[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 116 (Wednesday, August 1, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5858-S5863]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a
message from the House with respect to H.R. 1950.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Resolved, that the House agree to the amendment of the
Senate to the bill (H.R. 1905) entitled ``An Act to
strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling
Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other
threatening activities, and for other purposes'', with an
amendment.
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. President, I rise in strong support
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, our
legislation which embodies a bipartisan, bicameral agreement to
reconcile the current Senate and House-passed versions of Iran
sanctions legislation. Once implemented, this comprehensive new set of
sanctions will help dramatically to increase the pressure on Iranian
government leaders to abandon their illicit nuclear activities and
support for terrorism. This bill passed the House of Representatives by
an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 421 to 6 earlier this evening. I
hope all of my colleagues will join me in supporting it so that it can
be adopted by the Senate and signed into law by the President as soon
as possible.
So far, in the sputtering P5+1 negotiations, Iran has shown no clear
signs of a willingness to work with the international community to
engage in a serious way on nuclear issues. It remains to be seen
whether Iran will ultimately be willing to work towards progress on the
central issues at upcoming negotiating sessions, or whether the
meetings will simply be another in a series of stalling actions to buy
time to enrich additional uranium and further fortify their nuclear
program. That is why I think it necessary to intensify the pressure,
and move forward quickly now on this new package that leaves no doubts
about U.S. resolve on this issue. As we all recognize, economic
sanctions are not an end: they are a means to an end. That end is to
apply enough pressure to secure agreement from Iran's leaders to fully,
completely and verifiably abandon their illicit nuclear activities.
Isolated diplomatically, economically, and otherwise, Iran must
understand that the patience of the international community is fast
running out. With these new sanctions, including those targeted at the
I-R-G-C, we are pressing Iran's military and political leaders to make
a clear choice. They can end the suppression of their people, come
clean on their nuclear program, suspend enrichment, and stop supporting
terrorist activities around the globe. Or they can continue to face
sustained multilateral economic and diplomatic pressure, and deepen
their international isolation.
This legislation is based on the Senate bill which passed with
unanimous support in May. It incorporates new measures from Democrats
and Republicans in the House and Senate. The sanctions contained in
this bill reach more deeply into Iran's energy sector than ever before,
and build on the sweeping banking sanctions Congress enacted 2 years
ago to reach to insurance, shipping, trade, finance and other sectors,
targeting those who help to bolster Iranian government revenues which
support their illicit nuclear activities.
As I have said before, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is the
most pressing foreign policy challenge we face, and we must continue to
do all we can--politically, economically, and diplomatically--to avoid
that result. In recent months, we have seen increased signs that the
Iranian regime is feeling the pressure of existing sanctions. Their
currency has plummeted, their trade revenues have been sharply
curtailed, and they are under increasing pressure from the oil
sanctions regime currently in place. With passage of this bill, we are
taking another significant step to block the remaining avenues for the
Iranians to fund their illicit behavior and evade sanctions. The bill
also requires sanctions on those who purchase new Iranian sovereign
debt, thereby further limiting the regime's ability to finance its
illicit activities.
In addition, there are substantial new sanctions for anyone who
engages
[[Page S5859]]
in joint ventures with the National Iranian Oil Company, NIOC; provides
insurance or re-insurance to the National Iranian Oil Company or the
National Iranian Tanker Company, NITC; helps Iran evade oil sanctions
through reflagging or other means; or sells, leases, or otherwise
provides oil tankers to Iran, unless they are from a country that is
sharply reducing its oil purchases from Iran.
The bill also expands sanctions against Iranian and Syrian officials
for human rights abuses, including against those who engage in
censorship, jamming and monitoring of communications, and tracking of
Internet use by ordinary Iranian citizens.
Many of my colleagues, both Democrats and Republicans, have helped us
get to this point. I want to particularly thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Without her help, we would not
be here. I also want to thank my colleagues, including Senator
Menendez, who crafted many of its original provisions, and Senators
Schumer, Gillibrand, Lautenberg, Brown, Kyl, Lieberman, and others who
contributed their ideas. I also want to thank Majority Leader Reid for
his tireless efforts to enact a strong comprehensive sanctions bill.
Finally, I want to thank the staff who crafted the details of this
bill, and worked long hours in intensive discussions over the last
several weeks to get it done. They include Patrick Grant, Steve Kroll,
Georgina Cannon, Ingianni Acosta and Colin McGinnis of my Committee
staff; Dr. Yleem Poblete, Matt Zweig, and Ari Friedman of Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen's staff; John O'Hara and Andrew Olmem of Senator Shelby's
staff, and Shanna Winters, Dr. Richard Kessler, and Alan Makovsky of
Ranking Member Berman's staff.
