[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 73 (Monday, May 21, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3316-S3322]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 2011
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Foreign
Relations Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R.
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, and that the Senate proceed to its
consideration; that the Johnson of South Dakota-Shelby substitute
amendment, which is at the desk and is the text of Calendar No. 320, S.
2101, the Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act, as
reported by the Banking Committee, be considered; that a Johnson of
South Dakota-Shelby amendment, which is at the desk, be agreed to; that
the substitute amendment, as amended, be agreed to; that the bill, as
amended, be read a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on
passage of the bill, as amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the consent request?
[[Page S3317]]
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, reserving the right to object, and I
will not object, I would like to thank both leaders for their hard work
in getting what I believe is one of the more important sense-of-the-
Senate resolutions achieved here. It is very difficult. I think words
matter. The fact that this resolution points out that we need a
comprehensive policy that includes economic sanctions, diplomacy in
military planning, capabilities, and options; that this objective is
consistent with the one stated by President Barack Obama in the State
of the Union Address where he said, ``Let there be no doubt: America is
determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will
take no options off the table to achieve that goal''--I think this is
an important resolution. I thank the majority leader.
I also point out that the final part of it says that nothing in the
act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an authorization of
the use of force against Iran or Syria.
First of all, it is not an authorization. Second of all, I wonder if
we ought to include Canada and maybe Brazil and other countries along
with that since this resolution contemplates in no way anything
concerning Syria, but I guess we could probably throw it in. However, I
will not ask for a unanimous consent to amend to add Canada, although
the Canadians are very upset because they have no teams in the finals
of the National Hockey League Stanley Cup championship series.
Again, I thank both the Senate majority leader and the Republican
leader for the work they did and also our friend Senator Menendez, who
was also an important factor in getting this done.
I do not object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, to the majority leader, well done. I
think we are going to be able to voice vote a resolution that states
the policy of our country and our President very clearly.
To the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez, great job on the
sanctions. I hope the Senator understands why I wanted to put in all
options. I hope the sanctions will work. This is a clear statement by
the Senate backing up our President that when it comes to Iran having
nuclear capabilities, there will be more than sanctions on the table,
and the Iranians need to know that.
I hope we can end this peacefully for Israel's sake, for our sake,
and for the world's sake as we approach beefing up the sanctions with
the Banking Committee, with Senator Menendez's and Senator Kirk's
leadership, and others, who have done a great job. If you are on the
Banking Committee, you did a great job. I don't even know who is on it.
The bottom line is I think the sanctions were really well drafted and
will enhance the President's hand, so to speak. We cannot leave this
debate without making a very simple unequivocal statement that the goal
is to get it right. And if sanctions can lead to getting it right, God
bless. If the sanctions will not get us to where we want to go,
everything is on the table, including the use of military force,
because this country--Republicans and Democrats--is not going to allow
the Iranian regime to develop nuclear capability that will put the
world into darkness.
To everybody who negotiated this outcome, thank you very much.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment (No. 2123) in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
The amendment (No. 2124) was agreed to.
(The amendment is printed in today's Record under ``Text of
Amendments.'')
The substitute amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
The amendment was ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a
third time.
The bill was read the third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on passage of the bill as
amended.
The bill (H.R. 1905), as amended, was passed.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the motion to
reconsider be laid upon the table and that any statements related to
this matter be printed in the Record in the appropriate place as if
read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Madam President, before we leave here this evening, I must
mention the good work done by the Banking Committee. Senator Johnson of
South Dakota has been stalwart in this issue. He and Senator Shelby
worked together. It has been very heartwarming.
I appreciate Senator Menendez, who has been a loud voice in making
sure we do something on this legislation about which he feels so
strongly.
The most important thing for me is Iranians need to know we mean
business, particularly with the next round of international
negotiations taking place the day after tomorrow.
I am glad we resolved our differences and everyone realizes how
important it is to advance these measures to prevent Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon. They should be aware that there is still
more we can do. I am very happy with what we have done at this time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Madam President, I rise to discuss
today's unanimous, bipartisan approval of the Senate Iran Sanctions,
Accountability and Human Rights Act. With this action, we are adding
additional tough, targeted sanctions against the Iranian Government,
making it clear to the Iranian Government that they must stop their
illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons or face increased pressure on their
economy.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a longer statement of
mine on the bill plus a summary be included in the Record following my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. JOHNSON. The bill the Senate adopted today passed the Banking
Committee earlier this year by a unanimous bipartisan vote. Among its
other provisions, this legislation will have important effects because
it requires intensified targeting of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps,
sanctioning energy and uranium mining joint ventures with Iran, and
mandating sanctions for those who supply Iran with weapons and other
technologies used to commit human abuses, including those used to
impose an electronic curtain of censorship on Iran's citizens. In
addition, this legislation gives the President additional authority to
sanction the Asad regime in Syria.
