[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 65 (Thursday, May 9, 2013)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3288-S3294]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SYRIA
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I and my colleagues are here to
speak about Syria. The strategic and humanitarian costs of this
conflict continue to be devastating, not just for the people of Syria
but for vital American interests. As today's Washington Post editorial
makes clear, nearly all of the terrible consequences that those opposed
to intervention predicted would happen if we intervened in Syria have
happened because we have not.
There is mounting evidence that chemical weapons have been used by
the Asad regime. As many of our colleagues have noted--including
Senator Feinstein, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee--
President Obama's redline on Syria has been crossed. But instead of
acting, the Obama administration has called for additional evidence to
be collected by U.N. investigators who have not yet set foot in Syria
and probably never will. In the absence of more robust action, I fear
it will not be long before Asad takes this delay as an invitation to
use chemical weapons again on an even larger scale.
Moreover, as I have said before, by drawing a redline on chemical
weapons, the President actually gave the Asad regime a green light to
use every other weapon in his arsenal with impunity. More than 70,000
Syrians have been killed indiscriminately with snipers, artillery,
helicopter gunships, fighter jets, and even ballistic missiles. Indeed,
according to a recent Human Rights Watch report, more than 4,300
civilians have been killed by Syria's airstrikes alone since July 2012.
At the same time, Iran and its proxy Hezbollah are building a network
of militias inside Syria and the al-Qaida-aligned al-Nusra Front has
gained unprecedented strength on the ground. According to estimates
published in the media, some believe there were no more than a few
hundred al-Nusra fighters in Syria last year, but today it is widely
believed there could be thousands of extremist fighters inside Syria.
They are gaining strength by the day because they are the best, most
experienced fighters. They are well-funded and are providing
humanitarian assistance in the parts of Syria where people need it
most.
At the same time, this conflict is having increasingly devastating
consequences to the security and stability of our allies and partners
in Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees has characterized the situation in Syria as
an ``existential threat'' for Lebanon, where the government estimates
that 1 million Syrians have entered the country--1 million Syrians have
entered the country of Lebanon--which has a population of just over 4
million. Similarly, over the past 2 years, more than 500,000 Syrians
have flooded into Jordan, a country of only 6 million people. Consider
for a moment that in proportional terms this would be equivalent to 26
million refugees, or the entire population of Texas, suddenly crossing
our own borders.
In short, Syria is becoming a failed state in the heart of the Middle
East overrun by thousands of al-Qaida-affiliated fighters, with
possibly tons of chemical weapons, and poised to ignite a wider
sectarian conflict that could profoundly destabilize the region.
Yesterday brought news that the administration plans to organize,
together with Russia, an international peace conference later this
month to seek a negotiated settlement to the war in Syria. All of us--
all of us--are in favor of such a political resolution to this
conflict. No one wants to see this conflict turn into a fight to the
death and total victory for one side or the other. We all want to work
toward a political settlement that forms a new governing structure in
Syria reflective of the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people.
But let's be realistic. One of the lessons of the past 2 years is
that such a negotiated settlement will not be possible in Syria until
the balance of power shifts more decisively against Asad and those
around him. Until Asad, as well as his Iranian, Hezbollah, and Russian
backers no longer believe they are winning, what incentive do they have
to come to the table and make a deal? This is what two well-meaning
United Nations senior envoys have already learned.
Yes, Syrian opposition forces are gaining strength and territory on
the ground. But Asad still has air power--a decisive factor in that
climate, in that terrain--ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and a
host of other advanced weaponry, and he is using all of
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it. Furthermore, today's news reports that Russia has agreed to sell an
advanced air defense system to the Asad regime should lead us once
again to ask ourselves whether the path to peace in Syria runs through
Moscow.
I know Americans are war-weary and eager to focus on our domestic and
economic problems and not foreign affairs. I also know the situation in
Syria is complex and there are no ideal options. But the basic choice
we face is not complicated: Do the costs of inaction outweigh the costs
of action? I believe they do.
No one should think the United States has to act alone, put boots on
the ground, or destroy every Syrian air defense system to make a
difference for the better in Syria. We have more limited options at our
disposal, including limited military options, that can make a positive
impact on this crisis.
We could, for example, organize an overt and large-scale operation to
train and arm well-vetted Syrian opposition forces--a course of action
that was recommended last year by President Obama's entire national
security team. I am encouraged that Senator Menendez, the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, has introduced legislation this week
on this very issue and that he is speaking out about the need for more
robust action in Syria, including addressing Asad's air power.
As several key leaders in our own military have pointed out in
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee over the past several
months--from Gen. James Mattis to ADM James Stavridis--we have the
capacity--we have the capacity--to significantly weaken both the Asad
regime's air power and its increasing use of ballistic missiles, which
pose significant risks as delivery vehicles for chemical weapons.
To address this threat, we could use our precision strike
capabilities to target Asad's aircraft and Scud missile launchers on
the ground without our pilots having to fly into the teeth of Syria's
air defenses. Similar weapons could be used to selectively destroy
artillery pieces and make Asad's forces think twice about remaining at
their posts. We could use the Patriot missile batteries outside of
Syria to help protect safe zones inside Syria from Asad's aerial
bombing and missile attacks.