All told, when enacted this bill and other efforts by the President
will significantly increase pressure on Iran to abandon its illicit
nuclear activities. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record a detailed summary of the bill. I urge all my colleagues to
support this measure.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
Section-by-Section Summary
Sec. 1--Short Title, Table of Contents
Sec. 2--Definitions: Provides that the definitions of key
terms (``appropriate congressional committees,'' and
``knowingly,'') will be those found in the Iran Sanctions Act
(ISA) of 1996, as amended, and that the definition of
``United States person'' will be that found in the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (CISADA). Also defines ``financial transaction,''
to mean any transfer of value involving a financial
institution, including precious metals and various swaps,
futures, and other activities.
Sec. 101--Enforcement of Multilateral Sanctions Regime and
Expansion and Implementation of Sanctions: States the sense
of Congress that (i) the goal of compelling Iran to abandon
its efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capacity can be
effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy that
includes expansion and vigorous implementation and
enforcement of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against
Iran, diplomacy, and military planning and options,
consistent with the President's 2012 State of the Union
Address; and (ii) that intensified efforts to counter Iranian
sanctions evasion are necessary.
Sec. 102--Diplomatic Efforts to Expand Multilateral
Sanctions Regime: Urges efforts by the US to expand the UN
sanctions regime to include (i) imposing additional travel
restrictions on Iranian officials responsible for human
rights violations, the development of Iran's nuclear and
ballistic missile programs, and Iran's support for terrorism;
(ii) withdrawing sea- and airport landing rights for Iran
Shipping Lines and Iran Air, for their role in nuclear
proliferation and illegal arms sales; (iii) expanding the
range of sanctions imposed on Iran by US allies; (iv)
expanding sanctions to limit Iran's petroleum development and
imports of refined petroleum products; and (v) accelerating
US diplomatic and economic efforts to help allies reduce
their dependence on Iranian crude oil and other petroleum
products. Requires periodic reporting to Congress on the
status of such efforts.
Sec. 201--Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to Iran's
Energy Sector: Makes a number of substantial changes in and
additions to ISA's energy sanctions. These include (i)
increasing the number of required sanctions from three to
five; (ii) making sanctionable certain construction of
transportation infrastructure to support delivery of
domestically refined petroleum in Iran; (iii) making
sanctionable certain barter transactions, and the purchase or
facilitation of Iranian debt issued after the date of
enactment, that contribute to Iran's ability to import
refined petroleum products; (iv) extending ISA sanctions to
persons knowingly participating in petroleum resources joint
ventures established on or after January 1, 2002, anywhere in
the world in which Iran's government is a substantial partner
or investor; an exception is provided for ventures terminated
within 180 days of enactment; (v) extending ISA sanctions to
those providing certain goods and services (including
construction of certain infrastructure) that support Iran's
ability to develop its petroleum resources; and (vi)
extending ISA sanctions to support for Iran's domestic
production of petrochemical products.
Sec. 202--Imposition of Sanctions for Transportation of
Crude Oil from Iran and Evasion of Sanctions by Shipping
Companies: Requires imposition of at least five ISA sanctions
on a person who owns or operates a vessel that within 90 days
after the date of enactment is used to transport crude oil
from Iran to another country; applies only if the President
makes a determination, under the NDAA, that there is a
sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products from
countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum
to significantly reduce their purchases from Iran; an
exception is provided for transportation of crude oil from
Iran to countries that are exempt from NDAA sanctions because
they are significantly reducing such purchases. Also applies
at least five ISA sanctions to persons that own or operate a
vessel that conceals the Iranian origin of crude oil or
refined petroleum products transported on the vessel,
including by permitting the operator of the vessel to suspend
the vessel's satellite tracking devices, or by obscuring or
concealing the ownership by the government of Iran, or other
entities owned or controlled by Iran. Ships involved could be
barred from US ports for up to two years.
Sec. 203--Expansion of Sanctions with Respect to the
Development by Iran of WMDs: Requires imposition of five or
more ISA sanctions on persons who export, transfer, or
otherwise facilitate the transshipment of goods, services,
technology or other items and know or should have known this
action would materially contribute to the ability of Iran to
develop WMDs. Also requires ISA sanctions to be imposed
(subject to certain conditions) on persons who knowingly
participate in joint ventures with Iran's government, Iranian
firms, or persons acting for or on behalf of Iran's
government, in the mining, production or transportation of
uranium anywhere in the world. Exempts persons if they
withdraw from such joint ventures within six months after
date of enactment.
