Congressional Record, Volume 158 Issue 147 (Friday, November 16, 2012)

[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 147 (Friday, November 16, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H6401-H6409]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

RUSSIA AND MOLDOVA JACKSON-VANIK REPEAL AND SERGEI MAGNITSKY RULE OF
LAW ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2012

Mr. BURTON OF Indiana. Madam Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution
808, I call up the bill (H.R. 6156) to authorize the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to
products of the Russian Federation and Moldova and to require reports
on the compliance of the Russian Federation with its obligations as a
member of the World Trade Organization, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). Pursuant to House Resolution
808, the amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting of the text
of Rules Committee Print 112-33 is adopted and the bill, as amended, is
considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

H.R. 6156

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Russia and
Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law
Accountability Act of 2012''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

TITLE I--PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Termination of application of title IV of the Trade Act of
1974 to products of the Russian Federation.

TITLE II--TRADE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Sec. 201. Reports on implementation by the Russian Federation of
obligations as a member of the World Trade Organization
and enforcement actions by the United States Trade
Representative.
Sec. 202. Promotion of the rule of law in the Russian Federation to
support United States trade and investment.
Sec. 203. Reports on laws, policies, and practices of the Russian
Federation that discriminate against United States
digital trade.
Sec. 204. Efforts to reduce barriers to trade imposed by the Russian
Federation.

TITLE III--PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS FOR MOLDOVA

Sec. 301. Findings.
Sec. 302. Termination of application of title IV of the Trade Act of
1974 to products of Moldova.

TITLE IV--SERGEI MAGNITSKY RULE OF LAW ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2012

Sec. 401. Short title.
Sec. 402. Findings; Sense of Congress.
Sec. 403. Definitions.
Sec. 404. Identification of persons responsible for the detention,
abuse, and death of Sergei Magnitsky and other gross
violations of human rights.
Sec. 405. Inadmissibility of certain aliens.
Sec. 406. Financial measures.
Sec. 407. Report to Congress.

TITLE I--PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) The Russian Federation allows its citizens the right
and opportunity to emigrate, free of any heavy tax on
emigration or on the visas or other documents required for
emigration and free of any tax, levy, fine, fee, or other
charge on any citizens as a consequence of the desire of
those citizens to emigrate to the country of their choice.
(2) The Russian Federation has been found to be in full
compliance with the freedom of emigration requirements under
title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2431 et seq.)
since 1994.
(3) The Russian Federation has received normal trade
relations treatment since concluding a bilateral trade
agreement with the United States that entered into force in
1992.
(4) On December 16, 2011, the Ministerial Conference of the
World Trade Organization invited the Russian Federation to
accede to the World Trade Organization.

SEC. 102. TERMINATION OF APPLICATION OF TITLE IV OF THE TRADE
ACT OF 1974 TO PRODUCTS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.

(a) Presidential Determinations and Extension of
Nondiscriminatory Treatment.--Notwithstanding any provision
of title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2431 et
seq.), the President may--
(1) determine that such title should no longer apply to the
Russian Federation; and
(2) after making a determination under paragraph (1) with
respect to the Russian Federation, proclaim the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations
treatment) to the products of the Russian Federation.
(b) Effective Date of Nondiscriminatory Treatment.--The
extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of
the Russian Federation pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
effective not sooner than the effective date of the accession
of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization.
(c) Termination of Applicability of Title IV.--On and after
the effective date under subsection (b) of the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the Russian
Federation, title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2431
et seq.) shall cease to apply to the Russian Federation.

TITLE II--TRADE ENFORCEMENT MEASURES RELATING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

SEC. 201. REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
OF OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE.

(a) Reports on Implementation.--
(1) In general.--Not later than one year after the
effective date under section 102(b) of the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the Russian
Federation, and annually thereafter, the United States Trade
Representative shall submit to the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives a report assessing the following:
(A) The extent to which the Russian Federation is
implementing the WTO Agreement (as defined in section 2 of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3501)) and the
following agreements annexed to that Agreement:
(i) The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (referred to in section 101(d)(3) of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(3))).
(ii) The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15))).
(B) The progress made by the Russian Federation in acceding
to, and the extent to which the Russian Federation is
implementing, the following:
(i) The Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information
Technology Products of the World Trade Organization, agreed
to at Singapore December 13, 1996 (commonly referred to as
the ``Information Technology Agreement'') (or a successor
agreement).
(ii) The Agreement on Government Procurement (referred to
in section 101(d)(17) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19
U.S.C. 3511(d)(17))).
(2) Plan for action by trade representative.--
(A) In general.--If, in preparing a report required by
paragraph (1), the Trade Representative believes that the
Russian Federation is not fully implementing an agreement
specified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of that paragraph or
that the Russian Federation is not making adequate progress
in acceding to an agreement specified in subparagraph (B) of
that paragraph, the Trade Representative shall, except as
provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, include in
the report a description of the actions the Trade
Representative plans to take to encourage the Russian
Federation to improve its implementation of the agreement or
increase its progress in acceding to the agreement, as the
case may be.
(B) Classified information.--If any information regarding a
planned action referred to in subparagraph (A) is
classifiable under Executive Order 13526 (75 Fed. Reg. 707;
relating to classified national security information) or a
subsequent Executive order, the Trade Representative shall
report that information to the Committee on Finance of the
Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives by--
(i) including the information in a classified annex to the
report required by paragraph (1); or
(ii) consulting with the Committee on Finance and the
Committee on Ways and Means with respect to the information
instead of including the information in the report or a
classified annex to the report.
(3) Public comments.--
(A) In general.--In developing the report required by
paragraph (1), the Trade Representative shall provide an
opportunity for the public to comment, including by holding a
public hearing.
(B) Publication in federal register.--The Trade
Representative shall publish notice of the opportunity to
comment and hearing required by subparagraph (A) in the
Federal Register.
(b) Report on Enforcement Actions Taken by Trade
Representative.--Not later than 180 days after the effective
date under section 102(b) of the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the Russian
Federation, and annually thereafter, the United States Trade
Representative shall submit to the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives a report describing the enforcement
actions taken by the Trade Representative against the

[[Page H6402]]

Russian Federation to ensure the full compliance of the
Russian Federation with its obligations as a member of the
World Trade Organization, including obligations under
agreements with members of the Working Party on the accession
of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization.

SEC. 202. PROMOTION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION TO SUPPORT UNITED STATES TRADE AND
INVESTMENT.