Would any of these options immediately end the conflict? Probably
not. But they could save innocent lives in Syria. They could give the
moderate opposition a better chance to succeed in marginalizing radical
actors and eventually provide security and responsible governance in
Syria after Asad falls. However, the longer we wait, the worse the
situation gets and the tougher it will be to confront, as we will
inevitably be forced to do sooner or later.
I am encouraged that a consensus is emerging and many of our
colleagues--Democrats and Republicans alike--share this view. I note
the leadership of Senator Levin, the chairman of our Armed Services
Committee, whom I joined in writing a letter to President Obama urging
him to take more active steps in Syria. I also note the important voice
Senator Bob Casey has lent to this debate and ask unanimous consent
that his op-ed printed last week in the Huffington Post, ``Time to Act
in Syria''--which calls for consideration of more options, including
cruise missile strikes to neutralize the Syrian Air Force--be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Huffington Post, May 9, 2013]
Time to Act in Syria
(By Bob Casey)
Last week, I joined a bipartisan group of senators to ask
the President whether the Assad regime has used chemical
weapons. The administration's response suggests mounting
evidence of chemical weapons underscores the imperative that
the United States stand with the people of Syria during this
critical period.
The fall of Assad is not only good for Syria, but will deal
a significant blow to Iran and Hezbollah. Degrading the
destructive power of Iran and Hezbollah is in the national
security interests of the United States--Bashar al-Assad is a
key link between them.
In March, Senator Rubio and I offered legislation that
could offer a path forward. Since that time, several senators
have cosponsored the measure including Senators Kirk, Coons,
Klobuchar, Levin, Cardin, Boxer and Shaheen. This legislation
would provide support to the armed and political opposition,
increase humanitarian aid to Syrians inside the country and
to refugees in neighboring states. This bill also lays the
groundwork to address the immense humanitarian and political
challenges in the post-Assad era.
A political transition to a government that reflects the
will of the Syrian people is in the core interests of the
United States in the region. I have made the case
consistently that the U.S. should lead efforts to support the
moderate Syrian armed and political opposition. I have also
said that the U.S. should consider measures that would hamper
the ability of the Syrian Air Force to conduct aerial attacks
on civilians, including cruise missile strikes on Syrian Air
Force planes as they sit on the tarmac [Foreign Policy 2/27/
13]. In addition, the U.S., working with Turkey and NATO,
should use Patriot missile batteries to provide cover for
Syrians living in the northern part of the country who are
subjected to SCUD missile attacks.
Any U.S. action should not result in U.S. boots on the
ground.
It is time to act in the interests of our security in the
region. Decisive action by the U.S. and our allies could help
to tip the balance so that Syria can begin a transition
process. Absent constructive engagement by the U.S., I am
very concerned that the killing in Syria will continue and
extremists will play an increasingly influential role in
determining that country's future, resulting in very negative
implications for the region.
Mr. McCAIN. Let me conclude with one final thought. For America, our
interests are our values and our values are our interests. The moral
dimension cannot be lost from our foreign policy. If ever a case should
remind us of this, it is Syria.
Leon Wieseltier captured this point powerfully in the New Republic
this week:
Seventy thousand people have died in the Syrian war, most
of them at the hands of their ruler. Since this number has
appeared in the papers for many months, the actual number
must be much higher. The slaughter is unceasing. But the
debate about American intervention is increasingly conducted
in ``realist'' terms: the threat to American interests posed
by jihadism in Syria, the intrigues of Iran and Hezbollah,
the rattling of Israel, the ruination of Jordan and Lebanon
and Iraq. They are all good reasons for the president of the
United States to act like the president of the United States.
But wouldn't the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocidal
war be reason enough? Is the death of scores and even
hundreds of thousands, and the displacement of millions, less
significant for American policy, and less quickening? The
moral dimension must be restored to our deliberations, the
moral sting, or else Obama, for all his talk about
conscience, will have presided over a terrible mutilation of
American discourse: the severance of conscience from action.
Nearly two decades ago, I worked with Democratic and Republican
colleagues in Congress to support President Clinton as he led America
to do the right thing in stopping mass atrocities in Bosnia. The
question for another President today, and for all Americans, is whether
we will again answer the desperate pleas for rescue that are made
uniquely to us, as the United States of America.
I, first, would ask both of my colleagues one question, if it would
be all right. There is news today that the Secretary of State wants to
convene a conference, including the Russians, in order to try to bring
about a resolution at the same time we read reports that the Russians
are selling Syria the most advanced weapons. I guess I would ask my
colleague from South Carolina and then Senator Levin because I know he
has a statement.
Mr. GRAHAM. That would be a big contradiction.
