[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 80 (Thursday, May 31, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H3290-H3309]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 5743.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 667 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5743.
  The Chair appoints the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Yoder) to preside 
over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1418


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 5743) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Yoder in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
might consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I first wish to make an announcement with respect to 
the availability of the classified annex to the bill for the Members of 
the House. This is to reinforce a previous announcement made to Members 
by the Committee on Rules on May 23, 2012, and an informal announcement 
by leadership.

                              {time}  1420

  Mr. Chairman, the classified Schedule of Authorizations and the 
classified annex accompanying the bill remain available for review by 
Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence in room HVC 304 of the Capitol Visitors Center. The 
committee office will open during regular business hours for the 
convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to 
its consideration by the House.
  I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex 
contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date 
for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff 
to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these 
classified documents.
  Mr. Chairman, we're especially pleased with this year's fiscal 2013 
Intelligence authorization bill and its presence here on the floor 
today. This will be our third authorization since I assumed the 
chairmanship and my colleague, Mr. Ruppersberger, assumed the ranking 
member position on the House Intelligence Committee.
  The bill is a vital tool for congressional oversight of the 
intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to 
ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and 
authorities they need to do their important work.
  The Intelligence authorization bill funds U.S. intelligence 
activities spanning 17 separate agencies. This bill is significantly 
below last year's inactive budget, but up modestly from the President's 
roughly $72 billion in the unclassified number budget request for 
fiscal year 2013. It is also completely in line with the House budget 
resolution, which provides for a modest increase of defense activities 
above the President's budget.
  The FY13 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and 
provides for the development of future capabilities, all while 
achieving significant savings and ensuring the intelligence agencies 
are being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. The U.S. 
intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism 
and securing the country from many threats that we face. Effective and 
aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring continued 
success in the intelligence community. The current challenging fiscal 
environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our 
classified intelligence programs that can only come with an 
Intelligence authorization bill.
  The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance 
on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly but important 
programs. The bill funds requirements of the men and women of the 
intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom 
directly support the war zones and are engaged in other dangerous 
operations designed to keep America safe.
  It provides oversight and authorization for vital intelligence 
activities, including global counterterrorism operations such as the 
one that took out Osama bin Laden; efforts by the National Security 
Agency to defend us from advance foreign state-sponsored cyberthreats; 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global 
monitoring of foreign militaries and advanced weapons tests; and 
research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence 
agencies' technological edge, including work on code breaking and spy 
satellites.
  To stay competitive amidst declining budgets, the IC must wring out 
cost in all realms of operations--collection, processing, analysis, 
logistics, and ``back office'' operations. This bill promotes operating 
efficiencies in a number of areas, particularly in information 
technology, the ground processing of satellite data, and the 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance departments. The bill 
holds personnel levels, one of the biggest cost drivers, at last year's 
levels. Even so, the bill adds a limited number of new personnel 
positions for select, high-priority positions, such as FBI surveillance 
officers to keep watch on terrorists.
  The bill contains additional funding for intelligence collection 
programs, including increased counterintelligence to thwart foreign 
spies. The bill also increases funding for our intelligence community's 
comparative advantage--cutting-edge research and development.

[[Page H3291]]

  While we're on the subject of funding our intelligence agencies, I 
think I would be remiss if we didn't briefly discuss the looming threat 
of sequestration and the devastating consequences it would have for our 
vital intelligence operations. The intelligence community and the 
congressional intelligence oversight committees have worked together 
over the last year, in recognition of the current challenging fiscal 
environment, to find efficiencies in the intelligence budget. And we've 
done that. We've actually done more in certain areas by finding 
efficiencies in other areas and reducing the overall cost of our 17 
agencies.
  Unlike the dangerous, across-the-board cuts of the 1990s, however, 
these funding cuts were carefully selected to ensure that no important 
operational intelligence capabilities were impacted. Let me be clear: 
The intelligence community has given until it hurts to produce better 
budget efficiencies, but we have done this without adversely affecting 
the mission, which is critically important.
  All of this careful work, however, will have been done for nothing if 
Congress doesn't avert the sequestration train wreck. Sequestration 
will require a devastating cut to defense spending that will also 
entail dangerous across-the-board reductions in intelligence funding. 
The across-the-board nature of the sequester means that there is very 
little discretion left to our intelligence agencies on how to apportion 
these reductions.
  Let me give you just a few examples of the dangerous impact this 
would have. Thousands of intelligence officers and specialized 
technicians will be laid off, to include those working around the 
world, and around the clock, to stop terrorist plots before they arrive 
on U.S. shores. The National Security Agency would have to 
significantly reduce its ability to intercept, translate, and analyze 
terrorist communications about their plans to attack the United States 
and Western targets. This would significantly reduce our odds of 
detecting and disrupting those terrorist plots. Intelligence community 
support to our soldiers and marines in harm's way in Afghanistan would 
significantly be curtailed. Also, the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency would be forced to cut back the number of satellite images that 
it analyzes, reducing our odds of detecting significant foreign 
military activity, such as North Korean preparations for an attack on 
our troops in South Korea.
  Our intelligence agencies and the important work they do is our first 
line of defense against the many threats around the world to our 
national security. Sequestration would be dangerous and irresponsible 
for many reasons, not the least of which is the threat to those vital 
intelligence capabilities, and Congress must act to avoid it. The House 
has put an offer on the table that would avert this disaster. We passed 
a bill earlier this month with responsible spending reforms that will 
bring down the debt without endangering our national security. I urge 
my colleagues in the Senate to take up this bill without further delay.

  The bipartisan fiscal year 2013 Intelligence authorization bill 
preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally 
responsible. We have proven it can be done. The secrecy that is a 
necessary part of our country's intelligence work requires that the 
congressional Intelligence Committees conduct strong and effective 
oversight on behalf of the American people. That strong and effective 
oversight is impossible, however, without an annual Intelligence 
Authorization bill.
  I want to thank all of the members on the committee for their 
bipartisan effort to find agreement on a bill that saves money and 
moves forward smartly on protecting the interests of national security 
for the United States.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I rise today in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013. It is a bipartisan bill that gives our intelligence 
professionals the resources, capabilities, and the authorities they 
need to keep our country safe. When Chairman Rogers and I took over the 
leadership of the Intelligence Committee, we made a commitment to 
bipartisanship. We believe politics has no place on the Intelligence 
Committee. The stakes are just too high.
  We also made a commitment to passing intelligence budgets to give the 
intelligence community financial direction and to conduct proper 
oversight. I commend Chairman Rogers for making this an open process 
where we reached agreement on issues that will make this country safer 
and the intelligence process more efficient.
  But we also know we're facing tough economic times so we must use 
every dollar wisely. This budget is about 4 percent below the enacted 
levels for FY 2012. It holds personnel at last year's levels and 
authorizes an initiative to achieve major efficiencies and improve 
performance and information technology. We made cuts where appropriate, 
eliminated redundancies, and pushed programs to come in on time and on 
budget.
  The bill allocates resources to critical national security 
priorities: space, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and 
counterterrorism.
  We restored some of the cuts to commercial satellite imagery to 
ensure the warfighter and policymakers have the images they need. I 
believe commercial competition is important to ensure the warfighter 
and other policymakers get high-quality products while keeping costs 
down. It drives innovation and provides a much-needed policy in case 
there are problems with other government problems.

                              {time}  1430

  The bill reinforces cybersecurity by protecting the intelligence 
community's networks from countries like China and others trying to 
steal our valuable data.
  The bill also makes counterintelligence a priority by increasing 
surveillance of foreign spies from countries like China, Russia, and 
Iran.
  The bill improves supply-chain security and adds the 
counterintelligence analysts this Nation needs.
  The bill enhances counterterrorism efforts to continue the fight 
against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world.
  The bill increases oversight on the spending of domestic intelligence 
agencies.
  The bill also expands the intelligence community's capabilities 
around the global to ensure the United States is capable and ready to 
address the threats worldwide.
  The bill authorizes the Defense Clandestine Service created by the 
Department of Defense to reorganize its human intelligence collection 
and partner with the CIA's National Clandestine Service.
  The Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee remain committed to 
giving our intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs 
while also providing proper oversight and protecting personal privacy.
  Provisions offered by the minority members were accepted as part of 
the chairman's mark and other amendments were adopted unanimously by 
the committee.
  Congresswoman Schakowsky introduced an amendment that protects the 
inspector general of an intelligence agency from across-the-board cuts 
to preserve their role as a watchdog of an organization. I commend Ms. 
Schakowsky for her good work on this bill.
  Congressman Thompson introduced an amendment to expand our efforts to 
prevent drug cultivation on Federal lands. I commend Mr. Thompson for 
his efforts on this bill as well.
  In fact, we wouldn't be here today without the hard work of all of 
the members of the Intelligence Committee. This is truly a bipartisan 
product. The bill passed through markup by a margin of 19 0, a true 
testament to the bipartisan spirit of the committee.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for 2013. This bill ensures the Nation's intelligence community is 
effective, fiscally sound, and subject to appropriate oversight.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to a 
distinguished member of the committee, the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Nunes).
  Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, today is another milestone in our work to 
conduct strong oversight of the intelligence community. In just under 2 
years as chairman and ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan and

[[Page H3292]]

the gentleman from Maryland have proven that the Intelligence Committee 
is now really not just a bipartisan committee, but I think more 
importantly a nonpartisan committee, which is why this bill passed out 
of committee 19 0.
  During these austere times, it is also important to not only sustain 
our Nation's intelligence capabilities and provide for future needs, 
but to do so in a fiscally responsible way. This bill achieves 
significant savings by holding the line on authorizing spending below 
last year's levels--curbs unnecessary personnel growth--and targets 
intelligence investments. Included in this bill are the tools necessary 
to reduce operational costs of the intelligence community's front-line 
operators and provisions to conduct a house cleaning of ``back office'' 
operations.
  Moreover, this bill ensures that acquisitions are done on cost and on 
schedule while still expanding the IC community's comparative advantage 
of cutting-edge research and technology.
  One of the critical gaps this bill fixes is with structural 
deficiencies in the CIA Inspector General's Office. We are taking steps 
to allow the CIA to better recruit and retain a professional staff of 
investigators. This is done by allowing the IG to designate certain 
positions as law enforcement officers for retirement purposes.
  Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the Congress demand accountability 
and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs. That 
can only be done through consistent passage of an intelligence 
authorization bill. I urge all Members to support the bill before us 
today.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague from the State of California (Mr. Thompson).
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding, and I also thank the chairman and the ranking member for 
making sure that we're able to work together to produce a document that 
will benefit the entire country in regard to our national security, and 
I rise in strong support of this year's Intelligence authorization 
bill.
  As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human 
Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I'm pleased that we're 
able to put this product forward, and I strongly support the bill's 
emphasis on developing stronger counterintelligence capabilities 
throughout the intelligence community.
  Every time I travel overseas to observe operating conditions, I've 
been impressed by the work being done by our intelligence personnel, 
but also concerned about the increasing threats and challenges that we 
face. Today, our intelligence officers are facing increasingly hostile 
foreign intelligence services, insurgent groups, terrorists 
organizations, industrial spies, and the threat of cyberattacks. Many 
of our adversaries are working together in ways we haven't seen before. 
This is no longer the Cold War world with little cameras and secret 
compartments. It's now more complicated to find out how our enemies are 
getting intelligence on the United States and how these same enemies 
are protecting their own secrets.
  To address this threat, this bill provides additional resources to 
enable our intelligence community to collect better information and 
provide better analysis on how our adversaries are working against us.
  Second, since the emergence of the Arab Spring, our subcommittee has 
been examining how the intelligence community has been identifying the 
types of trends that have literally transformed countries overnight, 
countries like Tunisia and Egypt.
  I've heard firsthand from our intelligence personnel that they need 
more to better get a handle on the dynamics in their countries and 
their regions. The Arab Spring phenomenon can happen anywhere anytime, 
and our intelligence community must be better prepared the next time. 
This bill enables the intelligence community to rebuild its global 
mission by realigning and adding to its current resources dedicated to 
this collection effort. With these resources, intelligence personnel 
will have more tools to identify and report signs of instability in 
real-time.
  This bill also includes a number of other provisions that I believe 
are important to our national security. The bill requires the Director 
of National Intelligence to continue compiling threat assessment of 
foreign drug traffickers that are turning our public lands in the 
United States into hostile areas to further their operations. This 
threat assessment was first required in last year's authorization; and 
given the scope of the problem, it's essential that our efforts to 
combat foreign drug traffickers on our Federal property be continued.
  Also, the bill restores funding for the National Gang Intelligence 
Center. The analysis that the NGIC has provided on the growing gang 
influence in the U.S. military, for example, is critical to finding an 
adequate solution to this problem and the very reason Congress created 
the NGIC in the first place. It's important that this work continue.
  I am a little disappointed that we weren't able to do some things 
that we all believe are necessary. For example, the expansion of the 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math cooperative programs at 
colleges and universities is extremely important; and I think we need 
to continue to do more to make sure that we're able to grow that 
resource.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community must be prepared for any and 
all threats. While Osama bin Laden may no longer pose a direct threat 
to our country's safety and security, the remaining elements of al 
Qaeda and other emerging terrorist organizations are more determined 
than ever. It's critical for Congress to pass this bill, and I strongly 
support that we do so today.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I would yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
  Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I want to first start by commending 
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their great work 
on crafting this bipartisan bill, a strong piece of legislation that 
addresses some tremendously important issues that face our country.
  While this legislation in its detail--and we've heard the chairman 
speak about it--talks about new initiatives and programs and three-
letter Agencies, this is about something different from that. This is 
about protecting the American people. This is about keeping the 
citizens of El Dorado and Coffeyville and Wichita and Anthony, Kansas, 
safe against a staggeringly large and very real threat.
  On September 11, now over a decade ago, we began to enter a very 
different time, very different war. Now 15 years ago, I was serving in 
the military. I served along the East German border. Then it was 
different. We could see the enemy. They wore uniforms. There were 
fences and boundaries. And today, we live in a very, very different 
world. And this legislation, the 2013 Intelligence bill, attempts to, 
in a fiscally responsible way while protecting the privacy of every 
American citizen in a conscientious way, address those very real 
threats.