(a) Reports on Promotion of Rule of Law.--Not later than
one year after the effective date under section 102(b) of the
extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of
the Russian Federation, and annually thereafter, the United
States Trade Representative and the Secretary of State shall
jointly submit to the Committee on Finance of the Senate and
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives a report--
(1) on the measures taken by the Trade Representative and
the Secretary and the results achieved during the year
preceding the submission of the report with respect to
promoting the rule of law in the Russian Federation,
including with respect to--
(A) strengthening formal protections for United States
investors in the Russian Federation, including through the
negotiation of a new bilateral investment treaty;
(B) advocating for United States investors in the Russian
Federation, including by promoting the claims of United
States investors in Yukos Oil Company;
(C) encouraging all countries that are parties to the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, done at Paris
December 17, 1997 (commonly referred to as the ``OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention''), including the Russian Federation, to
fully implement their commitments under the Convention to
prevent overseas business bribery by the nationals of those
countries;
(D) promoting a customs administration, tax administration,
and judiciary in the Russia Federation that are free of
corruption; and
(E) increasing cooperation between the United States and
the Russian Federation to expand the capacity for civil
society organizations to monitor, investigate, and report on
suspected instances of corruption; and
(2) that discloses the status of any pending petition for
espousal filed with the Secretary by a United States investor
in the Russian Federation.
(b) Anti-Bribery Reporting and Assistance.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Commerce shall establish
and maintain a dedicated phone hotline and secure website,
accessible from within and outside the Russian Federation,
for the purpose of allowing United States entities--
(A) to report instances of bribery, attempted bribery, or
other forms of corruption in the Russian Federation that
impact or potentially impact their operations; and
(B) to request the assistance of the United States with
respect to issues relating to corruption in the Russian
Federation.
(2) Report required.--
(A) In general.--Not later than one year after the
effective date under section 102(b) of the extension of
nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the Russian
Federation, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
Commerce shall submit to the Committee on Finance of the
Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives a report that includes the following:
(i) The number of instances in which bribery, attempted
bribery, or other forms of corruption have been reported
using the hotline or website established pursuant to
paragraph (1).
(ii) A description of the regions in the Russian Federation
in which those instances are alleged to have occurred.
(iii) A summary of actions taken by the United States to
provide assistance to United States entities pursuant to
paragraph (1)(B).
(iv) A description of the efforts taken by the Secretary to
inform United States entities conducting business in the
Russian Federation or considering conducting business in the
Russian Federation of the availability of assistance through
the hotline and website.
(B) Confidentiality.--The Secretary shall not include in
the report required by subparagraph (A) the identity of a
United States entity that reports instances of bribery,
attempted bribery, or other forms of corruption in the
Russian Federation or requests assistance pursuant to
paragraph (1).

SEC. 203. REPORTS ON LAWS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION THAT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST
UNITED STATES DIGITAL TRADE.

Section 181(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2241(a))
is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Inclusion of certain discriminatory laws, policies,
and practices of the russian federation.--For calender year
2012 and each succeeding calendar year, the Trade
Representative shall include in the analyses and estimates
under paragraph (1) an identification and analysis of any
laws, policies, or practices of the Russian Federation that
deny fair and equitable market access to United States
digital trade.''.

SEC. 204. EFFORTS TO REDUCE BARRIERS TO TRADE IMPOSED BY THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

The United States Trade Representative shall continue to
pursue the reduction of barriers to trade imposed by the
Russian Federation on articles exported from the United
States to the Russian Federation through efforts--
(1) to negotiate a bilateral agreement under which the
Russian Federation will accept the sanitary and phytosanitary
measures of the United States as equivalent to the sanitary
and phytosanitary measures of the Russian Federation; and
(2) to obtain the adoption by the Russian Federation of an
action plan for providing greater protections for
intellectual property rights than the protections required by
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15))).

TITLE III--PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS FOR MOLDOVA

SEC. 301. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) Moldova allows its citizens the right and opportunity
to emigrate, free of any heavy tax on emigration or on the
visas or other documents required for emigration and free of
any tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizens as
a consequence of the desire of those citizens to emigrate to
the country of their choice.
(2) Moldova has been found to be in full compliance with
the freedom of emigration requirements under title IV of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2431 et seq.) since 1997.
(3) Moldova acceded to the World Trade Organization on July
26, 2001.

SEC. 302. TERMINATION OF APPLICATION OF TITLE IV OF THE TRADE
ACT OF 1974 TO PRODUCTS OF MOLDOVA.

TITLE IV--SERGEI MAGNITSKY RULE OF LAW ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2012

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the ``Sergei Magnitsky Rule of
Law Accountability Act of 2012''.

SEC. 402. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States aspires to a mutually beneficial
relationship with the Russian Federation based on respect for
human rights and the rule of law, and supports the people of
the Russian Federation in their efforts to realize their full
economic potential and to advance democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law.
(2) The Russian Federation--
(A) is a member of the United Nations, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe,
and the International Monetary Fund;
(B) has ratified the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
United Nations Convention against Corruption; and
(C) is bound by the legal obligations set forth in the
European Convention on Human Rights.
(3) States voluntarily commit themselves to respect
obligations and responsibilities through the adoption of
international agreements and treaties, which must be observed
in good faith in order to maintain the stability of the
international order. Human rights are an integral part of
international law, and lie at the foundation of the
international order. The protection of human rights,
therefore, particularly in the case of a country that has
incurred obligations to protect human rights under an
international agreement to which it is a party, is not left
exclusively to the internal affairs of that country.
(4) Good governance and anti-corruption measures are
instrumental in the protection of human rights and in
achieving sustainable economic growth, which benefits both
the people of the Russian Federation and the international
community through the creation of open and transparent
markets.
(5) Systemic corruption erodes trust and confidence in
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and human rights
protections. This is the case when public officials are
allowed to abuse their authority with impunity for political
or financial gains in collusion with private entities.
(6) The Russian nongovernmental organization INDEM has
estimated that bribes by individuals and businesses in the
Russian Federation amount to hundreds of billions of dollars
a year, an increasing share of the country's gross domestic
product.
(7) Sergei Leonidovich Magnitsky died on November 16, 2009,
at the age of 37, in Matrosskaya Tishina Prison in Moscow,
Russia, and is survived by a mother, a wife, and 2 sons.
(8) On July 6, 2011, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev's
Human Rights Council announced the results of its independent
investigation into the death of Sergei Magnitsky. The Human
Rights Council concluded that Sergei Magnitsky's arrest and
detention was illegal; he was denied access to justice by the
courts and prosecutors of the Russian Federation; he was
investigated by the same law enforcement officers whom he had
accused of stealing Hermitage Fund companies and illegally
obtaining a fraudulent $230,000,000 tax refund; he was denied
necessary medical care in custody; he was beaten by 8 guards
with rubber batons on the

[[Page H6403]]

