country. Tell them, put country before party. Don’t put China’s economy before the United States’

ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS

(Mr. DOLD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOLD. Mr. Speaker, as a small business owner, I know that it’s tough to get access to capital. If a company doesn’t have the resources it needs to grow and expand, then it’s virtually impossible to hire new workers.

Yesterday, the Financial Services Committee had a hearing where we examined a bipartisan bill, H.R. 3606, which would make it easier for companies to access capital markets and ease the overwhelming regulations that these young businesses encounter. This is exactly the type of bill that both sides can agree on, and I certainly urge my colleagues to support it.

Without a doubt, by allowing companies access to the markets, we give them the opportunity to succeed, and, in turn, they will have the opportunity to create additional jobs, which is what we desperately need.

Bill after bill has been passed out of this body and gone over to the Senate. Over two dozen bills wait on the Senate, of which each and every one of them are bipartisan and would create additional jobs. With an unemployment rate of over 8 percent for the past 34 months and at least 9 percent for 28 of those months, it’s about time that we move forward on the jobs package that we’re trying to push in the House. We need to step up and get America back to work.

PAYROLL TAX HOLIDAY

(Mr. TONKO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TONKO. Mr. Speaker, as we come to the close of yet another calendar year, and as we move well into the Federal fiscal year, much work remains to be done for America’s hardworking middle class families, the working families of this country that make our economy work. We need to make certain that we respond with the extension of the payroll tax holiday. This House knows that that is important business.

We know that the President presented a plan before Congress that would ask for a surcharge on the most upper income strata in our country to bring about fundamental fairness and to address social and economic justice. We know that the hardworking middle class has taken it on the chin with tax cuts of a decade and a half ago that have really caused hardship with the recession in this country where we lost 8.2 million jobs.

We could go forward and do the right thing. We can extend that payroll tax holiday and pay for it in a meaningful way, in a balanced way. We can then go forward with investments that middle class America truly deserves and requires.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. DOLD). Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, the Chair will postpone further proceedings today on motions to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote incurs objection under clause 6 of rule XX.

Record votes on postponed questions will be taken later.

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and confer in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 1892) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:

Senate amendment:

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE, TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the “Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE III—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Annual report on hiring of National Security Education Program participants.
Sec. 304. Enhancement of authority for flexible personnel management among the elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Preparation of nuclear proliferation assessment statements.
Sec. 306. Cost estimates.
Sec. 307. Use of intelligence relating to terrorism.
Sec. 308. Notification of transfer of a detainee held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Sec. 309. Enhanced procurement authority to manage supply chain risk.
Sec. 310. Burial allowance.
Sec. 311. Modification of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 312. Review of strategic and competitive analysis conducted by the intelligence community.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Intelligence community assistance to counter drug trafficking organizations using public lands.
Sec. 402. Application of certain financial reporting requirements to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 404. Clarification of status of Chief Information Officer in the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 405. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies within Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 411. Acceptance of gifts.
Sec. 412. Foreign language proficiency requirements for Central Intelligence Agency officers.
Sec. 413. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 414. Creating an official record of the Osama bin Laden operation.

Subtitle C—National Security Agency

Sec. 421. Additional authorities for National Security Agency security personnel.

Subtitle D—Other Elements

Sec. 431. Codification of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security as element of the intelligence community.
Sec. 432. Federal Bureau of Investigation participation in the Department of Justice leak bank.
Sec. 433. Accounts and transfer authority for appropriations and other amounts for intelligence elements of the Department of Defense.

TITLE V—OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 501. Report on airspace restrictions for use of unmanned aerial vehicles along the border of the United States and Mexico.
Sec. 502. Sense of Congress regarding integration of fusion centers.
Sec. 503. Strategy to counter improvised explosive devices.
Sec. 504. Sense of Congress regarding the priority of railway transportation security.

Sec. 505. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 506. Technical amendments to title 18, United States Code.
Sec. 507. Budgetary effects.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.—The term “congressional intelligence committees” means—

(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “intelligence community” has the meaning given
that term in section 3(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)).

TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

Funds are hereby appropriated to be appropriated for fiscal year 2012 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:

(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS AND PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2012, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3586 and House Report 112-575.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AVAILABILITY TO COMMITTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTelligence ACTIVITY.—The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the President.

(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.

(3) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The President shall not disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule except—

(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 415c);
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.

(c) USE OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES IN THE CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—In addition to any other purpose authorized by law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the head of any element of the Intelligence Community may use funds authorized in this Act to support research or other intelligence-related activities described in the classified annex accompanying this Act.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) AUTHORITY FOR INCREASES.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent positions for fiscal year 2012 authorized by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) only if the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to carry out the intelligence functions of such element.

