[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 100 (Friday, June 29, 2012)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1187-E1190]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




RECOMMENDING THAT ATTORNEY GENERAL ERIC HOLDER BE FOUND IN CONTEMPT OF 
                                CONGRESS

                                 ______
                                 

                               speech of

                          HON. DARRELL E. ISSA

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 28, 2012

  Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following letters to Ranking 
Member Elijah Cummings regarding H. Res. 711.


[[Page E1188]]


                                    Congress of the United States,
         Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                     Washington, DC, May 30, 2012.
     Hon. Elijah E. Cummings,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government 
         Reform,House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Ranking Member Cummings: This letter is a follow-up to 
     my letter dated May 24, 2012 regarding the March 15, 2010 
     application for a wire intercept that the Justice Department 
     authorized in support of Operation Fast and Furious.


       Additional Wiretap Applications Obtained by the Committee

       The Committee has obtained three additional wiretap 
     applications from the Fast and Furious investigation, dated 
     April 19, 2010, May 7, 2010, and May 18, 2010, respectively. 
     These three applications pertain to four target telephone 
     lines. Each application includes an accompanying memorandum, 
     dated April 15, 2010, May 6, 2010, and May 14, 2010, 
     respectively, from Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal 
     Division Lanny A. Breuer to Paul M. O'Brien, Director, Office 
     of Enforcement Operations, authorizing the interception 
     application. The memoranda from Breuer were marked 
     specifically for the attention of Emory Hurley, the lead 
     federal prosecutor for Operation Fast and Furious.
       In response to your personal request, I am enclosing copies 
     of these three wiretap applications. Please take every 
     precaution to treat them carefully and responsibly. I am 
     hopeful that they will assist you in understanding the extent 
     of information brought to the attention of senior officials 
     in the Criminal Division who were responsible for reviewing 
     the contents of the applications to determine if they were 
     legally sufficient and conformed to Justice Department 
     policy. The information is as vast as it is specific. These 
     wiretap applications, signed by the late Deputy Assistant 
     Attorney General John C. Keeney under the authority of his 
     supervisor, Assistant Attorney General Breuer, provide 
     additional insight into who knew--or should have known--what 
     and when in Operation Fast and Furious.
       To assist you in better understanding the facts, I 
     appreciate the opportunity to provide relevant and necessary 
     context for some of the information in these wiretap 
     applications. Due to the sensitivity of the documents, 
     individual targets and suspects will be referred to with 
     anonymous designations. Nonetheless, you will see that the 
     individuals referred to in the wiretap applications are well-
     known to our investigation.


            Facts Learned from the First Wiretap Application

       As I understand it, the wiretap application authorized on 
     March 15, 2010 was the first in this controversial case. Like 
     many federal wiretap applications, the affidavit provided 
     significant details about the controversial operational 
     tactics used in the case, such as breaking off surveillance 
     of a suspect who had illegally purchased firearms. As we now 
     know, as early as December 2009 agents from ATF and DEA knew 
     that the main target of the case, Target 1, planned to 
     acquire firearms for the purpose of transporting them to 
     Mexico. In fact, the affidavit in the first wiretap 
     application provides entire conversations obtained through a 
     separate DEA wire intercept detailing Target 1's efforts. The 
     affidavit acknowledges that while monitoring the DEA target 
     telephone numbers, law enforcement officers intercepted calls 
     that demonstrated that Target 1 was conspiring to purchase 
     and transport firearms for the purpose of trafficking the 
     firearms from the United States to Mexico.
       At the time it was preparing the first wiretap affidavit, 
     ATF was aware that from September 2009 to March 15, 2010, 
     Target 1 acquired at least 852 firearms valued at 
     approximately $500,000 through straw purchasers. As of March 
     15, 2010, ATF had identified 21 of these straw purchasers. 
     Between September 23, 2009 and January 27, 2010, 139 firearms 
     purchased by these straw purchasers were recovered--81 of 
     those in Mexico. These recoveries occurred one to 49 days 
     after their purchase in Arizona. The document reflects that 
     the Justice Department should have been fully aware that 
     large sums of money were being used to purchase a large 
     numbers of firearms, many of which were flowing across the 
     border. In fact, ATF even knew the tactics the smugglers were 
     using to bring the guns into Mexico. The straw purchasers 
     would purchase the firearms in Arizona and then transport 
     them either to Mexico or a location near the U.S.-Mexico 
     border from which others would drive the guns into Mexico.
       The first wiretap application in Fast and Furious contains 
     rich detail about the transactions by many of the straw 
     purchasers. Given this detail, it shocks the conscience that 
     federal law enforcement officials intentionally abandoned 
     surveillance. Even more shocking is that upon reviewing these 
     facts, senior Justice Department officials authorized the 
     wiretap applications instead of shutting down the 
     investigation.