Sec. 204--Expansion of Sanctions Available under the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996: Expands the current menu of sanctions
available to the President under ISA, to include a
prohibition on any US person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a
sanctioned person, an exclusion from the United States of
aliens who are corporate officers, principals or controlling
shareholders in a sanctioned firm, and application of
applicable ISA sanctions to the CEO or other principal
executive officers (or persons performing similar functions)
of a sanctioned firm, which could include a freeze of their
US assets.
Sec. 205--Modification of Waiver Standard under the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996: Revises the standard under section 9
of ISA for waivers of sanctions by the President (i) to
require that energy-related sanctions can only be waived if
waiver is essential to the national security interests of the
United States; (ii) require that WMD-related sanctions can
only be waived if waiver is ``vital to the national security
interests of the United States; (iii) to eliminate the
``permanent'' waiver in prior law and replace it with a one-
year renewable waiver; and (iv) to clarify that all waivers
must be on a case-by-case basis .
Sec. 206--Briefings on Implementation of the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996: Amends ISA to require briefings by the Secretary
of State to the appropriate congressional committees on ISA
implementation.
Sec. 207--Expansion of Definitions under the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996: Adds definitions of ``credible information,''
``petrochemical product,'' and ``services.'' ``Credible
information'' includes public announcements by persons that
they are engaged in certain activities, including those made
in a report to stockholders, and may include announcements by
the Government of Iran, and reports from the General
Accountability Office (GAO), the Energy Information
Administration, the Congressional Research Service, or other
reputable governmental organizations, or trade or industry
publications. ``Petrochemical product'' is defined consistent
with Executive Order 13590. ``Services'' include software,
hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering,
specialized energy information services, and others.
Sec. 208--Sense of Congress on Iran's Energy Sector: States
the sense of Congress that Iran's energy sector remains a
zone of proliferation concern, since the Iranian Government
continues to divert substantial revenue from petroleum sales
to finance its illicit nuclear and missile activities, and
that the President should apply the full range of ISA
sanctions to address the threat posed by Iran.
Sec. 211--Sanctions for Shipping WMD or Terrorism-Related
Materials to or from Iran: Requires the blocking of assets
of, and imposes other sanctions on, persons who knowingly
sell, lease, or provide ships, insurance or reinsurance, or
other shipping services,
[[Page S5860]]
for transportation of goods that materially contribute to
Iran's WMD program or its terrorism-related activities.
Applies as well to parents of the persons involved if they
knew or should have known of the sanctionable activity and to
any of subsidiaries or affiliates of the persons involved
that knowingly participated in the activity. Permits the
President to waive sanctions in cases ``vital to the national
security interest,'' but requires a report to Congress
regarding the use of such a waiver; the President must, in
any event, submit a report to Congress identifying operators
of vessels and other persons that conduct or facilitate
significant financial transactions that manage Iranian ports
designated for IEEPA sanctions.
Sec. 212--Imposition of Sanctions for Provision of
Underwriting Services or Insurance or Reinsurance for NIOC
and NITC: Requires five or more ISA sanctions against
companies providing underwriting services, insurance, or
reinsurance to National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) or the
National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) or a successor entity
to either company. Provides an exemption for persons
providing such services for activities relating to the
provision of food, medicine, and medical devices or
humanitarian assistance to Iran.
Sec. 213--Imposition of Sanctions for Purchase,
Subscription to, or Facilitation of the Issuance of Iran
Sovereign Debt: Requires the imposition of five or more ISA
sanctions on persons the President determines knowingly
purchase, subscribe to, or facilitate the issuance of Iranian
sovereign debt, or debt of an entity owned or controlled by
the Iranian Government, issued on or after the date of
enactment.
Sec. 214--Imposition of Sanctions on Subsidiaries and
Agents of UN-Sanctioned Persons: Amends CISADA to ensure that
US financial sanctions imposed on UN-designated entities
reach those persons acting on behalf of, at the direction of,
or owned or controlled by, the designated entities. Requires
the Treasury Department to revise its regulations within 90
days of enactment to implement the change.
Sec. 215--Imposition of Sanctions for Transactions with
Persons Sanctioned for Certain Activities Relating to
Terrorism or Proliferation of WMD: Extends CISADA to impose
sanctions on a foreign financial institution that facilitates
a significant transaction or transactions or provides
significant services not only to certain designated financial
institutions but also to designated persons whose property or
interests in property are blocked based on their connection
to Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or
support of terrorism.
