[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 191 (Tuesday, December 13, 2011)]
[House]
[Pages H8834-H8859]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
IRAN THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 2011
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass
the bill (H.R. 1905) to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose
of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other
threatening activities, and for other purposes, as amended.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R. 1905
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iran
Threat Reduction Act of 2011''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy.
TITLE I--IRAN ENERGY SANCTIONS
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Declaration of policy.
Sec. 104. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 105. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 106. Description of sanctions.
Sec. 107. Advisory opinions.
Sec. 108. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 109. Duration of sanctions.
Sec. 110. Reports required.
Sec. 111. Determinations not reviewable.
Sec. 112. Definitions.
Sec. 113. Effective date.
Sec. 114. Repeal.
TITLE II--IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT
Sec. 201. Codification of sanctions.
Sec. 202. Liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by
foreign subsidiaries.
Sec. 203. Declaration of Congress regarding United States policy toward
Iran.
Sec. 204. Assistance to support democracy in Iran.
Sec. 205. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons who are
responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses
committed against citizens of Iran or their family
members after the June 12, 2009, elections in Iran.
Sec. 206. Clarification of sensitive technologies for purposes of
procurement ban.
Sec. 207. Comprehensive strategy to promote internet freedom and access
to information in Iran.
TITLE III--IRAN REGIME AND IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
ACCOUNTABILITY
Sec. 301. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 302. Additional export sanctions against Iran.
Sec. 303. Sanctions against affiliates of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
Sec. 304. Measures against foreign persons or entities supporting
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Sec. 305. Special measures against foreign countries supporting Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
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Sec. 306. Authority of State and local governments to restrict
contracts or licenses for certain sanctionable persons.
Sec. 307. Iranian activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sec. 308. United States policy toward Iran.
Sec. 309. Definitions.
Sec. 310. Rule of construction.
TITLE IV--IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS; DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES
THAT INVEST IN IRAN; AND PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS,
SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN
Sec. 401. Iran financial sanctions.
Sec. 402. Divestment from certain companies that invest in Iran.
Sec. 403. Prevention of diversion of certain goods, services, and
technologies to Iran.
TITLE V--SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Sec. 501. Disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission
relating to sanctionable activities.
TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 601. Denial of visas for certain persons of the Government of
Iran.
Sec. 602. Inadmissibility of certain aliens who engage in certain
activities with respect to Iran.
Sec. 603. Amendments to civil and criminal penalties provisions under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Sec. 604. Exclusion of certain activities.
Sec. 605. Regulatory authority.
Sec. 606. Sunset.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Successive administrations have clearly identified the
unacceptability of the Iranian regime's pursuit of nuclear
weapons capabilities and the danger that pursuit presents to
the United States, to our friends and allies, and to global
security.
(2) In May 1995, President Clinton stated that ``The
specter of an Iran armed with weapons of mass destruction and
the missiles to deliver them haunts not only Israel but the
entire Middle East and ultimately all the rest of us as well.
The United States and, I believe, all the Western nations
have an overriding interest in containing the threat posed by
Iran.''.
(3) In the 2006 State of the Union Address, President Bush
stated that ``The Iranian government is defying the world
with its nuclear ambitions, and the nations of the world must
not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons.
America will continue to rally the world to confront these
threats.''.
(4) In February 2009, President Obama committed the
Administration to ``developing a strategy to use all elements
of American power to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon''.
(5) Iran is a major threat to United States national
security interests, not only exemplified by Tehran's nuclear
program but also by its material assistance to armed groups
in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, to
Lebanese Hezbollah, the Government of Syria, and to other
extremists that seek to undermine regional stability. These
capabilities provide the regime with potential asymmetric
delivery vehicles and mechanisms for nuclear or other
unconventional weapons.
(6) Iran's growing inventory of ballistic missile and other
destabilizing types of conventional weapons provides the
regime the capabilities to enhance its power projection
throughout the region and undermine the national security
interests of the United States and its friends and allies.
(7) Were Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, it
would, inter alia--
(A) likely lead to the proliferation of such weapons
throughout the region, where several states have already
indicated interest in nuclear programs, and would
dramatically undercut 60 years of United States efforts to
stop the spread of nuclear weapons;
(B) greatly increase the threat of nuclear terrorism;
(C) significantly expand Iran's already-growing influence
in the region;
(D) insulate the regime from international pressure, giving
it wider scope further to oppress its citizens and pursue
aggression regionally and globally;
(E) embolden all Iranian-supported terrorist groups,
including Hamas and Hezbollah; and
(F) directly threaten several United States friends and
allies, especially Israel, whose very right to exist has been
denied successively by every leader of the Islamic Republic
of Iran and which Iranian President Ahmadinejad says should
be ``wiped off the map''.
(8) Successive Congresses have clearly recognized the
threat that the Iranian regime and its policies present to
the United States, to our friends and allies, and to global
security, and responded with successive bipartisan
legislative initiatives.
(9) The extent of the Iranian threat is greater today than
when the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 was signed into
law, now known as the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. That
landmark legislation imposed sanctions on foreign companies
investing in Iran's energy infrastructure in an effort to
undermine the strategic threat from Iran, by cutting off
investment in its petroleum sector and thereby denying the
regime its economic lifeline and its ability to pursue a
nuclear program.
(10) Laws such as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,
which was retitled the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, paved the
way for the enactment of similar laws, such as the Iran,
North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act, the Iran-Iraq
Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, the Iran Freedom Support
Act, and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010.
(11) United States sanctions on Iran have hindered Iran's
ability to attract capital, material, and technical support
for its petroleum sector, creating financial difficulties for
the regime.
(12) In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-
195; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) issued on June 23, 2010, the
Members of the Committee of Conference noted that ``Although
[the Iran Sanctions Act] was enacted more than a decade ago,
no Administration has sanctioned a foreign entity for
investing $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector,
despite a number of such investments. Indeed, on only one
occasion, in 1998, did the Administration make a
determination regarding a sanctions-triggering investment,
but the Administration waived sanctions against the offending
persons. Conferees believe that the lack of enforcement of
relevant enacted sanctions may have served to encourage
rather than deter Iran's efforts to pursue nuclear
weapons.''.
(13) The Joint Explanatory Statement also noted that ``The
effectiveness of this Act will depend on its forceful
implementation. The Conferees urge the President to
vigorously impose the sanctions provided for in this Act.''.
(14) The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 mandates among other provisions that
the President initiate investigations of potentially
sanctionable activity under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996.
Although more than 16 months have passed since enactment of
this legislation, Congress has not received notice of the
imposition of sanctions on any entities that do significant
business in the United States, despite multiple reports of
potentially sanctionable activity by such entities. Although,
in accordance with the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, some potentially
sanctionable entities have been persuaded to wind down and
end their involvement in Iran, others have not.
(15) It is unlikely that Iran can be compelled to abandon
its pursuit of nuclear weapons unless sanctions are fully and
effectively implemented.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It shall be the policy of the United States to--
(1) prevent Iran from--
(A) acquiring or developing nuclear weapons and associated
delivery capabilities;
(B) developing its unconventional weapons and ballistic
missile capabilities; and
(C) continuing its support for foreign terrorist
organizations and other activities aimed at undermining and
destabilizing its neighbors and other nations; and
(2) fully implement all multilateral and bilateral
sanctions against Iran in order to deprive the Government of
Iran of necessary resources and to compel the Government of
Iran to--
(A) abandon and verifiably dismantle its nuclear
capabilities;
(B) abandon and verifiably dismantle its ballistic missile
and unconventional weapons programs; and
(C) cease all support for foreign terrorist organizations
and other activities aimed at undermining and destabilizing
its neighbors and other nations.
TITLE I--IRAN ENERGY SANCTIONS
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to achieve
nuclear weapons capability and to acquire other
unconventional weapons and the means to deliver them, both
through ballistic missile and asymmetric means, and its
support for foreign terrorist organizations and other
extremists endanger the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States and those countries with which
the United States shares common strategic and foreign policy
objectives.
