quite a few freedoms from government oppression and government activities.

To suggest that this is a loophole, I think, is a mistake. I think it was not intended by this Congress to criminalize behavior, particularly behavior that was legal in the country where it took place.

In the situation that the gentleman from Texas describes, where some people got together in Miami to discuss drugs from Colombia that were flown from Venezuela to France and purchased in the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere, I don’t think that they were in Miami because they thought that was a loophole. I think they were in Miami because they liked Miami. And why wouldn’t you? Miami is a great place. They weren’t there because it was a loophole. They just happened to be there. And I don’t think anybody foresaw that as being illegal conduct. They could have discussed that in Paris or in Caracas or anywhere else. They chose the criminal consequence. What they did was illegal in all those different countries, and they could have been prosecuted there.

I would submit to you, also, that this Nation and this world almost came to its knees because of derivatives and financial instruments created here in the United States, created here—not just talked about on Wall Street. But it had a global effect because those derivatives affected banks in Europe and all around the world. And as we almost came to its knees because of the criminal activities of people making lots of money with greed, Gekko greed, other people around the world suffered as well economically. But we’re not rushing here to criminalize talks between people in Washington and Wall Street and people in Paris about derivatives, about subprime loans, about ways to make money at the expense of poor people and possibly bring the world to its knees economically; that, we’re not discussing. But we are discussing the possibility of putting people in jail for going to Amsterdam and talking about buying some marijuana.

Something smells foul, and that’s why I oppose the bill.

Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Just finally, we can cover the international drug conspiracies with a reasonably drawn bill. Unfortunately, this bill not only covers the international drug conspiracies, but also, as the gentleman from Tennessee has pointed out, criminalizes money laundering, genocide, child soldiers—these are all extraterritorial offenses that do not require that the conduct also be against the law in a foreign country.

Moreover, most extraterritorial statutes don’t even require that the criminal engage in any illegal conduct inside the United States either. If they engage in terrorism or money laundering or genocide in a foreign country and simply come into the U.S., they can be prosecuted.

The issue of conduct being criminal in a foreign country is not addressed in extraterritorial laws but in extradition treaties.

Also, extradition treaties do not require that conduct be illegal in foreign countries. Before the U.S. can extradite anyone for violation of U.S. law, it must first establish “dual criminality” as required by most extradition treaties.

Dual criminality is the principle that a crime in one country has to be a crime in a country extraditing you. If a drug trafficker engages in a conspiracy here in the U.S., but is later apprehended in a foreign country, the government will have to establish that the dual criminality to extradite him back to the U.S.

The extradition laws and treaties among the countries of the world properly provide for this. This principle is rightly excluded from this legislation because it already exists in Federal law.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, I want to also emphasize that the Obama administration clearly supports this legislation. The Department of Justice supported similar legislation in the last Congress, and the Department of Justice stands by its position, as expressed in the 2010 views letters, and supports this legislation tonight.

I urge my colleagues to support this very strong bipartisan piece of legislation, and I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SMITH) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 313, as amended.

The question was taken: and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

IRAN THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 2011

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1905) to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1905

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.

SECTION I—IRAN ENERGY SANCTIONS

(a) SHORT TITLE—TABLE OF CONTENTS.—This Act may be cited as the “Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011”.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy.
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 104. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 105. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 106. Description of sanctions.
Sec. 107. Advisory opinion.
Sec. 108. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 109. Duration of sanctions.
Sec. 110. Reports required.
Sec. 111. Determinations not reviewable.
Sec. 112. Definitions.
Sec. 113. Effective date.
Sec. 114. Repeal.

TITLE II—IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT

Sec. 201. Codification of sanctions.
Sec. 202. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 203. Declaration of Congress regarding United States policy toward Iran.
Sec. 204. Assistance to support democracy in Iran.
Sec. 205. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Iran or their family members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.
Sec. 206. Clarification of sensitive technologies for purposes of procurement ban.
Sec. 207. Comprehensive strategy to promote internet freedom and access to information in Iran.

TITLE III—IRAN REGIME AND IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS ACCOUNTABILITY

Sec. 301. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 302. Additional export sanctions against Iran.
Sec. 303. Sanctions against affiliates of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 304. Measures against foreign persons or entities supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 305. Special measures against foreign countries supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
TITLE V—SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Sec. 501. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission relating to sanctionable activities.

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 601. Denial of visas for certain persons of the Government of Iran.

Sec. 602. Denial of visas from certain companies that invest in Iran.

Sec. 603. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services, and technologies to Iran.

Sec. 401. Iran financial sanctions.

Sec. 2. Statement of policy.

It shall be the policy of the United States to deny Iran the ability to acquire, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons and associated delivery capabilities; and develop its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.

Sec. 4. Conclusion.

It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities should be achieved as quickly as possible.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve nuclear weapons capability and to acquire other unconventional weapons and to develop its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities must be stopped.

(2) The Iranian government continues to: (A) acquire or develop nuclear weapons and associated delivery capabilities; (B) develop its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.

(3) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, some potentially sanctionable entities have been persuaded to wind down and end their involvement in Iran, others have not.

(4) It is unlikely that Iran can be compelled to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons unless sanctions are fully and effectively implemented.

Sec. 3. Statement of policy.

It shall be the policy of the United States to:

(1) prevent Iran from— (A) acquiring or developing nuclear weapons and associated delivery capabilities; (B) developing its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.

(2) continuing its support for foreign terrorist organizations and other activities aimed at undermining and destabilizing its neighbors and other nations; and

(3) fully implement all multilateral and bilateral sanctions against Iran in order to deprive the Government of Iran of necessary revenues and to compel the Government of Iran to— (A) abandon and verifiably dismantle its nuclear capabilities; (B) abandon and verifiably dismantle its ballistic missile and unconventional weapons programs; and

(4) cease all support for foreign terrorist organizations and other activities aimed at undermining and destabilizing its neighbors and other nations.

TITLE I—IRAN ENERGY SANCTIONS

Sec. 101. Findings.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve nuclear weapons capability and to acquire other unconventional weapons and to develop its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities must be stopped.

(2) The Iranian government continues to: (A) acquire or develop nuclear weapons and associated delivery capabilities; (B) develop its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.

(3) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, some potentially sanctionable entities have been persuaded to wind down and end their involvement in Iran, others have not.

(4) It is unlikely that Iran can be compelled to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons unless sanctions are fully and effectively implemented.

Sec. 2. Statement of policy.

It shall be the policy of the United States to:

(1) prevent Iran from— (A) acquiring or developing nuclear weapons and associated delivery capabilities; (B) developing its unconventional weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.

(2) continuing its support for foreign terrorist organizations and other activities aimed at undermining and destabilizing its neighbors and other nations; and

(3) fully implement all multilateral and bilateral sanctions against Iran in order to deprive the Government of Iran of necessary revenues and to compel the Government of Iran to— (A) abandon and verifiably dismantle its nuclear capabilities; (B) abandon and verifiably dismantle its ballistic missile and unconventional weapons programs; and

(4) cease all support for foreign terrorist organizations and other activities aimed at undermining and destabilizing its neighbors and other nations.

TITLE V—SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Sec. 501. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission relating to sanctionable activities.

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 601. Denial of visas for certain persons of the Government of Iran.

Sec. 602. Denial of visas from certain companies that invest in Iran.

Sec. 603. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services, and technologies to Iran.

Sec. 401. Iran financial sanctions.

Sec. 2. Statement of policy.

It shall be the policy of the United States to deny Iran the ability to...
support acts of foreign terrorist organizations and extremists and develop unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles. A critical means of achieving that goal is sanctions, which deny or restrict access to energy resources, including its ability to explore for, extract, refine, and transport by pipeline its hydrocarbon resources, in order to limit the funds Iran has available for pursuing its objectionable activities.

SEC. 104. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

(a) MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.—In order to further the objectives of section 103 of this Act, if a person has engaged in an activity described in subparagraph (A) of section 105(a) of this Act, and fails to verifiably divest all holdings and the activity described in subparagraph (A) of this section within one year from the date of certification by the President under subparagraph (A) of section 105(a) of this Act in the future.

(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the extent to which diplomatic efforts described in subsection (f), the President shall impose a special rule if the President determines that the person whose activity was the basis for any such determination.

(c) INTERIM REPORT ON MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS; MONITORING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on —

(1) the countries that have agreed to undertake measures to further the objectives of section 103 of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on—

(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.

(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on —

(1) the extent and duration of each instance of the application of such sanctions; and

(2) the disposition of any decision with respect to the application of such sanctions by the World Trade Organization or its predecessor organization.

(d) INVESTIGATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall initiate an investigation into the possible imposition of trade sanctions on persons or their affiliates that conduct business or have investments in Iran; and a description of those measures; and

(2) the countries that have not agreed to measures described in paragraph (1), and, with respect to those countries, other measures the President recommends that the United States take to further the objectives of section 103 of this Act with respect to Iran.

222x596, provide to the appropriate congressional committees all requested information relating to investigations or reviews initiated under this title, including the number, scope, and dates of such investigations or reviews.

(b) FORM.—The information required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(5) TERMINATION.—Subject to paragraph (6), the President may, on a case-by-case basis, terminate an investigation initiated under this subsection if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the determination that—

(i) the person whose activity was the basis for the investigation is no longer engaging in the activity described in subparagraph (A) and has divested all holdings and terminating the activity within one year from the date of the certification; and

(ii) the person has received reliable assurances that it will not knowingly engage in an activity described in section 106(a) of this Act in the future.

(B) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall apply the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act in accordance with section 106(a) of this Act to a person described in subparagraph (A) if—

(i) the person whose activity was the basis of the investigation has verifiably divested all holdings and terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph within one year from the date of certification by the President under subparagraph (A) or;

(ii) the person has been previously designated pursuant to section 4(e)(D) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, and fails to verifiably divest all holdings and terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) within 180 days from the date of enactment of this Act.

(C) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions taken by persons previously designated pursuant to section 4(e)(D) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, to verifiably divest all holdings and terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A).

SEC. 105. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN, PRODUCTION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN IRAN, AND EXPORTATION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO IRAN.—

(i) DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(iii) engages in an activity described in subparagraph (B) of section 105(a) of this Act in the future—

(A) any of which has a fair market value of $20,000,000 or more; or

(B) INVESTMENT DESCRIBED.—An investment described in this paragraph is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources.

(2) PRODUCTION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, if a person has engaged in an activity described in subparagraph (A) of section 105(a) of this Act, and the President determines that the person—

(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(h) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.

(b) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the development, production, or provision of such goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subparagraph (A) if the President determines that the person—

(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.

(b) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the development, production, or provision of such goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subparagraph (A) if the President determines that the person—

(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.

222x606, provide to the appropriate congressional committees all requested information relating to investigations or reviews initiated under this title, including the number, scope, and dates of such investigations or reviews.

(b) FORM.—The information required under subparagraph (A) shall be provided in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

(5) TERMINATION.—Subject to paragraph (6), the President may, on a case-by-case basis, terminate an investigation initiated under this subsection if the President certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the determination that—

(i) the person whose activity was the basis for the investigation is no longer engaging in the activity described in subparagraph (A) and has divested all holdings and terminating the activity within one year from the date of the certification; and

(ii) the person has received reliable assurances that it will not knowingly engage in an activity described in section 106(a) of this Act in the future.

(B) APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President shall apply the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act in accordance with section 106(a) of this Act to a person described in subparagraph (A) if—

(i) the person whose activity was the basis of the investigation has verifiably divested all holdings and terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph within one year from the date of certification by the President under subparagraph (A) or;

(ii) the person has been previously designated pursuant to section 4(e)(D) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, and fails to verifiably divest all holdings and terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) within 180 days from the date of enactment of this Act.

(C) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions taken by persons previously designated pursuant to section 4(e)(D) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, to verifiably divest all holdings and terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A).

SEC. 105. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN, PRODUCTION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN IRAN, AND EXPORTATION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO IRAN.—

(i) DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act—

(iii) engages in an activity described in subparagraph (B) of section 105(a) of this Act in the future—

(A) any of which has a fair market value of $20,000,000 or more; or

(B) INVESTMENT DESCRIBED.—An investment described in this paragraph is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources.

(2) PRODUCTION OF REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, if a person has engaged in an activity described in subparagraph (A) of section 105(a) of this Act, and the President determines that the person—

(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.