                              {time}  1440

  It is easy sometimes to forget--to forget from a decade ago and 
forget that al Qaeda is still there, active and trying, fighting 
vigorously to take down the American way of life. And to see this 
thoughtful piece of legislation put together in a way that both parties 
could agree to, that both parties could say this makes sense, these are 
the resources we have available, we're going to do this in a fiscally 
prudent way, is something that I think should encourage each of us and 
cause every Member to support this legislation.
  We can't allow anyone to forget that this threat is real. The gravity 
and consequences of not having an active and capable intelligence set 
of agencies and forces is too important. I know the chairman and 
ranking member both understand this, and I want to thank them for their 
work. I want to encourage each and every one of my colleagues to 
support the FY 2013 Intelligence Authorization bill.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague from the State of Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), 
whom I consider one of the foremost experts in the area of 
cybersecurity. Thank you for your work in that field, Mr. Langevin.
  (Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)

[[Page H3293]]

  Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I thank both Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for 
their outstanding work on this very important legislation and so many 
aspects contained in it.
  Last September, I proudly spoke in support of the fiscal year 2012 
Intelligence authorization bill because it addressed critical 
cybersecurity needs as well as many issues of great importance, not 
just to me but to our country and to the men and women of our 
intelligence services. I was pleased to be a part of a bipartisan 
effort within the Intelligence Committee to craft that legislation and 
gratified by the overwhelming bipartisan support that it garnered.
  Earlier this year, the House considered the Cyber Intelligence 
Sharing and Protection Act, which also received bipartisan support and, 
in my opinion, is a critical first step to confront the serious 
challenges our Nation faces in the realm of cybersecurity.
  Now, I continue to advocate for action on CISPA and on the 
comprehensive cybersecurity legislation that will ultimately be 
necessary to address this issue, but today I'm proud to support H.R. 
5743, the fiscal year 2013 Intelligence authorization bill because it 
builds on these earlier efforts to give the U.S. intelligence community 
the tools and funding it needs to meet the challenges of the future. 
Just as importantly, it supports the men and women of the intelligence 
community who enable those investments and keep our Nation secure.
  The National Counterintelligence Executive recently warned that China 
and Russia are conducting sophisticated cyberespionage against the 
U.S., in addition to more traditional espionage operations. They and 
other countries seek to undermine our military, technological, and 
innovative edge by exploiting our vulnerabilities in the cyber realm, 
in particular, our critical infrastructure. This situation presents a 
pervasive threat to U.S. economic security, and I'm very sad to say 
that they're having success.
  The estimates on the losses to U.S. industry and government from 
economic espionage range from $2 billion to over $400 billion a year. 
Now, this massive spread only emphasizes that we don't yet have the 
information we need to fully understand and combat this threat.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. The National Counterintelligence Executive cautions 
that the intelligence community can't entirely prevent cybertheft of 
national and industrial secrets, but the community can minimize the 
hostile activity and mitigate the effects. Those efforts will be more 
successful if the agencies collaborate, build public-private 
partnerships, and improve intelligence collection and analysis of the 
cyberthreat to our country.
  The FY 2013 bill responds by giving the intelligence agencies the 
resources they need to develop a strong, unified effort to counter 
China, Russia, and other actors that might threaten our economic 
security or technological edge. The bill also does a lot to protect our 
supply chain, which is another area of vulnerability.
  This is a good bill, it's an important bill, and I urge my colleagues 
to support it.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I'll reserve my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague from the State of California (Mr. Schiff).
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to rise to 
congratulate our chairman, Mr. Rogers, and our ranking member, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, for their extraordinary work in putting this bill 
together, and the incredible and bipartisan operation of the committee. 
This work product and the committee operations I think were a model 
that many of the rest of the committees on the Hill would do well to 
follow.

  I rise in strong support of H.R. 5743, an authorization bill that 
gives our intelligence community the tools they need to keep America 
safe.
  I'd like to focus on the technical aspects of the bill, specifically 
the intelligence community's future investments in key overhead 
technologies. This is a good bill, as it makes necessary budget cuts 
without affecting the mission of the intelligence community. And there 
is one issue in particular I would like to highlight.
  Since 9/11, we have been investigating the potential advantages of 
persistent video. Current systems that simply snap pictures miss 
critical dynamics of the adversary. Standard pictures limited to 
capturing isolated points in time can't tell where a bad actor came 
from or where they went after they committed an act of terror.
  Hypothetically consider: What if we could use a video and video a 
hostile area 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and during this period a 
roadside bomb occurred? With a variety of capabilities, we could simply 
rewind and watch the perpetrators as they planted the device and trace 
their locations both before and after the device exploded. Independent 
of the source--whether space, ground, or air--we simply can't do that 
with still photography. Similarly, such a capacity might help us 
identify proliferators of nuclear and missile technology.
  I favor an approach that invests in new technologies that go beyond 
our past and present capabilities. In my role as ranking member for the 
Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, I work to ensure that cost, 
schedule, and performance are met as we strive to explore this 
potential advantage for national security.
  Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, again, I want to thank you for the 
opportunity to express my views on this bill. I support it 
wholeheartedly and recommend its passage.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague from the State of Kentucky (Mr. Chandler).
  Mr. CHANDLER. First, I want to start by saying just how wonderful it 
is to be a part of a committee that actually works well together, and I 
thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for that. In 
this place these days, it seems a bit unusual, but on this committee, 
in my view, they are not Republicans and Democrats; there are patriots 
and Americans, and I appreciate that.
  I'm proud to support this bill, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013. This bill authorizes vital funding for our 
intelligence activities which we need to protect America and American 
interests.
  Congress has an obligation to support intelligence gathering while 
also protecting our civil liberties and considering our fiscal 
responsibilities. I believe this bill does just that, ensuring that we 
have resources and tools needed to keep our country safe even in this 
tough economic time.
  We live in complicated times, when terrorists can execute a 
cyberattack from halfway around the world, bringing down a nation's 
infrastructure or compromising individuals' identities and bank 
accounts. Now, more than ever before, our intelligence capabilities are 
critical to the safety and security of our country.
  In my tenure on the Intelligence Committee, I've had the privilege of 
working with the fine men and women of the intelligence community, and 
I'm here to tell you they are committed patriots who protect our Nation 
and our way of life every day. I cannot overstate how important the 
work they do is to the safety of our Nation.
  This bill, which passed out of the committee with overwhelming 
bipartisan support, allocates resources to critical national programs, 
including those that detect, prevent, and disrupt terrorist attacks 
against Americans. It enhances counterterrorism efforts to continue the 
fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. 
Furthermore, this bill shows the committee's commitment to giving our 
intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs while 
providing oversight and protecting personal privacy.
  The world just saw how first-rate our intelligence community is after 
the successful mission to kill Osama bin Laden last year. This 
legislation ensures that we can continue to have the world's premiere 
intelligence capabilities.
  Again, I thank the chairman and I thank the ranking member for the 
tremendous way that they cause the committee to work together. It's an 
honor

[[Page H3294]]

to serve on this committee, and I thank you.

                              {time}  1450

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, can I ask how much time each side 
has remaining?
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 15 minutes remaining. The 
gentleman from Michigan has 18 minutes remaining.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time, 
also.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I have one more speaker who is 
on his way to the floor, I understand, so I continue to reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  I'm proud that the bill under consideration has an emphasis on 
supporting counterintelligence resources. Last year, the chairman and I 
made it a priority to review the community's counterintelligence 
posture after learning more about the aggressive ways foreign 
intelligence and security services continue to steal U.S. secrets, 
including trade secrets, from U.S. companies.
  One of the most disturbing reports came from the National 
Counterintelligence Executive which said that Russia and China are both 
aggressively utilizing cyberspace to steal U.S. economic secrets. This 
informative unclassified report is available on the Director of 
National Intelligence Web site. I encourage every U.S. business to read 
it to understand the threat they face today. The hard work and money it 
takes to innovate and conduct research are all at risk.
  What China, Russia, and any other country who engage in espionage 
realize is that it's faster and cheaper to steal U.S. creativity than 
to develop it themselves. The report also gives examples of the 
millions of dollars that are at stake, like a single proprietary paint 
formula from Valspar valued at $20 million. These are some economic 
impacts of espionage, but they are also the cost to our national 
security and those of our allies.
  A spy within our intelligence community, with access to our most 
sensitive secrets, can mean the lives of our sources and our troops. In 
these cases, it is impossible to calculate the impact. Espionage is 
countered by the villages of our counterintelligence professionals. 
These are the people we depend upon to discover the spies within our 
midst. I'm proud that this bill adds the resources and personnel for 
this critical mission.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Heck).
  Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 5743, the 
Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act.
  This bill strikes the appropriate balance between the necessity for 
fiscal restraint and providing our intelligence community the resources 
they need so that they can continue to play a vital role in our 
national security. This is especially true in the technical collection 
systems that are the focus of the Subcommittee on Technical and 
Tactical Intelligence.
  H.R. 5743 puts the focus on how well our entire technical collection 
architecture systems work together. In the past, we have had a tendency 
to focus on a few large acquisition programs and not on the total 
capability that all systems bring to the nation. This bill leverages 
advancements in technology by making changes that are focused on 
ensuring collection platforms work together to simultaneously collect 
and correlate data.
  Additionally, through funding for the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency programs, this bill incrementally advances the 
ability to coordinate collection across a diverse set of collection 
platforms that are fielded by the intelligence and military 
communities.
  H.R. 5743 also takes an important first step toward reducing the cost 
of launch, and encourages the further development of commercial launch 
services. While the cost of getting to space has not traditionally been 
the focus of the intelligence community, these essential reforms will 
allow us to reallocate these savings to our Nation's core intelligence 
missions.
  Mr. Chairman, again I urge support of H.R. 5743. I thank the chairman 
and the ranking member for their leadership on this issue.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  For the third time in 3 years, Chairman Rogers and I have stood on 
the floor of the House encouraging our colleagues to support our 
intelligence budget bill. We both rise in support of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. I would like to thank Chairman 
Rogers for his bipartisan leadership on this bill.
  The bill gives our intelligence professionals the resources, 
capabilities, and authorities they need to protect American and 
American interests. We crafted a bill that addresses our core needs, 
including space, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and 
counterterrorism, while also keeping an eye on the bottom line. This 
bill is about 4 percent below last year's budget and holds personnel at 
last year's levels.
  The Intelligence Committee came together as Democrats and Republicans 
to do what is right for our country and for the intelligence community. 
The bill unanimously passed out of our committee by a margin of 19 0.
  I would also like to thank the staff of the Intelligence Committee 
for their hard work on this bill. You're only as good as your team and 
your staff.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for FY 2013.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as 
I may consume.
  I, too, want to thank the ranking member for his bipartisan 
leadership on this very, very important issue, our national security, 
and the staffs of both committees. We did something very unusual. We 
have the staffs work together to produce an authorization bill, and we 
think it makes a much better product with a lot more voices in the mix. 
We think we have gotten to a place that will protect America and save 
money for the taxpayers. That's a good place to be.
  And at the end of the day, this is about a very serious issue. It's 
about the fact that we have folks all around the world who are getting 
up in the morning trying to commit acts of violence against U.S. 
citizens or our allies. It's about nation-states who want to steal the 
very prosperity of America by stealing our intellectual property 
through spying or cyberspying. It's about nation-states who are making 
an investment in cyberattack capability that would actually cause 
catastrophic harm to the United States economy. It is about nation-
states who are engaged in the development of nuclear weapons for 
certainly no good purpose.
  In the nineties we had a peace dividend because the structure of the 
threat changed fundamentally, and we could rearrange the way we looked 
at the world and our defense posture and our national security posture 
around the world. And I think this is a good moment to caution where we 
go in the future.
  This is not like the nineties. We don't enjoy the same peace dividend 
in the sense that the world is more complicated and, in many ways, more 
dangerous than it has ever been before. Those intelligence services are 
getting aggressive. Our adversaries are getting better. They are 
investing in space and cyber in a way that is breathtaking if we don't 
keep pace. We don't have to spend dollar for dollar, but we do have to 
match intellectual capital with the solutions that we need to keep 
America safe.
  The very brave men and women who risk their lives all over the globe 
to protect our soldiers by providing them state-of-the-art and up-to-
date information, or by recruiting somebody in a very dangerous place 
somewhere else that might give us that little bit of advantage in 
knowing what our adversaries are up to, we owe a great debt of 
gratitude to those very brave Americans who risk their lives every 
single day in defense of this Nation. They are silent and quiet 
warriors, but deserve no less of our appreciation and gratitude for 
faithful service to this great Nation.
  This bill reflects that, and it reflects the important status that we 
are going