(2) The objectives of preventing the proliferation of
nuclear and other unconventional weapons and countering the
activities of foreign terrorist organizations and other
extremists through existing multilateral and bilateral
initiatives require further efforts to deny Iran the
financial means to sustain its nuclear, chemical, biological,
and missile weapons programs and its active support for
terrorism.
(3) The Government of Iran uses its diplomatic facilities
and quasi-governmental institutions outside of Iran to
support foreign terrorist organizations and other extremists,
and assist its unconventional weapons and missile programs,
including its nuclear program.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that the goal of compelling
Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other
threatening activities can be achieved most effectively
through full implementation of all sanctions enacted into
law, including those sanctions set out in this title.
SEC. 103. DECLARATION OF POLICY.
Congress declares that it is the policy of the United
States to deny Iran the ability to
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support acts of foreign terrorist organizations and
extremists and develop unconventional weapons and ballistic
missiles. A critical means of achieving that goal is
sanctions that limit Iran's ability to develop its energy
resources, including its ability to explore for, extract,
refine, and transport by pipeline its hydrocarbon resources,
in order to limit the funds Iran has available for pursuing
its objectionable activities.
SEC. 104. MULTILATERAL REGIME.
(a) Multilateral Negotiations.--In order to further the
objectives of section 103 of this Act, Congress urges the
President immediately to initiate diplomatic efforts, both in
appropriate international fora such as the United Nations,
and bilaterally with allies of the United States, to expand
the multilateral sanctions regime regarding Iran, including--
(1) qualitatively expanding the United Nations Security
Council sanctions regime against Iran;
(2) qualitatively expanding the range of sanctions by the
European Union, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other key
United States allies;
(3) further efforts to limit Iran's development of
petroleum resources and import of refined petroleum; and
(4) initiatives aimed at increasing non-Iranian crude oil
product output for current purchasers of Iranian petroleum
and petroleum byproducts.
(b) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the extent to which diplomatic efforts
described in subsection (a) have been successful. Each report
shall include--
(1) the countries that have agreed to undertake measures to
further the objectives of section 103 of this Act with
respect to Iran, and a description of those measures; and
(2) the countries that have not agreed to measures
described in paragraph (1), and, with respect to those
countries, other measures the President recommends that the
United States take to further the objectives of section 103
of this Act with respect to Iran.
(c) Interim Report on Multilateral Sanctions; Monitoring.--
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on--
(1) the countries that have established legislative or
administrative standards providing for the imposition of
trade sanctions on persons or their affiliates that conduct
business or have investments in Iran;
(2) the extent and duration of each instance of the
application of such sanctions; and
(3) the disposition of any decision with respect to such
sanctions by the World Trade Organization or its predecessor
organization.
(d) Investigations.--
(1) In general.--The President shall initiate an
investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions under
section 105 of this Act against a person upon receipt by the
United States of credible information indicating that such
person is engaged in an activity described in such section.
(2) Determination and notification.--Not later than 180
days after the date on which an investigation is initiated
under paragraph (1), the President shall (unless paragraph
(6) applies) determine, pursuant to section 105 of this Act,
if a person has engaged in an activity described in such
section and shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees of the basis for any such determination.
(3) Briefing.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and at the end of every 3-month
period thereafter, the President, acting through the
Secretary of State, shall brief the appropriate congressional
committees regarding investigations initiated under this
subsection.
(B) Form.--The briefings required under subparagraph (A)
shall be provided in unclassified form, but may be provided
in classified form.
(4) Submission of information.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall, in
accordance with section 15(b) of the State Department Basic
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2680(b)), provide to the
appropriate congressional committees all requested
information relating to investigations or reviews initiated
under this title, including the number, scope, and dates of
such investigations or reviews.
(B) Form.--The information required under subparagraph (A)
shall be provided in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
(5) Termination.--Subject to paragraph (6), the President
may, on a case-by-case basis, terminate an investigation of a
person initiated under this subsection.
(6) Special rule.--
(A) In general.--The President need not initiate an
investigation, and may terminate an investigation, on a case-
by-case basis under this subsection if the President
certifies in writing to the appropriate congressional
committees 15 days prior to the determination that--
(i) the person whose activity was the basis for the
investigation is no longer engaging in the activity or is
divesting all holdings and terminating the activity within
one year from the date of the certification; and
(ii) the President has received reliable assurances that
the person will not knowingly engage in an activity described
in section 105(a) of this Act in the future.
(B) Application of sanctions.--The President shall apply
the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act in
accordance with section 105(a) of this Act to a person
described in subparagraph (A) if--
(i) the person fails to verifiably divest all holdings and
terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph within one year from the date of certification of
the President under subparagraph (A); or
(ii) the person has been previously designated pursuant to
section 4(e)(3) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in
effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this
Act, and fails to verifiably divest all holdings and
terminate the activity described in subparagraph (A) within
180 days from the date of enactment of this Act.
(C) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the actions
taken by persons previously designated pursuant to section
4(e)(3) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as in effect on
the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, to
verifiably divest all holdings and terminate the activity
described in subparagraph (A).
SEC. 105. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Sanctions With Respect to the Development of Petroleum
Resources of Iran, Production of Refined Petroleum Products
in Iran, and Exportation of Refined Petroleum Products to
Iran.--
(1) Development of petroleum resources of iran.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the
President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described
in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act--
(i) makes an investment described in subparagraph (B) of
$20,000,000 or more; or
(ii) makes a combination of investments described in
subparagraph (B) in a 12-month period if each such investment
is of at least $5,000,000 and such investments equal or
exceed $20,000,000 in the aggregate.
(B) Investment described.--An investment described in this
subparagraph is an investment that directly and significantly
contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop
petroleum resources.
(2) Production of refined petroleum products.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the
President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described
in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
the date of the enactment this Act, sells, leases, or
provides to Iran goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in subparagraph (B)--
(i) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or
more; or
(ii) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more.
(B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support
described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in this subparagraph are goods, services,
technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of
Iran's domestic production of refined petroleum products,
including any direct and significant assistance with respect
to the construction, modernization, or repair of petroleum
refineries or associated infrastructure, including
construction of port facilities, railways, and roads, the
primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined
petroleum products.
(3) Exportation of refined petroleum products to iran.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the
President shall impose a majority of the sanctions described
in section 106(a) of this Act with respect to a person if the
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act--
(i) sells or provides to Iran refined petroleum products--
(I) that have a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or
(II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more; or
(ii) sells, leases, or provides to Iran goods, services,
technology, information, or support described in subparagraph
(B)--
(I) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or
more; or
(II) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair
market value of $5,000,000 or more.
(B) Goods, services, technology, information, or support
described.--Goods, services, technology, information, or
support described in this subparagraph are goods, services,
technology, information, or support that could directly and
significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran's ability
to import refined petroleum products, including--
(i) except as provided in subparagraph (C), underwriting or
entering into a contract to provide insurance or reinsurance
for the sale, lease, or provision of such goods, services,
service contracts, technology, information, or support;
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(ii) financing or brokering such sale, lease, or provision;
(iii) bartering or contracting by which the parties
exchange goods for goods, including the insurance or
reinsurance of such exchanges;
(iv) purchasing, subscribing to, or facilitating the
issuance of sovereign debt of the Government of Iran,
including governmental bonds; or
(v) providing ships or shipping services to deliver refined
petroleum products to Iran.
(C) Exception for underwriters and insurance providers
exercising due diligence.--The President may not impose
sanctions under this paragraph with respect to a person that
provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance if
the President determines that the person has exercised due
diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies,
procedures, and controls to ensure that the person does not
underwrite or enter into a contract to provide insurance or
reinsurance for the sale, lease, or provision of goods,
services, technology, information, or support described in
subparagraph (B).
(4) Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the
issuance of iranian sovereign debt.--Except as provided in
subsection (f), the President shall impose a majority of the
sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act with
respect to a person if the President determines that the
person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of
this Act, purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the
issuance of--
(A) sovereign debt of the Government of Iran, including
governmental bonds; or
(B) debt of any entity owned or controlled by the
Government of Iran, including bonds.
