[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 111 (Tuesday, July 30, 2013)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6073-S6078]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. REED (for himself and Mr. Johanns):
S. 1387. A bill to establish a pilot program to authorize the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to make grants to nonprofit
organizations to rehabilitate and modify homes of disabled and low-
income veterans; to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, I am proud to be once again reintroducing
the Housing Assistance for Veterans Act, HAVEN Act, with my colleague,
Senator Johanns.
Last year, we joined forces to successfully pass this legislation as
an amendment during the Senate's consideration of the National Defense
Authorization Act, NDAA. Unfortunately, due to concerns by some on the
Veterans' Affairs Committee, it was not included in the final version
of the NDAA. Those concerns have been addressed in this version of the
HAVEN Act, and I would like to thank the Veterans' Affairs Committee
for working cooperatively with us to strengthen the legislation.
Our veterans have made many personal sacrifices in service to our
Nation, and we must honor our commitment to provide them with the care
they have earned and deserve. One such way is to ensure that they have
access to adequate housing.
According to Rebuilding Together, 5.5 million of our veterans are
disabled, and one and a half million are at risk of homelessness. In my
home State of Rhode Island, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, there
are more than 19,000 veterans with disabilities, each of whom face
their own unique challenges in terms of their housing needs.
The Department of Veterans Affairs, VA, has programs that assist
veterans in adapting and improving their homes, but unfortunately,
these programs do not extend assistance to all veterans with
disabilities. It is clear we must do more, and with this legislation,
we are seeking to serve all veterans with disabilities, regardless of
the severity of the disability and whether the disability is service-
connected.
[[Page S6074]]
The HAVEN Act will give veterans the opportunity to renovate and
modify their existing homes by installing wheelchair ramps, widening
doors, re-equipping rooms, and making necessary additions and
adjustments to existing structures--all so that these homes are safer
and more suitable for our veterans.
Our legislation encourages key stakeholders, such as the Department
of Housing and Urban Development, the VA, housing non-profits, and
veterans service organizations, to work together to serve our veterans.
In order to extend the reach of this Federal funding, grant recipients
would be expected to either match Federal funding or make in-kind
contributions, through encouraging volunteers to help make repairs or
engaging businesses to donate needed supplies.
This bill is supported by the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign
Wars, Vietnam Veterans of America, Paralyzed Veterans of America,
VetsFirst, a program of United Spinal Association, Iraq and Afghanistan
Veterans of America, Habitat for Humanity, and Rebuilding Together. I
thank Senator Johanns for working with me on this important bill, and I
look forward to working with him and the rest of our colleagues to pass
this legislation.
______
By Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. Durbin, Ms. Stabenow, and Mr.
Brown):
S. 1388. A bill to require the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Secretary of Energy, to conduct a study on
the public health and environmental impacts of the production,
transportation, storage, and use of petroleum coke, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am introducing today, with my colleagues
Senators Durbin, Stabenow, and Brown, the Petroleum Coke Transparency
and Public Health Study Act, which would require the Department of
Health and Human Services to conduct a study on the health and
environmental impacts of petroleum coke. This bill, which is a
companion to a bill introduced by Representative Peters on June 6,
2013, was motivated by a situation in Detroit.
In March 2013, large piles of uncontained petroleum coke stored along
the banks of the Detroit River became publicly visible, raising
questions about the potential environmental and public health impacts.
Sitting just feet from the Detroit River, the piles have grown to
nearly three stories high over the past several months. I want to make
sure that this low-grade fuel does not pose a threat to the people of
Detroit or impair our waterways. The Detroit River is a valued resource
that must be preserved and protected.
Petroleum coke is a byproduct of refining crude oil into liquid fuels
such as gasoline and diesel. It is a commodity that can be cofired with
coal to produce low-cost energy. In recent years, a number of U.S.
refineries have undergone expansions in order to accommodate increases
in processing crude oil, including the Marathon refinery in Detroit,
MI; the Cenovus refinery in Wood River, IL; and the BP refinery in
Whiting, IN.
With increases in crude oil processing in the United States and
Canada, petroleum coke production is expected to rise. However, the
impacts of petroleum coke on public health and the environment have not
been fully assessed. Further, each State has different regulations for
managing, storing, and transporting it. It is important that we
understand the market projections for petroleum coke, how to properly
manage it, and its potential impacts on public health and the
environment.
