[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 116 (Wednesday, August 1, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H5552-H5578]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN THREAT REDUCTION AND SYRIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 2012
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree
to the resolution (H. Res. 750) providing for the concurrence by the
House in the Senate amendment to H.R. 1905, with an amendment.
The Clerk read the title of the resolution.
The text of the resolution is as follows:
H. Res. 750
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the
bill (H.R. 1905) entitled ``An Act to strengthen Iran
sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon
its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening
activities, and for other purposes.'', with the Senate
amendment thereto, shall be considered to have been taken
from the Speaker's table to the end that the Senate amendment
thereto be, and the same is hereby, agreed to with the
following amendment:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the
amendment of the Senate, insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO
IRAN
Sec. 101. Sense of Congress on enforcement of multilateral sanctions
regime and expansion and implementation of sanctions
laws.
Sec. 102. Diplomatic efforts to expand multilateral sanctions regime.
TITLE II--EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN
AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN
Subtitle A--Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to the energy sector of
Iran.
Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transportation of
crude oil from Iran and evasion of sanctions by shipping
companies.
Sec. 203. Expansion of sanctions with respect to development by Iran of
weapons of mass destruction.
Sec. 204. Expansion of sanctions available under the Iran Sanctions Act
of 1996.
Sec. 205. Modification of waiver standard under the Iran Sanctions Act
of 1996.
Sec. 206. Briefings on implementation of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996.
Sec. 207. Expansion of definitions under the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996.
Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on energy sector of Iran.
Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran
Sec. 211. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the provision of
vessels or shipping services to transport certain goods
related to proliferation or terrorism activities to Iran.
Sec. 212. Imposition of sanctions with respect to provision of
underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for the
National Iranian Oil Company or the National Iranian
Tanker Company.
Sec. 213. Imposition of sanctions with respect to purchase,
subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of
Iranian sovereign debt.
[[Page H5553]]
Sec. 214. Imposition of sanctions with respect to subsidiaries and
agents of persons sanctioned by United Nations Security
Council resolutions.
Sec. 215. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transactions with
persons sanctioned for certain activities relating to
terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
Sec. 216. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with
respect to financial institutions that engage in certain
activities relating to Iran.
Sec. 217. Continuation in effect of sanctions with respect to the
Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and
sanctions evaders.
Sec. 218. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by
foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 219. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission
relating to sanctionable activities.
Sec. 220. Reports on, and authorization of imposition of sanctions with
respect to, the provision of specialized financial
messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and other
sanctioned Iranian financial institutions.
Sec. 221. Identification of, and immigration restrictions on, senior
officials of the Government of Iran and their family
members.
Sec. 222. Sense of Congress and rule of construction relating to
certain authorities of State and local governments.
Sec. 223. Government Accountability Office report on foreign entities
that invest in the energy sector of Iran or export
refined petroleum products to Iran.
Sec. 224. Reporting on the importation to and exportation from Iran of
crude oil and refined petroleum products.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
Subtitle A--Identification of, and Sanctions With Respect to,
Officials, Agents, Affiliates, and Supporters of Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons
Sec. 301. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect
to, officials, agents, and affiliates of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 302. Identification of, and imposition of sanctions with respect
to, persons that support or conduct certain transactions
with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or other sanctioned
persons.
Sec. 303. Identification of, and imposition of measures with respect
to, foreign government agencies carrying out activities
or transactions with certain Iran-affiliated persons.
Sec. 304. Rule of construction.
Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps
Sec. 311. Expansion of procurement prohibition to foreign persons that
engage in certain transactions with Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
Sec. 312. Determinations of whether the National Iranian Oil Company
and the National Iranian Tanker Company are agents or
affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.
TITLE IV--MEASURES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN
Subtitle A--Expansion of Sanctions Relating to Human Rights Abuses in
Iran
Sec. 401. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons responsible for or
complicit in human rights abuses committed against
citizens of Iran or their family members after the June
12, 2009, elections in Iran.
Sec. 402. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods
or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used to
commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 403. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in
censorship or other related activities against citizens
of Iran.
Subtitle B--Additional Measures to Promote Human Rights
Sec. 411. Codification of sanctions with respect to grave human rights
abuses by the governments of Iran and Syria using
information technology.
Sec. 412. Clarification of sensitive technologies for purposes of
procurement ban under Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.
Sec. 413. Expedited consideration of requests for authorization of
certain human rights-, humanitarian-, and democracy-
related activities with respect to Iran.
Sec. 414. Comprehensive strategy to promote Internet freedom and access
to information in Iran.
Sec. 415. Statement of policy on political prisoners.
TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 501. Exclusion of citizens of Iran seeking education relating to
the nuclear and energy sectors of Iran.
Sec. 502. Interests in certain financial assets of Iran.
Sec. 503. Technical correction to section 1245 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
Sec. 504. Expansion of sanctions under section 1245 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
Sec. 505. Reports on natural gas exports from Iran.
Sec. 506. Report on membership of Iran in international organizations.
Sec. 507. Sense of Congress on exportation of goods, services, and
technologies for aircraft produced in the United States.
TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 601. Implementation; penalties.
Sec. 602. Applicability to certain intelligence activities.
Sec. 603. Applicability to certain natural gas projects.
Sec. 604. Rule of construction with respect to use of force against
Iran and Syria.
Sec. 605. Termination.
TITLE VII--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA
Sec. 701. Short title.
Sec. 702. Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who
are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses
committed against citizens of Syria or their family
members.
Sec. 703. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of goods
or technologies to Syria that are likely to be used to
commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 704. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage in
censorship or other forms of repression in Syria.
Sec. 705. Waiver.
Sec. 706. Termination.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
Except as otherwise specifically provided, in this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(2) Financial transaction.--The term ``financial
transaction'' means any transfer of value involving a
financial institution, including the transfer of forwards,
futures, options, swaps, or precious metals, including gold,
silver, platinum, and palladium.
(3) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' has the meaning
given that term in section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511).
TITLE I--EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO
IRAN
SEC. 101. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL
SANCTIONS REGIME AND EXPANSION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS.
It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling
Iran to abandon efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability and other threatening activities can be
effectively achieved through a comprehensive policy that
includes economic sanctions, diplomacy, and military
planning, capabilities and options, and that this objective
is consistent with the one stated by President Barack Obama
in the 2012 State of the Union Address: ``Let there be no
doubt: America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a
nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to
achieve that goal''. Among the economic measures to be taken
are--
(1) prompt enforcement of the current multilateral
sanctions regime with respect to Iran;
(2) full, timely, and vigorous implementation of all
sanctions enacted into law, including sanctions imposed or
expanded by this Act or amendments made by this Act,
through--
(A) intensified monitoring by the President and the
designees of the President, including the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of State, and senior officials in the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)), as
appropriate;
(B) more extensive use of extraordinary authorities
provided for under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and other sanctions laws;
(C) reallocation of resources to provide the personnel
necessary, within the Department of the Treasury, the
Department of State, and the Department of Commerce, and,
where appropriate, the intelligence community, to apply and
enforce sanctions; and
(D) expanded cooperation with international sanctions
enforcement efforts;
(3) urgent consideration of the expansion of existing
sanctions with respect to such areas as--
(A) the provision of energy-related services to Iran;
(B) the provision of insurance and reinsurance services to
Iran;
(C) the provision of shipping services to Iran; and
(D) those Iranian financial institutions not yet designated
for the imposition of sanctions
[[Page H5554]]
that may be acting as intermediaries for Iranian financial
institutions that are designated for the imposition of
sanctions; and
(4) a focus on countering Iran's efforts to evade
sanctions, including--
(A) the activities of telecommunications, Internet, and
satellite service providers, in and outside of Iran, to
ensure that such providers are not participating in or
facilitating, directly or indirectly, the evasion of the
sanctions regime with respect to Iran or violations of the
human rights of the people of Iran;
(B) the activities of financial institutions or other
businesses or government agencies, in or outside of Iran, not
yet designated for the imposition of sanctions; and
(C) urgent and ongoing evaluation of Iran's energy,
national security, financial, and telecommunications sectors,
to gauge the effects of, and possible defects in, particular
sanctions, with prompt efforts to correct any gaps in the
existing sanctions regime with respect to Iran.
SEC. 102. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO EXPAND MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS
REGIME.
(a) Multilateral Negotiations.--Congress urges the
President to intensify diplomatic efforts, both in
appropriate international fora such as the United Nations and
bilaterally with allies of the United States, for the purpose
of--
(1) expanding the United Nations Security Council sanctions
regime to include--
(A) a prohibition on the issuance of visas to any official
of the Government of Iran who is involved in--
(i) human rights violations in or outside of Iran;
(ii) the development of a nuclear weapons program and a
ballistic missile capability in Iran; or
(iii) support by the Government of Iran for terrorist
organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah; and
(B) a requirement that each member country of the United
Nations--
(i) prohibit the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines
from landing at seaports, and cargo flights of Iran Air from
landing at airports, in that country because of the role of
those organizations in proliferation and illegal arms sales;
and
(ii) apply the prohibitions described in clause (i) to
other Iranian entities designated for the imposition of
sanctions on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;
(2) expanding the range of sanctions imposed with respect
to Iran by allies of the United States;
(3) expanding efforts to limit the development of petroleum
resources and the importation of refined petroleum products
by Iran;
(4) developing additional initiatives to--
(A) increase the production of crude oil in countries other
than Iran; and
(B) assist countries that purchase or otherwise obtain
crude oil or petroleum products from Iran to eliminate their
dependence on crude oil and petroleum products from Iran; and
(5) eliminating the revenue generated by the Government of
Iran from the sale of petrochemical products produced in Iran
to other countries.
(b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the extent to which
diplomatic efforts described in subsection (a) have been
successful that includes--
(1) an identification of the countries that have agreed to
impose sanctions or take other measures to further the policy
set forth in subsection (a);
(2) the extent of the implementation and enforcement of
those sanctions or other measures by those countries;
(3) the criteria the President uses to determine whether a
country has significantly reduced its crude oil purchases
from Iran pursuant to section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended by
section 504, including considerations of reductions both in
terms of volume and price;
(4) an identification of the countries that have not agreed
to impose such sanctions or measures, including such
countries granted exceptions for significant reductions in
crude oil purchases pursuant to such section 1245(d)(4)(D);
(5) recommendations for additional measures that the United
States could take to further diplomatic efforts described in
subsection (a); and
(6) the disposition of any decision with respect to
sanctions imposed with respect to Iran by the World Trade
Organization or its predecessor organization.
TITLE II--EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN
AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN
Subtitle A--Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
SEC. 201. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ENERGY
SECTOR OF IRAN.
Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law
104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``With Respect
to'' and all that follows through ``to Iran'' and inserting
``Relating to the Energy Sector of Iran'';
(2) in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) by striking ``3 or more'' and inserting ``5 or more'';
and
(B) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting
``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012'';
(3) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by striking ``3 or more'' and inserting ``5 or more'';
and
(ii) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting
``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting before the period at
the end the following: ``or directly associated
infrastructure, including construction of port facilities,
railways, and roads, the primary use of which is to support
the delivery of refined petroleum products'';
(4) in paragraph (3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by striking ``3 or more'' and inserting ``5 or more'';
and
(ii) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting
``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B)--
(i) in clause (ii), by striking ``; or'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(ii) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end and
inserting a semicolon; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(iv) bartering or contracting by which goods are
exchanged for goods, including the insurance or reinsurance
of such exchanges; or
``(v) purchasing, subscribing to, or facilitating the
issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran,
including governmental bonds, issued on or after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012.''; and
(5) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) Joint ventures with iran relating to developing
petroleum resources.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B)
or subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of
the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a
person if the President determines that the person knowingly
participates, on or after the date of the enactment of the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, in
a joint venture with respect to the development of petroleum
resources outside of Iran if--
``(i) the joint venture is established on or after January
1, 2002; and
``(ii)(I) the Government of Iran is a substantial partner
or investor in the joint venture; or
``(II) Iran could, through a direct operational role in the
joint venture or by other means, receive technological
knowledge or equipment not previously available to Iran that
could directly and significantly contribute to the
enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources
in Iran.
``(B) Applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall not apply with
respect to participation in a joint venture established on or
after January 1, 2002, and before the date of the enactment
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, if the person participating in the joint venture
terminates that participation not later than the date that is
180 days after such date of enactment.
``(5) Support for the development of petroleum resources
and refined petroleum products in iran.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions
described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, leases, or provides to
Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in
subparagraph (B)--
``(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or
more; or
``(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate
fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.
``(B) Goods, services, technology, or support described.--
Goods, services, technology, or support described in this
subparagraph are goods, services, technology, or support that
could directly and significantly contribute to the
maintenance or enhancement of Iran's--
``(i) ability to develop petroleum resources located in
Iran; or
``(ii) domestic production of refined petroleum products,
including any direct and significant assistance with respect
to the construction, modernization, or repair of petroleum
refineries or directly associated infrastructure, including
construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the
primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined
petroleum products.
``(6) Development and purchase of petrochemical products
from iran.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions
described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, sells, leases, or provides to
Iran goods, services, technology, or support described in
subparagraph (B)--
``(i) any of which has a fair market value of $250,000 or
more; or
``(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate
fair market value of $1,000,000 or more.
``(B) Goods, services, technology, or support described.--
Goods, services, technology, or support described in this
subparagraph are goods, services, technology, or support that
could directly and significantly contribute to the
maintenance or expansion of Iran's domestic production of
petrochemical products.''.
SEC. 202. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
TRANSPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL FROM IRAN AND
EVASION OF SANCTIONS BY SHIPPING COMPANIES.
(a) In General.--Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996, as amended by section 201, is further amended by adding
at the end the following:
[[Page H5555]]
``(7) Transportation of crude oil from iran.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions
described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the
President determines that--
``(i) the person is a controlling beneficial owner of, or
otherwise owns, operates, or controls, or insures, a vessel
that, on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012, was used to transport crude oil from Iran
to another country; and
``(ii)(I) in the case of a person that is a controlling
beneficial owner of the vessel, the person had actual
knowledge the vessel was so used; or
``(II) in the case of a person that otherwise owns,
operates, or controls, or insures, the vessel, the person
knew or should have known the vessel was so used.
``(B) Applicability of sanctions.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii),
subparagraph (A) shall apply with respect to the
transportation of crude oil from Iran only if a determination
of the President under section 1245(d)(4)(B) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a sufficient supply of
petroleum and petroleum products produced in countries other
than Iran to permit purchasers of petroleum and petroleum
products from Iran to reduce significantly their purchases
from Iran is in effect at the time of the transportation of
the crude oil.
``(ii) Exception for certain countries.--Subparagraph (A)
shall not apply with respect to the transportation of crude
oil from Iran to a country to which the exception under
paragraph (4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d))
to the imposition of sanctions under paragraph (1) of that
section applies at the time of the transportation of the
crude oil.
``(8) Concealing iranian origin of crude oil and refined
petroleum products.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f),
the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions
described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person is a controlling
beneficial owner, or otherwise owns, operates, or controls, a
vessel that, on or after the date that is 90 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012, is used, with actual knowledge in
the case of a person that is a controlling beneficial owner
or knowingly in the case of a person that otherwise owns,
operates, or controls the vessel, in a manner that conceals
the Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products
transported on the vessel, including by--
``(i) permitting the operator of the vessel to suspend the
operation of the vessel's satellite tracking device; or
``(ii) obscuring or concealing the ownership, operation, or
control of the vessel by--
``(I) the Government of Iran;
``(II) the National Iranian Tanker Company or the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines; or
``(III) any other entity determined by the President to be
owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or an entity
specified in subclause (II).
``(B) Additional sanction.--Subject to such regulations as
the President may prescribe and in addition to the sanctions
imposed under subparagraph (A), the President may prohibit a
vessel owned, operated, or controlled by a person, including
a controlling beneficial owner, with respect to which the
President has imposed sanctions under that subparagraph and
that was used for the activity for which the President
imposed those sanctions from landing at a port in the United
States for a period of not more than 2 years after the date
on which the President imposed those sanctions.
``(C) Vessels identified by the office of foreign assets
control.--For purposes of subparagraph (A)(ii), a person
shall be deemed to have actual knowledge that a vessel is
owned, operated, or controlled by the Government of Iran or
an entity specified in subclause (II) or (III) of
subparagraph (A)(ii) if the International Maritime
Organization vessel registration identification for the
vessel is--
``(i) included on a list of specially designated nationals
and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign
Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury for
activities with respect to Iran; and
``(ii) identified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
as a vessel in which the Government of Iran or any entity
specified in subclause (II) or (III) of subparagraph (A)(ii)
has an interest.
``(D) Definition of iranian origin.--For purposes of
subparagraph (A), the term `Iranian origin' means--
``(i) with respect to crude oil, that the crude oil was
extracted in Iran; and
``(ii) with respect to a refined petroleum product, that
the refined petroleum product was produced or refined in
Iran.
``(9) Exception for provision of underwriting services and
insurance and reinsurance.--The President may not impose
sanctions under paragraph (7) or (8) with respect to a person
that provides underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance if the President determines that the person has
exercised due diligence in establishing and enforcing
official policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that
the person does not provide underwriting services or
insurance or reinsurance for the transportation of crude oil
or refined petroleum products from Iran in a manner for which
sanctions may be imposed under either such paragraph.''.
(b) Regulations and Guidelines.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall prescribe such regulations or guidelines as are
necessary to implement paragraphs (7), (8), and (9) of
section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as added by
this section, including such regulations or guidelines as are
necessary to implement subparagraph (B) of such paragraph
(8).
SEC. 203. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT
BY IRAN OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) In General.--Section 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
``(1) Exports, transfers, and transshipments.--Except as
provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or
more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect
to a person if the President determines that the person--
``(A) on or after the date of the enactment of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, exported
or transferred, or permitted or otherwise facilitated the
transshipment of, any goods, services, technology, or other
items to any other person; and
``(B) knew or should have known that--
``(i) the export, transfer, or transshipment of the goods,
services, technology, or other items would likely result in
another person exporting, transferring, transshipping, or
otherwise providing the goods, services, technology, or other
items to Iran; and
``(ii) the export, transfer, transshipment, or other
provision of the goods, services, technology, or other items
to Iran would contribute materially to the ability of Iran
to--
``(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or related technologies; or
``(II) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types
of advanced conventional weapons.
``(2) Joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or
transportation of uranium.--
``(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph (B)
or subsection (f), the President shall impose 5 or more of
the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a
person if the President determines that the person knowingly
participated, on or after the date of the enactment of the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, in
a joint venture that involves any activity relating to the
mining, production, or transportation of uranium--
``(i)(I) established on or after February 2, 2012; and
``(II) with--
``(aa) the Government of Iran;
``(bb) an entity incorporated in Iran or subject to the
jurisdiction of the Government of Iran; or
``(cc) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of,
or owned or controlled by, the Government of Iran or an
entity described in item (bb); or
``(ii)(I) established before February 2, 2012;
``(II) with the Government of Iran, an entity described in
item (bb) of clause (i)(II), or a person described in item
(cc) of that clause; and
``(III) through which--
``(aa) uranium is transferred directly to Iran or
indirectly to Iran through a third country;
``(bb) the Government of Iran receives significant revenue;
or
``(cc) Iran could, through a direct operational role or by
other means, receive technological knowledge or equipment not
previously available to Iran that could contribute materially
to the ability of Iran to develop nuclear weapons or related
technologies.
``(B) Applicability of sanctions.--Subparagraph (A) shall
not apply with respect to participation in a joint venture
established before the date of the enactment of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 if the
person participating in the joint venture terminates that
participation not later than the date that is 180 days after
such date of enactment.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996,
as amended by this section and sections 201 and 202, is
further amended--
(1) in section 5--
(A) in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), as redesignated by
subsection (a)(1) of this section--
(i) by striking ``paragraph (1)'' each place it appears and
inserting ``paragraph (1) or (2)''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (F)--
(I) by striking ``that paragraph'' and inserting
``paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may be''; and
(II) by striking ``the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010'' and inserting
``the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012'';
(B) in subsection (c)--
(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``subsections (a) and (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)
and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (a) or
(b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a) or paragraph (1) or
(2) of subsection (b)''; and
(C) in subsection (f)--
(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``subsection (a) or (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (a)
or paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b)''; and
(ii) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as paragraphs
(5) and (6), respectively; and
(2) in section 9, by striking ``section 5(a) or 5(b)(1)''
each place it appears and inserting ``subsection (a) or
paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b) of section 5''.
