanor Holmes (DC); Nugent, Richard B. (FL-11); 
     O'Rourke, Beto (TX-16); Pascrell, Bill, Jr. (NJ-09); Pastor, 
     Ed (AZ-07); Payne, Donald M., Jr. (NJ-10); Perlmutter, Ed 
     (CO-07); Peters, Scott H. (CA-52); Peterson, Collin C. (MN-
     07); Petri, Thomas E. (WI-06); Pingree, Chellie (ME-01); 
     Pocan, Mark (WI-02); Polis, Jared (CO-02); Rahall, Nick J., 
     II (WV-03); Rangel, Charles B. (NY-13).
       Roybal-Allard, Lucille (CA-40); Ruiz, Raul (CA-36); Runyan, 
     Jon (NJ-03); Rush, Bobby L. (IL-01); Ryan, Tim (OH-13); 
     Sablan, Gregorio Kilili Camacho (MP); Schakowsky, Janice D. 
     (IL-09); Scott, Robert C. ``Bobby'' (VA-03); Serrano, Jose E. 
     (NY-15); Shea-Porter, Carol (NH-01); Sinema, Kyrsten (AZ-09); 
     Slaughter, Louise McIntosh (NY-25).
       Speier, Jackie (CA-14); Takano, Mark (CA-41); Thompson, 
     Glenn (PA-05); Thompson, Mike (CA-05); Tiberi, Patrick (OH-
     12); Tierney, John (MA-06); Tonko, Paul (NY-20); Tsongas, 
     Niki (MA-03); Visclosky, Peter (IN-01); Walz, Timothy (MN-
     01); Waters, Maxine (CA-43); Welch, Peter (VT-At Large); 
     Whitfield, Ed (KY-01); Yarmuth, John (KY-03).

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act 
of 2013.
  It's been a pleasure working with Chairman Royce to craft this 
bipartisan legislation, which, by the way, passed unanimously in the 
Foreign Affairs Committee. Every Republican, every Democrat voted 
``yes'' on this. It now has more than 370 cosponsors. We share the goal 
of preventing a nuclear-capable Iran, and I could not ask for a better 
partner than Mr. Royce in this effort.
  Mr. Speaker, I think all of us agree that a nuclear-capable Iran 
would pose a grave threat to the U.S., a threat to our allies in the 
region, and a threat to the future of the global nonproliferation 
regime. All of us are aware that Iran has violated numerous U.N. 
Security Council resolutions and repeatedly blocked IAEA inspectors 
seeking to investigate its nuclear program.
  After many years of deceit and stonewalling by the Iranian regime, I 
continue to hold out hope that we can achieve a peaceful resolution of 
the Iranian nuclear crisis through diplomatic means. But time is 
growing short. According to the IAEA, Iran is installing advanced 
centrifuges to enrich more uranium and continues to build a heavy water 
reactor that could produce plutonium.
  We must not allow the Iranians to play the same old game, engaging in 
endless negotiations with no results while continuing to advance the 
nuclear program. That's why we must continue to pursue a two-track 
approach to Iran, one that incorporates both pressure and negotiations.
  The legislation before us today will significantly ratchet up the 
pressure and hopefully give our diplomats the leverage they need to 
persuade Iran that its only viable option is to end its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons.
  Among other things, this bill seeks to cut Iran's oil exports by 
another 1 million barrels a day, a reduction of two-thirds from current 
levels. It also strengthens existing sanctions by authorizing the 
President to restrict significant commercial trade with Iran.
  In addition, the bill seeks to deny the Iranian regime hard currency 
by enhancing efforts to cut off Iran's access to euros.
  Finally, the legislation imposes new sanctions against Iranian 
shipping ports and expands existing sanctions against Iranian human 
rights violators.
  Mr. Speaker, some of my colleagues argue that we should delay 
sanctions until after the new President of Iran takes office. I 
respectfully disagree. I know they share the goal of preventing a 
nuclear-capable Iran, but I believe we should take a different 
approach.
  Our efforts to impose new sanctions should not be based on the 
Iranian political calendar. In my view, the paramount consideration 
should be the Iranian nuclear clock, the nuclear calendar, the amount 
of time it will take Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
  I have no reason to believe that the results of the recent Iranian 
election will fundamentally alter Iran's current course. The unelected 
supreme leader, the Ayatollah, remains the one true decision-maker at 
the pinnacle of the regime. And president-elect Rouhani, who was 
directly involved in efforts to deceive the international community 
when he served as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, made clear during 
the campaign that he supports Iran's nuclear ambitions.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.
  If Rouhani truly has the willing authority to make a bold gesture on 
Iran's nuclear program, like suspending enrichment, he has a small 
window of opportunity before this bill becomes law. I think all of us 
would welcome such a gesture, but I'm not holding my breath.
  In closing, I would like to reiterate that by strengthening sanctions 
we are not calling for an end of diplomacy. After many years of 
fruitless negotiations, it is clear that talks will only succeed if the 
regime feels pressure to change course. That is what we are trying to 
accomplish with this legislation today.
  I look forward to working with Chairman Royce to ensure that the 
strongest possible sanctions are enacted into law, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina (Mr. Price).
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise in reluctant 
opposition to this measure before us today.
  I have supported the repeated rounds of sanctions that Congress has 
already enacted. I have supported them because of the threat of a 
nuclear-armed Iran and because of the intransigence of the Iranian 
Government in defiance of the international community.
  These sanctions have brought the Iranian economy to its knees, they 
have yet to produce meaningful concessions by the Iranian Government. I 
have thus remained open to the possibility of additional sanctions as 
part of a broader strategy to induce the Iranian Government to change 
its course.
  But the bill before us today could not come at a worse time. In 3 
days, Iran will inaugurate a new President, Hassan Rouhani, elected on 
promises of moderation and openness despite repression and intimidation 
by the Iranian regime, trying to deny him that election.
  Since his election, Dr. Rouhani has made repeated overtures to the 
international community, signaling his intent to resume the stalled P-
5+1 nuclear talks upon taking office and promising greater transparency 
and confidence-building measures. He reportedly intends to appoint as 
his foreign minister a seasoned diplomat who favors closer ties with 
the West.
  Let us be clear: we do not know whether Rouhani truly intends to 
follow through on these promises. We don't know if he'll be able to 
overcome the resistance of Iran's hardliners. We do know that history 
counsels us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change in 
Iran, and Rouhani's actions will surely speak louder than his words.
  But to rush through a new round of sanctions before the new President 
has even taken office could slam the window of opportunity shut before 
we even have a chance to test whether it is genuine.
  A recent letter to the President signed by a group of respected 
former diplomats and military officials--including Ambassador Tom 
Pickering and the former commander of CENTCOM, General Joseph Hoar--has 
warned that further sanctions ``could empower hardliners, in the 
Iranian Government, who are opposed to nuclear concessions, at the 
expense of those seeking to shift policy in a more moderate 
direction.''
  Moreover, by removing the President's authority to relax sanctions on 
countries that are cooperating with