(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--
(1) In general.--The President shall impose a majority of
the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this Act if the
President determines that a person, on or after the date of
the enactment of this Act, has knowingly exported,
transferred, permitted, hosted, or otherwise facilitated
transshipment that may have enabled a person to export,
transfer, or transship to Iran or otherwise provided to Iran
any goods, services, technology, or other items that would
contribute materially to the ability of Iran to--
(A) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or related technologies; or
(B) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons.
(2) Additional mandatory sanctions relating to transfer of
nuclear technology.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraphs (B)
and (C), in any case in which a person is subject to
sanctions under paragraph (1) because of an activity
described in that paragraph that relates to the acquisition
or development of nuclear weapons or related technology or of
missiles or advanced conventional weapons that are designed
or modified to deliver a nuclear weapon, no license may be
issued for the export, and no approval may be given for the
transfer or retransfer to the country the government of which
has primary jurisdiction over the person, of any nuclear
material, facilities, components, or other goods, services,
or technology that are or would be subject to an agreement
for cooperation between the United States and that
government.
(B) Exception.--The sanctions described in subparagraph (A)
shall not apply with respect to a country the government of
which has primary jurisdiction over a person that engages in
an activity described in that subparagraph if the President
determines and notifies the appropriate congressional
committees that the government of the country--
(i) does not know or have reason to know about the
activity; or
(ii) has taken, or is taking, all reasonable steps
necessary to prevent a recurrence of the activity and to
penalize the person for the activity.
(C) Individual approval.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A),
the President may, on a case-by-case basis, approve the
issuance of a license for the export, or approve the transfer
or retransfer, of any nuclear material, facilities,
components, or other goods, services, or technology that are
or would be subject to an agreement for cooperation, to a
person in a country to which subparagraph (A) applies (other
than a person that is subject to the sanctions under
paragraph (1)) if the President--
(i) determines that such approval is vital to the national
security interests of the United States; and
(ii) not later than 15 days before issuing such license or
approving such transfer or retransfer, submits to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the
justification for approving such license, transfer, or
retransfer.
(D) Construction.--The restrictions in subparagraph (A)
shall apply in addition to all other applicable procedures,
requirements, and restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and other related laws.
(E) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``agreement
for cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section
11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(b)).
(F) Applicability.--The sanctions described in subparagraph
(A) shall apply only in a case in which a person is subject
to sanctions under paragraph (1) because of an activity
described in such paragraph in which such person engages on
or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are to Be
Imposed.--The sanctions described in subsections (a) and
(b)(1) shall be imposed on--
(1) any person the President determines has carried out the
activities described in subsection (a) or (b), respectively;
and
(2) any person that--
(A) is a successor entity to the person referred to in
paragraph (1);
(B) owns or controls the person referred to in paragraph
(1), if the person that owns or controls the person referred
to in paragraph (1) had actual knowledge or should have known
that the person referred to in paragraph (1) engaged in the
activities referred to in that paragraph; or
(C) is owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or
control with, the person referred to in paragraph (1), if the
person owned or controlled by, or under common ownership or
control with (as the case may be), the person referred to in
paragraph (1) knowingly engaged in the activities referred to
in that paragraph.
For purposes of this title, any person or entity described in
this subsection shall be referred to as a ``sanctioned
person''.
(d) Publication in Federal Register.--The President shall
cause to be published in the Federal Register a current list
of persons and entities on whom sanctions have been imposed
under this title. The removal of persons or entities from,
and the addition of persons and entities to, the list, shall
also be so published.
(e) Publication of Projects.--The President shall cause to
be published in the Federal Register a list of all
significant projects that have been publicly tendered in the
oil and gas sector in Iran.
(f) Exceptions.--The President shall not be required to
apply or maintain the sanctions under subsection (a) or (b)--
(1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or
defense services--
(A) under existing contracts or subcontracts, including the
exercise of options for production quantities to satisfy
requirements essential to the national security of the United
States;
(B) if the President determines in writing that the person
to which the sanctions would otherwise be applied is a sole
source supplier of the defense articles or services, that the
defense articles or services are essential, and that
alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available;
or
(C) if the President determines in writing that such
articles or services are essential to the national security
under defense coproduction agreements;
(2) in the case of procurement, to eligible products, as
defined in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country or
instrumentality designated under section 301(b) of that Act
(19 U.S.C. 2511(b));
(3) to products, technology, or services provided under
contracts entered into before the date on which the President
publishes in the Federal Register the name of the person on
whom the sanctions are to be imposed;
(4) to--
(A) spare parts which are essential to United States
products or production;
(B) component parts, but not finished products, essential
to United States products or production; or
(C) routine servicing and maintenance of products, to the
extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably
available;
(5) to information and technology essential to United
States products or production; or
(6) to medicines, medical supplies, or other humanitarian
items.
SEC. 106. DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--The sanctions to be imposed on a
sanctioned person under section 105 of this Act are as
follows:
(1) Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned
persons.--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of
the United States to not give approval to for the issuance of
any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or
participation in the extension of credit in connection with
the export of any goods or services to any sanctioned person.
(2) Export sanction.--The President may order the United
States Government not to issue any specific license and not
to grant any other specific permission or authority to export
any goods or technology to a sanctioned person under--
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in
effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act);
(B) the Arms Export Control Act;
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
(D) any other law that requires the prior review and
approval of the United States Government as a condition for
the export or reexport of goods or services.
(3) Loans from united states financial institutions.--The
United States Government may prohibit any United States
financial institution from making loans or providing credits
to any sanctioned person totaling more than $10,000,000 in
any 12-month period unless such person is engaged in
activities to relieve human suffering and the loans or
credits are provided for such activities.
[[Page H8838]]
(4) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The following
prohibitions may be imposed against a sanctioned person that
is a financial institution:
(A) Prohibition on designation as primary dealer.--Neither
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System nor the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York may designate, or permit the
continuation of any prior designation of, such financial
institution as a primary dealer in United States Government
debt instruments.
(B) Prohibition on service as a repository of government
funds.--Such financial institution may not serve as agent of
the United States Government or serve as repository for
United States Government funds.
The imposition of either sanction under subparagraph (A) or
(B) shall be treated as one sanction for purposes of section
105 of this Act, and the imposition of both such sanctions
shall be treated as 2 sanctions for purposes of section 105
of this Act.
(5) Procurement sanction.--The United States Government may
not procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement
of, any goods or services from a sanctioned person.
(6) Foreign exchange.--The President may prohibit any
transactions in foreign exchange that are subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and in which the sanctioned
person has any interest.
(7) Banking transactions.--The President may prohibit any
transfers of credit or payments between financial
institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any
interest of the sanctioned person.
(8) Property transactions.--The President may prohibit any
person from--
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring,
withdrawing, transporting, or exporting any property that is
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with
respect to which a sanctioned person has any interest;
(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to such property; or
(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.
(9) Grounds for exclusion.--The Secretary of State may deny
a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may deny
admission into the United States to, any alien whom the
Secretary of State determines is an alien who, on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act, is a--
(A) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a
controlling interest of a person against whom sanctions have
been imposed under subsection (a) or (b);
(B) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a
controlling interest of a successor entity to or a parent or
subsidiary of such a sanctioned person;
(C) corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a
controlling interest of an affiliate of such a sanctioned
person, if such affiliate engaged in a sanctionable activity
described in subsection (a) or (b) and if such affiliate is
controlled in fact by such sanctioned person; or
(D) spouse, minor child, or agent of a person inadmissible
under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(10) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The
President may impose on the principal executive officer or
officers of any sanctioned person, or on persons performing
similar functions and with similar authorities as such
officer or officers, any of the sanctions under this
subsection. The President shall include on the list published
under section 105(d) of this Act the name of any person
against whom sanctions are imposed under this paragraph.
(11) Additional sanctions.--The President may impose
additional sanctions, as appropriate, in accordance with the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701
et seq.).
(b) Additional Measure Relating to Government Contracts.--
(1) Modification of federal acquisition regulation.--The
Federal Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section
1303 of title 41, United States Code, shall require a
certification from each person that is a prospective
contractor that such person and any person owned or
controlled by the person does not engage in any activity for
which sanctions may be imposed under section 105 or section
304 of this Act.