Sec. 216--Expansion of Mandatory Sanctions with Respect to
Financial Institutions that Engage in Certain Activities
Relating to Iran: Requires the Treasury Secretary to revise
regulations under Section 104 of CISADA to apply rules
cutting off access to the U.S. financial institutions to
foreign financial institutions knowingly facilitating,
participating or assisting in, or acting on behalf of or as
an intermediary, in connection with financial activities
involving designated Iranian banks, whether or not the
transactions are directly with those banks..
Sec. 217--Continuation of Sanction for the Government of
Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and Sanctions Evaders:
Requires that various sanctions imposed by Executive Order,
including blocking the property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian financial institutions, imposing penalties on foreign
sanction evaders, and blocking the property of the CBI, will
remain in effect until the President certifies that Iran and
the CBI have ceased to support terrorism and Iranian
development of WMD.
Sec. 218--Liability of Parent Companies for Violations of
Sanctions by Foreign Subsidiaries: Requires the imposition of
civil penalties under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) of up to twice the amount of the relevant
transaction, on US parent companies for the activities of
their foreign subsidiaries which, if undertaken by a US
person or in the United States, would violate US sanctions
law. Subsidiaries are defined as those entities in which a US
person holds more than fifty percent equity interest or a
majority of the seats on the board, or that a US person
otherwise controls. Covers activities under the current US
trade embargo with Iran and would apply regardless of whether
the subsidiary was established to circumvent US sanctions.
Sec. 219--Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosures on
Certain Activities in Iran: Amends the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 to require issuers whose stock is traded
on US stock exchanges to disclose whether they or their
affiliates have knowingly engaged in activities (i) described
in section 5 of ISA (energy sector activity); (ii) described
in 104(c)(2) or (d)(1) of CISADA (related to foreign
financial institutions who facilitate WMD/terrorism, money
laundering, IRGC activity, and other violations); (iii) in
105A(b)(2) of CISADA (related transfer of weapons and other
technologies to Iran likely to be used for human rights
abuses); (iv) involving persons whose property is blocked for
WMD/terrorism and; (v)involving persons or entities in the
government of Iran (without the authorization of a Federal
department or agency). Provides for periodic public
disclosure of such information, and communication of that
information by the SEC to Congress and the President.
Requires the President to initiate an investigation into the
possible imposition of sanctions as specified, and to make a
sanctions determination within six months.
Sec. 220--Reports on, and Authorization of Imposition of
Sanctions with Respect to, the Provision of Specialized
Financial Messaging Services to the Central Bank of Iran and
Other Sanctioned Iranian Financial Institutions: States the
sense of Congress that specialized financial messaging
services are a critical link to the international financial
system; requires the Secretary of the Treasury to report
periodically listing the persons who provide such services to
the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian banks that have been
designated for involvement in WMD or support for terror, and
assessing efforts to cut off the direct provision of such
services to such institutions. Authorizes the imposition of
sanctions under CISADA or IEEPA on persons continuing to
provide such services to the CBI or such other Iranian
institutions, subject to an exception for persons subject to
foreign sanctions regimes that require them to cut off
services to a substantially similar group of Iranian
institutions.
Sec. 221--Identification and Immigration Restrictions on
Senior Iranian Officials and their Family Members: Requires
the identification of and denial of visa requests to senior
officials, including the Supreme Leader, the President,
members of the Assembly of Experts, senior members of the
Intelligence Ministry of Iran, and senior members of the IRGC
that are involved in nuclear proliferation, support
international terrorism or the commission of serious human
rights abuses against citizens of Iran. Also includes their
family members. Provides for Presidential waiver if essential
to the national interest or if necessary to meet our UN
obligations; requires a report to Congress regarding the use
of such a waiver.
Sec. 222--Sense of Congress and Rule of Construction
Relating to Certain Authorities of State and Local
Governments: States the sense of Congress that the US should
support actions by States or local governments, within their
authority, including determining how investment assets are
valued for financial institutions safety and soundness
purposes, that are consistent with and in furtherance of this
Act. Amends CISADA to state that it shall not be construed to
abridge the authority of a State to issue and enforce rules
governing the safety, soundness, and solvency of a financial
institution subject to its jurisdiction or the business of
insurance pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Sec. 223--GAO Reports on Foreign Investment in Iran's
Energy Sector: Mandates reports from GAO on foreign
investment in Iran's energy sector, exporters of refined
petroleum products to Iran, entities providing shipping and
insurance services to Iran, Iranian energy joint ventures
worldwide, and countries where gasoline and refined petroleum
products exported to Iran are produced or refined.