I will just yield to Senator Levin to answer the question and make
his opening statement.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank, first of all, the Senator from
Arizona for the leadership he has taken on the question of Syria. In
answer to the question, to the best of my ability, at least, it would
not be the first time Russia has taken an inconsistent position. What I
am hoping is that the additional military pressure on Asad, which we
are all calling for this morning, would help put pressure on Russia to
understand, if that military pressure is forthcoming, that they should
participate in the political solution. I do not know that we can stop
them, as much as we would all wish to, from taking the inconsistent
position that they have, but I believe--and I think the Senator from
Arizona would probably agree, but he can speak for himself, obviously--
that if President Obama does as we are urging him to do, which is find
a way to put additional military pressure on Asad, that would be an
important sign to Russia that: OK, join in a solution. You participated
enough in the problem already. Join in the solution.
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They are inconsistent. But I think our goal of trying to get more
military pressure on Asad is very consistent with the idea that maybe
there will be a political solution, but if there is, it will be
promoted by military pressure on Asad and his understanding of that
fact.
The worsening situation in Syria and the snowballing plight of
millions in the region requires a response.
Since nonviolent demonstrations demanding democratic change began in
Syria in March of 2011, Bashar Asad and his clique of supporters have
unleashed a massacre that has claimed the lives of at least 70,000
Syrians, displaced more than 4 million people across a region that
already suffers from a massive refugee population, sparked a civil war
with a multitude of divergent ethnic groups and religious sects, and
placed the security of Syria's chemical weapons stockpile--which is one
of the world's largest--at risk of falling into the hands of terrorist
groups.
Despite the impact of this horrific campaign, Asad's commitment to
continuing the fight appears unwavering. One must look no further than
the increasingly indiscriminate tactics with which he conducts his
campaign. In recent months, in addition to Asad's possible use of
chemical weapons, he has increased his reliance on airstrikes, Scud
missiles, rockets, mortar shells, and artillery to terrorize and to
kill civilians.
Asad's ability to conduct this campaign is enabled by two actors--
Iran and Russia. Iran's financial, personnel, and materiel support have
been critical to ensuring Asad's military remains operable and that the
impact of defections is mitigated with reinforcements. Russia's support
to Syria's more advanced military weaponry, most notably air defense
systems, is critical to Asad's continued ability to project power into
areas of the country he no longer controls.
To add further complexity to the situation, al-Nusra Front, an al-
Qaida offshoot, continues to spread its influence in some areas of
Syria. Its presence is of concern and countering its spread needs to be
a priority. It is also critical that we ensure that countries in the
region that are seeking to force an end to the Asad regime are not
enabling and enhancing the capabilities of violent extremists who will
ultimately turn their weapons on moderate Syrians and on religious
minorities in Syria, such as the Syrian Christians.
The combination of these circumstances in Syria demonstrates that the
status quo is unacceptable and that time is not on our side. Many
officials in Washington share this sentiment but in the same breath
remind us that the situation in Syria is complex, volatile, and
asymmetric; Syria's Government institutions are crumbling, which could
create a dangerous vacuum; any action by the United States or the West,
even if it is with our Arab partners, risks significant escalation; and
that any security vacuum could be filled by Islamist extremists.
I have supported, and I will continue to support, the President's
contributions to provide humanitarian relief to the Syrian people
throughout the region, as well as the additional assistance he has
pledged to Jordan to help with the devastating impact of this conflict
on that country.
But it is essential that the United States, working with our allies
in the region, step up the military pressure on the Asad regime--of
course, doing so in a carefully thought out and regionally supported
way.
Certainly, there are significant challenges to any plan of action in
Syria. But we not only have to figure out the consequences of any
action, we also have to figure out the consequences of not taking
additional actions. In my view, the facts on the ground make the
consequences of inaction too great, and it is time for the United
States and our allies to use ways to alter the course of events in
Syria by increasing the military pressure on Asad until he can see that
his current course is not sustainable.
Taking steps to add military pressure on Asad will also provide
backing to Secretary Kerry's efforts to bring the Russians into the
dialog politically, which is aimed at leading to Asad's departure. I
commend Secretary Kerry for his efforts to bring Russia into that
dialog.
At the same time, of course, we condemn Russia's support for the Asad
regime. I happen to feel very strongly that even though we are
condemning, and should condemn, Russia's support for the Asad regime,
it is still in our interest that Russia participate in putting pressure
on Asad politically to depart, if Secretary Kerry can possibly do so.
I have joined Senator McCain recently in writing to President Obama,
urging the President to consider supporting a number of efforts,
including the creation by Turkey of a safe zone inside Syria along its
border, the deployment of our Patriot batteries closer to that border
in order to protect populations in that safe zone and to neutralize any
Syrian planes that threaten it and also to provide weapons to vetted
elements of the opposition in Syria. These actions--raising the
military pressure on Asad--will send the critical message to Asad that
he is going to go one way or the other.
The Armed Services Committee, which I chair, recently held an open
hearing on the situation in Syria and the Defense Department's efforts
to plan for a full range of possible options to respond to the
contingencies in Syria. Our committee is set to receive a classified
briefing on Syria next week. I intend to raise these issues with our
witnesses at that briefing. I know Senator McCain and Senator Graham
and others are also going to forcefully raise these issues with those
witnesses at that briefing and to urge them to carry the message back
to the administration that it is time to up the military pressure on
Asad.