[[Page H5235]]

our strategy toward Iran, this bill risks shattering the unprecedented 
international coalition which we have worked so hard to build, thus 
making sanctions less effective than they are at this moment.
  Some argue that we should not be concerned about the House passing 
this bill, since it will be some time before the Senate follows with an 
improved bill, and longer still before the new sanctions take effect. I 
must say, that is not a very compelling argument for rushing this bill 
to the floor right now. Why not act when we can assess the diplomatic 
prospects more accurately?
  Mr. Speaker, I will take a back seat to no one when it comes to my 
concern about the threat posed by a nuclear Iran to our ally Israel, to 
the broader Middle East, and to the United States.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional minute to the 
gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I will yield to no one in my concerns 
about these matters. I believe we must redouble our efforts to secure 
an enforceable agreement that ensures Iran does not acquire a nuclear 
weapon.
  But sanctions alone are not a strategy. In order to be effective, 
they must be integrated into a broader strategy that brings all other 
elements of American power to bear on the challenge. The administration 
is working hard to advance such a strategy, with unprecedented 
cooperation from our international partners.
  If the strategy fails to induce the new Iranian Government to change 
its course, then new sanctions may, indeed, be warranted. But to pass 
them now only undercuts our Nation's strategic objectives.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this ill-timed bill.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Cantor), the esteemed majority leader.
  Mr. CANTOR. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Nuclear Iran 
Prevention Act.
  I want to commend the gentleman from California, chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, in his leadership in bringing this bill to 
the floor. I also would like to commend Congressman Engel for his 
leadership in working through this issue bringing forward this piece of 
legislation.
  The authoritarian regime in Iran is a brutal theocracy that 
suppresses dissent at home and sponsors terrorism and chaos abroad. For 
years, our State Department has listed Iran as the world's leading 
state sponsor of terrorism, and many Americans have lost their lives at 
the hands of Iranian-backed killers. In a bid to establish reasonable 
dominance, Iran foments instability in neighboring countries and is a 
co-belligerent in Bashar Assad's ruthless war against the Syrian 
people. Despite rhetoric that may lead some to a contrary conclusion, 
this is the nature of a regime that continues its headlong effort to 
acquire nuclear weapons capability.
  Like all Americans, I want to see Iran abandon its nuclear 
aspirations through peaceful negotiations, but its leaders must 
understand the path they are on now will only lead to more condemnation 
and pressure.
  Considering that Iran continues to flagrantly violate numerous U.N. 
Security Council resolutions that call for the suspension of its 
nuclear enrichment program, while denying inspectors access to 
suspected nuclear sites, it is clear that Iran has negotiated again and 
again in bad faith. America's policies must be based on facts and not 
some hope about a new government perhaps in Iran that somehow will 
change the nature of the clerical regime in Tehran. We must respond to 
Iran's policies and behavior, not to its rhetoric.
  This act will strengthen the sanctions already in place and provide 
the President with new economic tools to pressure Iran to change course 
before it is too late.

                              {time}  1715

  Strengthening these measures will help our diplomatic efforts to 
encourage Tehran to become a responsible member of the international 
community and, once and for all, to abandon its pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.
  Again, I want to thank the gentleman from California, the gentleman 
from New York, and the rest of the Foreign Affairs Committee for their 
hard work on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support this 
legislation.
  Mr. ELLISON. May I inquire as to the time we have remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Minnesota has 12\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New York has 6\1/2\ minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from California has 5 minutes remaining.
  Mr. ELLISON. I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Moran).
  Mr. MORAN. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota, my friend.
  Mr. Speaker, 29 prominent policymakers and experts who understand 
Iran and international relations, which includes former CENTCOM 
Commander, Ambassador Tom Pickering, stated in a letter to President 
Obama just 2 weeks ago: ``No further sanctions should be imposed or 
considered at this time.''
  There were 131 bipartisan Representatives who also urged the 
President to test the opportunity presented by Iran's recent election 
to avoid actions that could delegitimize the democratic election that 
just took place in Iran, because the fact is that the Iranian people 
rejected the very cleric of government that we have all opposed that 
has been defined by hostile actions against the United States. In fact, 
when Mr. Rouhani was running, the people of Iran knew he was a former 
nuclear negotiator, and he promised greater nuclear transparency and to 
pursue, in his words, peace and reconciliation with the outside world.
  Isn't that just what we are looking for?
  I can't imagine we are looking for another war of choice, that we 
want to escalate the rhetoric. This is the best opportunity we have had 
in at least 8 years, if not more. Why throw that away?
  Now, some will say, ``Well, what we do in the House doesn't really 
matter. The Senate isn't going to do anything,'' but that's a nuance. 
We may understand why the House is acting, but the rest of the world 
doesn't likely understand what's going on here.
  The fact is that this bill empowers the very hard-liners who are the 
problem. The Iranian people are extraordinarily diverse. In fact, they 
used to be America's best friend in the Muslim world, and they just 
rejected a government that represented all of the things we oppose, and 
they did it democratically. I can't imagine that we have to operate in 
such a vacuum that we are going to continue to impose sanctions, that 
we are going to take away the President's ability to exercise leverage 
in those negotiations, and that, in fact, we are even going to lay it 
on further by taking away the exemption for necessary food and 
medicine.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. MORAN. This is destructive because it punishes the Iranian people 
and empowers the hard-liners. We have no problem with punishing the 
clerical government and many of the people in the military. They don't 
represent our values, but we want the Iranian people to seize 
democracy, to represent our values, to enter into negotiations. We've 
got to be able to bring about a more peaceful and productive world.
  So I would strongly urge this House to hold off. Let the new 
President at least be inaugurated. Let him at least take over. Let's 
see what we can do. Let's not act so prematurely and destructively.
  Mr. ROYCE. At this time, Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the Speaker 
of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Boehner).
  Mr. BOEHNER. Let me thank my colleague from California--the chairman 
of the committee--and his whole committee for their hard work on this 
issue, and a special thanks to the chairman emeritus of the committee, 
my colleague from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), on whose efforts we are 
building today.
  I also want to thank the committee chairs and the members who have 
worked so hard to get this bill to the floor today.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 850, the Nuclear Iran 
Prevention Act. This legislation recognizes a stark