last day of his life; and the ambulance crew that was called
to treat him as he was dying was deliberately kept outside of
his cell for one hour and 18 minutes until he was dead. The
report of the Human Rights Council also states the officials
falsified their accounts of what happened to Sergei Magnitsky
and, 18 months after his death, no officials had been brought
to trial for his false arrest or the crime he uncovered. The
impunity continued in April 2012, when Russian authorities
dropped criminal charges against Larisa Litvinova, the head
doctor at the prison where Magnitsky died.
(9) The systematic abuse of Sergei Magnitsky, including his
repressive arrest and torture in custody by officers of the
Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation that Mr.
Magnitsky had implicated in the embezzlement of funds from
the Russian Treasury and the misappropriation of 3 companies
from his client, Hermitage Capital Management, reflects how
deeply the protection of human rights is affected by
corruption.
(10) The politically motivated nature of the persecution of
Mr. Magnitsky is demonstrated by--
(A) the denial by all state bodies of the Russian
Federation of any justice or legal remedies to Mr. Magnitsky
during the nearly 12 full months he was kept without trial in
detention; and
(B) the impunity since his death of state officials he
testified against for their involvement in corruption and the
carrying out of his repressive persecution.
(11) The Public Oversight Commission of the City of Moscow
for the Control of the Observance of Human Rights in Places
of Forced Detention, an organization empowered by Russian law
to independently monitor prison conditions, concluded on
December 29, 2009, ``A man who is kept in custody and is
being detained is not capable of using all the necessary
means to protect either his life or his health. This is a
responsibility of a state which holds him captive. Therefore,
the case of Sergei Magnitsky can be described as a breach of
the right to life. The members of the civic supervisory
commission have reached the conclusion that Magnitsky had
been experiencing both psychological and physical pressure in
custody, and the conditions in some of the wards of Butyrka
can be justifiably called torturous. The people responsible
for this must be punished.''.
(12) Sergei Magnitsky's experience, while particularly
illustrative of the negative effects of official corruption
on the rights of an individual citizen, appears to be
emblematic of a broader pattern of disregard for the numerous
domestic and international human rights commitments of the
Russian Federation and impunity for those who violate basic
human rights and freedoms.
(13) The second trial, verdict, and sentence against former
Yukos executives Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev
evoke serious concerns about the right to a fair trial and
the independence of the judiciary in the Russian Federation.
The lack of credible charges, intimidation of witnesses,
violations of due process and procedural norms, falsification
or withholding of documents, denial of attorney-client
privilege, and illegal detention in the Yukos case are highly
troubling. The Council of Europe, Freedom House, and Amnesty
International, among others, have concluded that they were
charged and imprisoned in a process that did not follow the
rule of law and was politically influenced. Furthermore,
senior officials of the Government of the Russian Federation,
including First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, have
acknowledged that the arrest and imprisonment of Khodorkovsky
were politically motivated.
(14) According to Freedom House's 2011 report entitled
``The Perpetual Battle: Corruption in the Former Soviet Union
and the New EU Members'', ``[t]he highly publicized cases of
Sergei Magnitsky, a 37-year-old lawyer who died in pretrial
detention in November 2009 after exposing a multimillion-
dollar fraud against the Russian taxpayer, and Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the jailed business magnate and regime critic
who was sentenced at the end of 2010 to remain in prison
through 2017, put an international spotlight on the Russian
state's contempt for the rule of law. . . . By silencing
influential and accomplished figures such as Khodorkovsky and
Magnitsky, the Russian authorities have made it abundantly
clear that anyone in Russia can be silenced.''.
(15) The tragic and unresolved murders of Nustap
Abdurakhmanov, Maksharip Aushev, Natalya Estemirova, Akhmed
Hadjimagomedov, Umar Israilov, Paul Klebnikov, Anna
Politkovskaya, Saihadji Saihadjiev, and Magomed Y. Yevloyev,
the death in custody of Vera Trifonova, the disappearances of
Mokhmadsalakh Masaev and Said-Saleh Ibragimov, the torture of
Ali Israilov and Islam Umarpashaev, the near-fatal beatings
of Mikhail Beketov, Oleg Kashin, Arkadiy Lander, and Mikhail
Vinyukov, and the harsh and ongoing imprisonment of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, Alexei Kozlov, Platon Lebedev, and Fyodor
Mikheev further illustrate the grave danger of exposing the
wrongdoing of officials of the Government of the Russian
Federation, including Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, or of
seeking to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote
internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should continue to strongly support, and
provide assistance to, the efforts of the Russian people to
establish a vibrant democratic political system that respects
individual liberties and human rights, including by enhancing
the provision of objective information through all relevant
media, such as Radio Liberty and the internet. The Russian
Government's suppression of dissent and political opposition,
the limitations it has imposed on civil society and
independent media, and the deterioration of economic and
political freedom inside Russia are of profound concern to
the United States Government and to the American people.

SEC. 403. DEFINITIONS.

In this title:
(1) Admitted; alien.--The terms ``admitted'' and ``alien''
have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate.
(3) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' has the meaning given that term in section 5312
of title 31, United States Code.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States
or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a
foreign branch of such an entity.

SEC. 404. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DETENTION, ABUSE, AND DEATH OF SERGEI MAGNITSKY
AND OTHER GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of each person
who the President determines, based on credible information--
(1) is responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of
Sergei Magnitsky, participated in efforts to conceal the
legal liability for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei
Magnitsky, financially benefitted from the detention, abuse,
or death of Sergei Magnitsky, or was involved in the criminal
conspiracy uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky;
(2) is responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or
other gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights committed against individuals seeking--
(A) to expose illegal activity carried out by officials of
the Government of the Russian Federation; or
(B) to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally
recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of
religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the
rights to a fair trial and democratic elections, in Russia;
or
(3) acted as an agent of or on behalf of a person in a
matter relating to an activity described in paragraph (1) or
(2).
(b) Updates.--The President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an update of the list required by
subsection (a) as new information becomes available.
(c) Form.--
(1) In general.--The list required by subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form.
(2) Exception.--The name of a person to be included in the
list required by subsection (a) may be submitted in a
classified annex only if the President--
(A) determines that it is vital for the national security
interests of the United States to do so;
(B) uses the annex in such a manner consistent with
congressional intent and the purposes of this Act; and
(C) 15 days prior to submitting the name in a classified
annex, provides to the appropriate congressional committees
notice of, and a justification for, including or continuing
to include each person in the classified annex despite any
publicly available credible information indicating that the
person engaged in an activity described in paragraph (1),
(2), or (3) of subsection (a).
(3) Consideration of data from other countries and
nongovernmental organizations.--In preparing the list
required by subsection (a), the President shall consider
information provided by the chairperson and ranking member of
each of the appropriate congressional committees and credible
data obtained by other countries and nongovernmental
organizations, including organizations inside Russia, that
monitor the human rights abuses of the Government of the
Russian Federation.
(4) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required by subsection (a) shall be made available to
the public and published in the Federal Register.
(d) Removal From List.--A person may be removed from the
list required by subsection (a) if the President determines
and reports to the appropriate congressional committees not
less than 15 days prior to the removal of the person from the
list that--
(1) credible information exists that the person did not
engage in the activity for which the person was added to the
list;
(2) the person has been prosecuted appropriately for the
activity in which the person engaged; or
(3) the person has credibly demonstrated a significant
change in behavior, has paid an appropriate consequence for
the activities in which the person engaged, and has credibly
committed to not engage in the types of activities specified
in paragraphs (1) through (3) of subsection (a).
(e) Requests by Chairperson and Ranking Member of
Appropriate Congressional Committees.--

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(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after receiving a
written request from the chairperson and ranking member of
one of the appropriate congressional committees with respect
to whether a person meets the criteria for being added to the
list required by subsection (a), the President shall submit a
response to the chairperson and ranking member of the
committee which made the request with respect to the status
of the person.
(2) Form.--The President may submit a response required by
paragraph (1) in classified form if the President determines
that it is necessary for the national security interests of
the United States to do so.
(3) Removal.--If the President removes from the list
required by subsection (a) a person who has been placed on
the list at the request of the chairperson and ranking member
of one of the appropriate congressional committees, the
President shall provide the chairperson and ranking member
with any information that contributed to the removal
decision. The President may submit such information in
classified form if the President determines that such is
necessary for the national security interests of the United
States.
(f) Nonapplicability of Confidentiality Requirement With
Respect to Visa Records.--The President shall publish the
list required by subsection (a) without regard to the
requirements of section 222(f) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1202(f)) with respect to
confidentiality of records pertaining to the issuance or
refusal of visas or permits to enter the United States.