      New Information Contained in Additional Wiretap Applications

       These three additional wiretap applications further 
     demonstrate that senior officials in the Justice Department's 
     Criminal Division failed to sound the alarm, despite being 
     presented with unmistakable evidence of the extent of the 
     Fast and Furious gun trafficking ring. Given the danger 
     involved, these officials should have intervened without 
     hesitation. Throughout this investigation, one of my goals 
     has been to hold these officials accountable for their 
     management failures. In public statements, you have indicated 
     you agree with this objective. Given this new evidence 
     obtained by the Committee, I expect you to join me in seeking 
     to hold these officials accountable.


Senior DOJ Officials Knew by May 2010 That At Least 1,500 Firearms Were 
            Involved, and Recoveries in Mexico Were Ongoing

       The affidavits for the additional wiretap applications 
     demonstrate that senior officials at both ATF and Justice 
     Department headquarters knew that Target 1 was continuing to 
     acquire firearms illegally and traffic them to Mexico. By 
     April 19, 2010, Target 1 had acquired at least 1,217 firearms 
     through straw purchasers, costing approximately $800,000. By 
     May 17, 2010, less than a month later, Target 1 had acquired 
     nearly 300 additional firearms. Between September 23, 2009 
     and March 23, 2010, 302 of these firearms were recovered, 
     including 182 in Mexico and 116 along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
     These recoveries occurred between one and 105 days after the 
     firearms were purchased in Arizona. The affidavits illustrate 
     that ATF allowed Target 1 to continue to operate the firearms 
     trafficking ring despite evidence indicating that they should 
     have shut it down. Senior Department officials also failed to 
     act on these facts. As a result, Target 1 was able to acquire 
     even more firearms.


         Monitored Phone Calls Detail Large Numbers of Firearms

       The affidavits include details of phone conversations 
     showing that Target 1 and related straw purchasers were 
     heavily involved in illegal firearms trafficking. For 
     example, one affidavit details recorded conversations over 
     the course of a 30-day period between Straw Purchaser Y and a 
     cooperating FFL. In each of these recorded conversations, 
     Straw Purchaser Y discussed future firearms purchases from 
     the FFL. Following each of those conversations, Straw 
     Purchaser Y later arrived at the FFL and purchased firearms.
       In that month alone, Straw Purchaser Y bought a total of 
     120 AK-47 type rifles, 6 FN Herstal 5.7 caliber pistols, a 
     Springfield Armory .40 caliber pistol, a Glock .45 caliber 
     pistol, a Colt model ``El Jefe'' .38 super, and a Barrett .50 
     caliber rifle. One person's purchase of over 120 assault-type 
     firearms in less than a month should have set off alarm bells 
     for Criminal Division lawyers reading these affidavits. That 
     fact alone should have been enough for a senior Department 
     official to stop this program. Nobody did. This failure to 
     raise an alarm represents a major breakdown in leadership.


Surveillance Continues on the Illegal Purchase and Transfer of Firearms

       In addition to recording conversations of straw purchasers, 
     ATF surveillance units continued to observe them buy guns 
     illegally. For example, on April 16, 2010 surveillance units 
     witnessed Straw Purchaser Y buy three Barrett .50-caliber 
     rifles at a cost of $9,000 each from an FFL. Surveillance 
     followed Straw Purchaser Y and observed him transfer at least 
     one of the rifles into a vehicle registered to Target 1. 
     After the transfer, surveillance followed Target 1's vehicle 
     to the residence of Straw Purchaser V, where the firearm was 
     unloaded from the vehicle. Again, law enforcement did not 
     interdict these guns or make an arrest.
       On April 24, 2010, surveillance units observed Straw 
     Purchaser Y purchase three FN Herstal 5.7 mm pistols from the 
     same FFL. Later that day, surveillance units followed Straw 
     Purchaser Y to his residence, where the same vehicle 
     belonging to Target 1 was parked. After leaving Straw 
     Purchaser Y's residence, the vehicle was later observed at 
     the residence of Straw Purchaser V. At that point, 
     surveillance was simply terminated.
       A Barrett .50-caliber is a fearsome rifle that New York 
     City Police Commissioner Ray Kelly has called a ``weapon of 
     war.'' Senior Justice Department officials should have asked 
     tough questions of ATF about the circumstances surrounding 
     each of these purchases. Given the circumstances of these 
     purchases and the subsequent transfer to Target 1's vehicle, 
     senior Department officials had a duty to intervene in the 
     operation to ensure that it was being conducted in accordance 
     with the law and Department policy. Instead, they stood by as 
     the straw purchasing ring continued unabated.