SEC. 204. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER THE IRAN
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.
(a) In General.--Section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
[[Page H5556]]
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (12); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following:
``(9) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned
person.--The President may, pursuant to such regulations or
guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any
United States person from investing in or purchasing
significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a
sanctioned person.
``(10) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President may
direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United
States, any alien that the President determines is a
corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a
controlling interest in, a sanctioned person.
``(11) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The
President may impose on the principal executive officer or
officers of any sanctioned person, or on persons performing
similar functions and with similar authorities as such
officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this
subsection.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
and apply with respect to activities described in subsections
(a) and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996,
as amended by this title, commenced on or after such date of
enactment.
SEC. 205. MODIFICATION OF WAIVER STANDARD UNDER THE IRAN
SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996.
Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended
by section 203, is further amended by striking paragraph (1)
and inserting the following:
``(1) Authority.--
``(A) Sanctions relating to the energy sector of iran.--The
President may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period
of not more than one year, the requirement in section 5(a) to
impose a sanction or sanctions on a person described in
section 5(c), and may waive the continued imposition of a
sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of this section,
30 days or more after the President determines and so reports
to the appropriate congressional committees that it is
essential to the national security interests of the United
States to exercise such waiver authority.
``(B) Sanctions relating to development of weapons of mass
destruction or other military capabilities.--The President
may waive, on a case-by-case basis and for a period of not
more than one year, the requirement in paragraph (1) or (2)
of section 5(b) to impose a sanction or sanctions on a person
described in section 5(c), and may waive the continued
imposition of a sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of
this section, 30 days or more after the President determines
and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees
that it is vital to the national security interests of the
United States to exercise such waiver authority.
``(C) Renewal of waivers.--The President may renew, on a
case-by-case basis, a waiver with respect to a person under
subparagraph (A) or (B) for additional one-year periods if,
not later than 30 days before the waiver expires, the
President makes the determination and submits to the
appropriate congressional committees the report described in
subparagraph (A) or (B), as applicable.''.
SEC. 206. BRIEFINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRAN SANCTIONS
ACT OF 1996.
Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law
104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``(f) Briefings on Implementation.--Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and every 120 days
thereafter, the President, acting through the Secretary of
State, shall provide to the appropriate congressional
committees a comprehensive briefing on efforts to implement
this Act.''.
SEC. 207. EXPANSION OF DEFINITIONS UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS
ACT OF 1996.
(a) In General.--Section 14 of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (17) and (18) as paragraphs
(20) and (21), respectively;
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) as paragraphs
(17) and (18), respectively;
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (4) through (14) as
paragraphs (5) through (15), respectively;
(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
``(4) Credible information.--The term `credible
information', with respect to a person--
``(A) includes--
``(i) a public announcement by the person that the person
has engaged in an activity described in subsection (a) or (b)
of section 5; and
``(ii) information set forth in a report to stockholders of
the person indicating that the person has engaged in such an
activity; and
``(B) may include, in the discretion of the President--
``(i) an announcement by the Government of Iran that the
person has engaged in such an activity; or
``(ii) information indicating that the person has engaged
in such an activity that is set forth in--
``(I) a report of the Government Accountability Office, the
Energy Information Administration, or the Congressional
Research Service; or
``(II) a report or publication of a similarly reputable
governmental organization or trade or industry
organization.'';
(5) by inserting after paragraph (15), as redesignated by
paragraph (3), the following:
``(16) Petrochemical product.--The term `petrochemical
product' includes any aromatic, olefin, or synthesis gas, and
any derivative of such a gas, including ethylene, propylene,
butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and
urea.''; and
(6) by inserting after paragraph (18), as redesignated by
paragraph (2), the following:
``(19) Services.--The term `services' includes software,
hardware, financial, professional consulting, engineering,
and specialized energy information services, energy-related
technical assistance, and maintenance and repairs.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
and apply with respect to activities described in subsections
(a) and (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996,
as amended by this title, commenced on or after such date of
enactment.
SEC. 208. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the energy sector of Iran remains a zone of
proliferation concern since the Government of Iran continues
to divert substantial revenues derived from sales of
petroleum resources to finance its illicit nuclear and
missile activities; and
(2) the President should apply the full range of sanctions
under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act,
to address the threat posed by the Government of Iran.
Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Sanctions Against Iran
SEC. 211. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROVISION OF VESSELS OR SHIPPING SERVICES TO
TRANSPORT CERTAIN GOODS RELATED TO
PROLIFERATION OR TERRORISM ACTIVITIES TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (c), if
the President determines that a person, on or after the date
of the enactment of this Act, knowingly sells, leases, or
provides a vessel or provides insurance or reinsurance or any
other shipping service for the transportation to or from Iran
of goods that could materially contribute to the activities
of the Government of Iran with respect to the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction or support for acts of
international terrorism, the President shall, pursuant to
Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to
blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction
proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order 13224
(66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to
commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property
and interests in property of the persons specified in
subsection (b) if such property and interests in property are
in the United States, come within the United States, or are
or come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(b) Persons Specified.--The persons specified in this
subsection are--
(1) the person that sold, leased, or provided a vessel or
provided insurance or reinsurance or another shipping service
described in subsection (a); and
(2) any person that--
(A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in
paragraph (1);
(B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph
(1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred
to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known
that the person referred to in paragraph (1) sold, leased, or
provided the vessel or provided the insurance or reinsurance
or other shipping service; or
(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or
control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the
person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or
control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in
paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the sale, lease, or
provision of the vessel or the provision of the insurance or
reinsurance or other shipping service.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement to
impose sanctions with respect to a person under subsection
(a) on or after the date that is 30 days after the
President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is vital to the national
security interests of the United States; and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains the reasons for that determination.
(d) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Secretary
of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report identifying operators of vessels and
other persons that conduct or facilitate significant
financial transactions with persons that manage ports in Iran
that have been designated for the imposition of sanctions
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit the authority of the President to
designate persons for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to
Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to the
blocking of property of weapons of mass destruction
proliferators and their supporters) or Executive Order 13224
(66 Fed. Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to
commit, or support terrorism), or otherwise pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.).
[[Page H5557]]
SEC. 212. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PROVISION
OF UNDERWRITING SERVICES OR INSURANCE OR
REINSURANCE FOR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL
COMPANY OR THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), not
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions
described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996,
as amended by section 204, with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
such date of enactment, provides underwriting services or
insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil
Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, or a successor
entity to either such company.
(b) Exceptions.--
(1) Underwriters and insurance providers exercising due
diligence.--The President is authorized not to impose
sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person that
provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if
the President determines that the person has exercised due
diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies,
procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not
provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance for
the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian Tanker
Company, or a successor entity to either such company.
(2) Food; medicine; humanitarian assistance.--The President
may not impose sanctions under subsection (a) for the
provision of underwriting services or insurance or
reinsurance for any activity relating solely to--
(A) the provision of agricultural commodities, food,
medicine, or medical devices to Iran; or
(B) the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people
of Iran.
(3) Termination period.--The President is authorized not to
impose sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a
person if the President receives reliable assurances that the
person will terminate the provision of underwriting services
or insurance or reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil
Company, the National Iranian Tanker Company, and any
successor entity to either such company, not later than the
date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agricultural commodity.--The term ``agricultural
commodity'' has the meaning given that term in section 102 of
the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602).
(2) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' has the
meaning given the term ``device'' in section 201 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(3) Medicine.--The term ``medicine'' has the meaning given
the term ``drug'' in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(d) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of
1996.--The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the
imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same
extent that such provisions apply with respect to the
imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996:
(1) Subsection (c) of section 4.
(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
(3) Section 8.
(4) Section 9.
(5) Section 11.
(6) Section 12.
(7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
(8) Section 14.
(e) Rule of Construction and Implementation.--Nothing in
this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the
President to impose sanctions pursuant to the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),
section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a), or any other provision of
this Act.
SEC. 213. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PURCHASE,
SUBSCRIPTION TO, OR FACILITATION OF THE
ISSUANCE OF IRANIAN SOVEREIGN DEBT.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose 5 or more of
the sanctions described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions
Act of 1996, as amended by section 204, with respect to a
person if the President determines that the person knowingly,
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, purchases,
subscribes to, or facilitates the issuance of--
(1) sovereign debt of the Government of Iran issued on or
after such date of enactment, including governmental bonds;
or
(2) debt of any entity owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran issued on or after such date of enactment,
including bonds.
(b) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of
1996.--The following provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act of
1996, as amended by this Act, apply with respect to the
imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) to the same
extent that such provisions apply with respect to the
imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996:
(1) Subsection (c) of section 4.
(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
(3) Section 8.
(4) Section 9.
(5) Section 11.
(6) Section 12.
(7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
(8) Section 14.
SEC. 214. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
SUBSIDIARIES AND AGENTS OF PERSONS SANCTIONED
BY UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.
(a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2)(B) of the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(B)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``of a person subject'' and inserting the
following: ``of--
``(i) a person subject'';
(2) in clause (i), as designated by paragraph (1), by
striking the semicolon and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of,
or owned or controlled by, a person described in clause
(i);''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under
section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513)
as are necessary to carry out the amendments made by
subsection (a).
SEC. 215. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS SANCTIONED FOR
CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO TERRORISM OR
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) In General.--Section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) is amended in the
matter preceding subclause (I) by striking ``financial
institution'' and inserting ``person''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall make such revisions to the regulations prescribed under
section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513)
as are necessary to carry out the amendment made by
subsection (a).
SEC. 216. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY SANCTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT
ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 104 the
following:
``SEC. 104A. EXPANSION OF, AND REPORTS ON, MANDATORY
SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.
``(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
revise the regulations prescribed under section 104(c)(1) to
apply to a foreign financial institution described in
subsection (b) to the same extent and in the same manner as
those regulations apply to a foreign financial institution
that the Secretary of the Treasury finds knowingly engages in
an activity described in section 104(c)(2).
``(b) Foreign Financial Institutions Described.--A foreign
financial institution described in this subsection is a
foreign financial institution, including an Iranian financial
institution, that the Secretary of the Treasury finds--
``(1) knowingly facilitates, or participates or assists in,
an activity described in section 104(c)(2), including by
acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or as an
intermediary for, or otherwise assisting, another person with
respect to the activity;
``(2) attempts or conspires to facilitate or participate in
such an activity; or
``(3) is owned or controlled by a foreign financial
institution that the Secretary finds knowingly engages in
such an activity.
``(c) Reports Required.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012, and every 180 days thereafter, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains a detailed
description of--
``(A) the effect of the regulations prescribed under
section 104(c)(1) on the financial system and economy of Iran
and capital flows to and from Iran; and
``(B) the ways in which funds move into and out of
financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii),
with specific attention to the use of other Iranian financial
institutions and other foreign financial institutions to
receive and transfer funds for financial institutions
described in that section.
``(2) Form of report.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
contain a classified annex.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Financial institution.--The term `financial
institution' means a financial institution specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I),
(J), (K), (M), (N), (R), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of
title 31, United States Code.
``(2) Foreign financial institution.--The term `foreign
financial institution' has the meaning of that term as
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to
section 104(i).
``(3) Iranian financial institution.--The term `Iranian
financial institution' means--
``(A) a financial institution organized under the laws of
Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, including a foreign
branch of such an institution;
``(B) a financial institution located in Iran;
``(C) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or
controlled by the Government of Iran; and
[[Page H5558]]
``(D) a financial institution, wherever located, owned or
controlled by a financial institution described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 is amended by inserting after the item relating
to section 104 the following:
``Sec. 104A. Expansion of, and reports on, mandatory sanctions with
respect to financial institutions that engage in certain
activities.''.
SEC. 217. CONTINUATION IN EFFECT OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, THE CENTRAL BANK OF
IRAN, AND SANCTIONS EVADERS.
(a) Sanctions Relating to Blocking of Property of the
Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions.--
United States sanctions with respect to Iran provided for in
Executive Order 13599 (77 Fed. Reg. 6659), as in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall
remain in effect until the date that is 90 days after the
date on which the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees the certification described in
subsection (d).
(b) Sanctions Relating to Foreign Sanctions Evaders.--
United States sanctions with respect to Iran provided for in
Executive Order 13608 (77 Fed. Reg. 26409), as in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall
remain in effect until the date that is 30 days after the
date on which the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees the certification described in
section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8551(a)).
(c) Continuation of Sanctions With Respect to the Central
Bank of Iran.--In addition to the sanctions referred to in
subsection (a), the President shall continue to apply to the
Central Bank of Iran sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),
including blocking of property and restrictions or
prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of
property, until the date that is 90 days after the date on
which the President submits to Congress the certification
described in subsection (d).
(d) Certification Described.--
(1) In general.--The certification described in this
subsection is the certification of the President to Congress
that the Central Bank of Iran is not--
(A) providing financial services in support of, or
otherwise facilitating, the ability of Iran to--
(i) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons, or related technologies;
(ii) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear
facilities that could aid Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear
capability; or
(iii) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional
weapons; or
(B) facilitating transactions or providing financial
services for--
(i) Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
(ii) financial institutions the property or interests in
property of which are blocked pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) in
connection with--
(I) Iran's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; or
(II) Iran's support for international terrorism.
(2) Submission to congress.--
(A) In general.--The President shall submit the
certification described in paragraph (1) to the appropriate
congressional committees in writing and shall include a
justification for the certification.
(B) Form of certification.--The certification described in
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
contain a classified annex.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et
seq.).
SEC. 218. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership,
association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other
organization.
(2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means,
with respect to an entity--
(A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by
vote or value in the entity;
(B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors
of the entity; or
(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.
(b) Prohibition.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall prohibit an
entity owned or controlled by a United States person and
established or maintained outside the United States from
knowingly engaging in any transaction directly or indirectly
with the Government of Iran or any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Government of Iran that would be
prohibited by an order or regulation issued pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.) if the transaction were engaged in by a United
States person or in the United States.
(c) Civil Penalty.--The civil penalties provided for in
section 206(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b)) shall apply to a United States person
to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that
commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that
Act if an entity owned or controlled by the United States
person and established or maintained outside the United
States violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate,
or causes a violation of any order or regulation issued to
implement subsection (b).
(d) Applicability.--Subsection (c) shall not apply with
respect to a transaction described in subsection (b) by an
entity owned or controlled by a United States person and
established or maintained outside the United States if the
United States person divests or terminates its business with
the entity not later than the date that is 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 219. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION RELATING TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(r) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to Iran.--
``(1) In general.--Each issuer required to file an annual
or quarterly report under subsection (a) shall disclose in
that report the information required by paragraph (2) if,
during the period covered by the report, the issuer or any
affiliate of the issuer--
``(A) knowingly engaged in an activity described in
subsection (a) or (b) of section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act
of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in
subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8513) or a transaction described in subsection (d)(1)
of that section;
``(C) knowingly engaged in an activity described in section
105A(b)(2) of that Act; or
``(D) knowingly conducted any transaction or dealing with--
``(i) any person the property and interests in property of
which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed.
Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism);
``(ii) any person the property and interests in property of
which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed.
Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of
mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or
``(iii) any person or entity identified under section
560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to
the definition of the Government of Iran) without the
specific authorization of a Federal department or agency.
``(2) Information required.--If an issuer or an affiliate
of the issuer has engaged in any activity described in
paragraph (1), the issuer shall disclose a detailed
description of each such activity, including--
``(A) the nature and extent of the activity;
``(B) the gross revenues and net profits, if any,
attributable to the activity; and
``(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as
the case may be) intends to continue the activity.
``(3) Notice of disclosures.--If an issuer reports under
paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer
has knowingly engaged in any activity described in that
paragraph, the issuer shall separately file with the
Commission, concurrently with the annual or quarterly report
under subsection (a), a notice that the disclosure of that
activity has been included in that annual or quarterly report
that identifies the issuer and contains the information
required by paragraph (2).
``(4) Public disclosure of information.--Upon receiving a
notice under paragraph (3) that an annual or quarterly report
includes a disclosure of an activity described in paragraph
(1), the Commission shall promptly--
``(A) transmit the report to--
``(i) the President;
``(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee
on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and
``(iii) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate; and
``(B) make the information provided in the disclosure and
the notice available to the public by posting the information
on the Internet website of the Commission.
``(5) Investigations.--Upon receiving a report under
paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an activity
described in paragraph (1) (other than an activity described
in subparagraph (D)(iii) of that paragraph), the President
shall--
``(A) initiate an investigation into the possible
imposition of sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), section 104 or
105A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, an Executive Order specified in
clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), or any other
provision of law relating to the imposition of sanctions with
respect to Iran, as applicable; and
``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating such an
investigation, make a determination with respect to whether
sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the
affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).
``(6) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection shall
terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which
the President makes the certification described in section
401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect with respect to reports required to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the
date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
[[Page H5559]]
SEC. 220. REPORTS ON, AND AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF
SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO, THE PROVISION OF
SPECIALIZED FINANCIAL MESSAGING SERVICES TO THE
CENTRAL BANK OF IRAN AND OTHER SANCTIONED
IRANIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) providers of specialized financial messaging services
are a critical link to the international financial system;
(2) the European Union is to be commended for strengthening
the multilateral sanctions regime against Iran by deciding
that specialized financial messaging services may not be
provided to the Central Bank of Iran and other sanctioned
Iranian financial institutions by persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the European Union; and
(3) the loss of access by sanctioned Iranian financial
institutions to specialized financial messaging services must
be maintained.
(b) Reports Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that contains--
(A) a list of all persons that the Secretary has identified
that directly provide specialized financial messaging
services to, or enable or facilitate direct or indirect
access to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of
Iran or a financial institution described in section
104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and
(B) a detailed assessment of the status of efforts by the
Secretary to end the direct provision of such messaging
services to, and the enabling or facilitation of direct or
indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central
Bank of Iran or a financial institution described in that
section.
(2) Enabling or facilitation of access to specialized
financial messaging services through intermediary financial
institutions.--For purposes of paragraph (1) and subsection
(c), enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to
specialized financial messaging services for the Central Bank
of Iran or a financial institution described in section
104(c)(2)(E)(ii) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) includes doing so by serving as an
intermediary financial institution with access to such
messaging services.
(3) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
(c) Authorization of Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), if,
on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, a person continues to knowingly and
directly provide specialized financial messaging services to,
or knowingly enable or facilitate direct or indirect access
to such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a
financial institution described in paragraph (2)(E)(ii) of
section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8513(c)), the President may impose sanctions pursuant to that
section or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) with respect to the person.
(2) Exception.--The President may not impose sanctions
pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to a person for
directly providing specialized financial messaging services
to, or enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to
such messaging services for, the Central Bank of Iran or a
financial institution described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)) if--
(A) the person is subject to a sanctions regime under its
governing foreign law that requires it to eliminate the
knowing provision of such messaging services to, and the
knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or indirect
access to such messaging services for--
(i) the Central Bank of Iran; and
(ii) a group of Iranian financial institutions identified
under such governing foreign law for purposes of that
sanctions regime if the President determines that--
(I) the group is substantially similar to the group of
financial institutions described in section 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)(2)(E)(ii)); and
(II) the differences between those groups of financial
institutions do not adversely affect the national interest of
the United States; and
(B) the person has, pursuant to that sanctions regime,
terminated the knowing provision of such messaging services
to, and the knowing enabling and facilitation of direct or
indirect access to such messaging services for, the Central
Bank of Iran and each Iranian financial institution
identified under such governing foreign law for purposes of
that sanctions regime.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.) or the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et
seq.).
SEC. 221. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS ON,
SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN AND
THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.
(a) Identification.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall publish a list of each individual the
President determines is--
(1) a senior official of the Government of Iran described
in subsection (b) that is involved in Iran's--
(A) illicit nuclear activities or proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction;
(B) support for international terrorism; or
(C) commission of serious human rights abuses against
citizens of Iran or their family members; or
(2) a family member of such an official.
(b) Senior Officials of the Government of Iran Described.--
A senior official of the Government of Iran described in this
subsection is any senior official of that Government,
including--
(1) the Supreme Leader of Iran;
(2) the President of Iran;
(3) a member of the Cabinet of the Government of Iran;
(4) a member of the Assembly of Experts;
(5) a senior member of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran;
or
(6) a senior member of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps,
including a senior member of a paramilitary organization such
as Ansar-e-Hezbollah or Basij-e Motaz'afin.