This bill would address these key knowledge gaps by requiring a
comprehensive study on petroleum coke. The study would include an
analysis of the public health and environmental impacts of the
production, transportation, storage, and use of petroleum coke; an
assessment of best practices for storing, transporting, and managing
petroleum coke; and a quantitative analysis of current and projected
domestic petroleum coke production and utilization locations.
We should ensure that energy production occurs in a diligent and
responsible manner and does not harm public health or our environment.
With a changing energy market and limited dollars, we must have a
comprehensive understanding of how to effectively and efficiently
manage our future energy supply. This bill would give us the tools to
properly manage petroleum coke production with good environmental and
public stewardship.
______
By Mr. KING (for himself and Mr. Blunt):
S. 1390. A bill to establish an independent advisory committee to
review certain regulations, and for other purposes; to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Mr. KING. Mr. President, I would like to offer a few words on a bill
that I am introducing today with my colleague and friend, Senator Roy
Blunt of Missouri. Upon my arrival to the Senate, Senator Blunt and I
shared a conversation in which we discovered our interest in proposing
pragmatic legislation that would go about easing the ever-growing
regulatory burden borne by businesses across the country. Since then,
we have worked together to craft a bill that takes a reasonable
approach toward thinning out older regulations that have outlived their
utility, all while retaining essential congressional oversight. Today
we introduce the Regulatory Improvement Act of 2013, which I believe
will achieve this goal.
The Regulatory Improvement Act will create an independent Regulatory
Improvement Commission that will be tasked with reviewing outdated
regulations with the goals of modifying, consolidating, or repealing
regulations in order to reduce compliance costs, encourage growth and
innovation, and improve competitiveness. The composition of the
commission will be determined by congressional leadership and the
President, and the commission will be tasked with identifying a single
sector or area of regulations for consideration. After extensive review
involving broad public and stakeholder input, the commission will
submit to Congress a report containing regulations in need of
streamlining, consolidation, or repeal. This report will enjoy
expedited legislative procedures and will be subject to an up-or-down
vote in both houses of Congress without amendment.
Let me be clear: the intent of this bill is not to engage in a
wholesale dismantling of the existing regulatory regime. In particular,
I share some of my colleagues concerns that ``regulatory reform'' can
be employed as a euphemism to disguise an undercurrent of efforts to
completely undo significant legislation--from the Clean Air Act to the
Affordable Care Act. I do not support such efforts. That said, I
believe there is broad bipartisan consensus that regulations have a
cumulative effect and that Congress has neither the expertise nor
formal mechanisms through which it can effectively and expeditiously
conduct retrospective analyses. A Regulatory Improvement Commission
would provide a vehicle for the review of older regulations and
provided much-needed relief to businesses struggling to comply with
layers of competing or even duplicative regulations.
In a larger sense, this bill seeks to reclaim some of the ground that
Congress has ceded to executive agencies in recent years. From my
vantage point, the current regulatory structure has become akin to a
fourth, unchecked branch of government. As an institution, we must find
ways to reverse this disturbing trend and reestablish an appropriate
role of congressional oversight. Therefore, I am glad to introduce this
bipartisan bill that offers a reasonable way to revisit older
regulations, and I thank Senator Blunt for his interest and support of
the proposal.
______
By Mr. HARKIN (for himself, Mr. Grassley, and Mr. Leahy):
S. 1391. A bill to amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 and other laws to clarify appropriate standards for Federal
employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, today I join with my senior colleague from
Iowa, Senator Grassley, and with the distinguished chair of the
Judiciary
[[Page S6075]]
Committee, Senator Leahy, in reintroducing the Protecting Older Workers
Against Discrimination Act.
The need for this legislation was vividly demonstrated by the
experience of an Iowan--Jack Gross. Mr. Gross gave the prime of his
life, a quarter century of loyal service, to one company. Despite Mr.
Gross's stellar work record, FBL Financial demoted him and other
employees over the age of 50 and gave his job to a younger employee.
Expressly to prevent this kind of discrimination, in 1967 Congress
passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ADEA. Modeled from and
using the same language as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964--
which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
national origin and religion--the ADEA makes it unlawful to
discriminate on the basis of age.
