[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 61 (Thursday, April 26, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H2156-H2186]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1420
             CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT


                             General Leave

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 3523.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Woodall). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 631 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3523.
  The Chair appoints the gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. Biggert) to 
preside over the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  1422


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat 
intelligence and cyber threat information between the intelligence 
community and cybersecurity entities, and for other purposes, with Mrs. 
Biggert in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the 
first time.

[[Page H2157]]

  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from 
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Never a problem have I seen when it comes to our national security, 
Madam Chair, that we are just not prepared to handle.
  In just the last few years, nation-states, like China, have stolen 
enough intellectual property from just the Fed's contractors that it 
would be equivalent to 50 times the print collection of the Library of 
Congress. We have nation-states that are literally stealing jobs and 
our future. We also have countries that are engaged in activities and 
have capabilities that have the ability to break networks, computer 
networks, which means you can't just reboot. It means your system is 
literally broken. Those kinds of disruptions can be catastrophic when 
you think about the financial sector or the energy sector or our 
command and control elements for all of our national security 
apparatus.
  This is as serious a problem as I have seen. So, last year, I and my 
partner--Dutch Ruppersberger, the vice chairman and ranking member of 
the Intelligence Committee--agreed that this was a significant enough 
problem to the future prosperity of America that we'd better do 
something about it.
  We needed to stop the Chinese Government from stealing our stuff. We 
needed to stop the Russians from what they're doing to our networks and 
to people's personal information, data, and resources. We needed to 
prepare for countries like Iran and North Korea so that they don't do 
something catastrophic to our networks here in America and cause real 
harm to real people.
  So, in a bipartisan way, we set out to do something very, very, very 
narrow. When the government spies overseas, it collects malware--
viruses, software that is dangerous to our computers. That means they 
can either steal our stuff--the personal information off of your 
computer--or they can steal the secrets that make your business viable, 
the kinds of secrets that give people jobs.
  So wouldn't it be great if we could take that source code, that 
software and share it with the private sector so that they could put it 
on their private systems, like they do every single day to try to 
protect networks, and have that added advantage of that extra coverage 
from that malicious source code? The good news is this happens every 
day. If you have Norton or McAfee or Symantec or any other antivirus 
protection on your computer, it has patches of information that they 
know is really bad stuff, and every time you turn your computer on, it 
updates and tries to protect your computer, your personal information.
  That's all this is. It is adding to that patchwork some zeroes and 
some ones that we know is malicious code that is either going to steal 
your information or break your computer or something worse. That's all 
this bill is. It draws a very fine line between the government and the 
private sector. It is all voluntary. There are no new mandates. There 
is no government surveillance--none, not any--in this bill. It just 
says, if we know we have this source code, shouldn't we be obligated to 
give it so it doesn't do something bad to the companies and individuals 
in America. That's all this bill does.
  We have worked collaboratively with hundreds of companies, with 
privacy groups, with civil libertarians. We have worked with government 
folks. We have had hundreds and hundreds of meetings for over a year. 
We have kept this bill open in an unprecedented transparent way to try 
to meet the needs of privacy concerns, civil libertarian concerns, 
civil liberties concerns. We wanted to make sure that, with this bill, 
people understood exactly what we were trying to do, how simple it is, 
and how crucial it is to the future defense of this great Nation.
  Without our ideas, without our innovation that countries like China 
are stealing every single day, we will cease to be a great Nation. They 
are slowly and silently and quickly stealing the value and prosperity 
of America.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself an additional 1 minute.
  One credit card company said that they get attacked for your personal 
information 300,000 times a day--one company. We have a company that 
can directly show you stolen intellectual property. This one particular 
company estimated 20,000 manufacturing jobs that they lost for 
Americans, which were good-paying jobs, because countries like China 
stole their intellectual property and illegally competed against them 
in the marketplace.
  This is as bad a problem, Madam Chair, as I have seen. I think you'll 
hear throughout the day this has been a responsible debate and that it 
has been a responsible negotiation to get to privacy concerns and our 
ability to protect your information on your computer through this 
series of zeroes and ones, the binary code on our computers.
  Again, I want to thank my ranking member for his partnership and his 
work. He has been exceptional to work with on something on which we 
both agree and on which we agreed, in a bipartisan fashion, was a 
danger to the future prosperity of America.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  First of all, I do want to thank the chairman for working with us in 
a bipartisan way to protect our country from this very serious threat 
of cyberattacks.
  As the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, people 
often ask me what keeps me up at night. I tell them: weapons of mass 
destruction entering the country undetected and also a catastrophic 
cyberattack shutting down our water supply, power grid or banking 
systems; and those are just a few of the many areas that could be 
attacked and shut down.
  Every day, U.S. Web sites and our Nation's networks are threatened by 
foreign governments like China, Iran, Russia, and other groups trying 
to steal our money and valuable trade secrets. According to the 
National Counterterrorism Executive, the number one thing cyberthieves 
are trying to steal is information and communication technology, which 
form the backbone of nearly every other technology. In fact, according 
to the United States Cyber Command, $300 billion worth of trade secrets 
are stolen every year. This proves we need to make real changes to how 
we protect our cybersystems.
  The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act helps the private 
sector protect itself and its clients from these attackers and data 
thieves. The intelligence community has the ability to detect these 
cyberthreats, these malicious codes and viruses, before they are able 
to attack our networks; but right now, Federal law prohibits the 
intelligence community from sharing the classified cyberthreat with the 
companies that will protect us, that control the network--the AT&Ts, 
the Verizons, the Comcasts, those groups. We have the ability to give 
them the information to protect us; yet we have to pass a law to do 
that, and that's why we are here today.

                              {time}  1430

  The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act will clearly do 
that if we pass the bill. It allows the intelligence community to share 
the codes and signatures associated with malware and viruses and the 
means to counter the bad stuff with the companies. These companies keep 
a lookout for these viruses and work to stop them before they are able 
to attack their system.
  Companies then voluntarily give information about the cyberattack 
back to the government, machine code consisting of strings of zeroes 
and ones that uniquely identifies the malware. Cyberanalysts will use 
this information to better understand the attack and try to figure out 
who launched it and where it came from.
  This information will be used to protect against similar attacks in 
the future.
  Now, the Democrats worked hard to protect privacy and civil liberties 
in this bill throughout the entire process. We fought for additional 
privacy protections in the original bill that was marked up in 
committee. In the version we will vote on tomorrow morning, additional 
changes are also included in the amendments.

[[Page H2158]]

  Privacy and civil liberty groups and the White House all agree we 
made important positive changes that went a long way to improve the 
initial bill that came out of committee. We severely limit what 
information can be shared with the government and how it can be used.
  It is also important to note the entire process is completely 
voluntary and provides industry the flexibility they need to deal with 
business realities.
  The bill also requires an annual report from the inspector general of 
the intelligence community to ensure none of the information provided 
to the government is mishandled or is misused. This is a very important 
privacy issue.
  The review will include annual recommendations to improve the 
protection of privacy and civil liberties. That review will be done 
again by the inspector general.
  We also made it clear this legislation grants no new authority to the 
Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, or the 
intelligence community. At the urging of the White House and others, we 
included the Department of Homeland Security in the process so that 
there is not even a perception that our intelligence agencies or 
military will be in control of this. The Homeland Security Department 
will be coordinating as a civil body.
  In addition, companies that act in good faith to protect systems and 
networks can receive liability protection. This is what our bill does.
  Now, what does it not do? The bill does not allow the government to 
order companies to turn over private email or other personal 
information. This is not surveillance. The bill does not allow the 
government to monitor private networks, read private email, censor, or 
shut down any Web site.
  We have a broad coalition of support with 100 cosponsors, close to 30 
companies and industry groups, and dozens of trade organizations like 
Facebook, Microsoft, IBM, a lot of different groups that are supporting 
this bill.
  This is not a perfect bill, but the threat is great. I believe this 
legislation is critical for our national security and yet deals with 
the issue of privacy. We can do better in privacy, and we hope to get 
the bill to the Senate, where there will be a lot more negotiation. 
Congress must act now, and I encourage my colleagues to vote for this 
bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from 
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) who is on the Intelligence Committee and 
has a tremendous expertise on counterterrorism issues.
  Mrs. MYRICK. I want to say a big thanks to the chair and to the 
ranking member for all of their months of hard work on putting this 
cybersecurity bill together, and it is a bipartisan Intelligence 
Committee bill.
  We all know the private sector is a very diverse world that includes 
reputable companies but also grey market suppliers and counterfeiters, 
and State-owned enterprises and other entities that often act against 
the national security interests of the United States, as well as other 
private companies.
  The information technology sector, in particular, includes companies 
that are associated with some foreign governments and militaries and 
intelligence services of nations that attack the United States in 
cyberspace daily.
  State and local entities, along with the private sector, don't have 
the resources, the capabilities, or the information necessary to 
address these cybersecurity threats. This bill creates a necessary 
mechanism for the Federal Government to share its informational 
resources and cybersecurity threat analysis with the private sector and 
with State and local entities.
  The purpose of the bill is to transmit important cybersecurity 
information from the Federal Government to the private sector, not vice 
versa. The bill would empower the private sector to begin taking 
necessary steps to protect itself from cyberattacks, some they don't 
have any clue are happening.

  Ultimately though, it's going to be important for Congress and the 
Federal Government to continue the debate on cybersecurity to determine 
how to best confront the changing threats because this world is 
changing daily, and the Federal Government can't leave those 
responsibilities solely to the private sector, especially, like the 
chairman already mentioned, countries like China that are continuously 
developing cyberwarfare capabilities and the cyberattacks that they 
commit against the Western companies and infrastructures and government 
entities we all know about.
  So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this important piece of 
legislation and an important step in trying to protect the private 
sector in this country.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague from the State of Utah (Mr. Boswell) who 
formerly served on the Intelligence Committee.
  The CHAIR. The gentleman from Iowa is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, I appreciate the correction. We grow corn in 
Iowa, and we grow potatoes in Idaho. A little bit of fun.
  I rise to speak in support of this bill today. I look across at 
Chairman Rogers and here at Ranking Member Ruppersberger, and I have 
great confidence. I know these men. I know their staff. They've come to 
this very serious matter that lays before our country that we need to 
understand. We must take action.
  I'm encouraged by the process to involve key stakeholders from 
private industry and privacy groups during this drafting. This 
transparent engagement shaped many of the bipartisan constructive 
amendments being considered today that will improve the bill, and it's 
a good thing.
  The threat from malicious actors in cyberspace is real. You've heard 
it said over and over already by those who have spoken ahead of me. I 
concur with what they say. It's an absolutely real thing. You only need 
to pick up the newspaper or turn on the TV to see the threats facing 
our networks. These networks include those that power our homes, our 
factories, and our small businesses, allow our banking system to 
function and provide the very backbone to our current American way of 
life, and we rely on these networks every day.
  The bill under consideration today is a very narrow piece, but what 
we can agree on is it's a critical one to helping secure our networks 
and, therefore, the way of life as we know it today.
  There are continuing debates on how to implement the bill, but the 
debate isn't over what needs to be done; it must be done. Information 
we ask our intelligence community to use and that protects our 
government networks should, in a secure way, be shared to protect the 
many other critical networks we rely on.
  I believe companies are doing what they can to protect their networks 
to the extent they can today, but there is more that must be done.
  We cannot be in a situation where the government had information to 
prevent or mitigate a catastrophic cyberattack, and yet we did not have 
the procedure in place to share this information. Our American way of 
life includes a great respect for privacy and our civil liberties. We 
make no mistake about that.
  This bill, with the addition of many of the amendments which were 
drafted in concert with privacy groups, addresses many of those 
concerns.
  In addition, the annual unclassified report required by the statutory 
intelligence community inspector general will inform whether there are 
additional adjustments needed to be made.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 10 seconds.
  Mr. BOSWELL. So, in closing, I want to say this: Congress cannot wait 
to act. Network security hasn't kept up with network speed. This is the 
fundamental purpose of this bill. I encourage Members to begin to 
secure our networks through sharing information about the threats. 
Please vote ``yes.''
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger).
  Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois. I thank the ranking member and the 
chairman for your hard work on the issue and the members on the 
committee.
  This is very important. It goes beyond partisanship. This is about 
national security.
  The idea of cyberattacks, it's not something that is just out there 
in space that we really don't have to worry about. This is an issue 
that's here today, and it's here right now. In

[[Page H2159]]

fact, just today, the New York Stock Exchange was the target of a DDoS 
attack on some of its external computer systems. That's not something 
that we just magically happen to have today. This is happening every 
day, thousands and thousands of times a day.

                              {time}  1440

  I'm a military guy and I'm a military pilot. I think a lot about the 
threats from outside. You think a lot about threats of terrorism and 
threats of invasion or anything along that line. But I'll tell you one 
of the biggest threats that really keep us up at night is this idea of 
a cyberattack. I think it's something that we have to take head-on. 
This voluntary information-sharing between classified portions of our 
government and certified private actors will serve to enhance our 
defenses greatly.
  It is important to note the amount of classified information 
currently shared between our government and private industry is muddled 
at best. The few private companies who are lucky enough to receive an 
invitation into the current classified annex of cybersecurity-sharing 
face significant challenges when it comes to even understanding what 
that information is. Many times they simply get a badly scanned 
printout of a current threat situation from which they try to prevent a 
future attack, and it is woefully inadequate.
  We talk a lot about the Russians and about the Chinese and their use 
of cyberwarfare against us. That's a significant threat. That's 
something very serious. But I want to speak just momentarily about the 
threat from Iran.
  We all know that Iran is a very serious country that is very 
seriously focused on bringing down, in many cases, the West. They've 
said it themselves. The Iranian regime from the highest level down has 
publicly stated their plans to fight enemies with abundant power in 
cyberspace and Internet warfare. It's also publicly stated that Iran 
blames the West for the Stuxnet virus which disrupted their nuclear 
program, and they have vowed retaliation. The combination of the low 
cost and effectiveness of cyberwarfare has led the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard to actively and effectively recruit radical 
Islamist hackers for nefarious purposes. We can't stand idly by while 
we see nations like Iran threaten the future of this country.
  So I support this bill, and I commend the folks who have worked on 
it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague from the State of New Jersey, Mr. Rush Holt, who was formally 
on the Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman.
  The proponents of this legislation, who are all friends and well 
intentioned, have repeatedly said there's a real threat, a threat to 
our critical infrastructure, affecting our waterworks, and our electric 
grid. But this bill is so poorly constructed it is not designed to 
protect against those threats. There are any number of flaws with it.
  The American Civil Liberties Union points out that there would be an 
exception to all privacy laws; and it would allow companies to share 
private and personal data that they hold on their American customers, 
actually, among themselves and with the government. It would not limit 
companies to sharing only technical or nonpersonal data. They'd be free 
from any liability of misuse. They would only have to plead good 
intentions.
  The bill fails to narrowly define the privacy laws it would 
contravene; it fails to put the cybersecurity efforts in a civilian 
agency; it fails to require companies to remove personal identifiable 
information about individuals; it fails to sufficiently limit the 
government's use of information; it fails to create a robust oversight 
and accountability structure. With the bill in its current form, 
there's no requirement that personal information must be removed. 
There's no consumer or stakeholder group involved in the oversight. 
There's no way for any member of the public to know if their data has 
been shared in error, and on and on.
  And I should point out that it is not just the American Civil 
Liberties Union that opposes this. Even the American Library 
Association opposes it. The President, himself, says, if this passes, 
he will veto it. Passing this bill in response to the cyberthreat would 
be like going into Iraq because al Qaeda terrorists were a real threat.
  Yes, there's a real threat. This is not the answer.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stivers).
  Mr. STIVERS. Madam Chair, I would like to thank the gentleman from 
Michigan for yielding me time. I would also like to thank him for his 
leadership on this effort, as well as the ranking member, the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
  I rise today in support of the cybersecurity legislation under 
consideration. As a member of the Cybersecurity Task Force, I'm pleased 
that many of our recommendations are included in this bill.
  Cybersecurity is a very important issue. Every day there are people 
trying to use cyberattacks to steal our money, steal our jobs, and 
attack our national security.
  I know as a member of the Financial Services Committee that our 
financial sector spends billions of dollars every year trying to 
protect against cyberattacks. They protect consumers by increasing 
controls, making sure they have encryption, authenticating customers, 
and protecting customer data.
  That's all protecting our wallets, but we also need to protect our 
jobs. Unfortunately, there are folks who would like to use cyberattacks 
to steal our intellectual property and give it to those who compete 
against America, which will steal our jobs.
  Not allowing information-sharing like this bill does would be like 
saying to the Marines and the Army, You can't share information about 
how the enemy is going to attack you. As a member of the National Guard 
for the last 26 years, I know that cyber is also a real threat to our 
national security.
  This bill will update our information-sharing to allow private 
companies to share information with the government and the government 
to share information, and includes some important liability protection 
as well. It's a carefully crafted bill.
  I think the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman 
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) have been very open to working with 
folks to try to improve this bill. I'm looking forward to supporting 
some of the bipartisan amendments that I think will improve this bill.
  Madam Chair, we must protect ourselves against cyberattacks, against 
those who would steal our money, steal our jobs, and attack our 
country. This bill is not a panacea, but it's a great start. I'm happy 
to support it, and I hope all my colleagues will vote ``yes.''
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague 
from the State of California, Mr. Adam Schiff, who is also the ranking 
member on the Technical and Tactical Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Chair, I rise in reluctant opposition to the bill. But at the 
outset, I want to acknowledge the extraordinary work done by our 
chairman, Mike Rogers, and our ranking member, Dutch Ruppersberger. 
These two gentlemen have changed the nature and culture of our 
committee, made it far more productive, and they've done great work 
getting us to this point. And I want to acknowledge that at the outset.
  There's still work to be done in two areas principally, and I want to 
talk briefly about that. Even before I do that, I want to acknowledge 
why we're here.