                       Tracking Border Crossings

       The affidavits also describe Target 1's border crossings, 
     some of which occurred immediately following periods of 
     buying from the straw purchasers. From December 17, 2009 to 
     March 23, 2010, Target 1 made 13 documented crossings from 
     Mexico into the United States. Eleven of these crossings 
     occurred at Texas points of entry.
       On December 31, 2009, Straw Purchaser Y purchased seven 
     firearms. The following day, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from 
     Mexico into the United States via a port of entry in Fabens, 
     Texas. From December 30, 2009 to January 15, 2010, Straw 
     Purchaser Y and Straw Purchaser Z purchased a combined total 
     of 80 firearms. Then, on January 18, 2010, Target 1 again 
     crossed from Mexico into the United States via the Faben, 
     Texas point of entry. From January 26, 2010 to February 12, 
     2010, Straw Purchaser B, Straw Purchaser N, and Straw 
     Purchaser Y purchased 62 firearms combined. On February 13, 
     February 15, and February 16, 2010, Target 1 crossed by 
     vehicle from Mexico into the United States via a port of 
     entry in El Paso, Texas. From April 6, 2010 to April 24, 
     2010, Straw Purchaser Y purchased 24 firearms. On April 26, 
     2010, Target 1 crossed by vehicle from Mexico into the

[[Page E1189]]

     United States via a port of entry in Lukeville, Arizona. The 
     affidavits also state that Target 1 routinely travelled to El 
     Paso, Texas. In fact, according to the affidavits, 
     intercepted phone calls show that at that time, Target 1 was 
     engaging in conversations relating to firearms trafficking 
     with individuals in and around El Paso, Texas.
       Moreover, one of the affidavits states that ATF agents 
     believed Straw Purchaser Y was also traveling to El Paso, 
     Texas to receive U.S. currency to transport back to Mexico 
     for future gun purchases in the Phoenix, Arizona area. For 
     example, on March 23, 2010, the day after Straw Purchaser Y 
     returned from El Paso, Texas, Straw Purchaser M, Straw 
     Purchaser N, and Straw Purchaser Q purchased a total of 30 
     AK-47 type rifles and 7.62x39 caliber ammunition from 
     Phoenix, Arizona FFLs. Straw Purchaser Y traveled to El Paso, 
     Texas on two occasions after March 21, 2010. On both 
     occasions, Straw Purchaser Y drove to El Paso, Texas, stayed 
     at a hotel approximately one day, and then drove back to 
     Phoenix, Arizona. On the second occasion, surveillance units 
     observed Straw Purchaser Y meeting with an unknown individual 
     before returning to Phoenix, Arizona a short time later.


                               Conclusion

       These wiretap affidavits show that straw purchasers were 
     buying massive numbers of guns from Phoenix area FFLs, and 
     that federal law enforcement officials were contemporaneously 
     aware of many of these sales. By monitoring and recording 
     phone calls and conducting extensive surveillance, ATF 
     tracked the actions of the firearms trafficking ring. ATF 
     knew, and shared with the Criminal Division, that Target 1 
     facilitated the illegal transfer of these firearms to 
     Mexico for the drug cartels. The volume of firearms 
     distributed by the gun trafficking ring was a major threat 
     to public safety. Despite the volume of information 
     gathered through this field work, no one in ATF or Justice 
     Department headquarters took action. This is inexcusable.
       The new facts these wiretap applications reveal are 
     dismaying. More than we previously believed, senior officials 
     at the Department of Justice were aware of specific 
     information about ATF's efforts to monitor illegal 
     transactions and subsequently abandon surveillance. Now, more 
     than ever, it is imperative that you join me in demanding 
     that these senior officials be held accountable.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Darrell Issa,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

         Congress of the United States, Committee on Oversight and 
           Government Reform,
                                     Washington, DC, June 1, 2012.
     Hon. Elijah E. Cummings,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government 
         Reform,House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Ranking Member Cummings: This letter is a follow-up to 
     my letters dated May 24, 2012 and May 30, 2012 regarding the 
     applications for wire intercepts the Justice Department 
     authorized on March 15, 2010, April 19, 2010, May 7, 2010, 
     and May 18, 2010 in support of Operation Fast and Furious.