(2) Remedies.--
(A) In general.--If the head of an executive agency
determines that a person has submitted a false certification
under paragraph (1) after the date on which the Federal
Acquisition Regulation is revised to implement the
requirements of this subsection, the head of that executive
agency shall terminate a contract with such person or debar
or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal contracts
for a period of not less than 2 years. Any such debarment or
suspension shall be subject to the procedures that apply to
debarment and suspension under the Federal Acquisition
Regulation under subpart 9.4 of part 9 of title 48, Code of
Federal Regulations.
(B) Inclusion on list of parties excluded from federal
procurement and nonprocurement programs.--The Administrator
of General Services shall include on the List of Parties
Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs
maintained by the Administrator under part 9 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to section 1303 of
title 41, United States Code, each person that is debarred,
suspended, or proposed for debarment or suspension by the
head of an executive agency on the basis of a determination
of a false certification under subparagraph (A).
(3) Clarification regarding certain products.--The remedies
specified in paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to
the procurement of eligible products, as defined in section
308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.
2518(4)), of any foreign country or instrumentality
designated under section 301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C.
2511(b)).
(4) Rule of construction.--This subsection shall not be
construed to limit the use of other remedies available to the
head of an executive agency or any other official of the
Federal Government on the basis of a determination of a false
certification under paragraph (1).
(5) Waiver.--The President may, on a case-by-case basis,
waive the requirement that a person make a certification
under paragraph (1) if the President determines and certifies
in writing to the appropriate congressional committees that
failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national
security interests of the United States.
(6) Executive agency defined.--In this subsection, the term
``executive agency'' has the meaning given such term in
section 133 of title 41, United States Code.
(7) Applicability.--The revisions to the Federal
Acquisition Regulation required under paragraph (1) shall
apply with respect to contracts for which solicitations are
issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 107. ADVISORY OPINIONS.
The Secretary of State may, upon the request of any person,
issue an advisory opinion to such person as to whether a
proposed activity by such person would subject such person to
sanctions under this title. Any person who relies in good
faith on such an advisory opinion which states that such
proposed activity would not subject such person to such
sanctions, and any such person who thereafter engages in such
activity, shall not be made subject to such sanctions on
account of such activity.
SEC. 108. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Certification.--The requirement under section 105 of
this Act to impose sanctions shall no longer have force or
effect with respect to Iran if the President determines and
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that
Iran--
(1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its efforts to
design, develop, manufacture, or acquire--
(A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials and
technology;
(B) chemical and biological weapons; and
(C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch
technology;
(2) no longer provides support for acts of international
terrorism; and
(3) poses no threat to the national security, interests, or
allies of the United States.
(b) Notification.--The President shall notify the
appropriate congressional committees not later than 15 days
before making the certification described in subsection (a).
SEC. 109. DURATION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) Delay of Sanctions.--
(1) Consultations.--If the President makes a determination
described in section 105 of this Act with respect to a
foreign person, Congress urges the President to initiate
consultations immediately with the government with primary
jurisdiction over such foreign person with respect to the
imposition of sanctions under such section.
(2) Actions by government of jurisdiction.--In order to
pursue consultations under paragraph (1) with the government
concerned, the President may delay for up to 90 days the
imposition of sanctions under section 105 of this Act.
Following such consultations, the President shall immediately
impose on the foreign person referred to in paragraph (1)
such sanctions unless the President determines and certifies
to Congress that the government has taken specific and
effective actions, including, as appropriate, the imposition
of appropriate penalties to terminate the involvement of the
foreign person in the activities that resulted in the
determination by the President under section 105 of this Act
concerning such foreign person and the foreign person is no
longer engaged in such activities.
(b) Duration of Sanctions.--A sanction imposed under
section 105 of this Act shall remain in effect--
(1) for a period of not less than 2 years beginning on the
date on which such sanction is imposed; or
(2) until such time as the President determines and
certifies to Congress that the person whose activities were
the basis for imposing such sanction is no longer engaging in
such activities and that the President has received reliable
assurances that such person will not knowingly engage in such
activities in the future, except that such sanction shall
remain in effect for a period of at least one year.
(c) Waiver.--
(1) Authorization.--
(A) In general.--The President may waive the requirements
in section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act to impose a
sanction or sanctions, and may waive, on a case-by-case
[[Page H8839]]
basis, the continued imposition of a sanction or sanctions
under subsection (b) of this section, if the President
determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional
committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority
that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national
security interests of the United States.
(B) Contents of report.--Any report under subparagraph (A)
shall provide a specific and detailed rationale for a
determination made pursuant to such paragraph, including--
(i) a description of the conduct that resulted in the
determination under section 105(a) or section 105(b)(2) of
this Act, as the case may be;
(ii) in the case of a foreign person, an explanation of the
efforts to secure the cooperation of the government with
primary jurisdiction over such person to terminate or, as
appropriate, penalize the activities that resulted in the
determination under section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act,
as the case may be;
(iii) an estimate of the significance of the conduct of the
person concerned in contributing to the ability of Iran to
develop petroleum resources, produce refined petroleum
products, or import refined petroleum products; and
(iv) a statement as to the response of the United States in
the event that the person concerned engages in other
activities that would be subject to a sanction or sanctions
under section 105(a) or 105(b)(2) of this Act, as the case
may be.
(2) Waiver with respect to persons in countries that
cooperate in multilateral efforts with respect to iran.--
(A) In general.--The President may, on a case-by-case
basis, waive for a period of not more than 12 months the
application of section 105(a) of this Act with respect to a
person if the President, at least 30 days before the waiver
is to take effect--
(i) certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
that--
(I) the government with primary jurisdiction over the
person is closely cooperating with the United States in
multilateral efforts to prevent Iran from--
(aa) acquiring or developing chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons or related technologies; or
(bb) acquiring or developing destabilizing numbers and
types of advanced conventional weapons; and
(II) such a waiver is vital to the national security
interests of the United States; and
(ii) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report identifying--
(I) the person with respect to which the President waives
the application of sanctions; and
(II) the actions taken by the government described in
clause (i)(I) to cooperate in multilateral efforts described
in that clause.
(B) Subsequent renewal of waiver.--At the conclusion of the
period of a waiver under subparagraph (A), the President may
renew the waiver--
(i) if the President determines, in accordance with
subparagraph (A), that the waiver is appropriate; and
(ii) for subsequent periods of not more than 12 months
each.
(3) Publication in the federal register.--Not later than 15
days after any waiver authority is exercised pursuant to
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, the name of the
person or entity with respect to which sanctions are being
waived shall be published in the Federal Register.
SEC. 110. REPORTS REQUIRED.
(a) Report on Certain International Initiatives.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and
every 180 days thereafter, the President shall transmit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report
describing--
(1) the efforts of the President to mount a multilateral
campaign to persuade all countries to pressure Iran to cease
its nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile weapons
programs and its support of acts of international terrorism;
(2) the efforts of the President to persuade other
governments to ask Iran to reduce in the countries of such
governments the presence of Iranian diplomats and
representatives of other government and military or quasi-
governmental institutions of Iran, and to withdraw any such
diplomats or representatives who participated in the takeover
of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, on November 4,
1979, or the subsequent holding of United States hostages for
444 days;
(3) the extent to which the International Atomic Energy
Agency has established regular inspections of all nuclear
facilities in Iran, including those facilities presently
under construction; and
(4) Iran's use of Iranian diplomats and representatives of
other government and military or quasi-governmental
institutions of Iran to promote acts of international
terrorism or to develop or sustain Iran's nuclear, chemical,
biological, or missile weapons programs.
(b) Report on Effectiveness of Actions Under This Act.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to
Congress a report that describes--
(1) the extent to which actions relating to trade taken
pursuant to this title have--
(A) been effective in achieving the policy objective
described in section 103 of this Act and any other foreign
policy or national security objectives of the United States
with respect to Iran; and
(B) affected humanitarian interests in Iran, the country in
which a sanctioned person is located, or in other countries;
and
(2) the impact of actions relating to trade taken pursuant
to this title on other national security, economic, and
foreign policy interests of the United States, including
relations with countries friendly to the United States, and
on the United States economy.
The President may include in such reports the President's
recommendation on whether or not this Act should be
terminated or modified.