  We do ourselves, I think, a disservice when we talk about a 
cyberthreat. That sounds like something that may come in the future, 
something to be concerned about that might take place down the line. 
We're under cyberattack right now. This is not speculative. This is not 
intangible. This is happening right now. This needs to be dealt with, 
and we do need a sense of urgency. But there is a distance yet to go, 
and in two areas in particular.
  One is, when we gather cyberinformation and we share it between 
companies or between the government and companies, as we must do, we 
want to make sure that we minimize any unnecessary invasion of privacy 
of the American people. We can

[[Page H2160]]

do both, and we have to do both. We need to protect ourselves from 
cyberattack, and we need to protect and preserve the privacy rights of 
the American people.
  I think the bill needs a requirement that personally identifiable 
information be minimized to the maximum extent practicable. All we're 
asking for is what can reasonably be done. We're not asking for the 
private sector or the government to do the impossible, but we should 
require of our government that they minimize personal information that 
is shared to protect us from cybercrime. That's the first thing.
  The second item that really needs to be incorporated in this bill 
that my colleague, Mr. Thompson, will talk about as well is the need to 
protect critical infrastructure. That is a big missing piece in the 
bill, and I understand from my colleagues that it's not within the 
Intelligence Committee jurisdiction. That's correct. But as we saw from 
the Rules Committee, they're more than capable of incorporating things 
from more than one committee's jurisdiction in the rule, as we see in a 
rule that incorporates student loan interest and a bill on that subject 
with a bill on cybersecurity. There is nothing preventing the Rules 
Committee from bringing into the discussion today and allowing 
amendments on critical infrastructure.
  The absence of those two big pieces makes it impossible for me to 
support the bill today.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
  I just want to conclude by saying I look forward to our continued 
work on this bill, and I appreciate the great cooperation between the 
chair and ranking member, and I have respect for all the members of the 
committee.

                              {time}  1450

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Heck).
  Mr. HECK. I come to the floor today to voice my strong support for 
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act. We know that every 
day, American companies and computer systems are targeted by foreign 
nation-state actors who prey on sensitive business and personal 
information to gain an unfair advantage in the global marketplace. The 
theft of research and development results, negotiating positions, or 
pricing information costs us jobs here at home and puts personal 
information at risk. The same vulnerabilities that can result in the 
theft of sensitive business information could be used to attack 
critical infrastructure we rely on such as power plants, air traffic 
control systems, and electrical grids. An attack on these systems would 
be devastating. Protecting them and the constituents they serve must be 
considered an urgent national security concern.
  The government currently uses classified cyberthreat intelligence to 
protect its own systems, computer networks, and critical 
infrastructure. The business community has voiced its desire to be 
given the tools necessary to protect itself from cyberthreats. This 
bill will allow the government to provide classified cyberthreat 
information to private sector companies so that they can protect 
sensitive information and their customers' privacy against malicious 
cyberattacks. The bill places no mandates or burdens on private sector 
companies and does not expand the size or scope of the Federal 
Government. All information-sharing is totally voluntary under this 
legislation, and there are strong privacy protections in place for the 
information that is shared.
  After receiving input from the private sector and civil liberty 
groups and by building upon the success of an existing intelligence-
sharing pilot program with defense contractors, we have produced a bill 
that upholds constitutional rights to privacy while providing the 
private sector with the necessary means to defend itself against 
cyberattackers. I want to commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger for their outstanding leadership in crafting this 
legislation that was written in a transparent and bipartisan fashion.
  I urge my colleagues to support this bill that protects our homeland, 
protects our economy, and protects our privacy.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague from the State of Mississippi, Mr. Bennie Thompson, who is 
also the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee.
  Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to 
H.R. 3523. I also appreciate the efforts of my colleagues on the 
Intelligence Committee for fostering a greater sharing of cyberthreat 
information. This bill is a start, but my opposition is because it does 
not do what we know that we need to have done.
  Having been involved in homeland security issues for nearly a decade, 
I know how important it is to protect our Nation's networks from 
cyberattacks. But in an effort to foster information-sharing, this bill 
would erode the privacy protections of every single American using the 
Internet. It would create a Wild West of information-sharing, where any 
certified business can share with any government agency, who can then 
use the information for any ``national security'' purpose and grant 
that business immunity from virtually any liability. None of the 
amendments offered by the chairman and ranking member would change any 
of those basic facts.
  I and several of my colleagues offered amendments that would have 
addressed those concerns by ensuring that civilian agencies would take 
the lead in information-sharing, restricting how the government could 
use the information, and making sure consumers' sensitive information 
is adequately protected. Unfortunately, the House will not have an 
opportunity to consider them today.
  If my colleagues want to accomplish something on cybersecurity, then 
vote ``yes'' on any or all of the suspension bills before us today; but 
do not vote for H.R. 3523. It violates the ``do no harm'' rule and 
would set back the privacy rights of all our citizens who have enjoyed 
the establishment of the Internet.
  This fatally flawed bill is opposed by not only every major privacy 
or civil liberties group, from the ACLU to the Constitution Project to 
the Center for Democracy and Technology, but also the Obama 
administration. For these reasons, Madam Chair, I strongly urge a 
``no'' vote on H.R. 3523.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Terry).
  Mr. TERRY. I thank the gentleman.
  Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. It's a sensible bill 
that builds a necessary pillar in the cybersecurity strategy of our 
Nation.
  I've immersed myself in cybersecurity over the last couple of years. 
I've been on two task forces. I'm on the Energy and Commerce Committee. 
I've met with industry leaders in all of the critical infrastructure 
areas. And as I've gathered information and input, there's two 
principles at stake here. The common thread from all of them have said: 
we have to be flexible, and we have to be able to communicate. Those 
are the two principles on which this bill is based.
  Number one, flexibility. What it means is you can't lock this into a 
government agency because when government agencies start taking control 
of setting standards or working with an industry group to set standards 
on cybersecurity, the hackers take 5 seconds to get around that, and it 
will take years then for the industry to move around that. You are 
setting them up as ducks waiting to be shot if we do that. So we can't. 
We've got to give them the flexibility. The least government 
interference is what gives them the flexibility.
  The next part is communication. What I learned from the critical 
infrastructure industries is that what they want to know is, is there a 
threat out there, and what's the specifics of the threat? They know 
they're under attack every day. Maybe our defense agencies have 
specific information they can share, but they can't because it's top 
secret.
  So this bill allows there to be communication of specific threats to 
perhaps communicate from government to private sector some better 
practices that they can enact. That's what this breaks down, that 
barrier, not some of these civil liberty conspiracy theories. This is 
simple communication between government and private sector or private 
sector to private sector. This isn't

[[Page H2161]]

reporting on whether you're downloading an illegal movie or whatever. 
This is about securing our infrastructure.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague and friend from the State of Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), who 
is also a member of our Intelligence Committee and has worked very hard 
with the chairman and myself on the issue of cybersecurity. I consider 
him one of our experts on the Hill in the area of cybersecurity.
  (Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I want to thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I rise in strong support of H.R. 3523, and I want to thank Chairman 
Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for a bipartisan and inclusive 
process on an extremely difficult and technical issue. While I don't 
believe this legislation is perfect, and much work remains to be done, 
CISPA represents an important good-faith effort to come together as a 
necessary first step towards better cybersecurity for our Nation.
  I have long worked on this issue for many years to raise awareness 
and to secure our Nation against the threats that we face in 
cyberspace. Quite frankly, we are running out of time. I believe it's 
important that we act now to begin our legislative response to this 
critical issue.
  We all know how dependent we are on the Internet and how we use it so 
much in our daily lives, but the Internet was never built with security 
in mind. What's happening is our adversaries are using the 
vulnerabilities against us.
  I've also been very clear that we need to have robust privacy 
protections that must be included to safeguard personal information and 
also defend civil liberties in any cybersecurity response that we do 
enact. I'm pleased to say this legislation has been strengthened in 
that regard, and I believe more can be done as we continue this 
important debate.
  That being said, the efficient sharing of cyberthreat information 
envisioned by this legislation is vital to combating advanced 
cyberthreats and stemming the massive ongoing theft of identities, 
intellectual property, and sensitive security information.

                              {time}  1500

  This legislation clearly and simply will allow the government to 
provide classified information threat signatures to the private sector 
and also allow the private sector to share with us the cybersecurity 
attacks that they are experiencing, sharing that with the government so 
we have better situational awareness. If you look at this, it basically 
gives us radar, if you will, in cyberspace, sharing information back 
and forth on cyberthreats that are facing the country.
  This bill is a good step, but it's only a first step. Voluntary 
information-sharing is helpful and it's needed, but it does not, on its 
own, constitute strong cybersecurity.
  The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman from Rhode Island 30 
additional seconds.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for the additional time.
  I have long maintained that we must also move forward on legislation 
that establishes minimum standards for the cybersystems that govern our 
critical infrastructure, particularly the electric grid and our water 
systems.
  With that, I again want to thank Chairman Rogers and Mr. 
Ruppersberger for their outstanding efforts, and I ask my colleagues to 
support this important cybersecurity information-sharing legislation.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Bono Mack).
  Mrs. BONO MACK. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of this 
bill. This critically needed legislation will help to safeguard America 
in the future from cyberattacks by unscrupulous and rogue nations, 
terrorists and cybercriminals. We need to act before a disaster takes 
place, not after it, and this is our chance.
  As chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing 
and Trade, I have spent the past 16 months holding hearings and 
thoroughly examining the issue of online privacy. So as a cosponsor of 
this legislation, I have very carefully reviewed its privacy 
provisions, and I'm satisfied that it will not negatively impact 
American consumers.
  Frankly, the privacy concerns are exaggerated. There is no bogeyman 
hiding in the closet, and Big Brother is not tapping into your hard 
drive. This bill provides absolutely no authority to the Federal 
Government to monitor private networks--none. Additionally, all 
information-sharing with the government would be completely voluntary.
  The bill also encourages the private sector to ``anonymize'' the 
information it shares with the government or other entities, 
including--and this is very important to remember--the removal of 
personally identifiable information prior to sharing it.
  Finally, the bill also requires the intelligence community inspector 
general to review information-sharing between the private sector and 
the government and to provide an annual report to the Congress on its 
findings.
  These are very strong privacy protection features, and I applaud 
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for working so hard to 
protect the American consumer and to make this a truly bipartisan 
effort.
  Unfortunately, some people and some groups will say anything to try 
and scuttle this bill--sounding false alarms and raising imaginary red 
flags--despite the very real and dangerous threat posed by terrorists 
and our enemies if we do nothing.
  Madam Chair, I strongly urge the adoption of H.R. 3523.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague 
from the State of Georgia (Mr. Johnson).
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Thank you, Ranking Member Ruppersberger.
  Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to this very disturbing bill.
  One thing that is important to keeping our country number one has 
been the personal freedoms that we have all enjoyed since this 
country's beginning. Those freedoms lie in the Bill of Rights. And the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution within that Bill of 
Rights provides for a right of privacy. Now this right of privacy can 
be impacted by technology and various advances in science that make 
eavesdropping, surveillance, and investigation easier and also more 
secretive by law enforcement, by personal individuals, and by 
corporations, by any component that may look to misuse information for 
their personal benefit. So I rise in opposition to this disturbing 
bill.
  CISPA would grant the private sector blanket permission to harvest 
Americans' data for extremely broad ``cybersecurity purposes,'' 
notwithstanding any other provision of law. It would grant the private 
sector blanket permission to then share that data with the Federal 
Government, notwithstanding any other privacy laws or agreements with 
users.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. Capito). The time of the gentleman has 
expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Then, as if that weren't disturbing enough, 
this bill would grant the government broad authority to share that 
information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and use 
it for virtually any purpose defined as important to cybersecurity or 
national security.
  I know it's 2012, but it sure feels like ``1984'' in this House 
today. If you value liberty, privacy, and the Constitution, then you 
will vote ``no'' on CISPA.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
  Mr. NUNES. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of this bill.
  The bill before us today is targeted towards a very specific and 
growing threat to our Nation. Every day, American businesses are being 
targeted by China, Russia, and other foreign actors for cyber-
exploitation and theft. These acts of industrial espionage are causing 
enormous losses of valuable American intellectual property that 
ultimately costs the United States jobs. We cannot afford to allow 
high-paying jobs to be stolen in this manner, nor can we simply sit by 
and allow the cyberwarfare being conducted against us to continue 
without consequences.

[[Page H2162]]

  Madam Chairman, jobs are at stake, as is the technological capital of 
the United States. But if the reality of this economic cyberwarfare 
isn't convincing enough, you should understand that there are other 
good reasons for us to support this bill.
  The state-of-the-art technology stolen from Americans can easily be 
turned against us and represents a serious threat to America's critical 
infrastructure. None in this body would likely disagree that we have to 
prevent our enemies from protecting American military technology. 
That's why we have long had export controls and other mechanisms to 
prevent such a thing from occurring. Madam Chairman, how is the theft 
of intellectual property any less a threat today?
  Whether we like it or not, cyberwarfare is a reality. Our government 
and its security agencies understand this and are using both classified 
and unclassified information to fight the threat. But without passage 
of this bill, they are being forced to do so without the meaningful 
participation of industries--private industries--that are being 
subjected to attacks, that in some cases our government even knows 
about but cannot share that with those private companies.
  So we shouldn't expect America's private sector innovators to protect 
themselves if we won't tell them where the attacks are coming from. If 
we don't share this information or allow them to share information with 
us, how do we expect to secure the sensitive information?
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman from California an 
additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. NUNES. So we essentially have three choices. We can pass this 
bill, very narrowly focused, allowing our intelligence community to 
work with private industry, or we can fund a massive new government 
program. I think we've proven that those massive new government 
programs seldom work and are often costly. Or would the opponents of 
this bill simply rather do nothing and allow our country to continue to 
be attacked every day?
  We need to pass this bill to enable cyberthreat-sharing and provide 
clear authority for the private sector to defend its networks.
  Madam Chair, I want to close by saying that we should congratulate 
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for the work that 
they've done to protect this country.

                              {time}  1510

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague from the State of Oklahoma (Mr. Boren), who is also a member 
of the Intelligence Committee. He has worked very closely with me and 
the chairman to bring this bill to the floor today, and we thank him 
for that.
  Mr. BOREN. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act. I'm proud to have been a part 
of this bipartisan effort, led by Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger, to bring this bill to the floor today.
  There is one fact on which everyone can agree: our country must 
strengthen its cybersecurity capabilities. To achieve this, we need the 
cooperation of industry, government, and our citizens, and we need to 
protect the unique interests of each of these groups.
  Some may be asking the question, how does this bill protect American 
industry? It gives private companies the ability to receive classified 
information from the government to protect their networks. The bill 
also gives them flexibility to share information with the government 
without compromising their business equities or harming their 
customers. This information-sharing partnership will enhance government 
efforts to analyze and understand malicious codes and other 
cyberthreats.
  I think companies that have publicly supported this legislation have 
gotten a bad rap in the press. I think we all need to remember that 
these American companies are not the enemy. They employ thousands of 
Americans and provide essential cyberservices to millions of people. 
They are profit-making entities that want to satisfy their customers 
and grow their businesses. These American companies have absolutely no 
motivation to send private customer information to the government or 
anyone else. In fact, they have every reason to protect it.
  Under this legislation, American companies will enhance their 
capability to protect the private information of their customers by 
receiving classified assistance from the government. Moreover, they 
will help their customers and the country by voluntarily informing the 
government of malware and other malicious conduct and threats that 
emerge from their networks. But that is not the only way that this bill 
protects our citizens' privacy. It restricts the government's use and 
retention of any personal information that companies may choose to 
share. In addition, it directs the intelligence community inspector 
general to monitor and report any abuse of users' privacy.
  Finally, we must also remember that the government is not the enemy. 
The intelligence community does not want to squander this opportunity 
to improve our Nation's cybersecurity by abusing the civil liberties or 
privacy of American citizens. To this end, the bill specifies that the 
government can only use the information it receives from the private 
sector for purposes directly related to addressing cyberthreats, 
national security, and threats to life and limb.
  In closing, this legislation strikes the appropriate balance between 
the interests of the private sector industry, the Federal Government, 
and private citizens.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. BOREN. It will help our country avoid a potential 
cybercatastrophe that could threaten our national security and endanger 
our economic prosperity.
  With that, I urge my fellow Members to join me and support this 
important bill.
  Again, I want to say specifically to our ranking member and our 
chairman, thank you for putting the country's interests ahead of 
partisan gain. We're working together in this committee, both Democrats 
and Republicans, to do what is in the best interest of our intelligence 
community and the United States of America.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, may I ask how much time we have on 
both sides?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 8 minutes 
remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan has 10\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton).
  Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the chairman.

       The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
     houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
     and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
     issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
     affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
     searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

  My friends, that is the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, one of 
the original 10 in the Bill of Rights protecting, in writing, the 
privacy of the United States citizenry.
  I want to give Mr. Rogers and Mr. Ruppersberger an ``A'' for effort 
in terms of identifying the problem, but I have to give them an ``F'' 
for problem solution.
  The word ``privacy'' in the underlying bill is mentioned one time, 
and that in passing. There are no explicit protections for privacy. In 
fact, there is an explicit exemption of liability to all people who 
engage in the collection, dissemination, transfer, and sharing of 
information. The cause of action, if you feel your privacy has been 
violated, is to go to district court and prove there was willful and 
knowing sharing of your information without your permission. If you 
prevail in Federal district court, you get $1,000, or whatever it costs 
you.
  My friends, we have a real problem. I take the chairman at his word--
he's a former FBI agent--that he wants to solve this cyberthreat. I 
know he means it. But until we protect the privacy rights of our 
citizens, the solution is worse than the problem that they're trying to 
solve.
  Please vote ``no'' on this bill.