(c) Exclusion From United States.--Except as provided in
subsection (d), the Secretary of State shall deny a visa to,
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from the
United States, any alien who is on the list required by
subsection (a).
(d) Exception To Comply With United Nations Headquarters
Agreement.--Subsection (c) shall not apply to an individual
if admitting the individual to the United States is necessary
to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement
between the United Nations and the United States of America
regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June
26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, and other
applicable international obligations.
(e) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
subsection (a) or (c) with respect to an individual if the
President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is essential to the
national interests of the United States; and
(2) not less than 7 days before the waiver takes effect,
notifies Congress of the waiver and the reason for the
waiver.
SEC. 222. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING
TO CERTAIN AUTHORITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should support actions by States or local
governments that are within their authority, including
determining how investment assets are valued for purposes of
safety and soundness of financial institutions and insurers,
that are consistent with and in furtherance of the purposes
of this Act and other Acts that are amended by this Act.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Section 202 of the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(22 U.S.C. 8532) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act or any
other provision of law authorizing sanctions with respect to
Iran shall be construed to abridge the authority of a State
to issue and enforce rules governing the safety, soundness,
and solvency of a financial institution subject to its
jurisdiction or the business of insurance pursuant to the Act
of March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1011 et seq.) (commonly known as
the `McCarran-Ferguson Act').''.
SEC. 223. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT ON FOREIGN
ENTITIES THAT INVEST IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF
IRAN OR EXPORT REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO
IRAN.
(a) Initial Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report--
(A) listing all foreign investors in the energy sector of
Iran during the period specified in paragraph (2),
including--
(i) entities that exported gasoline and other refined
petroleum products to Iran;
(ii) entities involved in providing refined petroleum
products to Iran, including--
(I) entities that provided ships to transport refined
petroleum products to Iran; and
(II) entities that provided insurance or reinsurance for
shipments of refined petroleum products to Iran; and
(iii) entities involved in commercial transactions of any
kind, including joint ventures anywhere in the world, with
Iranian energy companies; and
(B) identifying the countries in which gasoline and other
refined petroleum products exported to Iran during the period
specified in paragraph (2) were produced or refined.
(2) Period specified.--The period specified in this
paragraph is the period beginning on January 1, 2009, and
ending on the date that is 150 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(b) Updated Report.--Not later than one year after
submitting the report required by subsection (a), the
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report containing the
matters required in the report under subsection (a)(1) for
the one-year period beginning on the date that is 30 days
before the date on which the preceding report was required to
be submitted by this section.
SEC. 224. REPORTING ON THE IMPORTATION TO AND EXPORTATION
FROM IRAN OF CRUDE OIL AND REFINED PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS.
Section 110(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8518(b)) is amended by striking ``a report containing the
matters'' and all that follows through the period at the end
and
[[Page H5560]]
inserting the following: ``a report, covering the 180-day
period beginning on the date that is 30 days before the date
on which the preceding report was required to be submitted by
this section, that--
``(1) contains the matters required in the report under
subsection (a)(1); and
``(2) identifies--
``(A) the volume of crude oil and refined petroleum
products imported to and exported from Iran (including
through swaps and similar arrangements);
``(B) the persons selling and transporting crude oil and
refined petroleum products described in subparagraph (A), the
countries with primary jurisdiction over those persons, and
the countries in which those products were refined;
``(C) the sources of financing for imports to Iran of crude
oil and refined petroleum products described in subparagraph
(A); and
``(D) the involvement of foreign persons in efforts to
assist Iran in--
``(i) developing upstream oil and gas production capacity;
``(ii) importing advanced technology to upgrade existing
Iranian refineries;
``(iii) converting existing chemical plants to petroleum
refineries; or
``(iv) maintaining, upgrading, or expanding existing
refineries or constructing new refineries.''.
TITLE III--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
Subtitle A--Identification of, and Sanctions With Respect to,
Officials, Agents, Affiliates, and Supporters of Iran's Revolutionary
Guard Corps and Other Sanctioned Persons
SEC. 301. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO, OFFICIALS, AGENTS, AND AFFILIATES
OF IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the
President shall--
(1) identify foreign persons that are officials, agents, or
affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; and
(2) for each foreign person identified under paragraph (1)
that is not already designated for the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)--
(A) designate that foreign person for the imposition of
sanctions pursuant to that Act; and
(B) block and prohibit all transactions in all property and
interests in property of that foreign person if such property
and interests in property are in the United States, come
within the United States, or are or come within the
possession or control of a United States person.
(b) Priority for Investigation.--In identifying foreign
persons pursuant to subsection (a)(1) as officials, agents,
or affiliates of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, the
President shall give priority to investigating--
(1) foreign persons or entities identified under section
560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to
the definition of the Government of Iran); and
(2) foreign persons for which there is a reasonable basis
to find that the person has conducted or attempted to conduct
one or more sensitive transactions or activities described in
subsection (c).
(c) Sensitive Transactions and Activities Described.--A
sensitive transaction or activity described in this
subsection is--
(1) a financial transaction or series of transactions
valued at more than $1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-
month period involving a non-Iranian financial institution;
(2) a transaction to facilitate the manufacture,
importation, exportation, or transfer of items needed for the
development by Iran of nuclear, chemical, biological, or
advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles;
(3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement,
or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's
energy sector, including a transaction relating to the
development of the energy resources of Iran, the exportation
of petroleum products from Iran, the importation of refined
petroleum to Iran, or the development of refining capacity
available to Iran;
(4) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement,
or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's
petrochemical sector; or
(5) a transaction relating to the procurement of sensitive
technologies (as defined in section 106(c) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515(c))).
(d) Exclusion From United States.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of
State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall exclude from the United States, any alien who,
on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a
foreign person designated pursuant to subsection (a) for the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(2) Regulatory exceptions to comply with international
obligations.--The requirement to deny visas to and exclude
aliens from the United States pursuant to paragraph (1) shall
be subject to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, including regulatory exceptions to permit the
United States to comply with the Agreement between the United
Nations and the United States of America regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and
entered into force November 21, 1947, and other applicable
international obligations.
(e) Waiver of Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the application of
subsection (a) or (d) with respect to a foreign person if the
President--
(A) determines that it is vital to the national security
interests of the United States to do so; and
(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that--
(i) identifies the foreign person with respect to which the
waiver applies; and
(ii) sets forth the reasons for the determination.
(2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph
(1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
contain a classified annex.
(f) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to remove any sanction of the United States in
force with respect to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as of
the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 302. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO, PERSONS THAT SUPPORT OR CONDUCT
CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY
GUARD CORPS OR OTHER SANCTIONED PERSONS.
(a) Identification.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report identifying foreign persons that the
President determines, on or after the date of the enactment
of this Act, knowingly--
(A) materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial,
material, or technological support for, or goods or services
in support of, Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its
officials, agents, or affiliates the property and interests
in property of which are blocked pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.);
(B) engage in a significant transaction or transactions
with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its
officials, agents, or affiliates--
(i) the property and interests in property of which are
blocked pursuant to that Act; or
(ii) that are identified under section 301(a)(1) or
pursuant to paragraph (4)(A) of section 104(c) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010, as added by section 312; or
(C) engage in a significant transaction or transactions
with--
(i) a person subject to financial sanctions pursuant to
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008), or 1929 (2010), or any other resolution
that is adopted by the Security Council and imposes sanctions
with respect to Iran or modifies such sanctions; or
(ii) a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of,
or owned or controlled by, a person described in clause (i).
(2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
(3) Barter transactions.--For purposes of paragraph (1),
the term ``transaction'' includes a barter transaction.
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--If the President determines
under subsection (a)(1) that a foreign person has knowingly
engaged in an activity described in that subsection, the
President--
(1) shall impose 5 or more of the sanctions described in
section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by
section 204; and
(2) may impose additional sanctions pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.) with respect to the person.
(c) Termination.--The President may terminate a sanction
imposed with respect to a foreign person pursuant to
subsection (b) if the President determines that the person--
(1) no longer engages in the activity for which the
sanction was imposed; and
(2) has provided assurances to the President that the
person will not engage in any activity described in
subsection (a)(1) in the future.
(d) Waiver of Imposition of Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--The President may waive the imposition of
sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a foreign
person if the President--
(A)(i) determines that the person has ceased the activity
for which sanctions would otherwise be imposed and has taken
measures to prevent a recurrence of the activity; or
(ii) determines that it is essential to the national
security interests of the United States to do so; and
(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that--
(i) identifies the foreign person with respect to which the
waiver applies;
(ii) describes the activity that would otherwise subject
the foreign person to the imposition of sanctions under
subsection (b); and
(iii) sets forth the reasons for the determination.
(2) Form of report.--A report submitted under paragraph
(1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
contain a classified annex.
(e) Waiver of Identifications and Designations.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle and
subject to paragraph (2), the President shall not be required
to make any identification of a foreign person under
subsection (a) or any identification or designation of a
foreign person under section 301(a) if the President--
(1) determines that doing so would cause damage to the
national security of the United States; and
(2) notifies the appropriate congressional committees of
the exercise of the authority provided under this subsection.
(f) Application of Provisions of Iran Sanctions Act of
1996.--The following provisions of
[[Page H5561]]
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by this Act, apply
with respect to the imposition under subsection (b)(1) of
sanctions relating to activities described in subsection
(a)(1) to the same extent that such provisions apply with
respect to the imposition of sanctions under section 5(a) of
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996:
(1) Subsections (c) and (e) of section 4.
(2) Subsections (c), (d), and (f) of section 5.
(3) Section 8.
(4) Section 9.
(5) Section 11.
(6) Section 12.
(7) Subsection (b) of section 13.
(8) Section 14.
SEC. 303. IDENTIFICATION OF, AND IMPOSITION OF MEASURES WITH
RESPECT TO, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES OR TRANSACTIONS WITH
CERTAIN IRAN-AFFILIATED PERSONS.
(a) Identification.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that identifies each agency of the
government of a foreign country (other than Iran) that the
President determines knowingly and materially assisted,
sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological
support for, or goods or services in support of, or knowingly
and materially engaged in a significant transaction with, any
person described in paragraph (2).
(2) Person described.--A person described in this paragraph
is--
(A) a foreign person that is an official, agent, or
affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps that is
designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.);
(B) a foreign person that is designated and subject to
financial sanctions pursuant to--
(i) the Annex of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1737 (2006);
(ii) Annex I of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1747 (2007);
(iii) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1803 (2008);
(iv) Annex I, II, or III of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1929 (2010); or
(v) any subsequent and related United Nations Security
Council resolution, or any annex thereto, that imposes new
sanctions with respect to Iran or modifies existing sanctions
with respect to Iran; or
(C) a foreign person that the agency knows is acting on
behalf of or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by,
a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(3) Form of report.--Each report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
(b) Imposition of Measures.--
(1) In general.--The President may impose any of the
following measures with respect to an agency identified
pursuant to subsection (a) if the President determines that
the assistance, exports, or other support to be prohibited by
reason of the imposition of the measures have contributed and
would otherwise directly or indirectly contribute to the
agency's capability to continue the activities or
transactions for which the agency has been identified
pursuant to subsection (a):
(A) No assistance may be provided to the agency under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) or
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) other
than humanitarian assistance or the provision of food or
other agricultural commodities.
(B) No sales of any defense articles, defense services, or
design and construction services under the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) may be made to the
agency.
(C) No licenses for export of any item on the United States
Munitions List that include the agency as a party to the
license may be granted.
(D) No exports may be permitted to the agency of any goods
or technologies controlled for national security reasons
under the Export Administration Regulations, except that such
prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the
reporting requirements of title V of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional
oversight of intelligence activities).
(E) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or
technical assistance to the agency by international financial
institutions in accordance with section 701 of the
International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
(F) The United States shall deny to the agency any credit
or financial assistance by any department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States Government, except that
this paragraph shall not apply--
(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting
requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.; relating to congressional oversight
of intelligence activities);
(ii) to the provision of medicines, medical equipment, and
humanitarian assistance; or
(iii) to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial
assistance provided by the Department of Agriculture to
support the purchase of food or other agricultural
commodities.
(G) Additional restrictions as may be imposed pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.).
(2) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to impose measures with respect to programs
under section 1501 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2632 note) and programs under
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501 et seq).
(c) Termination.--The President may terminate any measures
imposed with respect to an agency pursuant to subsection (b)
if the President determines and notifies the appropriate
congressional committees that--
(1)(A) a person described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
subsection (a)(2) with respect to which the agency is
carrying out activities or transactions is no longer
designated pursuant to subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection
(a)(2); or
(B) any person described in subparagraph (C) of subsection
(a)(2) with respect to which the agency is carrying out
activities or transactions is no longer acting on behalf of
or at the direction of, or owned or controlled by, any person
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2);
(2) the agency is no longer carrying out activities or
transactions for which the measures were imposed and has
provided assurances to the United States Government that the
agency will not carry out the activities or transactions in
the future; or
(3) it is essential to the national security interest of
the United States to terminate such measures.
(d) Waiver.--If the President does not impose one or more
measures described in subsection (b) with respect to an
agency identified in the report required by subsection (a),
the President shall include in the subsequent report an
explanation as to why the President did not impose such
measures.
(e) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and
Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives.
(f) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to
activities and transactions described in subsection (a) that
are carried out on or after the later of--
(1) the date that is 45 days after such date of enactment;
or
(2) the date that is 45 days after a person is designated
as described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (a)(2).
SEC. 304. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to limit the
authority of the President to designate foreign persons for
the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
Subtitle B--Additional Measures Relating to Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps
SEC. 311. EXPANSION OF PROCUREMENT PROHIBITION TO FOREIGN
PERSONS THAT ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS
WITH IRAN'S REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.
(a) In General.--Section 6(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act
of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Not later than 90 days'' and inserting
the following:
``(A) Certifications relating to activities described in
section 5.--Not later than 90 days''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) Certifications relating to transactions with iran's
revolutionary guard corps.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012, the Federal Acquisition Regulation
shall be revised to require a certification from each person
that is a prospective contractor that the person, and any
person owned or controlled by the person, does not knowingly
engage in a significant transaction or transactions with
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps or any of its officials,
agents, or affiliates the property and interests in property
of which are blocked pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Section 6(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as
amended by subsection (a), is further amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), as designated by
subsection (a)(1), by striking ``issued pursuant to section
25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C.
421)'';
(B) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A)--
(I) by striking ``the revision'' and inserting ``the
applicable revision''; and
(II) by striking ``not more than 3 years'' and inserting
``not less than 2 years''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``issued pursuant to
section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act
(41 U.S.C. 421)'';
(C) in paragraph (5), by striking ``in the national
interest'' and inserting ``essential to the national security
interests'';
(D) by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
``(6) Definitions.--In this subsection:
``(A) Executive agency.--The term `executive agency' has
the meaning given that term in section 133 of title 41,
United States Code.
``(B) Federal acquisition regulation.--The term `Federal
Acquisition Regulation' means the regulation issued pursuant
to section 1303(a)(1) of title 41, United States Code.''; and
(E) in paragraph (7)--
(i) by striking ``The revisions to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation required under paragraph (1)'' and inserting the
following:
``(A) Certifications relating to activities described in
section 5.--The revisions to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation required under paragraph (1)(A)''; and
(ii) by adding at the end the following:
[[Page H5562]]
``(B) Certifications relating to transactions with iran's
revolutionary guard corps.--The revisions to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1)(B) shall
apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are
issued on or after the date that is 120 days after the date
of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012.''.
(2) Section 101(3) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8511(3)) is amended by striking ``section 4 of the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403)'' and
inserting ``section 133 of title 41, United States Code''.
SEC. 312. DETERMINATIONS OF WHETHER THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL
COMPANY AND THE NATIONAL IRANIAN TANKER COMPANY
ARE AGENTS OR AFFILIATES OF IRAN'S
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian
Tanker Company are not only owned and controlled by the
Government of Iran but that those companies provide
significant support to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and
its affiliates.
(b) Determinations.--Section 104(c) of the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(22 U.S.C. 8513(c)) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(4) Determinations regarding nioc and nitc.--
``(A) Determinations.--For purposes of paragraph (2)(E),
the Secretary of the Treasury shall, not later than 45 days
after the date of the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012--
``(i) determine whether the NIOC or the NITC is an agent or
affiliate of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps; and
``(ii) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on the determinations made under clause (i), together
with the reasons for those determinations.
``(B) Form of report.--A report submitted under
subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form
but may contain a classified annex.
``(C) Applicability with respect to petroleum
transactions.--
``(i) Application of sanctions.--Except as provided in
clause (ii), if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that
the NIOC or the NITC is a person described in clause (i) or
(ii) of paragraph (2)(E), the regulations prescribed under
paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to a significant
transaction or transactions or significant financial services
knowingly facilitated or provided by a foreign financial
institution for the NIOC or the NITC, as applicable, for the
purchase of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran, only
if a determination of the President under section
1245(d)(4)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(4)(B)) that there is a
sufficient supply of petroleum and petroleum products
produced in countries other than Iran to permit purchasers of
petroleum and petroleum products from Iran to reduce
significantly their purchases from Iran is in effect at the
time of the transaction or the provision of the service.
``(ii) Exception for certain countries.--If the Secretary
of the Treasury determines that the NIOC or the NITC is a
person described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (2)(E),
the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall not
apply to a significant transaction or transactions or
significant financial services knowingly facilitated or
provided by a foreign financial institution for the NIOC or
the NITC, as applicable, for the purchase of petroleum or
petroleum products from Iran if an exception under paragraph
(4)(D) of section 1245(d) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d))
applies to the country with primary jurisdiction over the
foreign financial institution at the time of the transaction
or the provision of the service.
``(iii) Rule of construction.--The exceptions in clauses
(i) and (ii) shall not be construed to limit the authority of
the Secretary of the Treasury to impose sanctions pursuant to
the regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) for an
activity described in paragraph (2) to the extent the
activity would meet the criteria described in that paragraph
in the absence of the involvement of the NIOC or the NITC.
``(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
``(i) NIOC.--The term `NIOC' means the National Iranian Oil
Company.
``(ii) NITC.--The term `NITC' means the National Iranian
Tanker Company.''.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Waiver.--Section 104(f) of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8513(f)) is amended by inserting ``or section 104A''
after ``subsection (c)''.
(2) Classified information.--Section 104(g) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(g)) is amended by striking
``subsection (c)(1)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1) or (4) of
subsection (c) or section 104A'' both places it appears.
(d) Applicability.--
(1) In general.--If an exception to sanctions described in
clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph (4)(C) of section 104(c) of
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010, as added by subsection (b), applies
to a person that engages in a transaction described in
paragraph (2) at the time of the transaction, the President
is authorized not to impose sanctions with respect to the
transaction under--
(A) section 302(b)(1);
(B) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by
section 216; or
(C) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the
imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.
(2) Transaction described.--A transaction described in this
paragraph is a transaction--
(A) solely for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products from Iran; and
(B) for which sanctions may be imposed solely as a result
of the involvement of the National Iranian Oil Company or the
National Iranian Tanker Company in the transaction under--
(i) section 302(b)(1);
(ii) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by
section 216; or
(iii) any other applicable provision of law authorizing the
imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran.
TITLE IV--MEASURES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN IRAN
Subtitle A--Expansion of Sanctions Relating to Human Rights Abuses in
Iran
SEC. 401. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR
THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009,
ELECTIONS IN IRAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the Supreme Leader of Iran, the President of Iran, senior
members of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, senior members
of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ansar-e-Hezbollah and
Basij-e-Mostaz'afin, and the Ministers of Defense, Interior,
Justice, and Telecommunications are ultimately responsible
for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing a pattern
and practice of serious human rights abuses against the
Iranian people, and thus the President should include such
persons on the list of persons who are responsible for or
complicit in committing serious human rights abuses and
subject to sanctions pursuant to section 105 of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8514).
(b) Report.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
detailed report with respect to whether each person described
in subsection (a) is responsible for or complicit in, or
responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing
the commission of serious human rights abuses against
citizens of Iran or their family members on or after June 12,
2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran. For
any such person who is not included in such report, the
Secretary of State should describe in the report the reasons
why the person was not included, including information on
whether sufficient credible evidence of responsibility for
such abuses was found.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
(3) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 402. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT
ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES.