(c) Other Reports.--The President shall ensure the
continued transmittal to Congress of reports describing--
(1) the nuclear and other military capabilities of Iran, as
required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 and section 1607 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993; and
(2) the support provided by Iran for acts of international
terrorism, as part of the Department of State's annual
reports on international terrorism.
(d) Reports on Global Trade Relating to Iran.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the this Act
and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report, with respect
to the most recent 12-month period for which data are
available, on the dollar value amount of trade, including in
the energy sector, between Iran and each country maintaining
membership in the Group of 20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors.
SEC. 111. DETERMINATIONS NOT REVIEWABLE.
A determination to impose sanctions under this title shall
not be reviewable in any court.
SEC. 112. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Act of international terrorism.--The term ``act of
international terrorism'' has the meaning given such term in
section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, the Committee on Financial
Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate.
(3) Component part.--The term ``component part'' has the
meaning given such term in section 11A(e)(1) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410a(e)(1)).
(4) Credible information.--The term ``credible
information'' means, with respect to a person, such person's
public announcement of an investment described in section 105
of this Act, Iranian governmental announcements of such an
investment, reports to stockholders, annual reports, industry
reports, Government Accountability Office products, State and
local government reports, and trade publications.
(5) Develop and development.--The terms ``develop'' and
``development'' mean the exploration for, or the extraction,
refining, or transportation by pipeline of, petroleum
resources.
(6) Financial institution.--The term ``financial
institution'' includes--
(A) a depository institution (as defined in section 3(c)(1)
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), including a branch or
agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b)(7) of
the International Banking Act of 1978);
(B) a credit union;
(C) a securities firm, including a broker or dealer;
(D) an insurance company, including an agency or
underwriter; and
(E) any other company that provides financial services
including joint ventures with Iranian entities both inside
and outside of Iran and partnerships or investments with
Iranian government-controlled entities or affiliated
entities.
(7) Finished product.--The term ``finished product'' has
the meaning given such term in section 11A(e)(2) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2410a(e)(2)).
(8) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means--
(A) an individual who is not a United States person or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence into the
United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, joint venture, cooperative
venture, or other nongovernmental entity which is not a
United States person.
(9) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term ``foreign
terrorist organization'' means an organization designated by
the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization in
accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
(10) Goods and technology.--The terms ``goods'' and
``technology'' have the meanings given such terms in section
16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2415).
(11) Investment.--The term ``investment'' means any of the
following activities if any of such activities is undertaken
pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of
rights under such an agreement, that is entered into with the
Government of Iran or a
[[Page H8840]]
nongovernmental entity in Iran, on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act:
(A) The entry into a contract that includes responsibility
for the development of petroleum resources located in Iran,
or the entry into a contract providing for the general
supervision and guarantee of another person's performance of
such a contract.
(B) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an
equity interest, in the development described in subparagraph
(A).
(C) The entry into a contract providing for the
participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in the
development described in subparagraph (A), without regard to
the form of such participation.
(D) The provision of goods, services, or technology related
to petroleum resources.
(12) Iran.--The term ``Iran'' includes any agency or
instrumentality of Iran.
(13) Iranian diplomats and representatives of other
government and military or quasi-governmental institutions of
iran.--The term ``Iranian diplomats and representatives of
other government and military or quasi-governmental
institutions of Iran'' includes employees, representatives,
or affiliates of Iran's--
(A) Foreign Ministry;
(B) Ministry of Intelligence and Security;
(C) Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated entities;
(D) Crusade for Reconstruction;
(E) Qods (Jerusalem) Forces;
(F) Interior Ministry;
(G) Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled;
(H) Prophet's Foundation;
(I) June 5th Foundation;
(J) Martyr's Foundation;
(K) Islamic Propagation Organization; and
(L) Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
(14) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result means that a person has
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result of such conduct, circumstance, or
result.
(15) Nuclear explosive device.--The term ``nuclear
explosive device'' means any device, whether assembled or
disassembled, that is designed to produce an instantaneous
release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear
material (as defined in section 11(aa) of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa))) that is greater than the
amount of energy that would be released from the detonation
of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
(16) Person.--
(A) In general.--The term ``person'' means--
(i) a natural person;
(ii) a corporation, business association, partnership,
society, trust, financial institution, insurer, underwriter,
guarantor, or any other business organization, any other
nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any
governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and
(iii) any successor to any entity described in clause (ii).
(B) Exclusion.--The term ``person'' does not include a
government or governmental entity that is not operating as a
business enterprise.
(17) Petroleum resources.--The term ``petroleum resources''
includes petroleum and natural gas resources, refined
petroleum products, oil or liquefied natural gas, oil or
liquefied natural gas tankers, and products used to construct
or maintain pipelines used to transport oil or liquefied
natural gas.
(18) Refined petroleum products.--The term ``refined
petroleum products'' means diesel, gasoline, jet fuel
(including naphtha-type and kerosene-type jet fuel), and
aviation gasoline.
(19) United states or state.--The terms ``United States''
and ``State'' mean the several States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the
United States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or
possession of the United States.
(20) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a natural person who is a citizen of the United States
or who owes permanent allegiance to the United States; and
(B) a corporation or other legal entity that is organized
under the laws of the United States or any State if a natural
person described in subparagraph (A) owns more than 50
percent of the outstanding capital stock or other beneficial
interest in such corporation or legal entity.
SEC. 113. EFFECTIVE DATE.
This title shall take effect on the date of the enactment
of this Act and shall apply with respect to an investment or
activity described in subsection (a) or (b) of section 105 of
this Act that is commenced on or after such date of
enactment.
SEC. 114. REPEAL.
(a) In General.--The Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is repealed.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--The Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public
Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 103(b)(3)(E), by striking ``section 14 of
the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note)'' and inserting ``section 112 of the Iran Threat
Reduction Act of 2011'';
(2) in section 111(a)(1), by striking ``section 5 of the
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended by section 102 of this
Act'' and inserting ``section 105 of the Iran Threat
Reduction Act of 2011'';
(3) in section 112(3), by striking ``Iran Sanctions Act of
1996, as amended by section 102 of this Act,'' and inserting
``Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011''; and
(4) in section 201(2), by striking ``section 14 of the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-172; 50 U.S.C. 1701
note)'' and inserting ``section 112 of the Iran Threat
Reduction Act of 2011''.
(c) References.--Any reference in a law, regulation,
document, or other record of the United States to the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 shall be deemed to be a reference to
this title.
(d) Federal Acquisition Regulation.--Notwithstanding the
repeal made by subsection (a), the modification to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation made pursuant to section
6(b)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 shall continue in
effect until the modification to such Regulation that is made
pursuant to section 106(b)(1) of this Act takes effect.
TITLE II--IRAN FREEDOM SUPPORT
SEC. 201. CODIFICATION OF SANCTIONS.
United States sanctions with respect to Iran imposed
pursuant to--
(1) sections 1 and 3 of Executive Order 12957,
(2) sections 1(e), 1(g), and 3 of Executive Order 12959,
(3) sections 2, 3, and 5 of Executive Order 13059,
(4) sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Executive Order 13553, or
(5) sections 1, 2, and 5 of Executive Order 13574,
as in effect on September 1, 2011, shall remain in effect
until the President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees, at least 90 days before the removal
of such sanctions, that the Government of Iran has verifiably
dismantled its nuclear weapons program, its biological and
chemical weapons programs, its ballistic missile development
programs, and ceased its support for international terrorism.
SEC. 202. LIABILITY OF PARENT COMPANIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SANCTIONS BY FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a partnership,
association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other
organization.
(2) Own or control.--The term ``own or control'' means,
with respect to an entity--
(A) to hold more than 50 percent of the equity interest by
vote or value in the entity;
(B) to hold a majority of seats on the board of directors
of the entity; or
(C) to otherwise control the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity.
(3) Subsidiary.--The term ``subsidiary'' means an entity
that is owned or controlled by a United States person.
(4) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' means--
(A) a natural person who is a citizen, resident, or
national of the United States; and
(B) an entity that is organized under the laws of the
United States, any State or territory thereof, or the
District of Columbia, if natural persons described in
subparagraph (A) own or control the entity.