[[Page H3295]]

to have to take in the intelligence community when it comes to 
protecting America in what is promising to be a dangerous future when 
it comes to our adversaries. This bill, we think, takes head-on those 
new challenges, so that America can be equally prosperous in the future 
and as safe as we have ever been.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chair, today I rise in support of H.R. 5743, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. This bipartisan 
bill, which was reported by the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence by a unanimous 19 0 vote, provides funding and policy 
guidance to the America's intelligence community. Few bills are as 
important to our nation's security as this one.
  H.R. 5743 provides the necessary resources to vital security 
programs, many of which focus on detecting and preventing terrorist 
attacks. It is critical that America maintains its qualitative security 
edge with respect to intelligence gathering, data analysis, and 
counter-terrorism. This bill would ensure that happens.
  I recognize that given these challenging economic circumstances, 
difficult choices have to be made. This has led the Committee to 
authorize funding for intelligence activities at level that is four 
percent below last year's enacted budget. I appreciate the way Chairman 
Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger have worked together in an 
effort to fashion a bill that strikes an appropriate balance.
  The committee has made fiscally responsible choices when deciding 
where to cut funding, eliminating redundancies and directing that other 
programs be managed more efficiently.
  Mr. Chair, for obvious reasons many of the programs authorized by 
this legislation cannot be discussed publicly. However, these programs 
are subjected to congressional oversight and scrutiny by the 
Intelligence Committee, which takes seriously obligation to ensure that 
the programs authorized under this legislation and the officials who 
administer them operate within constitutional and legal bounds.
  I am pleased that the bill also contains provisions to strengthen the 
protection of the identities of covert agencies, to combat attempts by 
other countries to buy technology that could be used to develop weapons 
of mass destruction, and to enhance our counterterrorism efforts. As a 
member of the Committee on Homeland Security I know how important it is 
to make counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts priorities.
  It is a sad truth that we live in an age where our most pressing 
concern is the imminent threat of another terrorist attack. Our enemy 
does not respond to logic or reason, and therefore we must be prepared 
for every situation.
  Mr. Chair, I support this bill because I am persuaded that it 
furthers the nation's security interests and is the right thing to do. 
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for H.R. 5743.
  The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed 
in the bill, shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

                               H.R. 5743

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Non-reimbursable details.
Sec. 304. Strategy for security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 305. Repeal or modification of certain reporting requirements.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Sec. 401. Clarification on authority of CIA to transfer funds to CIA 
              activities authorized by law.
Sec. 402. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central 
              Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 403. Working capital fund.
Sec. 404. Intelligence community assistance to counter drug trafficking 
              organizations using public lands.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
              Research and Development Programs of the United States 
              Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Technical amendment to title 5, United States Code.
Sec. 503. Technical amendment to the National Security Act of 1947.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
       (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2013 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
       (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (3) The Department of Defense.
       (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (5) The National Security Agency.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Coast Guard.
       (8) The Department of State.
       (9) The Department of the Treasury.
       (10) The Department of Energy.
       (11) The Department of Justice.
       (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
       (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, 
     subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as 
     of September 30, 2013, for the conduct of the intelligence 
     activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through 
     (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill 
     H.R. 5743 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--
       (1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) 
     shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, and to the President.
       (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph 
     (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate 
     portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
       (3) Limits on disclosure.--In carrying out paragraph (2), 
     the President may disclose only that budget-related 
     information necessary to execute the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations and shall not disclose the Schedule or any 
     portion of the Schedule publicly.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2013 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to 
     in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that such action is necessary to the performance 
     of important intelligence functions, except that the number 
     of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized 
     under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such 
     element.
       (b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by 
     Contract Personnel.--
       (1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection 
     (a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element 
     of the intelligence community makes a determination that 
     activities currently being performed by contract personnel 
     should be performed by employees of such element, the 
     Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a 
     comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for 
     that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent 
     personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time 
     equivalent contract personnel performing such activities.
       (2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in 
     paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of 
     National Intelligence concurs with the determination 
     described in such paragraph.

[[Page H3296]]

       (c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The 
     Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
     congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 
     days prior to each exercise of an authority described in 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 2013 the sum of $530,652,000. Within such amount, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and 
     development shall remain available until September 30, 2014.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of 
     National Intelligence are authorized 831 full-time or full-
     time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2013. Personnel 
     serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the 
     Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence 
     Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2013 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for 
     advanced research and development shall remain available 
     until September 30, 2014.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30, 
     2013, there are authorized such additional personnel for the 
     Community Management Account as of that date as are specified 
     in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2013 the sum of $514,000,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAILS.

       Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 404h 1) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``An officer or employee of the United 
     States or member of the Armed Forces'' and inserting ``(a) 
     Civilian Employees.--An officer or employee of the United 
     States'';
       (2) by striking the second sentence; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
       ``(b) Members of the Armed Forces.--A member of the Armed 
     Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the 
     intelligence community funded through the National 
     Intelligence Program on a non-reimbursable basis, as jointly 
     agreed to by the head of the receiving and detailing 
     elements, for a period not to exceed three years.
       ``(c) No Limitation on Other Authority.--This section does 
     not limit any other source of authority for or non-
     reimbursable details.
       ``(d) No Effect on Appropriations.--A non-reimbursable 
     detail made under this section shall not be considered an 
     augmentation of the appropriations of the element of the 
     intelligence community receiving such detail.''.

     SEC. 304. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

       (a) Strategy.--The President shall develop a strategy and a 
     timeline for carrying out the requirements of section 3001(d) 
     of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
     2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(d)). Such strategy and timeline shall 
     include--
       (1) a process for accomplishing the reciprocity required 
     under such section for a security clearance issued by a 
     department or agency of the Federal Government, including 
     reciprocity for security clearances that are issued to both 
     persons who are and who are not employees of the Federal 
     Government; and
       (2) a description of the specific circumstances under which 
     a department or agency of the Federal Government may not 
     recognize a security clearance issued by another department 
     or agency of the Federal Government.
       (b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
     shall inform Congress of the strategy and timeline developed 
     under subsection (a).

     SEC. 305. REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING 
                   REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.--
       (1) Acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass 
     destruction and advanced conventional munitions.--Section 721 
     of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
     (50 U.S.C. 2366) is repealed.
       (2) Threat of attack on the united states using weapons of 
     mass destruction and the safety and security of russian 
     nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces.--Section 114 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is 
     amended--
       (A) in the heading, by striking ``additional annual reports 
     from the director of national intelligence'' and inserting 
     ``annual report on hiring and retention of minority 
     employees'';
       (B) by striking subsections (a), (c), and (d);
       (C) by striking ``(b) Annual Report on Hiring and Retention 
     of Minority Employees.--'';
       (D) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) as 
     subsections (a) through (e), respectively;
       (E) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated)--
       (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
       (ii) in paragraph (2) (as so redesignated), by 
     redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subparagraphs (A) and 
     (B), respectively; and
       (F) in subsection (e) (as redesignated by subparagraph 
     (D)), by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), as 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
       (3) Measures to protect the identities of covert agents.--
     Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421 
     et seq.) is amended--
       (A) by striking section 603; and
       (B) by redesignating sections 604, 605, and 606 as sections 
     603, 604, and 605, respectively.
       (b) Modification of Reporting Requirements.--
       (1) Intelligence advisory committees.--Section 410(b) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
     (Public Law 111 259; 124 Stat. 2725) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(b) Notification of Establishment of Advisory 
     Committee.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each notify 
     the congressional intelligence committees each time each such 
     Director creates an advisory committee. Each notification 
     shall include--
       ``(1) a description of such advisory committee, including 
     the subject matter of such committee;
       ``(2) a list of members of such advisory committee; and
       ``(3) in the case of an advisory committee created by the 
     Director of National Intelligence, the reasons for a 
     determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App) that an 
     advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of 
     such Act.''.
       (2) Customer feedback on department of homeland security 
     intelligence reporting.--Section 210A(g)(2) of the Homeland 
     Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h) is amended--
       (A) by inserting ``and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence'' after ``Committee on Homeland Security and 
     Governmental Affairs''; and
       (B) by inserting ``and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence'' after ``and the Committee on Homeland 
     Security''.
       (3) Intelligence information sharing.--Section 102A(g)(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 1(g)(4)) 
     is amended to read as follows:
       ``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a 
     timely manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, 
     policy, or practice that the Director believes impedes the 
     ability of the Director to fully and effectively ensure 
     maximum availability of access to intelligence information 
     within the intelligence community consistent with the 
     protection of the national security of the United States.''.
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Report submission dates.--Section 507 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)--
       (i) by striking ``(1) The date'' and inserting ``The 
     date'';
       (ii) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
     ``subsection (c)(1)(A)'' and inserting ``subsection (c)(1)'';
       (iii) by striking paragraph (2);
       (iv) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (C);
       (v) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``114(c)'' and 
     inserting ``114''; and
       (vi) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (D), (E), (F), 
     (G), (H), and (I), as paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), 
     (6), and (7), respectively; and
       (B) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``(A) Except as provided'' and inserting 
     ``Except as provided''; and
       (ii) by striking subparagraph (B).
       (2) Table of contents of the national security act of 
     1947.--The table of contents in the first section of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended--
       (A) by striking the item relating to section 114 and 
     inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 114. Annual report on hiring and retention of minority 
              employees.''; and

       (B) by striking the items relating to sections 603, 604, 
     605, and 606 and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 603. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
``Sec. 604. Providing information to Congress.
``Sec. 605. Definitions.''.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION ON AUTHORITY OF CIA TO TRANSFER FUNDS 
                   TO CIA ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of 
     the functions or activities authorized under section 104A of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403

[[Page H3297]]

     4a).'' and inserting ``any functions or activities of the 
     Agency authorized by law''.

     SEC. 402. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE 
                   CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       Section 17(e)(7) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(7)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Subject to applicable law'' and inserting 
     ``(A) Subject to applicable law''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B)(i) The Inspector General may designate an officer or 
     employee appointed in accordance with subparagraph (A) as a 
     law enforcement officer solely for purposes of subchapter III 
     of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, 
     if such officer or employee is appointed to a position in 
     which the duty is to investigate suspected offenses against 
     the criminal laws of the United States.
       ``(ii) In carrying out clause (i), the Inspector General 
     shall ensure that any authority under such clause is 
     exercised in a manner consistent with the provisions of 
     section 3307 of title 5, United States Code, as they relate 
     to law enforcement officers.
       ``(iii) For purposes of applying sections 3307(d), 8335(b), 
     and 8425(b) of title 5, United States Code, the Inspector 
     General may exercise the functions, powers, and duties of an 
     agency head or appointing authority with respect to the 
     Office.''.

     SEC. 403. WORKING CAPITAL FUND.

       Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1)--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting a semicolon;
       (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) authorize such providers to advertise through Federal 
     Government-owned websites the services of such providers to 
     the entities to which such providers are providing items 
     under the program, provided that the Director shall not 
     authorize such providers to distribute gifts or promotional 
     items.''; and
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) in paragraph (2)(E), by striking ``equipment or 
     property'' and inserting ``equipment, recyclable materials, 
     or property''; and
       (B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (f)(2)'' 
     and inserting ``subsections (b)(1)(D) and (f)(2)''.

     SEC. 404. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER DRUG 
                   TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS USING PUBLIC LANDS.