When Mr. Gross sought to enforce his rights under this law, a jury of
Iowans heard the facts and found that his employer discriminated
against him because of his age. That jury awarded him almost $47,000 in
lost compensation.
The case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court. In June 2009,
in Gross v. FBL Financial, Inc., the Court ruled against Mr. Gross, and
in doing so made it harder for those with legitimate age discrimination
claims to prevail under the ADEA. In fact, on remand, despite the fact
Mr. Gross had established that age discrimination was a factor in his
demotion, he lost his retrial.
For decades, the law was clear. In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Court ruled that if a plaintiff seeking relief under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act demonstrated that discrimination was a
``motivating'' or ``substantial'' factor behind the employer's action,
the burden shifted to the employer to show it would have taken the same
action regardless of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class.
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the
``motivating factor'' standard with respect to Title VII discrimination
claims.
Since the ADEA uses the same language as Title VII, was modeled from
it, and had been interpreted consistent with the Civil Rights Act,
courts rightly and consistently held that, like a plaintiff claiming
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion and national origin,
a victim bringing suit under the ADEA need only show that membership in
a protected class was a ``motivating factor'' in an employer's action.
If an employee showed that age was one factor in an employment
decision, the burden was on the employer to show it had acted for a
legitimate reason other than age.
In Gross, the Court, addressing a question on which it did not grant
certiorari, tore up this decades' old standard. In its place, the Court
imposed a standard that makes it prohibitively difficult for a victim
to prove age discrimination. According to the Court, a plaintiff bears
the full burden of proving that age was not only a ``motivating''
factor but the ``but for'' factor, or decisive factor. And,
unfortunately, just last month the Supreme Court, in University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, extended Gross to
retaliation cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Moreover,
lower courts have extended Gross to other civil rights claims,
including cases arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and
the Rehabilitation Act.
The extremely high burden Gross imposes radically undermines workers'
ability to hold employers accountable. As Professor Helen Norton
testified to the HELP Committee, ``Gross entirely insulates from
liability even an employer who confesses discrimination so long as that
employer had another reason for its decision. By permitting employers
to escape liability altogether even for a workplace admittedly infected
by discrimination, with no incentive to refrain from similar
discrimination in the future, the Gross rule thus undermines Congress's
efforts to stop and deter workplace discrimination.''
Bear in mind, unlawful discrimination is often difficult to detect.
Obviously, those who discriminate do not often admit they are acting
for discriminatory reasons. Employers rarely post signs saying, for
example, ``older workers need not apply.'' To the contrary, they go out
of their way to conceal their true intent. The employer is in the best
position to offer an explanation of why a decision that involves
discrimination or retaliation was actually motivated by legitimate
reasons. As Professor Norton testified, ``[s]uch burden shifting
appropriately recognizes and responds to employers' greater access to
information that is key to proving or disproving an element of a
particular claim . . .'' By putting the entire burden on the worker to
demonstrate the absence or insignificance of other factors, the court
in effect has freed employers to discriminate or retaliate.
Unfortunately, as Mr. Gross and his colleagues know all too well, age
discrimination does indeed occur. Countless thousands of American
workers who are not yet ready to voluntarily retire find themselves
jobless or passed over for promotions because of age discrimination.
Older workers often face stereotypes: That they are not as productive
as younger workers; that they cannot learn new skills; that they
somehow have a lesser need for income to provide for their families.
Indeed, according to an AARP study, 60% of older workers have
reported that they or someone they know has faced age discrimination in
the workplace. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, in Fiscal Year 2012, over 2,800 age discrimination
complaints were filed, a more than 20 percent increase from just five
years ago. Given the stereotypes that older workers face, it is no
surprise that on average they remain unemployed for more than twice as
long as all unemployed workers.
The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act reiterates
the principle that Congress established when it passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act--when making
employment decisions it is illegal for race, sex, national origin,
religion, age or disability to be a factor.
The bill repudiates the Supreme Court's Gross v. FBL Financial
decision and will restore the law to what it was for decades. It makes
clear that when an employee shows discrimination was a ``motivating
factor'' behind a decision, the burden is properly on the employer to
show the same decision would have been made regardless of
discrimination or retaliation. And, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991
with respect to discrimination cases under Title VII, if the employer
meets that burden, the employer remains liable, but remedies are
limited.