SEC. 405. INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS.

(a) Ineligibility for Visas.--An alien is ineligible to
receive a visa to enter the United States and ineligible to
be admitted to the United States if the alien is on the list
required by section 404(a).
(b) Current Visas Revoked.--The Secretary of State shall
revoke, in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), the visa or other
documentation of any alien who would be ineligible to receive
such a visa or documentation under subsection (a) of this
section.
(c) Waiver for National Security Interests.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State may waive the
application of subsection (a) or (b) in the case of an alien
if--
(A) the Secretary determines that such a waiver--
(i) is necessary to permit the United States to comply with
the Agreement between the United Nations and the United
States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into force
November 21, 1947, or other applicable international
obligations of the United States; or
(ii) is in the national security interests of the United
States; and
(B) prior to granting such a waiver, the Secretary provides
to the appropriate congressional committees notice of, and a
justification for, the waiver.
(2) Timing for certain waivers.--Notification under
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) shall be made not later
than 15 days prior to granting a waiver under such paragraph
if the Secretary grants such waiver in the national security
interests of the United States in accordance with
subparagraph (A)(ii) of such paragraph.
(d) Regulatory Authority.--The Secretary of State shall
prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out this
section.

SEC. 406. FINANCIAL MEASURES.

(a) Freezing of Assets.--
(1) In general.--The President shall exercise all powers
granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except that the requirements of
section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to
the extent necessary to freeze and prohibit all transactions
in all property and interests in property of a person who is
on the list required by section 404(a) of this Act if such
property and interests in property are in the United States,
come within the United States, or are or come within the
possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to persons
included on the classified annex under section 404(c)(2) if
the President determines that such an exception is vital for
the national security interests of the United States.
(b) Waiver for National Security Interests.--The Secretary
of the Treasury may waive the application of subsection (a)
if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is in the
national security interests of the United States. Not less
than 15 days prior to granting such a waiver, the Secretary
shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees
notice of, and a justification for, the waiver.
(c) Enforcement.--
(1) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this
section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry
out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth
in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705)
to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act
described in subsection (a) of such section.
(2) Requirements for financial institutions.--Not later
than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe or amend
regulations as needed to require each financial institution
that is a United States person and has within its possession
or control assets that are property or interests in property
of a person who is on the list required by section 404(a) if
such property and interests in property are in the United
States to certify to the Secretary that, to the best of the
knowledge of the financial institution, the financial
institution has frozen all assets within the possession or
control of the financial institution that are required to be
frozen pursuant to subsection (a).
(d) Regulatory Authority.--The Secretary of the Treasury
shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are
necessary to carry out this section.

SEC. 407. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on--
(1) the actions taken to carry out this title, including--
(A) the number of persons added to or removed from the list
required by section 404(a) during the year preceding the
report, the dates on which such persons have been added or
removed, and the reasons for adding or removing them; and
(B) if few or no such persons have been added to that list
during that year, the reasons for not adding more such
persons to the list; and
(2) efforts by the executive branch to encourage the
governments of other countries to impose sanctions that are
similar to the sanctions imposed under this title.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 90 minutes,
with 60 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means and 30 minutes
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Camp) and the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Levin) each will control 30 minutes. The gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman)
each will control 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton).
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, I'm very happy to yield to the
very competent leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen, for such time as she may consume.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman from Indiana for the time.
I plan to vote for this bill, H.R. 6156, even though I remain
strongly opposed to granting Russia permanent normal trade relations,
or PNTR, at this time, and I would like to explain the reasons why.
Those who argue for granting Russia PNTR, which has, until now, been
prevented by what is known as the Jackson-Vanik amendment, focus on the
supposed bilateral trade benefits; but the issue that concerns me and
many Members is not trade, but human rights.
Advocates of repeal say that the Jackson-Vanik amendment is outdated
and purely symbolic and, therefore, should be disregarded. But in the
area of human rights, Madam Speaker, symbols can have a very great
importance.
Over the years, Jackson-Vanik has become a sign of the continuing
U.S. commitment to human rights in Russia and elsewhere. Repealing the
amendment could very well be interpreted as an indication that our
commitment is now weakening. This would be a terrible signal to send at
a time when Vladimir Putin is in the process of imposing ever-tighter
restrictions on all opposition to his regime, especially democratic
activists and any others who dare to defy the authorities.
I also oppose granting Russia PNTR at this time because it is but one
more concession by the United States in pursuit of the President's
failed reset of relations with Moscow, which among other measures
includes the one-sided New START Treaty, the retrenching of NATO's
planned missile defense system against Iranian missiles, and Russia's
entry into the World Trade Organization. And now Moscow is being given
PNTR even as it pursues policies in Iran and elsewhere that undermine
U.S. interests.
Nevertheless, despite my objections, I will vote for the bill because
it is the only way of securing passage for H.R. 4405, the Magnitsky
Act, which has been incorporated into this bill as title IV.
By requiring the President to publicly identify and impose sanctions
on human rights violators in Russia, especially those involved in the
death of Sergei Magnitsky and the subsequent coverup, this legislation
will make clear that the U.S. remains fully committed to advancing
democracy and human rights in that country. These are more than just
symbolic steps. The proof comes from the threats by the

[[Page H6405]]

Kremlin of retaliation if Congress dares to act because the regime
fears that senior officials will be publicly implicated.
The administration tried very hard to prevent the Magnitsky Act from
moving forward and gave way only when faced with overwhelming
bipartisan support for it in both the House and the Senate, making it a
precondition for passage of PNTR.
In particular, the administration has tried to remove a requirement
that the list of officials and others be made public and has pushed
hard to be allowed to keep some of those names classified. But keeping
the names secret is exactly what the Kremlin hopes to do. Therefore,
although the legislation does allow the President to put the names of
some violators on a classified list, this exception can only be used
when the President determines that it is vital to U.S. national
security interests, and he must justify such action to us in the
Congress.
So, to erase any doubt, let me state for the record that the clear
intent of Congress is that this exception will be used only in rare
cases, and that misuse by the administration will quickly prompt a
strong response.