(b) GOODS, SERVICES, TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION, OR SUPPORT DESCRIBED.—Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subparagraph are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the development, production, or provision of such goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subparagraph (A) if the President determines that the person—

(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or

(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more.
an agreement for cooperation between the
receipt or retransfer to the country the govern-
ment of which has primary jurisdiction over
acquisition or development of nuclear weap-
ons or related technologies; or
materially to the ability of Iran to—
fer, or transship to Iran or otherwise pro-
posed to be transfer to the United States;
and
not later than 15 days before issuing such license or approving such transfer or re-
transfer, submits to the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate the justification for approving
such license, transfer, or retransfer.

(c) CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions in
paragraph (A) shall apply in addition to
all other applicable procedures, require-
s, inspections, and certifications
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1984 and other related
laws.

(E) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the term ‘agreement for cooperation’ has
the meaning given that term in section 11 b. of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).

(F) APPLICABILITY.—The sanctions
described in subparagraph (A) shall apply only in
a case in which a person is subject to sanctions
under paragraph (1) because of an activity described in such paragraph in
which such person engages on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) ADDITIONAL MANDATORY SANCTIONS
RELATING TO TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECH-
NOLOGY:

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
paragraphs (B) and (C), in any case in
which a person is subject to sanctions under
paragraph (1) because of an activity de-
scribed in such paragraph that relates to the
acquisition or development of nuclear weap-
ons or related technology or of missiles or
advanced conventional weapons that are
designed or modified to deliver a nuclear weap-
on, no license may be issued for the export,
and no approval may be given for the trans-
fer or retransfer to the country the govern-
ment of which has primary jurisdiction over
the person, of any nuclear material, facili-
ties, components, or other goods, services, or
technology that are or would be subject to an
classification by the United States or to
an agreement or understanding that
has primary jurisdiction over a person that
engages in an activity described in such sub-
paragraph if the President determines and
notifies the appropriate congressional com-
mittees that the government of the coun-
try—
(i) does not know or has reason to know
about the activity; or
(ii) has taken, or is taking, all reasonable
steps necessary to prevent a recurrence of
the activity, and to penalize the person
for the activity.

(C) INDIVIDUAL APPROVAL.—Notwith-
standing subparagraph (A), the President
may, on a case-by-case basis, approve the
issuance of a license for the export, or
approve the transfer or retransfer, of any nu-
clear material, component, or other goods,
services, or technology that are
or would be subject to an agreement for co-
operation, to a person in a country to which
such paragraphs apply (other than a per-
son that is subject to the sanctions under
paragraph (1) if the President—
(i) determines that such approval is vital
to the national security interests of the
United States; and
(ii) not later than 15 days before issuing
such license or approving such transfer or re-
transfer, submits to the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, a written justification for
approving such license, transfer,
or retransfer.

(D) CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions
in paragraph (A) shall apply in addition to
all other applicable procedures, require-
s, inspections, and certifications
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1984 and other related
laws.

SEC. 106. DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions to be
imposed on a sanctioned person under section
105(c) of this Act are as follows:

(1) EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ASSISTANCE
FOR EXPORTS TO SANCTIONED PERSONS.—The
President may direct the Export-Import Bank of
the United States to refuse to extend or to
increase, or to extend or to increase by an
amount not exceeding $10,000,000, the loan,
credit, or insurance that such bank commits or
issues prior to the date of enactment of this
Act or that is applied for on or before the
date of enactment of this Act.

(2) ADDITIONAL MANDATORY SANCTIONS
RELATING TO TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECH-
NOLOGY:

(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in
paragraphs (B) and (C), in any case in
which a person is subject to sanctions under
paragraph (1) because of an activity de-
scribed in such paragraph that relates to the
acquisition or development of nuclear weap-
ons or related technology or of missiles or
advanced conventional weapons that are
designed or modified to deliver a nuclear weap-
on, no license may be issued for the export,
and no approval may be given for the trans-
fer or retransfer to the country the govern-
ment of which has primary jurisdiction over
the person, of any nuclear material, facility,
components, or other goods, services, or
technology that are or would be subject to an
agreement or understanding that
has primary jurisdiction over a person that
engages in an activity described in such sub-
paragraph if the President determines and
notifies the appropriate congressional com-
mittees that the government of the coun-
try—
(i) does not know or has reason to know
about the activity; or
(ii) has taken, or is taking, all reasonable
steps necessary to prevent a recurrence of
the activity, and to penalize the person
for the activity.

(C) INDIVIDUAL APPROVAL.—Notwith-
standing subparagraph (A), the President
may, on a case-by-case basis, approve the
issuance of a license for the export, or
approve the transfer or retransfer, of any nu-
uclear material, component, or other goods,
services, or technology that are
or would be subject to an agreement for co-
operation, to a person in a country to which
such paragraphs apply (other than a per-
son that is subject to the sanctions under
paragraph (1) if the President—
(i) determines that such approval is vital
to the national security interests of the
United States; and
(ii) not later than 15 days before issuing
such license or approving such transfer or re-
transfer, submits to the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, a written justification for
approving such license, transfer,
or retransfer.

(D) CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions
in paragraph (A) shall apply in addition to
all other applicable procedures, require-
s, inspections, and certifications
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1984 and other related
laws.

(E) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the term ‘agreement for cooperation’ has
the meaning given that term in section 11 b. of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).

(F) APPLICABILITY.—The sanctions
described in subparagraph (A) shall apply only in
a case in which a person is subject to sanctions
under paragraph (1) because of an activity described in such paragraph in
which such person engages on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) SETTLEMENTS FROM UNITED STATES
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The United States Government shall impose
the following:

(1) SETTLEMENT BARRIERS.—The United States Government shall require
that the United States government not to
permit any exchange or clearing house to
settle transactions with any sanctioned
person or entity.

(2) USE OF UNITED STATES BANKS OR OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(3) LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS.—The United States Government
may prohibit any United States financial
institutions from providing credits to any sanctioned
person totaling more than $10,000,000 in any 12-month
period unless such person is engaged in ac-
tivities that relieve human suffering,
and the loans or credits are provided for such activi-
ties.
section 105(d) of this Act the name of any person against whom sanctions are imposed under this paragraph.

(11) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—The President may impose such sanctions, as appropriate, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(b) ADDITIONAL MEASURE RELATING TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS.—

(1) MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION.—The Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 1303 of title 41, United States Code, shall require a certification from a prospective contractor that such person and any person owned or controlled by the person does not engage in any activity for which sanctions may be imposed under section 105 or section 304 of this Act.

(2) REMEDIES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—If the head of an executive agency, or an officer of such agency, has submitted a false certification under paragraph (1) after the date on which the Federal Acquisition Regulation is revised to implement the requirements of this subsection, the head of that executive agency shall terminate a contract with such person or debar such person in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 1303 of title 41, United States Code, and suspend such person from doing business in violation of such regulations under part 9.4 of part 9 or title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.

(B) INCLUSION ON LIST OF PARTIES EXCLUDED FROM FEDERAL ACQUISITION AND NONPROCUREMENT PROGRAMS.—The Administrator of General Services shall include on the List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 1303 of title 41, United States Code, each person that is determined to be a party to a contract for which a false certification under subparagraph (A) was submitted.

(3) CLARIFICATION REGARDING CERTAIN PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS.—The remedies specified in paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to the procurement programs referred to in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country or instrumentality designated under section 309(b) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2519(b)).

(4) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This subsection shall not be construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the head of an executive agency or any other official of the Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false certification under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1).
basis, the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions under subsection (b) of this section, if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committee or committees that—

(B) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Any report under subparagraph (A) shall provide a specific and detailed rationale for a determination made pursuant to such paragraph, including—

(i) a description of the conduct that resulted in the determination under section 105(a) or sections 105(b)(2) of this Act, as the case may be;
(ii) in the case of a foreign person, an explanation of the efforts to secure the cooperation of the government with primary jurisdiction over such person to terminate or, as appropriate, penalize the activities that resulted in the determination under section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act, as the case may be;

(iii) an estimate of the significance of the conduct of the person concerned in contributing to the ability of Iran to develop petroleum resources, produce refined petroleum products, or import refined petroleum products; and

(iv) a statement as to the response of the United States in the event that the person concerned engages in other activities that would be subject to sanctions or sanctions under section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act, as the case may be.

(2) WAIVER WITH RESPECT TO PERSONS IN COUNTRIES THAT COOPERATE IN MULTILATERAL EFFORTS WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President may, on a case-by-case basis, waive, for a period of not more than 12 months, the application of section 105(a) of this Act with respect to a person that, at least 30 days before the waiver is to take effect—

(i) certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—

(I) the government with primary jurisdiction over the person is closely cooperating with the United States in multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from—

(aa) acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technologies; or

(bb) acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers of types of advanced conventional weapons; and

(II) such a waiver is vital to the national security interests of the United States; and

(ii) in the case of the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying—

(I) the person with respect to which the President waives the application of sanctions; and

(II) the actions taken by the government described in clause (i) in cooperation in multilateral efforts described in that clause.

(B) CREDIBLE INFORMATION.—The term "credible information" means—

(A) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(d)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), including a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978);

(B) a credit union;

(C) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;

(D) an insurance company, including an agency or underwriter; and

(E) any other company that provides financial services including joint ventures with Iranian entities both inside and outside of Iran and partnerships or investments with Iranian government-controlled entities or affiliated entities.

(3) PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER.—Not later than 15 days after any waiver authority is exercised pursuant to paragraphs (2) of this subsection, the name of the person or entity with respect to which sanctions are being waived shall be published in the Federal Register.

SEC. 112. DEFINITIONS.

(a) REPORT ON CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing—

(1) the efforts of the President to mount a multilateral campaign to persuade all countries to pressure Iran to cease its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile weapons programs and to support acts of international terrorism;

(2) the efforts of the President to persuade other governments to ask Iran to reduce in the countries of such government the presence of Iranian diplomats and representatives of other government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of Iran, and of those who directly control or represent Iranian diplomatic or military representatives who participated in the takeover of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, on November 4, 1979, or the subsequent holding of United States hostages for 444 days;

(3) the extent to which the International Atomic Energy Agency has established regular inspections of all nuclear facilities in Iran, including those facilities presently under construction; and

(4) Iran’s use of Iranian diplomats and representatives of the government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of Iran to promote acts of international terrorism or to develop or sustain Iran’s nuclear, chemical, biological, or missile weapons programs.

(b) REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THIS ACT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to Congress a report that describes—

(1) the extent to which actions relating to trade taken pursuant to this title have—

(A) been effective in achieving the policy objectives described in section 103 of this Act and any other foreign policy or national security objectives of the United States with respect to Iran; and

(B) affected humanitarian interests in Iran, the country in which a sanctioned person is located, or in other countries; and

(2) the impact of actions relating to trade taken pursuant to this title on other national security, economic, and foreign policy interests of the United States, including relations with countries friendly to the United States, and on the United States economy.

The President may include in such reports the President’s recommendation on whether or not this Act should be terminated or modified.

(c) OTHER REPORTS.—The President shall ensure the continued transmittal to Congress of reports describing—

(1) the nuclear and other military capabilities of Iran, as required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 103 of the Arms Export Control Act for Fiscal Year 1993; and

(2) the support provided by Iran for acts of international terrorism, as part of the Dynamic Action Against Iran, including all other governmental and nongovernmental support provided by Iran for acts of international terrorism.

(d) REPORTS ON GLOBAL TRADE RELATING TO IRAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, with respect to the most recent 12-month period for which data are available, on the dollar value amount of trade, including in the energy sector, between Iran and each country maintaining membership in the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors.

SEC. 111. DETERMINATIONS NOT REVIEWABLE.

(A) No judicial review of a determination under this title shall be available in any court.
(A) nongovernmental entity in Iran, or on or after the date of the enactment of this Act:

(1) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran, or the entry into a contract providing for the general supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of such a contract.

(2) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest, in the development described in subparagraph (A).

(3) The entry into a contract providing for the payment of royalties, earnings, or profits in the development described in subparagraph (A), without regard to the form of such payment.

(4) The provision of goods, services, or technology related to petroleum resources.

(12) IRAN.—The term ‘‘Iran’’ includes any agency, instrumentality, or office of Iran.

(13) IRANIAN DIPLOMATS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OR QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF IRAN.—The term ‘‘Iranian diplomats and representatives of other government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of Iran’’ includes employees, representatives, or affiliates of Iran’s—

(A) Foreign Ministry;

(B) Ministry of Intelligence and Security;

(C) Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated entities;

(D) Crusade for Reconstruction;

(E) Qods (Jerusalem) Forces;

(F) Interior Ministry;

(G) Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled;

(H) Prophet’s Foundation;

(I) Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance;

(J) Martyr’s Foundation;

(K) Islamic Propagation Organization; and

(L) Ministry of Islamic Guidance.