[[Page H2163]]

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have no more speakers, and I yield 
myself such time as I may consume.
  First thing, there were some comments that I would like to respond 
to.
  First thing, this bill does not allow the wholesale violation of 
privacy rights. This bill is extremely important to our national 
security, but also important to our citizens of this great country, our 
privacy rights, and civil liberties.
  The chairman and I have taken this very seriously, as have the 
members of our caucus. We know this is not a perfect bill--there will 
probably be additional changes. We will have more debate later on this 
afternoon.
  Now, some of the things I want to address. During the drafting of 
this legislation we put forward a wide range of privacy protections. We 
worked for the last year with the White House, privacy groups, and 
business groups to come to a coalition to make sure that we get this 
bill right.
  First, the bill severely limits what kind of information can be 
shared with the government. Only information directly pertaining to the 
threat can be shared, which is mostly formulas, X's and O's of the 
virus code. It's almost something that the companies deal with now in 
dealing with spam.
  Second, the bill encourages companies to voluntarily strip out 
personal information that may be associated with these zeroes and ones. 
Occasionally, that does occur, and we have to deal with that, and we'll 
continue to deal with that issue.
  There also are strong use limitations on the data. This information 
must be used for cybersecurity purposes or the protection of national 
security. The information cannot be used for regulatory purposes. For 
example, if there's evidence of tax evasion, that information cannot be 
used in a criminal proceeding, only in national security, only in the 
areas of life and limb, or for anything involving juvenile crimes.
  The bill prohibits the government from requiring the companies to 
give information to the government in exchange for receiving the 
cyberthreat intelligence. That means that when we pass the information 
of the attacks--it's called the secret sauce--to the providers, it's 
only voluntarily. The government can't put any restrictions on that 
whatsoever. That really means that this is not surveillance at all.
  The bill does not allow the government to order you to turn over 
private email or other personal information. This is not, again, 
surveillance.
  The bill does not allow the government to monitor private networks, 
read private emails, censor or shut down any Web site. This is not 
SOPA.
  In an effort to improve the bill even more, the intelligence 
community--thank you to the leadership of Chairman Rogers--has been 
working with privacy groups, the White House, and other interested 
parties to address these concerns with the legislation. We on our side 
of the aisle take, again, this issue of privacy very seriously. The 
committee has maintained an open door policy and made more changes to 
the bill to make it even better as we have gone on up until today.
  The legislation grants no new authority to the Department of Defense, 
National Security, or the intelligence community that require it to 
direct any public or private cybersecurity effort. If the government 
violates any of these restrictions placed on it by the legislation, the 
government can be sued for damages, costs, and attorneys fees.
  I think it is extremely important--we on the Intelligence Committee 
deal with these issues every day. This is a very sophisticated area 
that we deal with that most people don't know. So we're attempting, and 
we have for the last year, to educate as many of our Members as we can. 
But it's important to know that national security is clear--our effort 
and what we're attempting to do--but also to maintain the privacy, the 
constitutional rights of our citizens.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1520

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, I don't think we can say often enough 
how important it is that the chairman and ranking member have worked 
together, not only on the substance of this bill, but in the process of 
getting us here. They have, truly, put the country's interests first, 
and I think all Members should commend them for that.
  This was a good bill when it was reported out of committee 17 1. I 
think it will be a better bill once the amendments are considered and 
adopted. And for any Member who has concerns about privacy or misuse of 
information, I think they should look at the amendments that are going 
to be adopted; and any reasonable concern, any semi-reasonable concern 
about privacy will be addressed with the limitations that those 
amendments add.
  Madam Chair, this bill does not solve all the problems in 
cybersecurity. All four bills that we're considering today and tomorrow 
don't solve all the problems we have in cybersecurity. But it makes no 
sense to me, as some seem to have argued, that we should not solve this 
problem of information-sharing because we're not solving all the 
problems that somebody can see out there.
  This problem of information-sharing has been central to cybersecurity 
concerns for some time. I happened across a report from December 2004 
that was issued by a subcommittee I chaired of the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, along with the gentlelady from California (Ms. Zoe 
Lofgren), where we wrote: Whether it is vulnerability assessments, 
threat warnings, best practices or emergency response, information-
sharing with the private sector is critical to securing the United 
States from cyberattack. That was 8 years ago.
  Why has it not occurred? Because all the legal obstacles, all the 
fear of being sued has prevented it from occurring. And that's what 
this bill does. It clears away the legal underbrush that has prevented 
the kind of information-sharing that people have been talking about for 
a decade.
  This is a good, important step. It doesn't solve all the problems, 
but it puts more information at the disposal of critical infrastructure 
so that they can be protected. It should be adopted.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have a speaker on the way.
  Mr. Rogers, do you have any more speakers?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I do.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from the great State of Oregon (Mr. Walden).
  Mr. WALDEN. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for their 
bipartisan and thoughtful approach to this incredibly important issue 
facing our country. I support your legislation. I commend you both for 
identifying a glaring hole in our cyberdefenses: better information-
sharing between the private sector and the government.
  Such sharing is a force multiplier. It combines the technological 
strength of our network providers with the ongoing efforts of our 
agencies to combat growing cyberthreats. From the get-go, the bill has 
protected privacy and civil liberties and ensured that any information-
sharing is voluntary.
  I understand Chairman Rogers has also gone the extra mile to reach 
out to the privacy community and will be offering and supporting 
amendments to address any lingering concerns that may remain from 
misunderstandings over the language. Breaking down the barriers to 
information-sharing is a linchpin to better cybersecurity, and this 
legislation will be a tremendous step forward in securing cyberspace 
for our citizens.
  But don't take my word for it. That's what cybersecurity firms and 
researchers, Internet service providers, and government officials told 
the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, which I chair, in 
the three separate hearings that we held. That's what a bipartisan 
working group I convened concluded when it interviewed a broad spectrum 
of stakeholders in the cybersecurity debate.
  By contrast, no matter how well-intentioned, cybersecurity 
regulations would likely just expand government, reduce flexibility, 
impose costs, misallocate capital, create more red tape and not more 
security. According to one government witness, regulating cybersecurity 
practices would ``stifle

[[Page H2164]]

innovation and harm the industry's ability to protect consumers from 
cyberthreats.''
  Indeed, voluntary efforts, not government regulation, are already 
improving cybersecurity for communications networks that cover 80 
percent of Americans.
  When Congress is looking at a complex issue like cybersecurity, we 
need to heed the Hippocratic Oath: First, do no harm.
  So I want to thank my colleagues for making this process especially 
open and transparent. Representative Rogers has graciously reached out 
to members of the Energy and Commerce Committee to understand our 
concerns about protecting privacy and civil liberties and preventing 
regulatory overreach, and Representative Thornberry's work in 
organizing the House Republican Cybersecurity Task Force, which 
included Representatives Terry and Latta, members of my subcommittee.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 
seconds.
  Mr. WALDEN. The bottom line is, we're going to protect America from 
the greatest threat to America and to Americans with this legislation. 
We need to make sure that our private sector is nimble and flexible and 
innovative; and tying its hands with prescriptive regulation--we heard 
over and over again in our subcommittee hearings--would do the opposite 
of that and would result in the bad guys getting an edge on the good 
guys.
  I support this bipartisan legislation. I urge its passage.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague from the State of Georgia, Mr. John Lewis, one of the most 
respected Members of our Congress.
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Madam Chair, I want to thank my friend, the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) for yielding.
  Madam Chair, I rise to oppose H.R. 3523. It is a step back.
  Those of us who protested in the fifties and the sixties, who were 
called Communists, who had our telephone calls recorded, we have a long 
memory. We remember our Nation's dark past.
  Martin Luther King, Jr.'s telephone was wiretapped. His hotel room 
was wiretapped. His home was wiretapped. Our office was wiretapped. Our 
meetings were wiretapped. And it was not just people spying on civil 
rights activists, but people protesting against the war in Vietnam.
  We didn't have a Facebook, a Twitter, or email. These new tools must 
be protected. Today we have a mission, a mandate, and a moral 
obligation to protect future generations of activists and protestors.
  So I say to my colleagues, stand with us today. Stand up and stand on 
the right side of history. Oppose H.R. 3523.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Lots of misinformation about this bill today. I respect the gentleman 
from Georgia greatly for his efforts. I heard the gentleman from Texas 
talk about searches and seizures. And this is the good news: there are 
none of those things in this bill. None.
  You know, if I knew that your house was to be robbed, I would expect 
that if the police knew, that they'd pick up the phone and call you and 
say, you are going to be robbed. Take precaution. We'll be their 
shortly.
  This bill just says, if we have this nasty source code, these zeroes 
and ones, I want to give it to you so you can protect your systems. 
That's it. No monitoring, no content, no surveillance, nothing. That's 
not what this bill is about.
  I understand the passion about it. That's why we've taken a year to 
forge this bipartisan effort to get where we believe privacy is 
protected. It is paramount that we do that, that our civil liberties 
are protected. It is paramount that we do that.
  But we at least take down the hurdle to share nasty source code or 
software that's flying through the Internet, that's developed, and it's 
very sophisticated, by the Chinese and the Russians and the Iranians 
and other groups and non-nation-state actors that are going to steal 
your personal information.
  That's all this is. It's sharing bad source code so you can put it on 
your system so you don't get infected. End of story.
  I wish people would read the bill, all of it, every word of it. I 
think you'll find the carefully crafted language to make sure that our 
rights are protected, that the Fourth Amendment is protected.
  And by the way, just like the Army, the Navy, the Marines, your FBI 
is protecting you. That's what this bill allows it to do, simply that.
  So, as I said, I respect greatly the gentleman from Georgia. There's 
a lot of atrocities I think he lived through in his life that no one 
should have to live through. We took those things into consideration 
when we wrote this bill, and that's why we've got so much support and 
so much technical company support, companies like Facebook and 
Microsoft and all of those groups.
  So I hope people read the bill and support the bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  In closing, I want to say again that the purpose of this bill, as the 
chairman just said, is very basic and simple. We want to protect our 
citizens from attacks. We are being attacked as we speak right now. 
Just last year, it was estimated we lost $300 billion worth of trade 
secrets. We even know that one country is attacking a fertilizer 
company to find out how we make it better than they do. This is putting 
our businesses in jeopardy and jobs in jeopardy, and we know we sure 
need jobs.
  More importantly, those of us who work in this field know how serious 
these threats are. The head of our FBI, whose responsibility it is to 
provide our domestic national security, has said that one of the most 
serious threats, if not a bigger threat, in terrorism would be a 
catastrophic cyberattack. We've already talked today about what that 
would be. We have Secretary Napolitano, the Director of Homeland 
Security, who has said the same thing: that it is one of the most 
serious issues our country has to deal with. It's unfortunate, but most 
of our citizens aren't aware of how serious this threat is.
  So we've attempted to allow our intelligence community, which is one 
of the best in the world, to have the ability to see these threats 
coming in from other countries or from terrorist groups and to be able 
right now to give this information over to the private sector to 
protect us, you, me, our businesses. That's what this bill does. 
Nothing more. What we're attempting to do is to move the bill and get 
the bill to the Senate.
  We can always do better in the area of privacy and civil liberties, 
and we're going to continue to do that. We can always do better in the 
area of homeland security and go further to protect those institutions 
and our grid systems and that type of thing; but this is the start, 
because the one thing that now is stopping our country and is stopping 
us from protecting our citizens is this Congress.
  This Congress needs to pass this bill now. We need to move forward. 
We need to get it to the Senate. We need to start working with the 
Senate. Then hopefully we'll deal and work very closely with the White 
House and find a bill so that we can protect our citizens and also 
protect our civil liberties and privacy.
  I also understand Mr. Lewis. We all respect him and what he has gone 
through. As a former prosecutor and lawyer who has worked on many 
search and seizure warrants and that type of thing, I can tell you 
this: there are no violations in this bill at all. That is not what 
this bill is about. If it were, I wouldn't be in favor of it.
  I thank you, Mr. Rogers, for your cooperation and for working with us 
in this bipartisan manner. It is a very serious issue.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I do want to thank the ranking member and both staffs from both 
committees who have been tireless in this effort to get it right and to 
find that right place where we could all feel comfortable.
  The amendments that are following here are months of negotiation and 
work with many organizations--privacy groups. We have worked language

[[Page H2165]]

with the Center for Democracy and Technology, and they just the other 
day said they applauded our progress on where we're going with privacy 
and civil liberties. So we have included a lot of folks.
  It has been a long road. It has been the most open and transparent 
bill that, I think, I've ever worked on here. We kept it open to the 
very end to make sure that we could find the language that clarified 
our intent to protect privacy, to protect civil liberties, and to just 
be able to share dangerous information with victims. That's all this 
bill is. The whopping 13 pages it is does only that. So I appreciate 
the comments today. I look forward to the amendment debate.
  Again, Mr. Ruppersberger, it has been a joy to work with you on this 
particular issue.
  As an old Army officer once told me, once you find a problem, you are 
morally obligated to do something about it. We set about it a year ago 
to make America safe and to protect your network at home from people 
stealing it, breaking it, and doing something worse.
  So, Madam Chair, I look forward to the debate on the amendments, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Chair, although I am voting against the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of 2011 today, I recommend 
Representative C.A. ``Dutch'' Ruppersberger, the Ranking Member of the 
House Intelligence Committee, for his efforts to improve the bill 
significantly since its passage out of committee. He has been a leader 
in protecting our Nation against cyber attacks, and he has gone out of 
his way to make this bill as inclusive and bipartisan as possible. I 
want to thank him for the time he took to meet with me personally to 
discuss this legislation and ways to improve it going forward.
  I oppose this bill in its current form for several reasons. First, 
the Republicans on the House Rules Committee refused to allow debate on 
an amendment offered by Representative Bennie Thompson, the Ranking 
Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, to expand this 
legislation to protect our Nation's critical infrastructure.
  In testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, then-CIA 
Director Leon Panetta called cybersecurity ``the battleground for the 
future.'' Our Nation's critical infrastructure--including power 
distribution, water supply, telecommunications, and emergency 
services--has become increasingly dependent on computerized information 
systems to manage their operations and to process, maintain, and report 
essential information. Any effort to address this national security 
threat must address our Nation's critical infrastructure.
  In addition, the legislation includes several provisions that are 
problematic. For example, under the information-sharing provisions of 
the bill, private entities receive absolute immunity from criminal or 
civil liability for any harm that may result from a company's actions 
that stem from the sharing or receiving of cyber threat information as 
long as the company can show it was acting in good faith.
  This bill would also create a new exemption to the Freedom of 
Information Act that is unwarranted since current law exemptions 
provide the flexibility necessary to protect sensitive information. The 
bill would prohibit agencies from disclosing ``cyber threat 
information,'' and it would hold the government liable for such 
disclosure. Unfortunately, an amendment offered on the floor did not 
sufficiently address these concerns.
  Finally, the bill would allow companies to share private consumer 
data without adequate protections or oversight. Private entities would 
decide the type and amount of information to share with the Federal 
Government, and nothing in the bill would require companies to strip 
out unnecessary personally identifiable information. Again, an 
amendment offered on the floor did not go far enough to adequately 
address this issue.
  I appreciate the great effort that went into pulling this bill 
together, but more work is needed before I can offer my support. It is 
critical that we protect Americans from cyber attacks, and I hope we 
can continue to improve this legislation as we move forward.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 3523, 
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA).
  The main topic this week, as announced by the House Republican 
Leadership, is cyber security, a serious issue for our Nation. As we 
become more dependent on computers and technology for even common or 
routine actions that happen every day, we become at increased risk of 
great damage from a cyber attack. Nations or individuals who wish us 
harm know that, and so we must be vigilant.
  What we are considering today is premised on the idea that greater 
information sharing of cyber threats between the government and the 
private sector will improve security. While this is a relatively 
uncontroversial idea in concept, the bill before us raises a number of 
concerns.
  It is important to note at the outset that the bill allows companies 
to share information, including private e-mails and other Internet 
communications, with the government--notwithstanding any other law. So, 
protections in existing law, such as the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Wiretap Act, are totally superseded. The 
government could get all of your information without a warrant or 
subpoena, and you would have little ability, if any, to stop it. Such a 
blanket exemption should give us great pause.
  Unfortunately, the rest of the bill does not provide sufficient 
safeguards to justify this blanket exemption. To begin with, the 
definition of the cyber threat information to be shared is very broad. 
Suggestions have been made that define what should be included as cyber 
threat information in a narrow but sufficient way. These suggestions 
were not included in this bill.
  At the very least, companies and other entities providing the 
government with information should be required to take some reasonable 
steps to remove personally identifiable information. Such reasonable 
steps need not be overly burdensome, but, again, even this limited 
protection was not included.
  Once this information was shared with the government, it could be 
reviewed and used by any department. The Department of Defense, 
National Security Agency, and other defense and intelligence agencies 
thus would have access to the private, domestic internet activities of 
innocent Americans. This mixing of domestic information with military 
entities is dangerous and unprecedented. In fact, our policy has long-
been to keep the military out of such domestic affairs. Information 
about cyber security should be limited to the relevant domestic 
government bodies, such as the Department of Homeland Security.
  The power of government to use the information it receives would also 
be tremendously broad. One allowable use for this information is the 
hopelessly vague ``national security.'' In the past, the government has 
considered peace groups, civil rights activists, and other advocates to 
be ``threats'' to national security. It is easy to imagine how this 
term could be utilized for all the wrong reasons. The bill is supposed 
to be about cyber security, but allowing use of the information 
collected for national security purposes does not necessarily serve 
that purpose.
  Further, the bill makes enforcing even the limited restrictions it 
contains difficult. With respect to private entities, as long as they 
act ``in good faith,'' they are immune from any civil or criminal case 
in state or federal court. This low standard means that any time a 
company claims it thought it was following the law, persons harmed by 
the improper sharing of information will have no recourse.
  The bill does allow for civil actions against government violations. 
Unfortunately, the ability to bring a lawsuit against the government, 
as provided for in the bill, is deficient in three ways.
  First, the bill only would allow lawsuits against the government for 
breaches if filed ``not later than two years after the date of the 
violation.'' That time period is wholly unworkable, unfair, and 
unrealistic.
  Second, as written the bill only would impose liability on the 
government only for ``intentionally'' or ``willfully'' violating its 
restrictions. While this is helpful, such a limited liability scheme 
ignores damages arising from negligence. Such negligent acts could 
involve the failure to properly protect sensitive information or the 
failure to act with due care in deciding what information should be 
used.
  Lastly, the only remedy is monetary damages. Injunctive relief, which 
could force the government to change its practices, is not provided 
for.
  I filed an amendment with the Rules Committee to solve these three 
problems regarding the ability to hold the government accountable. It 
was not made in order.
  In fact, multiple amendments were filed with the Rules Committee 
which would have made significant improvements to this bill. They would 
have narrowed its terms, limited how information could be used, 
protected personal information, and so on. The Rules Committee chose 
not to make them in order. Some of the amendments the House was allowed 
to consider will improve the bill, but not enough to sufficiently 
protect our privacy and civil liberties.
  In closing, I want to reiterate that I recognize the importance of 
the issue of cyber security. I agree with the proponents of the bill 
that we must improve our cyber security defenses.
  But, I remain firmly committed to the notion that we can protect our 
security and maintain our liberty, privacy, and freedom. This bill puts 
our privacy at great risk, and unnecessarily so. As such, I oppose its 
passage and recommend my colleagues do the same.
  Mr. RAHALL. Madam Chair, I recognize the need to address the threats 
posed to our Nation and the American economy in cyber

[[Page H2166]]

space, but I also believe we must be very careful in maintaining the 
appropriate balance between protecting our national security and 
preserving our civil liberties.
  Given the concerns about this measure and the perceived threat to 
sensitive and personal information of American citizens, I believe that 
the House should take additional time to deliberate on this measure. 
The American public deserves an opportunity to gain a fuller 
understanding of the provisions included in this bill and how their 
daily lives may be affected by it.
  For these reasons, I will oppose the bill.
  The Acting CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment 
under the 5-minute rule.
  In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it 
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of 
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee print 112 20. That 
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

                               H.R. 3523

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Intelligence Sharing 
     and Protection Act''.