Today the Senate has shown that we can still act in a bipartisan way
on important priorities. I thank every Member for supporting passage of
this bill today. In particular, I thank all the members of the Banking
Committee for their work, including Ranking Member Shelby and Senators
Menendez, Kirk, Schumer, and Brown. In addition, I thank Majority
Leader Reid for his determination to get this legislation through the
Senate.
I look forward to working with my colleagues in the House to quickly
come together on a final bill the President can sign soon. It is
important that the Congress act swiftly so that we can continue to put
pressure on the Iranian regime to end its illicit and illegal nuclear
activity.
Again, I thank all my colleagues for their support on the Iran
sanctions bill today.
Exhibit 1
Tightening Iran Sanctions
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. President, the prospect of
a nuclear-armed Iran is the most pressing foreign policy
challenge we face, and we must continue to do all we can--
politically, economically, and diplomatically--to avoid that
result. The meetings here in Washington in March between
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama
underscored the gravity of these issues, and the importance
of an intensified, unified effort by the international
community to further isolate Iran's leaders and compel them
to abandon their illicit nuclear activities. Iran's
willingness to sit down again with the P5 + 1 group--the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany--
and begin to re-engage on the nuclear issues is a hopeful
sign. But even after the first meeting, which both sides
called ``constructive,'' it remains to be seen whether Iran
will actually be willing to work towards progress on the
central issues at the negotiating sessions planned for
Baghdad
[[Page S3318]]
later this week, or whether these meetings will simply be
another in a series of stalling actions to buy time to enrich
additional uranium and further fortify their nuclear program.
As that process moves forward, today the full Senate is
finally acting on an important bill to confront this very
serious threat to our national security, to Israel and to our
other allies in the Middle East and Europe. S. 2101, the Iran
Sanctions Accountability and Human Rights Act of 2012, was
approved by a unanimous bipartisan vote in the Senate Banking
Committee. I am pleased that, with the help of ranking member
Senator Shelby and other committee colleagues, we are
presenting to the full Senate, as we did 2 years ago, this
bipartisan bill to expand and tighten sanctions on Iran,
along with a manager's amendment to address several issues
that required updating to take into account recent events,
and clarifications or additions that my colleagues sought to
expand the reach and effectiveness of the bill, including
changes requested by Senator Menendez to an amendment he
offered in committee, section 503, to narrow its application
while preserving his original intent to enable attachment of
assets in which the government of Iran has an interest, to
satisfy certain terror-related judgments against Iran.
In pressing this bill forward we recognize that economic
sanctions are not an end: they are a means to an end. That
end is to apply enough pressure to secure agreement from
Iran's leaders to fully, completely and verifiably abandon
their illicit nuclear program. The President has made clear
that his policy is not to contain Iran once it has a nuclear
weapon: it is to prevent Iran from achieving that goal in the
first place. He is deadly serious about that. At the same
time, he is moving forward diplomatically, in consultation
with our allies, to test Iran's willingness to come clean on
its nuclear program, and resolve the international
community's concerns on this front.
Let me describe where we have been on Iran sanctions, so
that Senators may better understand where we're going. This
has been the subject of heated rhetoric on the Presidential
campaign trail, so I want to describe clearly the
longstanding bipartisan approach we in Congress have taken.
Since here in the Senate we sometimes cannot even agree to
cross the street together, in today's hyper-partisan
environment bipartisan agreement on this bill is notable. On
Iran sanctions we have always worked in a bipartisan fashion;
I hope that will continue.
In coordination with allies like the European Union, Japan,
South Korea, Australia, Canada, and others, the
Administration has taken its own steps to increase pressure
on Iran's petrochemical industry, oil and gas industry, and
financial sector. We acted in the Senate 5 months ago on an
amendment by Senators Menendez and Kirk to sanction the
Central Bank of Iran and other banks that deal with Iranian
banks involved in nefarious activities. Shortly thereafter,
Europe announced it will ban oil imports from Iran, starting
in July. This will further increase pressure on Iran's
economy and cut off other key sources of revenue for their
nuclear program. Almost $60 billion in energy-related
projects in Iran have been put on hold or discontinued. Oil
shipments have sharply declined due to sanctions. The Wall
Street Journal recently reported that Iran's crude oil output
has dropped to its lowest level in over 20 years, due largely
to the tightening squeeze of sanctions. And, in the last few
months, about half of the tankers booked monthly to load at
the country's largest terminal didn't complete the voyages,
according to brokers, company officials and ship-tracking
data. It is clear Iran is losing oil sales to key customers
in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, and is having some of its
biggest customers demand steep discounts to buy its oil. Some
estimate the losses in Iran's oil revenues are approaching 40
percent of daily sales. Iran's oil exports have the potential
to fall another 300,000 to 500,000 barrels a day or more when
the European Union's embargo takes effect in July, according
to a report this week by Barclays. That is a huge impact. A
senior IRGC official acknowledged the effectiveness of
sanctions recently, saying: ``The regime is at the height of
isolation and in the midst of a technological, scientific and
economic siege. We are not in a situation of imaginary
threats and sanctions. Threats and sanctions against us are
effectively being pursued.'' These sanctions have had a more
powerful effect than many thought possible.