(b) LIMITS ON DISCLOSURE.—The Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel in such element equal to the number of additional full-time permanent personnel authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3586, including any exemption from such personnel levels, of employment or assignment—

(1) in a support program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) in a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) in details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time training.

(d) NOTICE TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITY.—The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described in subsection (a) or (b).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2012 the sum of $767,393,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2012.

(b) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—The elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the employment of additional full-time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2012. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.

(c) CLASSIFIED AUTHORIZATIONS.—

(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2012 referred to in section 102(a), there are authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2012 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and development shall remain available until September 30, 2012.

(2) AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL LEVELS.—In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) there are authorized for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2012 such additional personnel as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 305. UPDATES OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR NOTIFICATION.—The President shall submit to Congress, in classified form, at least 30 days prior to the transfer or release of an individual detained at Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as of June 24, 2009, to the country of such individual’s nationality or last habitual residence or to any other foreign country or to a freely associated State the following information:

(1) The name of the individual to be transferred or released.
(2) The country or the freely associated State to which such individual is to be transferred or released.
(3) The terms of any agreement with the country or the freely associated State for the acceptance of such individual, including the amount of any financial assistance related to such agreement.
(4) The agencies or departments of the United States responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in paragraph (3) is carried out.

(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "freely associated State" means a State with which the United States has entered into an agreement providing for the mutual exchange of intelligence data and for cooperation in the conduct of intelligence and intelligence-related activities.

(c) CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede or otherwise affect the following provisions of law:

(2) Section 8120 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012.

SEC. 306. COST ESTIMATES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 506A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a–1) is amended—

(1) by inserting (A) after (2), and (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagaphs:

(B) For major system acquisitions requiring a service or capability from another acquisition or program to deliver the end-to-end functionality for the intelligence community end users, independent cost estimates shall include, to the maximum extent practicable, all estimated costs across all pertinent elements of the intelligence community. For collection programs, such cost estimates shall include the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and processing, including, but not limited to, the life cycle of the program. If such costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage are included in the cost estimate for any other major system that is a part of the intelligence community, the independent cost estimate shall identify and annotate such costs for such other elements accordingly; and

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) by inserting (A) after (2); and

(B) in paragraph (5), by striking such paragraph and inserting "(5) the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and processing, including, but not limited to, the life cycle of the program."

(b) In accordance with subsection (a)(2)(B), each independent cost estimate shall include all costs required across elements of the intelligence community to develop, acquire, procure, operate, and sustain the system to provide the end-to-end intelligence functionality of the system, including—

(i) for collection programs, the cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data processing, storing, and processing, including, but not limited to, the life cycle of the program; and

(ii) costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage scheduled to be executed in other elements of the intelligence community other than an element within the intelligence community described in paragraph (3) is carried out.

(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "covered agency" means any of the following:

(1) any appropriate consultation with procurement or other relevant officials of the covered agency.

(d) CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to supersede or otherwise affect the following provisions of law:

(1) Section 506I of such Act, as added by section 311 of title 41, United States Code, for the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems.

(e) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK.—The term "supply chain risk" means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted functionality, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system or a covered item of supply in section 4106(d)(3) of title 41, United States Code, or a covered procurement action; and

(f) PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY.—The term "covered procurement action" means any of the following actions, if the action takes place in the course of conducting a covered procurement:

(A) The exclusion of a source that fails to meet qualifications established in accordance with the requirements of section 3311 of title 41, United States Code, for the purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems.

(B) The exclusion of a source that fails to meet an acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the issuance of a task or delivery order.

(C) The decision to withhold payment for a contractor for a subcontractor with a particular source or to direct a contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular source from consideration for a subcontract under the contract.

(D) The head of a covered agency that is conducting intelligence and intelligence-related activities—

(i) carry out a covered procurement action;

(ii) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in whole or in part, the disclosure of information relating to the basis for carrying out a covered procurement or covered procurement action involving the covered agency;

(iii) make a determination in writing, which may be in classified form, that—

(1) the use of the authority in subsection (b)(1) is necessary to protect national security by reducing supply chain risk;

(2) less intrusive measures are not reasonably available to reduce such supply chain risk; and

(C) in a case where the head of the covered agency makes a determination under subsection (b)(2), the risk to national security due to the disclosure of such information.
outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such information;
(3) notifying the Director of National Intelligence that there is a significant supply chain risk to the system concerned, unless the head of the covered agency making the determination is the Director of National Intelligence; and
(4) providing a notice, which may be in classified form, of the determination made under paragraph (2) to the congressional intelligence committees that includes a summary of the basis for the determination, including a discussion of less intrusive measures that were considered and why they were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk.