     SEC. 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING.

       (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


          ``cyber threat intelligence and information sharing

       ``Sec. 1104.  (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber 
     Threat Intelligence With Private Sector and Utilities.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall establish procedures to allow elements of the 
     intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence 
     with private-sector entities and utilities and to encourage 
     the sharing of such intelligence.
       ``(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
     procedures established under paragraph (1) shall provide that 
     classified cyber threat intelligence may only be--
       ``(A) shared by an element of the intelligence community 
     with--
       ``(i) certified entities; or
       ``(ii) a person with an appropriate security clearance to 
     receive such cyber threat intelligence;
       ``(B) shared consistent with the need to protect the 
     national security of the United States; and
       ``(C) used by a certified entity in a manner which protects 
     such cyber threat intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.
       ``(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing that 
     the head of an element of the intelligence community may, as 
     the head of such element considers necessary to carry out 
     this subsection--
       ``(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
     permanent basis to an employee or officer of a certified 
     entity;
       ``(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
     permanent basis to a certified entity and approval to use 
     appropriate facilities; and
       ``(C) expedite the security clearance process for a person 
     or entity as the head of such element considers necessary, 
     consistent with the need to protect the national security of 
     the United States.
       ``(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of information to 
     a private-sector entity or a utility under this subsection 
     shall not create a right or benefit to similar information by 
     such entity or such utility or any other private-sector 
     entity or utility.
       ``(5) Restriction on disclosure of cyber threat 
     intelligence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
     certified entity receiving cyber threat intelligence pursuant 
     to this subsection shall not further disclose such cyber 
     threat intelligence to another entity, other than to a 
     certified entity or other appropriate agency or department of 
     the Federal Government authorized to receive such cyber 
     threat intelligence.
       ``(b) Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of Cyber 
     Threat Information.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with the express 
     consent of a protected entity for which such cybersecurity 
     provider is providing goods or services for cybersecurity 
     purposes, may, for cybersecurity purposes--
       ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain 
     cyber threat information to protect the rights and property 
     of such protected entity; and
       ``(ii) share such cyber threat information with any other 
     entity designated by such protected entity, including, if 
     specifically designated, the Federal Government.
       ``(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, a self-protected entity may, for 
     cybersecurity purposes--
       ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain 
     cyber threat information to protect the rights and property 
     of such self-protected entity; and
       ``(ii) share such cyber threat information with any other 
     entity, including the Federal Government.
       ``(2) Sharing with the federal government.--
       ``(A) Information shared with the national cybersecurity 
     and communications integration center of the department of 
     homeland security.--Subject to the use and protection of 
     information requirements under paragraph (3), the head of a 
     department or agency of the Federal Government receiving 
     cyber threat information in accordance with paragraph (1) 
     shall provide such cyber threat information to the National 
     Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center of the 
     Department of Homeland Security.
       ``(B) Request to share with another department or agency of 
     the federal government.--An entity sharing cyber threat 
     information that is provided to the National Cybersecurity 
     and Communications Integration Center of the Department of 
     Homeland Security under subparagraph (A) or paragraph (1) may 
     request the head of such Center to, and the head of such 
     Center may, provide such information to another department or 
     agency of the Federal Government.
       ``(3) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
     information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
       ``(A) shall only be shared in accordance with any 
     restrictions placed on the sharing of such information by the 
     protected entity or self-protected entity authorizing such 
     sharing, including appropriate anonymization or minimization 
     of such information;
       ``(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an unfair 
     competitive advantage to the detriment of the protected 
     entity or the self-protected entity authorizing the sharing 
     of information;
       ``(C) if shared with the Federal Government--
       ``(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of 
     title 5, United States Code;
       ``(ii) shall be considered proprietary information and 
     shall not be disclosed to an entity outside of the Federal 
     Government except as authorized by the entity sharing such 
     information;
       ``(iii) shall not be used by the Federal Government for 
     regulatory purposes;
       ``(iv) shall not be provided by the department or agency of 
     the Federal Government receiving such cyber threat 
     information to another department or agency of the Federal 
     Government under paragraph (2)(A) if--

       ``(I) the entity providing such information determines that 
     the provision of such information will undermine the purpose 
     for which such information is shared; or
       ``(II) unless otherwise directed by the President, the head 
     of the department or agency of the Federal Government 
     receiving such cyber threat information determines that the 
     provision of such information will undermine the purpose for 
     which such information is shared; and

       ``(v) shall be handled by the Federal Government consistent 
     with the need to protect sources and methods and the national 
     security of the United States; and
       ``(D) shall be exempt from disclosure under a State, local, 
     or tribal law or regulation that requires public disclosure 
     of information by a public or quasi-public entity.
       ``(4) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal cause 
     of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State 
     court against a protected entity, self-protected entity, 
     cybersecurity provider, or an officer, employee, or agent of 
     a protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
     provider, acting in good faith--
       ``(A) for using cybersecurity systems or sharing 
     information in accordance with this section; or
       ``(B) for decisions made based on cyber threat information 
     identified, obtained, or shared under this section.
       ``(5) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure 
     of information.--The submission of information under this 
     subsection to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or 
     affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a 
     person or entity to provide information to the Federal 
     Government.
       ``(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
       ``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
     threat information shared with the Federal Government in 
     accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful purpose only 
     if--
       ``(A) the use of such information is not for a regulatory 
     purpose; and
       ``(B) at least one significant purpose of the use of such 
     information is--
       ``(i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
       ``(ii) the protection of the national security of the 
     United States.
       ``(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal 
     Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat 
     information shared with the Federal Government under 
     subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose referred to 
     in paragraph (1)(B).
       ``(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this section 
     shall be construed to permit the Federal Government to--
       ``(A) require a private-sector entity to share information 
     with the Federal Government; or
       ``(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat intelligence 
     with a private-sector entity on the provision of cyber threat 
     information to the Federal Government.
       ``(d) Federal Government Liability for Violations of 
     Restrictions on the Disclosure, Use, and Protection of 
     Voluntarily Shared Information.--
       ``(1) In general.--If a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government intentionally or willfully violates subsection 
     (b)(3)(C) or subsection

[[Page H2167]]

     (c) with respect to the disclosure, use, or protection of 
     voluntarily shared cyber threat information shared under this 
     section, the United States shall be liable to a person 
     adversely affected by such violation in an amount equal to 
     the sum of--
       ``(A) the actual damages sustained by the person as a 
     result of the violation or $1,000, whichever is greater; and
       ``(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable 
     attorney fees as determined by the court.
       ``(2) Venue.--An action to enforce liability created under 
     this subsection may be brought in the district court of the 
     United States in--
       ``(A) the district in which the complainant resides;
       ``(B) the district in which the principal place of business 
     of the complainant is located;
       ``(C) the district in which the department or agency of the 
     Federal Government that disclosed the information is located; 
     or
       ``(D) the District of Columbia.
       ``(3) Statute of limitations.--No action shall lie under 
     this subsection unless such action is commenced not later 
     than two years after the date of the violation of subsection 
     (b)(3)(C) or subsection (c) that is the basis for the action.
       ``(4) Exclusive cause of action.--A cause of action under 
     this subsection shall be the exclusive means available to a 
     complainant seeking a remedy for a violation of subsection 
     (b)(3)(C) or subsection (c).
       ``(e) Report on Information Sharing.--
       ``(1) Report.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
     Community shall annually submit to the congressional 
     intelligence committees a report containing a review of the 
     use of information shared with the Federal Government under 
     this section, including--
       ``(A) a review of the use by the Federal Government of such 
     information for a purpose other than a cybersecurity purpose;
       ``(B) a review of the type of information shared with the 
     Federal Government under this section;
       ``(C) a review of the actions taken by the Federal 
     Government based on such information;
       ``(D) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of the 
     sharing of such information with the Federal Government on 
     privacy and civil liberties, if any;
       ``(E) a review of the sharing of such information within 
     the Federal Government to identify inappropriate stovepiping 
     of shared information; and
       ``(F) any recommendations of the Inspector General for 
     improvements or modifications to the authorities under this 
     section.
       ``(2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall 
     be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
     classified annex.
       ``(f) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any 
     statute of a State or political subdivision of a State that 
     restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity 
     authorized under subsection (b).
       ``(g) Savings Clauses.--
       ``(1) Existing authorities.--Nothing in this section shall 
     be construed to limit any other authority to use a 
     cybersecurity system or to identify, obtain, or share cyber 
     threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
       ``(2) Limitation on military and intelligence community 
     involvement in private and public sector cybersecurity 
     efforts.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
     provide additional authority to, or modify an existing 
     authority of, the Department of Defense or the National 
     Security Agency or any other element of the intelligence 
     community to control, modify, require, or otherwise direct 
     the cybersecurity efforts of a private-sector entity or a 
     component of the Federal Government or a State, local, or 
     tribal government.
       ``(3) Information sharing relationships.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to--
       ``(A) limit or modify an existing information sharing 
     relationship;
       ``(B) prohibit a new information sharing relationship;
       ``(C) require a new information sharing relationship 
     between the Federal Government and a private-sector entity; 
     or
       ``(D) modify the authority of a department or agency of the 
     Federal Government to protect sources and methods and the 
     national security of the United States.
       ``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Certified entity.--The term `certified entity' means 
     a protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
     provider that--
       ``(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
     clearance, as determined by the Director of National 
     Intelligence; and
       ``(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of National 
     Intelligence that such provider or such entity can 
     appropriately protect classified cyber threat intelligence.
       ``(2) Cyber threat information.--The term `cyber threat 
     information' means information directly pertaining to a 
     vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a 
     government or private entity, including information 
     pertaining to the protection of a system or network from--
       ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system 
     or network; or
       ``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access 
     to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
       ``(3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term `cyber threat 
     intelligence' means information in the possession of an 
     element of the intelligence community directly pertaining to 
     a vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a 
     government or private entity, including information 
     pertaining to the protection of a system or network from--
       ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system 
     or network; or
       ``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access 
     to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
       ``(4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term `cybersecurity 
     provider' means a non-governmental entity that provides goods 
     or services intended to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
       ``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term `cybersecurity 
     purpose' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity, 
     confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a 
     system or network, including protecting a system or network 
     from--
       ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system 
     or network; or
       ``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access 
     to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
       ``(6) Cybersecurity system.--The term `cybersecurity 
     system' means a system designed or employed to ensure the 
     integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard, 
     a system or network, including protecting a system or network 
     from--
       ``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system 
     or network; or
       ``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access 
     to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
       ``(7) Protected entity.--The term `protected entity' means 
     an entity, other than an individual, that contracts with a 
     cybersecurity provider for goods or services to be used for 
     cybersecurity purposes.
       ``(8) Self-protected entity.--The term `self-protected 
     entity' means an entity, other than an individual, that 
     provides goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to 
     itself.
       ``(9) Utility.--The term `utility' means an entity 
     providing essential services (other than law enforcement or 
     regulatory services), including electricity, natural gas, 
     propane, telecommunications, transportation, water, or 
     wastewater services.''.
       (b) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall--
       (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act, establish procedures under paragraph (1) of 
     section 1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     added by subsection (a) of this section, and issue guidelines 
     under paragraph (3) of such section 1104(a);
       (2) in establishing such procedures and issuing such 
     guidelines, consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security 
     to ensure that such procedures and such guidelines permit the 
     owners and operators of critical infrastructure to receive 
     all appropriate cyber threat intelligence (as defined in 
     section 1104(h)(3) of such Act, as added by subsection (a)) 
     in the possession of the Federal Government; and
       (3) following the establishment of such procedures and the 
     issuance of such guidelines, expeditiously distribute such 
     procedures and such guidelines to appropriate departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government, private-sector entities, 
     and utilities (as defined in section 1104(h)(9) of such Act, 
     as added by subsection (a)).
       (c) Initial Report.--The first report required to be 
     submitted under subsection (e) of section 1104 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of 
     this section, shall be submitted not later than one year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in 
     the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a 
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 112 
454. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in 
the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered 
as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall 
not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for 
division of the question.


                Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Langevin

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 1, line 13, strike ``Utilities'' and insert ``Critical 
     Infrastructure Owners and Operators''.
       Page 2, line 1, strike ``utilities'' and insert ``critical 
     infrastructure owners and operators''.
       Page 3, line 13, strike ``utility'' and insert ``critical 
     infrastructure owner or operator''.
       Page 3, line 16, strike ``utility'' each place it appears 
     and insert ``critical infrastructure owner or operator''.
       Page 17, strike lines 12 through 16.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

[[Page H2168]]

  The bill that we are considering today creates a voluntary 
information-sharing network, which could provide owners and operators 
of critical infrastructure with valuable threat information that would 
help them to secure their networks from cyberattacks.
  Unfortunately, the legislation specifies that it applies only to 
``private sector entities and utilities.'' While ``utilities'' is 
defined extremely broadly in the legislation as any entity that 
provides ``essential services,'' including telecommunications and 
transportation providers, there remains the possibility that the 
definition may exclude pieces of our critical infrastructure that have 
significant cybervulnerabilities.
  My amendment, which I am offering with my good friend Mr. Lungren 
from California, strikes the uses of the word ``utilities'' and 
replaces it in each instance with the phrase ``critical infrastructure 
owners and operators.'' This is a commonsense way to avoid potential 
confusion and to eliminate any possibility that critical entities could 
be denied the opportunity to opt into this voluntary information-
sharing framework and thereby share and receive the valuable classified 
threat information that will be available under CISPA.
  This amendment will not significantly expand the scope of the 
legislation, but instead will help prevent interpretations of language 
that could be contrary to the committee's intent, which I believe is 
the same as mine.
  Now, while I recognize that any regulation of critical infrastructure 
would be outside the Intelligence Committee's jurisdiction, I 
nonetheless want to take this opportunity to voice my strong conviction 
that our efforts must not stop with the legislation that we are 
considering this week.
  Just as the airline industry must follow Federal Aviation 
Administration safety standards, the companies that own and operate the 
infrastructure on which the public most relies should be accountable 
for protecting their consumers when confronted with a significant risk. 
I, along with many Members on both sides of the aisle and experts 
within and outside of government, have come to the same basic 
conclusion: the status quo of voluntary action will not result in 
strong cyberprotections for our most valuable and vulnerable 
industries. The Secretary of Homeland Security emphasized last week 
that our critical infrastructure control systems, which are mainly in 
private hands, must come up to a certain baseline level in 
cybersecurity standards.
  With increased public awareness helping to build momentum for 
legislative action, we have a real chance to address these threats. I 
hope that we will not look back on this moment years from now, 
regretting a missed opportunity after the damage has been done. While 
the amendment we are offering today will not by itself provide the 
protections that Mr. Lungren and I ultimately believe are necessary for 
our critical infrastructure, it is a useful first step, and I am 
thankful to Mr. Lungren for joining me in this effort.
  With that, Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to first compliment Mr. Langevin for 
working with us on the cybersecurity bill. He has been an instrumental 
force in pushing this cybersecurity issue to the front and in getting 
the language that we have that finds that right balance.
  My concern with this, which is why I thought, at least, the 
President's advisers who were recommending to him that he veto the bill 
were misguided, is that now we have done something in this bill that is 
fairly unique. It is all voluntary, and we have separated the 
government and the private sector. The government is not going to be 
involved in private sector networks, and they're not going to be 
involved in the government networks. Perfect. That's exactly the 
balance we found.
  With this, it crosses both of those, and it gets us to a place that I 
think we need to have a lot more discussion on, and you can see by the 
level of debate just on this issue how people are really nervous about 
the Federal Government getting into their business.

                              {time}  1540

  This, I'm afraid, opens it up to that. Here's the good news. We 
believe this is already covered in the bill as far as the sharing 
component, and you replace the word ``utility'' with something that 
isn't defined, ``critical infrastructure, owners and operators.'' We're 
not sure what that is, and in some cases you could extrapolate that to 
be even the local police, who argue they're part of the national 
security infrastructure. Does that mean local police are going to get 
very sensitive foreign cyberintelligence information? And why would 
they have it? We don't know the answers to those questions, and that's 
why we're having such a hard time with this amendment.
  I would argue that there does need to be a Homeland Security bill, 
and it really shouldn't be done in the Intelligence Committee. It 
should be done in the Homeland Security Committee.
  So I would love to work with Mr. Langevin as the process works its 
way through the Homeland Security Committee and believe that that 
should be fully debated.
  Remember, when you start getting regulation into the private sector, 
including private networks, that, I argue, is troublesome and very 
worrisome to me, and something I would have a hard time supporting.
  So, I look forward to working with the gentleman. I would have to 
oppose this amendment, but I want to thank you for all your work on the 
cyberissue and, clearly, this cyber information-sharing bill.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for 
his thoughts. I respectfully disagree. The word ``utilities'' is 
important, but I believe ``critical infrastructure,'' out of an 
abundance of caution, is a better term than ``utilities''.
  How much time do I have, Madam Chair?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished chairman on 
the Department of Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren).
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I think the amendment is quite 
simple. As written, the bill allows for information to be shared with 
the private sector and utilities, but there are those that do not fall 
within that that I think we would all agree should be able to have this 
relationship.
  Our amendment would have the simple effect of including those 
elements such as airport authorities, mass transit authorities, or 
municipal hospitals, which are neither private sector nor utilities, to 
be able to participate in this voluntary information-sharing regime.
  I find it odd to find out that the committee is worried about the 
definition of ``critical infrastructure.'' That has been defined in the 
U.S. Code for over a decade. It is in the language in 42 U.S.C. 5195c, 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, which defines 
critical infrastructure as:

       Systems or assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
     the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
     systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
     security, national economic security, national public health 
     or safety, or any combination of those matters.