I thank Senator McCain and others who are participating in this
discussion.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I wish to join with my distinguished
colleagues in our collective call for a greater engagement. I start
off, as I always do in many years in Congress between the House and the
Senate, with two questions: What is in the national interests of the
United States? What is in the national security interests of the United
States? The answer to those two questions is, in essence, how I
determine my views, my advocacy, my votes, and the policies I want to
pursue.
There are vital U.S. interests engaged in Syria. First, of course,
there is a humanitarian crisis, probably the most significant
humanitarian crisis at this moment--70,000 dead and climbing, 4 million
displaced. That is, of course, an urgent call. Beyond that we have
large chemical weapon stockpiles that potentially can fall into the
wrong hands. Some have, by a whole host of public reports, already been
used against the Syrian people. Unless you believe that somehow the
rebels have in their possession chemical weapons, then this largely has
to be from Asad. He has used them. I think once you use them, you are
willing to use them even in greater quantities. That is a real concern.
The Syrian State could collapse. That would leave a safe heaven for
terrorists, constituting a new threat to the region. You already have
al-Qaida affiliated al-Nusra, you have Hezbollah, you have the Iranian
Guard. You have the opportunity for a safe heaven for terrorists
constituting a new threat to the region with broader implications for
our own security.
The refugee crisis and sectarian violence spread instability
throughout the region. The King of Jordan was here 2 weeks ago and sat
with our committee. He made it very clear, his population has already
increased by 20 percent. At the rate it is going, the population of
Jordan could double. That is not sustainable for the kingdom. This is
one of the countries that has been one of our most significant and
faithful allies, and a constructive ally in the region. We cannot
afford for that ally to ultimately find itself in a position in which
it could very well collapse. We look at all of that.
Finally, there could be no more strategic setback to Iran--which this
body has spoken collectively and in a bipartisan united fashion to stop
its march toward nuclear weapons--than to have the Asad regime
collapse. That would be a tremendous setback to Iran and would cause a
disruption in the terror pipeline between Iran and Hezbollah in
Lebanon.
[[Page S3291]]
These are just some of the vital national security interests of the
United States in changing the tide. Under the present set of
circumstances, Asad believes he is winning. For so long, as he believes
he is winning, he will continue the course he is on. There has to be a
change in the tipping point.
After 2 years I believe there are those in the opposition--rebels we
can and have thoroughly vetted--we can assist in trying to change that
tipping point. If you have a monopoly on air power and on artillery,
then the reality is you will not see a change on the ground.
So the legislation I have introduced and am working with colleagues
on begins to move us in a different direction. It is to seek to arm
thoroughly vetted elements of the Syrian opposition so we can change
the tipping point. It is to, of course, continue to provide
humanitarian assistance and at the same time work for the assistance of
a transition fund to help those rebels that are already controlling
parts of the civilian population to help them administrate there and
prepare for the future.
The key point is unless we change the dynamics on the ground, we will
not have a change in the regime. So long as the regime can continue to
bomb its citizens indiscriminately--and if the reports, as we have seen
from various countries, including our own, suggest that Asad has used
chemical weapons against his own citizens--that is only an invitation
to allow him to continue to do it unless we act.
I am willing to consider other options. I know my colleague, Senator
McCain, very distinguished in this field, has suggested others. I am
willing to consider those as well. But I think, finally, we strengthen
the hand of the administration and Secretary Kerry. We all want to see
a politically, diplomatically achieved solution. But in the absence of
changing the calculus not only of Asad but of his supporters who have
propped him up, unless they believe he will fall, I am not sure we have
changed the calculus for the political opportunity to take place and
the diplomacy to be effective.
I think these efforts strengthen the hand of the administration,
create a parallel track that if diplomacy fails, we will have an
opportunity to pursue our vital national interests and security
interests, end the humanitarian tragedy, and create the type of
stability we want to see in the region. I appreciate my colleague
bringing us together on the floor of the Senate. I look forward to
continuing to work with him.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the distinguished chairman. May I say, it has
been a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to serve on the
Foreign Relations Committee, of which Senator Menendez is the chairman.
I think his stewardship of that committee has been outstanding. I
appreciate the very articulate argument the chairman just presented,
including the strategic dimension of this whole issue which sometimes
in our--particularly, when you focus so much on the humanitarian side,
the strategic interest of the fall of Bashar Al-Asad is something which
I think adds another dimension. I thank the Senator and chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I would just like to echo what Senator
McCain said about Senator Menendez. I would like to, for the record,
note that the tide of war in Syria changed today because of what is
happening on the floor of the Senate. That may be hard for people to
understand, but I really do not think so.
How do you change the tide of battle? You make it certain to the
world that Asad will go, and you provide hope to those who are fighting
him that they will prevail. I would suggest that a bipartisan consensus
is forming in the Senate that now is the time to do more, not less,
when it comes to Syria, including arming the rebels--the right rebels,
the right opposition, with the right weapons, which will eventually
change the tide of battle.