[[Page H5236]]

truth, and that is that Iran is a global menace, and this bill empowers 
the President to act decisively to address it.
  We know Iran is the world's most aggressive sponsor of terrorism, 
extending now into Syria, Libya, Lebanon, even into our hemisphere. We 
know that Iran is attempting to build an illicit nuclear weapons 
capability in willful defiance of both the U.N. Security Council and 
the IAEA, and we know the Supreme Leader and the Ayatollahs remain 
committed to the destruction of Israel, one of our dearest allies.
  The United States, especially its Congress, has a duty to respond to 
Iran's actions, not to its rhetoric, so this bill seeks to reduce 
Iran's oil exports by an additional 1 million barrels a day, which 
would be a two-thirds reduction from its current levels. We are also 
looking to target human rights violators, to close loopholes on access 
to hard foreign currency, and we will give the President the authority 
to restrict significant commercial trade with Iran. These strong and 
targeted sanctions will ensure that the administration has both the 
political and the economic tools to deal with this regime.
  Because the American people are not interested in allowing Iran 
another shot at running out the clock on negotiations while it marches 
toward developing a breakout of nuclear capability, I will cast my vote 
for this measure, and I would urge all of my House colleagues to join 
me.
  Mr. ENGEL. It is my pleasure now to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
minority whip, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I rise in support of this legislation, but I also thank my friend 
Keith Ellison for his perspective on this, and I want to speak to that 
as well. I want to thank Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel for 
their leadership on this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe the most dangerous threat to peace and 
stability in the Middle East continues to be that posed by Iran's 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, which would launch this turbulent region 
into a nuclear arms race that no one can afford to risk, including our 
troops in the region. Time and again, Security Council resolutions 
after Security Council resolutions, Iran has refused to heed the 
international community's warnings, and it has, instead, continued 
along a path toward the bomb, choosing isolation over integration.
  We are here today to talk about how to stop Iran's pursuit. As a 
government, we have many tools to use. Diplomacy is one and diplomacy 
must continue. Indeed, many feel the time is right to test President-
elect Rouhani's sincerity, and I agree, but he must expect us to turn 
his positive talk of a policy of reconciliation and peace into action. 
We should welcome and pursue his willingness to come to the table to 
negotiate. We need to test that, but delay has been too long for us not 
to pursue concurrent approaches. That tool of economic pressure, which 
is working, should also be pursued additionally. That is why I support 
this resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. I yield the gentleman an additional 1 minute.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I thank him for his 
thoughtfulness.
  Hopefully, negotiations will prove successful and such pressure can 
be either moderated or removed. President-elect Rouhani campaigned on a 
promise to ease the burden of sanctions on the Iranian people, and he 
won. We would welcome a second victory for him and the United Nations 
in seeing that objective of denuclearization realized.
  I support today's bill because I believe a robust sanctions regime 
could help encourage Iran to abandon its pursuit of the bomb and to end 
its support for terrorist groups and human rights abuses. President-
elect Rouhani is uniquely positioned, I believe, to show leadership on 
this and achieve early success in his new administration.
  However, our skepticism about the Iranian leadership's action in the 
past has been more than justified, but we must nevertheless continue to 
work for a resolution of this challenging issue. Engaging President-
elect Rouhani in our quest for early resolution is appropriate, but 
these sanctions are also appropriate. Therefore, I rise in their 
support.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism.
  Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, in February, I joined with our ranking member and our 
chairman and others in introducing this legislation, which passed our 
committee unanimously.
  Congress needs to act now because, while we go on summer break, new, 
faster centrifuges will be spinning 24-7-365. We are seeing Iran, as 
we've seen in hearings before our committee, evade the current 
sanctions. So, if we're going to keep the sanctions in force, we need 
this legislation to plug the loopholes that they are exploiting.
  Two facts remain unchanged by the Iranian elections: first, their 
program to create nuclear weapons continues; and second, the supreme 
leader, not the newly elected President, is making the decisions.
  Our committee adopted many amendments unanimously, including four of 
mine, and two I'd like to mention: one provides sanctions for those who 
sell uranium mining equipment to Iran, and another imposes sanctions on 
those who sell them dissident-suppressing technology.
  Those who oppose this bill need to come to the floor and say why Iran 
needs uranium mining equipment and dissident-suppressing technology. 
Let's pass this bill.
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you.
  Mr. Speaker, we have heard on the floor that we shouldn't base our 
diplomacy on the Iranian political calendar--I agree--but we shouldn't 
base our diplomacy and our foreign policy based on our political 
calendar.
  Recently, we enacted the most effective, crippling economic sanctions 
against Iran--ever--and it was done by the hard work of the 
administration, supported by Congress, to be able to mobilize an 
unprecedented coalition of people who agreed with us that they wanted 
to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons and sending that signal.
  But sadly, you can forget about President-elect Rouhani. This weakens 
President Obama. The optics now are to pull the rug out from underneath 
the newly elected moderate candidate. He's not my guy, he's not yours, 
but of the choices, it was a signal by the Iranian people.
  Think about the future tools. Are you really going to be able to 
ratchet up these sanctions much more dramatically? Do you expect China 
and Japan are going to follow that path? And, if they work, what about 
the dislocations to the American economy and the global economy in 
moving this oil off the market? I think people ought to consider that. 
Ultimately, the only solution is a diplomatic solution to try and work 
this through. We're not going to go to war and nuclear bomb them. We 
are not going to occupy Iran.
  It's ironic. Until recently--maybe still--Iran is the only country in 
the Middle East that had a positive view of Americans despite the fact 
that we helped the British overthrow their popularly elected President, 
Mossadegh, in 1953 and install the Shah as a dictator to rule over 
them.