(a) In General.--The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105 the
following:
``SEC. 105A. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN THAT
ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES.
``(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions in
accordance with subsection (c) with respect to each person on
the list required by subsection (b).
``(b) List.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that
the President determines have knowingly engaged in an
activity described in paragraph (2) on or after such date of
enactment.
``(2) Activity described.--
``(A) In general.--A person engages in an activity
described in this paragraph if the person--
``(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, goods or
technologies described in subparagraph (C) to Iran, any
entity organized under the laws of Iran or otherwise subject
to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran, or any
national of Iran, for use in or with respect to Iran; or
``(ii) provides services (including services relating to
hardware, software, and specialized information, and
professional consulting, engineering, and support services)
with respect to goods or technologies described in
subparagraph (C) after such goods or technologies are
transferred to Iran.
``(B) Applicability to contracts and other agreements.--A
person engages in an activity described in subparagraph (A)
without regard to whether the activity is carried out
pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered into
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.
``(C) Goods or technologies described.--Goods or
technologies described in this subparagraph are goods or
technologies that the President determines are likely to be
used by the Government of Iran or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities (or by any other person on behalf of
[[Page H5563]]
the Government of Iran or any of such agencies or
instrumentalities) to commit serious human rights abuses
against the people of Iran, including--
``(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are defined in
section 921 of title 18, United States Code), rubber bullets,
police batons, pepper or chemical sprays, stun grenades,
electroshock weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or
surveillance technology; or
``(ii) sensitive technology (as defined in section 106(c)).
``(3) Special rule to allow for termination of sanctionable
activity.--The President shall not be required to include a
person on the list required by paragraph (1) if the President
certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional
committees that--
``(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has taken
significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity
described in paragraph (2) for which the President would
otherwise have included the person on the list; and
``(B) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in any activity
described in paragraph (2) in the future.
``(4) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
``(A) each time the President is required to submit an
updated list to those committees under section 105(b)(2)(A);
and
``(B) as new information becomes available.
``(5) Form of report; public availability.--
``(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
``(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the
public and posted on the websites of the Department of the
Treasury and the Department of State.
``(c) Application of Sanctions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the President
shall impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with
respect to a person on the list required by subsection (b).
``(2) Transfers to iran's revolutionary guard corps.--In
the case of a person on the list required by subsection (b)
for transferring, or facilitating the transfer of, goods or
technologies described in subsection (b)(2)(C) to Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps, or providing services with respect
to such goods or technologies after such goods or
technologies are transferred to Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps, the President shall--
``(A) impose sanctions described in section 105(c) with
respect to the person; and
``(B) impose such other sanctions from among the sanctions
described in section 6(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as the President
determines appropriate.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 is amended by inserting after the item relating
to section 105 the following:
``Sec. 105A. Imposition of sanctions with respect to the transfer of
goods or technologies to Iran that are likely to be used
to commit human rights abuses.''.
SEC. 403. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO
ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED
ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) satellite service providers and other entities that
have direct contractual arrangements to provide satellite
services to the Government of Iran or entities owned or
controlled by that Government should cease providing
broadcast services to that Government and those entities
unless that Government ceases activities intended to jam or
restrict satellite signals; and
(2) the United States should address the illegal jamming of
satellite signals by the Government of Iran through the voice
and vote of the United States in the United Nations
International Telecommunications Union.
(b) Imposition of Sanctions.--The Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), as amended by section 402, is further
amended by inserting after section 105A the following:
SEC. 105B. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS
WHO ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER RELATED
ACTIVITIES AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN.
``(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions
described in section 105(c) with respect to each person on
the list required by subsection (b).
``(b) List of Persons Who Engage in Censorship.--
``(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that
the President determines have, on or after June 12, 2009,
engaged in censorship or other activities with respect to
Iran that--
``(A) prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom
of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran; or
``(B) limit access to print or broadcast media, including
the facilitation or support of intentional frequency
manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or
controlled by that Government that would jam or restrict an
international signal.
``(2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
``(A) each time the President is required to submit an
updated list to those committees under section 105(b)(2)(A);
and
``(B) as new information becomes available.
``(3) Form of report; public availability.--
``(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
``(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the
public and posted on the websites of the Department of the
Treasury and the Department of State.''.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010, as amended by section 402, is further amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 105A the
following:
``Sec. 105B. Imposition of sanctions with respect to persons who engage
in censorship or other related activities against
citizens of Iran.''.
(d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 401(b)(1) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(b)(1)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``, 105A(a), or 105B(a)'' after
``105(a)''; and
(2) by inserting ``, 105A(b), or 105B(b)'' after
``105(b)''.
Subtitle B--Additional Measures to Promote Human Rights
SEC. 411. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO GRAVE
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN
AND SYRIA USING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.
United States sanctions with respect to Iran and Syria
provided for in Executive Order 13606 (77 Fed. Reg. 24571),
as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of
this Act, shall remain in effect--
(1) with respect to Iran, until the date that is 30 days
after the date on which the President submits to Congress the
certification described in section 401(a) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)); and
(2) with respect to Syria, until the date on which the
provisions of and sanctions imposed pursuant to title VII
terminate pursuant to section 706.
SEC. 412. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR
PURPOSES OF PROCUREMENT BAN UNDER COMPREHENSIVE
IRAN SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVESTMENT
ACT OF 2010.
The Secretary of State shall--
(1) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, issue guidelines to further describe the
technologies that may be considered ``sensitive technology''
for purposes of section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22
U.S.C. 8515), with special attention to new forms of
sophisticated jamming, monitoring, and surveillance
technology relating to mobile telecommunications and the
Internet, and publish those guidelines in the Federal
Register;
(2) determine the types of technologies that enable any
indigenous capabilities that Iran has to disrupt and monitor
information and communications in that country, and consider
adding descriptions of those items to the guidelines; and
(3) periodically review, but in no case less than once each
year, the guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines
on the basis of technological developments and new
information regarding transfers of technologies to Iran and
the development of Iran's indigenous capabilities to disrupt
and monitor information and communications in Iran.
SEC. 413. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF REQUESTS FOR
AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS-,
HUMANITARIAN-, AND DEMOCRACY-RELATED ACTIVITIES
WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.
(a) Requirement.--The Office of Foreign Assets Control, in
consultation with the Department of State, shall establish an
expedited process for the consideration of complete requests
for authorization to engage in human rights-, humanitarian-,
or democracy-related activities relating to Iran that are
submitted by--
(1) entities receiving funds from the Department of State
to engage in the proposed activity;
(2) the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and
(3) other appropriate agencies of the United States
Government.
(b) Procedures.--Requests for authorization under
subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Office of Foreign
Assets Control in conformance with the Office's regulations,
including section 501.801 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations (commonly known as the Reporting, Procedures and
Penalties Regulations). Applicants shall fully disclose the
parties to the transactions as well as describe the
activities to be undertaken. License applications involving
the exportation or reexportation of goods, technology, or
software to Iran shall include a copy of an official
Commodity Classification issued by the Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, as part of the
license application.
(c) Foreign Policy Review.--The Department of State shall
complete a foreign policy review of a request for
authorization under subsection (a) not later than 30 days
after the request is referred to the Department by the Office
of Foreign Assets Control.
(d) License Determinations.--License determinations for
complete requests for authorization under subsection (a)
shall be made not later than 90 days after receipt by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control, with the following
exceptions:
(1) Any requests involving the exportation or reexportation
to Iran of goods, technology, or software listed on the
Commerce Control List maintained pursuant to part 774 of
title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, shall be processed in
a
[[Page H5564]]
manner consistent with the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation
Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102-484) and other
applicable provisions of law.
(2) Any other requests presenting unusual or extraordinary
circumstances.
(e) Regulations.--The Secretary of the Treasury may
prescribe such regulations as are appropriate to carry out
this section.
SEC. 414. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM
AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN IRAN.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the heads of other Federal
agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a comprehensive strategy to--
(1) assist the people of Iran to produce, access, and share
information freely and safely via the Internet, including in
Farsi and regional languages;
(2) support the development of counter-censorship
technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake
Internet activities without interference from the Government
of Iran;
(3) increase the capabilities and availability of secure
mobile and other communications through connective technology
among human rights and democracy activists in Iran;
(4) provide resources for digital safety training for media
and academic and civil society organizations in Iran;
(5) provide accurate and substantive Internet content in
local languages in Iran;
(6) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable
human rights advocates seeking to organize, share
information, and support human rights in Iran;
(7) expand surrogate radio, television, live stream, and
social network communications inside Iran, including--
(A) by expanding Voice of America's Persian News Network
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Radio Farda to provide
hourly live news update programming and breaking news
coverage capability 24 hours a day and 7 days a week; and
(B) by assisting telecommunications and software companies
that are United States persons to comply with the export
licensing requirements of the United States for the purpose
of expanding such communications inside Iran;
(8) expand activities to safely assist and train human
rights, civil society, and democracy activists in Iran to
operate effectively and securely;
(9) identify and utilize all available resources to
overcome attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or
otherwise deny international satellite broadcasting signals;
(10) expand worldwide United States embassy and consulate
programming for and outreach to Iranian dissident
communities;
(11) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists
in Iran; and
(12) discourage telecommunications and software companies
from facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of
Iran.
SEC. 415. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON POLITICAL PRISONERS.
It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to support efforts to research and identify prisoners
of conscience and cases of human rights abuses in Iran;
(2) to offer refugee status or political asylum in the
United States to political dissidents in Iran if requested
and consistent with the laws and national security interests
of the United States;
(3) to offer to assist, through the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, with the relocation of such
political prisoners to other countries if requested, as
appropriate and with appropriate consideration for the
national security interests of the United States; and
(4) to publicly call for the release of Iranian dissidents
by name and raise awareness with respect to individual cases
of Iranian dissidents and prisoners of conscience, as
appropriate and if requested by the dissidents or prisoners
themselves or their families.
TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS
SEC. 501. EXCLUSION OF CITIZENS OF IRAN SEEKING EDUCATION
RELATING TO THE NUCLEAR AND ENERGY SECTORS OF
IRAN.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall deny a visa
to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall exclude from
the United States, any alien who is a citizen of Iran that
the Secretary of State determines seeks to enter the United
States to participate in coursework at an institution of
higher education (as defined in section 101(a) of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a))) to prepare the
alien for a career in the energy sector of Iran or in nuclear
science or nuclear engineering or a related field in Iran.
(b) Applicability.--Subsection (a) applies with respect to
visa applications filed on or after the date of the enactment
of this Act.
SEC. 502. INTERESTS IN CERTAIN FINANCIAL ASSETS OF IRAN.
(a) Interests in Blocked Assets.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), notwithstanding
any other provision of law, including any provision of law
relating to sovereign immunity, and preempting any
inconsistent provision of State law, a financial asset that
is--
(A) held in the United States for a foreign securities
intermediary doing business in the United States,
(B) a blocked asset (whether or not subsequently unblocked)
that is property described in subsection (b), and
(C) equal in value to a financial asset of Iran, including
an asset of the central bank or monetary authority of the
Government of Iran or any agency or instrumentality of that
Government, that such foreign securities intermediary or a
related intermediary holds abroad,
shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of
execution in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of
any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for
personal injury or death caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage-taking,
or the provision of material support or resources for such an
act.
(2) Court determination required.--In order to ensure that
Iran is held accountable for paying the judgments described
in paragraph (1) and in furtherance of the broader goals of
this Act to sanction Iran, prior to an award turning over any
asset pursuant to execution or attachment in aid of execution
with respect to any judgments against Iran described in
paragraph (1), the court shall determine whether Iran holds
equitable title to, or the beneficial interest in, the assets
described in subsection (b) and that no other person
possesses a constitutionally protected interest in the assets
described in subsection (b) under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. To the extent the court
determines that a person other than Iran holds--
(A) equitable title to, or a beneficial interest in, the
assets described in subsection (b) (excluding a custodial
interest of a foreign securities intermediary or a related
intermediary that holds the assets abroad for the benefit of
Iran), or
(B) a constitutionally protected interest in the assets
described in subsection (b),
such assets shall be available only for execution or
attachment in aid of execution to the extent of Iran's
equitable title or beneficial interest therein and to the
extent such execution or attachment does not infringe upon
such constitutionally protected interest.
(b) Financial Assets Described.--The financial assets
described in this section are the financial assets that are
identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case
No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained by
restraining notices and levies secured by the plaintiffs in
those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 27,
2008, and extended by court orders dated June 23, 2009, May
10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain
restrained by court order.
(c) Rules of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed--
(1) to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right
to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist
party in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to
in subsection (b); or
(2) to apply to assets other than the assets described in
subsection (b), or to preempt State law, including the
Uniform Commercial Code, except as expressly provided in
subsection (a)(1).
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Blocked asset.--The term ``blocked asset''--
(A) means any asset seized or frozen by the United States
under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (50
U.S.C. App. 5(b)) or under section 202 or 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
and 1702); and
(B) does not include property that--
(i) is subject to a license issued by the United States
Government for final payment, transfer, or disposition by or
to a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
in connection with a transaction for which the issuance of
the license has been specifically required by a provision of
law other than the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) or the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.); or
(ii) is property subject to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, or that enjoys equivalent privileges and
immunities under the laws of the United States, and is being
used exclusively for diplomatic or consular purposes.
(2) Financial asset; securities intermediary.--The terms
``financial asset'' and ``securities intermediary'' have the
meanings given those terms in the Uniform Commercial Code,
but the former includes cash.
(3) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' means the Government of Iran,
including the central bank or monetary authority of that
Government and any agency or instrumentality of that
Government.
(4) Person.--
(A) In general.--The term ``person'' means an individual or
entity.
(B) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership,
association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group,
subgroup, or other organization.
(5) Terrorist party.--The term ``terrorist party'' has the
meaning given that term in section 201(d) of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note).
(6) United states.--The term ``United States'' includes all
territory and waters, continental, or insular, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(e) Technical Changes to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.--
(1) Title 28, united states code.--Section 1610 of title
28, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(7), by inserting after ``section
1605A'' the following: ``or section 1605(a)(7) (as such
section was in effect on January 27, 2008)''; and
(B) in subsection (b)--
(i) in paragraph (2)--
(I) by striking ``(5), 1605(b), or 1605A'' and inserting
``(5) or 1605(b)''; and
(II) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``,
or''; and
[[Page H5565]]
(ii) by adding after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency
or instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section 1605A
of this chapter or section 1605(a)(7) of this chapter (as
such section was in effect on January 27, 2008), regardless
of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon
which the claim is based.''.
(2) Terrorism risk insurance act of 2002.--Section 201(a)
of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610
note) is amended by striking ``section 1605(a)(7)'' and
inserting ``section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such section was
in effect on January 27, 2008)''.
SEC. 503. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO SECTION 1245 OF THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2012.
(a) Exception for Sales of Agricultural Commodities.--
(1) In general.--Section 1245(d)(2) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8513a(d)(2)) is amended--
(A) in the paragraph heading, by inserting ``agricultural
commodities,'' after ``sales of''; and
(B) in the text, by inserting ``agricultural commodities,''
after ``sale of''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect as if included in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81;
125 Stat. 1298).
(b) Report of Energy Information Administration.--
(1) In general.--Section 1245(d)(4)(A) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C.
8513a(d)(4)(A)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, and every 60 days thereafter'' and inserting
``October 25, 2012, and the last Thursday of every other
month thereafter''; and
(B) by striking ``60-day period'' and inserting ``2-month
period''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendments made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on September 1, 2012.
SEC. 504. EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS UNDER SECTION 1245 OF THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2012.
(a) In General.--Section 1245 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a), as
amended by section 503, is further amended--
(1) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``a foreign financial
institution owned or controlled by the government of a
foreign country, including''; and
(B) in paragraph (4)(D)--
(i) by striking ``Sanctions imposed'' and inserting the
following:
``(i) In general.--Sanctions imposed'';
(ii) in clause (i), as designated by clause (i) of this
subparagraph--
(I) by striking ``a foreign financial institution'' and
inserting ``a financial transaction described in clause (ii)
conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial
institution'';
(II) by striking ``institution has significantly'' and
inserting ``institution--
``(I) has significantly reduced'';
(III) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
or''; and
(IV) by adding at the end the following:
``(II) in the case of a country that has previously
received an exception under this subparagraph, has, after
receiving the exception, reduced its crude oil purchases from
Iran to zero.''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(ii) Financial transactions described.--A financial
transaction conducted or facilitated by a foreign financial
institution is described in this clause if--
``(I) the financial transaction is only for trade in goods
or services between the country with primary jurisdiction
over the foreign financial institution and Iran; and
``(II) any funds owed to Iran as a result of such trade are
credited to an account located in the country with primary
jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution.'';
(2) in subsection (h)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
``(3) Significant reductions.--The terms `reduce
significantly', `significant reduction', and `significantly
reduced', with respect to purchases from Iran of petroleum
and petroleum products, include a reduction in such purchases
in terms of price or volume toward a complete cessation of
such purchases.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(i) Termination.--The provisions of this section shall
terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which
the President submits to Congress the certification described
in section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8551(a)).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by paragraphs (1)
and (2) of subsection (a) shall apply with respect to
financial transactions conducted or facilitated on or after
the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 505. REPORTS ON NATURAL GAS EXPORTS FROM IRAN.
(a) Report by Energy Information Administration.--Not later
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration shall
submit to the President and the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the natural gas sector of Iran that
includes--
(1) an assessment of exports of natural gas from Iran;
(2) an identification of the countries that purchase the
most natural gas from Iran;
(3) an assessment of alternative supplies of natural gas
available to those countries;
(4) an assessment of the impact a reduction in exports of
natural gas from Iran would have on global natural gas
supplies and the price of natural gas, especially in
countries identified under paragraph (2); and
(5) such other information as the Administrator considers
appropriate.
(b) Report by President.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 60 days after receiving the
report required by subsection (a), the President shall,
relying on information in that report, submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report that includes--
(A) an assessment of--
(i) the extent to which revenues from exports of natural
gas from Iran are still enriching the Government of Iran;
(ii) whether a sanctions regime similar to the sanctions
regime imposed with respect to purchases of petroleum and
petroleum products from Iran pursuant to section 1245 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as
amended by sections 503 and 504, or other measures could be
applied effectively to exports of natural gas from Iran;
(iii) the geostrategic implications of a reduction in
exports of natural gas from Iran, including the impact of
such a reduction on the countries identified under subsection
(a)(2);
(iv) alternative supplies of natural gas available to those
countries; and
(v) the impact a reduction in exports of natural gas from
Iran would have on global natural gas supplies and the price
of natural gas and the impact, if any, on swap arrangements
for natural gas in place between Iran and neighboring
countries; and
(B) specific recommendations with respect to measures
designed to limit the revenue received by the Government of
Iran from exports of natural gas; and
(C) any other information the President considers
appropriate.
(2) Form of report.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a
classified annex.
SEC. 506. REPORT ON MEMBERSHIP OF IRAN IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and not later than September 1 of each year
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report listing the
international organizations of which Iran is a member and
detailing the amount that the United States contributes to
each such organization on an annual basis.
SEC. 507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPORTATION OF GOODS,
SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR AIRCRAFT
PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES.
It is the sense of Congress that licenses to export or
reexport goods, services, or technologies for aircraft
produced in the United States should be provided only in
situations in which such licenses are truly essential and in
a manner consistent with the laws and foreign policy goals of
the United States.
TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 601. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.
(a) Implementation.--The President may exercise all
authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
and 1704) to carry out--
(1) sections 211, 212, 213, 217, 218, 220, 312, and 411,
subtitle A of title III, and title VII;
(2) section 104A of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as added by
section 312; and
(3) sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as
added by subtitle A of title IV.
(b) Penalties.--
(1) In general.--The penalties provided for in subsections
(b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person
that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
causes a violation of a provision specified in paragraph (2)
of this subsection, or an order or regulation prescribed
under such a provision, to the same extent that such
penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act
described in section 206(a) of that Act.
(2) Provisions specified.--The provisions specified in this
paragraph are the following:
(A) Sections 211, 212, 213, and 220, subtitle A of title
III, and title VII.
(B) Sections 105A and 105B of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as
added by subtitle A of title IV.
SEC. 602. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act
shall apply to the authorized intelligence activities of the
United States.
SEC. 603. APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN NATURAL GAS PROJECTS.
