[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 25 (Friday, February 15, 2013)]
[House]
[Pages H571-H572]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR IRAN

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Messer). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of January 3, 2013, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks) is 
recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, my comments today are heavily 
contributed to by the author of ``The Nature of War,'' Ron Tira; and I 
want to acknowledge him. He's a noted military expert and noted 
national security expert, and I appreciate so very much his seminal 
contribution to these comments.
  Mr. Speaker, a nuclear Iran poses a severe and unfamiliar risk to the 
United States and its allies. We have to be very careful not to 
mistakenly assume that a relatively stable balance of deterrence, 
similar to the nuclear equilibrium between the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, can be achieved with Iran. A nuclear 
Iran represents a very different type of threat that simply cannot be 
managed.
  A nuclear Iran would serve to incentivize the development of nuclear 
weapons by many other regional powers in the Middle East, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
  Mr. Speaker, a multi-polar nuclear crisis is much harder to manage 
than anything we've experienced or did experience during the Cold War. 
If we could all just imagine for a moment the so-called ``chicken 
game.'' But instead of two drivers, imagine five drivers, Mr. Speaker, 
each speeding from different directions to converge on the same 
intersection.
  All of this, in addition to the other characteristics of the Middle 
East, such as unstable regimes and the danger of nuclear weapons 
falling into the hands of al Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
  Consider Qadhafi's Libya, Mr. Speaker, with several nuclear warheads. 
Who knows where they might be now? And where would the world be today 
if Syria's Assad had managed to complete his nuclear bombmaking 
efforts?
  Therefore, Mr. Speaker, the only viable U.S. policy is one of 
preventing

[[Page H572]]

Iran from going nuclear, not this delusional notion of containing a 
nuclear Iran. Indeed, prevention is the stated policy objective of this 
President and his top advisers.
  However, the problem is not with the stated policy, but with the 
strategy that is supposed to achieve it. And, Mr. Speaker, the facts on 
the ground reveal that our policy objectives are not turning into 
reality.
  Nearly all previous red lines demarcated by America and its allies 
over Iran's nuclear ambition have now been crossed, with very few 
repercussions to show for Iran's defiance. Iran is now enriching 
uranium in quantities, enrichment levels and facilities that would have 
terrified the entire free world only a few years ago.
  Indeed, at this very moment, a defiant Iran is forging ahead with the 
development of ballistic missiles, detonators and other components 
essential to nuclear weaponization.
  Mr. Speaker, why do we find it so challenging to realize our policy 
objectives?
  Why is the world's sole superpower unable to impose its will on a 
country whose GDP is comparable with that of Argentina and many of 
those whose significant military assets date back as far as arms deals 
with the Johnson and Nixon administrations?
  Mr. Speaker, one of the key enabling factors for Iran's nuclear 
weapons development is the perception of a lack of symmetry between 
Iranian and American seriousness and determination regarding the 
nuclear program. But for Iran, it is of the utmost importance, and the 
regime is willing to take risks and to pay high prices to achieve its 
objectives, or at least this is certainly how it postures.
  Mr. Speaker, Iran is successfully deterring its adversaries and 
positioning itself as ready to face a confrontation, even if its deep-
rooted weaknesses make it unlikely that it could ever withstand such a 
direct conflict.
  Mr. Speaker, it's time for us to be candid in questioning the 
strategic effectiveness of covert and clandestine operations, as 
important as they are. While the courage and resourcefulness of our 
intelligence community is unquestionable, and while covert and 
clandestine operations may inflict some damage on Iran's nuclear 
program, they cannot and have not been effective in convincing Iran to 
abandon its nuclearization policy.
  More significantly, covert and clandestine activities create an 
illusion of ``something being done,'' thus appearing to justify the 
fact that we continue to let more and more time pass.
  So, Mr. Speaker, we have to realize that covert operations simply 
cannot be the primary means by which we expect to deter Iran. If 
prevention is our real commitment, and not merely lip service, then we 
must deal with that Iranian nuclear challenge immediately, and not 
later.

                              {time}  1200

  Every day that passes, Iran grows more dangerously close to realizing 
its nuclear ambition--and to becoming virtually untouchable militarily. 
In the face of that reality, the more breathtaking reality is that it 
seems both the Iranian and American administrations favor wasting more 
time: Iran, because it allows them to forge ahead toward completion, 
and the Obama administration, because it allows them to postpone 
difficult decisions which would necessitate actual leadership from the 
White House.
  Mr. Speaker, the President's disingenuously stated ends are utterly 
at odds with our actual response, and this raises a host of questions 
as to the credibility of either the administration's true intent or its 
chosen strategies. It's almost unimaginable how much further American 
strategic credibility would deteriorate if Iran actually acquires the 
bomb in spite of the half-hearted ``warnings'' of Mr. Obama.
  Credibility questions also abound with regard to the administration's 
reasoning against military action. Time and again administration 
officials argue that the futility of military action is real since, 
allegedly, some of the nuclear assets are difficult to reach, and a 
military action may only postpone the nuclear program by a couple of 
years. But, Mr. Speaker, this is a peculiar argument, at the very 
least.
  Any nuclear production asset that is destroyed can be eventually 
rebuilt. Moreover, chasing each and every centrifuge, wherever it is 
stashed away, is ultimately an ineffective strategy. So why does the 
administration advocate such a strategy?
  Our strategic challenge, Mr. Speaker, is Iran's policy of pursuing a 
military nuclear capability. It is not necessarily, not even mostly, 
that Iran is currently in possession of certain nuclear production 
assets. It is Iran's policy that must be altered. Production assets 
will then inherently follow. To realize its objectives, the U.S. must 
compel Iran to alter its policy of acquiring a military nuclear 
capability and then enforce the policy change over time.
  If we fail to deprive Iran of nuclear weapons, we will ultimately 
have to face infinitely more dangerous challenges than those associated 
with preventing it from going nuclear. Consider the dangers for a 
moment of conducting a second operation to free Kuwait, only this time, 
once it's been taken over by a nuclear-armed Iran. And none of this 
even touches upon the grave reality that would emerge once Iran 
possesses intercontinental ballistic missile capability along with a 
strategic reach to our own shores.
  Mr. Speaker, it's a sad day when the vacuum of leadership in the 
White House has allowed Iran to posture more credibly than America, in 
spite of wielding a much smaller stick. In this instance, it has 
literally allowed Iran to be more strategically effective than we are.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, the administration has been trying for a very long 
time to diplomatically talk its way out of this challenge or to bluff 
its way out of the challenge by moving military assets up and down the 
Gulf, and therefore has made it doubtful that any further such 
statements or deployments can ever suffice to get the job done. Indeed, 
they may well have the opposite effect, as the demarcation of the 
administration's risk tolerance, which to any observer of its actions 
caps the ends it can reasonably expect to realize.
  So, Mr. Speaker, this brings us to the critical question that 
everyone should be asking themselves: If this administration is so 
deterred by a pre-nuclear Iran, how would it ever face up to a nuclear-
armed Iran? This is why, to date, in the only game that matters--that 
of conflicting policies--Mr. Speaker, the United States has not been 
able to alter Iran's policy of acquiring nuclear weapons. And, Mr. 
Speaker, we are running out of time to do things differently.
  With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

                          ____________________