                              {time}  1730

  I think there is a possibility that that recent election makes a 
difference in Iran. I hope it does. But one way to guarantee that it 
doesn't is to tell the Iranian people, We don't care what you do. We're 
going to rachet up the sanctions. We're going to undercut the new guy. 
We're going to tell you that we're just going to go down this path. It 
ought to be based on facts, on reason. Let these sanctions work. Don't 
undercut our President and the ability to be flexible if there is some 
daylight. Don't poke the Iranian people in the eye and ignore the sorry 
history we've had of fumbling the relationship with that country.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, it is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to 
the Democratic leader, Ms. Pelosi.

[[Page H5237]]

  Ms. PELOSI. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I thank you for 
the time and for your leadership as the ranking member on the Foreign 
Affairs Committee.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reiterate my strong belief that one of 
the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy is to build a world free of 
nuclear weapons. I applauded President Jimmy Carter at his inauguration 
in 1977 on a cold January day; I saluted President Reagan when he made 
his visit to Reykjavik, Iceland; and the commitment that many of our 
Presidents have made, including President Obama on this score.
  One of the pillars of our foreign policy must be to end the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; that is, to get rid of 
them. To meet that task today, our actions must be clear and our 
commitment must be unwavering. It must be to continue this policy of 
the United States to prevent any country from developing a nuclear 
weapons capability. That is why I offer my support for this bill today, 
the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act.
  This legislation recognizes that an Iran with a nuclear weapon would 
be an urgent threat to regional security and to global security, and, 
therefore, to the security of the United States of America. This 
measure builds on the progress made in 2010 when we enacted the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act. That 
law imposed sanctions to companies that sell Iran technology, services, 
know-how, and materials for its energy sector. It was the strongest 
Iran sanctions legislation ever passed by the Congress, but we must do 
more.
  With President Obama's strong, clear, and effective leadership, with 
broad bipartisan backing for a comprehensive strategy to halt Iran's 
nuclear program, we are seeing the results of the actions we have 
taken. More and more, Iran is being cut off from the financial system. 
Iran's oil is coming off the market. Iran's partners are cutting off 
ties of trade, business, and commerce. That's the way I think we should 
get this done, with economic sanctions.
  In short, Iran is feeling the bite of our sanctions, but we must keep 
the pressure on. Iran's nuclear pursuits continue. Iran's leaders 
refuse to change their approach and their policies. Iran's neighbors 
still feel the threat of the regime's declarations and actions. So our 
message must remain firm: Iran must suspend uranium enrichment, return 
to the negotiating table, and abandon its reckless pursuit of nuclear 
weapons.
  Now I appreciate and I have listened carefully and have the highest 
respect for Mr. McGovern and others, Mr. Ellison, who are opposing the 
resolution and have a different idea. I think as we weigh the equities, 
as they say, with all due respect to that approach, which I think is a 
reasonable one if we were dealing with a reasonable country with a 
reasonable leadership, but we are not.
  I know that the proximity to Israel is a cause for concern for 
Israel, our partner in the Middle East, and a concern for those of us 
who value the Israel-U.S. relationship. Israel has proximity, but we 
all have the problem. If Iran were to go farther in the development of 
a nuclear weapon, who else would want one in the region? What message 
does that send about our resolve to arrive at a world free of nuclear 
weapons?
  Anyway, I hope, as our colleagues say, a new regime is going to do 
all these things. I happen to think that no matter who is in power in 
Iran, that they probably would not abandon a nuclear program, calling 
it one for domestic and civilian use. That may be true. I hope it is. 
But I do think it is really important for us, because we have to make 
this opportunity--I hope that the inauguration of a new President, 
talks with the U.S. and the European allies and all the rest, can bear 
fruit. We can only hope that those reports prove true. We hope that 
progress is made toward an agreement that puts an end to Iran's pursuit 
of nuclear weapons and advances the cause of peace and security in the 
Middle East and around the world. Until that day comes, the Congress 
must continue to apply pressure. We must pursue all avenues of 
diplomacy and international leadership.
  Again, what are the pillars of our foreign policy? To promote our 
economy, the creation of jobs by promoting exports--that's on the 
economic side; export our values, the commitment to freedom and 
democracy throughout the world. What does that mean? To protect the 
American people and our national security. An important part of that 
pillar of our foreign policy is to rid the world of weapons of mass 
destruction and make sure that we're not adding countries to that club. 
For that reason, we must prevent a nuclear armed Iran. Let's do it 
diplomatically. Let's do it with economic sanctions. Let's do it by 
encouraging dialogue, engagement, and the rest. But let's do that 
engagement from strength.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on the resolution.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from 
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen), the chairman emeritus of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the author of the previous Iran sanctions 
legislation.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, a nuclear Iran is one of our biggest national security 
threats and the number one existential threat to our ally, the 
democratic Jewish State of Israel. We cannot and must not allow Iran, 
who is a designated state sponsor of terrorism, to reach nuclear 
breakout capability.
  The Obama administration should not be mistaken. The Iranian regime 
does not want peace. It still wants to wipe Israel off the map. Iran 
may be able to process low-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by 
next year.
  Iran has agreed to offer Syria a $3.6 billion credit facility to buy 
oil products to help keep Assad's murderous regime afloat. Iran 
supports and fights alongside Assad's forces, brutally slaughtering 
thousands of Syrians. Rouhani has no intention of changing Iran's 
dangerous path, and the ultimate decisionmaker in this oppressive 
regime remains the Ayatollah Khamenei, who has a blatant hatred of us 
and our allies.
  This bill includes my amendment that would eliminate the authority to 
waive sanctions against persons who are guilty of the most egregious 
activities in direct support of the Iranian regime's nuclear program.
  This is a commonsense provision. This is a strong bill, and I urge 
all of my colleagues to fully support its passage
  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).
  Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I have great respect for Chairman Royce 
and Ranking Member Engel and incredible respect for my Democratic 
leaders and the Republican leaders who have spoken in favor of this 
bill. But I must rise in opposition to H.R. 850.
  This Sunday on August 4, Iran will inaugurate a new President, Hassan 
Rouhani. It is a moment that allows President Obama, Secretary of State 
Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel, and the international community an 
opportunity to reengage with Iran on key issues of concern, most 
importantly the development of Iran's capacity to develop and launch a 
nuclear weapon.
  This may be a very small window of opportunity for a fresh start on 
dialogue and action on the future of a nuclear Iran. It may be short-
lived, depending on how Iran's new President views this moment. But it 
is a time when I, for one, want to support the White House, the State 
Department, and the Pentagon's ability to move forward our relationship 
and dialogue with Iran on this most serious matter.
  It is not the moment for Congress to increase and expand the level of 
U.S. sanctions against Iran. We have plenty of sanctions right now 
against Iran. If for some reason we need to increase even further the 
pressure against Iran and its new President, then we have the time to 
do so. It does not need to be done before the new Iranian President 
even takes office. We have time to weigh his sincerity and, more 
importantly, his actions to improve Iran's relations with the 
international community in the weeks and months to come. If he does 
not, if Iran remains intransigent and determined to develop a nuclear 
weapon, then the current onerous regimen of sanctions can be increased. 
But now is not the time to undermine U.S. diplomacy before it even has 
a chance to take shape.
  Like all my House colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I'm 
skeptical that President-elect Rouhani will change the course of Iran's 
nuclear development, but I am willing to give him a chance. I'm willing 
to give Secretary