(14) TERRORIST PERSON.—The term ‘‘terrorist person’’, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result of such conduct, circumstance, or result.

(15) NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.—The term ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’ means any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear material (as defined in section 112 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Energy Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note)) that is greater than the amount of energy that would be released from detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

(16) PERSON.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘person’’ means—

(i) a natural person;

(ii) a corporation, business association, partnership, trust, financial institution, labor union, partnership, association, trust, joint venture, or other organization, or any other business organization, any other non-governmental entity, organization, or group, and any governmental entity operating as a business enterprise;

(iii) any successor to any entity described in clause (ii).

(B) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘‘person’’ does not include a government or governmental entity that is not operating as a business enterprise.

(17) PETROLEUM RESOURCES.—The term ‘‘petroleum resources’’ includes petroleum and natural gas resources, refined petroleum products, oil and liquefied natural gas, oil or liquefied natural gas tankers, and products used to construct or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied natural gas.

(18) REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.—The term ‘‘refined petroleum products’’ means diesel fuel, jet fuel, gasoline, or any other hydrocarbon that includes a molecule with a carbon skeleton that is derived from a petroleum, kerosene-type, and kerosene-type jet fuel, and aviation gasoline.

(19) UNITED STATES OR STATE.—The terms ‘‘United States’’ and ‘‘State’’ mean the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

(20) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States person’’ means—

(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States or who owes permanent allegiance to the United States;

(B) a corporation or other legal entity that is engaged under the laws of the United States or any State if a natural person described in subparagraph (A) owns more than 50 percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial interest in such corporation or legal entity.

This title shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to an investment or activity described in section 165 of the Act that is commenced on or after such date of enactment.

SEC. 114. REPEAL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) is repealed.


(2) in section 111(a)(1), by striking ‘‘section 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 111(b) of the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011’’ and inserting ‘‘section 105 of the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011’’;

(3) in section 112(b)(3), by striking ‘‘Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 102 of this Act, and inserting ‘‘Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011’’; and


(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are—

(A) commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act; or

(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after such date of enactment.

(2) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned or controlled by a United States person if the United States person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 201. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.

United States sanctions with respect to Iran imposed pursuant to sections 102 and 106 of Executive Order 12957, as provided in Executive Order 12958, or as provided in Executive Order 12959, shall be listed and codified as follows:

SEC. 201A. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.

United States sanctions with respect to Iran imposed pursuant to Executive Order 12957, sections 1(e), 1(g), and 3 of Executive Order 12959, sections 2, 3, and 5 of Executive Order 13059, sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Executive Order 13353, or sections 1, 2, and 5 of Executive Order 13574, as in effect on September 1, 2011, shall remain in effect until the President certifies to the congressional committees that the Government of Iran has veritably dismantled its nuclear weapons program, its biological and chemical weapons programs, its ballistic missile development programs, and ceased its support for international terrorism.

SEC. 202. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.

(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ENTITY.—The term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other organization.

(2) OWN OR CONTROL.—The term ‘‘own or control’’ means, with respect to an entity—

(A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by vote or value in the entity; or

(B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors of the entity.

(3) SUBSIDIARY.—The term ‘‘subsidiary’’ means an entity that is owned or controlled by a United States person.

(b) SUBSIDIARY.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—A United States person shall be subject to a penalty for a violation of section 102 of this Act, if the President determines that a subsidiary of the United States person that is established or maintained outside the United States engages in an act that, if committed in the United States or by a United States person, would violate such provisions.

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are—

(A) commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act; or

(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after such date of enactment.

(2) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned or controlled by a United States person if the United States person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 203. DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

It shall be the policy of the United States to support those individuals in Iran seeking a free, democratic government that respects the rule of law and protects the rights of all citizens.

SEC. 204. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.

(a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—The President is authorized to provide financial and political assistance (including the award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals, NGOs, and other organizations that support democracy and the promotion of democracy in Iran. Such assistance may include the award of grants to eligible independent pro-democracy media, broadcasting, radio, and television media that broadcast into Iran.

(b) ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE.—Financial and political assistance is provided under this section shall be provided only to an individual, organization, or entity that—
(1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) at any time during the preceding 4 years;
(2) advocates the adherence by Iran to non-proliferation regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological and materials control; and
(3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the adoption of a democratic form of Government in Iran;
(4) is committed to respect for human rights, including the fundamental equality of women;
(5) works to establish equality of opportunity for all citizens and to reduce corruption;
(6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
(c) FUNDING.—Financial and political assistance authorized under this section may only be provided using funds available to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, the Human Rights and Democracy Fund, and the Near East Regional Democracy Fund.

(4) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 15 days before each obligation of assistance under this section, and in accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2381), the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of each obligation of assistance. Such notification shall include, as practicable, a description of programs of assistance by such assistance and an identification of the recipients of such assistance.

(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING DIPLOMATIC ASSISTANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) contacts should be expanded with opposition groups in Iran that meet the criteria for eligibility for assistance under subsection (b);
(2) support for those individuals seeking democracy in Iran should be expressed by United States representatives and officials in all appropriate international fora; and
(3) officials and representatives of the United States should—
(A) strongly and unequivocally support independent efforts in Iran calling for free, fair, and transparent elections and the United States of America recommit to the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America to permit the United States to comply with its international obligations.
(B) request that the United Nations Security Council, including by identifying foreign providers of censorship technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake Internet activities without interference from the Government of Iran.
(C) encourage all members of the United Nations to promote Internet freedom and access, and share information freely and safely via the Internet, including in Farsi and regional languages;
(D) sustain the development of counter-censorship technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake Internet activities without interference from the Government of Iran;
(E) improve the capabilities and availability of secure mobile communications among human rights and democracy activists in Iran;
(F) provide resources for digital safety training for media, unions, and academic and civil society organizations in Iran;
(G) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable human rights advocates seeking to organize, disseminate information, and support human rights in Iran;
(H) expand surrogate radio, television, live broadcasts, and social network communications in Iran, including the United States telecommunications and software companies to comply with the United States export licensing process for such purposes;
(I) expand activities to safely assist and train human rights, civil society, and union activists in Iran to operate effectively and securely;
(J) defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or otherwise deny international satellite broadcasting signals, including by identifying foreign providers of jamming technology;
(K) expand worldwide United States embassy and consular programming and outreach to Iranian diaspora communities;
(L) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists in Iran; and
(M) encourage companies to comply with the United States export licensing process for such purposes.

(SEC. 205. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPROMISING IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009, ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

(a) LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPROMISING IN CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009, ELECTIONS IN IRAN.

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a list of all persons who are senior officials of the Government of Iran, including the Supreme Leader, the President, Members of the Cabinet, Members of the Assembly of Experts, Members of the Ministry of Intelligence Services, or any Member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with the rank of brigadier general and above, including members of paramilitary organizations such as Ansar-e-Hefzollah and Basij-e Mostaz‘afin.
(c) Form.—The comprehensive strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified annex.

SEC. 301. IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS ACCOUNTABILITY

(a) Transactions With Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.—No United States person shall knowingly conduct any commercial transaction or financial transaction with, or make any investment in—

(1) any person or entity owned or controlled by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;

(2) any instrumentality, subsidiary, affiliate, or agent of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; or

(3) any project, activity, or business owned or controlled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

(b) Transactions With Certain Foreign Persons.—No United States person shall knowingly conduct any commercial transaction or financial transaction with, or make any investment in, any foreign person or foreign entity that conducts any transaction with or makes any investment with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which, if made by a United States person, would constitute a violation of subsection (a).

(c) Waiver.—Any United States person who violates subsection (a) or (b) shall be subject to one or more of the criminal penalties under the authority of section 206(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705).

(d) Waiver.—

(1) General.—The President is authorized to waive the restrictions in subsection (a) or (b) on a case-by-case basis if the President determines and notifies the appropriate congressional committees that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security interests of the United States.

(2) Publication in the Federal Register.—Not later than 15 days after any waiver authority is exercised pursuant to paragraph (1), the President shall publish a notice in the Federal Register describing the persons with respect to which sanctions are being waived shall be published in the Federal Register.

(e) Amendments to Code of Federal Regulations.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall make the appropriate amendments to the Code of Federal Regulations (“Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations”), to incorporate the provisions of this section.

(f) Definitions.—In this section, the terms “foreign person”, “knowingly”, and “United States person” have the meanings given such terms in section 112 of this Act.

SEC. 302. ADDITIONAL EXPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN


(1) licenses to export or reexport goods, services, or technology for the repair or maintenance of aircraft of United States origin to Iran may not be issued, and any such license issued before such date of enactment is no longer valid; and

(2) any export license or license authorization described in paragraph (1) may not be exported or reexported to Iran.

(b) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal or otherwise supersede the requirements of section 740.15(d)(4) of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to exports supporting vessels subject to the Export Administration Regulations).

SEC. 303. SANCTIONS AGAINST AFFILIATES OF IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

(a) In General.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and as determined by the President, the President shall identify in, and, in the case of a foreign person or foreign entity not already so designated, shall designate for inclusion in the Annex to Executive Order 13846, subsection (a)(v)(E)(ii) of section 106(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195; 22 U.S.C. 8515(c)); or

(1) any instrumentality, subsidiary, affiliate, or agent of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; or

(2) any other provision of law, effective on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) Priority for Investigation.—In carrying out this section, the President shall give priority to investigating foreign persons or foreign entities identified pursuant to section 560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to the definition of the Government of Iran) and foreign persons and foreign entities for which there is a reasonable basis to suspect that the person or entity has conducted or attempted to conduct one or more sensitive transactions or activities described in subsection (a).

(c) Sensitive Transaction or Activity.—A sensitive transaction or activity referred to in subsection (b) is—

(1) a transaction that facilitates the manufacture, import, export, or transfer of items needed for the development of nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles;

(2) an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq or Afghanistan, or equip or train, or encourage violence by, individuals or groups opposed to the governments of those countries;

(3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement, or sale of goods, services, and technology for Iran’s energy sector, including the development of the energy resources of Iran, export of petroleum products, and import of refined petroleum and refining capacities from Iran;

(4) a transaction relating to the procurement of sensitive technologies (as defined in section 106(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195; 22 U.S.C. 8515(c)); or

(5) a financial transaction or series of transactions valued at more than $1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-month period involving a non-Iranian financial institution.

(d) Inadmissibility to United States.—The Secretary of State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall deny admission into the United States to, any alien who, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is a foreign person designated for inclusion in the Annex to Executive Order 13382 pursuant to subsection (a).

(e) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to remove an sanction of the United States in force against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as of the date of the enactment of this Act or an under subsection (a) with respect to the person or entity if the President—

(1) determines that the person or entity has ceased the activity that resulted in the imposition of that sanction; and

(2) notifies the appropriate congressional committees that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States; and

SEC. 304. MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN PERSONS OR ENTITIES SUPPORTING IRAN’S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS

(a) Identification and Notification.—The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees and the public of any foreign person or foreign entity that is identified pursuant to subsection (c) that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States;

(1) provides material support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or any foreign person or foreign entity that is identified pursuant to subsection (c) that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States.

(b) Waiver.—

(1) In General.—The President shall apply to each foreign person or foreign entity identified in a notice under subsection (a) for a period determined by the President a major-
prior to the exercise of waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national security interests of the United States, and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the reasons for the determination.

SEC. 306. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO RESTRICT CONTRACTS OR LICENSES FOR CERTAIN SANCTIONABLE PERSONS.

(a) SANCTIONS.—With respect to any foreign entity identified pursuant to section 304(a) of this Act that is an agency of the government of a foreign country, the President shall, in addition to applying to the entity the sanctions described in section 304(c) of this Act, apply to the agency of the government of the foreign country the following measures:
(1) No assistance shall be provided to the agency of the government of the foreign country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any successor Act, or the Arms Export Control Act, or any successor Act, other than assistance that is intended to benefit the people of the foreign country directly and that is not provided through governmental agencies or entities of the foreign country.
(2) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or technical assistance to the agency of the government of the foreign country from any source, unless such financial assistance in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
(3) The United States shall deny to the agency of the government of the foreign country any credit or financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government.
(4) The United States Government shall not approve the sale to the agency of the government of the foreign country of any defense articles or defense services or issue any license for the export of items on the United States Munitions List.
(5) No exports to the agency of the government of the foreign country shall be permitted of any goods or technologies controlled for national security reasons under the Export Administration Regulations.
(6) At the earliest practicable date, the Secretary of State shall terminate, in a manner consistent with international law, the authorization or carrier that is controlled in fact by the agency of the government of the foreign country to engage in air transportation (as defined in section 4012(b) of title 49, United States Code).
(7) Additional restrictions may be imposed in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

(b) TERMINATION.—The President may terminate the sanctions applied to an entity or government of a foreign country pursuant to subsection (a) if the President determines that the entity or government, as the case may be, no longer engages in the activity or activities for which the sanctions were imposed and has provided assurances to the United States Government that it will not engage in the activity or activities in the future.