  That has been the definition that we have supported. That's been the 
definition that we've worked on. Your committee, our committee, all 
committees have. I find this a very simple amendment that tries to 
reach what we are all trying to reach. It does not grant any more 
authority to the Federal Government. It allows for the sharing of 
information to vital entities, as the gentleman has suggested, that we 
would all agree ought to be there.
  I would hope that pride of authorship is not the problem here. We're 
trying to do something that we think makes common sense. And if folks 
have trouble with the definition of critical infrastructure, you would 
have thought it would have been raised in the last decade.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.
  Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I would hope that we could have 
support for this bipartisan amendment brought forward by the gentleman 
who

[[Page H2169]]

serves on the Intelligence Committee. I serve on the Homeland Security 
Committee. I'm chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity.
  It seems to me to make imminent sense. I do not understand why there 
is some opposition to this amendment. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. How much time do I have remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would just remind the gentleman that the 
definition does not go back anywhere in this bill to that. It leaves it 
open, and when you start, again, crossing that valley between the 
government and the private sector, it causes serious issues--as you can 
see, the people who are very concerned that the government is going to 
get into regulating anything on the Internet.
  I would say this is no pride of authorship. I don't know if Mr. 
Ruppersberger and I could have any more authors participate in our bill 
than we have.
  The problem here is very real and very substantive. And that's why I 
think both the gentlemen, who have as much passion and care and 
commitment to this issue as I've seen, need to work that issue on the 
Homeland Security Committee so you can do it in a way that won't rise 
to the level of the objections that we have seen when just the 
suggestion of regulating outside of the purview of national security 
comes into discussion.
  That's why I would hope the gentleman would exercise extreme caution 
when taking that walk. It is perilous for the government to get into 
regulating the Internet, and I oppose that completely. That's why we 
have these problems, I think, arise from it. I think, if these are 
issues that they can get over, that this should have substantive 
debate. Remember, this very narrow bill took 1 year--1 year--of work 
and negotiation and discussions to get it to where we are today.
  So, I would encourage that maybe more thought ought to be put in it, 
and I would look forward to working with both gentleman as they 
introduce and work their bills through the Homeland Security Committee, 
as I think would be appropriate.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Again, I thank the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee for his thoughts. I want to be very clear that this term 
substituting ``critical infrastructure'' for ``utilities'' does not 
lend to regulating critical infrastructure. It just allows for the 
broadest possible definition of information-sharing among those 
entities that are deemed to be critical infrastructure.
  With that, I thank Chairman Lungren for his support of this 
bipartisan amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode Island 
will be postponed.
  The Chair understands that amendment No. 2 will not be offered.


                 Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Pompeo

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. POMPEO. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 8, beginning on line 18, strike ``or sharing 
     information'' and insert ``to identify or obtain cyber threat 
     information or for sharing such information''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.
  Mr. POMPEO. I want to thank Chairman Rogers and Chairman 
Ruppersberger for their hard work on this important piece of 
legislation. I am among those folks who, when I first learned of this 
legislation, had some concerns to make sure that it was balanced and it 
did the right things. Also as a former Army officer, I recognize the 
deep national security implications of the cyberthreat, but I also 
wanted to make sure that we also did everything that was necessary to 
protect everyone's privacy rights.
  This is a simple amendment. It makes clear that the liability 
protection in the bill with respect to the use of such systems only 
extends to the identification and acquisition of cyberthreat 
information and no further.
  This is an unprecedented threat from countries like China and Russia. 
These are hostile nations, and they're committing resources, 
unprecedented resources, to attack U.S. networks each and every minute 
of every day. While this new threat is being developed by our foreign 
enemies, organized criminals and foreign hackers also just as easily 
deploy malicious cyberattacks to disrupt stock markets, transportation 
networks, businesses, governments, and even our military operations.
  A devastating cyberattack could easily be unleashed from the remote 
comfort of enemies' computers thousands of miles away from our Nation. 
We must take this threat very, very seriously.
  Part of the challenge in cyberspace is that a line of computer code 
could be just as deadly as a traditional military weapon. We've already 
seen these attacks used as an instrument of war. In 2008, Georgia 
suffered a significant cyberattack prior to the invasion by Russia. 
This attack crippled Georgia's banking system and disrupted the 
nation's cell phone services, helping to clear the battlefield for the 
invading Russians.
  Perhaps the most significant dangerous activity in cyberspace even 
goes unnoticed. Cyberspies lay in wait for years in order to eventually 
steal precious military and economic secrets. Each of these examples 
further illustrates the need for legislation. Unfortunately, some civil 
liberties and privacy advocates claim that liability protection in this 
bill with respect to the use of cybersecurity systems could lead to 
broader activities than authorized.
  This legislation doesn't do that, but my amendment simply provides 
clarifying language to the original language of the bill, and thus 
enjoys the support of bipartisan cosponsors of the legislation, as well 
as the outside groups that raise these concerns.
  Madam Chair, I urge approval of this amendment.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek time in opposition?
  Mr. POMPEO. I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers), the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.

                              {time}  1550

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank Mr. Pompeo for working with 
us. This was an amendment negotiated with Mr. Ruppersberger and myself 
and Mr. Pompeo to clearly define the intention of the bill, and I think 
it offers protections. I think we should all strongly support Mr. 
Pompeo's amendment.
  Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
  The amendment was agreed to.


           amendment no. 4 offered by mr. rogers of michigan

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I have an amendment at the desk, Madam Chair.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 9, beginning on line 2, strike ``affect any'' and 
     insert ``affect--''.
       Page 9, strike lines 3 through 5 and insert the following:
       ``(A) any requirement under any other provision of law for 
     a person or entity to provide information to the Federal 
     Government; or
       ``(B) the applicability of other provisions of law, 
     including section 552 of title 5, United

[[Page H2170]]

     States Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information 
     Act'), with respect to information required to be provided to 
     the Federal Government under such other provision of law.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I strongly encourage the support 
of this amendment. It's a simple amendment we negotiated. It is 
clarifying language again on FOIA.
  With that, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Issa).
  Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Hopefully there will be 
time left over also for Mr. Chaffetz, who has worked hard on this 
amendment.
  I want to thank the chairman for working with our committee on this 
amendment that clarifies in the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act that FOIA, the Freedom of Information Access Act, is in 
fact clearly in effect for the vast majority of this information.
  We understand that companies--I will just take an example--such as 
electric utility companies may share their very vulnerabilities as a 
part of a process to reduce or eliminate these vulnerabilities. We 
certainly understand that that's not FOIAable. National security is not 
FOIAable. However, we, in this amendment, ensure that everything is at 
least possibly FOIAable whenever it would be appropriate, and then the 
only question is does it stand for one of the exclusions. So by making 
it narrow, we tell the American people that the Freedom of Information 
Act is in effect on cybersecurity and will not be unreasonably 
withheld.
  I think this is critical at a time when greater transparency is the 
promise and there is a great deal of concern about cybersecurity 
somehow being something that would take away America's freedoms. Just 
the opposite is true. Our freedom of the Internet, our freedom to have 
an effective and efficient system on which to build our infrastructure 
both for electricity and other utilities, but also for our everyday 
life, essentially requires the kind of cooperation that we anticipate.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition to the 
amendment; however, I do not oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I agree with Mr. Issa's comments. This is a joint 
amendment of Mr. Rogers and me. The amendment would make it clear that 
while FOIA exemption protects information obtained under the bill, 
regulatory information required by other authorities remains subject to 
FOIA requests.
  The chairman and I agree the law should not create a broad change. 
The type of information that is available under the Freedom of 
Information Act, we have a responsibility to protect classified 
information from disclosure, but we also understand the need to keep 
information open to the public. The amendment makes clear that 
information available under other authorities remains subject to FOIA, 
and I urge all Members to support this bipartisan amendment.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentleman from Utah.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I appreciate the bipartisan nature in which this is moving forward. I 
appreciate specifically Chairman Rogers, Chairman Issa, and the ranking 
member.
  I stand in support of this amendment. I think FOIA is a very 
important principle we have in this, and this just strengthens that.
  I would also say, Madam Chair, that I was opposed to SOPA. I was 
adamantly opposed to this. But this bill in particular is desperately 
needed in this country. Cybersecurity is a very real threat, and this 
bill is something that is needed in this country. I think it is strong 
in its Fourth Amendment protections. I think it's appropriate for this 
Nation to do this. We need to make sure that we're smart in how we 
advance.
  There have been some much-needed amendments that were adopted. But 
again, the bill, as we see it moving forward, I think, will strengthen 
cybersecurity in this country, and I'm proud of the fact that Chairman 
Rogers is bringing this bill to the floor.
  I urge the support of this amendment and the underlying bill.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House 
Report 112 454.


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Quayle

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. QUAYLE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 9, strike lines 8 through 18 and insert the following:
       ``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
     threat information shared with the Federal Government in 
     accordance with subsection (b)--
       ``(A) for cybersecurity purposes;
       ``(B) for the investigation and prosecution of 
     cybersecurity crimes;
       ``(C) for the protection of individuals from the danger of 
     death or serious bodily harm and the investigation and 
     prosecution of crimes involving such danger of death or 
     serious bodily harm;
       ``(D) for the protection of minors from child pornography, 
     any risk of sexual exploitation, and serious threats to the 
     physical safety of such minor, including kidnapping and 
     trafficking and the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
     involving child pornography, any risk of sexual exploitation, 
     and serious threats to the physical safety of minors, 
     including kidnapping and trafficking, and any crime referred 
     to in 2258A(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; or
       ``(E) to protect the national security of the United 
     States.
       Page 16, before line 1 insert the following:
       ``(4) Cybersecurity crime.--The term `cybersecurity crime' 
     means--
       ``(A) a crime under a Federal or State law that involves--
       ``(i) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or 
     network;
       ``(ii) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network; or
       ``(iii) efforts to exfiltrate information from a system or 
     network without authorization; or
       ``(B) the violation of a provision of Federal law relating 
     to computer crimes, including a violation of any provision of 
     title 18, United States Code, created or amended by the 
     Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99 474).''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Quayle) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. QUAYLE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I appreciate the opportunity to speak in favor of this bipartisan 
amendment that I'm offering along with Congresswoman Eshoo, Congressman 
Thompson, and Congressman Broun.
  H.R. 3523 is designed to increase the sharing of government 
intelligence and cyberthreats with the private sector and allow private 
sector companies to share threat information on a voluntary basis. The 
bill is consistent with our founding principles and our Constitution. 
Indeed, as the nature of the threats facing our Nation change, I 
believe this legislation is vital to protecting our country.
  Every day our military intelligence communities work to counter 
traditional threats like nuclear and biological weapons in order to 
prevent a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil, but today's security 
threats are becoming less traditional. Four nations have chosen 
cyberspace as an area of particular

[[Page H2171]]

vulnerability for America and are targeting critical military and 
economic cyberinfrastructure.
  Admiral Mike Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, lists cyberattacks as one of the top threats facing the United 
States. Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director Leon Panetta 
warned that the next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a 
cyberattack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security 
systems, our financial systems, our governmental systems.
  This legislation not only protects our national security and 
intellectual property, it also provides private and public entities to 
voluntarily work with the government to protect every individual's 
personal information from nation-state actors like China, Russia, and 
Iran, who are determined to use cyberattacks to steal from us and 
weaken us.

                              {time}  1600

  This bipartisan amendment will further solidify protecting the 
homeland from foreign nation-states wishing to do us harm, while 
protecting civil liberties.
  This amendment significantly narrows the bill's current limitation of 
the Federal Government's use of cyberthreat information that is 
voluntarily shared by the private sector. Specifically, this amendment 
strictly limits the Federal Government's use of voluntarily shared 
cyberthreat information to the following five purposes: cybersecurity 
purposes; investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes; 
protection of individuals from danger of death or serious bodily harm; 
and protection of minors from child pornography, any risk of sexual 
exploitation, and serious threats to the physical safety of a minor; 
finally, protection of the national security of the United States.
  If the government violates the use limitation, the bill provides for 
government liability for actual damages, costs, and attorney fees in 
Federal court. These provisions together ensure that information cannot 
be shared with the government or used under this bill unless there's a 
direct tie to cybersecurity.
  Cyberterrorists work fast, so Congress needs to work faster to 
protect America. Enabling information-sharing between the government 
and private sector is the quickest and easiest way to prevent a 
cyberattack on our Nation. Our amendment ensures we can accomplish this 
goal while also protecting the privacy of all Americans, and I urge my 
colleagues to support it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I rise to claim time in opposition, but I do not 
oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Thompson). He is on the Intelligence Committee and also a sponsor of 
this amendment.
  Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Madam Chair, I rise in support of the Thompson-Eshoo-Quayle-Broun 
amendment to this bill. The threat of a devastating cyberattack is real 
and cannot be understated. I believe the Federal Government and private 
companies need to work together to protect our national and economic 
security. But in doing so, we still have a responsibility to protect 
the constitutional rights of law-abiding citizens.
  I'm concerned that the underlying bill is drafted in a way where 
consumer information could be shared too broadly and used in ways 
unrelated to combating cybersecurity threats. The Thompson-Eshoo-
Quayle-Broun amendment will tighten the bill's limitation on the 
Federal Government's use of cyberthreat information shared under this 
legislation. Specifically, our amendment will limit the Federal 
Government's use of shared information only for cybersecurity purposes, 
for the investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes, to 
protect against the threat of imminent harm, and protect our country's 
national security.
  This bill, even with our amendment, isn't perfect. As this 
legislation moves forward, I expect the word of the chairman to be 
honored when he says that our committee will work together to further 
protect personal information and limit its use. For example, further 
narrowing terms in this bill, such as ``to protect the national 
security of the United States,'' will be necessary, I believe, to fully 
protect our civil liberties.
  Mr. QUAYLE. I yield 30 seconds to the chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, Mr. Rogers.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Quayle.
  Again, this is an amendment worked out with Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. 
Thompson, Mr. Quayle, and myself. Ms. Eshoo is also on the amendment.
  This is in consultation with all of the privacy groups and the civil 
liberty groups. We wanted to make sure that the intent matched the 
language. And we think this is a limiting amendment on what it can be 
used for, which is very narrow, is very specific; and we think this 
enhances already good privacy protections in the bill, and I strongly 
support it and would encourage the House to strongly support the 
bipartisan amendment.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. QUAYLE. I just want to thank the chairman and the ranking member 
and their staffs for working tirelessly on this bill. It's a good bill, 
and this amendment, I believe, strengthens it.
  I urge my colleagues to support it, and I yield back the balance of 
my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Quayle).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona will 
be postponed.


                  Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Amash

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. AMASH. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 10, after line 10, insert the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) Protection of sensitive personal documents.--The 
     Federal Government may not use the following information, 
     containing information that identifies a person, shared with 
     the Federal Government in accordance with subsection (b):
       ``(A) Library circulation records.
       ``(B) Library patron lists.
       ``(C) Book sales records.
       ``(D) Book customer lists.
       ``(E) Firearms sales records.
       ``(F) Tax return records.
       ``(G) Educational records.
       ``(H) Medical records.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Amash) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
  Mr. AMASH. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I'm extremely concerned about the privacy implications of the bill. 
The liability waiver goes too far, and the government can access too 
much of Americans' private information and use it in too many ways.
  Our amendment addresses that last concern. Our amendment prohibits 
CISPA from being used to snoop through sensitive documents that can 
personally identify Americans. The documents that our amendment makes 
off-limits to the government are library and book records, information 
on gun sales, tax returns, educational records, and medical records.
  We didn't pull this list out of thin air. In fact, the list already 
exists in Federal law as part of the PATRIOT Act. Under the PATRIOT 
Act, the Federal Government can obtain these documents as part of a 
foreign intelligence investigation only if senior FBI officials request 
the documents and a Federal judge approves.
  Many have questioned the wisdom of allowing the government access to 
sensitive documents even in those more limited circumstances. If the 
PATRIOT Act requires the approval of a Federal judge and a senior FBI 
official, surely we can't allow access to such personal information 
without any judicial or agency oversight. I don't know why the

[[Page H2172]]

government would want to snoop through library lists or tax returns to 
counter a cyberattack. But if the government wants these records, it 
has existing legal processes to obtain them. Our constituents' privacy 
demands that we not give the government unfettered and unsupervised 
access to these documents in the name of cybersecurity.
  Please support the bipartisan Amash-Labrador-Nadler-Paul-Polis 
amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition to 
the amendment?
  Mr. AMASH. I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. NADLER. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the Amash-
Labrador-Nadler-Paul-Polis Amendment.
  While I believe most Members agree both that a cyber attack could be 
devastating and that sharing information will help to fight that 
threat, the underlying bill is overly broad and intrusive. Our 
amendment will add at least a modicum of protection for Americans' 
privacy.
  While the idea of privacy may seem quaint to some in this day of 
social networking and the Internet, most Americans still believe that 
they have a zone of privacy vis-a-vis the government. As such, it is 
important we protect private actions from the prying eyes of 
government. Moreover, the government has a history of misusing such 
information and so we need to be very circumspect in what we allow it 
access to.
  Our amendment prohibits records or information regarding what books 
you bought or checked out of the library, your medical records, tax 
returns, and so on from being used by the government for any purpose if 
it obtained that information pursuant to this bill. There is no need 
for the government to have this most personal of information--I don't 
see how any of it could be possibly relevant to cyber security. And, if 
the information can't be legally used, hopefully that will discourage 
companies from sharing it in the first place.
  The categories of information in our amendment are already given a 
protected status in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 
FISA requires a court order and the approval of a high-ranking FBI 
official to request these personal materials. If that is the standard 
under FISA, we should not let companies cavalierly hand such records to 
the government with no independent review at all.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.


                Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. MULVANEY. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 10, after line 10 insert the following:
       ``(4) Notification of non-cyber threat information.--If a 
     department or agency of the Federal Government receiving 
     information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) determines that 
     such information is not cyber threat information, such 
     department or agency shall notify the entity or provider 
     sharing such information pursuant to subsection (b)(1).
       ``(5) Retention and use of cyber threat information.--No 
     department or agency of the Federal Government shall retain 
     or use information shared pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for 
     any use other than a use permitted under subsection (c)(1).
       ``(6) Protection of individual information.--The Federal 
     Government may, consistent with the need to protect Federal 
     systems and critical information infrastructure from 
     cybersecurity threats and to mitigate such threats, undertake 
     reasonable efforts to limit the impact on privacy and civil 
     liberties of the sharing of cyber threat information with the 
     Federal Government pursuant to this subsection.
       Page 14, after line 13, insert the following:
       ``(4) Use and retention of information.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any 
     existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government to retain or use information shared pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(1) for any use other than a use permitted 
     under subsection (c)(1).''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. MULVANEY. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I appreciate the opportunity to rise today to speak in 
favor to this amendment to the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act. CISPA is fundamentally based on the authority granted 
to Congress in article I of the Constitution and article IV of the 
Constitution, specifically to provide for the common defense and to 
protect the Nation against invasion--in fact, the only affirmative duty 
that this government is obligated to meet under the terms of our 
Constitution.
  This bill protects our Nation from foreign cyberthreats through the 
voluntary sharing of cyberthreat information. It is important for 
Members to understand this bill allows for only voluntary sharing of 
information on cybersecurity threats to the United States between the 
government and the private sector.