[[Page H5238]]

Kerry a chance. If nothing changes, then we can revisit this bill or 
others at a later date. But not now.
  I urge all of my colleagues to join me and vote against the untimely 
consideration of this bill.
  Mr. ENGEL. At this time, I yield to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings) for the purpose of making a unanimous consent request.
  (Mr. HASTINGS of Florida asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I 
rise in support of the measure that is being offered.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith), the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global 
Health, and Global Human Rights.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, first of all, let me thank 
Chairman Royce for offering this urgent and necessary bill, and Eliot 
Engel for his good cooperation on this important bill.
  The Iranian government is estimated to be a little more than a year 
away from developing nuclear weapons, an unprecedented and absolutely 
unacceptable threat. Iran's repeated threats to annihilate Israel are 
unconscionable and constitute a direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide in violation of article III of the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei speaks of Israel as a cancerous tumor, 
calls for the annihilation and destruction of the Jewish state, and the 
leveling of Tel Aviv and Haifa. These are not idle threats. President-
elect Rouhani, the past master of using negotiations as a cover to move 
Iran's nuclear program forward, is now being presented as a moderate, 
yet last year referred to Israel as the ``Great Zionist Satan.''
  Mr. Speaker, this bill dramatically ramps up sanctions pushed so 
effectively by Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen last Congress not only to 
pressure Iran to negotiate, but also to mitigate Iran's emerging 
capability to launch the genocidal war against Israel it has been 
threatening for years.
  This is a bipartisan bill, and it sends a clear, unmistakable message 
to Iran that we mean business. Those loopholes need to be closed, and 
Iran needs to be told that we want the sanctions to work. This tightens 
those loopholes and moves us in that direction.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. McDermott)
  (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McDERMOTT. Mr. Speaker, I am standing here asking: What's the 
rush? The Iranian President is being sworn in in 4 days. For the first 
time in years, there is a moderate who's been elected as head of Iran, 
who promises us progress on the issues that are of most concern to us.
  I'm not a blind optimist, and I have no illusions about the nature of 
Iran's Government. I understand that one election won't ensure us 
peace, but it could mean change, and we need to see what it looks like. 
Experts and former military officers, including the Commander in Chief 
of Central Command, warn that more sanctions right now will ``undercut 
the new President and his pledged plan of moderation.'' It gives 
ammunition to the hardliners who will operate against him. So the 
timing of this bill could not be worse from a foreign policy 
perspective.
  In addition, Members have not had a chance to fully review the bill, 
which is significantly different than when it was marked up coming out 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The marked-up version became public 
only a few days ago, and I know that many Members who cosponsored the 
original bill are not aware of the changes made in it. For these 
reasons, we sent a letter to our leadership asking, along with 15 other 
Members, urging them to delay consideration until after September. We 
could come back after our vacation and deal with this if it's really 
needed. It doesn't have to happen now, except because we're going out 
on Friday.
  Passing this legislation would support the hardliners' claims that we 
have no intention of negotiating; we hit the President before he even 
sits down in the chair. It's a dangerous sign to send and it limits our 
ability to find a diplomatic solution on nuclear arms in Iran.
  There is no public support in this country for another war. We've 
seen this movie before. We put sanctions on Iraq. I was here when they 
put them on. I saw us squeeze them for 10 years. The World Health 
Organization said 500,000 Iraqi kids died because we cut off medicine 
and food and other essentials to the Iraq community. Did it end in a 
change? No. We went to war with them. And if you think that this is 
going to squeeze and bring us to war, and you think that what happened 
in Iraq is going to happen here, remember we're 11 years in Iraq. And 
we do not have a stable democracy today. We have a government that's 
about to collapse.
  What we think we can do by squeezing people--and you're squeezing 
Iranian children today. Iranians cannot buy medicine on the world 
market and pay because we have cut off all of the banking connections 
everywhere so that there's no way for them to slip money through the 
banking system to pay for medicine for kids.
  We should delay this vote. Vote ``no.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has 
expired.
  Mr. ENGEL. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
Schneider), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. SCHNEIDER. I want to thank the ranking member.
  Mr. Speaker, preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon through 
sanctions and diplomatic pressure is one of the paramount issues of our 
time, and I am appreciative that today we will continue this important 
work to contain the threat.
  The bill before us seeks to expand the instruments available to the 
administration in implementing targeted sanctions against the Iranian 
Government, while at the same time providing flexibility to relieve 
undue burden on the population of Iran. I want to thank the chairman 
and the ranking member and the committee for working diligently on this 
bill, and I want to thank the members of the committee for joining me 
in support of this bill.
  Mr. ROYCE. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Poe), 
the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation.
  Mr. POE of Texas. This new so-called President of Iran is no 
different than Ahmadinejad. Rouhani is no moderate; he's just slick. He 
has lied to the United States in the past. Don't be deceived; he is not 
even in charge of Iran.
  The Ayatollah is in charge, and the Ayatollah picked all of the 
candidates running for president. The Ayatollah is still running the 
shots and is determined to get nuclear weapons and eliminate Israel and 
then the United States. And then what? Are we going to say, Oops, we 
made a mistake.
  We need these sanctions. We need a regime change in Iran, a peaceful 
one with the Iranian people. This Ayatollah has Hezbollah running all 
over the world causing terror, including killing his own people in Camp 
Liberty. We need to pass this legislation.
  Mr. ENGEL. I am pleased to yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Al Green).
  Mr. AL GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, with respect to all of my 
colleagues and the various positions that are being put forth, I 
support H.R. 850, a copy of which I happen to have in my hand; and I 
would point to page 38, line 11, which deals with exceptions for the 
sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices. 
I wanted to bring some clarity to this issue.
  With global security at risk, I don't think that we can take the 
risk. I do believe that we can proceed with diplomacy and sanctions at 
the same time. I support H.R. 850.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Arkansas (Mr. Cotton), who helped forge this legislation, H.R. 850.
  Mr. COTTON. Mr. Speaker, Hassan Rouhani is no moderate. He was a 
devoted follower of the 1979 revolutionary cabal in Iran. He led the 
1999 crackdown on students in Iran. He's bragged about deceiving 
Western nuclear inspectors. He's called Israel a Zionist Satan. He's 
not even a President-elect because he was chosen in a sham democracy 
and a sham election.

[[Page H5239]]