{time} 0920

Let me close by saying, Madam Speaker, that on this third anniversary
of the death of Sergei Magnitsky, while in police custody, we in
Congress are united in our support for those fighting for democracy and
human rights in Russia, and will stand with them in this time of
repression until they have triumphed and their country has taken its
rightful place among the democracies of the world.
Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Madam Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6156, the Russia and Moldova
Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
Act of 2012.
The Jackson-Vanik amendment is a good example of the power of
legislation to promote positive change. In 1974, when it was adopted,
the right to emigrate was being denied to many people in many non-
market countries, most notably the Soviet Union.
By limiting normal trade relations, Jackson-Vanik helped pressure
countries to change their restrictive immigration policies, and in the
case of the Soviet Union, to allow the immigration of Soviet Jews and
many other groups previously precluded from leaving to go to the United
States to Israel and to other countries.
We continue to have very serious concerns about the human rights
situation in Russia, but as the specific root causes of Jackson-Vanik
no longer exist, it has been waived for Russia every year since 1989.
The important piece of legislation we are considering today repeals
the Jackson-Vanik amendment with respect to Russia and Moldova, grants
Russia permanent normal trade relations, and includes an important new
provision to address human rights violations in Russia. Adherence to
accepted standards of both trade and human rights are important to
America and to a fruitful U.S.-Russia relationship.
Russia joined the WTO in August of this year, and is now subject to
WTO fair-trade disciplines and dispute resolution procedures. Enactment
of this bill is necessary for U.S. exporters to benefit from the WTO
rules and the enhanced market access in pursuing trade with Russia. It
will also afford us an additional mechanism to protect intellectual
property rights, including over the Internet.
Although Russia once was a small player in world trade, its imports
have shot up by 80 percent since 2005, 20 percent just last year. If we
don't pass this bill, American companies will be operating at a
disadvantage and have a harder time tapping into this growing market.
This is also an important step for strengthening democratic norms in
Russia. Over the past several years, the Russian people have
demonstrated a new-found confidence in questioning their government. We
hope that increased trade with Western nations, including the U.S.,
will bring greater transparency to the Russian economic system, and it
will help grow the middle class, which is at the forefront of demanding
improved democratic governance and the rule of law.
Regrettably, Russia remains one of the least free countries in
Europe, and it is important that we continue to raise serious concerns
about its dismal record on democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law.
In addition to Sergei Magnitsky's tragic death, we are deeply
concerned about a range of human rights violations including
extrajudicial killings, detention, torture of those expressing opposing
views, the serious irregularities in elections, and legislation enacted
by several city councils, including Saint Petersburg, to restrict the
rights of Russia's LGBT community.
The Magnitsky provisions would place restrictions on the financial
activities and travel of Russians connected to various human rights
violations. The names of these human rights violators would be publicly
available, unless the administration determines that the individual
must be placed on a classified list.

The intent of these provisions is for the administration to use the
classified list only under the prescribed set of circumstances outlined
in the bill, and our expectation is that the use of the classified list
will be the exception, not the rule.
Madam Speaker, I support this legislation and encourage my colleagues
to support it as well.
I reserve the balance of my time.

General Leave

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their
remarks and to insert extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 6156.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Indiana?
There was no objection.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, I yield whatever time he may
consume to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), a leader on the
Foreign Affairs Committee.
Mr. ROYCE. Madam Speaker, please excuse my voice today, but I did
want to rise in support of this legislation, and also to associate
myself with the observations made by my colleague, Congressman Berman,
and certainly with Congressman Burton.
The legislation here that was originally enacted in 1974, Congressman
Howard Berman is quite correct, this, during the Cold War, did play a
very key role with respect to immigration. But today, that is long
over. And with Russia joining the WTO in August, we have a problem here
in the United States, and that is, Russia, in doing so, made tariff
cuts for every country in the world except the United States. This bill
would correct that. And of course, without this legislation, exporters
here in the United States would lose.
I've never viewed Jackson-Vanik as an impediment to Russian relations
today. But neither do I see it as very helpful in pressing Russia on
issues like Iran or their conduct toward Syria. Russian opposition
level leaders, however, and Russian civil society, and the Russian
press, what free press remains in Russia today, really support this
legislation.
I think what this legislation intends is sort of a mutually
beneficial relationship with Russia, based on the rule of law, based on
human rights. That's the hope. It includes the Sergei Magnitsky
legislation that came out of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which
I'm an original cosponsor, and I do think we owe a debt of gratitude to
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for her determination to have that provision in
the legislation.
I think if we reflect on the words of the Russian opposition in their
Parliament, one said recently, this provision is very pro-Russian. It
helps defend us in Russia from criminals. It helps defend us from
criminals who kill our citizens, who steal our money and then hide it
abroad. And that's the point. That's what we're trying to do in that
provision.
And this bill, liberalizing trade while at the same time staying true
to human rights, should have passed months ago. Sometimes we have a
debate with the administration, in this particular case it was over the
question of sort of quiet diplomacy with Russia, or whether we were
going to speak out forcefully on these human rights provisions. I do
not prefer silence on issues such as this.

[[Page H6406]]

I think that the systemic corruption we're seeing today in Moscow,
and the abuse of power we're seeing from the regime, really demand
inclusion of these provisions. And I think, thankfully, a bipartisan
group in Congress, including Howard Berman, including Congresswoman
Ros-Lehtinen and others, stuck it out, came together on this and
insured the inclusion in this bill of these provisions in memory of
Sergei Magnitsky, in order to take a stand. And I think that is the
right course. I encourage all my colleagues to pass this legislation.

{time} 0930

Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
The gentleman from Massachusetts is the cochair of the Tom Lantos
Commission on Human Rights; but I think particularly I want to
recognize him because, in addition to everyone named so far, a very key
player in all of this has been this gentleman from Massachusetts, and
he has made tremendous efforts on these Magnitsky provisions.
So as we now move this bill to passage, I recognize chairman of the
Tom Lantos Commission on Human Rights, a gentleman who has worked on
this bill for 3 years and who has been a leader on human rights issues
all over the world. With thanks for his efforts and passion over this
part of the legislation, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the distinguished
ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee for all of his efforts
and support on this and on so many other issues. It is a privilege to
serve with him. I also want to thank the chairwoman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Both of these individuals are
responsible for making sure the final version of the Magnitsky Act
included in this bill is strong, workable, and precedent-setting. It is
a major piece of human rights legislation, and I am very, very grateful
for their leadership.
Madam Speaker, today is the third anniversary of the death of Sergei
Magnitsky, in whose honor title IV of this bill is named. He died on
November 16, 2009, after enduring torture and beatings while being
imprisoned for blowing the whistle on the largest tax fraud in Russian
history. He did the right thing, and he paid for it with his life at
the hands of brutal and corrupt Russian officials. His case remains in
impunity.
Yet, under title IV of this bill, the United States will not stand by
silently and let his killers and abusers and those who covered up these
crimes get away with it. Those identified as responsible for these
crimes will be named, their assets frozen, and a visa ban imposed.
We won't be acting alone. On September 26, the European Parliament
unanimously adopted a resolution recommending that the European Union
establish a common list of officials responsible for the death and
cover-up of Sergei Magnitsky and to impose an EU-wide visa ban on these
officials and freeze any financial assets they may hold inside the
European Union.
Let me be perfectly clear. This bill is not simply about the case of
Sergei Magnitsky. It applies to all of those who engage in gross human
rights violations or corruption. It is precedent-setting human rights
legislation. The House should be proud of what it is accomplishing
today for human rights and the rule of law for the Magnitsky family,
for the Russian people, for honorable Russian officials, and for human
rights defenders inside and outside Russia.
Because this bill includes the Magnitsky Act, I urge my colleagues to
vote for H.R. 6156 and would like to insert the European Parliament's
report and an article from the American Enterprise Institute in the
Record at this point.