Iran is also isolated diplomatically. The international
community is lined up against their nuclear program, with
progressively tougher UN sanctions imposed on them. Their
most important ally, Syria, is collapsing into civil war.
They are, as President Obama said, in a ``world of hurt.''
Many believe the recent shift by Iran's leaders on the
nuclear issue is the result of that pain, and the intense
pressure of heightened sanctions. But while it is clear that
existing sanctions are biting, they have not yet persuaded
Iran's leaders to drop their nuclear ambitions. We must not
let up now, as negotiations on these issues are continuing.
I believe that further progress in those negotiations
depends on intensifying that pressure on Iran's leaders, and
that's what this bill is all about. With these new sanctions,
including those targeted at the IRGC, we are forcing Iran's
military and political leaders to make a clear choice. They
can end the suppression of their people, come clean on their
nuclear program, suspend enrichment, and stop supporting
terrorist activities around the globe. Or they can continue
to face sustained multilateral economic and diplomatic
pressure, and deepen their international isolation.
Just as then-Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby did in
2010, Senator Shelby and I have incorporated ideas from many
of our Senate colleagues into one Committee bill, including
from S. 1048 sponsored by Senator Menendez. Senator Menendez
has been a leader on these issues, along with Senator Kirk,
and we acknowledge their many contributions. The bill also
borrows and refines ideas from legislation developed by
Senators Lautenberg, Gillibrand, Schumer, Kyl, Lieberman,
Brown, and others. I will now touch on a few of the
highlights of this bill and I will insert a more
comprehensive and detailed summary into the record at the end
of my remarks. Our legislation will: broaden the list of
available sanctions, require intensified targeting of Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps, require firms traded on US stock
exchanges to disclose Iran-related activity to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, sanction energy and uranium mining
joint ventures with Iran, penalize US parent firms for
certain Iran-related activities of their foreign
subsidiaries, mandate sanctions for those who supply Iran
with weapons and other technologies used to commit human
rights abuses, including those used to impose an ``Electronic
Curtain'' on Iran's citizens, and provide for other similar
measures designed to increase pressure on Iran's government.
All told, when enacted the bill will significantly increase
pressure on Iran's leaders, and that must be our goal as we
move forward in this process. I hope and expect my colleagues
will support this bill enthusiastically, and that we will be
able to reconcile it with the House bill and move it forward
quickly into law this year. I look forward to working with my
House colleagues, including Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Berman, who as former Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman has led the sanctions effort against Iran for many
years, and played a key role in developing both CISADA and
the House version of this measure, to get a bill enacted this
year.
Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Human Rights Act of 2012
Section-by-Section Summary
Sec. 1--Short Title, Table of Contents
Sec. 2--Findings
Contains a series of findings about the threat posed by
Iran, the bipartisan understanding of the implications of its
achieving a nuclear weapons capability, steps taken thus far
by the US, its allies and the United Nations Security Council
to counter that threat, and the need to intensify those
efforts to counter that threat and deter Iran's nuclear
ambitions.
Sec. 3--Definitions
Provides that the definitions of key terms (``appropriate
congressional committees,'' ``credible information,'' and
``knowingly,'') will be those found in the Iran Sanctions Act
(ISA) of 1996, as amended, and that the definition of
``United States person'' will be that found in the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (CISADA).
Sec. 101--Statement of Policy
Defines US policy to be to prevent Iran from (i) acquiring
or developing nuclear weapons and advanced conventional
weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, (ii) continuing
its support for international terrorism, and (iii) engaging
in other activities designed to destabilize its neighbors in
the region. It also outlines the US policy of support for
full implementation of all sanctions against Iran as part of
multilateral efforts to compel Iran to abandon its illicit
nuclear program.
Sec. 102--Expansion and Implementation of Multilateral
Sanctions Regime
States the sense of Congress that expansion and vigorous
implementation of bilateral and multilateral sanctions
against Iran, and vigorous enforcement of all U.S. sanctions,
is an effective way to achieve the goal of compelling Iran to
abandon its efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
Sec. 103--Diplomatic Efforts to Expand Multilateral Sanctions
Regime
Urges efforts by the US to expand the UN sanctions regime
to include (i) imposing additional travel restrictions on
Iranian officials responsible for human rights violations,
the development of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, and Iran's support for terrorism; (ii) withdrawing
sea- and airport landing rights for Iran Shipping Lines and
Iran Air, for their role in nuclear proliferation and illegal
arms sales; (iii) expanding the range of sanctions to which
Iran is subject; (iv) expanding sanctions to limit Iran's
petroleum development, imports of refined petroleum products
and reduce its revenue from sale of petrochemical products,
and (v) accelerating US diplomatic and economic efforts to
help allies reduce their dependence on Iranian crude oil and
other petroleum products. Requires periodic reporting to
Congress.