So to those who have been following this debate about Syria, to those
who have been in the fight trying to topple this regime, I cannot
stress to you how important today is in your cause. When you get
Senator Levin and Senator Menendez, two institutional, important
figures because of their chairmanships, but beyond that, important
because of who they are and what they bring to every debate around
national security, combined with Senator McCain and others, you have
turned the tide in Washington.
As to Senator McCain, he has been talking in the most eloquent terms
for at least a couple of years about stopping this war in Syria, ending
the Asad regime and replacing it with something better. He has been
right, as he usually is. But now is not the time to look backward, it
is to look forward.
I think an effort by the Senate and the House to acknowledge that the
tide of war needs to change and we should be bolder in our support for
the opposition is going to increase the likelihood of a peaceful
solution through diplomacy.
The Russians have to know, after today, if they know anything about
American politics, the game has changed when it comes to Asad, and this
is a monumental sea change in terms of the war in Syria by having four
Senators who care about such matters of foreign policy to speak out and
say we will support arming the rebels and being more involved
militarily.
To the opposition, this is a great day for you. To Asad, this seals
your fate.
Now, what do we do and how do we do it? It will not all end tomorrow
because of this colloquy today, but we are well on the way to ending
this war. Here is the choice: The current regime, which is evil to the
core, and the imperfect opposition, which has been infected by radical
Islam--you can fix the second one; you cannot fix the first. It is that
simple to me.
The sooner the war ends the better, not only for saving people in
Syria from further slaughter, but preventing what I think would be an
erosion of our national security interests in four areas. If this war
goes 6 more months, a failed state will emerge in Syria. It will be so
fractured you cannot put it back together.
The 6,000 al-Qaida associated fighters will grow in number, and there
will be a safe haven in Syria like there was in Afghanistan. That is
not good for us. Unlike Afghanistan, there is enough chemical weapons
in Syria to kill thousands if not millions of Americans and people who
are our allies. I worry greatly not only that chemical weapons have
been used in Syria on the opposition by the regime, but those same
chemical weapons will be used in the future by radical Islamists
against us.
The next bomb that goes off in America may have more than nails and
glass in it. The only reason millions of Americans or thousands of
Americans, hundreds of thousands have not been killed by radical
Islamists is they cannot get the weapons to kill that many of us. They
would if they could.
I have never seen a better opportunity for radical Islamists to get
ahold of weapons of mass destruction than I see in Syria today. Every
day that goes by their opportunity to acquire some of these weapons
grows dramatically. If you ask me what I worry the most about with
Syria and why we should get involved, it is for that very reason. If
these weapons get compromised, they are going to fall into the hands of
the people who will use them against us, and to believe otherwise would
be incredibly naive.
Jordan. Probably the most stabilizing figure in the Mideast in these
dangerous times is the King of Jordan. His country is being overrun by
refugees. If this war goes on 6 more months, that is probably the end
of his kingdom because it will create economic chaos and political
instability. He will be a victim of the civil war in Syria, and it will
have monumental consequences for our national security.
As we talk about Syria and chemical weapons falling into radical
Islamists' hands, we are dealing with a radical regime in Iran that is
marching toward building a nuclear weapon. If you think the ayatollahs
in Iran are trying to build a nuclear powerplant at the bottom of a
mountain, you are wrong. They are trying to build a nuclear weapon to
ensure their survivability. God only knows what they would do with
nuclear technology. But if you believe what they say, they would wipe
Israel off the map, and we would be next. I tend to believe what they
say.
If you allow Syria to continue to deteriorate and have a hands-off
policy
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toward Asad, then I think you are sending the worst possible signal to
Iran. As Senator Levin said, really the only ally Iran has today is
Asad in Syria. How can we convince the Iranians we are serious about
their nuclear problem when we do not seem to be very serious about Asad
using chemical weapons against his own people? What a terrible signal
to send at one of the most important times.
I would end with this thought: This bipartisan consensus that is
emerging today is going to pay great dividends. It is going to be
helpful to the President. We can end this war sooner rather than later.
But no matter what happens, there is going to be a second war in Syria,
unfortunately.
That second war is going to be between radical Islamists who want to
turn Syria into some kind of al-Qaida-inspired state, and the
overwhelming majority of Syrians who want to live a better life and be
our friends, not our enemies.
This war will occur after the fall of Asad. But it will end the right
way. The sooner we get the first war over, the shorter the second war
will be. I think we can bring this war to a close without boots on the
ground. The sooner we act the better.
One last thought. To the opposition, you would be helping your cause
if you would let the world know that you do not want Asad's chemical
weapons; that the new Syria will not be a state that wants weapons of
mass destruction; that you would agree these weapons should be
controlled by the international community and destroyed; that you would
agree to an international force coming on the ground with your blessing
the day after Asad falls to secure these weapons and destroy them for
all time. I think you would be helping your cause.
So I say to Senator McCain, I really appreciate his leadership for a
couple of years. But persistence does matter in politics and all things
that are important. I think the Senator's persistence is paying off.