This is a common sense, bipartisan bill. In fact, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, key provisions of which served as a model for this
legislation, passed the Senate on a bipartisan basis 93-5. Further, we
are introducing this bill only after countless hours of consultation
with civil rights stakeholders and representatives of the business
community. Moreover, this bill addresses the concerns that were raised
about an earlier version of the bill at a hearing held before the
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in March 2010.
In fact, I want to comment on two changes from that earlier version
of this bill introduced in the last Congress. Since October 2009, when
Senator Leahy and I first introduced the Protecting Older Workers
Against Discrimination Act, we have had the benefit of nearly three and
a half years of lower court application of the Gross decision.
The 2009 bill would have expressly amended the ADEA to make clear
that the analytical framework set out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green
applied to that statute. Even though, before Gross, every Court of
Appeals had held that McDonnell Douglas had applied to age claims, this
clarification was meant to address a footnote in Gross in which the
Court arguably questioned the applicability of McDonnell Douglas to the
ADEA. Since the bill was first introduced, however, every lower court
that has examined the issue has continued to apply McDonnell Douglas to
the ADEA. As a result, because McDonnell Douglas applies to the ADEA
already, we deem it unnecessary to amend the statute.
Second, the initial bill expressly amended only the ADEA. Since
Gross, however, lower courts have applied the Court's reasoning in that
decision to
[[Page S6076]]
other statutes. Because the most notable application has been to the
ADA, Rehabilitation Act and Title VII retaliation claims, those
statutes are expressly amended here too.
Finally, in Gross, the Court defended the Court's departure from
well-established law by noting that it ``cannot ignore Congress'
decision to amend Title VII's relevant provisions but not make similar
changes to the ADEA.'' In other words, the Court found that because
Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, codified the ``motivating
factor'' framework for discrimination claims under Title VII, but not
for the ADEA, Congress somehow must have intended Price Waterhouse not
to apply to any statute but Title VII.
Because of the Court's reasoning, I want to emphasize that this bill
in no way questions the motivating factor framework for other anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes that are not expressly
covered by the legislation. As the bill's findings make clear, not only
does this bill repudiate the Gross decision itself, but it expressly
repudiates the reasoning underlying the decision, including the
argument that Congress's failure to amend any statute other than Title
VII means that Congress intended to disallow mixed motive claims under
other statutes. It would be an error for a court to apply similar
reasoning following passage of this bill to other statutes. The fact
that other statutes are not expressly amended in this bill does not
mean that Congress endorses Gross's application to any other statute.
In conclusion, this bill is very straightforward. It reiterates what
Congress said in 1967 when it passed the ADEA--when making employment
decisions it is illegal for age to be a factor. A person should not be
judged arbitrarily because he or she was born in a certain year or
earlier when he or she still has the ability to contribute as much, or
more, as the next person. This bill will help ensure that all our
citizens will have an equal opportunity, commensurate with their
abilities, for productive employment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1391
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Older Workers
Against Discrimination Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) In enacting section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(adding section 703(m) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964),
Congress reaffirmed its understanding that unlawful
discrimination is often difficult to detect and prove because
discriminators do not usually admit their discrimination and
often try to conceal their true motives. Section 703(m) of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly approved so-called
``mixed motive'' claims, providing that an unlawful
employment practice is established when a protected
characteristic was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motived the
practice.
(2) Congress enacted amendments to other civil rights
statutes, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (referred to in this section as the ``ADEA''), the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, but Congress did not expressly
amend those statutes to address mixed motive discrimination.