(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of any measure described in subsection (a) with respect to an entity or government of a foreign country if the President—
(1) determines that the entity or government of the foreign country has the meaning given in section 121 of this Act, and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains the reasons for the determination.

SEC. 307. IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.

(a) FREEZING OF ASSETS.—In accordance with subsection (b), all property and interests in property of the foreign persons described in Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, or their affiliates, that are in the United States, that are in the custody and possession of the United States Munitions List.

(b) DESCRIPTION OF PROHIBITIONS.—The prohibitions described in subsection (a) include—
(1) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this subsection; or
(2) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

(c) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1) have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of threatening United States efforts to promote security and stability in Afghanistan;
(2) have knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts of violence or any person or entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this subsection; and
(3) have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of threatening United States efforts to promote security and stability in Afghanistan, and lead to a large increase in United States, International Security Assistance Force, Coalition and Iraqi and Afghan casualties; and
(4) have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of threatening United States efforts to promote security and stability in Afghanistan, and lead to a large increase in United States, International Security Assistance Force, Coalition and Iraqi and Afghan casualties; and

(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to urge the government of the foreign country to—
(1) uphold its commitments to the United States to ensure the continued well-being of those individuals living in Camp Ashraf;
(2) develop and support Iran’s conventional forces and Iran’s unconventional forces and Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile
forces, including developments in the pre-
ceding year, the size of Iran’s ballistic mis-
sile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces,
and the locations of launch sites; (D) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of
Iran’s unconventional weapons and Iran’s
ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise mis-
sile forces; and (E) a detailed analysis of the amount and sources of funding expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized by, Iran on programs to develop a capability to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran’s unconventional forces and Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces; and (F) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s unconventional forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces; and (G) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran’s missile forces and associated equipment.
(3) IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.—The term “Iran’s ballistic missile and unconventional weapons” means Iran’s ballistic missile forces and chemical, biological, and radiological weapons pro-
grams.
(4) IRAN’S CRUISE MISSILE FORCES.—The term “Iran’s cruise missile forces” includes the capability to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran’s unconventional forces and Iran’s ballistic missile forces and Iran’s cruise missile forces; and (B) includes— (i) Iran’s Navy, Air Force, Navy, domestic law enforcement, and elements of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, other than Iran’s Islamic Revolution-
ary Guard Corps-Quds Force; (ii) the role of the Government of Iran in shipping, support, and activities in the Middle East Eu-
rope, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
(5) Key vulnerabilities identified in para-
graphs (1) through (4) include— (A) Iran’s missile forces and associated equip-
ment; (B) Iran’s strategic and security strategy de-
classified form to the greatest extent pos-
sible; (C) evasive and other efforts by the Gov-
ernment of Iran to circumvent international and bilateral sanctions regimes; (D) the effect of bilateral and multilateral sanctions on the ability of Iran to implement its grand strategy and security strategy dis-
cribed in paragraph (1); and (E) Iran’s strategy and efforts to leverage economic, political, and cultural influence, coopera-
tion, and activities in the Middle East Eu-
rope, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
(6) Iran’s strategy and efforts to leverage economic, political, and cultural influence, coopera-
tion, and activities in the Middle East Eu-
rope, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
(7) Sensitive technology.—The term “sensitive technology” has the meaning given the term in section 101(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195; 22 U.S.C. 8513(e)).
SEC. 310. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the authority of the President to other-
wise designate foreign persons or foreign enti-
ties as persons subject to sanctions under this title or in the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking property of weapons of mass de-
struction proliferators and their supporters).
SEC. 311. IRAN SANCTIONS; DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN IRAN; AND PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.
SEC. 401. IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS.
(a) Financial Institution Certification.— Section 194(e) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–195; 22 U.S.C. 8513(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: “(9) Certification.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this para-
geraph, the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations to require any person whom a financial institution to provide positive cer-
tification to the Secretary if such person is engaged in corresponding relations or busi-
ness with any person described in subsection (b) that facilitates transactions from persons and domestic financial institu-
tions described in subsection (b) that facilitates transactions from persons and domestic financial institu-
tions described in subsection (b) that facilitates transactions from persons and domestic financial institu-
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tions described in subsection (b) that facilitates transactions from persons and domestic financial institu-
tions described in subsection (b) that facilitates transactions from persons and domestic financial institu-
(b) Central Bank of Iran.—Section 104(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Account-
ability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: “(4) Central Bank of Iran.— “(A) Determination.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this para-
geraph, the President shall determine whether the Central Bank of Iran has— “(i) provided financial services in support of, or otherwise facilitated, the ability of Iran to— “(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or related technologies; “(II) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear enrichment facilities; or “(III) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional weapons; or “(ii) facilitated a transaction or provided financial services for— “(I) Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps— “(II) a financial institution whose property or interests in property are subject to sanc-
tions imposed pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act— “(aa) in connection with Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or deliv-
ery systems for weapons of mass destruction; or “(bb) Iran’s support for acts of international terrorism.”
Section IV—Security and Exchange Commission

SEC. 501. DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RELATING TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.

(a) In General.—Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o) is amended by adding at the end the following subsection:

"(r) Meaning of Certain Activities Relating to Iran, Terrorism, and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.—"

"(I) In general.—The Commission shall, by rule, require any issuer described in paragraph (2) to disclose on a quarterly basis a detailed description of each activity described in paragraph (2) engaged in by the issuer or its affiliates during the period covered by the report, including—

(A) the nature and extent of the activity;

(B) the revenues, if any, attributable to the activity; and

(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to continue any activity described in this paragraph.

(2) Issuer described.—An issuer is described in this paragraph if the issuer is required to file reports with the Commission under section 13(a) of the Exchange Act or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

(b) Effective Date.—The amendment made by this section takes effect 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

Title V—Securities and Exchange Commission

SEC. 601. DENIAL OF VISAS FOR CERTAIN PERSONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

(a) In General.—Except as necessary to meet United States obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Russian-American Joint Commission on Security Matters signed on June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international treaty obligations, the Secretary of State (or the Secretary of Homeland Security, if the Secretary of State is unable to act) shall deny admission into the United States to, a person of the Government of Iran pursuant to section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 2402 note; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), section 408(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, section 223(d) of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2379d-1), and section 620B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2379d-1), including a person who is a senior official of the Government of Iran who is specified in the list under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 2402 note; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), and the Secretary determines that such person—

(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and

(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(b) Denial of a visa.—If the Secretary of State (or the Secretary of Homeland Security, if the Secretary of State is unable to act) determines—

(1) that an alien is described in subsection (a); and

(2) that denial of a visa is warranted by the circumstances of the case, the Secretary shall deny admission into the United States to that alien.

(c) Restriction on Contact.—No person—

(1) who has engaged, or is associated with, any person engaged in an activity described in subsection (b) that is sanctioned under this subpart; and

(2) who is a senior official of the Government of Iran who is specified in the list under section 6(j)(1)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C. 2402 note; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), and the Secretary determines that such person—

(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and

(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Title VI—Waivers with Respect to Certain Entities

SEC. 602. INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS.

(a) In General.—Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(aa) the alien is described in subclause (I); or

(bb) the alien is described in subclause (II); or

(cc) the alien is described in subclause (III); or

(dd) any other activity with respect to Iran for which sanctions may be imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38367) (or any successor thereto); or

(ee) any activity described in subclause (I), (II), or (III); or

(ff) any activity described in subsection (b) that is sanctioned under this subpart; or

(gg) any activity described in subsection (c) that is sanctioned under this subpart; or

(hh) any activity described in subsection (d) that is sanctioned under this subpart.

(b) Waiver.—The President may waive the requirements of subsection (a) if the President determines and certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the denial of admission of an alien under this section—

(1) was consistent with U.S. national security interests; or

(2) was the result of an error in the administration of immigration law.

(c) Application.—The waiver described in subsection (b) may be applied for by the Secretary of State in writing to the Attorney General, together with the reasons therefor.
has taken significant steps toward stopping the activity; and

“(cc) the President has received reliable assurances that the entity will not knowingly engage in an activity described in clause (ii)(1) again.”

(b) REGULATIONS.—Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (8 U.S.C. 236) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(j) REGULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INADMISSIBILITY OF ALIENS WHO ENGAGE IN CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall issue regulations and guidelines for interpreting and enforcing the provisions of paragraphs (H) and (I) of section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) on the admissibility of aliens who engage in certain sanctionable activities with respect to Iran.”

SEC. 603. AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES PROVISIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a), by striking “attempt to violate, conspire to violate” and inserting “attempt or conspire to violate”;

(2) in subsection (b), by striking “not to exceed” and all that follows and inserting “that is not less than twice the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation.”;

and

(3) in subsection (c) to read as follows:

“(c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.—A person who willfully commits, attempts or conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of, an unlawful act described in subsection (a) shall be fined not less than $1,000,000, imprisoned for more than 20 years, or both. A person other than a natural person shall be fined in an amount not less than the greater of half of the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation or $10,000,000.”

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section take effect on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to Congress that—

(1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its clear program; and we need those sanctions and no consequence, just rhetoric. We need overwhelming, crippling sanctions against Iranian officials and their nuclear complex; and we need those sanctions to be fully implemented with serious penalties for their violation.

SEC. 606. SUNSET.

(a) SUNSET.—The provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall terminate, and shall cease to be effective, on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to Congress that Iran—

(1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its nuclear weapons program; and

SEC. 604. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall apply to—

(1) activities subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947; or

(2) involving a natural gas development and pipeline project initiated prior to the date of enactment of this Act—

(A) to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey;

(B) in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or license awarded by a sovereign government, other than the Iranian government, before the date of enactment of this Act; and

(C) for the purpose of providing energy security and independence from Russia and other governments engaged in activities subject to sanctions under this Act.

SEC. 605. REGULATORY AUTHORITY.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate regulations as necessary for the implementation of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.

(b) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.—Not less than 60 days prior to the promulgation of regulations under subsection (a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the proposed regulations and of the provisions of this Act and the amendments made by this Act that the regulations are implementing.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the RECORD my correspondence with the chairmen of other committees of referral on this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Iran Threat Reduction Act, which I introduced together with the distinguished ranking member of our committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman). I would also like to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, for his key contributions on this Bill.

As is well known and articulated in the Declaration of National Emergency continued by successive U.S. Presidents, the Iranian regime poses an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

The revelation in October of Iran’s plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States on our soil and in the process murder and maim countless Americans is a stark reminder of the regime’s desire of a world at war with America. This network of U.S. officials foiled their plot, but the regime’s threat remains. We would be naive to think that they will not try again.

Meanwhile, Tehran continues to call for the destruction of our ally, Israel, while denying the Holocaust and making every effort to isolate the Jewish state. Ahmadinejad is more than willing to put Iran’s money where his mouth is, providing weapons, money, and support for several terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Hamas, which are waging war against Israel and our allies in the Middle East.

And last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency released a report providing extensive evidence that Tehran has been working on nuclear weapons for years, despite repeated calls for the regime to abandon these efforts. Their hostility is evident, and their intentions are crystal clear. We clearly understand the urgency of the Iranian threat.

Many of our closest allies understand this sense of urgency—from the Israelis to the British and the Canadians. We tried the olive branch of engagement, negotiation, and diplomacy. And what did we get, Mr. Speaker? Diatribes against the United States and our allies and a plot to shed blood on our soil.

The resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors in November does not even begin to cover the ground that we need. The resolution had no backbone for compliance by the regime and no consequence, just rhetoric. We need overwhelming, crippling sanctions against Iranian officials and their nuclear program; and we need those sanctions to be fully implemented with serious penalties for their violation.

We must undermine the foundations of the Iranian regime in order to compel it to abandon its deadly path. The Iran Threat Reduction Act closes loopholes in existing sanctions against Iran’s energy and financial sectors, sanctions senior Iranian regime officials and expands sanctions against those who help rogue regimes expand their dangerous weapons programs.