(b) In General.--A United States person shall be subject to
a penalty for a violation of the provisions of Executive
Order 12959 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) or Executive Order 13059
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or any other prohibition on
transactions with respect to Iran imposed under the authority
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), if the President determines that a subsidiary
of the United States person that is established or maintained
outside the United States engages in an act that, if
committed in the United States or by a United States person,
would violate such provisions.
(c) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (b) shall take effect on the
date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to
acts described in subsection (b)(2) that are--
(A) commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act; or
(B) except as provided in paragraph (2), commenced before
such date of enactment, if such acts continue on or after
such date of enactment.
(2) Exception.--Subsection (b) shall not apply with respect
to an act described in paragraph (1)(B) by a subsidiary owned
or controlled by a United States person if the United States
person divests or terminates its business with the subsidiary
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 203. DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD IRAN.
It shall be the policy of the United States to support
those individuals in Iran seeking a free, democratic
government that respects the rule of law and protects the
rights of all citizens.
SEC. 204. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN IRAN.
(a) Assistance Authorized.--The President is authorized to
provide financial and political assistance (including the
award of grants) to foreign and domestic individuals,
organizations, and entities that support democracy and the
promotion of democracy in Iran. Such assistance may include
the award of grants to eligible independent prodemocracy
broadcasting organizations and new media that broadcast into
Iran.
(b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Financial and political
assistance authorized under this section shall be provided
only to an individual, organization, or entity that--
[[Page H8841]]
(1) officially opposes the use of violence and terrorism
and has not been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization under section 219(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) at any time during the
preceding 4 years;
(2) advocates the adherence by Iran to nonproliferation
regimes for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
materiel;
(3) is dedicated to democratic values and supports the
adoption of a democratic form of Government in Iran;
(4) is dedicated to respect for human rights, including the
fundamental equality of women;
(5) works to establish equality of opportunity for all
people; and
(6) supports freedom of the press, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and freedom of religion.
(c) Funding.--Financial and political assistance authorized
under this section may only be provided using funds available
to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Broader
Middle East and North Africa Initiative, the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund, and the Near East Regional Democracy Fund.
(d) Notification.--Not later than 15 days before each
obligation of assistance under this section, and in
accordance with the procedures under section 634A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-l), the
President shall notify the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate of such
obligation of assistance. Such notification shall include, as
practicable, a description of the types of programs supported
by such assistance and an identification of the recipients of
such assistance.
(e) Sense of Congress Regarding Diplomatic Assistance.--It
is the sense of Congress that--
(1) contacts should be expanded with opposition groups in
Iran that meet the criteria for eligibility for assistance
under subsection (b);
(2) support for those individuals seeking democracy in Iran
should be expressed by United States representatives and
officials in all appropriate international fora; and
(3) officials and representatives of the United States
should--
(A) strongly and unequivocally support indigenous efforts
in Iran calling for free, transparent, and democratic
elections; and
(B) draw international attention to violations by the
Government of Iran of human rights, freedom of religion,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press.
SEC. 205. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS ON CERTAIN PERSONS WHO ARE
RESPONSIBLE FOR OR COMPLICIT IN HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CITIZENS OF IRAN OR
THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS AFTER THE JUNE 12, 2009,
ELECTIONS IN IRAN.
(a) List of Persons Who Are Responsible for or Complicit in
Certain Human Rights Abuses; Sanctions on Such Persons.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to
the appropriate congressional committees a list of all
persons who are senior officials of the Government of Iran,
including the Supreme Leader, the President, Members of the
Cabinet, Members of the Assembly of Experts, Members of the
Ministry of Intelligence Services, or any Member of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with the rank of brigadier
general and above, including members of paramilitary
organizations such as Ansar-e-Hezbollah and Basij-e
Mostaz'afin.
(2) Certification.--The President shall impose on the
persons specified in the list under paragraph (1) the
sanctions described in subsection (b). The President shall
exempt any such person from such imposition if the President
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that such person, based on credible evidence, is
not responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for
ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission
of serious human rights abuses against citizens of Iran or
their family members on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of
whether such abuses occurred in Iran.
(3) Updates of list.--The President shall transmit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
(A) not later than every 60 days beginning after the date
of the initial transmittal under such paragraph; and
(B) as new information becomes available.
(4) Form of report; public availability.--
(A) Form.--The list required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified
annex.
(B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion of the
list required under paragraph (1) shall be made available to
the public and posted on the Web sites of the Department of
the Treasury and the Department of State.
(5) Consideration of data from other countries and
nongovernmental organizations.--In preparing the list
required under paragraph (1), the President shall consider
credible data already obtained by other countries and
nongovernmental organizations, including organizations in
Iran, that monitor the human rights abuses of the Government
of Iran.
(b) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions described in this
subsection are ineligibility for a visa to enter the United
States and sanctions described in section 106 of this Act,
subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe,
including regulatory exceptions to permit the United States
to comply with the Agreement between the United Nations and
the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of
the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into
force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international
obligations.
(c) Termination of Sanctions.--The provisions of this
section shall terminate on the date on which the President
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees that the Government of Iran--
(1) has unconditionally released all political prisoners,
including the citizens of Iran detained in the aftermath of
the June 12, 2009, presidential election in Iran;
(2) has ceased its practices of violence, unlawful
detention, torture, and abuse of citizens of Iran while
engaging in peaceful political activity;
(3) has conducted a transparent investigation into the
killings, arrests, and abuse of peaceful political activists
that occurred in the aftermath of the June 12, 2009,
presidential election in Iran and prosecuted the individuals
responsible for such killings, arrests, and abuse; and
(4) has--
(A) established an independent judiciary; and
(B) is respecting the human rights and basic freedoms
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
SEC. 206. CLARIFICATION OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR
PURPOSES OF PROCUREMENT BAN.
The Secretary of State shall--
(1) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, issue guidelines to further describe the goods,
services, and technologies that will be considered
``sensitive technologies'' for purposes of section 106 of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8515), and publish those guidelines in
the Federal Register;
(2) determine the types of goods, services, and
technologies that enable any indigenous capabilities that
Iran has to disrupt and monitor information and
communications in that country, and consider adding
descriptions of those items to the guidelines; and
(3) periodically review, but in no case less than once each
year, the guidelines and, if necessary, amend the guidelines
on the basis of technological developments and new
information regarding transfers of goods, services, and
technologies to Iran and the development of Iran's indigenous
capabilities to disrupt and monitor information and
communications in Iran.
SEC. 207. COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY TO PROMOTE INTERNET FREEDOM
AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN IRAN.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a comprehensive
strategy to--
(1) help the people of Iran produce, access, and share
information freely and safely via the Internet, including in
Farsi and regional languages;
(2) support the development of counter-censorship
technologies that enable the citizens of Iran to undertake
Internet activities without interference from the Government
of Iran;
(3) increase the capabilities and availability of secure
mobile communications among human rights and democracy
activists in Iran;
(4) provide resources for digital safety training for
media, unions, and academic and civil society organizations
in Iran;
(5) increase the amount of accurate Internet content in
local languages in Iran;
(6) increase emergency resources for the most vulnerable
human rights advocates seeking to organize, share
information, and support human rights in Iran;
(7) expand surrogate radio, television, live stream, and
social network communications inside Iran, including by
assisting United States telecommunications and software
companies to comply with the United States export licensing
process for such purposes;
(8) expand activities to safely assist and train human
rights, civil society, and union activists in Iran to operate
effectively and securely;
(9) defeat all attempts by the Government of Iran to jam or
otherwise deny international satellite broadcasting signals,
including by identifying foreign providers of jamming
technology;
(10) expand worldwide United States embassy and consulate
programming for and outreach to Iranian dissident
communities;
(11) expand access to proxy servers for democracy activists
in Iran; and
(12) discourage telecommunication and software companies
from facilitating Internet censorship by the Government of
Iran.
(b) Eligibility for Assistance.--Assistance authorized
under the comprehensive stategy required under subsection (a)
shall be provided only to an individual, organization, or
entity that meets the eligibility criteria in section 204(b)
of this Act for financial and political assistance authorized
under section section 204(a) of this Act.