(d) ELIGIBILITY—The head of a covered agency may not delegate the authority provided in subsection (b) or the responsibility to make a determination under subsection (c) to an official below the level of the service acquisition executive for the agency concerned.

(e) SAVINGS—The authority under this section is in addition to any other authority under any other provision of law. The authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or affect the exercise of any other provision of law.

(f) EFFECTIVE DATE—The requirements of this section apply on the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to contracts that are awarded on or after such date.

(g) D ELEGATION.—The head of a covered agency provided in this section shall expire on the date that section 806 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–388; 10 U.S.C. 2094 note) expires.

SEC. 310. BURIAL ALLOWANCE.

(a) AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE.—
   (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of an agency or department determination element of the intelligence community may pay to the estate of a decedent described in paragraph (2) a burial allowance at the request of a representative of such estate, as determined in accordance with the laws of a State.
   (2) DESCRIPTION.—A decedent described in this paragraph is an individual—
      (A) who served as a civilian officer or employee of such an agency or department;
      (B) who died as a result of an injury incurred during such service; and
      (C) whose death—
         (i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities; or
         (ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity having a substantial element of risk.

(b) USE OF BURIAL ALLOWANCE.—A burial allowance paid under subsection (a) may be used to reimburse such estate for burial expenses, including recovery, mortuary, funeral, or memorial service, cremation, burial costs, and costs of transportation by common carrier to the place selected for final disposition of the decedent.

(c) AMOUNT OF BURIAL ALLOWANCE: RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PROVISIONS.—A burial allowance paid under subsection (a) shall be—
   (1) in an amount not greater than—
      (A) the maximum reimbursable amount allowed under Department of Defense Instruction 1344.68 or successor instruction, plus
      (B) the actual costs of transportation referred to in subsection (b); and
   (2) in addition to any other benefit permitted under any other provision of law, including funds that may be expended as specified in the General Provisions section of the classified annex accompanying this Act.

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report on the feasibility of implementing legislation to provide for burial allowances at a level which adequately addresses the cost of burial expenses and provides for equitable treatment when an officer or employee of a Federal agency or department dies as a result of an injury sustained in the performance of duty.

SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

(a) INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2004 (50 U.S.C. 403–1(b)) is amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).

(b) INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003.—Section 904(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 462c(d)(1)) is amended by striking “on an annual basis”.

(c) INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995.—Section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 217b) is amended—
   (1) by striking subsection (b); and
   (2) in subsection (c), by striking “reports referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b)” and inserting “report referred to in subsection (a)”.

(d) REPORT ON TEMPORARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS FOR CRITICAL LANGUAGE TRAINING—Paragraph (3)(D) of section 102A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–1(e)), as amended by section 306 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–259; 124 Stat. 2661), is amended by striking “The” and inserting “For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the”.

SEC. 312. REVIEW OF STRATEGIC AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS CONDUCTED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

(a) REVIEW.—The Director of National Intelligence shall direct the Director’s Senior Advisory Group to conduct a comprehensive review of the strategic and competitive analysis of international terrorism and homeland security conducted by elements of the intelligence community during the 12 month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 15 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees—
   (1) a report on the results of the review conducted under subsection (a); and
   (2) any advice recommended by the Director to implement the recommendations, if any, of the Director’s Senior Advisory Group based on such results.

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS USING ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE.

(a) CONSULTATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall consult with the heads of the Federal land management agencies on the appropriate actions the intelligence community shall take to assist such agencies to combat the threat from covered entities that are currently or have previously used public lands in the United States to further the operations of such entities.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report on the results of the consultation under subsection (a). Such report shall include—
   (1) an assessment of the intelligence community’s efforts to identify covered entities, including any collection gaps or insufficiencies; and
   (2) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence community to assist Federal land management agencies in identifying and protecting public lands from illegal drug growers and other activities of covered entities, including through the sharing of intelligence information.

(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
   (1) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘‘covered entity’’ means an international drug trafficking organization or other actor involved in drug trafficking generally.
   (2) FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCY.—The term ‘‘Federal land management agency’’ includes—
      (A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture;
      (B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior;
      (C) the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior;
      (D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior; and
      (E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior.
   (3) PUBLIC LANDS.—The term ‘‘public lands’’ means land under the jurisdiction of a Federal land management agency.

SEC. 402. APPLICATION OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the requirements of section 3515 of title 31, United States Code, to submit an audited financial statement shall not apply to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence if the Director of National Intelligence determines and notifies Congress that audited financial statements for such years for such Office cannot be produced on a cost-effective basis.