Sec. 224--Expanded Reporting on Iran's Crude Oil and
Refined Petroleum Products: Amends section 110(b) of CISADA
to require additional reporting by the President on the
volume of crude oil and refined petroleum products imported
to and exported from Iran, the persons selling and
transporting crude oil and refined petroleum products, the
countries with primary jurisdiction over those persons and
the countries in which those products were refined, the
sources of financing for such imports and the involvement of
foreign persons in efforts to assist Iran in developing its
oil and gas production capacity, importing advanced
technology to upgrade existing Iranian refineries, converting
existing chemical plants to petroleum refineries, and
maintaining, upgrading or expanding refineries or
constructing new refineries.
Sec. 301--Identifications and Sanctions on Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corps Officials, Agents, and Affiliates:
Requires the President to identify, and designate for
sanctions, officials, affiliates and agents of the IRGC
within 90 days of enactment, and periodically thereafter;
designation requires exclusion of such persons from the
United States, and imposition of sanctions related to WMD
under IEEPA, including freezing their assets and otherwise
isolating them financially. Also, outlines priorities for
investigating certain foreign persons, entities, and
transactions in assessing connections to the IRGC. Requires
the President to report on designations and provides for a
waiver if vital to the national security interest of the US.
Sec. 302--Identification and Sanctions on Foreign Persons
Supporting IRGC: Subjects foreign persons to ISA sanctions if
those persons knowingly provide material assistance to, or
engage in any significant transaction--including barter
transactions--with officials of the IRGC, its agents or
affiliates. Requires imposition of similar sanctions against
those persons who engage in significant transactions with UN-
sanctioned persons, those acting for or on their behalf, or
those owned or controlled by them. Provides for additional
sanctions under IEEPA as the President deems appropriate.
Requires the President to report on designations and waivers,
as applicable. Waiver is available if essential to the
national security interests of the US.
Sec. 303--Identification and Sanctions on Foreign
Government Agencies Carrying Out Activities or Transactions
with Certain Iran-Affiliated Persons: Requires the President,
within 120 days and every 180 days thereafter, to submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that
identifies
[[Page S5861]]
each agency of the government of a foreign country, other
than Iran, that the President determines knowingly and
materially supported a foreign person that is an official,
agent, or affiliate of IRGC designated pursuant to IEEPA or
various UN Resolutions. Provides authority for the President
to impose various measures described in the section, such as
denying assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or
proscribing certain US loans to the agency involved.
Sec. 304--Rule of Construction: Clarifies that sections 301
to 303 sanctions do not limit the President's authority to
designate persons for sanction under IEEPA.
Sec. 311--Expansion of US Procurement Ban to Foreign
Persons who Interact with the IRGC: Requires certification by
prospective US government contractors (for contract
solicitations issued beginning 120 days from the date of
enactment) that neither they nor their subsidiaries have
engaged in significant economic transactions with designated
IRGC officials, agents, or affiliates. Waiver is also
amended, so that it is available if ``essential to the
national security interests.'' Establishes a minimum
procurement ban penalty of two years for violators.
Sec. 312--Sanctions Determinations on NIOC and NITC: Amends
CISADA to require the Secretary of the Treasury to determine
and notify Congress whether the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC) and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) are
agents or affiliates of the IRGC. If found to be IRGC
entities, sanctions apply to transactions or relevant
financial services for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products from the NIOC or NITC, but only if the President
determines that there exists a sufficient supply of petroleum
from countries other than Iran to permit purchasers to
significantly reduce in volume their purchases from Iran.
Provides for an exception to financial institutions of a
country that is significantly reducing its purchases of
Iranian petroleum or petroleum products within specified
periods which track those provided for in section 1245 of the
FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
Sec. 401--Sanctions on those Complicit in Human Rights
Abuses: States the sense of Congress that the Supreme Leader,
seniors members of the Intelligence Ministry, senior members
of the IRGC and paramilitary groups, and other Ministers, are
responsible for directing and controlling serious human
rights abuses against the Iranian people and should be
included on the list of persons responsible for or complicit
in those abuses and subject to property blocking and other
CISADA 105 sanctions. Requires a report to appropriate
congressional committees within 180 days detailing the
involvement of the persons mentioned above in human rights
abuses against the citizens of Iran.
Sec. 402--Sanctions on those Transferring to Iran Certain
Goods or Technologies: Imposes sanctions provided for in
CISADA, including a visa ban and property blocking/asset
freeze, on persons and firms which supply Iran with equipment
and technologies including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas
and other riot control equipment, and jamming, monitoring and
surveillance equipment which the President determines are
likely to be used by Iranian officials to commit human rights
abuses. Requires the President to maintain and update lists
of such persons who commit human rights abuses, submit
updated lists to Congress, and make the unclassified portion
of those lists public. Requires the President to report on
designations and waivers, as applicable.