[[Page H8842]]
(c) Form.--The comprehensive strategy required under
subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and
may include a classified annex.
TITLE III--IRAN REGIME AND IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS
ACCOUNTABILITY
SEC. 301. IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.
(a) Transactions With Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps.--No United States person shall knowingly conduct any
commercial transaction or financial transaction with, or make
any investment in--
(1) any person or entity owned or controlled by Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps;
(2) any instrumentality, subsidiary, affiliate, or agent of
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
(3) any project, activity, or business owned or controlled
by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
(b) Transactions With Certain Foreign Persons.--No United
States person shall knowingly conduct any commercial
transaction or financial transaction with, or make any
investment in, any foreign person or foreign entity that
conducts any transaction with or makes any investment with
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which, if conducted
or made by a United States person, would constitute a
violation of subsection (a).
(c) Penalties.--Any United States person who violates
subsection (a) or (b) shall be subject to 1 or more of the
criminal penalties under the authority of section 206(c) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705).
(d) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--The President is authorized to waive the
restrictions in subsection (a) or (b) on a case-by-case basis
if the President determines and notfies the appropriate
congressional committees that failure to exercise such waiver
authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security interests of the United States.
(2) Publication in the federal register.--Not later than 15
days after any waiver authority is exercised pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this subsection, the name of the person with
respect to which sanctions are being waived shall be
published in the Federal Register.
(e) Amendments to Code of Federal Regulations.--Not later
than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
President shall amend part 544 of title 31, Code of Federal
Regulations (``Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators
Sanctions Regulations''), to incorporate the provisions of
this section.
(f) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``foreign
person'', ``knowingly'', and ``United States person'' have
the meanings given such terms in section 112 of this Act.
SEC. 302. ADDITIONAL EXPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 103(b)(2)(B)(iv)
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C.
8512(b)(2)(B)(iv)) or section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-484; 50 U.S.C. 1701
note) or any other provision of law, effective on the date of
the enactment of this Act--
(1) licenses to export or reexport goods, services, or
technology for the repair or maintenance of aircraft of
United States origin to Iran may not be issued, and any such
license issued before such date of enactment is no longer
valid; and
(2) goods, services, or technology described in paragraph
(1) may not be exported or reexported to Iran.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to repeal or otherwise supersede the requirements
of section 740.15(d)(4) of title 15, Code of Federal
Regulations (relating to reexports of vessels subject to the
Export Adminstration Regulations).
SEC. 303. SANCTIONS AGAINST AFFILIATES OF IRAN'S ISLAMIC
REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and as appropriate thereafter, the
President shall identify in, and, in the case of a foreign
person or foreign entity not already so designated, shall
designate for inclusion in the Annex to Executive Order 13382
(70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to blocking property of weapons
of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters) and
shall apply all applicable sanctions of the United States
pursuant to Executive Order 13382 to each foreign person or
foreign entity for which there is a reasonable basis for
determining that the person or entity is as an agent, alias,
front, instrumentality, official, or affiliate of Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or is an individual serving
as a representative of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps.
(b) Priority for Investigation.--In carrying out this
section, the President shall give priority to investigating
foreign persons and foreign entities identified under section
560.304 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to
the definition of the Government of Iran) and foreign persons
and foreign entities for which there is a reasonable basis to
suspect that the person or entity has conducted or attempted
to conduct one or more sensitive transactions or activities
described in subsection (c).
(c) Sensitive Transaction or Activity.--A sensitive
transaction or activity referred to in subsection (b) is--
(1) a transaction to facilitate the manufacture, import,
export, or transfer of items needed for the development of
nuclear, chemical, biological, or advanced conventional
weapons, including ballistic missiles;
(2) an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq
or Afghanistan, or equip or train, or encourage violence by,
individuals or groups opposed to the governments of those
countries;
(3) a transaction relating to the manufacture, procurement,
or sale of goods, services, and technology relating to Iran's
energy sector, including the development of the energy
resources of Iran, export of petroleum products, and import
of refined petroleum and refining capacity available to Iran;
(4) a transaction relating to the procurement of sensitive
technologies (as defined in section 106(c) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8515(c)); or
(5) a financial transaction or series of transactions
valued at more than $1,000,000 in the aggregate in any 12-
month period involving a non-Iranian financial institution.
(d) Inadmissiblity to United States.--The Secretary of
State shall deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall deny admission into the United States to, any
alien who, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
is a foreign person designated for inclusion in the Annex to
Executive Order 13382 pursuant to subsection (a).
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to remove any sanction of the United States in
force against Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as of
the date of the enactment of this Act by reason of the fact
that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is an entity of
the Government of Iran.
SEC. 304. MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN PERSONS OR ENTITIES
SUPPORTING IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
CORPS.
(a) Identification and Notification.--The President shall
notify the appropriate congressional committees in any case
in which the President determines that there is credible
information indicating that a foreign person or foreign
entity, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
knowingly--
(1) provides material support to Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps or any foreign person or foreign
entity that is identified pursuant to section 303(a) of this
Act as an agent, alias, front, instrumentality, official, or
affiliate of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or an
individual serving as a representative of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
(2) conducts any commercial transaction or financial
transaction with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or
any such person or entity.
(b) Waiver.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
this title and subject to paragraph (2), the President is not
required to make any identification or designation of or
determination with respect to a foreign person or foreign
entity for purposes of this title if doing so would cause
damage to the national security of the United States through
the divulgence of sources and methods of intelligence or
other critical classified information.
(2) Notice to congress.--The President shall notify
Congress of any exercise of the authority of paragraph (1)
and shall include in the notification an identification of
the foreign person or foreign entity, including a description
of the activity or transaction that would have caused the
identification, designation, or determination for purposes of
this title.
(c) Sanctions.--
(1) In general.--The President shall apply to each foreign
person or foreign entity identified in a notice under
subsection (a) for a period determined by the President a
majority of the sanctions described in section 106(a) of this
Act.
(2) Termination.--The President may terminate the sanctions
applied to a foreign person or foreign entity pursuant to
paragraph (1) if the President determines that the person or
entity no longer engages in the activity or activities for
which the sanctions were imposed and has provided assurances
to the United States Government that it will not engage in
the activity or activities in the future.
(d) IEEPA Sanctions.--The President may exercise the
authorities provided under subparagraphs (A) and (C) of
section 203(a)(1) of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)) to impose additional
sanctions on each foreign person or foreign entity identified
pursuant to subsection (a), for such time as the President
may determine, without regard to section 202 of that Act.
(e) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of any
measure described in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign
person or foreign entity if the President--
(1)(A) determines that the person or entity has ceased the
activity that resulted in the notification under subsection
(a) with respect to the person or entity (as the case may be)
and has taken measures to prevent its recurrence; or
(B) determines and so reports to the appropriate
congressional committees 15 days prior to the exercise of
waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver
authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to
the vital national security interests of the United States;
and
[[Page H8843]]
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains the reasons for the determination.
(f) Foreign Person Defined.--In this section, the term
``foreign person'' has the meaning given the term in section
112 of this Act.
SEC. 305. SPECIAL MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SUPPORTING IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
CORPS.
(a) Sanctions.--With respect to any foreign entity
identified pursuant to section 304(a) of this Act that is an
agency of the government of a foreign country, the President
shall, in addition to applying to the entity the sanctions
described in section 304(c) of this Act, apply to the agency
of the government of the foreign country the following
measures:
(1) No assistance shall be provided to the agency of the
government of the foreign country under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, or any successor Act, or the Arms
Export Control Act, or any successor Act, other than
assistance that is intended to benefit the people of the
foreign country directly and that is not provided through
governmental agencies or entities of the foreign country.
(2) The United States shall oppose any loan or financial or
technical assistance to the agency of the government of the
foreign country by international financial institutions in
accordance with section 701 of the International Financial
Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d).
(3) The United States shall deny to the agency of the
government of the foreign country any credit or financial
assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States Government.
(4) The United States Government shall not approve the sale
to the agency of the government of the foreign country any
defense articles or defense services or issue any license for
the export of items on the United States Munitions List.
(5) No exports to the agency of the government of the
foreign country shall be permitted of any goods or
technologies controlled for national security reasons under
the Export Administration Regulations.