  Iran isn't looking for a chance to get to ``yes'' in negotiations. 
They are looking to give you a pretext to get to ``no'' on this 
legislation. Stand strong and vote ``yes'' to sanction Iran to stop 
their nuclear weapons capabilities.
  Mr. ENGEL. At this time I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Deutch), the ranking member of the Middle East 
Subcommittee.
  Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Chairman Royce and 
Ranking Member Engel for working so hard to shepherd this bill through 
the House in a bipartisan way.
  This legislation before us today takes a significant step forward in 
our efforts to prevent the Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear 
weapons capabilities. Sanctions passed by this House have had 
devastating effects on the Iranian economy, and this legislation will 
continue our efforts to financially squeeze the regime by dramatically 
reducing Iran's oil exports and by diminishing Iran's ability to access 
other currencies, all of this while ensuring that humanitarian aid will 
continue to flow.
  Despite claims made earlier, this does not cut off medicine for 
children.
  Beyond that, this bill recognizes that despite a somewhat surprising 
outcome to the June presidential elections, the Iranian people are 
still living under a regime that too often brutally represses 
democratic ideals, and it imposes sanctions on those who aid the 
regime's active violation of human rights.
  To my friends who argue that this is the wrong time, I'd ask you to 
consider this: newly elected President Rouhani is scheduled to be sworn 
in in 4 days. He campaigned on economic sanctions relief. This relief 
will only come when the Ayatollah, when the supreme leader, decides to 
relinquish the nuclear weapons program. Now is the time to let 
President-elect Rouhani's actions speak louder than his words. Let him 
tell the supreme leader that the United States House of Representatives 
has passed new, devastating sanctions, and the only way to relief is 
through a negotiated end to the nuclear weapons program.
  Our policy on Iran has always been dual track: sanctions and 
diplomacy. Now is not the time to give up on either.
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
  We have to look at things as they really are, not as we wish them to 
be. To my friends who say, What's the hurry? The hurry is we don't have 
time to wait. While we're talking, centrifuges are spinning and Iran is 
getting ever closer to having a nuclear weapon. By waiting, we're only 
aiding and abetting them.
  Mr. Rouhani is no moderate. Moderates were not allowed to run in this 
Iranian election. He may be the least hard-core of all the hardliners; 
but make no mistake about it, he was directly involved in efforts to 
deceive the international community when he served as Iran's chief 
nuclear negotiator. And he made clear during his campaign that he 
supports Iran's nuclear ambitions.
  This is a bipartisan bill, and for good reason we have over 370 
cosponsors. I respectfully ask my colleagues to vote ``yes.''
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Speaker, the centrifuges are, indeed, spinning. 
And it is Mr. Rouhani as chief negotiator who met the international 
community with delay, with more centrifuges, more missiles, more 
stonewalling. And as my colleagues have pointed out, during that 
campaign he was the hand-picked candidate of the Ayatollah, one of 
eight hand-picked candidates because reformers were not allowed to run, 
was the one on the campaign who said--who boosted--about how he, as 
chief negotiator in Iran, didn't suspend enrichment but instead 
completed the program.
  This is the individual who, when he chaired Iran's National Security 
Council between 1989 and 2005, was at the table when Iran masterminded 
the 1994 bombing of the Jewish center in Buenos Aires. He is the 
individual who gave the order and boasted of it; the man who called on 
the regime's besieging militia to attack the students in 1999 and crush 
them, in his words, crush them mercilessly, crush them monumentally--a 
thousand arrested; hundreds tortured; 70 disappeared; many, many 
killed. This is the nature of that man. Do not misunderstand his 
intentions. That's why we need this legislation.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, last week The Hill published a column 
entitled ``Don't force an irresponsible vote on Iran sanctions.'' The 
column started with the following two sentences: ``The House of 
Representatives is under pressure to vote on a new Iran sanctions bill, 
H.R. 850, before members leave town for August recess. Scheduling such 