       Section 401(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112 87; 125 Stat. 1887) is 
     amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
       (1) by inserting ``and annually thereafter,'' after ``Not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act,'';
       (2) by striking ``submit to'' and inserting ``inform'';
       (3) by striking ``a report on the results'' and inserting 
     ``of the results''; and
       (4) by striking ``Such report'' and inserting ``Information 
     provided under this subsection''.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

     SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF 
                   THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       Section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107 306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is 
     amended by striking ``Not later than one year after the date 
     on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant 
     to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2010'' and inserting ``Not later than March 
     31, 2013''.

     SEC. 502. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE.

       Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting ``, the Office of the Director of 
     National Intelligence'' after ``the Central Intelligence 
     Agency''.

     SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 
                   1947.

       Section 605 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     426) (as redesignated by section 305 of this Act) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (4)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``intelligence 
     agency'' each place it appears and inserting ``element of the 
     intelligence community'';
       (B) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``intelligence 
     agency'' and inserting ``element of the intelligence 
     community''; and
       (C) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``intelligence 
     agency'' and inserting ``element of the intelligence 
     community'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (5);
       (3) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through (10) as 
     paragraphs (5) through (9), respectively; and
       (4) in paragraph (5) (as so redesignated), by striking 
     ``intelligence agency'' and inserting ``element of the 
     intelligence community''.

  The CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 112 
504. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the 
report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read, 
shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided 
and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject 
to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the 
question.


           Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk 
made in order under the rule, amendment No. 1.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Strike section 401 (page 18, lines 4 through 12).
       Strike section 403 (page 19, line 13 through page 20, line 
     11).

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as 
I might consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a manager's amendment to the bill, and very 
simply--and I don't want to waste a lot of time on it--it would simply 
strike two technical provisions to allow us to resolve any potential 
issues going forward.
  There were two technical issues that were deemed by the 
Parliamentarian as appropriation language. We just wanted to take that 
language out to make sure that there were no issues. It doesn't change 
the nature of the bill in any way, and it has bipartisan support. I 
would urge the body's support of the Rogers amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1500

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I rise in opposition to the amendment, but I do 
support the amendment.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The amendment was agreed to.


         Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Thompson of California

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 306. SUBCONTRACTOR NOTIFICATION PROCESS.

       Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National 
     Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
     committees a report assessing the method by which contractors 
     at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of 
     the intelligence community are granted security clearances 
     and notified of classified contracting opportunities within 
     the Federal Government and recommendations for the 
     improvement of such method. Such report shall include--
       (1) an assessment of the current method by which 
     contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an 
     element of the intelligence community are notified of 
     classified contracting opportunities;
       (2) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the 
     overall effectiveness of the ability of the intelligence 
     community to identify appropriate contractors at any tier 
     under such a contract;
       (3) an assessment of the role the existing security 
     clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability 
     of the intelligence community to notify such contractors of 
     contracting opportunities;
       (4) an assessment of the role the current security 
     clearance process in enhancing or hindering the ability of 
     contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an 
     element of the intelligence community to execute classified 
     contracts;
       (5) a description of the method used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence for assessing the effectiveness of the 
     notification process of the intelligence community to produce 
     a talented pool of subcontractors;
       (6) a description of appropriate goals, schedules, 
     milestones, or metrics used to measure the effectiveness of 
     such notification process; and
       (7) recommendations for improving such notification 
     process.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.

[[Page H3298]]

  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  My amendment will help small businesses that have the proper security 
clearances to better navigate the intelligence community's contracting 
process, and will ensure that they get a fair shot at business 
opportunities should these companies have the technical expertise and 
capabilities needed. This change will be good for small businesses and 
will strengthen our national security.
  Second- and third-tier contractors produce highly specialized 
technology for the intelligence community, but work directly for larger 
companies. These small businesses have extraordinary talent and 
expertise, but often find themselves excluded from many business 
opportunities with the larger intelligence community because, for 
example, they lack access to the classified databases where these 
opportunities are presented. Sometimes that access is as simple as a 
computer connection for cleared experts to review contracting 
opportunities.
  By limiting small businesses that have the appropriate security 
clearances from these contracting opportunities, we all lose. The 
intelligence community loses access to the best technical solutions by 
limiting who is able to fulfill or to even bid for those contracts. 
Small businesses lose the opportunity to display their expertise and to 
expand their companies. As important, the taxpayer loses by virtue of a 
lack of market competition and is given no assurance that the 
government is getting the best price for its classified contract 
requirements.
  My amendment addresses this problem by requiring an assessment of the 
IC's current contracting practices and a review of these practices to 
determine if they present unfair barriers to competition for small 
businesses. In particular, my amendment requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to report to Congress how the intelligence 
community is currently working with second- and third-tier contractors 
and to identify any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness 
of this contracting process. In this report, the DNI will be required 
to offer recommendations to improve the methods by which second- and 
third-tier contractors are granted security clearances and notified of 
classified contracting opportunities.
  Mr. Chairman, second- and third-tier contractors who support the 
technical efforts of the intelligence community are an underutilized 
asset. These same second-and third-tier contractors are also small 
businesses that many of our communities depend upon for jobs and for 
the economies in their local areas. My amendment ensures that the 
intelligence community is getting access to the best available 
technology while ensuring that small businesses around the country have 
a fair shot at expanding their companies.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I rise to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to thank Mr. Thompson for working with us, not only on the 
overall bill, but on any amendment that might strengthen the process. I 
am committed to continue to work with Mr. Thompson on these very 
issues, and I would support the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Thompson).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Conyers

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 306. REPORT ON CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY STRIKE AGAINST 
                   IRAN.

       Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
     to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
     containing an assessment of the consequences of a military 
     strike against Iran.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from 
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman and Members, I rise in support of this amendment with my 
colleagues Mr. Ellison of Minnesota and Ms. Lee of California. Our 
amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to submit 
to the congressional Intelligence Committee within 60 days a report 
containing an analysis of the potential consequences of a military 
strike against Iran.
  In recent months, the possibility of a preemptive military strike 
against Iran has been openly discussed as a policy option of last 
resort as our country and our allies determine how best to confront the 
challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program. At the same time, the 
national discussion has prompted a large number of current and former 
military and intelligence officials to come forward to encourage the 
Congress and the administration to consider the possible consequences 
both intended and others that may be unintended of such a strike.
  These high-level officials include former United States and Israeli 
national security officials, including a former Bush administration 
National Intelligence Council chairman, a former National Intelligence 
officer for the Near East and South Asia, General Colin Powell's former 
chief of staff, five retired generals, the former director of the 
Israeli Mossad, and a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense 
Forces.
  All of these experts have raised concerns that an attack on Iran 
could possibly result in serious harm to the global economy, 
potentially ignite a regional war and even push Iran into building a 
nuclear weapon. With consequences as serious as these being raised by 
outside and former national security experts, it is critical that the 
expertise and collective wisdom of our intelligence community be added 
to this debate so that our country's policy options involving war and 
peace can be rigorously examined by this body.
  For these reasons, I encourage my colleagues to support my amendment, 
and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I rise to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  This is an interesting amendment. This is something that we do as a 
matter of course in the committee, and it is as serious a matter as we 
consider: issues of war. It is also interesting that the consequences 
of a nuclear Iran are not a part of this. We would encourage that to 
happen, and we will engage in that discussion in the committee. A 
nuclear arms race in the Middle East is a catastrophe that is the worst 
part of a nightmare. Saudi Arabia has said, Hey, if Iran goes nuclear, 
we very well can't not go nuclear.
  We believe that other nations--Turkey, Egypt, others--have said it's 
probably in our best interests not to be the ones without a nuclear 
weapon program if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. The proliferation of 
nuclear weapons across the Middle East is dangerous, incredibly 
dangerous. That's one outcome. We also have to consider that outcome as 
well.

                              {time}  1510

  Think about where Israel is today. This is a talk about U.S. action 
against Iran, something that we should consider. We should be very 
careful about all of those considerations. Now think about Israel and 
what they may or may not have to do when it comes to taking out a 
nuclear weapon program where they know one of its destinations will 
impact the very existence of the people of Israel. They live in a 
dangerous neighborhood. Egypt is now an uncertain partner in peace. 
There is violence

[[Page H3299]]

breaking out in the Sinai because of the turmoil and the changes 
happening in Egypt. Hamas is well armed, as well armed as we have ever 
seen them, with missiles aimed at Israel. Hezbollah has about 30,000--
the public number--we believe of very accurate missile systems pointed 
at Israel. Iran is moving and marching forward. Clearly the IAEA just 
recently reported a 27 percent enrichment rate on traces of uranium. 
That doesn't get you to the all-important 95, but it crosses a very 
critical threshold and a dangerous one, that 20 percent enrichment 
rate. That is a dangerous place for them to be. You hit 20, it's a lot 
easier to get to 95.
  They have certainly shown that they are bad actors in the world. We 
should consider that as well, and we do in the Intelligence Committee. 
Imagine the fact that somebody would make the calculation, a nation-
state, to assassinate an ambassador of another nation in our Nation's 
capital. And if they killed U.S. civilians, so be it.
  We have seen a proliferation of these types of attacks from Iran. 
They haven't been very good at it yet. We've caught most of them. But 
they're learning from every event. And it's happening in places like 
Turkey, Pakistan, Argentina, and other places around the world. We are 
in a scary place indeed.
  I won't oppose this amendment, but we need to look at this in total. 
I will tell you that if you want to stop Iran from getting a nuclear 
weapons program, we have to step up. We're doing a fine job on the 
sanctions now--thanks to this body leading the way for sanctions 
working--but they also have to believe that military options are on the 
table. If they do not believe it, they'll continue down this path that 
is dangerous for the national security interests of the United States, 
of the Middle East, and indeed the world. Nuclear weapons in the hands 
of rogue elements is a thing that keeps me up every single night. I 
can't imagine that arms race in the Middle East making the job of 
stopping that any easier indeed.
  I will not oppose this amendment, but I do think it's important that 
we put it in all of the context of the threat that a nuclear Iran 
poses, not just to the Middle East but to the world.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Conyers. And I want to thank 
the chair as well for accepting the amendment, and I rise in support of 
the amendment.
  I think that Chairman Rogers' concerns are well stated. I know that 
the security of this country is something that you're committed to, as 
am I. This amendment, I think, will help slow down the rush towards war 
by asking those who are involved in our intelligence gathering to focus 
on just what a war with Iran will mean.
  I've been studying this in terms of the effects because we had a 
discussion a few years ago in Congress about the potential of bunker 
busters being used, and I looked at that and consulted with medical 
scientists who told me that a bunker buster would cause radiation to go 
hundreds, even thousands, of miles not only through Iran, but outside 
the country and into other countries, as well. It would be a major 
health catastrophe with a lot of innocent people killed.
  We have to think of the broad impact here of a potential attack. And 
I think that it's good that you're including this in the bill.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member and the 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee for their concern about this 
phase of intelligence, and I hope to enjoy their support and the 
support of the committee as a whole in having this amendment added to 
the work that is going on here today.
  I urge support of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Ms. LEE of California. Mr. Chair, first, let me thank my esteemed 
colleague Congressman John Conyers for giving me the opportunity to 
speak on this important amendment.
  I would also like to recognize Congressman Keith Ellison who has been 
an outstanding leader on issues affecting the Middle East.
  Mr. Chair, first let me say unequivocally that we can all agree that 
we must work to prevent an Iran armed with nuclear weapons--which would 
never be unacceptable.
  That is not what this amendment is about, this amendment is 
noncontroversial.
  This amendment is really just about common sense.
  It would simply require that the National Intelligence Director give 
Congress a report outlining their assessment of the consequences of 
launching a military strike against Iran.
  This amendment is necessary because, once again we hear very loudly 
the drum beat of war.
  If we have learned anything from the past ten years, it is that we 
have to be deliberate, be thoughtful, be careful, and know exactly what 
we are getting ourselves into before we launch another war in the 
Middle East.
  These decisions should not be taken lightly, and they must be based 
on sound reasoning, and the best information, and the best 
intelligence.
  We have a duty to our brave men and women in uniform who have 
sacrificed so much during the past decade of war to have an informed 
debate about the consequences of military action.
  I urge you to vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Farr

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in 
House Report 112 504 as modified by the order of the House of today.
  Mr. FARR. I have an amendment at the desk made in order by the rule.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title III, add the following new section:

     SEC. 306. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN 
                   LANGUAGES AND CULTURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
                   CYBER TOOLS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

       It is the sense of Congress that the head of each element 
     of the intelligence community should take into consideration 
     foreign languages and cultures during the development by such 
     element of the intelligence community of training, tools, and 
     methodologies to protect the networks of the United States 
     against cyber attacks and intrusions from foreign entities.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Farr) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. FARR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FARR. I want to thank our colleagues on this committee. Those of 
us who are not on the committee have the opportunity to share in 
participating in the debate on this bill and voting for it. I have to 
say over the years I've been here, I don't think this bill has been 
brought to the floor in such bipartisan unity as it has this session. I 
want to congratulate both of them for their leadership.
  Mr. Chairman, I also want to point out with this amendment that 
cyberanalysis is a relatively new field to the intelligence community. 
Training and tool development have focused on computer networks, but 
it's also important to understand the plans and intentions of foreign 
actors who are involved in cyberattacks and intrusions.
  How do we best understand foreign plans and intentions? Is it by 
providing some aspects of foreign language and cultural training to 
intelligent professionals that includes cyberanalysts? This training is 
essential because it helps the intelligence community to understand the 
behavior of our potential adversaries. It helps them anticipate the 
actions that they may be taking, and it helps them develop potential 
allies.
  The traditional missions of the intelligence community have undergone 
many changes, and the community must invest in new tools and develop 
creative ways to train its men and women. My amendment is necessary 
because the intelligence community department heads are not as focused 
as they should be on the gaps in foreign language skills and cultural 
knowledge in the workforce.
  The intelligence community provides specialized training for its men 
and women in foreign languages and culture, in analysis, in 
cybersecurity. However, aspects of all these areas should be brought 
together as a part of the toolkit for cyberanalysts to best meet our 
Nation's challenges.