(3) In the case of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, because
Congress did not expressly amend the ADEA to address mixed
motive claims, such claims were unavailable under the ADEA,
and instead the complainant bears the burden of proving that
a protected characteristic or protected activity was the
``but for'' cause of an unlawful employment practice. This
decision has significantly narrowed the scope of protections
afforded by the statutes that were not expressly amended in
1991 to address mixed motive claims.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
(1) to clarify congressional intent that mixed motive
claims shall be available, and that a complaining party need
not prove that a protected characteristic or protected
activity was the ``but for'' cause of an unlawful employment
practice, under the ADEA and similar civil rights provisions;
(2) to reject the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Gross
decision that Congress' failure to amend any statute other
than title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (with respect
to discrimination claims), in enacting section 107 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, suggests that Congress intended to
disallow mixed motive claims under other statutes; and
(3) to clarify that complaining parties--
(A) may rely on any type or form of admissible evidence to
establish their claims of an unlawful employment practice;
(B) are not required to demonstrate that the protected
characteristic or activity was the sole cause of the
employment practice; and
(C) may demonstrate an unlawful employment practice through
any available method of proof or analytical framework.
SEC. 3. STANDARDS OF PROOF.
(a) Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.--
(1) Clarifying prohibition against impermissible
consideration of age in employment practices.--Section 4 of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
623) is amended by inserting after subsection (f) the
following:
``(g)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, an
unlawful practice is established under this Act when the
complaining party demonstrates that age or an activity
protected by subsection (d) was a motivating factor for any
practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.
``(2) In establishing an unlawful practice under this Act,
including under paragraph (1) or by any other method of
proof, a complaining party--
``(A) may rely on any type or form of admissible evidence
and need only produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable
trier of fact to find that an unlawful practice occurred
under this Act; and
``(B) shall not be required to demonstrate that age or an
activity protected by subsection (d) was the sole cause of a
practice.''.
(2) Remedies.--Section 7 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 626) is
amended--
(A) in subsection (b)--
(i) in the first sentence, by striking ``The'' and
inserting ``(1) The'';
(ii) in the third sentence, by striking ``Amounts'' and
inserting the following:
``(2) Amounts'';
(iii) in the fifth sentence, by striking ``Before'' and
inserting the following:
``(4) Before''; and
(iv) by inserting before paragraph (4), as designated by
clause (iii) of this subparagraph, the following:
``(3) On a claim in which an individual demonstrates that
age was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
under section 4(g)(1), and a respondent demonstrates that the
respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of
the impermissible motivating factor, the court--
``(A) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief
(except as provided in subparagraph (B)), and attorney's fees
and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to
the pursuit of a claim under section 4(g)(1); and
``(B) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring
any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment.''; and
(B) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ``Any'' and inserting
``Subject to subsection (b)(3), any''.
(3) Definitions.--Section 11 of such Act (29 U.S.C. 630) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(m) The term `demonstrates' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.''.
(4) Federal employees.--Section 15 of such Act (29 U.S.C.
633a) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h) Sections 4(g) and 7(b)(3) shall apply to mixed motive
claims (involving practices described in section 4(g)(1))
under this section.''.
(b) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.--
(1) Clarifying prohibition against impermissible
consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in employment practices.--Section 703 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by striking
subsection (m) and inserting the following:
``(m) Except as otherwise provided in this title, an
unlawful employment practice is established under this title
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin or an activity protected by
section 704(a) was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.''.
(2) Federal employees.--Section 717 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2000e-16) is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) Sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) shall apply to mixed
motive cases (involving practices described in section
703(m)) under this section.''.
(c) Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.--
(1) Definitions.--Section 101 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12111) is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(11) Demonstrates.--The term `demonstrates' means meets
the burdens of production and persuasion.''.
(2) Clarifying prohibition against impermissible
consideration of disability in employment practices.--Section
102 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 12112) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(e) Proof.--
``(1) Establishment.--Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, a discriminatory practice is established under this Act
when the
[[Page S6077]]
complaining party demonstrates that disability or an activity
protected by subsection (a) or (b) of section 503 was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.
``(2) Demonstration.--In establishing a discriminatory
practice under paragraph (1) or by any other method of proof,
a complaining party--
``(A) may rely on any type or form of admissible evidence
and need only produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable
trier of fact to find that a discriminatory practice occurred
under this Act; and
``(B) shall not be required to demonstrate that disability
or an activity protected by subsection (a) or (b) of section
503 was the sole cause of an employment practice.''.
(3) Certain antiretaliation claims.--Section 503(c) of such
Act (42 U.S.C. 12203(c)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``The remedies'' and inserting the
following:
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the
remedies''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Certain antiretaliation claims.--Section 107(c) shall
apply to claims under section 102(e)(1) with respect to title
I.''.