Sec. 104--Imposition of Sanctions with regard to Iran
Declares the sense of Congress that efforts should be made
to maximize the effects of sanctions and to preserve
information-sharing.
[[Page S3319]]
Sec. 201--Sanctions with respect to Energy Joint Ventures
with Iran
Extends ISA sanctions to persons knowingly participating in
petroleum resources development joint ventures established on
or after January 1, 2002 anywhere in the world, unless such
ventures are terminated within 180 days of enactment, in
which Iran's government is a substantial partner or investor,
or through which Iran could otherwise receive energy sector
technology or know-how not previously available to its
government.
Sec. 202--Expands Sanctions on Providers of Goods and
Services to Iran's Energy Sector
Requires imposition of ISA sanctions on persons who
knowingly sell, lease, or provide to Iran goods, services,
technology or support (including refinery construction or
repair), or infrastructure predominantly used for the
transportation of refined petroleum products, that could
directly and significantly contribute to its petroleum
resources development or refining programs, in single
transactions of $1 million or more or multiple transactions
aggregating to $5 million or more in any 12-month period.
Requires imposition of at least three ISA sanctions to
persons who knowingly sell, lease, or provide to Iran goods,
services, technology or support for its petrochemical sector
in a single transaction of $250,000 or more, or multiple
transactions aggregating to $1,000,000 or more in any 12-
month period. In so doing, codifies the President's decision
to extend US sanctions to Iran's petrochemical sector,
adopting the standards, thresholds and petrochemicals list
contained in Executive Order 13590.
Sec. 203--Sanctions with respect to Uranium Joint Ventures
with Iran
Requires ISA sanctions to be imposed on persons who
knowingly participate in joint ventures with Iran's
government, Iranian firms, or persons acting for or on behalf
of Iran's government in the mining, production or
transportation of uranium anywhere in the world. Exempts such
persons from sanctions if they withdraw from such joint
ventures within 6 months after the date of enactment.
Sec. 204--Expansion of Sanctions Available under the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996
Expands the current menu of sanctions, available to the
President under the ISA, to authorize exclusion from the
United States of aliens who are corporate officers,
principals or controlling shareholders in a sanctioned firm,
and permits applicable ISA sanctions to be applied to the CEO
or other principal executive officers (or persons performing
similar functions) of a sanctioned firm, which could include
a freeze of their US assets.
Sec. 205--Definitions
Defines ``credible information'' and ``petrochemical
product.'' ``Credible information'' includes public
announcements by persons that they are engaged in certain
activities, including those made in a report to stockholders,
and may include announcements by the Government of Iran, and
reports from the General Accountability Office (GAO), the
Energy Information Administration, the Congressional Research
Service, or other reputable governmental organizations.
Defines ``petrochemical product'' consistent with Executive
Order 13590.
Sec. 211--Sanctions for Shipping WMD or Terrorism-related
Materials to or from Iran
Requires the blocking of assets of, and imposes other
sanctions on, persons who knowingly provide ships, insurance
or reinsurance, or other shipping services, for
transportation of goods that materially contribute to Iran's
WMD program or its terrorism-related activities. The
sanctions apply to parents of the persons involved if they
knew or should have known of the sanctionable activity and to
any of their subsidiaries or affiliates that knowingly
participated in the activity. Provides for Presidential
national security interest waiver; requires a report to
Congress regarding the use of such a waiver.
Sec. 212--Imposition of Sanctions on Subsidiaries and Agents
of UN-sanctioned Persons
Amends CISADA to ensure that US financial sanctions imposed
on UN-designated entities reach those persons acting on
behalf of, at the direction of, or owned or controlled by,
the designated entities. Requires the Treasury Department to
revise its regulations within 90 days of enactment to
implement the change.
Sec. 213--Liability of US Companies for Violations by their
Foreign Subsidiaries
Requires the imposition of civil penalties under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of up to
twice the amount of the relevant transaction on US parent
companies for the activities of their foreign subsidiaries
which, if undertaken by a US person or in the United States,
would violate US sanctions law. Subsidiaries are defined as
those entities in which a US person holds more than fifty
percent equity interest or a majority of the seats on the
board, or that a US person otherwise controls. Covers
activities under the current US trade embargo with Iran and
would apply regardless of whether the subsidiary was
established to circumvent US sanctions.