Sec. 403--Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and
Repression in Iran: States the sense of Congress that
satellite service providers and other entities that directly
provide satellite service to the Iranian government or its
entities should cease to provide such service unless the
government ceases its activities intended to jam or restrict
the signals and the US should address the illegal jamming
through voice and vote at the UN International
Telecommunications Union. Requires imposition of sanctions as
in section 401 against individuals and firms found to have
engaged in censorship or curtailment of the rights of freedom
of expression or assembly of Iran's citizens.
Sec. 411--Codification of Sanctions with Respect to Human
Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Using
Information Technology: Codifies Executive Order 13606,
Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United
States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights
Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information
Technology.
Sec. 412--Clarification of Sensitive Technologies for
Purposes of Procurement Ban under CISADA: Requires the
Secretary of State to issue guidelines, within 90 days of the
date of enactment, describing technologies that may be
considered ``sensitive technologies'' for the purposes of
Sec. 106 of CISADA, with special attention to new
technologies, determine the types of technology that enable
Iran's indigenous capabilities to disrupt and monitor
information and communications, and review the guidelines no
less than once each year, adding items to the guidelines as
necessary.
Sec. 413--Expedited Processing of Human Rights,
Humanitarian, and Democracy Aid: Requires the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department to
establish a 90-day process to expedite processing of US Iran-
related humanitarian, human rights and democratization aid by
entities receiving funds from the State Department; the
Broadcasting Board of Governors; and other federal agencies.
Requires the State Department to conduct a foreign policy
review within 30 days of request submission. Provides for
additional time for processing of applications involving
certain specified sensitive goods and technology, and
requests involving extraordinary circumstances.
Sec. 414--Comprehensive Strategy to Promote Internet
Freedom in Iran: Requires the Administration to devise a
comprehensive strategy and report to Congress on how best to
assist Iran's citizens in freely and safely accessing the
Internet, developing counter-censorship technologies,
expanding access to ``surrogate'' programming including Voice
of America's Persian News Network, and Radio FARDA inside
Iran, and taking other similar measures.
Sec. 415--Statement of Policy on Political Prisoners:
Declares the policy of the US to expand efforts to identify,
assist, and protect prisoners of conscience in Iran,
intensify work to abolish Iranian human rights violations,
and publicly call for the release of political prisoners, as
appropriate.
Sec. 501--Exclusion of Certain Iranian Students from the
US: Requires the Secretary of State to deny visas and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude certain Iranian
university students who may seek to come to the U.S. to study
to prepare for work in Iran's energy sector or in fields
related to its nuclear program, including nuclear sciences or
nuclear engineering.
Sec. 502--Interests in Financial Assets of Iran: Makes
certain blocked assets available for execution to satisfy any
judgment or judgments to the extent of any compensatory
damages against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism, so long
as the court determines that Iran has an equitable title to
or beneficial interest in those assets (subject to an
exception for certain custodial interests), and the court
also determines that no one possesses a constitutionally-
protected interest in the blocked assets under the Fifth
Amendment.
Sec. 503--Technical Corrections: Reaffirms longstanding US
policy allowing sale of certain licensed agricultural
commodities to Iran by amending the National Defense
Authorization Act to allow for continued payments related to
such commodities. Adjusts date of delivery of EIA reports.
Sec. 504--Expansion of NDAA Sanctions: Amends the NDAA to
provide that financial institutions located in countries that
have been exempted because they are significantly reducing
their reliance on Iranian oil may continue to do business
with the Central Bank of Iran only for petroleum transactions
and limited bilateral trade between Iran and those countries;
for the first time treats state-owned banks (other than
central banks) as subject to the same sanctions rules as
foreign private banks; provides incentives for
``significantly reducing'' countries to reduce to zero;
clarifies that ``significantly reducing'' includes a
reduction in price or volume toward a complete cessation of
crude oil imports; ties termination date to termination
certification in CISADA. Makes other technical corrections.
Sec. 505--Report on Natural Gas Exports from Iran: Requires
the Administrator of the Energy Information Administration to
submit a report to Congress and the President within 60 days
on Iran's natural gas sector, including an assessment of
exports of Iranian natural gas, identification of countries
purchasing the most Iranian natural gas, assessment of
alternative supplies available to those countries, and
assessment of the impact a reduction on exports would have on
global supplies and pricing. Requires the President to submit
a report to Congress within 60 days of receiving the EIA
report, and using the information it contains to provide
analysis and recommendations on the revenues received by Iran
from its natural gas exports and whether further steps should
be taken to limit such revenues.