I say to Senator Menendez and Senator Levin, what they have done
today joining up in a bipartisan fashion is going to pay great
dividends for our own national security interests. The way forward is
pretty clear.
I say to President Obama, we want to be your ally. We want to be your
supporter. We want you to get more involved, not less. We realize it is
hard. We realize there are risks no matter what we do. But as Senator
McCain said before, the risk of doing nothing by continuing on the
current track is far greater than getting involved in ending the war
sooner.
Mr. McCAIN. Can I just ask one question of my colleague? I understand
recently he made a trip to the Middle East. There is nothing like
seeing the terrible consequences of war. I understand the Senator
visited a refugee camp.
Maybe for the benefit of our colleagues the Senator could take a
minute to describe the horrible conditions people who have now been
made refugees have been subjected to and their failure to understand
why we won't be able to be of more assistance to them.
Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Senator for his question. It was one of the
most compelling trips I have ever made to the Middle East. We went to
Turkey, Jordan, and we went to a refugee camp in Jordan. Some 40,000
Syrian children are now in Jordanian schools. The burden on Jordan is
immense, but when you talk to the people in the camps, what they have
gone through and what their loved ones have gone through is
heartbreaking.
From a national point of view, once you visit the camps, you
understand what is at stake. They tell you about radical Islamists
moving in. They want no part of them but at the end of the day they are
having more influence because we are not in the fight. You can do this
without boots on the ground.
The most chilling thing they tell us, which Senator McCain, has been
echoing for a long time, is their children are watching the United
States. Like it or not, we have the reputation in the world that we can
do almost anything.
Well, we can't do almost anything, but we are seen as a force for
good. The people in Syria are beside themselves wondering where is
America. America, to them, is an idea. They want to be like us because
it means freedom, and it means economic opportunity. It means having a
say about your children's future. They are dumbfounded that we are not
more involved, given the stakes that exist in Syria. They tell us
without any hesitation that the young people of Syria will remember
this moment. They will hold this against us. I think I know what the
Senator is telling us.
Here is the good news: There is still time to act. It doesn't have to
end that way. The conditions in Syria are horrible. The refugee camps
were beyond imagination. The U.N. is doing a great job, but they are
running out of money. Jordan is about to fall if we don't stop this
war.
From a human point of view, we have got to get this war over and
America needs to be seen as part of the solution, not part of the
problem. From a national security point of view, Syria is going to
become a nightmare for the whole world, including the United States.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in
the Record a Washington Post editorial entitled ``Repercussions Of
Inaction,'' a Wall Street Journal article, ``U.S. Is Warned Russia
Plans Syria Arms Sale,'' and, finally, a piece by Leon Wieseltier that
is in the Washington Diarist.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, May 9, 2013]
The Repercussions of Inaction
(Editorial)
There are grave risks in continuing the current U.S. policy
toward Syria.
Opponents of U.S. intervention in Syria are adept at citing
the risks of a more aggressive U.S. effort to bring down the
regime of Bashar al-Assad. Weapons given to rebel fighters
might end up in the hands of extremists, the skeptics say.
U.S. air attacks or the creation of a no-fly zone would be
challenged by formidable air defenses. U.S. intervention
might increase the risk that the regime would resort to
chemical weapons.
Above all, say the anti-interventionists, direct or even
indirect U.S. engagement in the fighting would make Syria an
American problem, saddling a war-weary country with another
difficult, expensive and possibly unworkable nation-building
mission.
These are serious objections, though we believe that some
of the risks, such as the spread of weapons to jihadists, can
be mitigated, while others, such as the strength of Syrian
air defenses, have been exaggerated. Our greater concern is
about the side of the discussion critics of intervention
usually leave out--which is the risks that are incurred by
failing to intervene.
What will unfold in Syria if the Obama administration
persists with its policy of providing humanitarian and other
non-lethal aid while standing back from the fighting? The
most likely scenario is that Syria fractures along sectarian
lines. An al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, is already
consolidating control over a swath of northeastern Syria;
remnants of the regime, backed by Shiite fighters from
Lebanon's Hezbollah movement, could take over a strip of the
western coastline.
Such a splintering would almost certainly spread the
sectarian warfare to Iraq and Lebanon, as it has to some
extent already. That could cause the collapse of the Iraqi
political system that was the legacy of the U.S. mission
there. Chemical weapons stocks now controlled by the Assad
regime would be up for grabs, probably forcing further
interventions by Israel in order to prevent their acquisition
by Hezbollah or al-Qaeda. Jordan, the most fragile U.S. ally
in the Middle East, could collapse under the weight of Syrian
refugees. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which have been imploring
the Obama administration to take steps to end the war, could
conclude that the United States is no longer a reliable ally.
Of course, some of these consequences may come about
whatever the United States does. But the best way of
preventing them is to quickly tip the military balance
against the Assad regime--something that would probably
require an air campaign as well as arms for the moderate
opposition. If the regime's fighting strength is decisively
broken it might still be possible to force out the Assads and
negotiate a political transition, as Secretary of State John
F. Kerry aspires to do. For now, with the regime convinced it
is winning, there is no such chance--and with each passing
month Syria's breakup comes closer to reality.
