[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 169 (Friday, December 28, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S8507-S8508]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. SHELBY:
  S. 3713. A bill to make technical corrections to the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss legislation that I 
introduced to make technical corrections to the Dodd-Frank Act.
  Two and a half years ago, Congress rushed to pass the 2,300 page 
Dodd-Frank Act and, like any large and complex piece of legislation, it 
contains numerous technical errors.
  For example, section 742(b) of Dodd-Frank amends the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act by citing to section 206(e) of that act when, in fact, 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley does not have a section 206(e).
  Another example is that Dodd-Frank abolished the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, but failed to take out references to the OTS in at least 
20 statutes.
  These are the types of errors that should be corrected.
  While I strongly opposed Dodd-Frank and do not believe that it should 
have become law, I nevertheless believe that we should at least attempt 
to clean up the errors found throughout the legislation.
  Accordingly, the legislation I have introduced focuses purely on 
technical corrections of non-substantive inaccuracies and omissions in 
the final Dodd-Frank bill.
  The bill I introduced could have been many pages longer, but I sought 
to keep it to only those changes that were purely technical.
  There are many other technical changes that could be made that also 
involve policy judgments.
  I decided not to include those changes in my bill because I wanted to 
introduce a bill that could garner broad bipartisan support and serve 
as a starting point for forging additional compromises on other 
problems with Dodd-Frank.
  If Congress is ever going to be bipartisan, this is the bill. We 
should at a bare minimum be able to agree that a law with numerous 
technical errors should be fixed at least to the extent of those 
technical issues.
  While the issues addressed in this bill are technical in nature, they 
also take into account the realities with the ongoing implementation of 
Dodd-Frank.
  For example, this legislation extends for one year the deadline for 
completing and issuing the regulations, studies and reports required by 
Dodd-Frank that have not been met by the date specified.
  This provision does not aim to delay or undermine the rulemaking 
process in any way.
  On the contrary, it is meant to address the flawed rulemaking process 
stipulated by Dodd-Frank, which directs financial regulators to 
complete an unprecedented number of rulemakings in very short time 
frames.
  Presently, our financial regulators are in violation of the law 
because they have not completed scores of rulemakings by the times 
prescribed by Dodd-Frank. This is not how the world's leading democracy 
should function.
  Congress's laws should be followed, especially by the agencies it has 
created. Congress should either hold regulators accountable for not 
making statutory deadlines or should grant regulators more time so that 
they are not in violation of the law.
  In this case, extending deadlines is the appropriate and reasonable 
approach.
  While I offer this bill to technically improve Dodd-Frank, my views 
about the substantive provisions of Dodd-Frank have not changed.
  I continue to believe that it is a flawed and poorly conceived piece 
of legislation. It expanded the scope and power of ineffective 
bureaucracies, created vast new bureaucracies with little 
accountability, and seriously undermined the competitiveness of the 
American economy.
  Moreover, Dodd-Frank did all that without accomplishing what it set 
out to do--make our financial system safer.
  Instead, Dodd-Frank preserved and codified preferential treatment for 
large financial institutions.
  It solidified the close relationships between regulators and big 
banks by maintaining their pre-existing prudential regulators.
  Dodd-Frank also protected the big banks from bankruptcy by creating a 
new resolution mechanism to ensure that large financial institutions do 
not fail.
  In addition not one regulator was held accountable in the wake of the 
crisis. To add insult to injury, the very same regulators that missed 
the warning signs were then closely consulted on how to draft Dodd-
Frank.
  Accordingly, many provisions in Dodd-Frank should be reexamined and 
replaced with language which would actually address the serious 
problems in our financial regulatory system.
  This bill, however, does not address any of my substantive concerns 
with Dodd Frank. In fact, I made a conscious effort to avoid any 
substantive recommendations, and to focus exclusively on technical 
corrections.
  My hope is that this bill will form the foundation for a more 
comprehensive debate on Dodd-Frank in the next Congress. Therefore, I 
intend to reintroduce this bill when we return in January.
  By working together to revise Dodd-Frank, I believe Congress can not 
only

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make our financial system safer, but also foster economic growth and 
job creation.
  One would think that we could reach a bipartisan consensus on that.

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