(a) Exception for Certain Natural Gas Projects.--Nothing in
this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall apply to
any activity relating to a project--
(1) for the development of natural gas and the construction
and operation of a pipeline to transport natural gas from
Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe;
(2) that provides to Turkey and countries in Europe energy
security and energy independence from the Government of the
Russian Federation and other governments with jurisdiction
over persons subject to sanctions imposed under this Act or
amendments made by this Act; and
(3) that was initiated before the date of the enactment of
this Act pursuant to a production-
[[Page H5566]]
sharing agreement, or an ancillary agreement necessary to
further a production-sharing agreement, entered into with, or
a license granted by, the government of a country other than
Iran before such date of enactment.
(b) Termination of Exception.--
(1) In general.--The exception under subsection (a) shall
not apply with respect to a project described in that
subsection on or after the date on which the President
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that--
(A) the percentage of the equity interest in the project
held by or on behalf of an entity described in paragraph (2)
has increased relative to the percentage of the equity
interest in the project held by or on behalf of such an
entity on January 1, 2002; or
(B) an entity described in paragraph (2) has assumed an
operational role in the project.
(2) Entity described.--An entity described in this
paragraph is--
(A) an entity--
(i) owned or controlled by the Government of Iran or
identified under section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of
Iran); or
(ii) organized under the laws of Iran or with the
participation or approval of the Government of Iran;
(B) an entity owned or controlled by an entity described in
subparagraph (A); or
(C) a successor entity to an entity described in
subparagraph (A).
SEC. 604. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION WITH RESPECT TO USE OF FORCE
AGAINST IRAN AND SYRIA.
Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act
shall be construed as a declaration of war or an
authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.
SEC. 605. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The provisions of sections 211, 212, 213,
218, 220, 221, and 501, title I, and subtitle A of title III
shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on
which the President makes the certification described in
section 401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8551(a)).
(b) Amendment to Termination Date of Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.--
Section 401(a)(2) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C.
8551(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``, and verifiably
dismantled its,'' after ``development of''.
TITLE VII--SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN SYRIA
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Syria Human Rights
Accountability Act of 2012''.
SEC. 702. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS
OF SYRIA OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions
described in subsection (c) with respect to each person on
the list required by subsection (b).
(b) List of Persons Who Are Responsible for or Complicit in
Certain Human Rights Abuses.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of persons who
are officials of the Government of Syria or persons acting on
behalf of that Government that the President determines,
based on credible evidence, are responsible for or complicit
in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise
directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses
against citizens of Syria or their family members, regardless
of whether such abuses occurred in Syria.
(2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
(A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and
(B) as new information becomes available.
(3) Form of report; public availability.--
(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the
public and posted on the websites of the Department of the
Treasury and the Department of State.
(4) Consideration of data from other countries and
nongovernmental organizations.--In preparing the list
required by paragraph (1), the President shall consider
credible data already obtained by other countries and
nongovernmental organizations, including organizations in
Syria, that monitor the human rights abuses of the Government
of Syria.
(c) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are sanctions pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.),
including blocking of property and restrictions or
prohibitions on financial transactions and the exportation of
property, subject to such regulations as the President may
prescribe.
SEC. 703. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE
TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGIES TO SYRIA THAT
ARE LIKELY TO BE USED TO COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions
described in section 702(c) with respect to--
(1) each person on the list required by subsection (b); and
(2) any person that--
(A) is a successor entity to a person on the list;
(B) owns or controls a person on the list, if the person
that owns or controls the person on the list had actual
knowledge or should have known that the person on the list
engaged in the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for
which the person was included in the list; or
(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or
control with, the person on the list, if the person owned or
controlled by, or under common ownership or control with (as
the case may be), the person on the list knowingly engaged in
the activity described in subsection (b)(2) for which the
person was included in the list.
(b) List.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that
the President determines have knowingly engaged in an
activity described in paragraph (2) on or after such date of
enactment.
(2) Activity described.--
(A) In general.--A person engages in an activity described
in this paragraph if the person--
(i) transfers, or facilitates the transfer of, goods or
technologies described in subparagraph (C) to Syria; or
(ii) provides services with respect to goods or
technologies described in subparagraph (C) after such goods
or technologies are transferred to Syria.
(B) Applicability to contracts and other agreements.--A
person engages in an activity described in subparagraph (A)
without regard to whether the activity is carried out
pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered into
before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(C) Goods or technologies described.--Goods or technologies
described in this subparagraph are goods or technologies that
the President determines are likely to be used by the
Government of Syria or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities to commit human rights abuses against the
people of Syria, including--
(i) firearms or ammunition (as those terms are defined in
section 921 of title 18, United States Code), rubber bullets,
police batons, pepper or chemical sprays, stun grenades,
electroshock weapons, tear gas, water cannons, or
surveillance technology; or
(ii) sensitive technology.
(D) Sensitive technology defined.--
(i) In general.--For purposes of subparagraph (C), the term
``sensitive technology'' means hardware, software,
telecommunications equipment, or any other technology, that
the President determines is to be used specifically--
(I) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in
Syria; or
(II) to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of
the people of Syria.
(ii) Exception.--The term ``sensitive technology'' does not
include information or informational materials the
exportation of which the President does not have the
authority to regulate or prohibit pursuant to section
203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)).
(3) Special rule to allow for termination of sanctionable
activity.--The President shall not be required to include a
person on the list required by paragraph (1) if the President
certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional
committees that--
(A) the person is no longer engaging in, or has taken
significant verifiable steps toward stopping, the activity
described in paragraph (2) for which the President would
otherwise have included the person on the list; and
(B) the President has received reliable assurances that the
person will not knowingly engage in any activity described in
paragraph (2) in the future.
(4) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
(A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and
(B) as new information becomes available.
(5) Form of report; public availability.--
(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the
public and posted on the websites of the Department of the
Treasury and the Department of State.
SEC. 704. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS WHO
ENGAGE IN CENSORSHIP OR OTHER FORMS OF
REPRESSION IN SYRIA.
(a) In General.--The President shall impose sanctions
described in section 702(c) with respect to each person on
the list required by subsection (b).
(b) List of Persons Who Engage in Censorship.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of persons that
the President determines have engaged in censorship, or
activities relating to censorship, in a manner that
prohibits, limits, or penalizes the legitimate exercise of
freedom of expression by citizens of Syria.
(2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
(A) not later than 300 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act and every 180 days thereafter; and
(B) as new information becomes available.
(3) Form of report; public availability.--
(A) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
[[Page H5567]]
(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required by paragraph (1) shall be made available to the
public and posted on the websites of the Department of the
Treasury and the Department of State.
SEC. 705. WAIVER.
The President may waive the requirement to include a person
on a list required by section 702, 703, or 704 or to impose
sanctions pursuant to any such section if the President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national
security interests of the United States; and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on the reasons for that determination.
SEC. 706. TERMINATION.
(a) In General.--The provisions of this title and any
sanctions imposed pursuant to this title shall terminate on
the date on which the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees--
(1) the certification described in subsection (b); and
(2) a certification that--
(A) the Government of Syria is democratically elected and
representative of the people of Syria; or
(B) a legitimate transitional government of Syria is in
place.
(b) Certification Described.--A certification described in
this subsection is a certification by the President that the
Government of Syria--
(1) has unconditionally released all political prisoners;
(2) has ceased its practices of violence, unlawful
detention, torture, and abuse of citizens of Syria engaged in
peaceful political activity;
(3) has ceased its practice of procuring sensitive
technology designed to restrict the free flow of unbiased
information in Syria, or to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise
restrict the right of citizens of Syria to freedom of
expression;
(4) has ceased providing support for foreign terrorist
organizations and no longer allows such organizations,
including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to
maintain facilities in territory under the control of the
Government of Syria; and
(5) has ceased the development and deployment of medium-
and long-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles;
(6) is not pursuing or engaged in the research,
development, acquisition, production, transfer, or deployment
of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, and has provided
credible assurances that it will not engage in such
activities in the future; and
(7) has agreed to allow the United Nations and other
international observers to verify that the Government of
Syria is not engaging in such activities and to assess the
credibility of the assurances provided by that Government.
(c) Suspension of Sanctions After Election of Democratic
Government.--If the President submits to the appropriate
congressional committees the certification described in
subsection (a)(2), the President may suspend the provisions
of this title and any sanctions imposed under this title for
not more than 180 days to allow time for a certification
described in subsection (b) to be submitted.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Berman) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, by prior agreement with the gentleman
from California, who will do the same, I would like to yield 5 minutes
of my time to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) and ask unanimous
consent that he be allowed to control those 5 minutes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, are we
apportioning that 5 minutes from each side?
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. At the point where I am recognized, I will be also
seeking unanimous consent for the same kind of referral of time to your
control.
Mr. KUCINICH. I withdraw my reservation.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would also yield 5 minutes of my time to
the gentleman from Ohio and ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to
control those 5 minutes.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
General Leave
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and to include extraneous material on the measure under consideration.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, I have spoken on this floor many times about the Iranian
threat and the need for action to stop it, but ultimately we will all
be judged by a simple question: Did we stop Iran from getting a nuclear
weapons capability? If the answer is ``no,'' if we fail, then nothing
else matters. If we fail, it would be of no comfort to the American
people whose security and future would be put in danger. If we fail, it
would be of no comfort to our ally, Israel, whose very existence would
be put in danger.
History is full of avoidable tragedies, of foolish countries that
have allowed their enemies to prepare to destroy them. The entire world
now is fully aware of Iran's true intention. Now is the time to take a
stand. As Sir Winston Churchill said:
You ask, What is our aim? I can answer with one word:
victory. For without victory, there is no survival.
To get us on that path to victory, Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues
to render their full support to the Iran Threat Reduction and the Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012, a bicameral, bipartisan agreement that
represents the strongest set of sanctions ever put in place against the
regime in Tehran. It blacklists virtually all of Iran's energy,
financial, and transportation sectors, and cuts off companies that keep
doing business with Iran from access to our markets in the United
States.
This legislation also imposes sanctions to prevent Iran from
repatriating any proceeds from its oil sales, depriving the Iranian
regime of 80 percent of its hard currency earnings and half of the
funds that support its budget. This bill also imposes tough new
sanctions on the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian
Tanker Company, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It also
targets Iran's use of barter transactions to bypass sanctions, the
provisions of insurance to Iran's energy sector. It also targets
provisions of specialized financial messaging services to the Central
Bank of Iran.
Mr. Speaker, in 1995, the late former Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher said:
In terms of its organization, programs, procurement, and
covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route to
nuclear weapons, which has been followed by almost all states
that have recently sought a nuclear capability.
That was in 1995.
Secretary Christopher added:
There is no room for complacency.
Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in '96. That law, now
called the Iran Sanctions Act, sought to target Iran's economic
lifeline--its energy sector--and denied Tehran the financial resources
to pursue its nuclear ambitions, to sponsor violent Islamic groups, and
to dominate the region.
{time} 1430
Regrettably, just a couple years after enactment of that law, the
Clinton administration issued a blanket waiver of energy sector
sanctions that has been continued by successive administrations.
In 1996, U.S. concerns were not shared by our allies in Europe and
Asia, who argued that trade, dialogue, and engagement toward the
Iranian regime would succeed in moderating Tehran's behavior. This
allowed the Iranian threat to flourish.
However, Congress continued to develop new legislative
countermeasures in the form of the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006 and
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010 to address these Iranian threats and to hold the regime
accountable for its human rights violations, for its state sponsorship
of violent extremists, and for its pursuit of a nuclear capability.
We have analyzed Iranian reaction and behavior in response to these
new sanctions. We have looked at what steps our allies have undertaken
and considered the actions, or the paralysis, of the United Nations.
But most importantly, Mr. Speaker, we have intensified our response as
the Iranian threat has evolved and grown.
We know that ``the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.'' But far
more than vigilance is needed in this case.
[[Page H5568]]
Which brings us to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act, which we are considering today. This bipartisan, bicameral
agreement seeks to tighten the choke hold on the regime beyond anything
that has been done before. It sends a clear message that the American
people, through their elected representatives, are fully committed to
using every economic and political lever at their disposal to prevent
Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.
Through this bill, we declare that the Iranian energy sector is off
limits, and it blacklists any related unauthorized dealings. It will
undermine Iran's ability to repatriate the revenues it receives from
the sale of crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and
funds needed to sustain its nuclear program. It prevents the purchasing
of Iranian sovereign debt, thereby further limiting the regime's
ability to finance its illicit activities. It also expands sanctions
against Iranian and Syrian officials for human rights abuses,
particularly those facilitated by computer and network disruption,
monitoring, and tracking by those governments.
Yet we should be under no illusions, Mr. Speaker, that this
legislation is a magic wand that we wave, and we will resolve the
problem overnight. Sanctions have helped to knock the regime off
balance. But unless the executive branch fully implements these
measures immediately, the regime is likely to regain its footing and
further speed up its nuclear march. So let us act now to stop that
march.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, the threat posed by the Iranian regime is not just a
threat to the United States, or to our allies, or to the Iranian
people.
The Iranian regime is also a threat to the Syrian people, because of
Iran's close ties and assistance, including weapons that have helped
the regime in Syria to slaughter thousands.
Like Iran, Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism that poses a threat
to the U.S., to our ally Israel, and to other responsible nations.
I hope to be back on the House floor in the near future with the
Syria Freedom Support Act to address the totality of the Syrian threat,
but today we stand ready to hold the Assad regime accountable for its
gross human rights violations.
Today, we seek to ensure that neither of these brutal regimes has
access to resources that would enable them to perpetuate their cruelty.
Those allies who, 16 years ago, wanted to engage and continue
business as usual with Iran and who, until just a few years ago, were
proposing expanded trade agreements with the Assad regime in Syria,
have awaken to take a stand against the threatening activities of these
pariah states.
Congress must carry out its responsibility to the American people and
overwhelmingly adopt the bicameral, bipartisan agreement we are
considering today.
I urge the President to quickly sign it into law and immediately and
fully implement the sanctions it contains.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer), a national leader on the issue of
nonproliferation and human rights and particularly our efforts to stop
Iran's nuclear weapons program, the Democratic whip of the House.
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.
First, I want to rise and thank Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for
her continuing leadership and focus on this important issue, as she
does on so many other issues as well.
Mr. Speaker, let me thank my friend, the gentleman from California
and ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Berman. His
leadership on this issue in Congress is second to none, and I commend
him for his work.
This is a bill I expect will pass with overwhelming support in both
parties and for good reason. Iran cannot be allowed to develop a
nuclear weapon. America's policy, as President Obama has stated, is
prevention, not containment.
We have many tools at our disposal to prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons technology. While President Obama is keeping all
options on the table, the best diplomatic tool we have to deter Iran is
the sanctions regime his administration has expanded along with our
allies in Europe and elsewhere. These sanctions have already had a
significant effect, and Iran continues to face the prospect of severe
economic repercussions if they fail to abandon their nuclear weapons
plan.
President Obama deserves credit for his tough stances. The new
sanctions this legislation would impose target entities conducting
business with Iran's insurance, energy, and shipping sectors. As a
result of prohibitions on repatriating oil revenues, these sanctions
would deny Iran 80 percent of its hard currency earnings. Iran's
banking sector, including its central bank, is already sanctioned, a
result of the Iranian Government's financial support for terrorism in
the region and around the world.
There is no better evidence why this bill is so important than the
fact that 2 weeks ago, a terrorist attack in Bulgaria killed six
innocent civilians, five of them vacationing Israelis. There have been
numerous press reports linking Iran to that attack.
As long as Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, call for the
destruction of Israel, and provide arms to terror groups like Hamas and
Hezbollah, it will face the consequences in the form of sanctions,
isolation, and the continuing reality of the option of military action.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. I am pleased to yield the gentleman an additional 30
seconds.
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman.
The United States continues to stand strongly with our ally Israel.
And I am proud to have led an effort earlier this year with the
majority leader to strengthen U.S.-Israel military and intelligence
relations.
I urge all of my colleagues to unite behind this bill, just as we did
behind that one. A nuclear-armed Iran is not an option for the Middle
East, for the international community, and for the United States.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Texas, Congressman Ron Paul, an American patriot, someone who has
been relentless in his efforts to stop America from blundering into
foreign adventures.
Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I think this bill would be better named if we called it ``Obsession
with Iran Act of 2012'' because this is what we continue to be doing--
obsess with Iran and the idea that Iran is a threat to our national
security.
Iran happens to be a Third World nation. They have no significant
navy, air force, intercontinental ballistic missiles. The IAEA and our
CIA say they are not on the verge of a nuclear weapon.
It's so similar to what we went through in the early part of this
last decade where we were beating the war drums to go to war against
Iraq. And it was all a facade. There was no danger from Iraq. So this
is what we're doing, beating the war drums once again.
Since the bill has come back from the conference, if we are to deal
with civil liberties in Syria--well, I happen to be a civil
libertarian. I am very concerned about civil liberties. But let me tell
you, this bill is not going to do anything to enhance the civil
liberties of the individuals in Syria.
If we were really interested in civil liberties, why wouldn't we look
to ourselves? Why wouldn't we look to the things we do here? What about
our warrantless searches under the PATRIOT Act? What about the policy
of assassination, assassinating American citizens? What about arrests
by the military, the National Defense Authorization Act? What about the
drone warfare that we go on? Do you think we are protecting civil
liberties by arbitrarily dropping drones or threatening to drop drones
anyplace in the world, with innocent people dying?
If we want to really care about civil liberties in Syria, why don't
we care about the secret prisons we have and the history of torture
that we have had in this country?
What about the fact that kill lists are being made by the executive
branch of government, and we sit idly by and approve of it by saying
nothing, and the American people put up with it, and we march in this
direction, marching into a determination to have another war?
When you put sanctions on a country, it's an act of war, and that is
what this is all about. The first thing you do when war breaks out
between two
[[Page H5569]]
countries is you put sanctions on them. You blockade the country. So
this is an act of war.
What would we do if somebody blockaded and put sanctions on us and
prevented the importation of any product of this country? We would be
furious. We would declare war. We would go to war.
{time} 1440
So we are the antagonists. We're over there poking our nose and
poking our nose in other people's affairs, just looking for a chance to
start another war. First it's Syria and then Iran. We have too many
wars. We need to stop the wars. We don't have the money to fight these
wars any longer.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Turner), a member of our Committee on
Foreign Affairs.
Mr. TURNER of New York. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R.
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. I
would like to applaud Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen's tireless effort on this
legislation to ensure that Iran's terrorist regime does not threaten
the security of the United States and our greatest ally in the Middle
East, Israel.
I'm sure many of you remember that Iran was found by a Federal court
to have been directly involved in both the 1983 attacks on the marine
barracks in Beirut which killed 241 soldiers and the Khobar Towers
bombing in Saudi Arabia where a suicide bomber killed 14 airmen. The
victims and their families won a judgment in court against the Iranian
Government, but have had difficulty enforcing it because Iran could
hide behind sovereign immunity.
I introduced H.R. 4070, which is now part of this bill, to change a
specific part of Federal law to allow assets seized from the Iranian
Government to be allocated to the Beirut and Khobar Towers families to
recover the judgments owed to them. It is time that Iran is held
accountable for their involvement in the deaths of our soldiers.
I'm proud to say that this provision is truly bipartisan. My
colleagues on both sides of the aisle stand together against Iran. By
passing this bill today, we offer the victims' families the justice
that they have long been denied.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H. Res. 750, and I
yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
The bill before us today marks a significant step forward in our
sanctions effort against the Iranian regime and its illicit nuclear
program, the sanctions effort which even Tehran acknowledges is already
having a stressful impact on Iran's economy. I want to commend my
colleague, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for her work on this legislation; and
I'm proud to be the bill's chief cosponsor in the House.
Building on previous sanctions, this bill adds to what the gentlelady
and I set out to do when we introduced it. For example, through further
limiting transitions with the Central Bank of Iran, an initiative I
originated, this legislation restricts Iran's ability to repatriate the
revenue it receives from its diminishing oil sales. It includes
provisions that clamp down on Iran's oil exports by targeting the
National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company;
and it expands sanctions on Iranian shipping, insurance, and financing
in the energy sector.
The bill also increases sanctions on transactions with Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the spearhead of Iran's nuclear
proliferation and terrorism effort and the dominant player in the
Iranian economy. Further, at my suggestion, this bill now includes a
measure which expands CISADA sanctions beyond financial institutions to
include more than 200 additional individuals and companies that have
been linked to Iran's nuclear weapons of mass destruction and terrorism
programs.
