[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 103 (Thursday, July 18, 2013)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1091-E1092]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF MARINE 
  NAVIGATION SAFETY AND MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CRITERIA FOR 
                OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY INSTALLATIONS

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. PAUL C. BROUN

                               of georgia

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 18, 2013

  Mr. BROUN of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, on April 16, 2013, the House 
Science, Space, and Technology Subcommittees on Oversight and Energy 
held a joint hearing titled, ``Assessing the Efficiency and 
Effectiveness of Wind Energy Incentives.'' The attached document 
contains excerpts from an analysis that is part of the record for that 
hearing.

 ``A Comparative Analysis of the Development and Application of Marine 
  Navigation Safety and Marine Environmental Protection Criteria for 
Offshore Renewable Energy Installations, March 11, 2013'', By: John F. 
         McGowan, RADM USCG (ret), For: The McGOWAN Group, LLC.


                              Introduction

       The following has been excerpted from an analysis performed 
     in March 2013 by The McGowan Group, LLC.
       In recent years, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of 
     Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the U.S. Coast Guard 
     (USCG) has taken steps to establish a process and standards 
     for the leasing of areas for development of Offshore 
     Renewable Energy Installations (OREIs) on the U.S. Outer 
     Continental Shelf (OCS). In 2006, the USCG embarked on 
     setting standards to safeguard marine safety and marine 
     environmental protection for the siting and operation of 
     OREIs on the nation's waterways and oceans. In response to 
     special legislation enacted in 2006, the USCG was also 
     required to establish navigational safety terms and 
     conditions (T&C) specifically for Nantucket Sound due to the 
     proposal for the 130 turbine Cape Wind Associates (CWA) OREI.
       This report provides a comparative analysis of the T&C for 
     Nantucket Sound under Section 414 of the Coast Guard Maritime 
     Transportation Act of 2006 (CGMTA) and the navigational 
     safety actions taken elsewhere or now under development by 
     USCG and BOEM. As this report concludes, the Nantucket Sound 
     standards provide significantly less protection for 
     navigation safety than the comparative measures established 
     or proposed for every other OREI location.


        The site and the design (Nantucket Sound and Cape Wind)

       Nantucket Sound is not only a heavily used body of water, 
     but one of the most dangerous places to navigate in the U.S. 
     In fact, the seaman's' handbook, The Coast Pilot, singles out 
     Nantucket Sound for special caution due to the frequent 
     occurrence of wind, fog, and high velocity currents.
       Horseshoe Shoal, found near the center of Nantucket Sound, 
     is a well-known and marked hazard whose rocks are seldom 
     visible above the Sound's surface. Water depths in and around 
     the Shoal vary from 2 ft. to nearly 60 ft. The shoal is 
     bounded by the North Channel, which runs below Great Neck and 
     Hyannis, and the Main Channel, which runs from Vineyard Sound 
     from the west to the Atlantic Ocean to the east. The Main 
     Channel that the CWA facility would abut has a controlling 
     depth of thirty feet. The proposed project site is virtually 
     surrounded by general anchorages for vessels awaiting entry 
     into port, conducting repairs, or escaping or riding-out bad 
     weather or visibility that is common in Nantucket Sound.
       Other than marked channels and charts, there are no Traffic 
     Separation Schemes (TSS), vessel traffic reporting or control 
     systems in place in the Sound. The port of Boston, Buzzards 
     Bay, the Cape Cod Canal, and Rhode Island Sound all have TSS 
     ship routes, or in the case of the Cape Cod Canal and 
     Buzzard's Bay, vessel reporting systems in place. These USCG 
     systems significantly mitigate navigational risk and play a 
     prominent role in the navigational risk assessment for other 
     areas being considered as potential sites for offshore wind 
     facilities on the Atlantic coast. The absence of TSS or other 
     vessel control measures makes navigational risk in the Sound 
     subject to comparatively greater risks.
       While the Main Channel in Nantucket Sound can support 
     vessels with drafts up to 24 ft., including cruise liners, it 
     also serves as the main artery for ferries connecting the 
     Sound's islands and for an estimated 250 large oceangoing 
     fishing vessels. The proposed site for the CWA facility 
     borders these channels and routes extensively used year-round 
     by the ferry systems, some of which offer high-speed service 
     at 30 knots on all its sides.
       The CWA proposal would place the WTGs directly adjacent to 
     these busy vessel routes, in some cases to be constructed 
     within 975 ft. to 1,200 ft. from the edge of the North and 
     Main channels, respectively. Without an additional buffer 
     from these routes, an allision with the nearest WTGs would 
     occur in a mere 60 seconds, at normal speeds, for a vessel or 
     boat that leaves the channel. A high speed ferry would have 
     20 seconds to detect, take action, and respond to avoid such 
     allisions. Collision risk with vessels traveling within or 
     adjacent to the project site also would be a problem due to 
     WTG interference with navigation and collision avoidance 
     radar.