SEC. 403. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3h) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
   (f) INFORMATION ON WEBSITE.—(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including methods to contact the Inspector General.
   (2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

SEC. 404. CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER IN THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to the Chief Information Officer, Small Business Administration the following new item:
   (o) INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

Section 193 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3h) is amended—
   (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
   (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection:
      (c) TEMPORARY FILLING OF VACANCIES.—With respect to filling temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (other than that of the Director of National Intelligence), section 335(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, may be applied—
         (A) by substituting ‘‘an element of the intelligence community’’ for such term as that term is defined in
section 3(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)), for ‘‘such Executive agency’’; and
(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting the ‘‘Director of the Central Intelligence Agency’’ for ‘‘such agency’’.

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 411. ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS.

Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended—
(1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(a)’’; and
(2) by striking the second and third sentences and inserting the following:
‘‘(2) Any gift accepted under this section (and any income produced by any such gift)—
(A) may be used only for—
(i) artistic display;
(ii) purposes relating to the general welfare, education, or recreation of employees or dependents of employees of the Agency or for similar purposes; or
(iii) purposes relating to the welfare, education, or recreation of an individual described in paragraph (3); and
(B) under no circumstances may such a gift (or any income produced by any such gift) be used for operational purposes.

(3) An individual described in this paragraph is an individual who—
(A) is an employee or a former employee of the Agency who suffered injury or illness while employed by the Agency that—
(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities; or
(ii) occurred under other circumstances determined by the Director to be analogous to the circumstances described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) is a family member of such an employee or former employee; or
(C) is a surviving family member of an employee of the Agency who died in circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A).

(4) The Director may not accept any gift under this section that is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure not to be met from the gift itself or from income produced by the gift unless such expenditure has been authorized by law.

(5) The Director may, in the Director’s discretion, determine that an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3) may accept a gift for the purposes described in paragraph (2)(A)(iii).’’;

SEC. 412. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS.

(a) In General.—Section 104a(g) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403a-4a(g)) is amended—
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)—
(i) by inserting ‘‘in the Directorate of Intelligence service or the National Clandestine Service career service’’ after ‘‘an individual’’;
(ii) by inserting ‘‘or promoted’’ after ‘‘appointed’’;
(iii) by striking ‘‘individual’’— and inserting ‘‘individual has been certified as having a professional speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level using such other indicators of proficiency as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate.’’;
(2) by striking subparagaphs (A) and (B); and
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘position or category of positions’’ both places that term appears and inserting ‘‘position, category of positions, or occupation’’.

SEC. 413. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.

Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
‘‘(h) INFORMATION ON WEBSITE.—(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the Agency’s publicly accessible website information relating to the Office of the Inspector General including methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General.’’

SEC. 414. CREATING AN OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE OSAMA BIN LADEN OPERATION.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
(2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat to the United States and the international community.
(3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001, the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them, including the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in countries around the world including the 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the mass transit system in London, England.
(4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in countries around the world including the 2004 attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the mass transit system in London, England.
(5) Following the May 1, 2011, terrorist attacks, the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al Qaeda, deny the safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned areas along the Pakistan border, and bring Osama bin Laden to justice.
(6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as ‘‘the central front in our enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism’’.
(7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces and the intelligence community prompted the Director of National Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, ‘‘Never have I seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden.’’

(10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world, terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national security.
(11) President Obama said, ‘‘For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda’s leader and inspiration in countries around the world. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our Nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda.’’
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the best of the intelligence community’s capabilities and teamwork;
(2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this event as a defining point in the history of the United States;
(3) it is vitally important that the United States memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that future generations will have an official record of the events that transpired before, during, and as a result of the operation; and
(4) preserving this history now will allow the United States to have an accurate account of the events while those that participated in the events are still serving in the community.
(c) REPORT ON THE OPERATION THAT KILLED OSAMA BIN LADEN.—Not later than 90 days after the completion of the report being prepared under section 12 of the Central Intelligence Act of 2004, the report shall include a record or account of the events that led to the death of Osama bin Laden, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit such report to the congressional intelligence committees.
(d) PRESERVATION OF RECORDS.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall preserve records, including intelligence information and assessments, used to generate the report described in subsection (c).
SEC. 415. RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(a) STUDY.—The Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall carry out a study of the personnel authorized and available personnel benefits of the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such study shall include:

(1) an identification of any barriers or disincentives to the recruitment or retention of experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency; and

(2) a comparison of the personnel authorities of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with personnel authorities of Inspectors General of other agencies and departments of the United States, including a comparison of the benefits available to experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency with similar benefits available within the offices of Inspectors General of such other agencies or departments.

(b) RECOMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives—

(1) a report on the results of the study conducted under subsection (a); and

(2) any recommendations for legislative action based on such report.