I hope that our Members join us in stopping this dangerous regime in its tracks.
I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1905 that has indicated involvement of the jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that bill, this Committee understands that the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar legislation should such a conference be convened.

Thank you for your consideration and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Chairman.

Dear Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC,

I am writing regarding H.R. 1905, the “Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011.” I am seeking continued and involved and involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this or similar legislation, and requests your support for any such request.

I would appreciate your response to this letter concerning H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011, and for your agreement that provisions of this bill fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

I am willing to waive this committee’s right to consider the bill. In so doing, I do not waive my right to consider the subject matter of the bill. I appreciate your commitment to insert this exchange of letters into the committee report and the Congressional Record, and your support for outside conferees from the Committee, should a conference be convened.

Sincerely,

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Chairman.

House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, November 23, 2011.

Hon. LAMAR SMITH, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC,

Dear Chairman Smith: Thank you for your letter concerning H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011. I concur in your judgment that provisions of the bill are within the jurisdiction of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

I am willing to waive this committee’s right to consider the bill. In so doing, I do not waive my right to consider the subject matter of the bill. I appreciate your commitment to insert this exchange of letters into the committee report and the Congressional Record, and your support for outside conferees from the Committee, should a conference be convened.

Sincerely,

Darrell Issa, Chairman.

House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC,

Dear Chairman Bachus: Thank you for your cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011.

I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Financial Services Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1905 which the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that bill, this Committee understands that the Financial Services Committee is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate conference or similar legislation should such a conference be convened.

Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Chairman.
the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.

I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming this understanding with respect to H.R. 1055, and would ask that a copy of any letters on this matter be included in the Congressional Record during Floor consideration.

Sincerely,

DAVE CAMP,
Chairman.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.

Hon. DAVE CAMP, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Longworth HOB, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN CAMP: Thank you for your cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1055, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011.

I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Committee on Ways and Means regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1055 which the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to the consideration of this bill, this Committee understands that the Committee on Ways and Means is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill.

I will seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar legislation should such a conference be convened.

Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Chairman.

With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to place in the RECORD an article from the Christian Science Monitor entitled, "Used-car salesman as Iran proxy? Why assassination plot doesn't add up for experts." And also from Mother Jones, "Four Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb Plot."

[From The Christian Science Monitor—CSMonitor.com, Oct. 12, 2011]

USED-CAR SALESMAN AS IRAN PROXY? Why ASSASSINATION PLOT DOESN'T ADD UP FOR EXPERTS

By Scott Peterson

The U.S. has blamed the specialist Qods Force in an Iran assassination plot. But those who track the group say the plot doesn’t reflect the careful planning, efficiency, and strategy the Qods Force is known for.

How much is Iran’s Qods Force when it comes to covert operations abroad?

This wing of the Revolutionary Guard was accused by U.S. military commanders in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 of operating plots against more than 150,000 American troops on the ground, of backing militias of all stripes, and of exercising strong influence on Baghdad’s rulers.

Yet how many Iranian Qods Force operatives did that take? One U.S. diplomat posted to Baghdad at the time had the consensus answer: There were just eight Qods Force men in all of Iraq.

In Pictures: Iran’s Military Might

Indeed, the Qods Force has a reputation for careful, method as well as effective use of local proxies, and ultimately their dramatic deployment by Tehran as covert tools to expand Iran’s influence across a region rich in anti-U.S. experts are raising questions about fresh U.S. charges of an Iranian-backed bomb plot, this time to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington and blow up the Saudi and Israeli embassies.

A criminal complaint filed by U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday charges Mansour Arbabsiar—a naturalized U.S. citizen with an Iranian passport from Corpus Christi, Texas—and Gholam Shakuri, an Iran-based member of Iran’s Qods Force, with plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador on U.S. soil in an operation "directed by factions of the Iranian government."

Details of Alleged Plot

Those who know Iran well are skeptical, but not not impossible. Mr. Arbabsiar may have arranged for $100,000 to be transferred from Iran as a downpayment of $1.5 million for the hit, as U.S. charges indicate.

Arbabsiar may also have boasted to one alleged accomplice in the plot—an associate of Mexico’s Zeta drug cartel, who also happened to be an informant of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration—that his cousin was a "big general" in the Iranian military.

While also describing a series of potential attacks that may even have stated—apparently in secretly taped conversations—that mass American casualties as a result were not a problem: "They want that guy dead," said another associate.

Sahimi also notes that, even at the height of the regime’s assassinations of opponents in the past, it did not target non-Iranians.

While Iran may have many reasons to be concerned about its survival, it did not target non-Iranians. "It is keenly aware that it is under the American microscope," says Sahimi, making even less likely Iran embarking "on such a useless assassination involving a low-level, non-player individual."

Such reservations are not the same ones given to Iranian officials, who dismiss the charges of a murder plot. But analysts suggest more information will need to be revealed before judgment can be made.

Arbabsiar, a former used car salesman, would appear to have been a surprise choice of an assassination tool. Yet he apparently traveled several times to Mexico to recruit drug-cartel hit men, had $100,000 from Iran paid into a U.S. account and promised much more, and discussed the plot on a normal telephone.

The Iranian modus operandi is only to trust sensitive plots to their own employees, Ayatollah Khomeini, Saudi Hezbollah, Hamas, the Sadr faction in Iraq, Iran-friendly extremist Muslims in Afghanistan and other Muslim groups," wrote Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service on Gulf2000 on Wednesday.

"Are we to believe that this Texas car seller was a Qods sleuth agent for many years resident in the U.S.?' Ridiculous," said Mr. Katzman, who authored a study of the Revolutionary Guard in Iraq for the House Foreign Affairs 1st subcommittee (The Iranian command system) never ever use such has-beens or loosely connected people for sensitive plots such as this.

And what kind of man is he? The Associated Press spoke to Arbabsiar’s friend and former Texas business partner David Shamsi, who said he was a "hustler." The Iranian-American, the AP reported, "was likable, albeit a bit lazy."
December 13, 2011

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H8849

Mr. Speaker, U.S. policy towards Iran has failed to

4 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE IRAN

BOMB PLOT

[From Mother Jones, Oct. 12, 2011]

[From Brookings, Dec. 13, 2011, Reprinted by

permission of Foreign Affairs, November 2011, which cites the ineffec-

tiveness of the United States sanctions policy.

[From Foreign Affairs, Dec. 13, 2011, Reprinted by

permission of Foreign Affairs, November 2011, Vol. 89, No. 7 (2011 by

the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.)

THE SELF-LIMITING SUCCESS OF IRAN

SANSCTIONS

(By Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, For-

eign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy: Raj Takey, Senior Fellow for

Middle Eastern Studies, Council on For-

eign Relations)

Since the 1979 revolution that ousted Iran's

pro-Arab monarch and replaced it with a
thecocratic regime hostile to the West, the
United States has sought to temper Iran's
government, including Members of Con-
gress, to engage Iran diplomatically,

considering legislation that significantly

debate a proposal that

H8849

sanctions to Iran's east and west that removed

their elders; these children of the revolution

sent and an insistence on absolute fealty to

an aging clerical tyrant; abroad, provocative

actions towards Washington. Unexpectedly, it

has been a younger generation of Iranian

politicians—Ahmadinejad and his cohort—

who have rejected the nascent pragmatism of

their elders; these children of the revolution

are seeking to revive its mandates rather

than to restrain them.

At the same moment as Iran's formidable

nuclear bomb and aim towards the region

began an even more dramatic set of political

transformations, first with the US interven-
tions to Iran's east and west that removed

the theocracy's most menacing adversaries,

and later with the advent of a powerful, far-

reaching movement for democratic account-

ability across the Arab world. As a result of

these intersecting trends, Iran's paranoid,

combative leadership has been emboldened
to take advantage of the opportunities to be

found in an uncertain regional environment

with a shifting balance of power. For this

reason, the threats posed by Iran's domestic

and regional policies loom ever larger for

Washington and the broader international

community.

To date, however, the Obama administra-
tion has stuck to the essential framework of

the carrot-and-stick diplomacy it adopted

upon taking office in 2009—an approach that
differs merely in style from that of the Bush
administration during its second term. This
self-described 'dual-track' strategy relies on
economic pressure to force Iran to enter

negotiations and moderate its policies, con-
sistent with the basic American formula

for dealing with Iran since 1979. The achieve-
ment of such an approach has always been
open to question.

Even as the Obama administration has im-
posed the broadest and most robust multilat-
erial restrictions on Iran in history, all of

Tehran's most disturbing policies, including

its aggressive nuclear programme, proceed

pace. Sanctions have imposed heavy finan-
cial and political costs on the Iranian Repub-
lic, but they have not convinced Iranian
leaders that their interests would be better
served by relinquishing its weapons ambi-
tions. Instead, sanctions are driving the other
reckless poli-
cies, or even opening a serious dialogue with

Washington. This obscurity is a function of the
complex political transformation within the

Islamic Republic. As a result of the momentous
changes that have

swept the broader region. As a result, in

dealing with the Islamic Republic of 2011
economic sanctions can have little expecta-
tion of achieving meaningful changes in

Tehran's policies. This article examines the

history of sanctioning the Islamic Republic,

and argues that despite their increasing se-

verity, sanctions have failed to achieve their

intended policy results thanks to the re-
gime's capacity for resisting international

pressure. Moreover, the rise of a new genera-
tion of hard-liners and the aftermath of

the Arab Spring has exacerbated the regime's
aversion to compromise.

U.S. policy towards Iran has failed to

ensure a peaceful Iran that aids re-

gional security. Yet today we are con-

sidering legislation that significantly

reduces or even eliminates any effective

U.S. Gov-

ernment, including Members of Con-
gress, to engage Iran diplomatically,

and it further hurts ordinary Iranian
people by imposing indiscriminate sanctions. Proponents of the Iran Threat Reduction Act claim that it’s a last ditch effort to prevent military confrontation with Iran. Yet, this bill takes away the most effective tool to prevent war—diplomacy. As the United States only began to extricate itself from the highly questionable military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot allow the United States to be plunged into yet another disastrous war.

I oppose nuclear proliferation for military purposes for all countries and believe that sanctions have proven to be a failed policy. We must rely on diplomacy, not outlaw it, and avoid taking steps which push us closer to military confrontation.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

This bill may represent our last chance to escalate means to pressure the Iranian regime into stopping its nuclear weapons program. Within the next year, possibly in the next 6 months, this program may become irreversible unless we act now.

We know that sanctions are having an impact. President Ahmadinejad recently said that Iranian banks “cannot make international transactions anymore.” Just this weekend, Iran’s Central Bank governor said the situation of sanctions is hard but probable. Without this bill before us today, I intend to make his fight much harder.

No sanctions can be deemed truly effective until Iran ends its nuclear weapons program. We know that Iran is steadily increasing its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, moving its centrifuges to a hardened underground facility and making progress in other ways towards a nuclear-weapons capability. We need to do more and faster.

If we build on past efforts by imposing sanctions on foreign commercial enterprises that do business with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, by widening the scope of sanctions on human-rights abusers, and by other means. But one of the most important elements of this bill is my measure to impose sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank, which provides key financial support for Iran’s nuclear-weapons and terrorism activities. This measure would block Iran entirely off from the world’s banking system, dealing an unprecedented blow to Iran’s economy.

This may cause short-term difficulties for the world’s oil market. And it may rattle some of our allies. But it is necessary because stopping Iran’s nuclear program is of paramount strategic importance—and we are running out of time.

Mr. Speaker, our absolute goal must be to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program. That is the goal of this bill. We may have only a few more months to deal peacefully with this crisis. There is no time to lose.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

I reserve the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the RECORD an article from the Washington Post ombudsman entitled, “Getting ahead of the facts on Iran,” which states that the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb nor does it say it is building one.

[From The Washington Post, December 9, 2011]

GETTING AHEAD OF THE FACTS ON IRAN

(By Patrick B. Pexton)

Headlines are tricky and difficult. They’re written quickly, with print and Web publishing deadlines always looming, and with space limitations, yet headline writers try to be creative, informative, and occasionally, humorous. Few readers remember the hundreds of well-crafted headlines that entice yet describe a story accurately. But when a headline is bad, it sticks with you, like a burn you can’t get off.

So it was with recent headlines that appeared on one of The Post’s online photo galleries.

I was bombarded—about 1,500 e-mails—with complaints about this headline (it was an organized campaign, but more about that in a minute). The photo slideshow depicted Iran’s nuclear research facilities and originally had a headline and subhead that readers felt were misleading: “Iran’s quest to possess nuclear weapons, the main headline said, followed by this subhead: ‘Intelligence shows that Iran received foreign assistance to overcome key hurdles in acquiring a nuclear weapon, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.’”