Sec. 506--Report on Membership of Iran in International
Organizations: Requires the Secretary of State to submit a
report to Congress listing the international organizations of
which Iran is a member and detailing the amount the US
contributes to each such organization annually.
Sec. 507--Sense of Congress on Exportation of Goods,
Services, and Technologies for Aircraft Produced in the US:
States the sense of Congress that licenses to export or re-
export goods, services, or technologies for aircraft produced
in the US should be provided, in the case of Iran, only in
situations where such licenses are essential and in a manner
consistent with US laws and foreign policy goals.
Sec. 601--Implementation; Penalties: Provides the President
with the necessary procedural tools to administer the
provisions of the new law, including subpoena and other
enforcement authorities for specified provisions of the bill.
Sec. 602--Applicability to Authorized Intelligence
Activities: Provides a general exemption for authorized
intelligence activities of the U.S.
Sec. 603--Applicability to Certain Natural Gas Projects:
Contains special conditions for a project outside Iran of
substantial importance to U.S. national interests and
European energy security interests and energy independence
from the Government of the Russian Federation.
Sec. 604--Rule of Construction: Provides that nothing in
this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an
authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.
Sec. 605--Termination: Provides for termination of some
provisions of the new law if
[[Page S5862]]
the President certifies as required in CISADA that Iran has
ceased its support for terrorism and ceased efforts to
pursue, acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology,
and has verifiably dismantled its WMD.
Sec. 701--Short Title for Title VII: The ``Syria Human
Rights Accountability Act of 2012.''
Sec. 702--Sanctions on those Responsible for Human Rights
Abuses of Syria's Citizens: Requires the President to
identify within 90 days, and sanction under IEEPA, officials
of the Syrian government or those acting on their behalf who
are complicit in or responsible for the commission of serious
human rights abuses against Syria's citizens, regardless of
whether the abuses occurred in Syria.
Sec. 703--Sanctions on those Transferring to Syria
Technologies for Human Rights Abuses: Requires the President
to identify and sanction persons determined to have engaged
in the transfer of technologies--including weapons, rubber
bullets, tear gas and other riot control equipment, and
jamming, monitoring and surveillance equipment--which the
President determines are likely to be used by Syrian
officials to commit human rights abuses or restrict the free
flow of information in Syria. Provides for exceptions where a
person has agreed to stop providing such technologies, and
agreed not to knowingly provide such technologies in the
future. Requires the President to report on designations and
waivers, where applicable, and to update the list
periodically.
Sec. 704--Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and
Repression in Syria: Requires the President to identify and
report to Congress within 90 days of enactment those persons
and firms found to have engaged in censorship or repression
of the rights of freedom of expression or assembly of Syria's
citizens, and impose sanctions under IEEPA on such persons.
Requires periodic updating of the list, and public access via
the websites of the Departments of State and Treasury.
Sec. 705--Waiver: Provides for Presidential national
security interest waiver for Syria provisions; requires a
report to Congress on the reasons for the waiver.
Sec. 706--Termination: Provides for termination of the
Syria provisions if the President certifies that certain
conditions are met.
Parent Companies
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to engage in a colloquy
with my friend, the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, regarding HR 1905, the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I want to thank the
chairman for crafting a strong sanctions package that includes language
I authored to close a loophole in current law that allows foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. companies to continue doing business with Iran
without imposing any penalties on their U.S. parent companies. We must
close this loophole once and for all, and I am pleased the Chairman
agrees with me.
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I thank Senator Lautenberg for his
longstanding leadership on this issue. As I have previously noted, it
is long past time for foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to end
their business in Iran. That is already happening due to US and
international pressure on the business and financial sectors, and this
new provision will accelerate that process. Firms realize the huge
risks such activity poses, reputationally and otherwise, to their
companies. I note that it is already a violation of U.S. law for U.S.
subsidiaries to engage in sanctionable activity in Iran's energy sector
and certain other activities under U.S. sanctions laws. It is also a
violation of U.S. trade law for a U.S. firm to do business of any kind
in Iran via a subsidiary that it directs. The balance that has been
struck in prior law is to focus only on the activity of U.S. companies.
Foreign subsidiaries are not, by definition, U.S. companies, and your
provision takes a major new step forward in this area of the law. I
agree with you that the way we have addressed this issue authorizing
for the first time penalties on U.S. parents if their foreign
subsidiaries engages in an activity that would be sanctionable if
committed by a U.S. person--is a sound and responsible one, and will
hopefully shut down this activity once and for all.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman agree that the language in the bill
currently under consideration would apply the same penalties that can
be imposed on U.S. companies that directly violate the U.S. trade ban
to those U.S. parent companies whose foreign subsidiaries are doing
business with Iran?