                              {time}  1610

  It includes no mandates to the private sector. It contains no new 
spending and strictly limits how the government can use the information 
that is voluntarily provided by the private sector. The amendment that 
I've offered with Mr. Dicks today goes one step further to protect the 
private information of American citizens. It explicitly prohibits the 
Federal Government from retaining or using the information for purposes 
other than specifically specified or set forth in the legislation.
  Let's make it clear. The government cannot keep or use the shared 
information to see if you failed to pay your taxes. The government 
cannot use this information to read your emails. The government cannot 
use this information to track your credit card purchases or look at the 
Web sites that you've been visiting. Under our amendment, the Federal 
Government cannot use retained information unless it was directly 
related to a cyber or national security threat.
  Finally, this bipartisan amendment requires--requires--the Federal 
Government to notify any private sector entity that shares information 
with the government if that information is not, in fact, cyberthreat 
information so that it doesn't happen again, and the government must 
delete that information.
  The privacy of American citizens is simply too important to dismiss. 
Our amendment narrows the scope of the bill to ensure personal 
information is protected and that we are focusing on the true threat--
advanced, foreign state-sponsored cyberattacks against America and its 
private entities.
  With that, I would yield such time as he may consume to the chairman.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I just want to rise in strong 
support of this amendment. I appreciate Mr. Mulvaney's working with the 
committee.
  This is a limiting amendment, and I think it, again, is in response 
to making sure that the intent of the bill meets the language of the 
bill, and this is well done to continue to protect privacy and civil 
liberties of all Americans and still allow for the government to share 
malicious source code with the private sector.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment; although I do not oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I also support this amendment. It is very 
important. It's another example of what we're attempting to do to 
protect the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens but yet have a 
bill that we clearly need to protect them from a national security 
perspective.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MULVANEY. I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.

[[Page H2173]]

  Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South 
Carolina will be postponed.


                  Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Flake

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. FLAKE. I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 12, after line 18, insert the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(E) a list of the department or agency receiving such 
     information;

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Flake) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. FLAKE. This amendment is straightforward. It would require the 
inspector general of the intelligence community to include a list of 
federal agencies and departments receiving information shared with the 
government in the report already required by the underlying 
legislation.
  This act is an important piece of legislation that will help private 
entities and utilities protect themselves from catastrophic attacks to 
their networks by creating the authority for private entities and 
utilities to voluntarily share information pertaining to cyberattacks 
with the Federal Government and vice versa.
  H.R. 3523 avoids placing costly mandates on private industry and the 
creation of a new regulatory structure. That's what I really appreciate 
about this legislation, as I'm sure everyone does--it's voluntary.
  As with any new intelligence program, however, it's incumbent on us 
to make sure robust protections exist to safeguard privacy rights. The 
inspector general report required under H.R. 3523 will provide a 
thorough review of the information shared under these new authorities 
and will address any impacts such sharing has on privacy and civil 
liberties. Adding the list of the departments and agencies that were 
recipients of this shared information, as my amendment would do, would 
add information on which government agencies exactly are receiving 
shared information. Such information will further mitigate the risk of 
abuse to privacy rights and increase the effectiveness of the inspector 
general's report.
  I commend my colleagues from Michigan and Maryland. They've been 
working hard to put together this bipartisan measure, working up until 
the very last minute to ensure that Members' concerns are addressed, 
and I believe that this is an important piece of legislation.
  I'd like to yield to the gentleman from Michigan such time as he may 
consume.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank the gentleman from Arizona 
for working with us. This, again, was a negotiated amendment. The 
gentleman approached us with concerns to make sure that the IG report 
adequately reflected and allowed us to perform the adequate oversight. 
This amendment does that. I appreciate his work and effort, and I think 
this strengthens the bill and continues to provide the oversight and 
protection of civil liberties and privacy for all Americans.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition?
  Mr. FLAKE. I just want to say I support the legislation in the 
underlying bill, and I would urge support for this amendment as well, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                 Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Pompeo

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 14, after line 13, insert the following:
       ``(4) Limitation on federal government use of cybersecurity 
     systems.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
     provide additional authority to, or modify an existing 
     authority of, any entity to use a cybersecurity system owned 
     or controlled by the Federal Government on a private-sector 
     system or network to protect such private-sector system or 
     network.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.
  Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to offer a 
second amendment to this incredibly important piece of legislation 
that's been worked on for an awfully long time to balance the security 
needs of our Nation and the privacy rights of every United States 
citizen.
  Similar to the first amendment I offered, this amendment addresses 
some of the concerns raised by me, privacy folks, and civil libertarian 
advocates to make very clear the intentions of this legislation. I 
talked earlier about the threat we face today. It's real, it's foreign, 
it's domestic, and these cyberattacks are an enormous risk to our 
national security and to our economic security.
  I now strongly support this legislation. I've had a chance to work 
with Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger to solidify 
limitations on this legislation that make it very clear that this 
government's use of this information will be limited.
  I think some have claimed incorrectly that the current bill could be 
read to provide new authority to the Federal Government to install its 
Einstein system on private sector networks and to monitor traffic and 
send it back to the government with absolutely no limitations. That's 
wrong.
  This amendment, however, makes it even more clear. This amendment 
makes clear that nothing in this bill would alter existing authorities 
or provide any new authority to any entity to use a Federal Government-
owned or -operated cybersecurity system on a private sector system or 
network to protect such a system or network.
  Again, I'm pleased to support the legislation. It doesn't create any 
new regulatory regime. It doesn't create any more Federal bureaucracy. 
And it has no additional spending. I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment and final passage of CISPA.
  I yield whatever time he might consume to the chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. This is an important amendment, and again, I 
think it alleviates some of the concerns. They were misguided, but this 
locks it down, makes it very tight and makes it very clear on the 
limiting of this information, which is the intent of this bill. So I 
think this amendment addresses the privacy and civil liberties 
advocates' claims that the liability protection in the bill with 
respect to the use of cybersecurity systems could be read to be broader 
than the activities authorized by the legislation.
  As I said, that was not true, certainly not the intent. This 
amendment makes that very clear in the bill that that would not be its 
purpose, and it is a limiting amendment. I strongly support this 
amendment. It is a bipartisan amendment as well.
  Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chairwoman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
  The amendment was agreed to.

                              {time}  1620


                Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Woodall

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. WOODALL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 14, after line 13 insert the following:
       ``(4) No liability for non-participation.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to subject a protected entity, 
     self-protected entity, cyber security provider, or an 
     officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity, self-
     protected entity, or cybersecurity provider, to liability for 
     choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized 
     under this section.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman

[[Page H2174]]

from Georgia (Mr. Woodall) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
  Mr. WOODALL. Madam Chair, my amendment is a simple amendment. What 
we're doing here in this bill today, to the great credit of the 
chairman and the ranking member, is instituting a voluntary system by 
which our private companies and utilities can cooperate in the name of 
securing America's cyberspace. But what happens so often is, when the 
Federal Government creates a so-called ``voluntary'' standard, suddenly 
those folks who choose not to play on that playing field are subject to 
new liabilities because they rejected that voluntary standard.
  Well, if it's going to be a truly voluntary standard, we have to 
ensure that those who reject it are not held to any new liabilities. I 
believe that was the intent of the committee as they crafted this 
legislation, but my amendment makes that clear to say that no new 
liabilities arise for any company that chooses not to participate in 
this new truly voluntary cybersecurity cooperative regime.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition?
  Mr. WOODALL. With that, I want to thank the ranking member and the 
chairman for their tremendous openness throughout this entire process. 
Briefing after briefing, phone call after phone call, they both made 
themselves available to Members on both sides of the aisle so that we 
could get our questions answered in what is sometimes a difficult area 
to understand and digest. I thank them both for their leadership, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Woodall).
  The amendment was agreed to.


               Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 14, after line 14 insert the following:
       ``(1) Availability.--The term `availability' means ensuring 
     timely and reliable access to and use of information.
       Page 15, strike lines 1 through 25 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(2) Confidentiality.--The term `confidentiality' means 
     preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
     including means for protecting personal privacy and 
     proprietary information.
       ``(3) Cyber threat information.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `cyber threat information' 
     means information directly pertaining to--
       ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network of a 
     government or private entity;
       ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of a system or network of a government or 
     private entity or any information stored on, processed on, or 
     transiting such a system or network;
       ``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or 
     network of a government or private entity; or
       ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network of a government or private entity, including to gain 
     such unauthorized access for the purpose of exfiltrating 
     information stored on, processed on, or transiting a system 
     or network of a government or private entity.
       ``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include information 
     pertaining to efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system 
     or network of a government or private entity that solely 
     involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer 
     licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
     unauthorized access.
       ``(4) Cyber threat intelligence.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `cyber threat intelligence' 
     means intelligence in the possession of an element of the 
     intelligence community directly pertaining to--
       ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network of a 
     government or private entity;
       ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of a system or network of a government or 
     private entity or any information stored on, processed on, or 
     transiting such a system or network;
       ``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or 
     network of a government or private entity; or
       ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network of a government or private entity, including to gain 
     such unauthorized access for the purpose of exfiltrating 
     information stored on, processed on, or transiting a system 
     or network of a government or private entity.
       ``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include intelligence 
     pertaining to efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system 
     or network of a government or private entity that solely 
     involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer 
     licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
     unauthorized access.
       Page 16, strike line 5 and all that follows through page 
     17, line 2, and insert the following:
       ``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `cybersecurity purpose' means 
     the purpose of ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of, or safeguarding, a system or network, 
     including protecting a system or network from--
       ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network;
       ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of a system or network or any information stored 
     on, processed on, or transiting such a system or network;
       ``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or 
     network; or
       ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network, including to gain such unauthorized access for the 
     purpose of exfiltrating information stored on, processed on, 
     or transiting a system or network.
       ``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include the purpose 
     of protecting a system or network from efforts to gain 
     unauthorized access to such system or network that solely 
     involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer 
     licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
     unauthorized access.
       ``(6) Cybersecurity system.--
       ``(A) In general.--The term `cybersecurity system' means a 
     system designed or employed to ensure the integrity, 
     confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard, a system 
     or network, including protecting a system or network from--
       ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network;
       ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or 
     availability of a system or network or any information stored 
     on, processed on, or transiting such a system or network;
       ``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or 
     network; or
       ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or 
     network, including to gain such unauthorized access for the 
     purpose of exfiltrating information stored on, processed on, 
     or transiting a system or network.
       ``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include a system 
     designed or employed to protect a system or network from 
     efforts to gain unauthorized access to such system or network 
     that solely involve violations of consumer terms of service 
     or consumer licensing agreements and do not otherwise 
     constitute unauthorized access.
       Page 17, after line 2 insert the following:
       ``(7) Integrity.--The term `integrity' means guarding 
     against improper information modification or destruction, 
     including ensuring information nonrepudiation and 
     authenticity.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to H.R. 
3523. This amendment is the result of a series of long discussions 
between Members of the bipartisan coalition supporting this bill and 
various privacy and civil liberties groups.
  As many know, I have long worked with these outside groups and with 
industry to make sure that where Congress acts with respect to 
technology, it does so in a way that is thoughtful, intelligent, and 
shows a strong respect for privacy and civil liberties.
  I am a firm believer that Congress can craft legislation that 
addresses technology issues and allows the private sector to flourish 
while also protecting the rights of Americans. This amendment seeks to 
move the legislation further down that path.
  To do so, this amendment carefully narrows the definitions of the key 
terms in the bill--``cyberthreat information,'' ``cyberthreat 
intelligence,'' ``cybersecurity purposes,'' and ``cybersecurity 
systems''--and adds in three new definitions from the existing law. 
Together, these new definitions ensure that companies in the private 
sector can protect themselves against very real cyberthreats. At the 
same time, they limit what information the private sector can identify, 
obtain, and share with others, and they do so in a way that is 
technology neutral so that the definitions we write into law today do 
not become obsolete before the ink is dry.
  Specifically, these new definitions remove language from prior 
versions of the bill that could have been interpreted in broad ways. 
They remove or modify definitions that could have

[[Page H2175]]

been thought to cover things that the bill did not intend to cover, 
like unauthorized access to a system or network that purely involves 
violations of a terms of service. These revised definitions also rely 
in part on existing law to cover the appropriate set of threats to 
networks and systems without being overly broad.
  I would note that these definitional changes are important on their 
own for the narrowing function they serve. In the view of groups like 
the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Constitution Project, 
this amendment represents ``important privacy improvement.'' 
Specifically, the change to the definitions addresses a number of key 
issues raised by a variety of groups, and many in the Internet user 
community. As such, these amendments move an already important bill in 
an even better direction.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment, but I do not oppose the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Poe).
  Mr. POE of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Anytime the government gets involved in data sharing and data 
storage, there is going to be the possibility for abuse.
  I hear from my constituents in Texas and U.S. companies that they 
continue to lose information to cyberattacks from abroad. Most of these 
attacks come from none other than the organized crime syndicate of 
China, as I call it. They steal our intellectual property, and then 
they use the stolen information to compete against the United States.
  We need a commonsense information-sharing system to combat the 
growing threat to this way of life that we have in America. However, we 
have to do it in such a way that protects our privacy and 
constitutional rights of citizens.
  While I believe the intent of the base bill was never to allow the 
government to use information it obtained for any other purposes than 
cybersecurity, I believe that the clear and simple language in Mr. 
Goodlatte's amendment is necessary to make it 100 percent clear that 
this is strictly prohibited.
  As we remember from the 2012 NDAA debate, it's important, especially 
when dealing with legislation that affects civil liberties and 
constitutional rights, Congress needs to be perfectly 100 percent 
clear. I believe the Goodlatte amendment does this. I urge all Members 
to support it.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, at this time, I am pleased to yield 1 
minute to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank the distinguished former 
chairman and member, Mr. Goodlatte, for his commonsense amendment. 
Again, this is working to make sure that this bill is restricted for 
both information use, privacy, and civil liberties, and why the 
coalition, I argue, continues to grow because of the good work of folks 
like Mr. Goodlatte. It's bipartisan in nature, and I would strongly 
urge the body's support for the Goodlatte amendment.
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, I am not aware of any other speakers 
on this amendment, so I would urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment. It is, as the chairman indicated and the ranking member 
indicated, bipartisan legislation that will improve the underlying bill 
in significant ways and protect the civil liberties of American 
citizens in a more clear fashion.
  I thank all of those in the Chamber and outside who contributed ideas 
to help us craft this amendment and urge all of my colleagues to 
support it.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia 
will be postponed.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now 
rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Woodall) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Capito, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3523) to 
provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber 
threat information between the intelligence community and cybersecurity 
entities, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
during further consideration of H.R. 3523, pursuant to House Resolution 
631, amendments No. 10 and No. 5 in House Report 112 454 may be 
considered out of sequence.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 631 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 3523.
  Will the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) kindly resume 
the chair.

                              {time}  1630


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat 
intelligence and cyber threat information between the intelligence 
community and cybersecurity entities, and for other purposes, with Mrs. 
Capito (Acting Chair) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The Acting CHAIR. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today, 
a request for a recorded vote on amendment No. 13 printed in House 
Report 112 454 by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) had been 
postponed.


             Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Turner of Ohio

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 15, line 7, insert ``deny access to or'' before 
     ``degrade''.
       Page 15, line 20, insert ``deny access to or'' before 
     ``degrade''.
       Page 16, line 10, insert ``deny access to or'' before 
     ``degrade''.
       Page 16, line 21, insert ``deny access to or'' before 
     ``degrade''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
  Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Madam Chairman, this amendment would make a 
technical correction to the definition sections of this bill to ensure 
that U.S. cybersecurity policies remain consistent for protections 
against threats to our government and private sector networks.
  This amendment will maintain consistency among this bill and other 
cybersecurity policies. The terms ``deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy'' 
are found throughout our national cybersecurity strategy and our 
guidance documents. The term ``deny'' was inadvertently omitted from 
H.R. 3523. Inserting ``deny'' makes the bill consistent with other 
national documents in the discussion of cybersecurity.
  The increase in cybersecurity incidents led to the development of 
centers like the Air Force's Cyberspace Technical Center of Excellence 
at Wright Patterson Air Force base in my district in Dayton, Ohio. To 
combat this growing trend in the sophistication of cyberattacks, the 
Center of Technical Excellence has been turned to that focus.
  The need to protect U.S. networks from denial-of-service attacks was 
made clear when, for 3 weeks in 2007, Estonia was the target of a 
large-scale

[[Page H2176]]

series of denial-of-service attacks against government Web sites, 
banks, universities, and Estonian newspapers.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment and the 
underlying bill.
  I yield 30 seconds to the chairman.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I want to, again, thank Mr. 
Turner for this important clarification amendment and working with us 
to improve the status of the bill to make sure that we are able to 
protect America's networks and increases the ability for us to protect 
privacy and civil liberties.
  I appreciate the gentleman's good effort, and I would encourage the 
House to support the Turner amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition?
  Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
  The amendment was agreed to.


                Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

     SEC. 3. SUNSET.

       Effective on the date that is five years after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act--
       (1) section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
     added by section 2(a) of this Act, is repealed; and
       (2) the table of contents in the first section of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 2(d) of 
     this Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 
     1104, as added by such section 2(d).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman 
from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. MULVANEY. This amendment, ladies and gentlemen, is fairly simple 
and straightforward, but it bears discussion for a few moments. It 
requires the bill to expire of its own terms within 5 years. It's what 
we call in this business a sunset clause. And by its own terms, if the 
bill is passed, it will automatically cease to be, cease to be 
enforceable after 5 years unless this body acts affirmatively to renew 
it.
  Generally, I think this is good policy with most things that we do in 
Washington, D.C. In fact, several people say that one of the biggest 
difficulties we have in this town is that we simply create laws all the 
time and they never go away. So generally speaking, I think sunset 
clauses are to be admired and to be encouraged.
  Even more so is the case, however, when we deal with situations where 
we have concerns regarding individual liberties. We've worked very, 
very hard to make this bill a good bill. It is an excellent bill. I'm 
proud to be a cosponsor of this bill.
  But every single time that we start moving into the realm where the 
government action starts to bump up against individual liberties, it's 
a good idea to take a pause after this certain amount of time, in this 
case 5 years, and look our hands over, look over the actual 
implementation of the bill and make sure that we did exactly what we 
thought that we were going to do.
  Finally, I think in a case when we're dealing with technology, which 
moves so very rapidly--in fact, we've written this bill as well as we 
possibly could to try and deal with unanticipated development in 
technology--but when you're dealing with technology that moves so 
rapidly and changes so quickly, I think it's important, after a certain 
period of time, again, here, 5 years, to step back, look our hands over 
and make sure that things worked exactly as we thought they would.
  So, for that reason, Madam Chairman, I ask that this amendment be 
considered and be approved.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition to 
the Member's amendment?
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South 
Carolina will be postponed.