(c) FUNDING.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall transfer to the Inspector General of the Office of Personnel Management such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section.

Subtitle C—National Security Agency

SEC. 411. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SECURITY PERSONNEL.

(a) AUTHORITY TO TRANSPORT APPREHENDED PERSONS.—Paragraph (5) of section 11(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows:—

“(5) Agency personnel authorized by the Director under paragraph (1) may transport such individual to the custody of law enforcement officials. Such transportation may be provided only to make a transfer of custody at a location within 30 miles of the premises described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).”.

(b) CONFIRMING AMENDMENT RELATING TO TORT LIABILITY.—Paragraph (1) of section 11(d) of the National Security Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end and inserting “; or”; and

(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting “; or”;

(c) AUTHORITY TO MAINTAIN AND USE SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS.—Section 11(4)(K) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402a(4)(K)) is amended to read as follows:

“(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.”.

SEC. 432. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PARTICIPATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE.

Subsection (b) of section 6372 of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may, whenever the Director determines to be in the national interest, transfer to the Department of Justice under this subchapter—

(A) personnel and any law enforcement equipment and other property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(B) any recommendations for legislative action.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may, whenever the Director determines to be in the national interest, transfer to the Department of Justice under this subchapter—

(A) personnel and any law enforcement equipment and other property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and

(B) any recommendations for legislative action.

SEC. 501. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

(a) STRATEGY.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall establish a coordinated strategy utilizing all available personnel and material resources for intelligence collection and analysis to identify and counter network activity and operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan related to the development and use of improvised explosive devices.

(2) CONTENTS.—The strategy established under paragraph (1) shall identify—

(A) the networks involved in the procurement and material transfer of improvised explosive devices and any other materials relevant to improvised explosive device construction from factories and vendors in Pakistan into Afghanistan;
This is a good day for the United States, certainly a good day for the men and women who serve so proudly in our intelligence services that work tirelessly to keep America safe. This is a good day to bring the fiscal year 2012 intelligence authorization bill to the floor today. This will be our second intelligence authorization bill since January when Chairman Rogers and my ranking member took his position as well for the House Intelligence Committee, and it will be the 29th bill in our committee’s history.

This bill is a vital tool for congressional oversight of the intelligence community’s classified activities and is critical to ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to do their important work.

Passing an annual intelligence authorization bill is vital to keeping the laws governing our intelligence operations up to date. The FY12 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and provides for the development of future capabilities, all while achieving significant savings.

The U.S. intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from many threats that we face today. Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring continued success in the intelligence community.

The intelligence authorization bill funds U.S. intelligence activities spanning 17 separate agencies. This funding totaled roughly $80 billion in fiscal year 2010. The current challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come with an intelligence authorization bill.

The bill’s comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly programs. This bill funds the requirements of the men and women of the intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom directly support the war zones or are engaged in other dangerous operations to keep America and Americans safe.

It provides oversight and authorization for critical intelligence activities, including the global counterterrorism operations that took out Osama bin Laden; cyberdefense by the National Security Agency; countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global monitoring of foreign militaries and weapons tests; research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence agencies’ technological edge, including work on code breaking and spy satellites.

This has been a strategy for a tough fiscal climate. After passage of the Budget Control Act, the committee re-vamped the bill it reported out of committee back in May to double its budget savings. As a result, the bill is significantly below the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012 and further still below the levels authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2011. These savings—and this is important, Mr. Speaker—were achieved without impacting the intelligence community’s important mission, as the cuts of the 1990s did.

The bottom line is that this bipartisan bill preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of our country’s intelligence work requires that the congressional intelligence committees conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the American people. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however, without an annual intelligence authorization bill. And I want to thank both of the staffs for the Republicans and the Democrats, and the members from both the Republicans and Democrats on this committee for coming together in this way on the important issue of national security. And I thank my friend, DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, the ranking member, for his leadership in getting us not to one, but to two authorization bills within just 10 months. And that’s no small accomplishment, as you might know, Mr. Speaker.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I rise today in favor of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012. When Chairman Rogers and I took over leadership of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we made a commitment to work together to ensure the intelligence community has the authorities it needs to effectively protect America. This intelligence authorization bill achieves this purpose. It gives our intelligence professionals critical resources, capabilities, and authorities.

When I first introduced the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2011 earlier this year, and now we can see the finish line for FY12.

For 5 years, there were no intelligence bills. There was a gap in oversight. When this bill is signed into law, it will be the third time in 3 years that the Intelligence Committee has passed an intel authorization act.

I strongly believe that passing the annual intelligence authorization bill is critical to national security. The Intelligence Committee wants to strengthen the intelligence community and give them the tools they need. However, it is also our job to conduct thorough, effective oversight and provide budgetary direction. This bill does that.