       Additional Wiretap Applications Obtained by the Committee

       The Committee has obtained two additional wiretap 
     applications from the Fast and Furious investigation, dated 
     June 2, 2010 and July 2, 2010. These two applications pertain 
     to two target telephone lines. Each application includes an 
     accompanying memorandum, dated June 1, 2010 and July 1, 2010, 
     respectively, from Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer 
     to Paul M. O'Brien, Director of the Office of Enforcement 
     Operations, authorizing the interception application. The 
     memoranda from Breuer were marked specifically for the 
     attention of Emory Hurley, the lead federal prosecutor for 
     Operation Fast and Furious.
       These documents further highlight the scope and volume of 
     information known by the Department of Justice, including 
     senior officials in the Criminal Division, about Fast and 
     Furious. Between March and July 2010, these officials had 
     access to rapidly mounting evidence of firearms trafficking 
     and gunwalking, and had multiple opportunities to halt 
     Operation Fast and Furious. They did not. Instead, these 
     officials authorized the wiretap applications, and Fast and 
     Furious continued unabated.
       In response to your personal request, I am enclosing copies 
     of these two wiretap applications. Please take every 
     precaution to treat them carefully and responsibly. I am 
     hopeful that they will assist you in understanding the extent 
     of information brought to the attention of senior officials 
     in the Criminal Division who were responsible for reviewing 
     the contents of the applications to determine if they were 
     legally sufficient and conformed to Justice Department 
     policy. The information they contain is as vast as it is 
     specific. These wiretap applications were signed by Jason M. 
     Weinstein and Kenneth A. Blanco, respectively, under the 
     authority of their supervisor, Assistant Attorney General 
     Breuer.
       To assist you in better understanding the facts, I 
     appreciate the opportunity to provide relevant and necessary 
     context for some of the information in these wiretap 
     applications. Due to the sensitivity of the documents, 
     individual targets and suspects will be referred to with 
     anonymous designations. Nonetheless, you will see that the 
     individuals referred to in the wiretap applications are well-
     known to our investigation.


           Facts Learned from the Prior Wiretap Applications

       The prior four wiretap applications provided a breathtaking 
     amount of facts and details about the operational tactics 
     used in Fast and Furious. The applications demonstrate that 
     ATF knew as early as December 2009 that the main target of 
     the case, Target 1, planned to acquire firearms for the 
     purpose of transporting them to Mexico. In fact, the 
     applications include entire conversations obtained through a 
     DEA wire intercept demonstrating Target l's specific plans. 
     The applications acknowledge that while monitoring the DEA 
     target telephone numbers, law enforcement officers 
     intercepted calls that demonstrated that Target 1 was 
     conspiring to purchase and transport firearms for the purpose 
     of trafficking the firearms from the United States to Mexico.
       The applications include transcripts of phone conversations 
     showing that Target 1 and related straw purchasers were 
     heavily involved in illegal firearms trafficking. The 
     applications describe ATF surveillance units observing straw 
     purchasers buying guns illegally. The applications also 
     describe Target l's border crossings, which often coincided 
     with firearms purchases by the straw buyers. The affidavits 
     even show that firearms were recovered in Mexico soon after 
     straw purchasers bought them in Arizona, sometimes the next 
     day. Though aware of all of these facts, ATF did not arrest 
     anyone in the gun trafficking ring until many months later.


      New Information Contained in Additional Wiretap Applications

       These two additional wiretap applications further 
     demonstrate that senior officials in the Justice Department's 
     Criminal Division failed to sound the alarm, despite being 
     presented with unmistakable evidence of the extent of the gun 
     trafficking ring and the controversial tactics used in Fast 
     and Furious. Given the danger involved, these officials 
     should have intervened without hesitation. Throughout this 
     investigation, one of my goals has been to hold these 
     officials accountable for their management failures. In 
     public statements, you have indicated you agree with this 
     objective.


                      $1 Million Worth of Firearms

       From September 2009 to July 2010, Target 1 acquired over 
     1,500 firearms through his straw purchasers at a cost of 
     approximately $1,000,000. In other words, Target l's firearms 
     trafficking ring acquired at least an additional 700 guns at 
     a cost of $500,000 in approximately four months after the 
     Justice Department authorized the first wiretap application.
       From December 17, 2009 to July 2, 2010, Target 1 crossed 
     from Mexico into the United States a total of 15 times. 
     Thirteen of these 15 crossings occurred at Texas port of 
     entries. According to the applications, Target 1 orchestrated 
     both narcotics and firearms transactions with the intent to 
     sell narcotics, purchase firearms, and then transport the 
     firearms into Mexico from the United States. Although ATF and 
     the Justice Department were aware of this information for 
     many months, they took no steps to interrupt Target l's 
     criminal activities.