(4) Remedies.--Section 107 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 12117) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Discriminatory Motivating Factor.--On a claim in
which an individual demonstrates that disability was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, under section
102(e)(1), and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent
would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court--
``(1) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief
(except as provided in paragraph (2)), and attorney's fees
and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to
the pursuit of a claim under section 102(e)(1); and
``(2) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring
any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment.''.
(d) Rehabilitation Act of 1973.--
(1) In general.--Sections 501(g), 503(d), and 504(d) of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791(g), 793(d), and
794(d)), are each amended by adding after the words ``title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12111 et seq.)'' the following: ``, including the standards
of causation or methods of proof applied under section 102(e)
of that Act (42 U.S.C. 12112(e)),''.
(2) Federal employees.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
to section 501(g) shall be construed to apply to all
employees covered by section 501.
SEC. 4. APPLICATION.
This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply
to all claims pending on or after the date of enactment of
this Act.
______
By Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Casey, and Mr.
Moran):
S. 1395. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to
permanently extend and expand the charitable deduction for
contributions of food inventory; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce the Good
Samaritan Hunger Relief Tax Incentive Act along with Senators Cochran,
Casey, and Moran. This bill is an effort I have worked on with former
Senator Richard Lugar for many years and I am happy to continue the
effort on behalf of hungry families nationwide this Congress.
In the wake of our Nation's economic recession, the demand on food
banks, church food pantries, and soup kitchens has increased
significantly. According to a study by the United States Department of
Agriculture, over 50 million Americans lived in food insecure
households in 2011. The same study found that households with children
reported food insecurity at a much higher rate than households without
children. In fact, in Vermont alone, over 12,000 children rely on food
from food shelves each month.
Despite the increased demand for donated food, it is estimated that
between 25 and 40 percent of the food that is produced, grown, and
transported in the United States will never be consumed. This
contributes to the 70 billion pounds of fit and wholesome food that are
sent to landfills in the United States each year.
This bill would address this troubling trend by giving greater
incentives to all businesses to donate food to non-profit organizations
that feed the hungry. The current tax code allows corporations to
receive a special deduction for donations to food banks, but it
excludes many other small businesses such as farmers, ranchers, and
restaurant owners from the same tax incentive. Unfortunately, these
businesses often find it more cost effective to throw away food than to
donate it to those in need.
I am pleased beginning in 2006, Congress temporarily extended this
tax incentive to most businesses, and most recently extended the
provision through the end of 2013. After the provision was enacted, in
the restaurant industry alone we saw a 137 percent increase in the
pounds of food donated. The Good Samaritan Hunger Relief Tax Incentive
Act would make this provision permanent, and would extend the deduction
to farmers who often have large amounts of fresh food to donate.
This bipartisan legislation is supported by numerous organizations
including Feeding America, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the
Food Marketing Institute, Grocery Manufactures Association, the
National Restaurant Association, the Vermont Food Bank, and Hunger Free
Vermont. I hope as this Congress considers comprehensive tax
legislation in the future this measure is included. We must do more to
ensure that no one in America goes hungry, and increasing the amount of
food available to food banks is a critical step toward meeting that
goal.
By Mr. DURBIN:
S. 1399. A bill to amend the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act to
extend the interest rate limitation on debt entered into during
military service to debt incurred during military service to
consolidate or refinance student loans incurred before military
service; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of
the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1399
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. INTEREST RATE LIMITATION ON DEBT ENTERED INTO
DURING MILITARY SERVICE TO CONSOLIDATE OR
REFINANCE STUDENT LOANS INCURRED BEFORE
MILITARY SERVICE.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 207 of the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. App. 527) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``on debt incurred
before service'' after ``Limitation to 6 percent'';
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs
(3) and (4), respectively;
(3) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new
paragraph (2):
``(2) Limitation to 6 percent on debt incurred during
service to consolidate or refinance student loans incurred
before service.--An obligation or liability bearing interest
at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year that is incurred by
a servicemember, or the servicemember and the servicemember's
spouse jointly, during military service to consolidate or
refinance one or more student loans incurred by the
servicemember before such military service shall not bear an
interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent during the period
of military service.'';
(4) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of
this subsection, by inserting ``or (2)'' after ``paragraph
(1)''; and
(5) in paragraph (4), as so redesignated, by striking
``paragraph (2)'' and inserting ``paragraph (3)''.