Sec. 214--Securities and Exchange Commission Disclosures on
Certain Activities in Iran
Amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to require
issuers whose stock is traded on US exchanges to disclose
whether they or their affiliates have knowingly engaged in
activities (i) in section 5 of the ISA (energy sector
activity); (ii) in 104(c)(2) or (d)1 of CISADA (related to
foreign financial institutions who facilitate WMD/terrorism,
money laundering, IRGC activity, and other violations); (iii)
in 105A(b)(2) of CISADA (related to those who transfer
weapons and other technologies to Iran likely to be used for
human rights abuses); (iv) with persons whose property is
blocked for WMD/terrorism and; (v) persons in the government
of Iran. Provides for periodic public disclosure of such
information, and conveyance of that information by the SEC to
Congress and the President. Requires the President to
initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of
sanctions as specified, and to make a sanctions determination
within 6 months.
Sec. 215--Immigration Restrictions on Senior Iranian
Officials and their Family Members
Requires the identification of and denial of visa requests
to senior officials, including the Supreme Leader, the
President, members of the Assembly of Experts, senior members
of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, and members of the IRGC
with the rank of brigadier general or higher that are
involved in nuclear proliferation, support international
terrorism or the commission of serious human rights abuses
against citizens of Iran. Also includes their family members.
Provides for Presidential national security interest and UN
obligations waiver; requires a report to Congress regarding
the use of such a waiver.
Sec. 216--Sanctions with respect to the Provision of Certain
Financial Communications Services to the Central Bank of
Iran and Sanctioned Iranian Financial Institutions
States the sense of Congress that the President should
intensify current diplomatic efforts to ensure that global
financial communications services providers such as SWIFT
terminate services to Iranian financial institutions
designated for the imposition of sanctions pursuant to IEEPA.
Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to
submit a list, within 60 days of the date of enactment, of
entities that provide financial communications services to or
facilitate access to such services for the Central Bank of
Iran or financial institutions described in 104(c)(2)(E)(ii)
of CISADA (i.e., institutions whose property is blocked in
connection with Iran's proliferation of WMD or its support
for terrorism). Requires reporting by the Secretary of the
Treasury within 90 days of enactment on the efforts of SWIFT
to terminate the provision of services to the Central Bank of
Iran and Iranian financial institutions designated for
sanction. Authorizes the imposition of sanctions under CISADA
or IEEPA with respect to a financial communications services
provider, and the directors of, and shareholders with a
significant interest in, a provider, that has not terminated
such services to the Central Bank of Iran or designated
Iranian financial institutions.
Sec. 217--GAO Reports on Iran's Energy Sector
Mandates regular reports from GAO on foreign investment in
Iran's energy sector, exporters of refined petroleum products
to Iran, entities providing shipping and insurance services
to Iran, Iranian energy joint ventures worldwide, and
countries where Iranian petroleum is produced or refined.
Sec. 218--Expanded Reporting on Iran's Crude Oil and Refined
Petroleum Products
Amends section 110(b) of CISADA to require additional
reporting on the volume of crude oil and refined petroleum
products imported to and exported from Iran, the persons
selling and transporting crude oil and refined petroleum
products, the countries with primary jurisdiction over those
persons and the countries in which those products were
refined, the sources of financing for such imports and the
involvement of foreign persons in efforts to assist Iran in
developing its oil and gas production capacity, importing
advanced technology to upgrade existing Iranian refineries,
converting existing chemical plants to petroleum refineries
and maintaining, upgrading or expanding refineries or
constructing new refineries.
Sec. 301--Sanctions on Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps
Officials, Agents, and Affiliates
Requires the President to identify, and designate for
sanctions, officials, affiliates and agents of the IRGC
within 90 days of enactment, and periodically thereafter;
designation requires exclusion of such persons from the
United States, and imposition of sanctions (related to WMD
under IEEPA, including freezing their assets and otherwise
isolating them financially). Also, outlines priorities for
investigating certain foreign persons and transactions in
assessing connections to the IRGC. Requires the President to
report on designations and waivers.
Sec. 302--Sanctions on Foreign Persons Supporting IRGC
Subjects foreign persons to ISA sanctions if those persons
knowingly provide material assistance to, or engage in any
significant transaction--including barter transactions--with
officials of the IRGC, its agents or affiliates. Requires
imposition of similar sanctions against those persons who
engage in significant transactions with UN-sanctioned
persons, those acting for or on their behalf, or those owned
or controlled by them. Provides for additional sanctions
under IEEPA as the President deems appropriate. Requires the
President to report on designations and waivers, as
applicable.
[[Page S3320]]
Sec. 303--Rule of Construction
Clarifies that section 301 and 302 sanctions do not limit
in any way the President's authority to designate persons for
sanction under IEEPA.