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. The bill would authorize the imposition
of similar civil penalties on such U.S. parent companies.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Does the chairman also agree that this language
subjects to penalties U.S. parent companies if their foreign
subsidiaries knew or should have known that the subsidiary was directly
or indirectly doing business with an Iranian entity, even if it was the
case that the parent companies were not actually aware of the activity
of the subsidiary?
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. I agree this legislation mandates
penalties on a U.S. parent company if its foreign subsidiary has
knowledge or should have had knowledge that the subsidiary was doing
prohibited business with Iran, even if the U.S. parent company has no
knowledge of these transactions.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. And does the chairman agree that this requirement
that the foreign subsidiary knew or should have known that they were
doing business with Iran relates only to the actual business
transaction and does not require that the subsidiary had or should have
had knowledge of current U.S. sanctions law in order to place penalties
on the U.S. parent company?
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Yes. That is my intent.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thank Chairman Johnson for all of his work on this
important Iran sanctions package. Iran continues to defy numerous
United Nations Security Council resolutions. It funds Hamas, Hezbollah,
and other terrorist organizations, and it commits severe human rights
abuses against its own people. We must do everything we can to place as
much pressure on the Iranian regime as possible to change its behavior,
and I am pleased that we have finally closed this loophole in current
law and put U.S. companies on notice that they will be held responsible
for the activities of their subsidiaries with respect to Iran.
Mr. REID. I move to concur in the House amendment, and I believe the
Senate is ready to act on this motion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion.
The motion was agreed to.
Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the motion to reconsider be
laid upon the table with no intervening action or debate and that any
statements related to this bill be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Humanitarian trade, including
agricultural commodities, food, medicine and medical products has long
been specifically exempted by Congress from successive rounds of Iran
sanctions legislation, as long as such trade is licensed by the
Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, or OFAC.
With the sharp drop in the value of Iran's currency, and the
worsening economic situation in Iran, it is becoming more apparent that
U.S. financial sanctions targeting Iran's banking sector are causing
increased concern among U.S. and other businesses, and banks of our
allies engaged in such trade.
The fear is that engaging in humanitarian trade in the current
sanctions environment might lead to sanctions for legitimately licensed
humanitarian trade. We must underscore with other countries and their
banks that humanitarian trade with Iran is not subject to sanctions if
it is appropriately licensed by OFAC.
This has been a concern since the Senate first considered this bill
and this concern still remains. It is not and has not been the intent
of U.S. policy to harm the Iranian people by prohibiting humanitarian
trade that is licensed by the U.S. Treasury Department, and we should
do all we can to avoid this outcome. OFAC consistently issues many
licenses, both general and specific, for this type of trade.
The practical financing difficulties arising today between banks and
those engaging in licensed humanitarian trade can be best addressed by
U.S. government officials, who should do more to make it clear that no
U.S. sanctions will be imposed against third-country banks that
facilitate OFAC-licensed or exempted humanitarian trade. The
Administration must continue to make this clear in public statements,
in private meetings with foreign financial institutions, and elsewhere
as appropriate. Misinterpretation of U.S. law, among foreign financial
institutions, should no longer deny
[[Page S5863]]
the people of Iran the benefit of OFAC-approved humanitarian trade.
Mr. REID. I am pleased that the Senate has just passed the final
version of the Iran Sanctions legislation.
I want to thank Senators Johnson, Shelby and Menendez for their
leadership and all of their hard work getting this bill completed.
At a time when Iran continues to defy the international community
with its nuclear weapons program, it is critical we continue to tighten
our sanctions regime.
This legislation expands our existing sanctions on Iran's energy
sector, and imposes new sanctions targeting shipping and insurance.
Iran continues to try to evade existing sanctions. But this
legislation, in combination with newly announced measures by the Obama
administration, closes loopholes and stops the use of front companies
or financial institutions to get around international sanctions.
Our current sanctions, and a recent European Union ban on purchasing
Iranian oil, have already had an impact.
In spite of the rhetoric coming out of Iran, the regime is clearly
feeling the heat.
Oil exports are down by 50 percent, and the Iranian currency has lost
nearly 40 percent of its value.
Iranian tankers full of oil are crowding the waters around Iran,
acting as floating storage facilities for oil the rogue nation cannot
sell.
Over the past year, I have come to the floor many times urging
passage of this measure.
I am pleased we have finally completed this important work.
There is no time to waste, as the Iranian regime continues to
threaten our ally Israel and the national security of the United
States.
____________________