[[Page H3300]]

  My amendment will not cause undue burden to the intelligence 
community. It will serve as an essential reminder to those whose 
decisions impact training and tool development to remember the value 
and importance of including foreign languages and cultural knowledge in 
all aspects of our intelligence mission.
  I know of no opposition to my amendment, and I would hope that it 
would be supported by both sides of the aisle.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  When we talk about critical STEM knowledge and skills for our Intel 
workforce, we should also be talking about STEM L, which combines STEM 
with foreign language.
  STEM is Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math. Including foreign 
language and culture training with STEM would create a power-house 
workforce for the Intelligence Community.
  For example, just as cyber analysts should understand some aspects of 
foreign language and culture, language and intelligence analysts should 
also have some understanding of computer network concepts and 
technology.
  The Intelligence Community trains its workforce in STEM and foreign 
language, but not together. The training is stove-piped by career 
field.
  This does not suggest that all types of intelligence analysts need to 
be experts in STEM or even in a foreign language. However, the 
Intelligence Community should consider exploring cross-pollination of 
knowledge.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to 
applaud the gentleman for his work. We look forward to working with him 
as we move forward, and I will support the amendment.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FARR. Thank you for your support, and I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Farr).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  1520


                 Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Cuellar

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title IV, add the following new section:

     SEC. 405. INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH MEXICO AND CANADA.

       (a) Authorization.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     may--
       (1) if the Director determines that the sharing of 
     intelligence information with Mexico and Canada for purposes 
     of reducing drug trafficking would not threaten national 
     security, allow the sharing of such intelligence information 
     with Mexico and Canada; and
       (2) make use of intelligence information from Mexico and 
     Canada for such purposes.
       (b) Type of Information.--Information shared or used under 
     subsection (a) may include the movements of drug cartels and 
     other criminal behavior.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from Texas 
(Mr. Cuellar) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today and encourage my colleagues to support my 
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013.
  Particularly, I want to thank Chairman Rogers and our ranking member, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, for their bipartisan approach on this particular 
piece of legislation.
  My amendment would authorize the Director of National Intelligence to 
participate in information sharing with the Republic of Mexico and 
Canada for the purposes of border security and combating drug 
trafficking and any related crimes.
  Nothing in this amendment requires the Director of National 
Intelligence to share their information, but based on this information, 
this amendment simply gives the agency the power to do so in the event 
that the Director sees the real benefit in combating the flow of drugs 
throughout the United States and our neighbors.
  This important amendment will go a long way in making sure that our 
northern and southern neighbors have all the tools we can offer to stop 
the violence and trafficking caused by drug cartels. The Republic of 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States share a deep concern over the 
threat to our societies by drug trafficking and other criminal 
organizations operating on both sides of our common borders. The 
growing operational and financial capabilities of criminal groups that 
traffic in drugs, arms, persons, as well as transnational criminal 
activity, pose a clear and present threat to our lives and the well-
being of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican citizens.
  North America must make it a priority to break the power and impunity 
of drug and criminal organizations that threaten the health and public 
safety of their citizens and the stability and security of the region. 
Both the Canadian and Mexican Governments are profoundly committed to 
the concerted bilateral strategic and tactical cooperation necessary to 
combat effectively this criminal activity, particularly the threat it 
presents to our Nation's youth and the importance of having adequate 
access to intelligence information.
  This amendment will make whatever intelligence gathered by the United 
States that can be shared, will be shared to stop the flow of illegal 
drugs. In addition, this amendment will ensure that whatever 
intelligence gathered by our neighbors can be properly used by our law 
enforcement to make sure that we stop the drugs.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to say that I do appreciate, 
again, the work of our ranking member, the chairman. I hope that the 
chairman is supportive of this amendment, and I certainly want to thank 
all the committee members.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to compliment the gentleman for his work in bringing attention 
to this very important issue.
  We have a serious problem on our southern border with our friend, 
neighbor, and ally, Mexico. They are under siege by organized criminal 
narcotrafficking organizations.
  If you have just looked at the sheer death count and the murder and 
mayhem in some of the provinces along our southern border, it is 
shocking; and I think this will serve to at least make an advance on 
trying to help our southern neighbors get a handle on what is a serious 
and growing violent problem to our neighbor to the south. And I commend 
the gentleman and look forward to working with him in the future on 
this very important issue, and I would support the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CUELLAR. Again, I want to thank Chairman Rogers for his work, our 
ranking member also, and the committee staff. Thank you for the 
support.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Cuellar).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Hahn

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in 
House Report 112 504 as modified by the order of the House of today.
  Ms. HAHN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title IV (page 21, after line 2), add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 405. CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION OFFICER REVIEW OF 
                   CYBERSECURITY POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       Section 103D(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403 3d(b)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new 
     paragraph:

[[Page H3301]]

       ``(7) ensure that any coordination and training between an 
     element of the intelligence community and a law enforcement 
     agency does not violate the Constitutional rights of racial 
     or ethnic minorities; and''.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Hahn) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. HAHN. I also want to start out by thanking Chairman Rogers and 
Ranking Member Ruppersberger for bringing forward this bipartisan bill, 
and I am echoing I think what everyone is feeling today, that I think 
it's important for the American people to see this, to see us come 
together on such an important issue when it comes to protecting all 
Americans, so it feels good to be a part of this today.
  I know that we face complex challenges and threats to our national 
security, and I don't think anyone ever wants to see another September 
11 terrorist attack on this Nation. To prevent that, I know we need to 
use many tools at our disposal to combat the ever-evolving dangers that 
threaten our society. We need all levels of law enforcement to work 
together to ensure that we're safe.
  We must protect the rights of all of our citizens as we do this. We 
cannot allow our desire to protect our country come at the expense of 
any group in this great country. This is the promise of our Nation's 
Founding Fathers. The promise of equal justice under the law is etched 
in our Supreme Court building. This is part of our Nation's DNA that 
there is the promise of equality.
  My amendment furthers this promise. It requires the Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer, which is in the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, to ensure that any training between the intelligence 
community and law enforcement includes the protection of constitutional 
rights of racial and ethnic minorities.
  Mr. Chairman, we cannot take our national security for granted, but 
we have to ensure that everyone has equal justice under the law.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to thank the gentlelady for her concern on these very 
important issues. One of the things that's so important, I think, to 
our country, is that we do have a strong and robust national security 
service of all sorts.
  In order for that to work and be the most effective, people have to 
have trust in it. They have to understand that their rights are 
protected, and I think this amendment states exactly where they are and 
where they should be. And, therefore, I won't oppose the amendment, and 
I applaud the gentlelady's concern and effort. It will serve as a 
valuable reminder, I think, to the men and women who are standing tall 
in our defense what it's all about and why they do it.
  I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. HAHN. Thank you to the chairman and the ranking member for 
bringing this bipartisan bill forward that I think will have such great 
support.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Hahn).
  The amendment was agreed to.


          Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title IV (page 21, after line 2), add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 405. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON HIRING OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES 
                   BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of the 
     Central Intelligence Agency should take such actions as the 
     Director considers necessary to increase the recruitment and 
     training of ethnic minorities as officers and employees of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the chairperson of the Intelligence 
Committee and the ranking member and speak in the spirit of 
bipartisanship, and I congratulate both gentlemen for recognizing that 
the security and intelligence of America speaks loudly to the idea of 
bipartisanship.
  Just a few hours ago, I was in a classified briefing--for fear of 
anyone thinking that I will share that classified briefing, I will not. 
But what I will say is it is clear that intelligence is a key to the 
peace and security that the American people have experienced since 9/
11. Through the work of Members of Congress and the intelligence 
community, of which we owe a great deal of that gratitude, we have been 
able to, for now some 11 years plus on our soil, experience the safety 
and security, although we have had many attempts.
  For that reason, I believe this is important work. My amendment says 
that it is important for the Director to consider the necessary 
processes to increase the recruitment and training of ethnic minorities 
as officers and employees of the CIA.

                              {time}  1530

  We have done this before. We have encouraged them to do so. And we 
can say that there have been gradual steps. And we applaud that. But 
the men and women who conduct this important work certainly deserve our 
support and all of the resources that we can muster to make sure they 
are successful in their endeavors. Yet we also ensure that the CIA 
itself reflects the American population and that of the world. Having 
agents who can be deployed anywhere at any time is vital to our 
national security, as well as the ability to interact with foreign 
nationals who speak the language is truly important. A diverse 
workforce can make America safer and more secure.
  Historically, there's been an exclusion of minorities, particularly 
African Americans and Latinos, in the highest levels of national 
security. Let's continue to break that barrier. It's taken decades for 
minorities to make inroads into America's national security apparatus. 
And I know that this is a sense of Congress, but I always have faith 
that people will adhere to a positive statement by this body.
  Although the number of CIA employees remains a classified secret, the 
Agency has released some numbers over the years. In 1966, blacks 
represented 10 percent of the CIA's total workforce and only 3 percent 
of the Agency's officers in senior intelligence service, whereas 17 
percent of the clerical staff and 22 percent of the Agency's blue 
collar workforce was African American.
  Over this past weekend, we commemorated, mourned, and celebrated our 
fallen soldiers. I had the privilege of having uncles who went off to 
war in World War II, one who served as a chief petty officer in the 
United States Navy. That was the integrated United States Navy. I can 
tell you that we are better for it when we utilize the talents of all 
Americans.
  In 1992, a declassified study of CIA personnel found that about half 
of all black intelligence officers reported that they had been victims 
of racial harassment by the Agency. As of today, of the CIA's core of 
case officers, which is believed to number more than 1,000, only 11 
percent are minorities and 18 percent are women. The majority of the 
Agency's top managers are still predominantly nonminorities.
  According to CIA officials, one-third of the new operations officers 
hired in 2011 have been women, while just 11 percent have been 
minorities, as traditionally defined: African Americans, Asian 
Americans, or Latinos. Twenty percent of all new operations officers 
are native speakers of a foreign language and 75 percent have advanced 
proficiency in foreign languages, many because they've lived abroad. 
Almost half have advanced degrees.
  I applaud that and I truly believe, as some may be listening and 
saying, Aren't we are all Americans? Yes, we are. If we are all 
Americans, then our

[[Page H3302]]

