[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 61 (Thursday, April 26, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2809-S2810]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     TRIBUTE TO MAYOR CHARLES LONG

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to my good friend 
Mr. Charles Long, the longtime mayor of Booneville, KY. Mr. Long has 
served as mayor of this small Owsley County town for 53 years. During 
his tenure, he has worked to provide a better life for the citizens of 
Booneville by providing exceptional opportunities for various daily 
improvements, as well as working to make vital amenities more easily 
accessible to all.
  One of the most significant accomplishments of Mayor Long's time in 
office has to do with developments he oversaw in the area of water and 
sanitation. The mayor oversaw the installation of the town's water and 
sewer system in 1968. Afterwards, he went on to guarantee that over 98 
percent of Owsley County had access to the water system and worked to 
see the sewage system expanded to over 400 residents in the county.
  Mayor Long serves on the Kentucky River Area Development Committee--
KRADD. The mayor's home county of Owsley is one of the eight counties 
in eastern Kentucky that KRADD supervises. The organization has been a 
major force in further developing the rural areas of eastern Kentucky, 
and Mayor Long is an integral part of that process.
  Besides the hard work Mayor Long does for the people of Booneville, 
he is known for being a beloved and involved member of his large 
family. His children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren are all 
very proud of him and all he has accomplished.
  Sadly, Charles recently lost the love of his life and wife of 72 
years, Virginia Ruth Long. Mrs. Long passed away on March 27, 2012, at 
the age of 92. During a recent session of the Kentucky State Senate, 
she was honored by a Senate Resolution commemorating her life and 
accomplishments. I know Mayor Long surely appreciated that gesture.
  Charles Long has literally spent the majority of his life serving the 
local people of Booneville as their mayor. He is able to look back at 
his long and successful career and reminisce on the countless 
improvements he has put in place for the city he holds dear to his 
heart. Mr. Charles Long exhibits a commendable display of 
characteristics such as dedication, kindheartedness, and reliability 
which set him apart as a true hometown hero.
  I am honored to stand on the floor of the U.S. Senate today in 
tribute to Mayor Charles Long's service to the town of Booneville and 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. And I ask my Senate colleagues to join me 
in expressing recognition to Mayor Long for his long and fruitful 
tenure in office.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would like to call the attention of my 
colleagues to a column published in the April 23rd edition of The 
Washington Post by Dr. Henry Kissinger and retired GEN Brent Scowcroft. 
These are two of the most respected voices on nuclear strategy, 
deterrence, and arms control, and they both recently testified on the 
New START treaty.
  The article, titled ``Strategic Stability in Today's Nuclear World,'' 
comes at an important time. The President, we know, has tasked his 
advisors to conduct an assessment of our nuclear forces and strategy to 
inform future arms reductions beyond the levels established by the New 
START treaty. The administration is said to be considering reductions 
that could lead to as few as 300 warheads, which would require rather 
significant changes to long-standing U.S. nuclear doctrine.
  Dr. Kissinger and General Scowcroft warn that:

       Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to 
     stress our conviction that the

[[Page S2810]]

     goal of future negotiations should be strategic stability and 
     that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of 
     strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived 
     determination.

  In fact, the authors go on to warn the reader that:

       Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of 
     nuclear weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead 
     to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable.

  This short column should be required reading for all of my 
colleagues, and the eight key criteria listed by the authors, to govern 
nuclear weapons policy, should become the basis for our consideration 
of nuclear strategy and arms control moving forward.
  I want to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Kissinger and General 
Scowcroft for their important contributions to our ongoing debates 
about nuclear weapons and, more broadly, for their decades of service 
to our country.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in 
the Record at the end of my remarks.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, April 23, 2012]

              Strategic Stability In Today's Nuclear World

              (By Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft)