And of critical importance, this bill vastly strengthens sanctions on
both Iranian and Syrian human rights abusers. These provisions are very
important, but the Iranians should not be fooled into thinking this is
the last word on sanctions. Far from it.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to call on the administration to
implement the authorities we have given them, fully and without delay.
Iran's nuclear clock is ticking, and time is not on our side. The
actions the executive branch took yesterday, including the first-ever
CISADA sanctions on foreign banks--more than 2 years after CISADA
became law--are a good beginning, but Iran's nuclear weapons program
continues apace. Every day, it is enriching more uranium and at higher
levels.
The only hope we have for a peaceful solution is to apply enough
pressure to ensure that Iran ends its nuclear weapons program. The bill
before us and the action the administration has taken applies
significantly more pressure; but let there be no doubt, there is more
we can do and more that we will do if Iran doesn't end its nuclear
weapons program verifiably and completely. We have more work to do.
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List Search
(Updated: 6/25/2012)
NPWMD
Entities/Individuals
Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center;
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[[Page H5570]]
MULTIMAT IC VE DIS TICARET PAZARLAMA LIMITED SIRKETI;
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Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
What this is doing is essentially stopping any kind of a negotiated
deal and putting us on a path towards war with Iran. You know, it is
likely that any negotiated deal that would prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
would provide for Iranian enrichment for peaceful purposes under the
framework of the nuclear nonproliferation weapons treaty with strict
safeguards and inspections. So we're taking a path here that guarantees
that we're put on a glide slope right to war. Why are we doing this, we
don't have enough wars in this country? We aren't involved in enough
places around the world in war?
This is a bad resolution.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'd like to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), who is our subcommittee chairman
on Middle East and South Asia of our Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentlelady for yielding and I thank her for
her very strong support and leadership on this particular issue and on
so many issues in this Congress.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this well-crafted legislation which
significantly ratchets up pressure on the regime in Tehran, as well as
all those who support or enable its dangerous quest for a nuclear
weapons capability. As we stand here today, Iran's centrifuges continue
to spin and the regime inches closer to that very end. If allowed to
cross that threshold, untold consequences would surely follow.
Iran, which former President George W. Bush aptly called the
``world's primary state sponsor of terror,'' would no doubt feel
emboldened in its meddling in the internal affairs of our gulf allies
and in threats to U.S. global and regional interests. Questions of
rationality aside, the regime would also have the ability to follow
through on its repeated threats to eradicate the State of Israel. Iran
cannot be allowed to acquire this capability, and I believe that this
legislation may very well significantly enhance pressure on the regime.
The nuclear program is, however, a symptom of the disease rather than
the disease itself. A nuclear program is not in and of itself what
makes this particular regime so nefarious. Rather, it is the perverse
nature of the regime that makes the nuclear program so dangerous. And
there can be no doubt that the regime in Tehran is a blight upon the
Iranian people and on the region, and, in fact, on the whole world. To
speak of the nuclear program independently of the regime which pursues
it is in effect putting the cart before the horse.
But this legislation does not fall into that trap. In addition to
targeting the nuclear program, H.R. 1905 puts significant pressure on
the regime for its horrific human rights abuses and supports the
oppressed Iranian people in their fight for freedom.
Mr. Speaker, I urge adoption of this critical legislation, and I want
to once again thank the distinguished chairwoman, Ms. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen from Florida, for her leadership on this issue. She has been
pushing and pushing and pushing against this corrupt Iranian regime for
such a long time, and to do right by our ally Israel, and ultimately to
do what is in the best interest of the people of the United States as
well. It is in nobody's interest to have a nuclear Iran, and so I want
to thank her for her leadership.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Trade.
{time} 1450
Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I want to thank the chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee for
her work on this bill and for reaching an agreement with the Senate
Banking Committee, and I rise in strong support of this measure.
I especially want to thank the chairman for working with me on title
III of this bill, as it reflects several years of our work together.
Title III targets the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and began its life
as H.R. 2379, then designated the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps
Designation Implementation Act, which I introduced along with the
chairman in May of 2009.
These provisions impose tough secondary sanctions against any person,
including foreign companies, that conduct any significant transaction
with the IRGC or any of its designated fronts and affiliates. The IRGC,
through its support of Hezbollah and its direct action, has much blood
on its hands.
I want to thank the chairman and her staff for including section 303,
which applies sanctions to countries and governments--not just
companies--that conduct transactions or provide support for the IRGC
and for provisions which indicate that if you want to be a Federal
contractor, you must certify that you do not do prohibited business
with the IRGC.
This bill also includes important provisions I first proposed in the
Stop Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program Act that will provide sanctions
against those who lend money to the Iranian Government. It includes
another provision I authored which will implement sanctions against
those firms that give the Iranian Government the technologies for
surveillance and repression of their own people.
This is not the final act, literally or figuratively. What we've done
so far is not enough to force Iran to abandon its nuclear program. We
ought to stay in session and pass even more sanctions against Iran.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the Record a statement by
the Friends Committee on National Legislation, which says that the new
sanctions push the U.S. and Iran closer to war.
New Iran Sanctions Push U.S., Iran Closer Toward War--Friends Committee
on National Legislation
Washington, DC.--FCNL's Lobbyist on Middle East issues Kate
Gould issued the following statement opposing the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (H.R. 1905) that
could reach the House floor as early as today:
The Friends Committee on National Legislation strongly
opposes the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
of 2012 (H.R. 1905). We believe this legislation would
[[Page H5571]]
undermine human rights in Iran and cripple the accountability
of the diplomatic process now underway to prevent a nuclear-
armed Iran, pushing the U.S. and Iran closer toward a
devastating war.
War is the ultimate human rights violation, and this bill
lays the groundwork for war by escalating the scale of
economic warfare that Congress would impose on ordinary
Iranian citizens. As in the case of the decades of U.S. and
U.N. sanctions against Iraq that culminated in a U.S.
invasion of that country, economic warfare punishes
civilians, emboldens hardliners in Iran's regime, and
forecloses diplomatic options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
and war.
Punishing Iranian Civilians
FCNL and ten other national advocacy and religious
organizations from the human rights and peace and security
community wrote to Senator Tim Johnson, Chair of the Senate
Banking Committee, last week to oppose this bill, and to
highlight the importance of keeping channels open for
Iranians to have access to food, medicine, and other
humanitarian goods and services.
Ordinary Iranians already face tremendous difficulties in
accessing basic medicine under sanctions. For example, this
week, the board of directors of the Iranian Hemophilia
Society informed the World Federation of Hemophilia that the
lives of tens of thousands of children are being endangered
by the lack of proper drugs, as a consequence of
international sanctions.
The Iranian Hemophilia Society notes that U.S. and
international sanctions technically do not ban medical goods.
Yet, despite the `humanitarian exemption' in U.S. sanctions
laws, medicine is not getting in to Iran because the
``sanctions imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and the
country's other financial institutions have severely
disrupted the purchase and transfer of medical goods.''
The humanitarian exemption is of profound importance, as
the U.S. business community and humanitarian organizations
have pointed out. We are relieved that this legislation does
not directly prohibit Iranians from accessing food, medicine,
and humanitarian trade. However, if the Iranian civilian
economy is destroyed by sanctions, then millions of Iranians
will be deprived of their livelihoods, and unable to purchase
the food, medicine, and other goods that the humanitarian
exemption is supposed to protect. Further destabilization of
the Iranian currency and decimation of the Iranian economy
will push Iran closer to the state of Iraq when it was under
sanctions. During that time, UNICEF estimated that U.N.
sanctions contributed to the deaths of half a million
children.
Emboldening Hardliners in Iran
This bill would embolden hardliners in the Iranian regime,
at the expense of the civilians who will overwhelmingly bear
the brunt of these sanctions. Just as Saddam Hussein never
missed a meal under the decades of sanctions against Iraq,
top Iranian officials will not have difficulty accessing food
and medicine. National security expert Fareed Zakaria has
noted that the U.S./U.N. sanctions' ``basic effect has been
to weaken civil society and strengthen the state'', and that
``the other effects of the sanctions has been that larger and
larger parts of the economy are now controlled by Iran's
Revolutionary Guard--the elite corps of the armed forces.''
Foreclosing Diplomatic Options, Laying Groundwork for War
As countless U.S. and Israeli security officials have
pointed out, diplomacy is the single most effective way to
prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran. This bill would be a
setback to achieving a near-term diplomatic resolution of the
standoff over Iran's nuclear program, foreclosing diplomatic
options to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran and a devastating
war.
This bill would tie the President's hands, eroding the
little flexibility that Congress normally allows the
executive branch to conduct negotiations with Iran and allow
for sanctions relief in exchange for serious, verifiable
Iranian concessions. We are particularly concerned about
section 217, which effectively endorses regime change. The
provision would prohibit the President from lifting sanctions
against the Central Bank of Iran unless Iran agrees to a host
of conditions that the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot
reasonably be expected to agree to.
As veteran intelligence officer Paul Pillar has pointed
out, requiring Iran to end efforts to ``acquire or develop
ballistic missiles'', [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(iii)] ``goes
beyond any United Nations resolutions on Iran, which talk
about nuclear capability of missiles, and even beyond
anything ever demanded of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, for which
range limits were imposed. It would be understandable if
Tehran reads such language as further evidence that the
United States is not interested in any negotiated agreement
but instead only in regime change.''
The bill even requires the President to certify that Iran
does not ``construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear
facilities that could aid Iran's effort to acquire a nuclear
capability'' [section 217 (d)(1)(A)(ii.)]: in order to lift
sanctions against Iran's Central Bank. It appears that
Congress is requiring that t broad indiscriminate sanctions
remain in place unless Iran surrenders its nuclear program
entirely, even if it is a verifiably peace program.
FCNL strongly urges members of Congress to speak out and
vote against this broad, indiscriminate sanctions legislation
on the House floor today.
I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Representative
Ron Paul.
Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I'm still rather impressed with the obsession over a weapon that does
not exist and no concern whatsoever about many nuclear weapons that are
held by countries that never even joined the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty.
It's called for in the debate that Iran should end all its nuclear
programs, but they're permitted to have the nuclear program under the
nonproliferation treaty. And the other countries that have weapons,
including the countries that hold the weapons that came from the Soviet
system, it seems like that would be a much greater danger.
The investigation by either the U.N. or by our CAs has never
indicated that they have ever enriched above 20 percent. And they said
they won't even do it to 20 percent if the West would cooperate and
sell them this material. They said, we don't need it, but we need 20
percent enrichment for nuclear isotopes, medical isotopes. So our
refusal to deal with them prompts them to take up enrichment to 25
percent; 5 percent, of course, is what they're allowed to do for
nuclear energies.
But this idea that we can badger people and then defy the law, what
we're asking them to do, to close down their program, is you're asking
them to defy international law. They agreed to this. They have a right
to do this under this treaty. And for us to come and say, well, they
must quit it, I think it really is very close to an obsession on a
country that is incapable of attacking us, or attacking--they don't
have a history of invading their neighboring countries. The last time
they were at war was with Iraq, and we bugged Iraq to go into Iran.
So I find this very distressing that the obsession continues. I find
it very, very upsetting that this vote will, of course, be
overwhelmingly in support of correcting the civil liberties of Syria
and making Iran toe the line and give up on something that they're
permitted to do. A vote for this, in my opinion, in time will show that
it's just one more step to another war that we don't need.
We have not been provoked. They are not a threat to our national
security, and we should not be doing this. We've been doing it too
long. For the last 10, 15 years we have been just obsessed with this
idea that we go to war and try to solve all the problems of the world;
and at the same time, it is bankrupting us.
I strongly urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), who is the chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.
Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I want to start here by commending Chairman
Ros-Lehtinen for this sustained focus on Iran that she has had for
many, many years. I also want to thank Ranking Member Berman for the
strong pressure that he has put on the regime in Iran, as well.
Recently, we had the administration fighting hard against bipartisan
sanctions targeting the Central Bank of Iran. But what I want to point
out is that in a bipartisan way here, Congress insisted on, and today
the administration touts, the impact of sanctions on Iran's economy.
Here is the point I'd like to make: we'd be in a much better position
if the executive branch, both Republicans and Democrats--right now we
have the problem with the Obama administration's slow-walking this; but
had they been more willing to work with Congress to craft tougher
sanctions earlier, we'd be in a lot better position right now. The
bill's stepped-up penalties on those cooperating with Iran's energy and
shipping sectors, frankly, that's the Achilles' heel that we should be
aiming at.
Very importantly, this bill also includes a human rights title to go
after those abusing Iran's citizens. Let's let Iranians know that we
are on their side and we are going to focus on those crimes against
humanity and on the brutal regime opposing them. It's a regime that
beats and that imprisons--I've talked to some of these victims--and
that often rapes its own people in
[[Page H5572]]
order to try to impose its will. It's a regime that executes political
prisoners by the hundreds.
Congress is increasing the pressure. Many of us, certainly the
chairman, would like to go further. Iran's centrifuges are spinning,
but this progress here today deserves support.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my friend from
Florida (Mr. Deutch), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the
author of the bill which declares Iran's energy sector a zone of
proliferation.
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to recognize Chairman
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member Howard Berman for their
extraordinary leadership and their tireless work to bring forward a
bipartisan and bicameral bill. I thank you for working with me to
include several of my provisions in this legislation, including the
Iran Transparency and Accountability Act, a measure that will, for the
first time, require companies to disclose their business with Iran on
SEC filings and for the first time create a public listing of these
disclosures to clearly and definitively let the American people know
which companies continue to support the illicit nuclear weapons program
of Iran.
Mr. Speaker, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
significantly expands sanctions against the Iranian regime and those
who, in the face of united international opposition, continue to
contribute to Iran's quest for nuclear weapons.
This bill sends one clear message to the entire world: if you do
virtually any business in the Iranian energy sector--the financial
lifeline of this regime's nuclear program--you will be subject to
sanctions.
Today, the United States Congress takes U.S. sanctions policy to an
unprecedented level. By sending this legislation to the President's
desk, Congress can initiate an unprecedented crackdown on the Iranian
regime. But our work does not end here. These punishing sanctions are a
means to an end; and we cannot, for one moment, take our eye off the
endgame--halting Iran's march toward a nuclear weapon.
Again, I thank the chairman and ranking member for their leadership.
I urge my colleagues to support this important bill. Now is the time to
stand for human rights in Iran and Syria. Now is the time. Now is the
time to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include for the Record a publication
from the International Civil Society Action Network, ``What the Women
Say: Killing Them Softly: The Stark Impact of Sanctions on the Lives of
Ordinary Iranians.''
What the Women Say: Killing Them Softly: The Stark Impact of Sanctions
on the Lives of Ordinary Iranians--Brief 3: July 2012
The unprecedented, devastating and counterproductive impact
of sanctions, coupled with the on-and-off threat of war, is
an ever-growing reality in the lives of ordinary Iranians.
For the generation of Iranians whose childhood was punctured
by nightly bombings, fear of chemical attacks, and eight
years of death and destruction resulting from the Iran-Iraq
war, the current state of uncertainty, prospects of hardship
and unraveling of the lives they rebuilt is overwhelming.
In New York, London, Washington and Brussels the rationale
for sanctions vary. Central to the case is the notion that
only crippling sanctions can slow Iran's nuclear program and
bring about change. A number of the sanctions also target
state institutions and individuals implicated in human rights
violations. Regardless of their political leanings, among
western leaders, policymakers and pundits, no one denies that
economic sanctions are blunt instruments that typically harm
the civilian population far more than the state. Western
policy makers, however, respond that `this is the price that
has to be paid'--the questions of price for what, how much,
how long and by whom are left hanging.
Iranians have the answers. The earliest sanctions imposed
in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution
(and American hostage taking) had less direct impact on the
public. But since 1995, when the Clinton Administration honed
in on the oil and gas sector to the current day where the
banking and financial sectors have been targeted, private
enterprise and ordinary citizens are the primary and
overwhelming victims. Needless to say, they are skeptical of
western politicians or institutions that claim to care about
the well being, human rights or aspirations of the Iranian
populace.
It is not uncommon for Iranians in every walk of life to
recall the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), when the Western world
was complicit with Saddam's Iraq and its use of chemical
weapons. With the impact of current sanctions seeping into
every day life now, many Iranians consider them to be a
profoundly insidious and destructive force and source of
basic human rights violations, affecting a wide cross section
of Iranians.
As one women's rights activist stated, ``the international
community's sole focus on the nuclear issue has resulted in
the adoption of policies that inflict great damage on the
Iranian people, civil society and women. Militarization of
the environment will prompt repressive state policies and the
possibility of promoting reform in Iran will diminish.''
Iranians' wariness of the international community, however,
has not quelled criticism of their own government. They have
neither an appetite for war nor for the bellicose language of
the state. They criticize the government's mishandling of the
economy in recent years. They balk at the continued
imposition of social restrictions. Those involved in civil
rights activism including students, workers, women and
leaders from ethnic groups and religious minority communities
are among the first to feel the endless pressures and
limitations imposed on them. Not least because the sanctions
and threat of war allow the state to invoke ``a state of
emergency'' and in so doing suppress critics and voices of
dissent.
In its ongoing series of MENA region `What the Women Say'
briefs, ICAN provides a gendered analysis of the impact of
sanctions, echoing the voices and experiences of Iranians,
particularly women's rights activists, regarding the social,
economic, political and security consequences. At a time when
the United States, the European Union and others are
heralding their national action plans on women, peace and
security that highlight the need for women's protection in
times of crisis and their participation in conflict
prevention and peacemaking, this brief offers the
international community recommendations on limiting the
immediate and long-term damage being wrought on women,
Iranian society and ultimately regional security.
1. Current sanctions cut deep and wide into the social and economic
life of ordinary Iranians
Iranians know war and they know sanctions. The experiences
of women, men, the elderly and the young who lived through
the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war are rarely recounted
today, but the long term impact is still evident. Though
their plight is rarely discussed, women of child bearing age
and soldiers exposed to chemical warfare still suffer from
complex health problems. Similarly the thousands of men
handicapped by landmines and war wounds are rarely a topic of
conversation. Another long term impact has been the rise of
female headed households in part due to war deaths among men.
Throughout the 1980s war years, Iranians also suffered from
sanctions and lived under a strict rations policy. But it was
a very different society then. Some 50 percent of Iranians
lived in rural areas and were largely self sufficient through
domestic agricultural production. The sanctions too were
limited to key sectors pertaining to military equipment. As a
result the public impact was less evident. International
trade relations were sustained including with the U.S.
private sector. Today only 29 percent of Iranians live in
rural areas. Continued migration to urban areas has led to
the expansion of cities and their peripheries. The majority
of migrants eke out their living in the service industry and
informal economy on the margins of cities. The sanctions
regime is doing most damage to those who are already
vulnerable--the urban poor. As the pressures increase,
economic class and social divisions are also being
exacerbated.
2010 sanctions choking insurance and shipping sectors with
implications for public health: Sanctions introduced in the
summer of 2010 directly targeted insurance companies that
insured Iranian shipping involved in the import and export of
products. Despite denials by proponents of the sanctions
regime, this round of sanctions directly affected the
availability of foreign-made medication and other healthcare
products to Iranians including vitamins for children and
pregnant women and sanitary products. The implication for
serious illnesses including cancer is particularly profound.
As one women's rights activists recounted, ``foreign made
medicine became difficult to find in 2010, and with the
intensification of sanctions this trend has continued.
Domestically produced drugs, which are dependent on imported
ingredients, are also more expensive and difficult to find.''
Others echo this experience. ``Many Iranians can no longer
afford the high cost of cancer treatment drugs that have
become hard to find,'' says the daughter of a female cancer
patient. ``Family members have to go from one hospital to
another and to multiple pharmacies to find and then purchase
the medicines at high costs for the treatment and life of
their family members. Patients with poorer prognoses or those
who cannot afford it are forgoing treatments and opting for
an early death so they don't burden their families
financially.''
Sanctions targeting Iran's oil and gas sector were also
intensified in 2010, through limiting or ending the sale of
gasoline products to Iran. In anticipation, the Iranian
government initiated a number of steps including ending of
subsidies for gasoline, rationing gasoline and increasing
domestic refining processes. As a result, the price increase
has been significant, with unrationed gasoline
[[Page H5573]]
costing 4000 Rials per liter in 2009 and projected to
increase to 8000 Rials in 2012. Free market prices for
gasoline are currently at 7000 Rials per liter. Additionally
the quality of the domestic product is much lower than
imports, according to experts.