Report With a Proposal for a European Parliament Recommendation to the
Council on Establishing Common Visa Restrictions for Russian Officials
Involved in the Sergei Magnitsky Case

proposal for a european parliament recommendation to the council on
establishing common visa restrictions for russian officials involved in
the sergei magnitsky case (2012/2142(INI))

The European Parliament, having regard to Article 215 of
the TFEU, having regard to the proposal for a recommendation
to the Council by Guy Verhoefstadt and Kristiina Ojuland, on
behalf of the Aide Group (B7-0196/2012), having regard to its
resolution of 17 February 2011 on the rule of law in Russia,
having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2010 on the
Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2009 and the
European Union's policy on the matter, having regard to its
resolution of 14 December 2011 on the upcoming EU-Russia
Summit on 15 December 2011 and the outcome of the Duma
elections on 4 December 2011, having regard to its
recommendation of 2 February 2012 to the Council on a
consistent policy towards regimes against which the EU
applies restrictive measures, having regard to the adoption
of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act by the
US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee on 26 June 2012,
seeking to impose visa bans and asset freezes on Russian
officials allegedly involved in the detention, abuse and
death of Sergei Magnitsky, having regard to the draft
resolution entitled `Rule of law in Russia: case of Sergei
Magnitsky', which was presented to the 2012 annual session of
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, calling on national
parliaments to take action to impose visa sanctions and asset
freezes, having regard to Rule 121(3) of its Rules of
Procedure, having regard to the report of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs (A7-0285/2012),
A. whereas the arrest, conditions of detention and
subsequent death in custody of Sergei Magnitsky represent a
well documented and substantial case of disrespect for
fundamental human rights;
B. whereas the posthumous prosecution of Sergei Magnitsky
is a violation of international and national laws and clearly
shows the malfunctioning of the Russian criminal justice
system;
C. whereas the Russian Federation, as a member of the
Council of Europe and of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, has committed itself to fully
respecting fundamental rights and the rule of law, and
whereas the European Union has repeatedly offered additional
assistance and expertise to help the Russian Federation
modernise, and abide by, its constitutional and legal order;
D. whereas, despite the 2011 conclusions of the inquiry
conducted by the Russian President's Human Rights Council on
the illegality of Sergei Magnitsky's arrest, detention and
being denied access to justice, the investigations are
stalled and the officials involved have been exonerated and
even assigned to the posthumous case; whereas such actions on
the part of the authorities demonstrate the politically
motivated nature of Magnitsky's prosecution;
E. whereas the European Union has urged the Russian
authorities on many occasions and formats, from regular human
rights consultations to summit-level meetings, to conduct
thorough independent investigations in this special, well
documented case, and to put an end to the current climate of
impunity;
F. whereas the case of Sergei Magnitsky is only one but the
most prominent and well documented case of abuse of powers by
the Russian law enforcement authorities, heavily violating
the rule of law; whereas a multitude of other juridical cases
exist using systematically the pretext of economic crimes and
alleged corruption for eliminating business competitors or
political rivals;
G. whereas visa restrictions and other restrictive measures
are not traditional judicial sanctions per se, but constitute
a political signal of the EU's concern to a larger target
audience and thus remain a necessary and legitimate foreign
policy tool;
H. whereas EU sanctions on the Magnitsky case could prompt
the Russian authorities to make genuine and fresh efforts to
address, in a more concrete and convincing manner, the
question of the rule of law in Russia and the current climate
of impunity;
I. whereas several national parliaments of EU Member
States--among them Italy, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Sweden and Poland--have already passed resolutions
urging their governments to introduce sanctions on the
Magnitsky case, while several other national parliaments,
such as those in Portugal, France, Spain and Latvia, are at
the initial drafting stage for such resolutions;
1. Addresses the following recommendations to the Council:
(a) to establish a common EU list of officials responsible
for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, for the subsequent
judicial cover-up and for the ongoing and sustained
harassment of his mother and widow;
(b) to impose and implement an EU-wide visa ban on these
officials and to freeze any financial assets they or their
immediate family may hold inside the European Union;
(c) to call on Russia to conduct a credible and independent
investigation encompassing all aspects of this tragic case,
and to bring all those responsible to justice;
(d) to urge the Russian authorities to put an end to the
widespread corruption and to reform the judicial system, and
bring it into line with international standards, by creating
an independent, just and transparent system that cannot,
under any circumstances, be misused for political reasons;
(e) to raise, in the course of bilateral meetings with
Russian authorities, this issue as well as the issue of
intimidation and impunity in cases involving human rights
defenders, journalists and lawyers, in a more determined,
resolute and result-oriented manner;
2. Encourages the Council to take a coherent and proactive
stance on other serious

[[Page H6407]]

human rights violations in Russia, on the basis of well
documented, converging and independent sources and convincing
evidence, and to introduce similar restrictive measures
against offenders as a last resort measure;
3. Underlines that the commitment of the Russian
authorities to basic values such as the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and basic freedoms, remains the main
prerequisite for EU-Russia relations and for the development
of a stable and reliable partnership between the two parties;
4. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation
to the Council and, for information, to the Commission, the
Member States, the Russian State Duma and the Government of
the Russian Federation.

proposal for a recommendation B7-0196/2012

The European Parliament, having regard to Article 215 of
the TFEU, having regard to the European Parliament
recommendation to the Council on a consistent policy on
restrictive measures, adopted on 2 February 2012, having
regard to the decision by the United States to impose travel
restrictions on 60 officials involved in the Sergei Magnitsky
case and to similar considerations in a number of other
countries, having regard to Rule 121(1) of its Rules of
Procedure,
A. whereas the arrest and subsequent death in custody of
Sergei Magnitsky represents a well documented and substantial
case of disrespect for fundamental human rights in Russia,
and serves as a chilling reminder of the many documented
shortcomings in the respect shown for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Russia;
B. whereas Russia, as a member of the Council of Europe,
has committed itself to fully respecting fundamental rights
and the rule of law, and whereas the European Union has
repeatedly offered additional assistance and expertise to
help Russia modernise, and abide by, its constitutional and
legal order, in line with Council of Europe standards;
C. whereas there is an increasing need for a firm, robust
and comprehensive EU policy towards Russia, offering support
and assistance backed up by firm and fair criticism,
including sanctions and restrictive measures when needed;
D. whereas visa restrictions and other restrictive measures
are not traditional judicial sanctions per se, but constitute
a political signal of the EU's concern to a larger target
audience and thus remain a necessary and legitimate foreign
policy tool;
1. Addresses the following recommendations to the Council:
(a) to establish a common EU list of officials responsible
for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, for the subsequent
judicial cover-up and for the ongoing and sustained
harassment of his mother and widow;
(b) to impose and implement an EU-wide visa ban on these
officials and to freeze any financial assets they or their
immediate family may hold inside the European Union;
(c) to call on Russia to conduct a credible and independent
investigation encompassing all aspects of this tragic case;
2. Instructs its President to forward this recommendation
to the Council and, for information, to the Commission, the
Member States, and the State Duma and Government of Russia.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date adopted................. 20.9.2012
Result of final vote......... +: 62
-: 2
0: 1
Members present for the final Franziska Katharina Brantner, Elmar Brok,
vote. Jerzy Buzek, Tarja Cronberg, Arnaud
Danjean, Mario David, Michael Gahler,
Marietta Giannakou, Ana Gomes, Andrzej
Grzyb, Liisa Jaakonsaari, Jelko Kacin,
loannis Kasoulides, Nicole Kiil-Nielsen,
Evgeni Kirilov, Maria Eleni Koppa, Pawel
Robert Kowal, Eduard Kukan, Vytautas
Landsbergis, Krzysztof Lisek, Sabine
Losing, Ulrike Lunacek, Francisco Jose
Milan Mon, Maria Muniz De Urquiza,
Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Norica
Nicolai, Pier Antonio Panzeri, loan
Mircea Pascu, Alojz Peterle, Bernd
Posselt, Hans-Gert Pottering, Cristian
Dan Preda, Libor Roucek, Tokia Saifi,
Jose Ignacio Salafranca Sanchez-Neyra,
Nikolaos Salavrakos, Jacek Saryusz-
Wolski, Gyorgy Schopflin, Werner Schulz,
Marek Siwiec, Sophocles Sophocleous,
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen, Charles
Tannock, Inese Vaidere, Johannes
Cornelis van Baalen, Geoffrey Van Orden,
Sir Graham Watson, Boris Zala
Substitute(s) present for the Laima Liucija Andrikiene, Elena Basescu,
final vote. Marije Cornelissen, Jacek Protasiewicz,
Teresa Riera Madurell, Carmen Romero
Lopez, Marietje Schaake, Helmut Scholz,
Alf Svensson, Indrek Tarand, Traian
Ungureanu, Ivo Vajgl, Luis Yanez-
Barnuevo Garcia, Joachim Zeller, Janusz
Wladyslaw Zemke
Substitute(s) under Rule Maria Badia i Cutchet, Ivari Padar
187(2) present for the final
vote.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[From the American Enterprise Institute, Nov. 15, 2012]