The gallery was linked to two stories by The Post’s national intelligence reporter, John Warrick, one on Nov. 6 and one on Nov. 8 describing the latest IAEA report, in which the U.N. agency said that Iran’s drive for nuclear technology has military aspects that could bring it to the threshold of a nuclear bomb.

“But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor does it say that it is building one. It is not the case that its multiyear effort pursuing nuclear technology has reached a point where it is consistent with building a bomb.”

This was an effort organized by a left-leaning group called ”Just Foreign Policy.” Donilon, addressing the administration’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program in light of the latest IAEA report, stated that sanctions have isolated Iran internationally, helped delay Iran’s nuclear program, and facilitated dividing Iran’s isolation from the United States only now begins to extricate itself from the highly questionable policy of mass destruction] program as facts. Now we’re seeing the same behavior concerning Iran.

So he spotlighted the headline on the top of Just Foreign Policy’s home page, with this message: “U.S. media helped railroad the nation into war with Iraq by treating unknown claims about Iraq’s alleged [weapons of mass destruction] program as facts. Now we’re seeing the same behavior concerning Iran.”

Photo galleries generally are built by photo editors and then passed to copy editors for captions and headlines. I couldn’t identify exactly where. The process these headlines went wrong, but when I raised the issue it was quickly fixed.

In foreign policy, one bad headline can check the globe in minutes and undermine The Post’s credibility. It can also play into the hands of those who are seeking further confrontation with Iran.

I would like to place in the RECORD an article, “Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanction Strategy” which raises questions about the Iranian stockpile and how much enriched uranium they actually have.

EXPERTS CAST DOUBT ON IRAN SANCTION STRATEGY

Monday, November 28, 2011
(By Ardavan Naimi)

WASHINGTON, DC.—“We have succeeded in imposing the strongest sanctions to date on the Iranian regime,” said Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor, last week at the Brookings Institution. Donilon, addressing the administration’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program in light of the latest IAEA report, stated that sanctions have isolated Iran internationally, helped delay Iran’s nuclear program, and facilitated dividing inside Iran’s political establishment.

But according to some of the experts participating in a panel discussion preceding Donilon’s keynote address, the sanctions have largely punished ordinary Iranians and have united, not divided, political factions in Iran.

According to Keven Harris, U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph peace scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the Johns Hopkins University, the sanctions are “not as smart as we think.” Harris described the effects of sanctions inside of Iran. “Sanctions are having an impact… in what I like to call ‘trickle down’ sanctions. Sanctions affect the ability of citizens to buy banks and obtain foreign exchange and goods, consequently affecting small and medium sized enterprises...”
inside Iran—such as the construction and automobile industry. This process has resulted in the rising cost of business. This trickling down helps to raise “unemployed to a certain extent,” and also decreases wages, affecting everyday Iranians.

Harris challenged the assumption that sanctions facilitate divisions inside Iran’s political system. Threatened regimes may act together . . . all of a sudden they have a real big incentive to start working together,” said Harris. “At high peaks of perceived external threat, it’s conducive to unity and the discourse of factionalism dies down.”

We spend a lot of resources on sanctions . . . political, we need to ask ourselves, what’s the cost benefit of that versus spending resources on diplomatic options.

Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations believes that “Iran’s nuclear program is driven by domestic political factors.” Yet, Takeyh takes the argument that Iran’s nuclear program is actually the Islamic Republic’s only perceived path to “intimidation.” By withholding sanctions and obtaining a nuclear weapon, Iran would “extract tributes from international concession.” “This program . . . may be more dramatic mediation underpinned by economic coercion,” said Takeyh.

Harris challenged Takeyh’s assertion, stating that “if the goal of the program is their perceived only path to international legitimacy, then it seems like an alternative policy would be to provide a different path to international legitimacy for Iran that they don’t perceive as open.”

Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists, discussed the latest IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program. “Is there anything really new in the annex of the IAEA report?” asked Ferguson, “you have to say, not really. There’s not a whole lot of new stuff in there.” Although there are reasons for concern regarding Iran’s ongoing efforts, Ferguson says that “most of the things that are documented, that we know well, happened prior to 2003.”

Iran continues to build up its stockpile of 19.75 percent enriched uranium, yet Ferguson acknowledges “even at 20 percent enrichment, it’s still going to take a few hundred kilograms of that amount of material to have enough for one bomb . . . and Iran so far adhering to the IAEA, has something like 80 kilograms enriched to that level.” Even when factoring in Iran’s 4,900 kilograms of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium, Ferguson concludes that it is “still not enough material to provide Iran with a true breakout capability.” Ferguson suggested that the best response to Iran’s defiance is not further threats or sanctions but to use diplomatic mediation to facilitate increased safeguards and limits on Iran’s nuclear program.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).

Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate the gentleman’s courtesy in permitting me to speak on the bill. We will postulate that Iran has been a terrible actor and that having nuclear weapons is a threat to international stability and something that we should resist.

I am concerned about the legislation that is before us being potentially counterproductive in two areas. It’s not clear how much time we have left. In its report on Iran’s nuclear program last November, the International Atomic Energy Agency stated that not only has Iran continued to make significant progress regarding its nuclear program, but it said that it had uncovered solid evidence that Iran has been working on a nuclear explosive device as well.

Given the Iranian regime’s history of concealing its clandestine nuclear activities, Tehran may very well be closer to a nuclear weapons capability than we even assume. Some estimates now place them a mere 6 months to a year away from having all the ingredients in place to build a nuclear weapon. Every day that we move forward increases their ambition, their desire to realize their nuclear ambitions, and our nightmare scenario moves closer and closer to becoming a reality.

The Iranian regime is not interested in any outcome other than a nuclear Iran. Even the most optimistic among us must ask ourselves, what’s the cost benefit of that versus spending resources on diplomatic options?

Mr. Speaker, Congress should spend a good deal of time trying to deal with Iran. I am concerned about what we do with Iran matters. But I’m deeply concerned about language here that would prohibit any official or unofficial capacity—having no person employed by the United States contacting in an official or unofficial capacity.

My reading of this is that it is inappropriate to tie the hands of the administration to require 15 days’ notice to exercise a waiver authority. Where we have been successful in the past, for example, in defusing a real nuclear problem with Cuba, there was actual engagement with the administration. President Kennedy and others were able to work dealing with the real problem, dealing with the Soviet Union, our adversaries, people who could actually and should actually negotiate.

I am deeply concerned that we not forestall opportunities to engage in diplomacy, which needs to be a part of any reasonable sanction policy going forward trying to deal with Iran.

From my vantage point, I think we need to be careful about how we move forward dealing with sanctions policies. Sanctions are a very important tool to protect our interests and ask questions later. My hope is that we will have an opportunity to deal with this issue with the gravity that it requires, have interaction on the floor, be careful about what we’re doing going forward with the economic impact and the fact that it may very well likely further embolden this administration, the administration of Iran. I don’t think that’s something that is appropriate to us.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

A nuclear Iran is unacceptable. Our fundamental strategic objective must be to stop Iran before it obtains nuclear weapons capabilities and to compel it to permanently dismantle its pursuit of such weapons. That is the test we face. And if we fail, it will come as no consolation to the families of the victims of past and future Iranian attacks or to our allies.

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I’d like to thank Chairman ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN for bringing together the best ideas of so many Members—and, of course, to move toward another important step toward dissa

The Menendez-Kirk language would, like this bill, sanction those U.S. banks that violate our law by doing business with Iran. It makes foreign assets owned by non-U.S. companies that the Central Bank of Iran has foolishly left in the United States or may have done so. But the key thing about the Kirk-Menendez language is that it tells European and Asian and other non-U.S. banks that they must stop doing business with the Central Bank of Iran and virtually all the major banks of Iran as well. It imposes secondary sanctions. And I believe the Kirk-Menendez language will make it difficult for Iran to sell oil or to buy anything with its oil revenue.

I urge the passage of this bill, the Kirk-Menendez language, and other sanctions against Iran.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the Democratic whip for the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. HOYER).

Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. BUMEN) for yielding. I also want to thank him and my colleagues from the Kirk-Menendez coalition for their leadership on this bill.

Looking at the particulars of this bill, I want to thank the chairwoman for including in this bill, in title III, provisions dealing with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. These are based on the landmark 2007 Ignition Implementation Act, which I introduced in 2009 along with the chairwoman, ED ROYCE, and DAN BURTON.

This title III makes it clear to foreign companies that, if they do business with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, they cannot do business in the United States.

I also want to thank the chairwoman for cosponsoring, both last year and this year, my bill, the Stop Iran’s Nuclear program and regime survival. We owe a special debt of gratitude to the mullahs who are running Iran, because it is their incompetence and their corruption that creates a risk to regime survival even at a time of very high oil prices. And we owe a debt of gratitude to the Iranian people, who rose upon against this regime in the summer of 2009 and whose desire for freedom poses a real threat to regime survival.

On top of these dangerous risks, Iran’s continued nuclear development runs the risk, of course, of launching a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Indeed, just last week, a former Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, confirmed our worst fears, suggesting that his country might begin to pursue a nuclear capability in response to Iran’s nuclear development.

Iran has continued its sponsorship of terrorism against our ally, Israel, and carries out gross human rights abuses against its own people. Sanctions against Iran’s energy, transportation, and financial institutions are necessary to, and I believe, will make clear to Iran the steep costs of its choices. That is why I am in strong support of this resolution, the Iran Threat Reduction Act and the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act, and urge my colleagues to vote “yes” on both.
Moreover, in his testimony before a Senate committee in March 2011, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed that the intelligence community still had a high level of confidence that Iran had not yet made a decision to restart its nuclear weapons program.

Because the weapons program is believed to rely on projects that are not yet completed, intelligence about weapons development is not consistent with the notion that any weapons-related R&D has resumed which is not part of the current Administration’s coordinated program. That program’s activities were resumed later. Key personnel are still involved in those renewed activities apparently tiring loose ends regarding their prior research and development work.

**SUMMARY OF KEY IAEA FINDINGS ON WEAPONS-RELATED ACTIVITIES**

The IAEA deserves credit for continuing to press for a body of research that presents this information to the IAEA Board of Governors in spite of Iran’s unwillingness to cooperate with the investigation. This resolve helps to bolster the credibility of the agency and show that countries cannot simply get away with nonproliferation violations by denial and obfuscation.

According to the report, Iran was engaged in an effort prior to the end of 2003 which ran the full range of nuclear weapons development, from acquiring the raw nuclear material to weaponization. Clapper stated the IAEA eventually deliver via a missile. Just as important as the type of work being carried out is how that work was organized. The series of projects that made up Iran’s nuclear program appears to have been overseen by “senior Iranian figures” and engaged in “working level correspondence” consistent with a coordinated program.

**Key components of this program include:**

- **Fissile Material Production:** As documented in previous reports, Iran ran an undeclared, intermittent, integrated weapons-development program that the IAEA has identified as the backbone of Iran’s nuclear program. The report has provided some insight into the type of activity that may have been resumed, which seems to be focused on warhead design verification. The act that the agency was able to detail some of the organizational structure of Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran will likely be concerned about its inability to hide such important information and will likely engage in further restructuring following this report, which may delay its efforts once again. Considering the IAEA’s reliance on intelligence information from states, it went through considerable length to demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. It was not just a matter of acquiring consistent information from different countries, but it seems some of the most incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which Iran admits it relied upon.

- **The information from the Khan network includes details about nuclear warhead designs the network gave Iran that match up to the IAEA’s investigation into that work.** It must also insist that Iran improve its cooperation with the agency prior to the next board meeting.

A consensus response is unlikely given existing divisions among the 35 countries, and in part because the issue is very much an election-year concern on the board. Beijing and Moscow have also unfortunately played an unhelpful role prior to the release of the report by calling on Director-General Yukiya Amano to limit the information detailed it contains. However, it is important that the board’s response convey to as many countries as possible to demonstrate to Tehran that it cannot engage in work directly related to nuclear weapons development. Iran cannot complain that Western states are trying to deny the Islamic Republic its nuclear “rights.” The U.S. position, consistent with the 2005 offer by the P5+1, has been that Iran could resume enrichment some time in the future after it reestablishes confidence with the international community by abandoning any nuclear weapons

**As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 1, 2011, it is the U.S. Government’s position is that “under very strict conditions” and “having responded to the international community’s Security Council-mandated sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and missile sectors and, if Iran remains unwilling to cooperate with the IAEA and ignore the Security Council’s further isolate Iran diplomatically and economically.”