       A New START treaty reestablishing the process of nuclear 
     arms control has recently taken effect. Combined with 
     reductions in the U.S. defense budget, this will bring the 
     number of nuclear weapons in the United States to the lowest 
     overall level since the 1950s. The Obama administration is 
     said to be considering negotiations for a new round of 
     nuclear reductions to bring about ceilings as low as 300 
     warheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel 
     obliged to stress our conviction that the goal of future 
     negotiations should be strategic stability and that lower 
     numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic 
     analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination.
       Regardless of one's vision of the ultimate future of 
     nuclear weapons, the overarching goal of contemporary U.S. 
     nuclear policy must be to ensure that nuclear weapons are 
     never used. Strategic stability is not inherent with low 
     numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could 
     lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are 
     conceivable.
       We supported ratification of the START treaty. We favor 
     verification of agreed reductions and procedures that enhance 
     predictability and transparency. One of us (Kissinger) has 
     supported working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, 
     albeit with the proviso that a series of verifiable 
     intermediate steps that maintain stability precede such an 
     end point and that every stage of the process be fully 
     transparent and verifiable.
       The precondition of the next phase of U.S. nuclear weapons 
     policy must be to enhance and enshrine the strategic 
     stability that has preserved global peace and prevented the 
     use of nuclear weapons for two generations.
       Eight key facts should govern such a policy:
       First, strategic stability requires maintaining strategic 
     forces of sufficient size and composition that a first strike 
     cannot reduce retaliation to a level acceptable to the 
     aggressor.
       Second, in assessing the level of unacceptable damage, the 
     United States cannot assume that a potential enemy will 
     adhere to values or calculations identical to our own. We 
     need a sufficient number of weapons to pose a threat to what 
     potential aggressors value under every conceivable 
     circumstance. We should avoid strategic analysis by mirror-
     imaging.
       Third, the composition of our strategic forces cannot be 
     defined by numbers alone. It also depends on the type of 
     delivery vehicles and their mix. If the composition of the 
     U.S. deterrent force is modified as a result of reduction, 
     agreement or for other reasons, a sufficient variety must be 
     retained, together with a robust supporting command and 
     control system, so as to guarantee that a preemptive attack 
     cannot succeed.
       Fourth, in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, 
     verification is crucial. Particularly important is a 
     determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the 
     calculation of stability. At present, that level is well 
     within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. 
     We must be certain that projected levels maintain--and when 
     possible, reinforce--that confidence.
       Fifth, the global nonproliferation regime has been weakened 
     to a point where some of the proliferating countries are 
     reported to have arsenals of more than 100 weapons. And these 
     arsenals are growing. At what lower U.S. levels could these 
     arsenals constitute a strategic threat? What will be their 
     strategic impact if deterrence breaks down in the overall 
     strategic relationship? Does this prospect open up the risk 
     of hostile alliances between countries whose forces 
     individually are not adequate to challenge strategic 
     stability but that combined might overthrow the nuclear 
     equation?
       Sixth, this suggests that, below a level yet to be 
     established, nuclear reductions cannot be confined to Russia 
     and the United States. As the countries with the two largest 
     nuclear arsenals, Russia and the United States have a special 
     responsibility. But other countries need to be brought into 
     the discussion when substantial reductions from existing 
     START levels are on the international agenda.
       Seventh, strategic stability will be affected by other 
     factors, such as missile defenses and the roles and numbers 
     of tactical nuclear weapons, which are not now subject to 
     agreed limitations. Precision-guided large conventional 
     warheads on long-range delivery vehicles provide another 
     challenge to stability. The interrelationship among these 
     elements must be taken into account in future negotiations.
       Eighth, we must see to it that countries that have relied 
     on American nuclear protection maintain their confidence in 
     the U.S. capability for deterrence. If that confidence 
     falters, they may be tempted by accommodation to their 
     adversaries or independent nuclear capabilities.
       Nuclear weapons will continue to influence the 
     international landscape as part of strategy and an aspect of 
     negotiation. The lessons learned throughout seven decades 
     need to continue to govern the future.

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