This bill makes smart choices. It trims and eliminates duplicative efforts wherever possible. We made careful decisions and were mindful to protect the current and future capabilities that protect our Nation. This bill aligns our resources with our current threats and makes important investments in space, satellites, and cyber.
This bill is even more important today with the 10th anniversary of 9/11 fresh in our minds. When it comes to terrorism, Osama bin Laden may be gone, but radical extremists still have the United States as a target.

Integrally the best defense against terrorism, and this bill makes our defense even stronger. This act is bipartisan and bicameral. The members of our Intelligence Committee work not as Democrats or Republicans, or as the House or Senate, but as Americans protecting our country. This bill is proof that Congress can work together to do good things. I fully support this bill and urge my colleagues to do the same.

And I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman Rogers for helping put this bill together.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished colleague from the State of California, Mr. THOMPSON.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012, which I introduced as a member of the Sub-committee on Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence. I am pleased that we were able to work together to bring a bipartisan, bicameral intelligence authorization bill to the Floor for the fourth year in a row. This is a testament to the hard work and leadership of our chairman, Mr. ROGERS, and ranking member, Mr. RUPPERSBERGER.

This bill will increase information sharing throughout the intelligence community. It includes a provision that is important to my home State of California, requiring the Director of National Intelligence to compile a threat assessment of foreign drug traffickers that are destroying our public lands here in the United States and causing unacceptable levels of violence because of their drug-growing operations in our public parks and forests.

This bill requires the DNI to share this information with Federal land management agencies like the Forest Service so that we can take back our public lands.

The bill also includes a provision that I introduced working with my friend and former committee colleague, Representative Anna Eshoo from California, requiring the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide a full report on the events surrounding the May 2011 Osama bin Laden raid. We are all aware of the intelligence community’s extraordinary efforts in carrying out this operation. We believe it’s important that the intelligence community document this operation in our permanent record as to how the operation was conducted and its importance on our counterterrorism efforts.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation will improve our national security, will enhance the capabilities of the intelligence community, and will make our Nation stronger.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think we really need to discuss the issue of cybersecurity. Cyberthreat is the one thing I think that keeps a lot of us on the Intelligence Committee up at night, how serious a threat it is to our country—we’re being attacked on a regular basis. And we as a country need to do what we have to do to go forward and deal with the issue of cyber.

Cyber poses one of the greatest threats to Americans from both an economic and national security perspective. We are losing millions of dollars because of cyberattacks. Our intellectual property is being stolen daily just as we speak is being attacked as we speak. We have seen countless examples of cutting-edge U.S. ideas being stolen and used for foreign products.

Cyber is also a major national security concern. We only have to look at the attack on South Korea’s banking system to realize the impact an attack can have on critical infrastructure. In South Korea, depositors lost access to their money and critical investment. Data was lost. An attack like this could happen to any country if we do not prepare and focus on the issue of cybersecurity. This bill strengthens U.S. cyberdefenses, again, a very important part of this bill.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I appreciate the gentleman bringing up the issue of cybersecurity, an incredibly important issue, one that this committee spends a great deal of time on. And the ranking member and myself and many members of this committee have co-authored a bill—and many Members of this House—to give that first important step to protecting Americans’ networks from both economic espionage and attack of those particular networks.

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I can’t think of anything that is more pressing than that particular issue, and I appreciate the gentleman’s working with us on that particular issue and being a leading voice here in Congress on that particular issue.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think another major issue that we’ve addressed in this bill is the issue of space. Years ago, when we went to the Moon, the whole country understood how important space was to the national defense of our country, and, in those days, everyone knew the names of the astronauts the same as they know the names of NFL quarterbacks today.

And yet, because of the fact that there hasn’t been as much in space, we as a country need to educate our constituents how important space is. We are the strongest country in the world, and one of the main reasons is because we are active and control the skies. Yet, right now, our space program has to be reinvigorated, and we have to refocus on that.

America, again, controls the world because we control the skies. Our investment in space keeps us safe. If we fail to make that investment, other countries will move ahead and edge us out. As an example, China is going to the Moon. They are spending time, research, and development to get to the Moon. Currently, we rely on the Russians to get to the international space station.

We must reinvest in the capabilities to give us the edge in space. We also need to think about different ways to get ahead. The bill breaks down barriers of our launch industry. All options need to be on the table as we talk about keeping America’s edge in space.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bill that I authored, working with my constituents how important space is. Years ago, when we went to the Moon, the whole country understood how important space was to the national defense of our country, and, in those days, everyone knew the names of the astronauts the same as they know the names of NFL quarterbacks today.