CIA, one of our most storied Agencies, needs to join and continue to 
recruit and improve on bringing in the diverse picture of the face of 
America because we'll be better for it.
  When President Truman integrated the United States military, we 
became better for it. We celebrate all people who are willing to put 
the Nation's uniform on and die for their country. Likewise, for this 
wonderful intelligence Agency, we do the same.
  With that, I ask my colleagues to support my amendment, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, though I do not oppose the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I thank the gentlelady for her amendment. Certainly, the good news 
is, as she said, she has pointed out the progress that has been made. 
And that's right, they have done an exceptionally good job of 
understanding that diversity is part of the success of our intelligence 
services. So restating that policy is probably a good idea. I will not 
oppose the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the gentleman. I thank the ranking 
member as well.
  In closing, let me just pay tribute to Garrett Jones, who served as a 
CIA station chief in Somalia during peacekeeping operations in 1993 and 
was cited as an African American officer who was able to work 
undercover for weeks in North Mogadishu, which his duty officers said 
would have been all but impossible by Jones' other officers.
  We all have a contribution to make. And I look forward to this sense 
of Congress not being weeded out in conference and reemphasizing the 
importance of this effort.
  With that I ask support of my amendment, and I yield back the balance 
of my time.
  Mr. Chair, I rise to debate my amendment #7 to H.R. 5743 
``Intelligence Authorization Act,'' which is a Sense of Congress that 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should take such 
actions as the Director considers necessary to increase the recruitment 
and training of ethnic minorities as officers and employees of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
  The men and women who conduct this important work certainly deserve 
our support and all of the resources that we can muster to make sure 
that they're successful in their endeavors. Yet, we must also ensure 
that the CIA itself reflects the American population and that of the 
world. Having agents who can be deployed anywhere at any time is vital 
to our national security. As is a diversity of thought and perspectives 
that can be garnered by having a diverse workforce.
  Historically there has been an exclusion of minorities, particularly 
African Americans and Latinos in the highest levels of national 
security.
  It has taken decades for minorities to make inroads into America's 
national security apparatus.
  Although the number of CIA employees remains a classified secret, the 
agency has released some numbers over the years. In 1996 Blacks 
represented 10 percent of the CIA's total work force and only 3 percent 
of the agency's officers in senior intelligence service whereas 17 
percent of the clerical staff and 22 percent of the agency's blue-
collar work force was African American.
  In 1992 a declassified study of CIA personnel found that about half 
of all black intelligence officers reported that they had been victims 
of racial harassment by the agency.
  As of today the CIA's corps of case officers which is believed to 
number more than 1,000 and only 11 percent are minorities and 18 
percent are women.
  The Majority of the agency's top managers are still predominantly 
White males.
  According to the CIA officials one-third of the new operations 
officers hired in 2011 have been women. While just 11 percent have been 
minorities as traditionally defined (African Americans, Asian Americans 
or Latinos), 20 percent of all new operations officers are native 
speakers of a foreign language and 75 percent have advanced proficiency 
in foreign languages, many because they have lived abroad. Almost half 
have advanced degrees.
  There have been improvements since 1992, however, more must and 
should be done to ensure that diversity is reflected at the highest 
levels of the CIA.
  The value of diversity in a spy service that operates in almost every 
country would seem to be obvious.
  Garrett Jones who served as CIA station chief in Somalia during 
peacekeeping operations in 1993, cited the example of an African 
American officer who was able to work undercover for weeks in north 
Mogadishu, which he said would have been all but impossible for Jones 
or any of the station's other white officers. As we must deploy CIA 
agents all over the world. We need agents that are able to blend into a 
variety of situations. We need diversity.
  Interest in working for the CIA rose after the Sept. 11 attacks. 
Between October 2001 and October 2002, the agency received 170,000 
resumes.
  Since founding of Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
minority representation increased to nearly 23 percent in 2009 in FY 
2009, up since FY05, when it was 20 percent. Minorities received nearly 
25 percent of promotions in FY09 and over 27 percent of new hires were 
minority. Women earned 46 percent of promotions in FY09, significantly 
higher than their representation at about 39 percent.
  Letitia ``Tish'' Long is the first woman to head a major intelligence 
agency as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the 
office responsible for collecting and analyzing overhead imagery and 
geospatial information.
  Women have held the #2 spot at several intelligence agencies, 
including National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and 
NGA. CIA however has never had a woman as #2, but has had a woman in 
its #3 spot.
  My amendment is a reflection of the need to continue to place the 
spotlight on the intelligence community to ensure that they continue in 
their efforts to reflect the needs of this country by recruiting, 
training, and retaining qualified minorities,
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  The amendment was agreed to.


          Amendment No. 8 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       After section 501 (page 21, after line 14), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
                   COMMUNITY TO PROTECT CIVIL LIBERTIES OF 
                   RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES.

       It is the sense of Congress that the intelligence community 
     should take all appropriate actions necessary to protect the 
     civil liberties of religious and ethnic minorities.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Again, let me thank the chairman of the 
committee and the ranking member for bringing forward a bipartisan 
initiative, and I hope that this would add to, again, reemphasizing 
what we have begun to do and that we will continue to do, and that is 
to recognize the value of security, but also recognize what Americans 
hold dear--their privacy, their respect for individual rights, their 
civil liberties. And so this amendment speaks specifically to the 
importance of protecting the civil liberties of religious and ethic 
minorities.
  I can cite the moments in history where we have failed. Certainly, 
the Japanese interment loudly speaks in current, modern-day history of 
the tragedy of not respecting the civil liberties of Americans. 
Certainly, if we went as far back as the slave history of America, we 
can see that those who are on American soil who would have sought well 
to be Americans, their civil liberties were not protected.
  But America has made great progress, and I think it is important as 
we look at new populations that come to this country that we 
particularly focus on this whole concept of religious liberty. It is a 
concept that sometimes is very difficult to adhere to. I may not agree 
with your faith and your religion, but you have the right to practice 
it as long as you're not doing harm to the American people.
  For example, President George W. Bush in 2001 told the American 
Congress during that very difficult time that terrorists practice a 
fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim 
scholars and the vast

[[Page H3303]]

majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the 
peaceful teachings of Islam.
  And so this particular faith certainly has been one that has been 
most noted. I think we have all come to the conclusion that we should 
protect the civil liberties of those who practice their faith under the 
Constitution of the United States, which the First Amendment guarantees 
the right to the freedom of access, freedom of movement, freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech.
  I would hope that in the intelligence community, as they do their 
work fighting terrorism, fighting the potential of those terrorist 
cells that may find themselves on our soil, that they will recognize 
the right of individuals to practice the faith and the aspect of the 
faith that follows the tenets of their faith and not categorize those 
individuals simply because of their faith that they might be intending 
to do us wrong.
  There are many incidences where we have the kind of treatment of 
individuals because they happen to be of a particular background, 
particular ethnicity, racial background, and then, of course, faith. 
But I want to speak to this amendment so that people will know that it 
is a broad base, because many times we have disagreement with a number 
of subsets of different faiths, whether it's Protestant, whether it's 
faith that we are used to addressing.
  So it is a statement that says that the civil liberties of all 
Americans will not be deprived through the necessity of protecting this 
land through our intelligence community on the basis of their religion 
and ethnic minorities.
  We know that in some jurisdictions there have been incidences of 
individuals that believe that their privacy has been intruded upon. I 
would hope that in the framework of the fine work that the intelligence 
community has to do that there is no intimidation of making sure that 
civil liberties can be protected.
  Many of us have debated a number of bills on the floor of the House 
dealing with privacy questions. I think it is important in this sense 
of Congress to always restate that we are committed to national 
security, but we're committed to the civil liberties of those within 
our soil--American citizens.
  With that, I ask my colleagues to support my amendment, and I reserve 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to thank the gentlelady. Civil liberties are incredibly 
important. It's important that the American people have faith in their 
intelligence services that they are, in fact, catching bad guys and 
protecting Americans' civil liberties. The good news is that as a part 
of the Director of National Intelligence they have a Civil Liberties 
Protection Officer. This is a reaffirmation, I think, of that valuable 
work that that particular officer does, and really all of the members 
of our intelligence community need be reminded that protection of 
American civil liberties is an important value and an important thing 
to do while in fact you're catching the bad guys.
  I support the amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Let me capture what the chairman said. I 
like the terminology that says the American people must have faith in 
their intelligence community, but faith in the principles upon which we 
live. And they must know that the Constitution is a living, breathing 
document. And we as Members of Congress must as well.

                              {time}  1540

  So, again, I make a plea that this sense of Congress is a 
reaffirmation, but also an encouragement and a statement that should be 
in this bill that we respect the civil liberties of racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities, and in fact so will our intelligence community.
  With that in mind, I would ask my colleagues to support the amendment 
and also ask that it be maintained even in conference, the 
reaffirmation of this important instruction as the civil liberties 
protection officer operates and does the work that they need to do. I 
ask my colleagues to support the amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. Chair, I rise to debate my amendment #8 to H.R. 5743, 
``Intelligence Authorization Act,'' which is a Sense of Congress that 
the intelligence community should take all appropriate actions 
necessary to protect the civil liberties of religious and ethnic 
minorities.
  We can obtain vital intelligence without compromising our civil 
liberties. As you know, risks to civil liberties are inherent in the 
very nature of domestic intelligence. This is because intelligence 
necessarily operates in secret and as a result, it is difficult to 
subject intelligence activities to the checks and balances that the 
Framers of the Constitution realized were essential to prevent abuses 
of power. Even judicial reviews of intelligence activities are often 
given deference.
  Intelligence is the information we use to identify and locate 
individuals involved in planning terrorist acts. This information must 
then be used to prevent any potential attack and can be done in ways 
that are legally permissible.
  Domestic intelligence community left unchecked could pose significant 
dangers to open government, individual privacy, and civil liberties. My 
amendment is designed as a limitation for a reason. We need a bill that 
is strong on civil liberties, and includes protections against 
infringement of our constitutional right to privacy.
  My amendment serves as a reminder that the American people have put 
their faith in the intelligence community and in Congress to protect 
not only their security but the very essence of what makes America 
great . . . our freedoms.
  Thomas Jefferson in 1787 stated that ``[A] bill of rights is what the 
people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or 
particular, and what no just government should refuse.''
  The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America have forced 
serious reflections about the institutional framework of civil society 
and the commitment to democratic principles. Although the balancing of 
the protections of citizens' rights and liberties against their peace 
and security is a continuous constitutional struggle. Especially during 
war and national crisis.
  According to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ``We're likely to experience 
more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case 
in our country . . . it will cause us to re-examine some of our laws 
pertaining to criminal surveillance, wiretapping, immigration and so 
on'' (New York Times, Sept. 29 2001).
  Our efforts to provide for the safety and security has required 
Americans to accept certain restriction on their freedoms--more 
surveillance of their papers and communications, more searches of their 
belongings, possible detention without a writ of habeas corpus, and 
proceedings by military tribunals without the standard protections of 
due process of civil courts.
  I realize that we must give our intelligence community the proper 
tools to protect us while upholding the civil liberties of Americans.
  We must always recognize that the American people are being asked to 
trade off civil liberties and personal freedom for a greater sense of 
security from the threat of terrorist.
  It is no answer to these legitimate concerns that police officers or 
member of the intelligence community who monitor political or religious 
meetings, compile dossiers on political activists, or infiltrate lawful 
protest organizations are complying with the Fourth Amendment and are 
doing no more than any member of the public could do on his or her own. 
When government acts, it has a special obligation to respect 
constitutional rights--which include the First as well as the Fourth 
Amendment--an obligation not imposed on private citizens. My amendment 
is a Sense that it is the intent of this body to protect the civil 
liberties of the very groups that may be monitored as a direct response 
to our concerns about a terrorist attack. We must be led not by fear 
but by reason!
  The challenge to our intelligence community is the same as the 
challenge for the nation as a whole. Securing the Nation's freedom 
depends not on making a choice between security and liberty, but in 
designing and implementing policies that allow the American people to 
be both safe and free.
  Increased threats of terrorism after September 11, 2001, lightning-
fast technological innovation, and the erosion of key privacy 
protections under the law threaten to alter the American way of life in 
fundamental ways.
  Terrorism threatens--and is calculated to threaten--not only our 
sense of safety, but also our freedom and way of life. Terrorists 
intend to frighten us into changing our basic laws and values and to 
take actions that are not in our long-term interests.
  While the government has both the power and the obligation under the 
Constitution to

[[Page H3304]]

defend the nation and its security, these powers cannot be exercised in 
a manner that contravenes individual constitutional liberties. Among 
others, these include the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of 
speech, religion, and association, and the Fourth Amendment's 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, as 
with all government powers, national security and intelligence 
gathering powers should be subject to checks and balances, including 
meaningful judicial review and probing oversight by the Congress.
  The internment of thousands of Japanese serves as a reminder for why 
we must protect the civil liberties of religious and ethnic minorities.


  JAPANESE INTERNMENT--A LESSON ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING CIVIL 
                               LIBERTIES

  One week after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt promised to preserve constitutional freedoms, ``We will not, 
under any threat, or in the face of any danger, surrender the 
guarantees of liberty our forefathers framed for us in our Bill of 
Rights'' but it was not long after that speech that the War Department 
was concerned about a foreign threat to the west coast.
  Congress held hearing and in 1942 the Congressional Subcommittee on 
Aliens and Sabotage recommended ``the immediate evacuation of all 
persons of Japanese lineage and all the other, aliens and citizens 
alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the 
defense of the U.S. from all strategic areas''. President Roosevelt 
signed the Executive order 9066 calling for the evacuations . . . 
Roosevelt justified the action as ``war requires every possible 
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense 
material, national-defense premises . . .''
  The result: More than 120,000 Japanese Americans, the majority of 
whom were American citizens or legal permanent residents were placed in 
internment camps violating their civil rights to be treated with 
fairness and equality, without discrimination and their Fifth Amendment 
right to due process.
  It was not until 1988 that victims received a reparation check and an 
apology from President Reagan. ``The United States unjustly interned, 
evacuated, or relocated you and many other Japanese Americans . . . and 
unfairly denied Japanese Americans and their families fundamental 
liberties during World War II . . . the Nation's actions were rooted 
deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political 
leadership.''
  My amendment stands as a reminder that we must not repeat the 
mistakes of our past.