**MAINTAIN PRESSURE AND ENGAGE**

In response to the IAEA’s report, the international community should redouble efforts to bolster the integrity of the agency and press the issue and to present this important information to states, it went through considerable length to demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. It was not just a matter of acquiring consistent information from different countries, but it seems some of the most incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which Iran admits it relied upon.

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**Will Sanctions Against Iran Raise Gas Prices?**

(By Brian Fung)**

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**Will Sanctions Against Iran Raise Gas Prices?**

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The Senate unanimously passed a bill Thursday that would impose economic sanctions on Iran, over the objection of the White House. One of the administration’s complaints was that the bill could lead to an increase in the price of gasoline that could be as much as $1.25 a gallon. How much could sanctioning Iran cost us at the pump? The nightmare scenario would be an additional $25 per barrel, which would just over 5 percent of the world’s crude, which doesn’t seem like a lot. But oil demand is price-insensitive—people and businesses continue to buy fuel, no matter what the cost, until the costs go way up. That means a reduction in supply will have a disproportionate affect on prices. In the past, price increases have been followed by a decline in production.

Based on the same historical data, and given
that oil is currently hovering at around $100 per barrel, a complete shutdown of Iranian exports could force prices as high as $150. (That’s 5 percent, times the tenfold multiplier.) The price of $100 per barrel could increase a dollar-chance in the cost of a barrel of oil usually translates to a two-and-a-half cent surge in retail gas prices, cutting off foreign oil prices could reduce the price of gasoline by a dollar and a quarter.

This theoretical scenario is extremely unlikely, however. The Senate bill permits the president to delay the sanctions if the new agreements don’t immediately impact the price of oil. (Consider, for example, the oil for food program that undermined sanctions against Iraq. The Senate sanctions against Iran also have a humanitarian exemption.)

There haven’t been a truly effective, worldwide boycott of a country’s oil exports since 1991–93, when Iran nationalized its oil industry. As long as Iran oil continues to flow to Asia and Europe, the sanctions would have a relatively small impact on prices.

There’s also the possibility that Saudi Arabia could make up for some of the banned Iranian oil, as it did during the first and second Persian Gulf wars. The Saudis wouldn’t be able to ramp entirely on in the short term; they don’t have as much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the blow, though.

There is one long-shot scenario that should be mentioned, in which oil prices go even higher than $150 per barrel. When pressured in the past, Iran has threatened to block oil delivery through the Strait of Hormuz. Around 17 percent of oil tradable globally passes through that waterway.

While such an occurrence could theoretically lead to $8-per-gallon gasoline, based on the historic relationship between supply and price, it’s a practical impossibility. Demand would drop significantly at those dizzying prices, causing the cost of a barrel of oil to increase more in proportion with changes to supply. More importantly, the economic shock to the world economy would likely trigger a naval response from the U.S. and its allies.

Mr. Speaker, an article in the Wall Street Journal raises this question as well. It says that crude flirts with $100 a barrel on geopolitical unrest. And it also quotes a commodity strategist at a major bank in London saying that they don’t have as much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the blow, though.

Mr. Speaker, an article in the Wall Street Journal raises this question as well. It says that crude flirts with $100 a barrel on geopolitical unrest. And it also quotes a commodity strategist at a major bank in London saying that they don’t have as much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the blow, though.

A director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, Mr. Adam Szubin, stated that there are real scenarios in which an oil spike might hit. This is from an article: U.S. officials warn that new sanctions could be a boon to Iran. There’s another article that cites that, an article from The New York Times which states that U.S. officials have declared they’d hold Iran accountable for a purported plot, but they’ve now decided that a proposed move against Iran’s central bank would disrupt international oil markets and could damage the reeling American and world economies. I think that’s something that we ought to be concerned about; that if, in fact, we are moving forward with sanctions, sanctions which will have an effect on the price of oil, is this the timing to do that kind of thing, and are we prepared in this Congress to accept the responsibility for a sharp increase in the price of oil pricing?

Here’s a quote from a blog called San Francisco Gate quoting the Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “There’s absolutely a risk the price of oil would go up, which could mean that Iran, would, in fact, have more money to fuel its nuclear ambitions, not less.”

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ENGEL), a senior member of the committee, a leader in these efforts for many years, the ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee.

Mr. ENGEL. I rise in strong support of this legislation.

Under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. This is a dangerous regime which has already killed thousands of Israelis and will kill the destruction of Israel. And every day they’re getting closer to weaponizing a stockpile of enriched uranium.

No amount of naivete or wishful thinking will get the Iranian regime to back down. And if diplomacy hasn’t worked and won’t work. They’ll only play for time.

We heard the same arguments about not putting the sanctions on the apartheid regime in South Africa. Now we hear that oil is going to go sky high.

Well, you know what? I think morality is more important than the price of oil. I think morality says that this terrible regime should not be allowed to have nuclear weapons, should not be allowed to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth, should not be allowed to do the horrible things that it does.

This important bill imposes tough sanctions on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and against the Central Bank of Iran, and the Iranians have to know our sanctions will only be increased if they don’t back off soon.

We have bipartisan support here. People say Congress doesn’t work together. We worked together on this. This is important. We need to pass this bill.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

I would respectfully respond to my friend from New York that the price of oil is, in fact, a moral question.

I want to raise the question of the constitutionality of this particular proposal. I believe that it’s unconstitutional because it is an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and freedom of association. It is an unconstitutional abridgement of the right of free expression by Federal employees. It is a violation of whistleblower protection which have been granted a constitutional basis; that, in fact, it violates our own speech and debate clause of the Constitution of the United States because we have an obligation to inquire and to ask questions; that it violates the Constitution’s separation of powers; that it violates the President’s power to engage in foreign diplomacy; that it is operationally impossible; that you can have even Admiral Mullen, former Chair of the Joint Chiefs, point out that with the communications that could occur from a lack of diplomacy, we could be putting our own people at risk.

In fact, there was an article that was published that deals with a scenario that would happen in the Gulf where there are run-ins between American and Iranian vessels. The no contact provision, if enacted, could outlaw the U.S. Navy’s bridge-to-bridge communications with Iranian vessels.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. DEUTCH), someone who has provided a major contribution to this legislation that’s now before the House.

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank the ranking member, my friend, Mr. BERMAN.

The legislation before us today will give the United States the tools to impose the most stringent, the most crippling sanctions aimed at cracking down on what is the greatest threat to international security, a nuclear armed Iran.

The Iran Threat Reduction Act builds on the already significant steps this Congress took, along with our partners in the EU and at the United Nations last year, to dramatically ratchet up pressure on the Iranian regime in order to thwart its illicit quest for nuclear weapons. The bill comes on the heels of the IAEA report that confirmed what we already knew—the Iranian regime is pursuing nuclear weapons. It comes on the heels of the failed Iranian assassination plot and the dangerous attack coordinated by the regime on the British Embassy. And it comes even as the Iranian regime contributes to the brutal crackdown on the Syrian people that has left over 5,000 dead, so that the regime can continue to use Syria as a conduit for routing weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas to be used against Israel.

Mr. Speaker, I am proud to have authored two provisions contained in this bill. And I would like to thank the bill’s sponsors, Chairman ROSENSTEIN and Ranking Member BERMAN, for working with me to include the Iran Transparency and Accountability Act and the Iran Human Rights Democracy Promotion Act.
with Iran on its SEC filings. This forced disclosure will accelerate the imposition of sanctions.

Mr. Speaker, this legislation also includes mandatory sanctions on those who perpetrate the most egregious human rights abuses. This regime’s use of information technology to suppress its opposition must be stopped, and the United States must stand with the people of Iran in their quest for democracy and freedom. Mr. Speaker, a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable, and we must make it clear that we are serious, determined, and aggressive in our approach to halt Iran’s illegal, destabilizing, and dangerous pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would like to place in the RECORD an article by Seymour Hersh which cites the IAEA’s report suggesting, according to the Arms Control Association, that “it is apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable.”

[The New Yorker Online Only Daily Complimentary Access December 18, 2011]

**IRAN AND THE IAEA.**

(Posted by Seymour M. Hersh)

The first question in last Saturday night’s Republican debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly published report by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.) provides a stark warning.

The report, which raised renewed concern about the “possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran,” struck a darker tone than previous assessments. It was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the IAEA report had provided “additional credible evidence that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon” and asked what various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would encourage public support for effective arms control. The A.C.A. noted that the IAEA did “reinforce what the non-proliferation community has recognized for some times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continued others.” (The American intelligence community reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007 estimate.)

The IAEA’s report “suggests,” the A.C.A. paper said, that Iran “is working to shorten the time frame to build the bomb once and if it makes the decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable.”

Joe Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a disarmament group, said, “The Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night.”

I’ve been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker for the past decade, with a focus on the credibility of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons production program in Iran. The goals of the high-risk American covert operations was to find something physical—a “smoking calutron,” as a knowledgeable official once told me—to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to attack and destroy the site.

The new report, published in its lead story the day after the report came out, that IAEA investigators “have amassed a trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a ‘credible’ case that Iran is carrying out nuclear-weapons activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as declaring that “the level of detail is unbelievable. . . . The report describes virtually all the steps to make a nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of those steps. It reads like a menu. The entire, much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on the IAEA report noted, more cautiously, that “it is true that the basic allega- tion—that Iran is pursuing a nuclear program—and as a result, it has been able to refine its analysis.” The net effect has been to create “more concern.” But Robert0.

But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings? The IAEA said it had continued in recent years “to receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to possible Iranian nuclear programs” and, as a result, it has been able “to refine its analysis.” The net effect has been to create “more concern.”

The question is, of course, that Iran has simply circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the IAEA, perhaps even building Dick Cheney’s nightmare: a hidden underground nuclear-weapons enrichment facility.

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nuclear bomb on peaceful neighbors like Israel. This outcome is unacceptable, and the United States must continue to enact tougher sanctions to ensure that this never happens.

H.R. 1905 will add new sanctions targeting the Central Bank of Iran, making it difficult for foreign companies to do business with Iran. H.R. 1905 will also increase sanctions on members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Mr. Speaker, the biggest threat to world peace is the religious fanatics in Iran having a nuclear bomb. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons simply cannot happen. Not on our watch. I implore my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation which will force Iran to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

I would like to place in the RECORD a letter from 26 organizations that urge Congress to consider the provisions restricting contact with Iranian officials.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE: We urge you to oppose the provision restricting contact with Iran included in the Iran sanctions bill H.R. 1905 and to work with your colleagues to remove it from the bill when it comes to the House floor. We are concerned that Section 606C of this legislation would undermine prospects for a diplomatic resolution of Iran’s disputed nuclear program, increasing the threat of war.

This provision was inserted into the bill during committee markup, after most of the cosponsors had already signed onto H.R. 1905. Section 606C of H.R. 1905 would expressly prohibit contact between U.S. government officials and certain Iranian officials, as noted below.

(2) Restriction on contact.—No person employed by the United States Government may contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that—(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, is representing, or is otherwise associated with the Government of Iran; and (2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with terrorist organizations. (d) Waiver.—The President may waive the requirements of subsection (c) if the President determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional committees that—(1) the President has determined that the Government of Iran is in compliance with its obligations under international law; (2) the President has determined that there are compelling reasons, based on national security, to engage in such contact; and (3) the President has determined that such contact is consistent with the national security interests of the United States.

At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran, sustained and flexible diplomacy is an essential tool to prevent war. Just before he retired from the position of Chairman of the Joint Staff, Admiral Mullen called for an established channel of communications with Iran, noting that: “We haven’t had a connection with Iran since we had a link, early days of the Cold War we had links of the Soviet Union . . . if something happens it’s virtually assured that we won’t get it right, that there will be miscalculations which would be extremely dangerous in that part of world . . . I think any channel would be terrific.”

We urge every member of Congress to oppose Section 606C speak out on the House floor against efforts designed to constrain diplomatic engagement with Iran.

Sincerely,
Friends Committee on National Legislation; Americans for Peace Now; Arms Control Association; Center for Interfaith Engagement, Eastern Mennonite University; Church of the Brethren; Council for a Livable World; Fellowship of Reconciliation; Just Foreign Policy; Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness Project; Mennonite Central Committee; Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns; Mennonite Central Committee; Minnesota Peace Project; Middle East Studies Association of North American Council; New Internationalism Project, Institute for Policy Studies; Peace Action; Peace Action West; Peace Catalyst International; Progressive Democrats for America; Project on Middle East Democracy; Student Peace Alliance; United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries; United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society; Women’s Action for New Directions; SP Human Security: Partners for Peacebuilding Policy.