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I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

The ranking member brings up an important point about how complex this bill is and the level of threats and the degree of threat that this great country faces every day and really the importance of our investment in the technology that we need to keep ahead of enemy nations who seek to do us harm.

This bill embodies the fact that there will be members of the intelligence community whose job it is to find those Russian spies, illegal alien Russian case that was here—that are attempting to do bad things to the United States. The same with Chinese spies and Iranian spies, and the list is very long. And, unfortunately, it’s not a movie; it’s a spy novel; it’s not a fantasy. These things are real. They happen every day in the United States, and we are a target of those nation-states as they seek to steal our secrets.

This bill provides those protections, and that means that we have to invest in space. It means that we have to invest in our cybersecurity capability. It means that we have to invest in our HUMINT collection, meaning recruiting others who will help us identify and ferret out those who seek to do us harm.

It means that we have the challenges of trying to make sure that al Qaeda, who has expressed an interest in a radiological bomb, doesn’t get their hands on those types of materials. It means that we have to be careful about nuclear weapons being proliferated around the world by either force secruity or, worse yet, nation-states who encourage that type of activity.
It is no simple job being an intelligence officer or being in the intelligence community here in the United States. I think this bill is an accurate reflection on how we move to the next place, but also an important reminder of the importance of what they do, often in the shadows. The men and women who conduct this important work certainly deserve our support and all of the resources that we can muster to make sure that they're successful in their endeavors.

With that, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I think it's extremely important that we look back where we've come from since 9/11.

During 9/11, or before 9/11, we had agencies, intelligence agencies that just were not working together. There was not a teamwork approach. And, as a result of not working together, the attack of 9/11 occurred. The 9/11 Commission made numerous recommendations, and a lot of those recommendations were very positive and were implemented.

As a result of the bin Laden raid and bringing him to justice, I think it showed the teamwork that is needed, especially in the intelligence community, to work together, whether or not it's NSA, the NRO, it's the military, all those different agencies coming together and working as a team. And we would not have had the success that we had with bin Laden if it weren't for that teamwork approach.

I think now we have to learn about the teamwork approach and working together in Congress, also. We as Members of Congress need to do our job and come together and do the people's work, and the partisan politics has to stop.

What I'm leading to is that I think that this bill, and the previous bills that we've passed, and the leadership of Chairman ROGERS and the open minds of every member, whether Democrat or Republican, on the Intelligence Committee has allowed us to come together and have a bipartisan bill. And we would hope that what is happening here today in the bills that we've passed will be looked at as an example for the future.

Again, Chairman ROGERS, thank you for that commitment. We made a commitment when we first came that the stakes are too high, national security is too high, and we must work together.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to a member of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. SCHIFF.

Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to thank the chair and ranking member for the extraordinary job they have done on the Intelligence Committee.

This committee, I think, has been more productive than it's been in years, and owing largely to the efforts of these two gentlemen as well as all the members of the committee. I am greatly appreciative of the spirit of cooperation and nonpartisanship that prevails on the Intelligence Committee, and I want to thank both of these gentlemen.

I also enjoy working with Joe HECK, the chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, and as ranking member I appreciate the opportunity to work on our overhead architecture issues. I remain concerned that we are largely investing in some inherited systems that are important but very expensive and can often crowd out new innovations and new technologies that are worthy of investment that provide potentially game-changing capabilities, but I look forward to continuing to work with the chair and ranking member to advance the science and technology that helps us stay one step ahead of our adversaries and helps us keep an eye on some of the bad actors around the world that pose a potentially great threat to the United States.

But, once again, I'm greatly appreciative of the efforts of the committee and our leadership. I think this is a superb bill and moves our intelligence capabilities forward.

I urge my colleagues to join in support.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I appreciate the gentleman and look forward to continuing to work with the gentleman from California on those activities when it comes to our overhead architecture. There are programs worthy of investment, and the technology that we apply to this particular effort is incredibly important.

We always need to stay ahead. America always needs to be number one, and this bill reflects that. I think the work of the gentleman certainly is reflected in this bill as well, and I look forward to continuing to work with you to make sure that we don't have crowding out when it comes to future technology. I think it's incredibly important.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I do want to acknowledge the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee and the work done by Mr. HECK and also Mr. SCHIFF. I have served with Mr. SCHIFF for years on the Intelligence Committee, and he has been very focused on the technical area, which is extremely important to our national security.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, it took a long time for us to get to this point here today. We spent days in important hearings analyzing the intelligence community, making sure that we focused on what the intelligence community needed. We knew, as this country has an issue with respect to the deficit, that we had to do some cutting.