                        protect personal privacy

  When the Bill of Rights was written, protecting personal privacy was 
largely an issue of protecting the integrity of physical property--and 
so the Fourth Amendment speaks of the people's right to security in 
their ``persons, houses, papers, and effects . . .''
  Today, our most intimate conversations, correspondence and records 
are apt to be recorded digitally, rather than contained in paper 
records secured in private homes and offices. Likewise, the most 
routine details of daily life--credit card purchases at a drug store or 
bookstore, passage through a toll booth or subway station, the 
television shows recorded by a digital video recorder--now leave 
electronic footprints scattered across a myriad of computer databases.
  Today, the transformation of our society from one dependent primarily 
on the privacy of ``persons, houses, papers, and effects'' in the 
physical world is accelerating exponentially. As the result of this 
transformation, a host of previously anonymous behavior and private 
information can now be captured and linked to a specific person without 
any trespass into the person's home or office.
  Our laws are struggling to catch up. So far, the courts have left 
largely immune from Fourth Amendment scrutiny a range of highly 
personal information--including financial records, medical records, and 
library and book records--on a theory that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information in the hands of third parties. 
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
  Today, we live a world in which a personal calendar or journal--once 
stored in paper form in a home, office, or briefcase--is now as likely 
to be stored on a personal digital assistant connected to a server 
owned by a third party. In such a world, the courts should reconsider 
the idea that information held by third parties lacks constitutional 
protection.
  In United States v. United States District Court (``Keith''), 407 
U.S. 297 (1972), the Supreme Court decided that wiretapping was subject 
to the Fourth Amendment even if it was conducted for national security 
purposes. That case involved a domestic terrorist conspiracy to bomb 
the office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
Still, without dismissing the real national security threat posed by 
such illegal activity, the Supreme Court rejected Attorney General John 
Mitchell's claim of a clandestine domestic intelligence gathering power 
that would allow the executive branch to wiretap without court review 
or congressional authorization.
  Such an unchecked power, the Supreme Court observed, would inevitably 
pose dangers to lawful dissent: ``Though the investigative duty of the 
executive may be stronger in such [national security] cases, so also is 
there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. . . . 
History abundantly documents the tendency of government--however 
benevolent and benign its motives--to view with suspicion those who 
most fervently dispute its policies. . . . The price of lawful public 
dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance 
power.'' Keith, 407 U.S. at 313 314.
  Safeguards also must exist to protect First Amendment freedoms of 
speech, worship and association. When conducting counter-terrorism and 
counter-intelligence investigations, the Department of Justice operates 
under guidelines approved by the Attorney General. The purpose of 
investigative guidelines is to ensure that intrusive investigative 
techniques are used to monitor terrorists, spies, and foreign agents, 
not political or religious organizations engaged in lawful dissent. 
These guidelines recognize that such techniques, which are left largely 
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment, pose a risk to First Amendment 
freedom of association.
  The Supreme court has recognized a ``vital relationship between 
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.'' NAACP v. 
State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Where individuals 
participate in unpopular political or religious organizations, members 
of those organizations fear--often with good reason--``economic 
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other 
manifestations of public hostility.'' Routine, intrusive government 
investigations of lawful, but unpopular, political organizations would 
clearly pose a serious risk to the First Amendment because their 
members would fear that such information, if leaked, could be used 
against them.
  It should be the Government's burden to establish, to the 
satisfaction of Congress, that intelligence gathering initiatives do 
not pose a threat to fundamental American values. Congress can decide 
simply to forbid the policy from going forward at all because it cannot 
be implemented consistently with fundamental American civil liberties. 
Support my amendment!


                  Racial Profiling/Religious Profiling

  The Department of Justice, DOJ, banned any use of racial profiling in 
2003. Despite this, racial profiling still occurs; there are some who 
claim racial profiling led to the 50 percent decrease in violent crime. 
In reality, racial profiling is against our basic values, it does not 
work, and it actually hinders effective law enforcement. That opinion 
is shared by law enforcement professionals and legal scholars, as well 
advocates of populations most likely to be targeted by profiling. The 
overwhelming weight of statistical data supports this position.
  As the Ranking Member on the Homeland Security Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Senior Member of the Judiciary Committee, I am aware 
of the injustices that are faced by minorities in this country due to 
racial profiling. In Homeland Security I had to sit through a hearing 
on the Radicalization of our Prisons, the need to watch Muslim 
Americans, and certain Somali Americans.
  In the days following the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, 
this country came together in an unprecedented and inspiring display of 
unity and patriotism. Americans of differing ethnicities, background 
and religions came together in support of the nation.
  In his address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, 
President George W. Bush told Congress, the American people, and the 
world that ``terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism 
that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of 
Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings 
of Islam.''
  The Homeland Security Committee continues to focus on the Islamic 
faith and those who follow it, as a threat to national security. We set 
the example that the Intelligence Community follows. We must stand up 
to violations of a person's civil liberty, but most especially for 
religious and ethic minorities. It is clear that Muslim Americans since 
9/11 have been singled out and targeted for their religious beliefs.
  Racial and religious profiling is against our basic values, it does 
not work, and it actually hinders effective law enforcement. That 
opinion is shared by law enforcement professionals and legal scholars, 
as well advocates of populations most likely to be targeted by 
profiling. The overwhelming weight of statistical data supports this 
position.
  And yet, there are still those who insist that it is a valid tool for 
crime fighting and anti-terrorism work. They insist that if you have 
nothing to hide, you have no reason to mind answering a few simple 
questions, that it is a minor inconvenience. I find that inexplicable.

[[Page H3305]]

  It is more than a minor inconvenience to have the police or FBI come 
into your workplace, to question you in front of your coworkers, and 
put your job at risk. It is more than a minor inconvenience to be 
stopped on the street, to be pulled over on a pretext, so that police 
officers can find a reason to question you. When the use of force or 
threat of force by police officers is dramatically increasing, it is 
more than a minor inconvenience to be more likely to be pulled over and 
put in that position, because of the color of your skin.
  Thirty two million Americans have reported that they were the victims 
of racial profiling. That is thirty two million Americans humiliated, 
intimidated, and treated as second class citizens in service of a 
policy that does nothing to keep us safer.
  In past years, I have supported measures that would end this 
practice. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about how we can 
end this ineffective, un-American practice, whether through training, 
executive orders, or through legislation we craft in Congress.


                     RACIAL PROFILING AND TERRORISM

                         ``DRIVING WHILE ARAB''

  The events of September 11, 2001, have had a profound impact on 
racial profiling. Following the terrorist attacks, law enforcement 
agents have subjected individuals of Arab or South Asian descent, 
Muslims, and Sikhs to racial profiling. While national and local 
statistics are not yet available, anecdotal accounts how Arabs, 
Muslims, and Sikhs have endured racial profiling.
  For example, in the months following September 11th, a new type of 
racial profiling has developed: ``driving while Arab.'' Arabs, Muslim, 
and Sikhs across the country were subjected to traffic stops and 
searches based in whole or part on their ethnicity or religion.
  On October 4, 2001, in Gwinnett, Georgia, an Arab motorist's car was 
stopped, he was approached by a police officer whose gun was drawn, and 
he was called a ``bin Laden supporter'' all for making an illegal U-
turn. On October 8, 2001, two Alexandria, VA, police officers stopped 
three Arab motorists. The officers questioned the motorists about a 
verse of the Koran hanging from the rear view mirror, and asked about 
documents in the back seat. The police officer confiscated the 
motorists' identification cards and drove off without explanation. He 
returned 10 minutes later, and claimed be had had to take another call.
  On December 5, 2001, a veiled Muslim woman in Burbank, Illinois, was 
stopped by a police officer for driving with suspended plates. The 
officer asked the woman when Ramadan was over, asked her offensive 
question about her hair, and pushed her into his patrol car as he 
arrested her for driving with suspended plates. The woman was released 
from custody later that day.


                    DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS

  A particularly egregious form of terrorism profiling occurs when Arab 
men and women are detained and deported without due process.
  Since September 11th, hundreds of Arab and Muslim individuals have 
been detained on suspicion of terrorist activity. Practically none of 
these individuals was involved with terrorism. However, many were 
detained for weeks and eventually changed with minor immigration 
violations.
  Based on these minor immigration violations some were deported. In 
one case, two Pakistani immigrants were arrested and detained 45 days 
for allegedly overstaying their visas.
  In another case an Israeli was detained for 66 days before being 
charged with entering the United States unlawfully.
  In a particularly shocking case, a French teacher from Yemen, who was 
married to an American citizen and therefore eligible to become a 
citizen himself, was reporting for duty as an army recruit at Fort 
Campbell, Kentucky, on September 15, 2001. The man was apprehended by 
Federal agents, separated from his wife and interrogated for 12 hours. 
The agents accused him of violating immigration laws, conspiring with 
Russian terrorists, spousal abuse, and threatened him with beatings. 
The man was given a lie detector test which proved he was telling the 
truth when he denied being associated with terrorists.


                    CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL PROFILING

  The consequences of Racial Profiling for minority groups in the 
United States, for Arab, Muslim and Sikh groups, and in the 
immigrations context are dire for individual who are both innocent and 
guilty of criminal activity.
  In the case of the innocent, for every person in possession of drugs 
apprehended through profiling, many more law-abiding minorities are 
treated as if they are criminals.
  Racial profiling increases the stops and arrests of minority groups. 
Frequent stops and arrests of minorities generate more extensive 
criminal histories, and result in longer sentences.
  Racial profiling results in increased arrests and convictions of 
minorities. In many states, a felony conviction can impact a person's 
ability to exercise their basic social rights. In 46 States and the 
District of Columbia, convicted adults cannot vote. Thirty-two States 
disenfranchise felons on parole, while 29 States disenfranchise felons 
on probation.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mrs. Myrick

  The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in 
House Report 112 504.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       After section 501 (page 21, after line 14), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 502. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN 
                   OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report that--
       (1) identifies foreign suppliers of information technology 
     (including equipment, software, and services) that are linked 
     directly or indirectly to a foreign government, including--
       (A) by ties to the military forces of a foreign government;
       (B) by ties to the intelligence services of a foreign 
     government; or
       (C) by being the beneficiaries of significant low interest 
     or no interest loans, loan forgiveness, or other support by a 
     foreign government;
       (2) assesses the vulnerability to malicious activity, 
     including cyber crime or espionage, of the telecommunications 
     networks of the United States due to the presence of 
     technology produced by suppliers identified under paragraph 
     (1).
       (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       (c) Telecommunications Networks of the United States 
     Defined.--In this section, the term ``telecommunications 
     networks of the United States'' includes--
       (1) telephone systems;
       (2) Internet systems;
       (3) fiber optic lines, including cable landings;
       (4) computer networks; and
       (5) smart grid technology under development by the 
     Department of Energy.

  The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from 
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from North Carolina.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, first, like other Members today, I want to 
express my gratitude and thanks to Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger for all of the work that they've done, just the 
incredible bipartisan working relationship that they've established on 
our committee. It really is kind of unheard of, and we're very proud of 
it, and I'm very proud to be a member of the committee.
  I rise today to urge my colleagues to support my amendment to the 
Intelligence authorization bill, and I'm pleased that Representative 
Wolf is a cosponsor of this initiative, and I'd like to thank him for 
his support and all his work on this issue.
  This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to 
submit an unclassified report to Congress that would identify foreign 
suppliers of information technology with ties to a foreign government, 
military, or intelligence service. It would also require the DNI to 
provide an assessment of the risks associated with such entities.
  The U.S. Government has serious concerns about public and private 
sector information technology supply chains. A network is only as 
secure as the components that make up that network. If the origin of 
those components is unknown or the security of those components is 
compromised, that's a major flaw in the network.
  I believe these concerns need to be better shared with industry and 
the public. Sharing more information along these lines will help the 
private sector better understand potential risks and take action that 
will help the U.S. Government mitigate its supply-chain concerns.
  The more that the private sector knows of potential problems, the 
better it can protect itself. If the private sector is more aware of 
potential risks, then it can better work with the Federal Government to 
mitigate potential supply-chain concerns.
  I would like to thank Chairman Rogers for his support of this 
amendment,

[[Page H3306]]

and I again urge my colleagues to support the amendment on the floor.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment, though I do not oppose it.
  The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First, I support this amendment as a continuation 
of the work that we have begun in Congress as an attempt to focus our 
intelligence community and the executive Agencies to this important 
threat that my friend and colleague has made.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I do not rise on the gentlelady's 
amendment. In the statement I made on amendment No. 7, I indicated that 
the CIA officer's name that was undercover, that was not the CIA's 
undercover agent's name, which I would not give. It was the section 
station director's name, Mr. Garrett Jones. The CIA agent was 
undercover and remains unnamed. But he was an African American who did 
his duty because of his background.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank the gentlelady from North 
Carolina, say thank you very, very much for her work on the supply 
chain and its vulnerabilities. She has spent a lot of time on our 
committee making sure that we're doing all the right things to try to 
protect the supply chain when it comes to cyberthreats and other 
vulnerabilities that may exist, so I couldn't support the amendment 
more.
  Lastly, I would just like to thank the gentlelady. This will be her 
last authorization bill. She has been a fantastic member of this 
committee and has brought a lot of stature to the issues she's engaged 
in--everything from home-grown terrorism to cyber to supply chain 
management. She has been a national treasure on that committee. She 
will be sorely missed. I wanted to offer our congratulations and our 
thanks to a job well done.
  Mrs. MYRICK. I thank the gentleman for his kind words, and I yield 
back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Platts). The question is on the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Yoder) having assumed the chair, Mr. Platts, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5743) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant 
to House Resolution 667, he reported the bill back to the House with an 
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment 
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
  If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                           Motion to Recommit

  Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. CRITZ. I am, in its present form.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Critz moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 5743, to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions 
     to report the same back to the House forthwith with the 
     following amendment:
       After section 501 (page 21, after line 14), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 502. PROTECTING UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH, 
                   TECHNOLOGICAL PROWESS, AND AMERICAN JOBS.