It’s interesting that what we’re actually suggesting here is taking diplomacy off the table. I was here for the debate in Iraq. I led the effort in this Congress in challenging the then-Bush administration that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which they intended to use against the United States. I was here. I don’t know how many of you were here. But I saw a case being made for war, and that case was based on exaggerations and unfortunately in some cases distortions and lies.

We have to be very careful that we’re not setting the stage for still another war. We must be very careful that when we assert a certain level of preparedness on the part of Iran with respect to their nuclear capability that we aren’t actually shutting the door that needs to be open in order to try to resolve any difficulty between our nations. We can say, well, we want to get them back to the table, but then don’t talk to them.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to my distinguished colleague and good friend who’s been very active on these issues, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. PALLONE).

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. BERMAN.

I want to take issue with my colleagues from Ohio. I don’t think there is a comparison between the situation in Iraq and Iran because it has become abundantly clear that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; and a nuclear Iran is not only a threat to the United States but democratic nations all across the globe.

The legislation before us builds on the comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act passed last Congress and imposes new and stronger sanctions, and this bill is the next logical step in U.S. policy to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.

I am quoting from an article in The Hill, which I cited earlier:

Section 601 would prohibit U.S. Government employees in any official or unofficial capacity from contacting anyone who is affiliated with the Iranian Government who presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated with a terrorist organization.

Look, if you want to stop war, you have to have communication with people. I mean, if you look back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is one of the gravest crises of the 20th century, it was the United States and Russia were able to engage in a communication.

So we have to be very careful that we don’t pass any kind of a law that would restrict, not just First Amendment rights and not just freedom of association, but would restrict the basic kind of diplomacy that’s used, because everyone here knows that diplomacy is not just leaders talking to leaders. All kinds of backdoor diplomacy goes on, and I think that that needs to be taken into consideration.

I reserve the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As I said, Mr. Speaker, I am going to close; so the gentleman from Ohio must use his time.

I reserve the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my colleagues very much for whom I have the greatest respect, but the opportunity to discuss this; although I painfully must disagree with you here.

Broad sanctions against Iran can only further isolate Iran from the international community and cause the regime to be even more aggressive.

The sanctions actually play directly into the hands of the Iranian Government. They directly undermine the efforts of the Iranian people, who have courageously challenged their government often at the cost of their lives. The sanctions could be seen as a gift to the regime, not just a political gift for polarization within their country to cross opposition, but also an economic gift because the price of oil will go up, and Iran will cash in on that.

Section 302 of this bill revokes the President’s authority to license the export of civilian aircraft parts and repairs for Iranian civil aircraft, authority which would ensure the safety of flight for humanitarian purposes. This provision reckless places the lives of Iranian Americans in danger. We ought to defeat this bill and stand for diplomacy.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Iran remains the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. According to our Treasury Department, Iran is a critical transit point for funding to support al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This network serves as the core pipeline that provides al Qaeda money, facilitators, and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia, including al Qaeda’s operational commander. Also, Tehran is providing key support to the regime in Damascus, another state sponsor of terrorism that is of proliferation concern and which is currently engaged in the violent repression of the people of Syria.

Iran is also directly responsible for the deaths of many Americans. It continues to sponsor violent extremist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan that have killed our men and women in uniform. Just last week, a Federal judge found that the Iranian regime provided material aid and support for al Qaeda’s 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

Just imagine what an emboldened Iran would do if allowed to obtain nuclear weapons and the means by which to deliver them. Remember what the regime has already said that it wants to do. Ahmadinejad has openly proclaimed that Iran seeks a world without America and Zionism; and Iran’s so-called supreme leader has stated...
that Iran is prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge, and technology of its scientists. We should take them at their word and impose crippling sanctions on this regime, and it starts tonight. Mr. Speaker. With this bill, H.R. 905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act. Let’s pass it tonight.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Speaker, last year, when we passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act, I came to the floor stating that we must go further. Our stated goal then, as it is now, was to protect Americans, our allies, and the Iranians who suffer under a tyrannical regime. We have made it clear that it is unacceptable for Iran to develop nuclear weapons.

While a step in the right direction, last year's version of Iran Sanctions gave too much flexibility to the administration and included vast loopholes that weakened the law's effective- ness. As I speak now, the Obama administration has not lifted sanctions to ten foreign companies and has given leeway to companies operating in Iran. Iran has continued development of nuclear weapons and poses an even greater threat to America and her allies.

Today's bill, H.R. 905, the Iran Threat Re- duction Act, takes the threat of Iran's nuclear program seriously. The legislation would mandate sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran. It would also impose sanctions on foreign banks that continue to do business with the Iranian Central Bank. Just last week the Senate unanimously supported sanctioning the Iranian Central Bank. As the House and Senate are deeply divided on other major issues, we all believe that Iran is a threat that must be dealt with swiftly and that the Central Bank must be sanctioned. H.R. 905 also would reassert that it is U.S. policy to ensure Iran does not obtain the ability to produce nuclear weapons. Finally, the bill would close the loophole in current U.S. law that allows foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to bypass U.S. sanctions.

Will this legislation single-handedly prevent a nuclear Iran from emerging? Likely it will not. We may have waited too long for our actions today to single-handedly dismantle Iran's nuclear ambitions. However, with this legislation, allies are already indicating they will follow our lead and potentially sanction the Iranian Central Bank as well. As we show the rest of the world we take this threat seriously, they will too. I urge my colleagues to support this measure.

Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Iran Threat Reduction Act. Although I do have concerns about new language added to the bill in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is my hope that this language will be corrected before this bill advances.

The passage last year of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was a key step in the effort to prevent Iran from gaining the ability to develop a nuclear weapon and it is important that we continue to apply pressure to the Iranian regime.

It is true that if President Ahmadinejad and his regime were allowed to access a nuclear weapon, Iran would pose a significant threat to global stability and security and a threat to the security of the State of Israel. This bill is an appropriate next step as we work to increase pressure on Iran to end its nuclear program and end its open hostility toward Israel and the United States. By authorizing new sanctions against Iran and by imposing sanctions against additional activities, this bill successfully expands on the precedent set by CISADA and sends the right message to Iran and to the international community.

However, as I said, changes were made to this bill during the committee process that raise questions about whether or not the bill inappropriately limits the ability of any Ameri- can President to direct the Administration to conduct diplomacy with Iran. This new language could end up jeopardizing American security by preventing our diplomats from resolving minor issues before they become more serious disputes.

The Obama Administration, for example, has done an excellent job in this point in addressing the threat of a nuclear Iran. Just last month, the Administration imposed additional sanctions on Iran, including labeling Iran as a “primary money-laundering concern.” The Admin- istration should also be commended for ensuring the success of sanctions by securing the cooperation of the international community in imposing serious sanctions that had not even been considered by many of our allies until President Obama's pressure led them to toughen their stance against Iran. It makes no sense to tie the Administration's hands now, particularly given the successful efforts by President Obama to toughen the international community's stand against Iran.

The lead Democratic sponsor of this bill and the senior Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, my good friend Mr. Berman, has made clear that he does not believe that this bill should limit the President's ability to con- duct diplomacy as he sees fit, and I agree with that assessment. Like Mr. Berman, I believe that this issue must be clarified in conference to ensure that this bill does not inadvertently exacerbate problems that it is intended to fix. I believe that it is in our interest that we con- tinue working constructively with our allies to strengthen sanctions against Iran and so I urge my colleagues to support this bill and to ensure going forward that it is implemented in a productive way.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I strongly sup- port this legislation whose purpose is to deny Iran both the ability to support terrorist organizations and to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

I want to express my strong admiration and support for Representative HOWARD BERMAN, the ranking member of the House Foreign Af- fairs Committee. With regard to his role as Chairman BER- MAN's forceful and steadfast leadership, this legislation to impose the most stringent sanc- tions yet on Iran would not have come before us. We are standing firm against Iran because of Representative BERMAN'S ceaseless efforts to forge a bipartisan consensus to act against the grave threat to Israel and other allies that is posed by Iran and its leadership.

Iran is a growing danger to peace and sta- bility in the Middle East and beyond. Its nu- clear program in and of itself is the most dan- gerous threat to peace in the world today. To- day's House bill would allow us to be far more effective in fighting the Taliban in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime, Iran is an ongoing and growing danger to the region and the world.

Iran's unrelenting hostility to the United States, to Israel and others requires the most forceful response. It is clear that Iran's leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. All of the inde- pendent international assessments, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, attest to a steady progression to weaponize its uranium assets. At the same time, Iran is perfect- ing its medium and long-range missile capi- abilities.

Together, these initiatives can only have one purpose: at the least, to enable Iran to ex- ercise nuclear blackmail in pursuit of its ex- treme agenda. But this also means that Iran will have the Iranian people. capability to actu- ally use a nuclear weapon, and bring a catas- trophe upon us all—and upon the Iranian peo- ple.

This is unacceptable. Iran's nuclear program must be stopped. Iran simply must not be per- mitted to acquire a nuclear weapon.

President Obama has been exceptionally clear on Iran. Just last week, on December 8, President Obama again was emphatic in stat- ing U.S. policy:

... What I can say with respect to Iran, I think it's very important to remember, particu- larly given some of the things that went on there, that this administration has systemati- cally imposed the toughest sanctions on Iran—on Iran ever.

"When we came into office, the world was divided, Iran was unified and moving aggres- sively on its own agenda. Today, Iran is iso- lated, and the world is unified in applying the toughest sanctions that Iran has ever experi- enced. And it's having an impact inside of Iran. And that's as a consequence of the ex- traordinary work that's been done by our na- tional security team.

"Now, Iran understands that they have a choice: They can break that isolation by acting responsibly and foreswearing the development of nuclear weapons, which would still allow them to pursue peaceful nuclear power, like every other country that's a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or they can continue to operate in a fashion that isolates them from the entire world. And if they are pursuing nu- clear weapons, then I have said very clearly, that's contrary to the interests of the United States: it's contrary to the national security interests of our allies, includ- ing Israel; and we are going to work with the world community to prevent that."

With respect to what the United States is willing to do to prevent Iran from acquiring nu- clear weapons, President Obama said, "No options off the table means I'm considering all options."

The best way to avoid getting to that point is to do everything we can to impose the hardest pressure on Iran in order to make its present nuclear course unsustainable to the regime.

The Iran Threat Reduction Act will put into force the strongest sanctions yet against Iran. It imposes sanctions on Iran's oil industry, in- cluding sanctions on the importation of gasoline, which Iran desperately needs. There are increased sanctions on defense products and technology.

Sanctions are also imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and on several financial and banking sectors. Because Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon, it will become exceedingly impossible for Iran to engage in international commerce.
Today we are also considering H.R. 2105, which would strengthen our nonproliferation regime against Iran, North Korea, and Syria. It’s worth remembering that Syria had an undeclared nuclear facility under construction at the time it was bombed a few years ago. This bill would impose a series of new constraints on countries that may be thinking about, or are known or suspected to be, supplying proliferation-related technology to any of these three states. One provision would prohibit U.S. nuclear cooperation with a country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such countries.

I regret that these bills are necessary. I wish that our past peaceful, diplomatic efforts had produced changes in their proliferation-related behavior. Unfortunately, they have not. These rogue regimes are willing to tolerate considerable international isolation as they continue to pursue prohibited weapons programs. But I believe there is a point at which the diplomatic and economic isolation will begin to threaten their hold on power, and it is when that point is reached that we will likely have our best chance of peacefully disarming these rogue states. That is why I still believe that diplomacy, backed by enforceable sanctions, can ultimately achieve the goal we all share, and why I will support these bills.

I support this bill and once again thank Representative HOWARD BERMAN for his courageous leadership in helping us face the most dangerous foreign policy crisis in the world today.

Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, the recent IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program indicates that Iran continues to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Specifically, the IAEA’s November 2011 report noted that Iran has carried out a number of activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. These, in the efforts, some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual-use equipment and materials by military related individuals; efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material; the acquisition of nuclear weapons development information; the development of a clandestine nuclear supply network; and work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of components.

These are ominous developments that the House simply cannot ignore.

I am glad that the House is considering this legislation. I recognize that sanctions like this are crude instruments, but the threatening actions of the government of Iran must be countered. This bill will help increase diplomatic pressure on Iran by further tightening sanctions, particularly on entities associated with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is a key player in Iran’s nuclear weapons acquisition effort. The IRGC’s activities are a key reason why this legislation is necessary.

I recognize that this legislation is not perfect. I am particularly troubled by the possibility that this provision will be modified before it goes to the President for his signature.

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