Sec. 311--Extension of US Procurement Ban to Foreign Persons
who interact with IRGC
Requires certification by prospective US government
contractors (for contract solicitations issued beginning 90
days from the date of enactment) that neither they nor their
subsidiaries have engaged in significant economic
transactions with designated IRGC officials, agents or
affiliates.
Sec. 312--Sanctions Determinations on NIOC and NITC
Amends CISADA to require the Secretary of the Treasury to
determine and notify Congress whether the National Iranian
Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company are
agents or affiliates of the IRGC. If found to be IRGC
entities, sanctions apply to transactions or relevant
financial services for the purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products from the NIOC or NITC only if the President
determines that there exists a sufficient supply of petroleum
from countries other than Iran to permit purchasers to
significantly reduce in volume their purchases from Iran.
Provides for an exception to financial institutions of a
country that has significantly reduced its purchases of
Iranian petroleum or petroleum products within specified
periods which track those provided for in section 1245 of the
FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.
Sec. 401--Sanctions on those Transferring to Iran
Technologies for Human Rights Abuses
Imposes sanctions provided for in CISADA, including a visa
ban and property blocking/asset freeze, on persons and firms
which supply Iran with equipment and technologies--including
weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and other riot control
equipment, and jamming, monitoring and surveillance
equipment--which the President determines are likely to be
used by Iranian officials to commit human rights abuses.
Requires the President to maintain and update lists of such
persons who commit human rights abuses, submit updated lists
to Congress, and make the unclassified portion of those lists
public. Requires the President to report on designations and
waivers, as applicable.
Sec. 402--Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and
Repression in Iran
Requires imposition of sanctions as in section 401 against
individuals and firms found to have engaged in censorship or
curtailment of the rights of freedom of expression or
assembly of Iran's citizens.
Sec. 411--Expedited Processing of Human Rights, Humanitarian,
and Democracy Aid
Requires the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the
Treasury Department to establish a 90-day process to expedite
processing of US Iran-related humanitarian, human rights and
democratization aid by entities receiving funds from the
State Department; the Broadcasting Board of Governors; and
other federal agencies. Requires the State Department to
conduct a foreign policy review within 30 days of request
submission. Provides for additional time for processing of
applications involving certain specified sensitive goods and
technology, and requests involving novel or extraordinary
circumstances.
Sec. 412--Comprehensive Strategy to Promote Internet Freedom
in Iran
Requires the Administration to devise a comprehensive
strategy and report to Congress on how best to assist Iran's
citizens in freely and safely accessing the Internet,
developing counter-censorship technologies, expanding access
to ``surrogate'' programming including Voice of America's
Persian News Network, and Radio FARDA inside Iran, and taking
other similar measures.
Sec. 413--Sense of Congress on Political Prisoners
Declares that the United States should expand efforts to
identify, assist, and protect prisoners of conscience in Iran
and intensify work to abolish Iranian human rights
violations. Directs the Secretary of State to publicly call
for the release of political prisoners, as appropriate.
Sec. 501--Exclusion of Certain Iranian Students from the US
Requires the Secretary of State to deny visas and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude certain Iranian
university students who may seek to come to the U.S. to study
to prepare for work in Iran's energy sector or in fields
related to its nuclear program, including nuclear sciences or
nuclear engineering.
Sec. 502--Technical Correction
Reaffirms longstanding US policy allowing the sale of
certain licensed agricultural commodities to Iran by amending
section 1245(d)2 of the National Defense Authorization Act to
allow for continued payments related to such commodities.
Sec. 503 Interests in Financial Assets of Iran
Deems blocked assets of Iran seized or frozen in the US,
and property interests of Iran in the United States, to
include property held in book entry and related indirect
forms, property held by securities clearing agencies and
other intermediaries, and inchoate interests in funds
transfers in the payment process through intermediary banks,
regardless of federal or state law that might otherwise
apply, if that property is an interest held for the benefit
of Iran or if any intermediary holds the interest for the
benefit of Iran and the status of the property is relevant to
any attachment or proceedings in aid of execution, whenever
issued, on judgments against Iran for damages for personal
injury or death caused by torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking, or material support for
such an act. Defines various terms used for purposes of the
section, including ``blocked asset,'' ``clearing
corporation,'' ``financial asset,'' ``security,'' and
``securities Intermediary.''
Sec. 504--Report on Membership of Iran in International
Organizations
Requires the Secretary of State to submit a report to
Congress listing the international organizations of which
Iran is a member and detailing the amount the US contributes
to each such organization annually.
Sec. 601--Technical implementation; penalties
Provides the President with the necessary procedural tools
to administer the provisions of this new law, drawing on
relevant provisions of IEEPA, including ensuring that the
Administration can require recordkeeping of certain persons,
and has subpoena and enforcement authority for certain
specified provisions of the bill.
