[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 61 (Thursday, April 26, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2809-S2810]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TRIBUTE TO MAYOR CHARLES LONG
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to my good friend
Mr. Charles Long, the longtime mayor of Booneville, KY. Mr. Long has
served as mayor of this small Owsley County town for 53 years. During
his tenure, he has worked to provide a better life for the citizens of
Booneville by providing exceptional opportunities for various daily
improvements, as well as working to make vital amenities more easily
accessible to all.
One of the most significant accomplishments of Mayor Long's time in
office has to do with developments he oversaw in the area of water and
sanitation. The mayor oversaw the installation of the town's water and
sewer system in 1968. Afterwards, he went on to guarantee that over 98
percent of Owsley County had access to the water system and worked to
see the sewage system expanded to over 400 residents in the county.
Mayor Long serves on the Kentucky River Area Development Committee--
KRADD. The mayor's home county of Owsley is one of the eight counties
in eastern Kentucky that KRADD supervises. The organization has been a
major force in further developing the rural areas of eastern Kentucky,
and Mayor Long is an integral part of that process.
Besides the hard work Mayor Long does for the people of Booneville,
he is known for being a beloved and involved member of his large
family. His children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren are all
very proud of him and all he has accomplished.
Sadly, Charles recently lost the love of his life and wife of 72
years, Virginia Ruth Long. Mrs. Long passed away on March 27, 2012, at
the age of 92. During a recent session of the Kentucky State Senate,
she was honored by a Senate Resolution commemorating her life and
accomplishments. I know Mayor Long surely appreciated that gesture.
Charles Long has literally spent the majority of his life serving the
local people of Booneville as their mayor. He is able to look back at
his long and successful career and reminisce on the countless
improvements he has put in place for the city he holds dear to his
heart. Mr. Charles Long exhibits a commendable display of
characteristics such as dedication, kindheartedness, and reliability
which set him apart as a true hometown hero.
I am honored to stand on the floor of the U.S. Senate today in
tribute to Mayor Charles Long's service to the town of Booneville and
the Commonwealth of Kentucky. And I ask my Senate colleagues to join me
in expressing recognition to Mayor Long for his long and fruitful
tenure in office.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would like to call the attention of my
colleagues to a column published in the April 23rd edition of The
Washington Post by Dr. Henry Kissinger and retired GEN Brent Scowcroft.
These are two of the most respected voices on nuclear strategy,
deterrence, and arms control, and they both recently testified on the
New START treaty.
The article, titled ``Strategic Stability in Today's Nuclear World,''
comes at an important time. The President, we know, has tasked his
advisors to conduct an assessment of our nuclear forces and strategy to
inform future arms reductions beyond the levels established by the New
START treaty. The administration is said to be considering reductions
that could lead to as few as 300 warheads, which would require rather
significant changes to long-standing U.S. nuclear doctrine.
Dr. Kissinger and General Scowcroft warn that:
Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to
stress our conviction that the
[[Page S2810]]
goal of future negotiations should be strategic stability and
that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of
strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived
determination.
In fact, the authors go on to warn the reader that:
Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of
nuclear weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead
to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable.
This short column should be required reading for all of my
colleagues, and the eight key criteria listed by the authors, to govern
nuclear weapons policy, should become the basis for our consideration
of nuclear strategy and arms control moving forward.
I want to express my deep appreciation to Dr. Kissinger and General
Scowcroft for their important contributions to our ongoing debates
about nuclear weapons and, more broadly, for their decades of service
to our country.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in
the Record at the end of my remarks.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, April 23, 2012]
Strategic Stability In Today's Nuclear World
(By Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft)
A New START treaty reestablishing the process of nuclear
arms control has recently taken effect. Combined with
reductions in the U.S. defense budget, this will bring the
number of nuclear weapons in the United States to the lowest
overall level since the 1950s. The Obama administration is
said to be considering negotiations for a new round of
nuclear reductions to bring about ceilings as low as 300
warheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel
obliged to stress our conviction that the goal of future
negotiations should be strategic stability and that lower
numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic
analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination.
Regardless of one's vision of the ultimate future of
nuclear weapons, the overarching goal of contemporary U.S.
nuclear policy must be to ensure that nuclear weapons are
never used. Strategic stability is not inherent with low
numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could
lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are
conceivable.
We supported ratification of the START treaty. We favor
verification of agreed reductions and procedures that enhance
predictability and transparency. One of us (Kissinger) has
supported working toward the elimination of nuclear weapons,
albeit with the proviso that a series of verifiable
intermediate steps that maintain stability precede such an
end point and that every stage of the process be fully
transparent and verifiable.
The precondition of the next phase of U.S. nuclear weapons
policy must be to enhance and enshrine the strategic
stability that has preserved global peace and prevented the
use of nuclear weapons for two generations.
Eight key facts should govern such a policy:
First, strategic stability requires maintaining strategic
forces of sufficient size and composition that a first strike
cannot reduce retaliation to a level acceptable to the
aggressor.
Second, in assessing the level of unacceptable damage, the
United States cannot assume that a potential enemy will
adhere to values or calculations identical to our own. We
need a sufficient number of weapons to pose a threat to what
potential aggressors value under every conceivable
circumstance. We should avoid strategic analysis by mirror-
imaging.
Third, the composition of our strategic forces cannot be
defined by numbers alone. It also depends on the type of
delivery vehicles and their mix. If the composition of the
U.S. deterrent force is modified as a result of reduction,
agreement or for other reasons, a sufficient variety must be
retained, together with a robust supporting command and
control system, so as to guarantee that a preemptive attack
cannot succeed.
Fourth, in deciding on force levels and lower numbers,
verification is crucial. Particularly important is a
determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the
calculation of stability. At present, that level is well
within the capabilities of the existing verification systems.
We must be certain that projected levels maintain--and when
possible, reinforce--that confidence.
Fifth, the global nonproliferation regime has been weakened
to a point where some of the proliferating countries are
reported to have arsenals of more than 100 weapons. And these
arsenals are growing. At what lower U.S. levels could these
arsenals constitute a strategic threat? What will be their
strategic impact if deterrence breaks down in the overall
strategic relationship? Does this prospect open up the risk
of hostile alliances between countries whose forces
individually are not adequate to challenge strategic
stability but that combined might overthrow the nuclear
equation?
Sixth, this suggests that, below a level yet to be
established, nuclear reductions cannot be confined to Russia
and the United States. As the countries with the two largest
nuclear arsenals, Russia and the United States have a special
responsibility. But other countries need to be brought into
the discussion when substantial reductions from existing
START levels are on the international agenda.
Seventh, strategic stability will be affected by other
factors, such as missile defenses and the roles and numbers
of tactical nuclear weapons, which are not now subject to
agreed limitations. Precision-guided large conventional
warheads on long-range delivery vehicles provide another
challenge to stability. The interrelationship among these
elements must be taken into account in future negotiations.
Eighth, we must see to it that countries that have relied
on American nuclear protection maintain their confidence in
the U.S. capability for deterrence. If that confidence
falters, they may be tempted by accommodation to their
adversaries or independent nuclear capabilities.
Nuclear weapons will continue to influence the
international landscape as part of strategy and an aspect of
negotiation. The lessons learned throughout seven decades
need to continue to govern the future.
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