                   Section 414 and the 2008 MMS FEIS

       In 2005, Congress enacted Section 414 of the Coast Guard 
     Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 (CGMTA). Section 414 
     requires the USCG to ``specify the reasonable terms and 
     conditions the Commandant determines necessary to provide for 
     navigational safety with respect to the proposed lease, 
     easement, or right-of-way and each alternative to the 
     proposed lease, easement or right-of-way considered by'' the 
     Secretary of the Interior for an offshore wind energy 
     facility in Nantucket Sound.
       Section 414 makes it clear that the T&C are to protect the 
     navigational status quo, not to protect CWA or its design. 
     The USCG can fulfill this duty only by developing T&C that 
     ensure the project does not present navigational risks, 
     including the possible need to alter the project design 
     through the establishment of a buffer zone from existing 
     shipping and ferry routes, or to deny the lease application 
     at the proposed location. The burden to provide for 
     navigational safety belongs to CWA, not to mariners, 
     fishermen, or the public.
       In late 2008, USCG altered its approach that would have 
     addressed navigation safety concerns by including changes to 
     the project, to instead adopt the position that the project 
     had to be accepted as it was proposed. As a result, all 
     burden for safety was placed on mariners and USCG did not 
     recommend a safety separation or buffer zone from the Sound's 
     established channels and shipping routes. Several lawsuits 
     are pending against the CWA project, including challenge of 
     the USCG T&C.


                               BOEM's EAs

       BOEM began implementing DOI's ``Smart from the Start'' 
     initiative in 2011 with USCG and other agencies to produce 
     environmental assessments (EAs) for offshore wind 
     development. The initiative called for the identification of 
     areas on the Atlantic OCS that were most suitable for 
     commercial wind energy and the availability of those areas 
     for leasing and site assessment. During 2011, BOEM published 
     Notices identifying those ocean areas and requested public 
     comment.
       Significant public comment was received from maritime 
     interests in response to the BOEM Notices. Major changes were 
     made to the various Wind Energy Areas (WEAs) including 
     excluded areas. The EAs provide mitigation of marine 
     navigation risk by outright exclusion of areas that could 
     produce navigation or fishing conflict and by providing safe 
     separation/buffer zones between WEAs and vessel routes. The 
     following safety criteria are evident from the final 
     selection of lease blocks in these EAs:
       The presence of Traffic Separation Schemes (TSS) or other 
     vessel routing/control measures facilitate the safe 
     designation of WEAs in ocean areas bearing volumes of marine 
     traffic and/or fishing activity.
       Safety separation/buffer zones of 1 nm from TSSs and from 
     shipping routes should be applied in WEA identification as 
     well as in subsequent site selection.
       Marine traffic routes and fishing areas should be 
     identified and their densities estimated and projected for 
     future growth and expansion in defining the limits of WEAs.
       Blocks should be excluded which would conflict with the 
     safe operation and transit of shipping on recognized routes 
     and from vessels working in traditional fishing areas.
       None of these criteria were applied to the siting, size and 
     shape of the CWA proposal for Nantucket Sound.