          Amendment No. 5 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 
printed in House Report 112 454.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the 
desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 9, after line 5, insert the following:
       ``(c) Cybersecurity Operational Activity.--
       ``(1) In general.--In receiving information authorized to 
     be shared with the Federal Government under this section, the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized, notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, to acquire, intercept, retain, 
     use, and disclose communications and other system traffic 
     that are transiting to or from or stored on Federal systems 
     and to deploy countermeasures with regard to such 
     communications and system traffic for cybersecurity purposes 
     provided that the Secretary certifies that--
       ``(A) such acquisitions, interceptions, and countermeasures 
     are reasonable necessary for the purpose of protection 
     Federal systems from cybersecurity threats;
       ``(B) the content of communications will be collected and 
     retained only when the communication is associated with known 
     or reasonably suspected cybersecurity threat, and 
     communications and system traffic will not be subject to the 
     operation of a countermeasure unless associated with such 
     threats;
       ``(C) information obtained pursuant to activities 
     authorized under this subsection will only be retained, used 
     or disclosed to protect Federal systems from cybersecurity 
     threats, mitigate against such threats, or, with the approval 
     of the Attorney General, for law enforcement purposes when 
     the information is evidence of a crime which has been, is 
     being, or is about to be committed; and
       ``(D) notice has been provided to users of Federal systems 
     concerning the potential for acquisition, interception, 
     retention, use, and disclosure of communications and other 
     system traffic.
       ``(2) Contracts.-- The Secretary may enter into contracts 
     or other agreements, or otherwise request and obtain the 
     assistance of, private entities that provide electronic 
     communication or cybersecurity services to acquire, 
     intercept, retain, use, and disclose communications and other 
     system traffic consistent with paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Privileged communications.--No otherwise privileged 
     communication obtained in accordance with, or in violation 
     of, this section shall lose its privileged character.
       ``(4) Policies and procedures.-- The Secretary of Homeland 
     Security shall establish policies and procedures that--
       ``(A) minimize the impact on privacy and civil liberties, 
     consistent with the need to protect Federal systems and 
     critical information infrastructure from cybersecurity 
     threats and mitigate cybersecurity threats;
       ``(B) reasonably limit the acquisition, interception, 
     retention, use, and disclosure of communications, records, 
     system traffic, or other information associated with specific 
     persons consistent with the need to carry out the 
     responsibilities of this section, including establishing a 
     process for the timely destruction on recognition of 
     communications, records, system traffic, or other information 
     that is acquired or intercepted pursuant to this section that 
     does not reasonably appear to be related to protecting 
     Federal systems and critical information infrastructure from 
     cybersecurity threats and mitigating cybersecurity threats;
       ``(C) include requirements to safeguard communications, 
     records, system traffic, or other information that can be 
     used to identify specific persons from unauthorized access or 
     acquisition; and
       ``(D) protect the confidentiality of disclosed 
     communications, records, system traffic, or other information 
     associated with specific persons to the greatest extent 
     practicable and require recipients of such information to be 
     informed that the communications, records, system traffic, or 
     other information disclosed may only be used for protecting 
     information systems against cybersecurity threats, mitigating 
     against cybersecurity threats, or law enforcement purposes 
     when the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is 
     being, or is about to be committed, as specified by the 
     Secretary.
       Page 14, after line 24, insert the following:
       ``(2) Countermeasure.--The term `countermeasure' means an 
     automated action with defensive intent to modify or block 
     data packets associated with electronic or wire 
     communications, internet traffic, program code, or other 
     system traffic transiting to or from or stored on an 
     information system to counteract a cybersecurity threat.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentlewoman 
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a

[[Page H2177]]

Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Madam Chair, let me thank you for your 
courtesy. Let me thank the chairperson for his courtesy and the ranking 
member for his courtesy. I was very appreciative, with the overlapping 
committee work, for the courtesy of the floor. I thank you very much.
  Let me hold up the Constitution and say that I believe in the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, particularly, that protects us 
against unreasonable search and seizure. And I also recognize the 
bipartisan effort of this particular legislation and recognize that we 
may have disagreement.
  My amendment ensures that comprehensive policies and procedures are 
implemented by the Department of Homeland Security to protect Federal 
systems from cybersecurity threats and minimize the impact on privacy. 
What it does not do is allow Homeland Security and the Justice 
Department to spy on Americans.
  Let me be very clear. It does not allow the infrastructure of 
Homeland Security and the Justice Department to spy on Americans. I 
would not adhere to that.
  It is a shame that oversight of our Nation's critical infrastructure, 
however, was not included in this bill. The hard work that has been 
done by the Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. Lungren and Ms. Clarke, 
joined with other Members, was worthy of consideration.
  I understand the strictures that we're dealing with. My amendment is 
designed to put in place comprehensive privacy protections in order to 
prevent any gross infringement of an individual's civil liberties or 
privacy rights. It allows the Department of Homeland Security to 
protect Federal systems that enable air traffic controllers to operate.
  Madam Chairperson, we know the climate that we live in. God has 
blessed us, if I might even say that, but more importantly, the hard 
work of men and women who happen to be Federal employees, that no 
action has occurred on our soil since 9/11.
  This amendment would allow the Department of Homeland Security to 
protect Federal systems that enable air traffic controllers to operate, 
that enable Congress to operate, that enable all Federal agencies to 
operate.
  My amendment is intentionally narrowly tailored to go after known or 
reasonable threats to our Federal systems. Let me be very clear. This 
is not a reflection on this legislation from the extent of hard work.

                              {time}  1640

  I am just saying that, coming from my perspective, I would hope that 
we would look at infrastructure.
  I am not advocating for the bill. I am advocating for an open 
discussion on this issue that certain elements have to be resolved in 
dealing with the cyberthreats that we face. I've long been an advocate 
for protecting the right to privacy and the civil liberties of all 
Americans--that is very much a part of this amendment--but I am also 
mindful of the importance of the infrastructure.
  As we assess cybersecurity measures and take steps to implement 
legislation, I believe we must be sure to strike the proper balance 
between effective and strong security for our digital networks and 
protecting the privacy of individuals as well as infrastructure that 
involves transportation. I am ever mindful that we must be careful not 
to go about strengthening cybersecurity at the expense of infringing on 
people's privacy rights and civil liberties, which is why my amendment 
is narrowly tailored and sets clear restrictions on the scope of 
communications addressed and why and how that information can be used.
  Our Nation's critical infrastructures are composed of public and 
private institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public 
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, 
information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and 
finance, chemicals and hazardous materials.
  I ask my colleagues to support the amendment, and I reserve the 
balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
  If you thought it was good for the businesses to require Facebook to 
give them your passwords, you'll love this. If not, you should go 
apoplectic. I think that's an awful practice on Facebook. This is 
worse. I want to read just from the law. Notwithstanding any other 
provision, it allows them to:

       acquire, intercept, retain, use, and disclose 
     communications and other system traffic that are transiting 
     to and from or are stored on the Federal systems and to 
     deploy countermeasures with regard to such communications and 
     system traffic for cybersecurity purposes.

  This is dangerous. It's dangerous. For the very narrow bill that has 
been misrepresented from what we do, this is Big Brother on steroids. 
We cannot allow this to happen. This would be the government tracking 
communications or your medical records from the veterans' association. 
It would track your IRS forms coming in and out of the Federal 
Government. This is exactly what scares people about trying to get into 
the business of making sure we protect our networks, but we can't do it 
by trampling on privacy and civil liberties.
  This is awful. I am just shocked, after all of this debate and all of 
this discussion on our very narrow bill, that my friends would come up 
with something that wholesale monitors the Internet and gets all of the 
information which we've fought so hard to protect on behalf of average 
Americans.
  I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Westmoreland).
  Mr. WESTMORELAND. I want to thank the chairman for yielding.
  Let me say this to my colleague from Texas: that we have had a number 
of amendments here today that have tried to streamline this bill in 
order to make it even narrower and to take out any perception that it 
would be personal information and limit what government can do and be 
very explicit in the terms of what this sharing is, which is voluntary, 
which is narrowly drawn.
  The chairman and the ranking member have done a wonderful job of 
working with other Members to allow these amendments to make this bill 
better. I am very disappointed. This amendment basically guts the 
bill--it expands it--when everybody who has been down here so far has 
been trying to narrow it. This just expands it even more. This is the 
type of amendment that people fear in that we would give Homeland 
Security the ability to intercept and keep the transmissions. That is 
totally out of hand.
  I just hope that we will vote against this amendment and support the 
underlying bill.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. What an exaggeration. I know that they have 
been propelled by all of the media that has given them great support.
  They know that the underlying bill, in fact, is considered an 
invasion of privacy; but if you look at my amendment, it is only when 
the communication is associated with a known or a reasonably suspected 
cybersecurity threat. It is narrow, but more importantly, it has a 
privacy provision. I believe in privacy. Let me just say that I was not 
going to be denied the right to come to the floor to be able to frame 
what we should be doing--looking at infrastructure and the complement 
of making sure that privacy is protected.
  This particular book, even with the amendments they have, will 
probably not draw this to the point of acceptance. So I would argue 
that this is a productive debate but that the amendment that Jackson 
Lee has submitted does not, in fact, at all violate privacy. I would 
say to them that I look forward to being able to address this question 
as we go forward.
  I am going to ask, at this time, unanimous consent to withdraw this 
amendment for the misinterpretation that my friends on the other side 
of the aisle have predicted or thought that they were going to put on 
this particular amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  There was no objection.


               Amendment No. 10 Offered by Ms. Richardson

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 
printed in House Report 112 454.

[[Page H2178]]

  Ms. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 14, after line 6, insert the following new 
     subparagraph:
       ``(C) prohibit a department or agency of the Federal 
     Government from providing cyber threat information to owners 
     and operators of critical infrastructure;

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Richardson) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. I stand today in support of the Richardson amendment 
to H.R. 3523; but I would like to take a moment to thank the majority 
leader, Mr. Cantor, Chairman Rogers, and Ranking Member Ruppersberger 
for their tolerance in allowing us to come to the floor. I was ranking 
member of a committee that was in operation at this time, and I thank 
you for allowing us to come forward.
  The Richardson amendment ensures that owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure systems that are potential targets to 
cyberattacks receive information about cyberthreats. Some examples of 
our critical infrastructure systems that this amendment would apply to 
are: energy facilities, banking and finance facilities, chemical 
facilities, dams, nuclear plants, emergency services, agriculture and 
food systems, water treatment systems. Many of these would be in great 
danger and would need information.
  Every single Member of Congress has critical infrastructure sectors 
in their districts, whether they be public or private, and every 
community in this Nation has some critical infrastructure presence that 
should be protected and advised of threats. In my district, I have the 
Home Depot Athletic Center, which holds up to 27,000 people. There is 
the Boeing Company, which manufactures the C 17 planes. There is the 
Long Beach Police and Fire Department EOC center, the Long Beach Gas 
and Oil Department, and water treatment facilities. The numbers go on. 
We need to make sure that not only ports and government facilities but 
also private facilities are approved and entitled to have this same 
information.
  Some inherent complications are that there are 18 different Federal 
Government agencies that have jurisdiction over critical infrastructure 
sectors. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has 
jurisdiction over chemical, commercial facilities, dams, emergency 
services, and nuclear power alone.
  H.R. 3523, as currently drafted, does not mention how critical 
infrastructure sectors that do not fall within the jurisdiction of 
government intelligence agencies would receive critical cyberthreat 
information or have the systems in place to share information 
appropriately. This amendment makes an important improvement to that 
legislation.
  I would like to commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger, who mentioned in their testimony before the Rules 
Committee and the Intelligence Committee that there was a key fault 
here in this critical infrastructure section. I am further pleased that 
the Rules Committee acknowledged that by finding this amendment in 
order, and I urge my colleagues to consider this seriously.
  While Chairman Lungren's original cyber bill did not make it to the 
House floor, I offer this Richardson amendment in the same bipartisan 
spirit that I did when his bill was brought forward in our 
subcommittee. Mr. Lungren and Mr. Langevin spoke earlier on the 
bipartisan amendment regarding critical infrastructure, hence my 
building my comments on that.
  Richardson amendment No. 10 ensures that our critical infrastructure 
sectors will not be left out from receiving information that could 
protect their systems against a terrorist attack.

                              {time}  1650

  This amendment makes sure that industries most at risk of a 
cyberattack receive information that they need to protect the public 
and the facilities at large. My amendment makes explicit that critical 
infrastructure sectors be included in information-sharing relationships 
and does not include any new Federal authorities.
  With that, Madam Chairwoman, I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  Mr. ROGERS from Michigan. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate the gentlelady's effort. Again, 
we were pretty careful in this year-long process of trying to find a 
very narrow solution because of all of the challenges that come with 
trying to get a piece of legislation across the House to the Senate to 
the President's desk.
  I argue that the Homeland Security Committee should engage in a 
critical infrastructure debate. Here's the problem: it's not defined 
for the purposes of this bill. So we don't know what that means. We've 
been very careful to separate the government from the private sector. 
There is no government involvement in the private sector networks. It 
is just information, malicious source code-sharing. That's it.
  This, we're not sure where it goes. Many in industry believe that 
they're talking about the backbone of the Internet. Are they talking 
about the backbone of the Internet? We don't know. It's not well 
defined. That would mean, then, that the government for the first time 
gets into the backbone of the Internet. I think that's a horrible, 
terrible idea.
  So I don't think that's what the gentlelady intends, but the problem 
is that's not what the language says.
  I look forward to working with the gentlelady as she works through 
those issues on Homeland Security because these are hard. They are 
tricky. Sometimes a word will get you in trouble, as we have found 
along the path here, and as it should. We should be really careful 
about how we're doing this.
  So I would encourage the gentlelady to work with us. I know Mr. 
Ruppersberger, since we've been through this, we can provide some help 
along the way, and we look forward to the product that you all work on 
that is geared toward the infrastructure piece. Again, this was never 
intended to solve all the problems. It was intended to be a very narrow 
first step to say, Hey, if your house is being robbed, we want to tell 
you before the robber gets there. That's all this bill does. It tells 
if your computer is going to get hacked and your personal information 
stolen, we want you to have the malicious code so you can protect 
yourself. That's all this bill does.
  So we get a little nervous when it starts crossing that divide that 
we've established between the government and the private sector. You 
start crossing that divide, we think you can get into some serious 
trouble in a hurry without very clearly defined language and 
definition.
  Unfortunately, I have to oppose the amendment, but I look forward to 
working with the gentlelady on a very important issue, infrastructure 
protection, as the Homeland Security does its work.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
  Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. As we said before, our bill is extremely limited, 
and we're attempting again to allow our government, our intelligence 
community, to give the information that's necessary to protect our 
citizens from these cyberattacks.
  Ours is the most active bill that is out there now. Our bill, 
hopefully, will pass and go to the Senate, and there will be a lot more 
negotiation. But there is a lot of work to do in other areas, too, such 
as Homeland Security; and I know there are other issues involved in the 
Homeland Security markup, I know that there are issues involving 
Judiciary.
  I can say this: I know that the chairman and I for 1 year now have 
worked very openly with every group that we think would be involved in 
this bill. Because of different positions taken, including HLU, we 
listened. This bill is better, and we hope that it passes.
  So we clearly will work with you, but we on the Intelligence 
Committee are very limited to our jurisdiction, and that's why a lot of 
these issues we can't deal with other than what is in our bill right 
now.

[[Page H2179]]

  I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Ms. RICHARDSON. Again, I'd like to thank both the chairman and the 
ranking member and look forward to the opportunity to work with you.
  I would just give you one analogy to consider as we move forward. As 
you recall on 9/11 when the planes hit those two Twin Towers, the 
government had the ability to notify the private airlines to scramble 
the planes and to demand that all of the planes would be landed because 
we didn't know where they were going to go.
  At that point, the government had the ability to work with the 
private sector, with the airline industry, to communicate information 
that they were now becoming aware of.
  I'm certainly not suggesting that we interfere with the free-flowing 
ideas of the Internet. What this amendment is suggesting, and I look 
forward to working with you in the future, is that the government does 
have the ability if in the event something happens with dropping some 
chemicals into water, for example, treatment facilities, that the 
government should certainly have the ability to work with those private 
sector companies to be able to notify them and ensure that the public 
is protected.
  I thank you for hearing the amendment, and I look forward to working 
with you going forward.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentlelady, and I look forward to 
that opportunity.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Richardson).
  The amendment was rejected.


                    Announcement by the Acting Chair

  The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that amendment No. 16 will 
not be offered.
  Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now resume on 
those amendments printed in House Report 112 454 on which further 
proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
  Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Langevin of Rhode Island.
  Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Rogers of Michigan.
  Amendment No. 6 by Mr. Quayle of Arizona.
  Amendment No. 7 by Mr. Amash of Michigan.
  Amendment No. 8 by Mr. Mulvaney of South Carolina.
  Amendment No. 13 by Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia.
  Amendment No. 15 by Mr. Mulvaney of South Carolina.
  The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the minimum time for any 
electronic vote after the first vote in this series.


                Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Langevin

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode 
Island (Mr. Langevin) on which further proceedings were postponed and 
on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 167, 
noes 243, not voting 21, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 184]

                               AYES--167

     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baldwin
     Bass (CA)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bonamici
     Boren
     Boswell
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (FL)
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Castor (FL)
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Critz
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dent
     Deutch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Fudge
     Garamendi
     Gibson
     Gonzalez
     Green, Al
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hastings (FL)
     Heinrich
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (NY)
     Kissell
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lujan
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Markey
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Nadler
     Neal
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Pingree (ME)
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sewell
     Shuler
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Stark
     Sutton
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thornberry
     Tierney
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wilson (FL)
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth

                               NOES--243

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (NH)
     Benishek
     Berg
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Capito
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Coble
     Cole
     Conaway
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Crowley
     Culberson
     Denham
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Hall
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Hinojosa
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kelly
     King (IA)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Lankford
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lewis (CA)
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Matheson
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCotter
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Napolitano
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Quayle
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ryan (WI)
     Scalise
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--21

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Cantor
     Cardoza
     Clarke (NY)
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Johnson (GA)
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Murphy (CT)
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Scott, David
     Sires
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1723

  Messrs. ALEXANDER, COSTELLO, DUNCAN of South Carolina, REHBERG, 
COURTNEY and PEARCE changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. BRADY of Texas, Ms. SEWELL, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California, 
Mr. CONYERS, Ms. WATERS, Ms. McCOLLUM and Ms. PINGREE of Maine changed 
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 184, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''

[[Page H2180]]

           Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan

  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Chaffetz). The unfinished business is the 
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) on which further proceedings were postponed 
and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 412, 
noes 0, not voting 19, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 185]

                               AYES--412

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--19

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Clarke (NY)
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Johnson (GA)
     Landry
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Schrader
     Sires
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1727

  Mr. CUMMINGS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall No. 185, I was away from the 
Capitol due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been 
present, I would have voted ``aye.''


                 Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Quayle

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona 
(Mr. Quayle) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 410, 
noes 3, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 186]

                               AYES--410

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta

[[Page H2181]]


     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                                NOES--3

     Gohmert
     Lofgren, Zoe
     McClintock

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Johnson (GA)
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Schrader
     Sires
     Slaughter
     Sullivan

                              {time}  1731

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 186, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


                    Amendment No. 7 Offered by Amash

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
(Mr. Amash) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 415, 
noes 0, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 187]

                               AYES--415

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Johnson (GA)
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Sires
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1736

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 187, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


                Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) on which further proceedings were postponed and 
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.

[[Page H2182]]

                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 416, 
noes 0, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 188]

                               AYES--416

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Sires
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1740

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 188, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


               Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia 
(Mr. Goodlatte) on which further proceedings were postponed and on 
which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414, 
noes 1, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 189]

                               AYES--414

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano

[[Page H2183]]


     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                                NOES--1

       
     Lofgren, Zoe
       

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Akin
     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Sires
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1744

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 189, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''


                Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney

  The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South 
Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) on which further proceedings were postponed and 
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 413, 
noes 3, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 190]

                               AYES--413

     Ackerman
     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amash
     Amodei
     Andrews
     Austria
     Baca
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baldwin
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Bass (NH)
     Becerra
     Benishek
     Berg
     Berkley
     Berman
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonamici
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (PA)
     Brady (TX)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cohen
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Deutch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Doggett
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Fudge
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grijalva
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Heinrich
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Jenkins
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Jordan
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kelly
     Kildee
     Kind
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Kucinich
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lujan
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Lynch
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     McNerney
     Meehan
     Meeks
     Mica
     Michaud
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Olver
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pingree (ME)
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Polis
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Price (NC)
     Quayle
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Reyes
     Ribble
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Ryan (WI)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Scalise
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sessions
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Speier
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Sutton
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tierney
     Tipton
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Webster
     Welch
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (FL)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                                NOES--3

     Dingell
     Schrader
     Turner (NY)

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Sires
     Slaughter

                              {time}  1747

  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 190, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Woodall) having assumed the chair, Mr. Chaffetz, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3523) to 
provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber 
threat information between the intelligence community and cybersecurity 
entities, and for other purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution 
631, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted 
in the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.

[[Page H2184]]

  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment 
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
  If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                           Motion to Recommit

  Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. PERLMUTTER. In its current form, I am.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Perlmutter moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 3523, to 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with 
     instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith 
     with the following amendments:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

     SEC. 3. PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF INTERNET PASSWORDS AND THE 
                   CREATIVITY OF THE INTERNET.

       Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
     shall be construed to--
       (1) permit an employer, a prospective employer, or the 
     Federal Government to require the disclosure of a 
     confidential password for a social networking website or a 
     personal account of an employee or job applicant without a 
     court order; or
       (2) permit the Federal Government to establish a mechanism 
     to control United States citizens' access to and use of the 
     Internet through the creation of a national Internet firewall 
     similar to the ``Great Internet Firewall of China'', as 
     determined by the Director of the National Intelligence.
       Page 12, line 22, strike ``and''.
       Page 12, line 25, strike the period and insert a semicolon.
       Page 12, after line 25, insert the following:
       ``(G) the number of Americans who have--
       ``(i) been required by employers, prospective employers, or 
     the Federal Government to release confidential passwords for 
     social networking websites; and
       ``(ii) had personal information released to the Federal 
     Government under this section or obtained in connection with 
     a cybersecurity breach; and
       ``(H) the impact of the information that has been released 
     or obtained as referred to in subparagraph (G) on privacy, 
     electronic commerce, Internet usage, and online content.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Colorado is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Speaker, the House has heard this before. It's 
very simple, sweet and direct, and I will take a moment and just read 
it so that everybody has a chance to understand it again. What we're 
doing is avoiding and prohibiting an employer, as a condition of 
employment, from demanding a confidential Facebook password--Twitter, 
Tumblr--or any social media of the like. It reads this way:

       Nothing in this act or the amendments made by this act 
     shall be construed to permit an employer, a prospective 
     employer, or the Federal Government to require the disclosure 
     of a confidential password for a social networking Web site 
     or a personal account of an employee or job applicant without 
     a court order; or permit the Federal Government to establish 
     a mechanism to control United States citizens' access to and 
     use of the Internet through the creation of a national 
     Internet firewall, similar to the ``Great Internet Firewall 
     of China'', as determined by the Director of National 
     Intelligence.

  So what this amendment does is two things. It is the final amendment 
to this bill. There are no more amendments to this bill. I know some 
people voted against this amendment when it was brought up a couple of 
weeks ago; and for those of you who regret voting against it, you're 
going to get a chance to correct that vote. This is something I've been 
working on with Mr. Heinrich and Mr. McHenry. It just says we're not 
going to allow as a condition of employment the requirement of a 
Facebook password or the like. Now, there is a reason for this.
  One, there is all sorts of personal information that I may have or 
that somebody else may have with respect to Facebook or Twitter or 
LinkedIn, whatever it might be; and they're entitled to have an 
expectation of privacy, a sense that their freedom of speech--their 
freedom to peaceably assemble, in effect--is not violated. So that's 
the first reason.
  The second reason is if an employer or the Federal Government poses 
as somebody, by having their Facebook passwords, then they can 
impersonate; they can become imposters. It is a two-way exchange of 
information so that somebody who is completely unrelated to the 
employment now is communicating with an impostor. That's another reason 
for this.
  The third reason is for the employers, themselves, to avoid liability 
by learning information that may then cause them to take actions that 
would violate a protected group. So there are at least three good 
reasons to do this.
  We have precedent in our law, and it is the Employee Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988. We said we're not going to allow as a condition 
of employment the use of lie detectors. You can use background checks, 
and you can use references. There are plenty of vehicles by which to 
check out somebody's employment references; but we're not going to 
allow lie detectors, and we should not allow that the Facebook 
passwords be given up as a condition of employment. So we have 
precedent in the law. We don't allow polygraphs or lie detectors as a 
condition of employment. Let's use what we already have--background 
checks, references, et cetera.
  The second piece of this is that we will not allow the command and 
control of the Internet or access to the Internet by the United States 
Government, saying that which is similar: that we want to avoid what 
has happened in China, that we want to avoid what has happened in Iran. 
We don't want the Internet taken down and our access, individuals' 
access, to the Internet broken.
  So there are two pieces to this. One is not allowing the demand of a 
confidential password and not allowing the government to have the 
command and control and the ability to take down the Internet, an 
action similar to what we've seen in other countries.
  This is a very simple amendment. It's very straightforward. We've had 
a lot of amendments that have garnered the support of virtually every 
Member of this House. This should be one of those. This is the final 
amendment. I would hope that we would uphold the Constitution by 
passing this amendment, as well as by making sure that the Internet is 
available to anyone who wants to use it at any time.
  With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Today, 300,000 times somebody will be trying 
to get into our credit card companies--300,000 times, one company. In 
just the last few years, just in defense contractors, foreign nation-
states have stolen more intellectual property, which will end up 
protecting this country, equivalent to 50 times the print collection of 
our U.S. Library of Congress. Anonymous is attacking businesses, and 
today attacked Wall Street because they're anti-capitalists. There are 
people out there today who are literally robbing the future of America 
for our jobs, our prosperity, and our economic prowess in the world; 
and they're doing it by design.
  A year ago, we set out to try to do something small. If we have some 
bad software--some bad, malicious virus information--shouldn't we be 
obligated to share that with the private sector so they can protect 
themselves? Absolutely.
  If we don't do this, a nation-state like China has geared up its 
military and intelligence services for the very purpose of economically 
wounding the United States--by draining our intellectual property dry. 
They have done it by stealing pesticide formulas. They have done it by 
stealing pharmaceutical formulas. They have done it by stealing 
intellectual property when it relates to military hardware and then 
have copied it, and it has cost us a tremendous amount of more money to 
have had to go back and redesign it.

                              {time}  1800

  So we can play games. We can do silly things. This amendment actually 
does nothing to protect a person's private password at home. Nothing. 
Not one thing. But it is serving to try to obfuscate and maybe send it 
back to committee and come back.

[[Page H2185]]

  This has been a bipartisan bill, and I can't tell you how 
disappointing this amendment is to me. I have worked with Mr. 
Ruppersberger and the members of this committee. I have worked with the 
privacy groups. We've worked with civil libertarians. They threw 
everything but the kitchen sink at us. By the way, this does nothing, 
or this would have been thrown at us, too. You know why? Because it 
doesn't do anything. I get it. Sounds great. You're going to run out 
and do some bad things with it.
  But this is our Nation's defense. This is the last bastion of things 
we need to do to protect this country. We've done it since 9/11. We did 
Homeland Security. We've done the Patriot Act. We've done other things 
that this body and the other body and the President of the United 
States signed to protect this country, as our Constitution tells us to 
do for the common defense of this great Nation.
  I will tell you something. We can have this debate. We can talk about 
a bill that does absolutely nothing to protect someone's private 
password at home, or we can get about the business of trying to give 
the private sector just a little bit of information to protect people's 
private information in the comfort of their homes, so that we can 
protect this Nation from a catastrophic attack.
  The director of the national security didn't say ``maybe,'' didn't 
say, ``could happen.'' They said it will happen.
  This is the one small thing we get to do to prepare for a whole bunch 
of folks out there that want to bring this Nation down.
  We ought to stand together today in a bipartisan way. We ought to 
reject all of the confusion and obfuscation and all of the things that 
they're saying about this bill that just are not true. We ought to 
stand here and say, We respected the fact that you kept the government 
stuff government, and the private stuff private, and you're not mixing 
it up, and you're not surveilling. You're doing none of those things. 
You're just sharing some pretty bad information so that they can apply 
it to their patches that happen on your computer every single day, 
thousands of times a day, to try to keep viruses off your computer, and 
that's it.
  We've spent a lot of time today trying to go in a different 
direction. People are upset that there aren't things in the bill. Okay. 
I mean, the Buffett rule isn't in the bill. I don't think that ought to 
get a veto threat either.
  This is where we are. This is that first small threat.
  I'm going to ask all of you to join us today. Reject this red 
herring, this obfuscation, and stand with America. They need it. There 
are 3 million businesses with all of the associations telling us, 
Please, give us that classified secret malware information that your 
government has so we can protect the people we have as customers and 
clients. They're begging for it because they're getting killed every 
single day. It's happening right this second.
  This is our chance to stand up. This was a bipartisan effort. If you 
really believe in bipartisanship, if you believe that's the future of 
this Chamber, and that's the dignity of the very Founding Fathers that 
gave it to us, then today is the day to prove it.
  Reject this amendment, stand for America. Support this bill.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clauses 8 and 9 of rule XX, this 
15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 5-minute 
votes on passage of H.R. 3523, if ordered; and suspension of the rules 
with regard to H.R. 2050, if ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 183, 
nays 233, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 191]

                               YEAS--183

     Ackerman
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bass (CA)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Bonamici
     Boren
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown (FL)
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Carson (IN)
     Castor (FL)
     Chandler
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Connolly (VA)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Critz
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Deutch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly (IN)
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Frank (MA)
     Fudge
     Garamendi
     Gonzalez
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hanabusa
     Hastings (FL)
     Heinrich
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hochul
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kildee
     Kind
     Kissell
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lujan
     Lynch
     Markey
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Moran
     Murphy (CT)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Peterson
     Pingree (ME)
     Polis
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Ross (AR)
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schrader
     Schwartz
     Scott (VA)
     Scott, David
     Serrano
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Smith (WA)
     Speier
     Stark
     Sutton
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Tonko
     Towns
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--233

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Amash
     Amodei
     Austria
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Bartlett
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (NH)
     Benishek
     Berg
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Brooks
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cole
     Conaway
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Culberson
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Dold
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers
     Emerson
     Farenthold
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Fleming
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gibson
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gohmert
     Goodlatte
     Gosar
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Hall
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Kelly
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kline
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Landry
     Lankford
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lewis (CA)
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul
     McClintock
     McCotter
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meehan
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Palazzo
     Paulsen
     Pearce
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Posey
     Price (GA)
     Quayle
     Reed
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rigell
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (FL)
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ryan (WI)
     Scalise
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schweikert
     Scott (SC)
     Scott, Austin
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Southerland
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden
     Walsh (IL)
     Webster
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Sires
     Slaughter

[[Page H2186]]



                              {time}  1823

  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall 191, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``aye.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 248, 
noes 168, not voting 15, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 192]

                               AYES--248

     Adams
     Aderholt
     Alexander
     Altmire
     Amodei
     Austria
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Barletta
     Barrow
     Bartlett
     Bass (NH)
     Benishek
     Berg
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Black
     Blackburn
     Bonner
     Bono Mack
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Buchanan
     Buerkle
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Butterfield
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Cantor
     Capito
     Cardoza
     Carney
     Carter
     Cassidy
     Castor (FL)
     Chabot
     Chaffetz
     Chandler
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coffman (CO)
     Cole
     Conaway
     Connolly (VA)
     Cooper
     Costa
     Cravaack
     Crawford
     Crenshaw
     Critz
     Cuellar
     Culberson
     Denham
     Dent
     DesJarlais
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dold
     Donnelly (IN)
     Dreier
     Duffy
     Duncan (SC)
     Duncan (TN)
     Ellmers
     Fincher
     Fitzpatrick
     Flake
     Fleischmann
     Flores
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garamendi
     Gardner
     Garrett
     Gerlach
     Gibbs
     Gingrey (GA)
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Gowdy
     Granger
     Graves (GA)
     Graves (MO)
     Griffin (AR)
     Griffith (VA)
     Grimm
     Guinta
     Guthrie
     Hanabusa
     Hanna
     Harper
     Harris
     Hartzler
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Heck
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Herrera Beutler
     Hochul
     Huelskamp
     Huizenga (MI)
     Hultgren
     Hunter
     Hurt
     Israel
     Issa
     Jenkins
     Johnson (OH)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jordan
     Kelly
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kinzinger (IL)
     Kissell
     Kline
     Labrador
     Lamborn
     Lance
     Langevin
     Lankford
     Larsen (WA)
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Latta
     Lewis (CA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Long
     Lucas
     Luetkemeyer
     Lummis
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Manzullo
     Matheson
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCaul
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McKinley
     McMorris Rodgers
     Meehan
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran
     Mulvaney
     Murphy (PA)
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Noem
     Nugent
     Nunes
     Nunnelee
     Olson
     Owens
     Palazzo
     Paulsen
     Peterson
     Petri
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe (TX)
     Pompeo
     Price (GA)
     Quayle
     Reed
     Reichert
     Renacci
     Ribble
     Rivera
     Roby
     Roe (TN)
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rokita
     Rooney
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Ross (AR)
     Ross (FL)
     Royce
     Runyan
     Ruppersberger
     Ryan (WI)
     Scalise
     Schilling
     Schmidt
     Schock
     Schrader
     Scott (SC)
     Scott, Austin
     Scott, David
     Sessions
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Southerland
     Stearns
     Stivers
     Stutzman
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (PA)
     Thornberry
     Tiberi
     Tipton
     Towns
     Turner (NY)
     Turner (OH)
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden
     Webster
     West
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wilson (SC)
     Wittman
     Wolf
     Womack
     Woodall
     Yoder
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Young (IN)

                               NOES--168

     Ackerman
     Akin
     Amash
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baldwin
     Barton (TX)
     Bass (CA)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Bishop (UT)
     Bonamici
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brooks
     Brown (FL)
     Capps
     Capuano
     Carnahan
     Carson (IN)
     Chu
     Cicilline
     Clarke (MI)
     Clarke (NY)
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Costello
     Courtney
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Deutch
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Emerson
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Farenthold
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fleming
     Frank (MA)
     Fudge
     Gibson
     Gohmert
     Gosar
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hahn
     Hall
     Hastings (FL)
     Heinrich
     Higgins
     Himes
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Holt
     Honda
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson Lee (TX)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Keating
     Kildee
     Kind
     Kucinich
     Landry
     Larson (CT)
     Lee (CA)
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lujan
     Lynch
     Mack
     Marchant
     Markey
     Matsui
     McClintock
     McCollum
     McCotter
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McNerney
     Meeks
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Moore
     Murphy (CT)
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Olver
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor (AZ)
     Pearce
     Pelosi
     Perlmutter
     Peters
     Pingree (ME)
     Polis
     Posey
     Price (NC)
     Quigley
     Rahall
     Rehberg
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Richmond
     Rigell
     Rohrabacher
     Rothman (NJ)
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Schweikert
     Scott (VA)
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sewell
     Sherman
     Simpson
     Speier
     Stark
     Sutton
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Tonko
     Tsongas
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walsh (IL)
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Welch
     Wilson (FL)
     Woolsey
     Yarmuth

                             NOT VOTING--15

     Blumenauer
     Bucshon
     Canseco
     Davis (KY)
     Filner
     Hirono
     Holden
     Maloney
     Marino
     McHenry
     Paul
     Pence
     Rangel
     Sires
     Slaughter


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes 
remaining.

                              {time}  1831

  Mr. HOYER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. TIPTON changed his vote from ``no'' to aye.''
  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall 192, I was away from the Capitol 
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I 
would have voted ``no.''


                          personal explanation

  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained and missed 
rollcall vote Nos. 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 
and 192. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on rollcall 
vote Nos. 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, and 191. I would have 
voted ``no'' on rollcall vote Nos. 182, 183, and 192.

                          ____________________