Sec. 602--Applicability to Authorized Intelligence Activities
Provides a general exemption for authorized intelligence
activities of the U.S.
Sec. 603--Termination
Provides for termination of some provisions of the new law
if the President certifies as required in CISADA that Iran
has ceased its support for terrorism and ceased efforts to
pursue, acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology.
Sec. 701--Short Title for Title VII
The ``Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012.''
Sec. 702--Sanctions on Those Responsible for Human Rights
Abuses of Syria's Citizens
Requires the President to identify within 90 days, and
sanction under IEEPA, officials of the Syrian government or
those acting on their behalf who are complicit in or
responsible for the commission of serious human rights abuses
against Syria's citizens, regardless of whether the abuses
occurred in Syria.
Sec. 703--Sanctions on those Transferring to Syria
Technologies for Human Rights Abuses
Requires the President to identify and sanction persons
determined to have engaged in the transfer of technologies--
including weapons, rubber bullets, tear gas and other riot
control equipment, and jamming, monitoring and surveillance
equipment--which the President determines are likely to be
used by Syrian officials to commit human rights abuses or
restrict the free flow of information in Syria. Provides for
exceptions where a person has agreed to stop providing such
technologies, and agreed not to knowingly provide such
technologies in the future. Requires the President to report
on designations and waivers, where applicable, and to update
the list periodically.
Sec. 704--Sanctions on those Engaging in Censorship and
Repression in Syria
Requires the President to identify and report to Congress
within 90 days of enactment those persons and firms found to
have engaged in censorship or repression of the rights of
freedom of expression or assembly of Syria's citizens, and
impose sanctions under IEEPA on such persons. Requires
periodic updating of the list, and public access via the
websites of the Departments of State and Treasury.
Sec. 705--Waiver
Provides for Presidential national security interest waiver
for Syria provisions; requires a report to Congress on the
reasons for the waiver.
Sec. 706--Termination
Provides for termination of the Syria provisions if the
President certifies that the Government of Syria is
democratically elected and representative of the people of
Syria, or a legitimate transitional government of Syria is in
place. Certification required must stipulate that the
government of Syria has released political prisoners, ceased
the abuse of citizens engaged in peaceful political activity,
ceased the practice of procuring sensitive technology to
restrict the free expression rights of its citizens, ended
support for terrorist organizations, ceased development of
missile programs, is not engaged in the development or
acquisition of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, and
agreed to allow the UN and international observers to verify
such claims. Provides for suspension of sanctions for 1 year
if a transitional government is in place, to provide time to
develop the more detailed certification above.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, first let me thank the majority leader
for his doggedness in making sure we could come to an agreement that
sends a clear message to Iran before the P5+1 talks take place this
week. His commitment made the difference.
I would also like to thank the chairman of the Banking Committee,
Senator Johnson of South Dakota, who, in
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an agenda that is incredibly full with all of the challenges the
Banking Committee is taking up, made sure the whole effort on Iran
sanctions had a priority in the committee and worked to get the strong,
bipartisan, unanimous vote that came out of the committee that gives us
the foundation to move forward today. So I thank both of them.
Today the Senate sends a clear message to Iran as it prepares for the
P5+1 talks in Baghdad, and basically that message is: provide a real
and verifiable plan for completely dismantling your nuclear weapons
program or Washington will further tighten the economic noose. The
Obama administration is moving forward with full implementation of the
Menendez-Kirk Central Bank sanctions, and the U.S. Congress is ready
with additional measures, such as sanctions on the National Iranian Oil
Company and Iranian energy joint ventures that will further isolate the
regime.
I think Iran's Supreme Leader has a choice: Either come to Baghdad
with a real plan to terminate Iran's nuclear program or we will make
our own plan through sanctions and other necessary measures to ensure
that Iran fails to achieve its nuclear ambitions.
And lest anyone think this is necessary, Madam President, as
negotiators head to Baghdad this week for the P5+1 talks, this bill is
another tool that will demonstrate to Iran that the United States is
not backing down and that buying time and just thinking that you can go
and talk without substantive, meaningful concessions here is just not
going to work.
In case anyone has doubts as to the need for this legislation, the
record is pretty clear. In recent weeks the International Atomic Energy
Administration has been subject to Iranian delays and deception over
access to the Parchin facility--a facility they claim has no connection
to their nuclear program but which scientists believe may contain a
blast chamber used to test explosives that can trigger a nuclear blast.