                               USCG ACPARS

        Concurrent with the BOEM ``Smart from the Start'' process, 
     in 2011, USCG embarked on a separate study whose scope would 
     influence OREI facility siting and design. The USCG issued 
     its first and interim report in July 2012. The final report 
     is not expected to be issued until the end of 2013.
       The core of the USCG ACPARS analysis and the basis for its 
     recommended exclusions from the WEAs proposed in the BOEM 
     Notices is the ``R-Y-G'' methodology developed from standards 
     and criteria for OREIs applied in the UK and which provide 
     three break points between WEAs and vessel traffic routes:
       1 nm--The minimum separation distance to the parallel 
     boundary of a TSS. At this distance there would still be S 
     band radar interference and automatic radar plotting aid 
     (ARPA) is adversely affected. This is also the boundary 
     between High/Medium navigational safety risk.
       2 nm--The separation distance where compliance with COLREGS 
     becomes less challenging, mitigation measures would still be 
     required to reduce risk As Low as Reasonably Practicable 
     (ALARP). This is also the boundary between Medium/Low 
     navigational safety risk.
       5 nm--The separation distance where there are minimal 
     impacts to navigational safety and risk should be acceptable 
     without additional mitigation. This is also the boundary 
     between Low/Very Low navigational safety risk.
       ACPARS examined the shipping routes and patterns for each 
     area as well as individual blocks in the WEAs proposed by 
     BOEM. Blocks that were determined to be hazardous to marine 
     navigation and to the marine environment were ``colored'' 
     RED, which the group defined as: ``those blocks, or portions 
     of blocks, that cannot/should not be developed now or in the 
     future because of vessel traffic usage. Development of these 
     blocks

[[Page E1092]]

     would have an unacceptable impact to navigational safety and 
     precludes development.'' YELLOW BLOCKS were defined as 
     ``those blocks, or portions of blocks, that require further 
     study/analysis of existing traffic usage/patterns as well as 
     projected future traffic increases based on development of 
     adjoining/adjacent blocks. Development of these blocks would 
     potentially have an unacceptable impact on navigational 
     safety which requires additional study to determine the risk 
     and possible mitigation if developed.'' GREEN BLOCKS were 
     defined as ``those blocks, or portions of blocks, whose 
     development would, based on available information, pose 
     minimal to no detrimental impact to navigational safety. 
     Traffic using these blocks can be 're-routed' around 
     developed alternative energy sites. These blocks would 
     require minimal, if any, mitigation.''
       ACPARS stated: ``Although consensus was not reached, the 
     majority of the ACPARS Workgroup recommended the use of a 1NM 
     separation distance from shipping routes for determining the 
     boundary between Yellow and Red Blocks. As stated above there 
     was consensus for using 5NM as the minimum distance from 
     shipping routes for Green Blocks.''


    Comparison--Nantucket Sound Versus The OREI Navigational Safety 
                                Measures