One significant impact of the increased use of domestically
produced gasoline has been a noticeable decline in air
quality, particularly in Tehran. Reports note that Tehran's
air quality, which was already poor, has worsened
significantly since gasoline imports were sanctioned. Even
the New York Times report explained the connection between
the ban on gasoline imports, the push to use domestically
produced gasoline and the rapid air quality deterioration:
``According to e-mails circulated to industry experts . . .
lran's new supply of domestic gasoline may contain high
levels of aromatics--more than twice the level permitted by
Iranian law. Burning aromatics in car engines produces
exhaust packed with high concentrations of ``floating
particles'' or ``particulates'' that, added to the typical
smog caused by nitrous oxides and ozone, can cause a range of
health problems, from headaches and dizziness to more serious
cardiac and respiratory complaints.'''
In the same year, Mohsen Nariman, MP from Babol said, ``air
pollution is on the rise at an unusual rate and it seems that
one of the main causes is the substandard gasoline that is
being used in Tehran.'' One newspaper, the Hamshahri Daily,
reported that 310 persons died per day as a result of poor
air quality in Tehran in the months of October and November
2011. The cause of death included increased respiratory
complications, heart attacks and stroke.
Unprecedented banking sanctions targeting Iranians in all
areas of life: The banking sanctions that went into effect in
December 2011 have also wreaked havoc in people's lives. The
Iranian Rial has almost halved in value against the US dollar
and other currencies. With memories of the Iran-Iraq war
still fresh for many Iranians, across Tehran and other
cities, people, including shopkeepers and merchants reacted
by hoarding products. Consequently the price of a wide range
of goods and products including foodstuffs rose between 20-
100 percent, and continues to fluctuate.
The knock-on effect is evident in all areas of life. While
incomes have not increased, rents have doubled in some areas
of the city. The price of bread--a staple of the Iranian diet
especially for the poor--has increased by some 1500% in the
past 2 years, in part due to the removal of state subsidies.
The uncertainty is causing stagnation for the private sector,
while some businessmen point out that companies affiliated
with the state are exploiting the situation as they have
access to government exchange rates. Sanctions were imposed
to prevent a nuclear weapons program. Instead, as one
commentator notes, the price of manure has risen.
Iranian students studying abroad have also been impacted
seriously. Many are being forced to give up their education
as their families can no longer afford the tuition. Some UK
universities are refusing to register Iranian students
because they cannot prove that they can transfer the
necessary fees. But the sanctions--or the way that banks and
other bodies currently interpret them--make it impossible for
most Iranian students to do so.
In addition countless Iranians who have relatives living in
the EU and US and those who travel for medical treatment have
become entangled in the vast banking sanctions net. Thousands
have personal bank accounts and savings in western banks,
some dating back decades. Now they are being forced to shut
down their accounts and find themselves caught in a financial
no-man's land; being forced to close existing accounts, while
barred from transferring their savings to other accounts
internationally or in Iran.
In effect the banking sanctions are forcing massive
reliance on a cash based economy, making already vulnerable
Iranians dependent on black marketeers for the transfer of
funds to cover educational, health or other legitimate costs.
It is also fostering the rise of informal power structures
and contributing to the lack of accountability and
transparency. Even the Iranian Vice President has
acknowledged this development, stating, ``in the framework of
these sanctions we [the Iranian government] have to begin
negotiations with goods traffickers near the borders and use
them to buy products which are included in the sanctions.''
Not surprisingly many Iranians are left questioning if the
banking sanctions are intent on forcing Iran's rulers to come
to the negotiating table or if Iranian society and the
country's infrastructure at large are being deliberately
targeted and weakened. The timing of the intensification of
sanctions is particularly questionable. Iranian observers,
notably civil and political activists are asking whether
sanctions are in fact intent on balancing power in the region
in favor of regimes that ``despite their authoritarian nature
accommodate the west and its security agenda in the Middle
East, at a time when revolutions may threaten the existing
security dynamics in the region.''
In an interview with Radio Farda, Mehrdad Emadi, Economic
Consultant to the EU, stressed the destructive nature of
these sanctions, noting:
``This particular form of sanctioning a nation has been
unprecedented in the history of the world. The only similar
type of sanctions, were implemented for a short period of
time, and were intended to prevent the illegal transfer of
funds by Qaddafi within the framework of the activities of
Libya's Central Bank. But even during that time, [the
sanctions] weren't implemented in this fashion [as we see
against Iran's Central Bank], . . . not all the transactions
of the Libyan Central Bank were sanctioned and the sanctions
focused only on the illegal transfer of funds and money
laundering . . . [The Iranian sanctions] are not related to a
specific sector or industry nor to business entities or
specific individuals. In this framework, all monetary
transactions, currency transactions and business credit
accounts for imports as well as exports and for the coverage
and payment of insurance, which in every country falls under
the responsibilities of the Central Bank of that country,
will be made illegal in Iran. Iran's Central Bank will no
longer be able to carry-out these duties, because it has now
been identified as a center for money laundering. In this
framework, international corporations, governmental
organizations, non-governmental bodies or security
organizations will no longer be able to transfer funds or
open credit lines for trade, using the Central Bank.''
In the same interview, Hossein Mansour, a UK-based
economist offered a bleaker analysis, noting, ``the negative
impact on Iran's economy, especially in the long run, will
only be addressed with the expenditure of billions of dollars
and after several generations, and will be devastating for
the infrastructure of the Iranian economy.''
2. Women are bearing the brunt of the economic and social impact of
sanctions
Women are especially affected by the economic fall out of
the sanctions. They are being pushed out of the job market
and bearing the brunt of increased unemployment. Women's
rights experts recognize socio-economic pattern emerging
similar to those in Iraq when sanctions were imposed. In Iraq
sanctions and the ensuing poverty resulted in the withdrawal
of girls from education and increases in child marriage
(families were forced to marry off their young daughters to
reduce the number of mouths to feed). Iranian girls are at
risk of similar developments.'' Moreover, women's rights
experts believe that the externally imposed sanctions will
allow conservatives to further their regressive social agenda
by relegating women back to the domestic sphere, limiting
their access to education and the job market and couching it
as an attempt to increase male employment.
Despite significant societal changes, Iran remains a male
dominated culture, reinforced by the government's
conservative ideology that considers men as the heads of
households and primary breadwinners. Programs in line with
this ideology, seeking to relegate women to the home as wives
and mothers only have been stepped up in recent years.
Indirect and immeasurable consequences of sanctions:
stifling women's education, a key engine of socio-political
change: Women's rights activists are also wary of the
indirect impact of sanctions--and the manipulation of the
economic hardships by conservatives--on women's access to
higher education. Educated women from middle and traditional
working classes across rural and urban areas, among the rich
and the poor, have been the primary engine of socio-political
change in Iran. The demand for equal rights and equal socio-
political, economic and cultural rights permeates every level
of society. From the outset of the Islamic republic, the
status of women has been a critical and contentious issue. In
2003, conservatives proposed the imposition of quotas to
limit women's access to higher education and the measures
were briefly implemented across some medical fields in the
2004 national university entrance exams. Massive outcry among
students and women's rights activists forced the withdrawal
of the quotas.
Conservatives have not backed down however. They continue
to argue that when women are more educated than men,
traditional family values are undermined, as women prefer to
marry at an older age, seek similarly educated (or more
educated spouses) and have higher expectations. These
traditionalists also posit that women in the work force take
away men's jobs. Concerns about the impact of women being
more educated than men have prompted some conservative
lawmakers to reinstate quotas limiting women's participation
in higher education. Women and student's rights activists
believe that during President Ahmadinejad's second term the
quotas have been introduced with greater zeal and less
accountability. They coincide with the intensification of
sanctions and increased economic hardships. As the economic
situation worsens, women's access to higher education, will
likely endure further limitations. Even school age girls are
at risk as economic pressures may force families to make
choices and opt for boys' schooling. This may lead to
diminished literacy rates among girls in the near future.
In effect, the marginalization of women from education and
employment enables extreme conservatives to kill many birds
with one stone. They prevent a high rate of women's entry
into the public space (via universities). They eliminate
women from the economy and job market, particularly, higher
earning and more influential positions. They sustain and
revive the power imbalance between women and men, as women
will have fewer choices in life, limited control of resources
and become (and remain) more economically dependent on men at
greater rates than already exist. Ultimately they
[[Page H5574]]
may quash the force of women's demands--the next generation's
voices--for progressive change in society at large. As one
conservative member of parliament and staunch supporter of
limiting women's presence in university has put it: ``when
women can't travel to far away cities without the permission
of their husbands, their expertise has no impact on improving
the situation of the country!''
There is also a significant reduction in women's share of
the national budget. In the past for example, housewives
received national insurance, but this has been eliminated,
while the military budget has doubled for next year.
Downturns in domestic production, increases male
unemployment and violence against women: There are also more
insidious effects, difficult to quantify but increasingly
evident. The sanctions have caused massive downturns in
domestic production. The fledgling private sector is unable
to import the necessary raw materials for manufacturing. The
banking sanctions are causing a virtual standstill in imports
and exports by legitimate businesses. Even domestic
agriculture will lose its markets.
Meanwhile those with political connections are exploiting
the situation often by importing cheaper Chinese products.
This downward trend in domestic production will give rise to
lower wages, increase unemployment among men and women and
ultimately put pressure on families. As evident in other
settings, women will bear the brunt of dealing with their
unemployed spouses and the men of the family within the home.
These new dynamics are likely to lead to increased incidences
of domestic violence and family conflicts, as men's inability
to live up to social expectations can lead to depression and
attacks on women. Reduction in family income inevitably is
forcing women to find new sources of income. Their coping
strategies will likely include cutting back on their own
health, wellbeing and dietary needs to provide for their
dependents. As in other countries, for the most vulnerable,
poverty will likely lead to risky survival strategies
including child labor and sex work--informal sectors which
have expanded in Iran in recent years.
The most vulnerable are at the greatest risk: Afghan
refugee women and children: Vulnerable groups, such as Afghan
refugees and migrants who have been living in Iran legally
and illegally as a result of decades of war and unrest in
their own country, are also at greater risk. The situation is
most severe for Afghan women and children refugees or Iranian
women married to Afghan men and their children who do not
have identity cards. The intensification of government
crackdowns and forced repatriation programs, against Afghans
(including their Iranian wives and children) with illegal
status in Iran, has already had a negative impact on the
livelihood of these groups, but as the economy has worsened
the hostility they face from Iranian society and the
government has also increased. Afghans have been targeted
with segregation programs in public spaces and are facing
increased state and other forms of violence, while their
access to income and jobs has also been severely limited.
Comprising a large percent of those employed in the informal
sector as household help, street peddlers and in the service
industry Afghan women and children are at risk of facing
worsening working conditions and abuse in their place of
employment.
3.Independent civil society and civic activism are among the first
casualties of current international policies
Many of the men and women who founded and run Iran's civil
rights movements including human rights and women's rights
activists, workers unions and journalists spent their
childhood or young adulthood at war. They have tasted and
experienced the impact of war and sanctions on a personal
level. They are also fierce advocates of international human
rights and humanitarian norms and ideals.
The public outpouring in the aftermath of the disputed 2009
presidential elections prompted the state to impose heavy
security measures against civic actors. But debilitating
sanctions coupled with the daily rhetoric of war has elevated
national security concerns and further diminished the state's
tolerance of dissent internally. Activists are regularly
accused of working in concert with the west to destroy the
Islamic Republic. The uncertainty and fear has also affected
the public's receptivity to social activism. It is seen as a
secondary issue compared to the urgent realities of poverty
and prospect of war.
The sanctions are having a long-term negative impact on the
source of societal change in Iran. The urban middle class
that has historically played a central role in creating
change and promoting progress in Iran are key casualties of
the sanctions regime. Many civil society organizations and
charities survive on the basis of voluntary activism and
support. But facing economic uncertainty, many people are
retreating from public voluntary work. Even the most
committed have less time, as they are working longer hours
and often at multiple jobs to meet their economic needs.
Moreover with private enterprise in demise, more people will
become dependent on the state and thus unable and fearful of
engaging in civil activism. Additionally, sanctions and in
particular the limitations placed on transfer of funds, has
created serious impediments for charity organizations engaged
in health and medical services, education efforts, support
for orphans and disadvantaged women and children to carry-out
their work. Many of these organizations have ceased their
activities.
Sanctions are isolating Iranians from international forums:
Beyond the economic impact, civil society, including the
women's movement in Iran has been further isolated from their
international counterparts, as a result of the sanctions.
Security challenges imposed by their own government already
curtail civil society's ability to attend regional and
international conferences, workshops and other events. But
the policies of other governments further complicate their
lives. Visas that Iranian passport holders need to travel
internationally, take considerable amount of time and
resources. The new banking sanctions have ended the
possibility of financial exchanges, while the falling price
of the Rial has increased the financial burden for those
activists who want to participate in conferences and training
opportunities. Activists, like regular Iranians, cannot use
banks to transfer funds for conference participation, hotel
reservations, or to attend courses abroad. Finally, for years
despite state restrictions, activists have used the internet
as a critical tool for communication. But the sanctions
policies have led many large hardware and software
manufacturers in the United States to deny services and
products to Iranians. Thus just when contact with and
solidarity from the outside world are most needed, Iranians
are faced with the greatest level of isolation.
4. What Women Do: resilience, courage, voices of peace and a window to
the future
Women's rights activists have never had it easy. They have
fought against an assault on their legal and political rights
as well as their demand for equal opportunities in the
economic, social and cultural life of the country. In 2006,
when a group of women initiated the Million Signatures
Campaign to demand the reform of laws that discriminate
against women, they immediately faced state scrutiny and
obstruction. The movement thrived however, transcending age,
economic, rural, urban and even political and religious
divisions to draw in a mix of volunteers. Using new and old
media, improvised street theater and small group education
and outreach initiatives they raised public awareness
about the impact of gender based discriminatory laws and
called on people to sign up and join their campaign in
favor of legal changes. Despite security pressures the
movement elevated issues of gender equality to the
national level both politically and within wider society.
After the summer of 2009, and the mass post-election
protests, women's rights activists faced increased
restrictions as the space for dissent became ever more
limited. With the rise of sanctions and ratcheting up of the
war rhetoric, these activists are under immense pressure to
become silent and conform. Countless social and political
activists have been imprisoned and or forced into exile.
Students--female and male have been expelled from
universities because of their civil activism. Under these
circumstances, with economic hardships and prospects of yet
another devastating war, longterm planning and the
development of sustainable programs to maintain the gains
already made and push for basic rights are increasingly
difficult, if not impossible.
Women's Demands: no sanctions, no war, talk it out! Despite
these pressures, the Iranian women's movement has not been
silenced. The call against war, in favor of a negotiated
settlement, and an end to sanctions has become a primary
issue for many, despite the risks they incur. They are using
every opportunity to send their message to the world.
Women's rights activists now living outside of Iran draw on
international platforms to echo the concerns and voices of
their counterparts inside the country. Meanwhile, despite the
risks, women in Iran have not been silenced either. One
group, the Mothers for Peace, representing different sectors
and ideologies began its activities in 2008, with the aim of
preventing war and violence in the country and promoting
peace regionally. They, along with other women's groups, have
issued several statements opposing the possibility of war.
Echoing this, in 2011, on the International Day to Fight
Violence Against Women (November 25th), another group of
Iranian activists issued their antiwar and violence
statement, noting:
``We a group of women's rights activists in Iran, are
worried about the increasing violence against women and
children [that is the result] of the polarized and hostile
atmosphere [and] dead-end national and international politics
of tension and violence. As a result of these policies,
violence against women and children infiltrates the deepest
social and political and familial layers of Iranian
society.''
On March 8, 2012, in honor of International Women's Day,
several activists involved in the One Million Signatures
Campaign recorded video messages opposing war. They reject
the official narratives that often pose the problems in the
terms of good and evil, just and unjust, and call on all
sides--including their own government--to engage in
constructive dialogue rather than the rhetoric of war and
threats.
Recommendations to the international community, particularly the US and
European countries
Fundamentally rethink policy on Iran:
[[Page H5575]]
1. End the sanctions policy against Iran. Recognize that
sanctions as a general rule have a poor record of influencing
the behavior of states and in many situations have severely
harming the population at large, particularly vulnerable
groups and democratic movements. Ninety-nine percent of the
current sanctions against Iran are too broad to impact the
behavior of the government, instead they target the
population.
2. Sanctions are not a substitute for war. they are a step
closer to war. Failed sanctions will only work to strengthen
the position of those advocating for another war in the
region. Resolve to address the differences in a mutually
respectful manner immediately.
3. Recognize that sanctions weaken society not the state.
Iranian society is already witnessing the emergence of
radical groups. As one women's rights activist notes, in
countries of this region, including Iran, growing gaps
between the rich and poor do not make governments vulnerable,
rather they make the population vulnerable to increased
radicalization against the West as a way of coping with
humiliation. In border areas, where poverty is severe, we
already witness the increasing influence of terrorist groups.
If this trend continues we will be faced with a weakened
Iranian society--at risk of being radicalized, with
detrimental consequences for regional security in the medium
and long term.
4. Recognize that sanctions undermine women's security and
empowerment. The US and EU have been strong proponents of the
global women, peace and security agenda with the development
of priorities and action plans to ensure women's empowerment.
But sanctions undermine and contravene these policies. The
contradictory nature of US and EU rhetoric, policies and
actions increase the Iranian public's suspicion about them,
and credence to charges of hypocrisy.
On negotiations with the Iranian government:
5. Engage Iran on the full range of issues. including
regional security, economic issues. human rights, culture.
etc. Incentives, especially those that reduce the hardship of
ordinary Iranians, should be put forth to encourage a
peaceful settlement to the disputes of the international
community with Iran.
6. Call for the inclusion of civil society in engagement
with Iran. Should Iran and the international community reach
an agreement that would allow for negotiations and dialogue
on a wider set of issues, civil society, including women's
groups, human rights groups and peace activists, should
participate.
On immediate steps for redressing the impact of sanctions
on ordinary citizens:
7. Do not force an entire nation to adopt nontransparent
means of financial transactions. Revise the banking sanctions
so that ordinary people are not caught in them. Specifically,
adopt measures to facilitate the transfer of funds by
ordinary Iranian citizens and Iranians with dual nationality
(EU, US, UK etc) for travel, tuition, and medical care, in
the case of sale of property, inheritance or for other
personal and familial purposes. Forcing Iranians to move
toward a cash economy reduces transparency and fosters the
growth of shadowy actors.
8. Address the adverse healthcare impact of sanctions
immediately. Sanctions including limitations impacting the
import of medicines, medical equipment and forced usage of
substandard gasoline are affecting people's health and lives.
These issues should be investigated and alleviated
immediately with cooperation between the US, European and
Iranian governments.
9. Help ease and enable visa applications for Iranians
seeking to visit relatives. Throughout the EU, US, Canada and
Australia there are millions of citizens of Iranian descent.
They have elderly parents and relatives living in Iran who
visit them regularly. Visas for relatives should be expedited
and offered for longer periods.
10. Encourage student visas and conference attendance.
Student visas and visas for conference participation should
be processed more quickly and with less financial burden on
applicants.
11. Facilitate free and safe access to the internet to help
foster independent civil society. Sanctions have severely
limited Iranian civil society's safe access to the internet
including necessary software and hardware. The international
community should help provide this access and limit the
imposition of sanctions in this sector.
{time} 1500
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
The Senate Banking Committee summarized this bill by saying that it
``aims to prevent Iran from repatriating any of the revenue from sale
of its crude oil, depriving Iran of hard currency earnings and funds to
run its state budget.''
Spoken plainly, this bill would destroy the Iranian economy and
further hurt the Iranian people that we claim to support. Iranians are
already suffering under stifling sanctions as they experience rising
food prices and lack of access to basic medicine. For example, the
sanctions against the Iranian banking sector have greatly diminished
the value of Iranian currency and have a negative effect on nearly
every aspect of the lives of ordinary Iranians. The price of rent,
education, and bread have all increased.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Dold), an esteemed member of the Committee
on Financial Services.