       (a) In General.--In obligating and expending funds 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the head of each 
     element of the intelligence community shall take all steps 
     necessary to protect and ensure that--
       (1) the intelligence and military capability of the United 
     States is not improperly transferred to or stolen by a 
     foreign nation or a state sponsor of terrorism;
       (2) the intelligence and military capability of the United 
     States and sensitive information pertaining to economic, 
     financial, and consumer information is protected from 
     cybersecurity attacks, including cybersecurity attacks from 
     Iran and China; and
       (3) contracts and work performed for such element of the 
     intelligence community is first provided to United States 
     companies and workers and not outsourced to foreign-owned 
     companies, unless the Director of National Intelligence 
     determines that it is in the interests of national security.
       (b) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section, 
     the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means any country the 
     government of which the Secretary of State determines has 
     repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
     terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export 
     Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant 
     to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 
     40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other provision of 
     law.

  Mr. CRITZ (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the reading be dispensed with.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I object.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  The Clerk will read.
  The Clerk continued to read.

                              {time}  1550

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask 
unanimous consent that the motion be considered as read.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Speaker, intelligence gathering has always been a key 
component of keeping America strong and resilient through our history, 
and it is imperative in this post-9/11 era.
  It is crucial that the intelligence community be provided the 
resources they need to combat threats from foreign powers and global 
terrorist organizations. This is why I'm offering this final amendment 
today, to help strengthen our defenses against physical and 
cybersecurity attacks.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to the bill. This amendment 
will not kill the bill or send it back to the committee. If it is 
adopted, the bill will immediately proceed to final passage as amended.
  My amendment contains three components that will ensure we continue 
to provide the best security to our Nation.
  First, it would instruct the head of each element of the intelligence 
community to take all steps and precautions to ensure that the 
intelligence and military capability of the United States is not 
improperly transferred or stolen by a foreign nation or a state sponsor 
of terrorism.
  Mr. Speaker, we live in a time where information is readily available 
and transferable at the click of a mouse or the stroke of a keyboard. 
While the advantages of such readily available information have helped 
spur economic opportunities and growth, it has also opened the door for 
one of the many intelligence challenges we face as a Nation.
  We already have in place a number of protocols that dictate how and 
under what circumstances our military can transfer technology, goods, 
and services to our allies across the globe, but it is imperative that 
we do everything we can to ensure this information doesn't end up in 
the hands of unfriendly foreign powers or state sponsors of terrorism.

[[Page H3307]]

  Within the past few years, we have seen foreign nations attempt to 
steal our Nation's military technology and sensitive information 
through the use of joint ventures and other techniques. We must do 
everything that we can to ensure that our military and intelligence 
secrets remain our secrets. Many of those same capabilities reside in, 
are accessed through, or are enabled through cyberspace.
  Reliable access to cyberspace is critical to U.S. national security, 
public safety, and economic well-being, but cyberthreats continue to 
grow in scope and severity daily. Tens of thousands of new malicious 
software programs originating from Iran or China are identified each 
day, threatening our security, our economy, and our citizens.
  No longer do we need to just worry about foreign spies infiltrating 
our military and intelligence agencies. Our worry must now extend to 
the young man or woman sitting in their apartment 6,000 miles away 
utilizing a laptop to tap into our government mainframes.
  Secondly, my amendment would direct the head of each element of the 
intelligence community to take those steps necessary to ensure that our 
Nation's intelligence and military capabilities, as well as sensitive 
economic, financial, and consumer information, remain protected from 
improper transfer, theft, or cybersecurity attack.
  Finally, my amendment would ensure that we continue to promote 
American businesses and keep jobs--especially one of such crucial 
importance--in America.
  As the number of threats to our Nation has grown and the required 
response has put a large demand on the intelligence community, we have 
increasingly relied on contractors to perform tasks to ensure the 
safety of our Nation. This amendment would instruct our intelligence 
community to always put American workers first and not outsource these 
jobs to foreign-owned companies.
  Mr. Speaker, I have witnessed the detrimental effects that 
outsourcing has had. Numerous areas of our country have also seen the 
ugly effects of outsourcing, and we must put American workers and 
businesses first, especially in the critical sphere of intelligence.
  Compounding the economic damage outsourcing has done to our country, 
the national security risk posed by allowing foreign companies to 
operate our intelligence capabilities would be catastrophic to the 
environment of our Nation.
  Mr. Speaker, in the global environment in which we operate, we must 
keep America strong, keep America competitive, and keep America first.
  Mr. Speaker, again, my amendment will be the final amendment to the 
bill. I have great respect for the chairman, Mr. Rogers, and the 
ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger, for the bipartisan bill they put 
together. It is important to note that this amendment will not kill the 
bill or send it back to committee. If it is adopted, the bill will 
immediately proceed to final passage as amended. My amendment will 
ensure we have an even stronger American intelligence community.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on this final amendment, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the 
motion to recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. First of all, this is a motion to recommit. 
Let's not fool ourselves. And I understand this is the loyal opposition 
portion of the debate. It happens in each and every bill; I get it.
  We've spent a lot of time in a bipartisan way getting the bill, and I 
think it's one of our better products given the detail with which we 
went over every budget line and operational detail in this budget. So 
when I read this, it looks like it was prepared fairly quickly in order 
to meet the time demand here, and it's very concerning.
  In some of the things that we've done--even in this Chamber, we 
debated the cybersecurity bill and people had strong passions on both 
sides of the aisle of that bill about protection of civil liberties and 
just making sure there were checks and balances on our ability just to 
share information, a very small little piece. When you read this bill, 
that makes our cybersecurity bill look like a walk in the park. This is 
an expansion of the government involved in the Internet in a way that I 
find a little bit scary and shocking that they would allow it to get 
this far. Let me read it:

       The intelligence community shall take all steps necessary 
     to protect and ensure that--
       Sensitive information pertaining to economic, financial, 
     and consumer information is protected from cybersecurity 
     attacks.

  That means you've got to reach way out into the Internet. Now you've 
just empowered the intelligence community--the very people we said we 
want to keep separate--into the Internet. This is dangerous. That's 
what happens when you get in a hurry and try to have a political 
amendment on a very bipartisan bill, and that's unfortunate about this.
  The first paragraph, I would submit, we should make as a part of the 
``department of redundancy department.'' All of that already happens. 
We do that as a matter of course and mission.
  Again, it's a little bit surprising that they would allow this. I 
would even hope that your Members would take a very close look at this. 
You have just put your Members in a pretty bad spot about making them 
vote on something that will actually have the government involved in 
your Internet. Welcome to the laptop near you. Very concerning to me.
  I will passionately oppose this, would urge all of my colleagues to 
passionately oppose this, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair 
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on 
the question of passage.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 180, 
nays 235, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 300]

                               YEAS--180

     Ackerman
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bass (CA)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Bonamici
     Boren
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (FL)
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Castor (FL)
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly (VA)
     Cooper
     Costello
     Courtney
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Deutch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly (IN)
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Fudge
     Garamendi
     Gonzalez
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hastings (FL)
     Heinrich
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hochul
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kildee
     Kind
     Kissell
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lujan
     Lynch
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Murphy (CT)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Ross (AR)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Sires
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Stark
     Sutton
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--235

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Amash
     Amodei
     Austria
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (NH)
     Benishek
     Berg

[[Page H3308]]


     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canseco
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cole
     Conaway
     Conyers
     Costa
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Dold
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Hall
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Kelly
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Lankford
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marino
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCotter
     McHenry
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meehan
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Paul
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pence
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Quayle
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (FL)
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ryan (WI)
     Scalise
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Webster
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Burton (IN)
     Clay
     Doyle
     Ellison
     Fortenberry
     Granger
     Guinta
     Lewis (CA)
     Mack
     Maloney
     McCarthy (CA)
     Rangel
     Roby
     Slaughter
     Velazquez
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1620

  Messrs. GOWDY, STIVERS, GRIMM, THOMPSON of Pennsylvania, KINGSTON, 
COLE, CARTER, MULVANEY and NUNNELEE changed their votes from ``yea'' to 
``nay.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 386, 
noes 28, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 301]

                               AYES--386

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Bucshon
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canseco
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis (KY)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Edwards
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hochul
     Holden
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     Latta
     Levin
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Marino
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McHenry
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Pence
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sires
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (IN)

                                NOES--28

     Amash
     Blumenauer
     Capuano
     Clarke (NY)
     Duncan (TN)
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Gibson
     Holt
     Jackson (IL)
     Johnson (IL)
     Jones
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Lee (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Markey
     McDermott
     McGovern
     Miller, George
     Olver
     Paul
     Polis
     Rush
     Stark
     Woolsey
     Young (AK)

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Burton (IN)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Doyle
     Ellison
     Fortenberry
     Guinta
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Mack
     McCarthy (CA)
     Rangel
     Roby
     Slaughter
     Tiberi
     Velazquez
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1628

  Mr. RUSH changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                              {time}  1630


        Authorizing the Clerk to Make Corrections in Engrossment

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in 
the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 5743, the Clerk be authorized to make 
such technical and conforming changes as necessary to reflect the 
actions of the House.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Woodall). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Michigan?

[[Page H3309]]

  There was no objection.


               Permission to Include Exchange of Letters

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to 
include an exchange of letters with the chairman of the Committee on 
Homeland Security with respect to the bill at this point in the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.

         House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on 
           Intelligence,
                                     Washington, DC, May 31, 2012.
     Hon. Peter King,
     Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding 
     certain intelligence and intelligence-related programs and/or 
     activities of the Department of Homeland Security that are 
     authorized in H.R. 5743, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2013.
       While the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     continues to authorize these programs and intelligence-
     related activities consistent with the legislative history 
     describing the respective jurisdictions of the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     Homeland Security (Congressional Record, January 4, 2005, 
     page H25), I agree that certain elements of these activities 
     could raise issues that would benefit from discussion amongst 
     the Committees and the Department of Homeland Security with 
     respect to the overall organization of the Department, and 
     would be glad to discuss such issues.
       As you asked, I will include a copy of your letter to me 
     and this response in the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of H.R. 5743 on the House floor.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Mike Rogers,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                         House of Representatives,


                               Committee on Homeland Security,

                                     Washington, DC, May 29, 2012.
     Hon. Mike Rogers,
     Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
         House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Chairman Rogers: I am writing in regards to the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 recently 
     approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence--specifically, the section of the legislation 
     that authorizes the newly created Homeland Security 
     Intelligence Program (HSIP) at the Department of Homeland 
     Security (DHS).
       As you know, the HSIP, in essence, consists of several 
     activities within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at 
     DHS that the Director of National Intelligence has deemed 
     should no longer be part of the National Intelligence Program 
     (NIP). While the details of the program are classified, the 
     creation of the HSIP raises new issues that are of mutual 
     interest to our committees and requires further discussion 
     between our staffs and clarification from DHS.
       While those discussions are ongoing and will take time, I 
     understand the importance of advancing this legislation to 
     the House floor in an expeditious manner and I do not, in any 
     way, wish to impede that from happening. However, given that 
     there remains issues that our committees must work through 
     with DHS--including how to best fund, organize, and budget 
     certain HSIP activities--I respectfully request that we 
     formally memorialize our mutual agreement to continue our 
     dialogue regarding the HSIP as legislation moves forward as 
     you approach a conference with the Senate.
       I also request that this letter and your response be 
     included in the House Permanent Select Committee report of 
     this bill and in the Congressional Record during 
     consideration of this measure on the House floor. Thank you 
     for your attention to this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Peter T. King,
     Chairman.

                          ____________________