       The attached Figure 4-12 has been excerpted from the BOEM 
     EA for Massachusetts and displays the TSS schemes for Rhode 
     Island Sound, the Port of Boston, and the approaches to NY. 
     It shows ``High'' density vessel tracks in a yellow to salmon 
     color scheme. Figure 1 shows commercial vessels in Nantucket 
     Sound, specifically its Main Channel, in heavy volumes very 
     similar to those studied for the proposed WEAs in the 
     Massachusetts and in the Rhode Island & Massachusetts EAs 
     produced by BOEM.
       What is not shown in these Figures is the disparity of 
     navigation risk and of displacement of fishing activities 
     that would be created by OREIs in the various WEAs as 
     compared to CWA. Using the WEA area described in the RI & MA 
     BOEM EA (RIMAWEA) as a comparison to the proposed CWA site, 
     several factors emerge that drive starkly different 
     navigational and operational risk environments that 
     transiting vessels must overcome.
       The RIMAWEA would be located adjacent to the high density 
     TSS in Rhode Island Sound. The vessel one-way lanes of the 
     TSS are each 1 nm wide with depths ranging from 60-120 ft. 
     The Main Channel directly adjacent to the CWA site on 
     Horseshoe Shoal can be visualized as a higher risk single-
     lane carrying vessel traffic in multiple directions which 
     narrows to 3/4 nm between two dangerous shoals with 30-60 ft. 
     of water at the junction of heavy vessel traffic crossing 
     from east to west and north to south. There are few shoals 
     and ledges in the direct vicinity of the RIMAWEA and the RI 
     TSS; vessels leaving the TSS by design or in emergency have 
     ``sea room'' to maneuver and recover in water depths ranging 
     from 60-160 ft. Utilizing both BOEM EA and ACPARS criteria, a 
     troubled vessel seeking to avoid a casualty with a WTG placed 
     near the TSS or with another vessel hidden in radar 
     interference from the facility would have a 1 nm buffer space 
     between the RIMAWEA TSS and other vessel routes to safely 
     react. ACPARS examined the vessel routes and traffic density 
     for the RIMAWEA proposed for RI Sound, the region most akin 
     to the navigation conditions found in Nantucket Sound. USCG 
     requested that BOEM exclude 16 blocks from the RIMAWEA to 
     safeguard navigation safety for vessels on routes or within 
     the TSS which would pass within a safety buffer of 1 nm from 
     the WEA.
       USCG also requested BOEM include the following statement in 
     the EA: ``UK Maritime Guidance Note MGN-71 and the expertise 
     of waterways SME's to evaluate and/or identify individual 
     BOEMRE RFIs/CFIs. Based on MGN-371, any areas <1 NM from 
     existing shipping routes pose a high risk to navigational 
     safety and are not considered acceptable for the placement 
     OREIs. Areas >5NM from existing shipping routes are 
     considered to pose minimal risk to navigational safety. 
     Everything between 1NM and 5NM would require analysis to 
     determine if mitigation factors could be applied to bring 
     navigational safety risk to within acceptable levels. Please 
     note that impacts to radar and ARPA still occur outside of 1 
     NM which will have to be evaluated along with other potential 
     impacts. The above are only planning guidelines and a full 
     navigational risk assessment will be required as part of the 
     EIS prior to approving construction of any OREIs.''
       In contrast, USCG accepted the design and siting of the CWA 
     facility without challenge and without imposing any minimum 
     separation distance between the surrounding vessel routes and 
     channels and the facility's WTGs. The CWA facility design and 
     placement of its WTGs would provide the crew of a passenger 
     ferry or boat that leaves the channel a mere 60 seconds, at 
     normal speeds, and a high speed ferry a mere 20 seconds to 
     detect, take action and respond to avoid a collision with an 
     adjacent WTG.
       Another significant disparity lies in the treatment of the 
     safety and operational needs of commercial fishing vessels. 
     The 2012 BOEM EAs examined and then excluded entire blocks 
     and sections of the proposed WEAs to prevent the displacement 
     of those vessels and their traditional fishing activity. BOEM 
     appears to have adopted the position that commercial fishing 
     vessels and their operating techniques make for an 
     unacceptable safety risk when operating within or in the 
     vicinity of a WEA. BOEM, MMS, and USCG took the opposite tack 
     in their review and acceptance of the CWA proposal. The 
     repeated complaints of the fishing industry in the Sound that 
     the CWA facility would make it unsafe for them to fish on or 
     adjacent to the rich fishing grounds at Horseshoe Shoal were 
     simply ignored or obfuscated.


                               Conclusion

       1. The application of safe separation/buffer zones in the 
     design of offshore WEAs and the exclusion of ocean blocks to 
     eliminate potential conflicts with the marine navigation 
     safety needs have been uniformly applied to all WEAs with the 
     exception of Nantucket Sound.
       2. USCG has failed to effectively apply the same marine 
     navigation safety and environmental protection standards, 
     guidance, and criteria it developed for OREIs in the U.S. to 
     the CWA facility.
       3. Neither a sufficient and meaningful site assessment nor 
     an accurate and detailed vessel traffic assessment has been 
     conducted for the CWA proposed facility.
       4. A navigational risk assessment to a recognized standard 
     has not been conducted nor have adequate and effective marine 
     safety mitigation actions been identified for CWA.
       5. The CWA facility is fatally flawed as currently designed 
     and sited. It is incompatible with the needs of marine 
     transportation in Nantucket Sound and is an unnecessary and 
     unacceptable threat to the current-day and future users of 
     Nantucket Sound's waterways.

                          ____________________