Three Cheers for the Magnitsky Act and American Values

(By Leon Aron)

In the next few days, the House and the Senate will almost
certainly vote on and pass the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law
Accountability Act. The bill is named after a 37-year-old
lawyer who was tortured to death in a Moscow prison after he
uncovered an elaborate scheme that had defrauded the Russian
treasury of $230 million. November 16th will be the third
anniversary of his death.
The Magnitsky Act would deny entry to the United States and
freeze the assets and property of those individuals
responsible for this embezzlement, the death of Sergei
Magnitsky, and its cover up, as well as any current or future
abuse of human and political rights.
The anti-Putin opposition in Russia has overwhelmingly
supported the Magnitsky Act. Even leftists and nationalists
have been ardently in favor. Just as vehemently, the Kremlin
has denounced the legislation, crying ``interference in its
internal affairs'' and threatening an ``appropriate
response.''
The ``interference'' objection has not a leg to stand on.
The legislation is directed not against Russia but against
those who torment and defraud it. Moreover, Russia and the
Soviet Union--to which Russia is the legal successor--are
party to multiple agreements, most notably the Helsinki Act
of 1976 and its subsequent iterations that explicitly make
human and political rights subject to international scrutiny.
As for the Kremlin's response, Russians on the internet
have had tons of fun with it: ``No more shopping trips to
Moscow by the wives of US officials!'' ``No more Black Sea
vacations for them!'' ``US officials will be prohibited from
keeping their money in Russian banks and their children
denied admissions to Russian colleges!''
Although it might precipitate a petty tit-for-tat, the
Magnitsky Act is part of something far larger than mere ups
and downs in US-Russian relations. It is a long overdue step
reaffirming the core values that guide US foreign policy and
advancing what is--or ought to be--one of its key,
overarching geostrategic objectives: The emergence of a
stable, free, and democratic Russian state at peace, in the
long last, with its own people and the world.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I yield the gentleman an additional 2 minutes.
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I would like to enter into a colloquy
with the majority and minority floor managers--the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Burton) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman)--
just to clarify the congressional intent regarding the use of the
classified annex mentioned in section 404(c)(2) of H.R. 6156.
Section 404 of the bill would hold accountable Magnitsky's killers
and other human rights violators by placing targeted sanctions on them.
In particular, the bill imposes a visa ban and asset freeze on
individuals responsible for participating in or for covering up Sergei
Magnitsky's detention, abuse and death, and on individuals responsible
for certain other gross violations of human rights. As part of that
accountability, section 404 requires the President to publish a list of
the people responsible for those particular abuses.
It is my understanding that the congressional intent behind title IV
is for people subject to sanctions to be placed on an unclassified list
in a transparent manner and that any classified annex may be used only
as an exception and not the rule. The administration may list a person
in the classified annex only if the President determines that it is
absolutely vital to the national security interests of the United
States and provides Congress with prior notice and justification.
I yield to the floor manager for the majority, Mr. Burton, such time
as he requires to clarify his own understanding.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Yes, Madam Speaker, I share in the gentleman's
understanding of congressional intent as reflected in the text of
section 404(c). The list of sanctionable individuals is meant to be
unclassified, and any classified annex should be used only as an
exception.
Mr. McGOVERN. In reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman.
I yield to the floor manager for the minority, Mr. Berman, such time
as he requires to clarify his understanding.
Mr. BERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Speaker, that is also my understanding. The intent of Congress
is to place people in the classified annex only if the President
determines and justifies to the relevant committees that it is vital
for the national security interests of the United States.
Mr. McGOVERN. In reclaiming my time, I thank the gentlemen for their
assurances and clarifications.

[[Page H6408]]

I want to thank this Congress for their bipartisan support of this
Magnitsky Act, which, I think, makes it clear that, if the United
States of America stands for anything, we stand out loud and foursquare
for human rights.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, I am very happy to yield 2
minutes to one of the real leaders on the Foreign Affairs Committee,
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, almost 40 years ago, this
body heard the cries of the Jewish refuseniks trapped behind the Iron
Curtain, and it passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which brilliantly
linked the free movement of goods with the free movement of people. It
was a congressional initiative, opposed by the White House, which
sought ``reset'' at all costs--at that time it was called ``detente''--
with Russia.
It's a sad commentary on what the Russian people continue to suffer
that now, more than 40 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we
meet in the same House Chamber to struggle with similar issues.
Russia is now a market economy and permits emigration, but human
rights and the rule of law are trampled with impunity and often
violence. Since Jackson-Vanik--a marvelous tool for promoting human
rights in the seventies and eighties--doesn't address Russia's current
problems, we need a new tool. The need for one should be evident to
anyone who follows the news. Madam Speaker, the Magnitsky provisions of
the trade bill we are considering provide such a tool.
These tools couldn't be timelier as some lament a perceived decline
in American influence abroad. The Magnitsky sanctions shouldn't cost us
a dime--and the howls from the Kremlin suggest we are on to something.
While threats like cutting off aid or military cooperation mean nothing
to the Russians, its kleptocratic elite deeply value access to the
West. The privilege of a U.S. visa affords a measure of respectability
as well as a quick exit for those who worry daily that somebody may be
held to account for the crimes against their countrymen. Further,
corrupt Russian officials know better than to keep their fortunes
inside Russia, risking confiscation by other corrupt officials.
The penalties imposed by Jackson-Vanik applied to the entire Russian
economy, but those envisioned by the Magnitsky legislation look to
personal responsibility and target the individual bad actor. What this
bill is saying is that murderers and torturers are not welcome in this
country. I would certainly hope that we are not so compromised in our
security and commercial relations that to publicly name and shame these
individuals would be seen to hurt our interests. It is a great bill,
and it will have, hopefully, good, strong bipartisan support.
Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to how much time both
sides have.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 6\3/4\
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Indiana has 4\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the ranking member of
the Europe and Eurasia Subcommittee, my friend from New York (Mr.
Meeks).
Mr. MEEKS. I want to first thank ranking member Howard Berman for his
leadership on this, as well as to thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen.
I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 6156, the Russia and Moldova
Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
Act of 2012. Granting permanent normal trade relations with Russia and
Moldova is long overdue; and with this vote we look to the future and
put aside some longstanding vestiges of the Cold War.
I strongly endorse granting permanent normal trade relations to
Moldova. Since 2001, when Moldova entered the World Trade Organization,
the United States has been in noncompliance with WTO rules because
Congress has failed to repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Moldova is a
Western-oriented, fully democratic country, and Moldova deserves to be
treated as an economic partner so we can strengthen our ties to her
further.
We will hear lots today about the economic, human rights, and foreign
policy implications of this bill; and Russia will be at the center of
the debate.