It's not about cutting; it was what to cut. And we wanted to make sure that this bill, this big intelligence bill, working as Republicans and Democrats, would not affect the mission for the national security of our country. We spent time before the bill passed, hours and hours, working, staff working, coming together. And what's very unique, also, about this committee is that both the Democrat and the Republican staff worked very closely together, and I hadn't seen that in the past as a member of this committee for over 9 years right now. And that's one of the main reasons that we have such a great, effective staff that work together as a team, to come together to make sure that we did what we had to do.

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Now we are here today to finish the job. Republicans and Democrats have come together to make important choices and to do what is right for the intelligence community and our country. This bill makes America safer.

Again, I commend everyone who participated in this effort, especially the bipartisan leadership of Chairman ROGERS and the other members of the Intelligence Committee, and the leadership of Senators FEINSTEIN and CHAMBLISS in the Senate Intelligence Committee, again working together. We can do our work here, but we need the Senate to come together, and we did, and we now have the product here today.

I would like to thank again both the Democrat and Republican staff for the countless hours they spent.

I fully support the fiscal year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act and urge my colleagues to do the same.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

I want to thank the members of the committee, both Republican and Democrat, for their fine bipartisan effort on this national security bill of real significance. Many, many hours on behalf of both the Democrat staff and the Republican staff to get this right. When we had to trim back some finances from the community without impacting the mission, that is no small challenge, and I think this product is a testament to all of the work on behalf of both staffs, and both members, Republican and Democrat, to get us the Intelligence Authorization Act.

I want to take this time to thank Senator FEINSTEIN and Senator CHAMBLISS for their work as well on this particular bill. We wouldn't be here today if it weren't for that bicameral and bipartisan effort, again, on this national security bill.

Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that...
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act. In particular, this bill includes funding to accelerate implementation of an insider threat detection program and requires best practices implemented in the Army to be reviewed for inclusion across the Intelligence Community. In addition, the bill supports critical resources for cybersecurity, a threat which demands the attention of national security specialists.

As the successful operation against Usama bin Laden demonstrated earlier this year, the Intelligence Community has made significant strides towards working together to counter the most complex threats facing our nation. Productive cooperation and intelligence integration embodies the intent of congressional reforms made after the tragic events of 9/11. I am encouraged to see this progress, especially in the area of information sharing.

While the sharing of classified information is imperative to keep our country safe, technological advances have also increased the risks of this cooperation. As we saw last year with the damage of Wikileaks the threat from a malicious insider, with the “keys to the kingdom,” is real.

This bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to review improvements made to the Army’s insider threat regulation and consider implementation across the Intelligence Community. The bill also accelerates other technical initiatives within the insider threat program. It is imperative that we ensure our security officers and network administrators have this capability in place to protect our most sensitive information.

Further, this bill helps secure our information and networks both from the insider and from outside actors by addressing the risks posed to our cyber networks. We must all work together to raise awareness of this threat and work with both public and private sector partners. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this bill.

Mr. HECK, Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 1892.

As the Chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, I was tasked with leading a comprehensive review of our Nation’s satellite systems. This review was conducted and I am confident that the systems proposed in the classified annex of this bill provide the best value approach to collecting the overhead imagery demanded by our Nation’s senior policymakers, intelligence analysts and warfighters.

Two of the intelligence community’s chief weapons against terrorism are information— and the ability to communicate that information swiftly. This reality places a significant demand on our imaging systems, and it brings into focus the cost associated with these systems.

As we’re fighting the war on terror, we must not allocate resources without due process. Former Secretary of Defense Gates and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen both identified America’s growing debt as their number one national security concern.

This bill recognizes and selectively funds competition in areas where competitive pressure will help improve innovation, reduce risk and strengthen the industrial base. This bill also recognizes and encourages competition in space launch programs with an eye towards reducing the cost of spacecraft launch while maintaining reliability.

In addition to concern over the federal government’s spending habits, another reason for reforms is to accomplish the most complex threats facing our nation. The intelligence community is no exception: we must ensure they are accountable and receive proper oversight because most of their work occurs outside of the public’s view.

Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger are doing incredible work on this issue, and I applaud their dedication to restoring proper accountability and oversight to the intelligence community.

I am confident the intelligence authorization act provides the resources and latitude our intelligence community needs while removing excess and indolence. That is why I urge my colleagues to vote “yes” on H.R. 1892.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. ROGERS) that the House suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendments to the bill, H.R. 1892.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The right to free religious belief and practice is a fundamental human right. But as Coptic Christians in Egypt and other religious minorities can attest, that right is frequently and tragically denied. It was for this reason that Congress, established the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent, bipartisan Federal Commission charged with monitoring and protecting and promoting religious freedom abroad.

Our State Department prioritizes an array of diplomacy, economics, and other issues that sometimes keep it from speaking and acting boldly against religious suppression. For this