a vote would be irresponsible and highly counterproductive to U.S. 
strategy on Iran.''
  The authors of the column were not some peaceniks or pundits, but 
experts with real life experiences in military, diplomacy and fighting 
for a future of freedom for the people of Iran--Gen. (retired) Joseph 
Hoar, former Commander in Chief of United States Central Command, Col. 
(retired) Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to General Colin 
Powell, and Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American 
Council.
  Today, the House of Representatives is advancing this ``irresponsible 
and highly counterproductive'' bill to push Iran deeper into a state of 
isolation and push the U.S. further away from a diplomatic resolution 
to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Most disturbing, by severely 
limiting diplomatic options for the U.S. and our international 
partners, this bill advances the agenda of those who seek to once again 
push the U.S. towards military confrontation. Our nation has been down 
this irresponsible, dangerous and costly path before with the war in 
Iraq and I completely reject the idea that war with Iran is inevitable 
or a viable solution to this situation.
  On August 3rd the new president of Iran, Dr. Hassan Rouhani, will 
take office. Dr. Rouhani was elected as a moderate voice who campaigned 
to ``pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation'' with the West. The 
new president was Iran's former lead nuclear negotiator and was 
critical of the nuclear ``extremism'' of his dangerous predecessor, 
President Ahmadinejad. This is the absolute best opportunity and most 
favorable conditions to proceed with a diplomatic course.
  Just in the past month, I received over 100 calls, e-mails and 
letters urging me to sign a letter to President Obama calling for a 
renewed diplomatic effort with Iran's new leader.
  On July 19th I joined 130 Democrats and Republicans in signing the 
letter to Mr. Obama urging him ``to pursue the potential opportunity 
presented by Iran's recent presidential election by reinvigorating U.S. 
efforts to secure a negotiated nuclear agreement.'' Our letter goes on 
to say, ``we believe it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. 
Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity for progress toward a 
verifiable, enforceable agreement on Iran's nuclear program that 
ensures the country does not acquire a nuclear weapon. In order to test 
this proposition, it will be prudent for the United States to utilize 
all diplomatic tools to reinvigorate ongoing nuclear talks.''
  H.R. 850 and its extreme sanctions takes the opposite course. It 
sends the signal that the U.S. wishes to punish the Iranian people and 
will only settle for submission, rather than a negotiated, face saving 
solution that meets the security needs of the United States, Israel, 
and the entire international community and the economic needs of the 
Iranian people. This bill is a blunt instrument that harms U.S. 
interests, undercuts President Obama, and gives no hope to the millions 
of Iranians who look to the U.S. as a beacon of freedom and 
inspiration.
  Clearly there are no guarantees that diplomacy will work in the near 
term and preventing a nuclear-armed Iran is an absolute. So, advancing 
H.R. 850 and tougher sanctions can proceed at anytime in the months 
ahead if Iran rejects negotiations or refuses to take tangible, 
verifiable steps towards an agreement. The House could vote on this 
bill in October or November, giving President Obama, our international 
partners, and the new Iranian leadership a legitimate window of time to 
seek peaceful progress.
  This bill has 375 co-sponsors so there is absolute certainty that 
this bill will pass and then Congress can go on its August recess. This 
bill will not move in the U.S. Senate in the days ahead so nothing will 
be accomplished by the passage of H.R. 850 other than some chest 
pounding by politicians, the imposition of an embarrassing obstacle to 
U.S. diplomats, and a victory for the hardliners in Iran who reject 
negotiations as much as hardliners in this country.
  Today, at this moment in time, this is a bill that harms U.S. 
interests and I will vote against it.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express 
concern about the decision to bring H.R. 850 to the floor for a vote 
today. We must act strongly and strategically to prevent a nuclear-
armed Iran, and I believe diplomatic negotiations are currently the 
best possible means at our disposal for achieving this goal.
  Unfortunately, I am concerned that voting on H.R. 850 now may 
undermine efforts to