Combine that information with Iran's continued enrichment of uranium
to 20 percent, development of new enrichment facilities, conducting of
high explosives testing and detonator development to set off a nuclear
charge, computer modeling of a core of a nuclear warhead, and the
August 2011 IAEA inspection that revealed 43.5 pounds of a component
used to arm nuclear warheads was unaccounted for in Iran, and that Iran
is working on an indigenous design for a nuclear payload small enough
to fit on Iran's long-range Shahab-3 missile, a missile capable of
reaching Israel, capable of reaching some of our allies in Europe which
we are committed to NATO to defend, there is a pretty clear picture of
why this is in the national interest and security of the United States
and what is going on in Iran.
The bill is intended to give Iran a pretty clear picture in return of
what America's response to their posture would be. This includes
sanctions on the national Iranian oil and tanker companies to terminate
a work-around to the Central Bank sanctions; sanctions on satellite
companies that provide satellite services to the Iranian regime but
fail to prevent jamming by Iran of transmissions by other users of the
same satellite service company; sanctions on financial messaging
service companies that provide services to sanctioned Iranian financial
institutions; imposition of liability on parent companies for actions
of foreign subsidiaries; and sanctions on energy joint ventures with
Iran related to the development of petroleum resources. Those are just
some.
This is perfecting legislation to CISADA and I am so thrilled we are
seeing it today.
Finally, I wish to also comment on one particular section of the bill
to ensure there is no ambiguity about its intent. Section 503, as
revised in the managers' amendment, preempts any conflicting Federal or
State law, but only as they pertain to the eligibility for attachment
and execution of certain blocked assets of the state of Iran,
identified in the section, for judgments against Iran for the execution
of terrorist acts, including the marine corps barracks bombing in
Lebanon in 1983, which killed 241 U.S. servicemen, and the Khobar
Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 which killed 19 U.S. servicemen.
Nothing in this legislation alters any other applicable law.
As someone who authored these provisions, I wanted to be sure that
there was understanding on the record that Iran, in addition to
stopping its nuclear weapons program, which is in the national interest
and security of the United States, should not be able to avoid having
its assets attached and pursued and executed upon as they killed
Americans and having been part of killing Americans abroad.
With that, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
Order of Procedure
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 2
minutes; immediately thereafter, the Senator from Ohio, Senator Brown,
be permitted to speak for 5 minutes; and then the Senator from Kansas,
Senator Moran, be permitted to speak for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SCHUMER. I will be brief. First, I wish to thank our chairman,
Senator Johnson of South Dakota, for being so steadfast in bringing
this bill to the floor. He worked in tandem with Senator Shelby, whom I
thank as well. Senator Menendez has been a true leader on these issues
and has been the lead sponsor of many of the pieces of legislation to
tighten the economic noose on Iran. I wish to thank my friend and
colleague Senator Graham from South Carolina as well for being so
instructive on this issue.
We have had a lot of divisions between Democrats and Republicans, but
on the issue of making sure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon,
we are united. The threat, the specter of an Iranian nuclear weapon,
will continue to bring Democrats and Republicans together. I hope the
Iranian Government recognizes that, because we are going to continue to
tighten and tighten and tighten restrictions so that Iran realizes that
not just the United States but just about all of the civilized world is
against her gaining a nuclear weapon. The Iranians can't talk about why
shouldn't have it when everyone else does. With the kind of saber
rattling and verbiage that comes out of that regime about what they
might do to Israel or other countries, it shows they are not a mature
enough nation to be possessing this God-awful power.
The point I wish to make here tonight is this is another step
forward. We are further tightening the sanctions. We will continue to
tighten them so that the answer for Iran, if they persist with moving
forward on producing a nuclear weapon, is economic chaos for the
Iranian leadership and, unfortunately, for many of the Iranian people.
Let Iran beware. This is just another step. We will not stop. We are
united as two parties, we are united as a Nation, and we are united as
a family of nations to make sure we do everything we can to prevent
Iran from becoming a nuclear power. That would represent a disaster to
the nations of the world, and one we cannot tolerate.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Madam President, I wish to reiterate and
underscore the words of my colleague, the senior Senator from New York,
about how important the tightening of the Iran sanctions are to Israel,
to the United States of America, and to the stability of the world.
Allowing nuclear weapons in the hands of a country as unstable as Iran
and which is hostile to so many of our values and which is hostile to
most people in the world--not just the United States, not just Israel,
not just the democratic world--how problematic this is for the entire
world. That is why I am pleased with the work Chairman Johnson did,
along with Ranking Member Shelby, Senator Menendez, Senator Graham, and
others, so that this continues to send an important message to Iran
that we will continue to increasingly tighten sanctions threatening to
Iran and the stability of its economy, and helping Iran to understand
that this will create difficulties for that regime in having any
support of its people with the economic consequences that could happen
as we tighten sanctions.
As Senator McCain said, we will take nothing off the table. We want a
diplomatic solution with these sanctions. We want Iran to recognize it
is in their interests not to have nuclear weapons. That is the best
thing for all of us, but, again, taking nothing off the table.
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