                    Straw Purchasers by the Numbers

       These additional wiretap applications again provide 
     startling numbers regarding Target l's straw purchasers. For 
     example, by July 2, 2010, Straw Purchaser Y had purchased at 
     least 616 firearms from the Arizona Federal Firearms 
     Licensees (FFLs). Y purchased 125 of these guns between March 
     26, 2010 and June 5, 2010. By March 26, 2010, ATF had only 
     recovered 81 firearms purchased by Straw Purchaser Y, 
     including 28 in Mexico, within eight to 120 days after the 
     firearms were purchased in Arizona.
       Straw Purchaser Z had bought 281 firearms from Arizona FFLs 
     by June 8, 2010. By July 2, 2010, at least 57 of these guns 
     had been recovered in the possession of others or at crime 
     scenes, either in the United States or Mexico. Surveillance 
     units also observed a vehicle registered to Straw Purchaser Z 
     parked in front of Target l's residence from June 4, 2010 
     until June 7, 2010. On June 7, 2010, Customs and Border 
     Protection officers observed Straw Purchaser Z and Target 1 
     crossing into the United States from Mexico in a vehicle 
     registered to Straw Purchaser B.
       Between January 26, 2010 and June 5, 2010, Straw Purchaser 
     N purchased 96 firearms from Arizona FFLs. From October 5, 
     2009 through June 8, 2010, Straw Purchaser B bought 83 
     firearms from Arizona FFLs. In that same period, Straw 
     Purchaser Q purchased 141 firearms.
       The applications painstakingly document several of the 
     straw purchasers' firearms acquisitions, including specific 
     quantities, dates, and locations. The applications also 
     specify to whom the firearms were transferred, and even at 
     what specific crime scenes the guns were later recovered. 
     Though fully aware that these firearms were being smuggled 
     into the hands of the Mexican drug cartels, senior Department 
     officials allowed the illegal purchases and transfers to 
     continue. The continued acquisition of firearms by the gun 
     trafficking network exacerbated the threat to public safety. 
     Even when faced with these stark facts, senior Department 
     officials failed to put an end to this operation.


                    Additional Wiretap Applications

       You now have a total of six applications for Fast and 
     Furious. Officials in the Justice Department's Criminal 
     Division authorized these applications on the following 
     dates:

[[Page E1190]]



------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Criminal Division
      Wiretap                  Date                    Signature
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1                   March 10, 2010...........  Kenneth Blanco.
2/3                 April 15, 2010...........  John Keeney.
4                   May 6, 2010..............  John Keeney.
5                   May 14, 2010.............  John Keeney.
6                   June 1, 2010.............  Jason Weinstein.
7                   July 1, 2010.............  Kenneth Blanco.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       There may be additional wiretaps from Fast and Furious that 
     are not currently in the Committee's possession. During his 
     transcribed interview, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
     Jason Weinstein said:
       Q. And did you review wiretap applications in Operation 
     Fast and Furious?
       A. I reviewed what I believe to be three of the wiretaps in 
     Fast and Furious, in what I now know to be Fast and Furious.
       Weinstein later clarified:
       Q. How many did you authorize?
       A. I authorized three to the best of my recollection.
       Q. You were the signing official authorizing three?
       A. On three of them, yes.
       As the chart above reflects, however, Weinstein only signed 
     one of the wiretaps currently in possession of the Committee. 
     This leaves the likely possibility that at least two more 
     wiretaps from Fast and Furious exist. To fully understand the 
     scope of what the Criminal Division knew about Fast and 
     Furious and when they knew it, it is essential that the 
     Committee have access to these other two wiretap 
     applications, if they exist.


                               Conclusion

       The volume of information known to senior Justice 
     Department officials regarding Fast and Furious by July 2, 
     2010 is overwhelming. Despite this, Fast and Furious 
     continued for nearly seven more months. Notably, only after 
     U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry's murder were arrests 
     made and indictments issued. In light of the information 
     contained in these wiretap affidavits, approved under 
     Assistant Attorney General Breuer's authority, Washington, 
     D.C.-based Justice Department officials can no longer 
     disclaim responsibility in failing to shut down Fast and 
     Furious. We now know numerous senior officials had access to 
     information about the controversial and dangerous operational 
     tactics used in Fast and Furious.
       At the Committee's February 2, 2012 hearing with the 
     Attorney General, you stated that we ``now have all the 
     facts.'' These wiretap applications prove that your comment 
     was premature. The information contained in these wiretaps 
     underscores the reality that we do not have all the facts. I 
     hope you will join me in strongly urging the Department of 
     Justice to cooperate with our investigation fully until we 
     obtain all the facts and it holds those responsible for 
     authorizing the continuance of this operation accountable.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Darrell Issa,
     Chairman.

                          ____________________