In short, there are substantial risks for the United States
if it intervenes in Syria but also grave dangers in its
present policy. On Tuesday President Obama said his job was
to ``constantly measure'' what actions were in the best U.S.
interest. It's not an easy calculus, to be sure. But for two
years, as Mr. Obama has heeded the warnings about U.S.
engagement, the situation in Syria has grown more dangerous
to U.S. interests. There are no good options, as everyone
likes to say. But it's becoming increasingly clear
[[Page S3293]]
that the greatest risk to the United States lies in failing
to take decisive action to end the Assad regime.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2013]
U.S. Is Warned Russia Plans Syria Arms Sale
(By Jay Solomon, Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes)
Washington.--Israel has warned the U.S. that a Russian deal
is imminent to sell advanced ground-to-air missile systems to
Syria, weapons that would significantly boost the regime's
ability to stave off intervention in its civil war.
U.S. officials said on Wednesday that they are analyzing
the information Israel provided about the suspected sale of
S-300 missile batteries to Syria, but wouldn't comment on
whether they believed such a transfer was near.
Russian officials didn't immediately return requests to
comment. The Russian Embassy in Washington has said its
policy is not to comment on arms sales or transfers between
Russia and other countries.
The government of President Bashar al-Assad has been
seeking to purchase S-300 missile batteries--which can
intercept both manned aircraft and guided missiles--from
Moscow going back to the George W. Bush administration, U.S.
officials said. Western nations have lobbied President
Vladimir Putin's government not to go ahead with the sale. If
Syria were to acquire and deploy the systems, it would make
any international intervention in Syria far more complicated,
according to U.S. and Middle East-based officials.
According to the information the Israelis provided in
recent days, Syria has been making payments on a 2010
agreement with Moscow to buy four batteries for $900 million.
They cite financial transactions from the Syrian government,
including one made this year through Russia's foreign-
development bank, known as the VEB.
The package includes six launchers and 144 operational
missiles, each with a range of 125 miles, according to the
information the Israelis provided. The first shipment could
come over the next three months, according to the Israelis'
information, and be concluded by the end of the year. Russia
is also expected to send two instruction teams to train
Syria's military in operating the missile system, the
Israelis say.
Russia has been Mr. Assad's most important international
backer, outside of Iran, since the conflict in Syria started
in March 2011, and supplies Syria with arms, funding and
fuel. Russia maintains a naval port in Syria, its only outlet
to the Mediterranean. Moscow also has publicly voiced worries
that a collapsed Syria could fuel Islamist activities in its
restive Caucasus regions.
Secretary of State John Kerry met with Mr. Putin on Tuesday
in Moscow. The leaders said they would stage an international
conference this month aimed at ending the civil war. U.S.
officials couldn't say whether Messrs. Kerry and Putin or
their teams discussed the arms sale.
British Prime Minister David Cameron is scheduled to visit
Mr. Putin in Russia on Friday. The White House on Wednesday
said Mr. Cameron would visit Washington on Monday to discuss
issues including Syria's civil war and counterterrorism, plus
trade and economic issues, with President Barack Obama.
The Obama administration has argued that Mr. Assad has to
leave office as part of a political transition in Damascus.
The Kremlin has maintained that he retains a large base of
support and should be included in negotiations over a future
Syrian government.
Should Mr. Putin's government go ahead with the sale, it
would mark a significant escalation in the battle between
Moscow and Washington over Syria. U.S. officials said they
believe Russian technicians are already helping maintain the
existing Syrian air-defense units.
The first air-defense deals between Russia and Syria date
back decades. Russia in recent years has stepped up shipments
to modernize Syria's targeting systems and make the air
defenses mobile, and therefore much more difficult for
Israel--and the U.S.--to overcome.
According to a U.S. intelligence assessment, Russia began
shipping SA-22 Pantsir-S1 units to Syria in 2008. The system,
a combination of surface-to-air missiles and 30mm
antiaircraft guns, has a digital targeting system and is
mounted on a combat vehicle, making it easy to move. Syria
has 36 of the vehicles, according to the assessment.
In 2009, the Russians started upgrading Syria's outdated
analog SA-3 surface-to-air missile systems, turning them into
the SA-26 Pechora-2M system, which is mobile and digital,
equipped with missiles with an operational range of 17 miles,
according to the assessment.
The U.S. is particularly worried about another modernized
system Moscow provides--the SA-5. With an operational range
of 175 miles, SA-5 missiles could take out U.S. planes flying
from Cyprus, a key North Atlantic Treaty Organization base
that was used during Libya operations and would likely be
vital in any Syrian operation.
The U.S. has stealth aircraft and ship-based, precision-
guided missiles that could take out key air-defense sites.
Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
has privately told the White House that shutting down the
system could require weeks of bombing, putting U.S. fighter
pilots in peril and diverting military resources from other
priorities.
According to an analysis by the U.S. military's Joint
Staff, Syrian air defenses are nearly five times more
sophisticated than what existed in Libya before the NATO
launched its air campaign there in 2011. Syrian air defenses
are about 10 times more sophisticated than the system the
U.S. and its allies faced in Serbia.