[[Page H5240]]

achieve a peaceful, negotiated elimination of Iranian nuclear capacity. 
At a time when a new Iranian President-elect has made statements 
indicating a greater openness to diplomacy, returning this message with 
a vote on tougher sanctions only serves to empower Iranian hardliners 
and weaken Iranian moderates.
  U.S. policy must make it clear that the goal of sanctions on Iran is 
to elicit verifiable concessions from Iran that have a material impact 
on its ability to develop a nuclear weapon. In order to achieve this 
goal, the President must have the ability to waive sanctions in 
exchange for Iranian concessions. Yet H.R. 850 places significant 
restrictions on the President's authority to waive sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, while we must maintain a credible military threat 
towards Iran, we must also make every effort to promote the success of 
diplomatic negotiations with Iran. If we fail to negotiate a solution 
that ensures the safety of the U.S. and our close ally Israel by 
verifying that Iran does not have the capacity to develop nuclear 
weapons, we will be left with few alternatives but military engagement. 
I urge my colleagues to come together and support tough but fair 
diplomacy with Iran.
  Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 850, which 
provides our diplomats the leverage they need to persuade Iran that the 
only viable course of action is to suspend work on its nuclear program.
  The bill restricts oil exports from Iran and cuts off various Iranian 
industries from the global marketplace. It also expands sanctions on 
Iranian human rights violators. Lastly, this bill provides flexibility 
for the President to not apply sanctions when he deems it appropriate.
  There is adequate time to test the willingness and ability of 
President Rouhani to pursue good faith talks and reach an acceptable 
resolution. That said, complete inaction could signal indifference or a 
weakening of our resolve to pro-nuclear forces in Iran. Incoming 
President Rouhani and the other regime leaders must be made to 
understand that U.S. economic pressure and other sanctions will remain 
in force until there is a reliable and verifiable halt to Iran's 
nuclear program. Given Iran's progress in nuclear enrichment, time is 
of the essence and Iran's past delaying tactics cannot be allowed to 
continue.
  As an original cosponsor of H.R. 850, I urge my colleagues to send a 
strong, unequivocal message to the Iranian regime.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I am a co-sponsor of this legislation and I 
urge my colleagues to support it today.
  It is clear that the current regime in Iran poses troubling security 
challenges to the world community and our allies in the Middle East. 
The hateful and threatening comments made by the President of Iran 
against Israel cannot be tolerated. Further, the provocative actions 
taken by Iran to further their nuclear weapons program must be stopped. 
A nuclear Iran would destabilize the region and threaten the United 
States and our allies. Iran must alter its dangerous course, and the 
United States needs to be fully involved to help bring this about.
  I continue to support the Obama Administration's actions to seek a 
diplomatic solution to Iran's unnecessary and unwise pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. It is unacceptable for Iran to possess nuclear weapons. 
However, despite having imposed some of the most stringent sanctions on 
Iran ever, the United States and our international partners have thus 
far been unable to compel Iran to abandon its quest for a nuclear 
weapon. Accordingly, the House has no choice but to pass H.R. 850.
  This bill would designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a 
foreign terrorist organization, impose sanctions on specific Iranian 
officials (i.e., the Supreme Leader, Guardians Council, MOIS, Quds 
Force, etc.), and tie additional sanctions to human rights abuses. I 
regret that the failure of Iran's government to change its course makes 
this bill necessary, as many ordinary Iranians have already suffered 
much as a result of the existing sanctions. We all want to see the 
people of Iran freed from the tyranny and oppression of the current 
clerical regime, but above all our greatest obligation is to prevent 
Iran from building and fielding nuclear weapons. This bill, if enacted 
into law, will hopefully bring us one step closer to that goal.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I, along with the Gentleman from Arkansas, 
Mr. Cotton, recognize that this critical legislation requires countries 
still purchasing oil from Iran to reduce their combined imports by 1 
million barrels per day within a year. Iran's energy sector provides 
the regime the resources needed to fund its nuclear weapons program. We 
remain extremely concerned with the pace of Iran's nuclear program. 
Some estimate that Iran may achieve a nuclear weapons breakout 
capability next year.
  For this reason, we remain committed to sending the toughest possible 
sanctions bill to the President's desk, as quickly as possible.
  Mr. GINGREY of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 
850--the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013. As a cosponsor of this 
important legislation, I would like to commend the bipartisan 
leadership of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Royce of California 
and Ranking Member Engel of New York on this issue.
  Mr. Speaker, it goes without saying that our strongest ally in the 
Middle East is the State of Israel. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us 
to provide them with our unwavering support. In order to uphold this 
commitment, we must stop Iran's nuclear proliferation efforts. That is 
why I am pleased that from the outset of this legislation, the 
statement of policy is absolutely clear when it states, ``It shall be 
the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a 
nuclear weapons capability.''
  Congress took an important step during 2012 to implement economic 
sanctions on Iran through the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012. This important legislation punishes individuals who 
knowingly sell more than 1,000,000 barrels of refined product, or 
individuals that sell, lease, or provide Iran with goods, services, 
technology, or information.
  However, despite this effort, Iran's nuclear program has continued to 
grow. It was reported today that Iran has an additional 5,000 new 
centrifuges are ready to start operation to complement the existing 
12,000 already in place. This comes on the heels of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency's statement in June that Tehran was violating 
international regulations by increasing the number of centrifuges. This 
continued growth in Iran's nuclear proliferation is simply 
unacceptable.
  Mr. Speaker, while we took a critical first step in the 112th 
Congress, it is abundantly clear that further action is needed to 
curtail Iran's nuclear program. H.R. 850 today will only expand 
sanctions targeting Iran's human rights violations, and--for the first 
time--allow the President of the United States to impose sanctions on 
any entity that maintains significant commercial ties to Iran. H.R. 850 
hits Iran where it hurts the most. By strengthening existing sanctions 
on 1,000,000 barrels of crude per day, this bill essentially takes 
money away from the Iranian regime that it would potentially use on the 
nuclear program.
  Once again, this legislation will show our strong support of Israel 
and its ability to remain a beacon of democracy in the Middle East. I 
urge my colleagues to join me in supporting H.R. 850.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce) that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the bill, H.R. 850, as amended.
  The question was taken.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds 
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.

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