{time} 0940

But I hope that we do not lose sight of this most basic point. At its
core, today's vote on Russian PNTR is about an evolving relationship.
The U.S.-Russia relationship has been at the top of our foreign policy
agenda for more than half a century. The fact that the House has
deliberated for so long to bring H.R. 6156 to the floor is an
indication that this is still an important relationship.
In 1974, when the Jackson-Vanik amendment was enacted, there was a
Soviet Union, and the purpose of the amendment was to end the Soviet
Union's policy that prevented the immigration of Jews. The objective
has long since been met, and since 1991, Russia terminated fees on
Russian immigrants. This is why, since 1992, the United States has
certified that Russia complies with Jackson-Vanik and we have normal
trade relations with Russia.
The bill before us today simply makes that policy permanent. It also
replaces the human rights policy of a bygone era with a more
appropriate one for the issues in Russia today. In so doing, we allow
U.S. businesses to take advantage of the many rules-based market
opening and tariff reducing commitments that were part of the Russians'
WTO accession package, and we uphold our longstanding commitment to
protecting human rights and human dignity.
Madam Speaker, we are nearly 3 months behind our biggest global
competitors. The U.S. is the only one of the over 150 WTO members that
did not immediately benefit from Russia joining the WTO. We are the
only one. Only until we repeal Jackson-Vanik, Russia has a right to
suspend all agreed upon WTO trade concessions with regard to the U.S.
We're talking about losing out on hundreds of millions of dollars in
just tariff cuts alone. Passage of this bill will expand our engagement
with Russia and better facilitate the exporting of our goods.
But trade is never just about the movement of goods and services. It
is also about the transformative flow of people, ideas, best practices,
and values. Increased trade may be the most efficient way yet to
promote rule of law, fight corruption, support human rights, and
inspire a civil society in Russia.
With passage of H.R. 6156, we get beyond the Jackson-Vanik amendment,
a Cold War relic, and level the playing field for American businesses
and provide encouragement for whistleblowers. Therefore, I ask my
colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, I'm very happy to now yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from California, a member of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Soviet dictatorship collapsed over two decades
ago. Being someone who spent a considerable time of my life opposing
Soviet communism, I have been disappointed to see that many of my own
colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, have never gotten the Cold War
out of their mind. So many of us in this body have been treating
democratic Russia as if it is still the Soviet Union.
Over the years, we should have established this level of cooperation,
especially the economic cooperation that we're codifying today. This
should have been established long ago. Instead, what happened was the
people stuck in the Cold War kept vilifying the Soviet Union and
exaggerating every shortcoming while at the same time ignoring similar
flaws, for example, in China. The human rights abuses in China are
outrageous, but yet we have moved forward time and again to expand
their ability to make money on us, even to steal our technologies with
a one-way free trade policy with China.
We need to make sure that the people of Russia know what we're saying
today: that the Cold War is over, that we need to march forward
together to meet the challenges of both of our countries, and that we
will open up our economy in economic cooperation with you so that we
can stand together and prosper and so that we can also deal with the
challenges of an ever more powerful and aggressive China and radical
Islam, which is as great a threat

[[Page H6409]]

and kills as many Russians as they do Americans. The Russian people
have to know that after today we have left the Cold War behind; we will
quit vilifying the Soviet Union and holding them to a different
standard than we do other countries simply because in the past they
were our enemies.

Madam Speaker, I gladly step forward to endorse this expansion of
freedom of trade between our peoples.
Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, I have no further requests for time and
simply need time to close.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I reserve the right to close, so I yield to my
colleague.
Mr. BERMAN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I think this is a very historic piece of bipartisan legislation. Just
as Jackson-Vanik became a tool to deal with one aspect of a horrible
set of policies by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, we now, using
the Magnitsky legislation, deal with some very serious human rights
issues remaining in Russia, but not in the context of restricting trade
but in the context of deepening our economic relationship with Russia.
I think what this legislation does altogether, in combination, is
promote both that economic relationship and shared adherence to common
standards of human rights democracy and the rule of law.
I urge its support, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, I yield myself the balance of
my time.
Russia joined the World Trade Organization this year. Russia's
accession will bring 140 million new consumers into the WTO's
international rules-based system. This will help U.S. companies who
have been at a disadvantage in competing with their European and Asian
counterparts in Russia.
In order to join the WTO, Russia has been required to make
substantial reforms to open its economy to international investment.
These reforms include significant cuts on tariffs impacting
manufactured goods and agricultural products, as well as a pledge to
cut farm subsidies in half by 2018. Russia must also allow 100 percent
foreign ownership of companies in a diverse group of industries,
including banking, telecommunications, and retail. More importantly,
Russia will be bound to respect the WTO's intellectual property
protections and will participate in the organization's system for
settling trade disputes.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, I've visited
Moscow and have met with representatives of the American Chamber of
Commerce and many American businesses that are already active in
Russia. Whether we pass this bill or not, these companies will remain
in Russia, and the Russian market is too big to ignore. However, let's
make it easier for U.S. companies to do business in Russia.
In addition, the Peterson Institute, a prominent economic think tank,
estimates that if we pass this bill and Russia receives PNTR, U.S.
exports to Russia will double over the next 5 years from $9 billion to
$19 billion. This increased trade could support upwards of 50,000 new
jobs here in the United States.
This legislation requires the Secretary of State and the trade
representative to provide Congress with a number of reports that
explain the steps that they've taken to ensure that Russia is in
compliance with the WTO. These reports must include updates on what the
administration is doing to advocate for American investors in Russia,
including those investors in the Yukos Oil Company, who suffered about
$12 billion in losses when the Russian Government expropriated the
company.
Regarding Moldova, this former state of the Soviet Union joined the
WTO in 2001. However, because Jackson-Vanik applies to Moldova as well
as Russia, the U.S. has not been able to offer that country PNTR, and
this bill will fix that.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Madam Speaker, Moldova and Russia are now
going to be able to participate with the United States in more free
trade. I think this is a great bill, and I urge my colleagues to
support it.

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