(b) Implementation of Limitation.--Subsection (b) of such
section is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``the interest rate
limitation in subsection (a)'' and inserting ``an interest
rate limitation in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)'';
and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in the paragraph heading, by striking ``as of date of
order to active duty''; and
(B) by inserting before the period at the end the
following: ``in the case of an obligation or liability
covered by subsection (a)(1), or as of the date the
servicemember (or servicemember and spouse jointly) incurs
the obligation or liability concerned under subsection
(a)(2)''.
(c) Student Loan Defined.--Subsection (d) of such section
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Student loan.--The term `student loan' means the
following:
``(A) A Federal student loan made, insured, or guaranteed
under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1070 et seq.).
``(B) A private student loan as that term is defined
section 140(a) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.
1650(a)).''.
______
By Mr. REED (for himself and Mr. Brown):
S. 1400. A bill to increase access to adult education to provide for
economic growth; to the Committee on Finance.
Mr. REED. Mr. President, our economy will not work for individuals or
for our nation unless we create and support avenues for adults to
continue their education and build their skills. These are longstanding
issues that I
[[Page S6078]]
have worked on for many years, including the last attempt to
reauthorize the Workforce Investment Act. I was pleased to work with
Senator Webb in the 112th Congress on the Adult Education and Economic
Growth Act, and I am proud to reintroduce it today with Senator Brown.
I thank Congressman Ruben Hinojosa for introducing the companion
legislation in the House of Representatives.
The Adult Education and Economic Growth Act increases the investment
in adult education programs; ensures better coordination among adult
education programs, workforce development programs, and higher
education; strengthens professional development for adult education
providers; expands the use of technology in adult education programs;
and provides incentives for employers to support their workers who need
adult education services.
In Rhode Island, roughly 41 percent of working age adults have a
college degree. By 2018, it is estimated that 61 percent of Rhode
Island jobs will require some postsecondary education. We have an
estimated 91,000 individuals without a high school diploma--the basic
ticket to accessing postsecondary education and training.
Nationally, the numbers make a similar case for the need to invest in
adult education. According to the National Commission on Adult
Literacy, 80 to 90 million U.S. adults today, about half of the adult
workforce, do not have the basic education and communication skills
required to obtain jobs that pay a family-sustaining wage. These
individuals continue to struggle in the recovering economy, with
unemployment rates above 10 percent for individuals who do not have a
high school diploma, compared to 7.6 percent for high school graduates
and less than 4 percent for workers with bachelor's degrees.
Simply put, we will not be able to close the skills gap without a
robust investment in adult education. Unfortunately, we have not been
making this kind of investment. Funding has been anemic, and as a
result, services reach fewer than 3 million adults annually--a fraction
of the need.
The Adult Education and Economic Growth will help turn around this
dire situation by increasing the authorization for adult education
programs authorized under Title II of the Workforce Investment Act to
$850 million and establishing a new state technology grant for adult
education to upgrade the delivery system and assist adults in attaining
critical digital literacy skills. This legislation requires state and
local workforce investment boards to address adult education in their
plans for using funds authorized under Title I of the Workforce
Investment Act, including incorporating adult education into career
pathways programs and offering integrated education and training
programs. It also strengthens programs and services for English
learners, including authorizing the Integrated English Literacy and
Civics Program, and for adults with disabilities. The legislation will
also build the knowledge base on what works for adult learners through
a National Center for Adult Education, Literacy, and Workplace Skills.
Finally, the Adult Education and Economic Growth Act will provide
employers with tax incentives to invest in developing the basic skills
of their employees.
In sum, the Adult Education and Economic Growth Act offers a
comprehensive approach to reaching the millions of adults who need
basic skills, English literacy instruction, or a secondary school
diploma so that they can embark on a career pathway that leads to
economic stability and success. I am pleased to have worked with the
National Commission on Adult Literacy in developing this legislation. I
urge my colleagues to cosponsor this bill and work with me to include
its provisions in the pending reauthorization of the Workforce
Investment Act.
____________________