Mr. DOLD. I certainly want to thank the chairwoman for her leadership
on this very important issue. I also want to thank the ranking member
for his bipartisan leadership as well.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that a nuclear-armed Iran is actually the
greatest threat we have to our own national security here at home. This
issue is not a right versus left issue; this is a right versus wrong
issue.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation is significant in its seriousness and
its scope. By blacklisting virtually all of Iran's energy, banking, and
transportation sectors, and specifically targeting those who enable
Iran's attempted evasion of sanctions, this legislation sends a
powerful signal to the Iranian regime that they should not ever
question the resolve of the United States Congress to do what is
necessary to confront Iran's illicit nuclear ambitions.
This legislation is the product of bipartisan efforts and hard work
of many people, and I certainly appreciate Chairman Ros-Lehtinen's and
Ranking Member Berman's focus to try to get this passed as quickly as
possible.
I'm pleased to have contributed to strengthening this sanctions
package with bipartisan proposals that I introduced with Representative
Deutch from Florida, whom we just heard from, that declare the Iranian
energy sector a ``zone of proliferation concern,'' and which will
enhance the human rights portion of the bill.
I also want to note the significant contributions by Senator Mark
Kirk, who has been a consistent champion and leader on the forcefulness
of Iran sanctions.
I look forward to this legislation's passage today and implementation
with urgency by the administration, and I look to continue to work with
my colleagues in Congress on this issue until we can affirm that the
Iranian regime is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
I urge adoption of this resolution and for the immediate
implementation by this administration.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I'm very pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman who organized the Iran Working Group 7 or 8 years ago to
focus congressional attention on the looming threat of a nuclear Iran,
my friend from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank the chairlady from Florida and my friend from
California for recognizing some grave and serious points.
First, they recognize that on the 11th of September of 2001, 19
people armed with airplane tickets and box cutters wreaked havoc on the
United States of America. They recognize that a group of people with a
small, improvised nuclear device could wreak havoc far worse than that
on the Mall that stands in front of this building or on Times Square.
Weapons these days are not just delivered by intercontinental
ballistic missiles; they can be delivered by U-Haul trucks or by other
means. This is the essential threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation to
the United States.
The choice that we face is whether we should take concerted action to
prevent that threat or whether we shouldn't. I commend the chairlady
and my friend from California for choosing to unify this Congress, this
country with the rest of the world with the proposition that we should
present the Iranian leadership with a choice. If they decide to abandon
their nuclear weapons program--which they illicitly concealed for 25
years--if they agree to live under international protocols, then the
sanctions that have been imposed will be lifted and we can move forward
toward peace and progress. But if they do not, they will most certainly
suffer the consequences of a deteriorating economy and problems within
their social structure.
We have made our choice to stand united in favor of these strong
sanctions. We are presenting the Iranians
[[Page H5576]]
with their choice. Let us hope and pray they make a choice for peace
and renewed prosperity.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
We went to war against Iraq under the assumption they had weapons of
mass destruction. Iran doesn't have weapons of mass destruction.
One of the problems with this bill is that it effectively states that
sanctions on Iran's Central Bank would not be lifted unless there's a
regime change. So we're bringing a whole new dimension here. It's about
even more than nuclear weapons; now we're talking about regime change,
because this resolution creates a new requirement for the termination
of sanctions that are dependent on the cessation of the Central Bank's
financing of the Revolutionary Guard, and it imposes new restrictions
on the President's ability to waive sanctions.
So, what are we doing here? Setting the stage for another war. Regime
change, and then upping the bar for Iran and essentially laying the
groundwork for a conflict.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to close.
Mr. BERMAN. I'm very pleased to yield 1 minute to a former member of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, my friend from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the ranking member and the
chairwoman of this committee for bringing us together.
I don't like sanctions, Mr. Speaker, but I rise in strong support of
this legislation. And when I say that, I understand what sanctions can
do to women and children and families. In fact, I'm reminded of a
debate on apartheid and sanctions in South Africa. That debate was a
question of whether you undermine that nation. But we saw what happened
with sanctions when we came together as a Nation to bring down the
dastardly structure of apartheid.
Iran, right now today, can stop this legislation by shedding itself
of all signs of building a nuclear weapon. The regime change is not by
war. This bill does not suggest war. It means that voluntarily, by
election, their government can change. But what I believe is most
important is that we recognize, having seen that fallen woman bleeding
in the street, that human rights abuses are massive. They're massive in
their influence on Iraq, where they're influencing the treatment of
residents of Camp Ashraf. That must stop.
So this legislation is crucial because it impacts the human rights
abuses, it indicates that there is no giving on a nuclear weapon, and
it gives Iran, right now today, the ability to stop this legislation
and sanctions by owning up to eliminating any sign of a nuclear
weaponization, treating its people with dignity, and responding to the
needs of the people in Camp Ashraf.
I support the legislation enthusiastically.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 30 seconds.
Collectively, the provisions in this bill move the goalpost from
negotiations over Iran's nuclear enrichment program to regime change. I
just want to point out that the record of our country on regime change
isn't all that good. Yes, we knocked out Saddam Hussein under the lie
that he had weapons of mass destruction, and now al Qaeda is all over
Iraq.
So, what are we about here? We're setting the stage for another war
where we syphon the revenue out of this country, send it to war
machines, can't meet our own needs. Since when does Iran achieve
greater importance than our own country? That's what I want to know. I
want somebody to explain that to me.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, could I get another indication of the time
remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 4\1/2\
minutes remaining; the gentleman from Ohio has 3 minutes remaining; the
gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. BERMAN. In this case, I'm pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, a longtime
member and leader on the Foreign Affairs Committee and a very active
legislator on the issue before us today--that is, the effort to stop
Iran from getting a nuclear weapon--my friend from New York (Mr.
Engel).
Mr. ENGEL. I thank my friend for yielding to me, and I rise in strong
support of this legislation.
I am glad that the Senate and the House finally came together on this
very, very important bill.
{time} 1510
This bill has very, very strong support, as you can tell, on both
sides of the aisle, and the reason it does is because Iran has proven
itself to be a very, very dangerous player.
Iran is the leading supporter of terrorism in the world. Iran
supplies and supports the terrorist group Hezbollah in Lebanon. And, in
fact, now we see what's going on in Syria. And if it was not for Iran,
Assad would not be able to continue his brutal ways and his murdering
of his own people. Right now, as we talk, there are Iranian guards
fighting on the side of Assad in Syria, and Iran chooses to be, and
continues to be, a rogue nation.
Iran must not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. She has lied to
the world consistently in talking about her purposes of the weapon, but
Iran is not fooling anybody.
And so what these sanctions do is hits at Iran's oil and natural gas
sectors, making it very, very difficult for them to launder money and
making it very, very difficult to continue their repressive ways.
The world has spoken. This isn't only the United States. These are
countries all over the world. And unfortunately, or the blocking of
some vetoes in the United Nations, there would already be sanctions in
Iran.
So I urge my colleagues to support this. I think there's a reason why
virtually every Member of Congress on both sides of the aisle supports
it.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
These sanctions are hurting ordinary people in Iran. I pointed out
earlier, matters like the price of rent, bread--Americans can
understand that--education, all of these things are increasing. And
these sanctions then directly undermine Iran's civil society by giving
the regime a chance to crack down even harder on internal dissent.
These sanctions will ensure that those crackdowns continue.
Ordinary Iranians are struggling simply to make ends meet under this
sanctions regime that already exists. They cannot afford to suspend the
time necessary to participate in social movements which provide basic
social services to push for democratic change in their country.
Are these the intended effects that we wish to have on the Iranian
people and Iranian Americans?
And if not, passing this kind of a broad, indiscriminate sanctions
bill sends the wrong message. If the sanctions imposed on Iraq are any
precedent, we know that sanctions are not an effective tool in
promoting or supporting domestic democracy movements.
We also know those sanctions did not prevent an unnecessary and
wasteful war with Iraq. In effect, the expansion of the broad and
indiscriminate sanctions, including this legislation, hurts our ability
to negotiate with Iran, imposes long-term harm detrimental to the
Iranian people.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I
have no further requests for time.
And I'd like to just raise a couple of the issues that my friends,
Mr. Paul from Texas and Mr. Kucinich from Ohio, have put forth in the
context of opposition to this bill.
This is not the next step to war. This is the alternative to war.
Iran having a nuclear weapon is unacceptable for many, many reasons:
It means the end of the nonproliferation regime;
It means countries all through that part of the world will seek their
own nuclear weapons;
It raises the specter of nuclear weapons being passed on and dirty
bombs being passed on to terrorists, and there is nothing in the
comments of the regime that could let one relax and think they would
never be the first to use those nuclear weapons.
That is unacceptable. Our alternatives are either war or finding a
diplomatic resolution of their nuclear weapons program, the end of that
program.
[[Page H5577]]
They've been found, not by the White House, not by some Vulcans in
foreign policy, but by the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council, over and
over again, to have violated their obligations under the
nonproliferation treaty to which they are a signatory. They don't
ratify the additional protocols. They move ahead with enrichment plants
that they don't need for a peaceful weapons program.
They do not have a right to enrich. You could argue they have a right
to a nuclear energy program, but not a right to enrich. They conceal
information in violation of their treaty obligations.
This is, hopefully, the final step, but if not we will have to
intensify the sanctions to achieve that diplomatic program.
And Iran is not some bucolic, peace-loving state that has never done
anything against its neighbors. Everyone knows that Hezbollah is a
direct foreign agent of Iran that gets its funding, its training, and
its sponsorship and its directions from Iran.
We know what they've done to the marines in Lebanon. We've known what
they tried to do to the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington. We know
that in Delhi and in Bulgaria and a number of other capitals around the
world, their effort to commit terrorist acts against Israeli diplomats
and Israeli citizens. Their record as a state sponsor of terror is the
largest and most impactful in the world.
They are pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. It is our obligation
to do every measure we have to stop them from getting that, and we want
to do it peacefully. This strategy that we are embarked on is an effort
to find a way to do this without resorting to war, and I urge my
colleagues to stand strongly behind this bill.
This is the alternative. It is the only feasible alternative.
Otherwise, we are faced with two very dismal prospects: a military
action or an Iran with nuclear weapons and all that means.
I urge an ``aye'' vote.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
Sanctions are a form of war in this case, and it will lead to war.
And remember, we're not talking about--some time ago we were talking
about if Iran would have a nuclear weapon, but then the bar's been
lowered to say nuclear weapon capability. And now the game's being
changed to say not just nuclear weapon capability, but we want regime
change as well.
I mean, if this isn't a prescription for war, then I didn't
participate in the debate in this House of Representatives in October
of 2002 warning this Congress, chapter and verse, that Iraq had no
weapons of mass destruction, no role with al Qaeda in 9/11, did not
have any intention or capability of attacking the United States. This
is a version of that debate all over again.
I mean, come on. What are we doing here? Why is this more important
than our country?
You know, our postal service is going into default tonight, a
manufactured default, mind it. No debate on the House floor about this
today, but an attempt to manufacture a war with Iran.
What are we about?
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
I will retain my time to close, so if Mr. Kucinich could wrap up his
part of the debate, we can conclude.
Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask how much time remains?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. KUCINICH. And how much time does the gentlelady have?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 30 seconds
remaining.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
This legislation also requires the President to impose sanctions on
those who are responsible for or are complicit in certain human rights
abuses in Syria, but it fails to acknowledge that our own country and a
number of our allies are actively participating and stoking the
violence on the ground. Divisions and infighting within the various
militias operating on the ground are already occurring. And we also
read that al Qaeda's also been involved in Syria.
So, look, we have to get serious about what America's purpose is in
the world. It's not to be a heavy foot. It's not to proliferate wars
all over.
The first thing we have to do is take care of things here at home:
jobs for all, health care for all, education for all, retirement
security for all. When we can do those kinds of things, then we can
pretend that we can be the policeman of the world. But until we've done
that, we don't have any right to go all around the world trying to tell
people how to live.
And we can settle this matter with Iran without war. We can settle it
through diplomacy. Diplomacy. It would be real interesting to try it.
And we ought to support any efforts of the Obama administration to use
diplomacy here. Let's not use this political climate to push us into a
war.
I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1520
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining time.
I would like to recognize the commitment, the dedication and tireless
efforts of the members of our House Foreign Affairs Committee family,
particularly of our staff director, Dr. Yleem Poblete, who Ranking
Member Berman once described as driving a hard bargain. Just ask her
hubby, Jason. Also, thanks to Matt Zweig and Ari Fridman.
Thanks to Chairman Johnson of the Senate Banking Committee and to his
staff, particularly Colin McGinnis, Patrick Grant and Steve Kroll, as
well as Ranking Member Shelby and his staff.
A strong and warm thanks and big hug to my good friend Mr. Berman--
the ranking member--and to his staff, particularly Shanna Winters, Alan
Makovsky and Ed Rice, as well as minority staff director Richard
Kessler.
I would like to thank Senators Menendez and Mark Kirk and the
critical Representatives, Deutch, Sherman and Dold.
Let's stop Iran before it's too late. Let's pass this bill. I yield
back the balance of my time.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2012.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Rayburn, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I write concerning the House-
Senate negotiations on H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran
sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon
its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening
activities, and for other purposes. I understand the House
and Senate have reached an agreement on provisions related to
an Energy Information Administration report on Iran's natural
gas sector.
I wanted to notify you that the Committee on Energy and
Commerce will forgo action on this House-Senate compromise
language so that the bill may proceed expeditiously to the
House floor for consideration. This is done with the
understanding that the Committee is not waiving any of its
jurisdiction on this or similar legislation.
I would appreciate your response confirming this
understanding with respect to this provision of the House-
Senate compromise to H.R. 1905, and I ask that a copy of our
exchange of letters on this matter be included in the
Congressional Record during its consideration on the House
floor.
Sincerely,
Fred Upton,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 30, 2012.
Hon. Fred Upton,
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Rayburn, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Upton: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 1905, an Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the
purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear
weapons and other threatening activities, and for other
purposes.
I appreciate your Committee's decision to forgo action on
the House-Senate compromise text so that it may proceed
expeditiously to the House floor. I acknowledge that your
decision in this case does not represent the waiver of any of
your jurisdiction over this bill or similar legislation.
I will place a copy of your letter and this reply into the
Congressional Record during House consideration of the Senate
amendment to H.R. 1905.
Sincerely,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1905,
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012. This bill
is a critical effort to tighten sanctions against the Tehran regime,
and to increase pressure to force the government to abandon its pursuit
of nuclear weapons.
Iran's nuclear ambitions pose a grave threat to the United States, to
regional stability in the
[[Page H5578]]
Middle East, and to the entire international community. Both President
Obama and the United States Congress have unequivocally stated that
Iran must not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons.
On his visit to the Middle East this week, U.S. Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta stated that ``sanctions are having a serious impact in
terms of the economy in Iran.'' Iran is now struggling to conduct
international trade, losing markets and trading partners. Its currency
has lost over half of its value.
Meanwhile, the administration continues to expand sanctions against
Tehran. Earlier this week, President Obama signed an executive order to
extend sanctions to anyone, using any method of payment, who purchases
Iranian crude oil--preventing Iran from circumventing sanctions by
using bartering and other unconventional payment options. It also
expanded sanctions on buyers of Iranian petrochemical products, and
authorized penalties for entities seeking to evade U.S. sanctions. Also
this week, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Bank of Kunlun in China and
Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq for providing financial services to Iranian
banks.
Today, Congress is acting to further tighten the economic noose on
the Iranian regime. The bill under consideration today, H.R. 1905,
strengthens and expands existing sanctions, banning any commercial
activities with Iran's oil and natural gas sector, including helping
Iran ship its oil under the flag of another nation. This bill increases
sanctions targeting entities involved with the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps and sanctions human rights offenders.
When coupled with existing sanctions, today's bill represents the
strongest-ever effort to financially isolate Iran. This is critical,
because we must persuade the Tehran government to abandon its pursuit
of nuclear weapons. I strongly support utilizing our entire diplomatic
and economic arsenal to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear
weapons.
Today's bill is a critical step towards increasing pressure on the
Iranian government. I urge my colleagues to join me in strongly
supporting this legislation.
Mr. REED. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to reaffirm my support for
sanctions to be placed upon Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Khamenei
are once again stressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles within Iran's borders and we must take swift and
strong actions against these measures.
Iran is not just a threat to the United States, but to all free
countries around the globe. As a country that harbors terrorists,
foreign leaders must stay vigilant and recognize Iran's practices as a
national security concern.
Lastly, we must stand up against the human rights abuses the Iranian
regime is supporting. Its citizens have continually been sheltered from
outside information and ideas due to strict governmental control. We
need to inform the regime that the Iranian citizens deserve the basic
human rights as laid out by the United Nations. I am proud to support
H.R. 1905 and I encourage the President to sign this into law promptly.
Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the
conference report to H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria
Human Rights Act of 2012. This bipartisan legislation represents the
strongest set of sanctions to isolate any country in the world during
peacetime.
It is imperative that our nation takes all steps necessary to isolate
Iran, force them to end their dangerous pursuit of nuclear weapons, and
secure that the regime in Teheran will no longer be a threat to peace
and prosperity in the Middle East.
Once this legislation is passed and signed into law, virtually all of
Iran's energy, financial, and transportation sectors would be subject
to U.S. sanctions. Companies conducting business in these industries
would face the possibility of losing access to U.S. markets.
I also applaud the inclusion of sanctions against human rights
abusers in Iran and Syria in this legislation. The deplorable actions
by the political and military leaders in Iran and Syria against their
own people must come to an immediate halt and deserve global
condemnation.
Important allies, such as the European Union, Canada, Australia,
Japan, South Korea, India, and Israel, have joined the American people
in enacting sanctions against Iran.
It is important that this Chamber say with a strong, unified voice
that we stand with Israel during these difficult times.
As co-chair of the Democratic Israel Working Group, I call on Members
from both sides of the aisle to vote in support of this bipartisan
resolution.
I would also like to take a moment to thank the President for his
leadership on sanctions on Iran. Yesterday, President Obama signed an
Executive Order that imposes new sanctions against the Iranian energy
and petrochemical sectors, as well as sanctions against those who are
providing material support to the National Iranian Oil Company,
Naftiran Intertrade Company, or the Central Bank of Iran. These
measures will help strengthen the existing sanctions regime and bring
Iran that much closer to ending its heedless quest for nuclear weapons.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support
of the House amendment to the previous Senate amendment to H.R. 1905.
In his 2002 State of the Union Address, former President George H.W.
Bush said that Iran was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and
exporting terror. A decade later, Iran's global threat is greater than
ever.
We are currently embroiled in a standoff with Iran over its pursuit
of nuclear capability. We find ourselves on the brink of conflict over
potential Iranian armed interference with oil and other shipments
through the Strait of Hormuz and its persistent threats against Israel.
Even prior to 9-11, Hezbollah, supported by Iran, was responsible for
more American deaths around the world than any other terrorist
organization. Since 2001, Iran has embarked on more direct efforts to
harm American interests as evidenced by last year's foiled Iranian-
backed assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador to the United
States.
The current state of Iranian sanctions clearly has not worked to
reduce Tehran's threat to global peace. That's why we need the enhanced
approach this legislation will take in countering efforts by Iran to
evade the impact of international sanctions. H.R. 1905 as amended
tightens reporting on countries violating sanctions on these countries
and strengthens measures against those who would aid and abet these
disturbers of global peace.
It also effectively blacklists Iran's energy sector and anyone doing
business with it. By preventing Iran from repatriating the proceeds
from its oil sales, this rogue government will be deprived of 80
percent of its hard currency earning and half of the funds used to
support its national budget.
Iran has used many tricks to subvert current sanctions--from oil for
gold swaps to selling energy bonds to other trading and bartering
schemes. They have been successful because there are governments who
care more for making profit from doing business in Iran than in
preventing threats to world peace. International efforts to rein in the
nuclear ambitions of Iran have been stymied particularly by China.
Despite expressing formal support for United Nations Security Council
sanctions against Iran since 2005, China has stepped in where other
nations have curtailed trade with Iran. China's Bank of Kunlun and the
Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq have facilitated transactions worth millions
of dollars for Iranian banks already under sanctions. Stronger
sanctions will make such unsavory alliances more difficult. This is why
the reformulated bill we consider today is so vital in eliminating to
the extent possible all avenues for Iran's allies to play enabler to
its nuclear ambitions and to its patronage of terrorist operations.
I want to congratulate House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee Chairman Tim Johnson and other members for their hard work in
crafting a bipartisan, bicameral bill that works.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the
rules and agree to the resolution, H. Res. 750.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
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