____
[From the Washington Diarist, May 7, 2013]
Stung!
(By Leon Wieseltier)
A reporter who visited the White House last week brought
back the news that the criticism of President Obama's
immobility about the Syrian disaster has ``begun to sting.''
Good.Something got through. The president's sophistries about
his ``red line'' helped, of course: he spoke his way into a
predicament that he cannot speak his way out of, thereby
damaging the article of faith about the magical powers of his
speech. The press is full of reports that our policy may be
changing, that we may finally supply weapons to rebels we can
ideologically support, that we have identified such rebels
under the leadership of General Salim Idris, and so on. ``We
are on an upward trajectory,'' a White House official told
another reporter about these second thoughts, which only a
short while ago it would have considered a downward
trajectory. Obama, somewhat embarrassed by the implication
that for two years he may have been in error about one of the
most consequential crises of his presidency, is having the
White House rehearse its old admonition about caution (its
chin-stroking Kissingerian term for a doctrinaire timidity),
but still something may be stirring. The Syrian use of sarin
and the Israeli airstrikes (which were miraculously unimpeded
by the mythical power of Assad's air defenses) seem to have
concentrated the West Wing mind. Is Obama being stung into
action? I do not really believe it--his interventionism runs
deep, philosophically and temperamentally; but in any event
it is not too early to record a few lessons that can be
extracted from this fiasco.
The bitterness of belatedness. There is nothing we know
about Assad now that we did not know a year ago and longer.
Not even his use of chemical weapons changes our
understanding of him. His strategy in this crisis has always
been to transform a democratic rebellion into a sectarian
war, and his method for doing so has been to commit crimes
against humanity. In the two years of American quiescence the
Syrian situation has become only more dire, so that those who
now plead that there are no perfect options are right. But
there are imperfect options, which is often all that the
Hobbesian life of nations anyway allows: we can still create
pro-Western elements in the struggle for Syria after Assad,
and deny Al Qaeda a government in Damascus, and stem the tide
of the refugees that is shaking the entire region. But the
road to a democratic Syria is now much longerand more twisted
than it had to be. I say this not only in recrimination, but
also because Obama's failure to act swiftly in the Syrian
crisis reiterates one of the regular mistakes of American
presidents after the cold war, which is to refuse to treat an
emergency like an emergency. In many problems of statecraft,
patience is a virtue and judiciousness the beginning of
wisdom; but not in all. There are gross outrages against
justice, such as the butchery of civilians, that must be
acted against without delay or they have not been properly
understood. Confronted by this degree of urgency, the
difference between success and failure is time. Why do we
have to keep rediscovering this? Must the learning curve of
presidents always cost many thousands of lives? Has anyone at
the White House read Samantha Power's book?
The cult of the exit strategy. A ``senior American official
who is involved in Syria policy'' plaintively said this to
Dexter Filkins of The New Yorker: ``People on the Hill ask
me, `Why can't we do a no-fly zone? Why can't we do military
strikes?' Of course we can do these things. The issue is,
where will it stop?'' The answer is, we don't know. But is
the gift of prophecy really a requirement for historical
action? Must we know the ending at the beginning? If so, then
nobody would start a business, or a book, or a medical
treatment, or a love affair, let alone an invasion of
Normandy Beach. We can have certainty about our objectives
but not about our circumstances. The most serious actionis
often improvisatory, though its purposes should always be
clear. The prestige of ``the exit strategy'' in our culture
is another American attempt to deny the contingency of
experience and assert mastery over what cannot be mastered--
in this instance, it is American control-freakishness applied
to the use of American force. But we often engage with what
we cannot master. No outcomes are assured, except perhaps
when we do nothing. We do not need to control the realm in
which we need to take action; we need only to have strong and
defensible reasons and strong and defensible means, and to
keep our wits, our analytical abilities, about us. After all,
there are many ways, good and bad, to end a military
commitment, as Obama himself has shown. All this talk of
exiting is designed only to inhibit us from entering. Like
its cousin ``the slippery slope,'' ``the exit strategy'' is
demagoguery masquerading as prudence.
The eclipse of humanitarianism. Seventy thousand people
have died in the Syrian war,
[[Page S3294]]
most of them at the hands of their ruler. Since this number
has appeared in the papers for many months, the actual number
must be much higher. The slaughter is unceasing. But the
debate about American intervention is increasingly conducted
in ``realist'' terms: the threat to American interests posed
by jihadism in Syria, the intrigues of Iran and Hezbollah,
the rattling of Israel, the ruination of Jordan and Lebanon
and Iraq. Those are all good reasons for the president of the
United States to act like the president of the United States.
But wouldn't the prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocidal
war be reason enough? Is the death of scores and even
hundreds of thousands, and the displacement of millions, less
significant for American policy, and less quickening? The
moral dimension must be restored to our deliberations, the
moral sting, or else Obama, for all his talk about
conscience, will have presided over a terrible mutilation of
American discourse: the severance of conscience from action.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleagues. I yield.
____________________