(6) At the earliest practicable date, the Secretary of
State shall terminate, in a manner consistent with
international law, the authority of any air carrier that is
controlled in fact by the agency of the government of the
foreign country to engage in air transportation (as defined
in section 40102(5) of title 49, United States Code).
(7) Additional restrictions may be imposed in accordance
with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
(b) Termination.--The President may terminate the sanctions
applied to an entity or government of a foreign country
pursuant to subsection (a) if the President determines that
the entity or government, as the case may be, no longer
engages in the activity or activities for which the sanctions
were imposed and has provided assurances to the United States
Government that it will not engage in the activity or
activities in the future.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of any
measure described in subsection (a) with respect to an entity
or government of a foreign country if the President--
(1)(A) determines that the entity or government, as the
case may be, has ceased the activity that resulted in the
notification under section 304(a) of this Act with respect to
the entity or government and has taken measures to prevent
its recurrence; or
(B) determines and so reports to the appropriate
congressional committees 15 days prior to the exercise of
waiver authority that failure to exercise such waiver
authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to
the vital national security interests of the United States;
and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains the reasons for the determination.
SEC. 306. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
RESTRICT CONTRACTS OR LICENSES FOR CERTAIN
SANCTIONABLE PERSONS.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or
local government may adopt and enforce measures to prohibit
the State or local government, as the case may be, from
entering into or renewing any contract with, or granting to
or renewing any license for persons that conduct business
operations in Iran described in section 309 of this Act.
SEC. 307. IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.
(a) Freezing of Assets.--In accordance with subsection (b),
all property and interests in property of the foreign persons
described in Executive Orders 13382 and 13224, or their
affiliates, that are in the United States, that on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act come within the United
States, or that on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act come within the possession or control of United States
persons, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in with respect to
any such person determined by the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Secretary of Defense to--
(1) have committed, or to pose a significant risk of
committing, an act or acts of violence that have the purpose
or effect of threatening United States efforts to promote
security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan;
(2) have knowingly and materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, logistical, or technical
support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act
or acts of violence or any person or entity whose property
and interests in property are blocked pursuant this
subsection; or
(3) be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or
purported to act for or on behalf of any person whose
property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to
this subsection.
(b) Description of Prohibitions.--The prohibitions
described in subsection (a) include--
(1) the making of any contribution or provision of funds,
goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person
whose property and interests in property are blocked; and
(2) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds,
goods, or services from any such person.
(c) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) an increase in both the quantity and quality of Iranian
arms shipments and technological expertise to the Iraqi
insurgents, the Taliban, other terrorist organizations and
criminal elements has the potential to significantly change
the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and lead to a
large increase in United States, International Security
Assistance Force, Coalition and Iraqi and Afghan casualties;
and
(2) an increase in Iranian activity and influence in Iraq
threatens the safety and welfare of the residents of Camp
Ashraf.
(d) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to urge the Government of Iraq to--
(1) uphold its commitments to the United States to ensure
the continued well-being of those individuals living in Camp
Ashraf;
(2) prevent the involuntary return of such individuals to
Iran in accordance with the United States Embassy Statement
on Transfer of Security Responsibility for Camp Ashraf of
December 28, 2008; and
(3) not close Camp Ashraf until the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees can complete its process, recognize
as political refugees the residents of Camp Ashraf who do not
wish to go back to Iran, and resettle them in third
countries.
(e) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``foreign
person'' and ``United States person'' have the meanings given
such terms in section 112 of this Act.
SEC. 308. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.
(a) National Strategy Required.--The President shall
develop a strategy, to be known as the ``National Strategy to
Counter Iran'', that provides strategic guidance for
activities that support the objective of addressing,
countering, and containing the threats posed by Iran.
(b) Annual Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than January 30 of each year,
the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the current and future strategy of the
United States toward Iran, and the implementation of the
National Strategy to Counter Iran required under subsection
(a).
(2) Form.--If the President considers it appropriate, the
report required under this subsection, or appropriate parts
thereof, may be transmitted in classified form.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under
subsection (b) shall include a description of the security
posture and objectives of Iran, including at least the
following:
(1) A description and assessment of Iranian grand strategy
and security strategy, including--
(A) the goals of Iran's grand strategy and security
strategy, and strategic objectives; and
(B) Iranian strategy to achieve such objectives in the
Middle East, Europe, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
(2) An assessment of the capabilities of Iran's
conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces,
including--
(A) the size and capabilities of Iran's conventional forces
and Iran's unconventional forces;
(B) an analysis of the formal and informal national command
authority for Iran's conventional forces and Iran's
unconventional forces;
(C) the size and capability of Iranian foreign and domestic
intelligence and special operations units, including the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force;
(D) a description and analysis of Iranian military
doctrine;
(E) the types and amount of support, including funding,
lethal and nonlethal supplies, and training, provided to
groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist
organizations and regional militant groups; and
(F) an estimate of the levels of funding and funding and
procurement sources by Iran to develop and support Iran's
conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces.
(3) An assessment of Iranian strategy and capabilities
related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile forces
development, including--
(A) a summary and analysis of nuclear weapons capabilities;
(B) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding
expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized
by, Iran to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities;
(C) a summary of the capabilities of Iran's unconventional
weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise
missile
[[Page H8844]]
forces, including developments in the preceding year, the
size of Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise
missile forces, and the locations of missile launch sites;
(D) a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's
unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces
and Iran's cruise missile forces; and
(E) an estimate of the amount and sources of funding
expended by, and an analysis of procurement networks utilized
by, Iran on programs to develop a capability to develop
unconventional weapons and Iran's ballistic missile forces
and Iran's cruise missile forces.
(4) The Government of Iran's economic strategy, including--
(A) sources of funding for the activities of the Government
of Iran described in this section;
(B) the role of the Government of Iran in the formal and
informal sector of the domestic Iranian economy;
(C) evasive and other efforts by the Government of Iran to
circumvent international and bilateral sanctions regimes;
(D) the effect of bilateral and multilateral sanctions on
the ability of Iran to implement its grand strategy and
security strategy described in paragraph (1); and
(E) Iran's strategy and efforts to leverage economic and
political influence, cooperation, and activities in the
Middle East Europe, Africa, Western Hemisphere, and Asia.
(5) Key vulnerabilities identified in paragraph (1), and an
implementation plan for the National Strategy to Counter Iran
required under subsection (a).
(6) The United States strategy to--
(A) address and counter the capabilities of Iran's
conventional forces and Iran's unconventional forces;
(B) disrupt and deny Iranian efforts to develop or augment
capabilities related to nuclear, unconventional, and missile
forces development;
(C) address the Government of Iran's economic strategy to
enable the objectives described in this subsection; and
(D) exploit key vulnerabilities identified in this
subsection.
(7) An implementation plan for United States strategy
described in under paragraph (6).
(d) Classified Annex.--The reports required under
subsection (b) shall be in unclassified form to the greatest
extent possible, and may include a classified annex where
necessary.
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the
Committee on Finance, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 309. DEFINITIONS.
Except as otherwise provided, in this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
Appropriations, the Committee on Finance, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Iran's ballistic missile forces.--The term ``Iran's
ballistic missile forces'' includes ballistic missiles,
goods, and associated equipment and those elements of the
Government of Iran that employ such ballistic missiles,
goods, and associated equipment.
(3) Iran's ballistic missile and unconventional weapons.--
The term ``Iran's ballistic missile and unconventional
weapons'' means Iran's ballistic missile forces and chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons programs.
(4) Iran's cruise missile forces.--The term ``Iran's cruise
missile forces'' includes cruise missile forces, goods, and
associated equipment and those elements of the Government of
Iran that employ such cruise missiles capable of flights less
than 500 kilometers, goods, and associated equipment.
(5) Iran's conventional forces.--The term ``Iran's
conventional forces''--
(A) means military forces of Iran designed to conduct
operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's
unconventional forces and Iran's ballistic missile forces and
Iran's cruise missile forces; and
(B) includes Iran's Army, Air Force, Navy, domestic law
enforcement, and elements of the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps, other than Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Quds Force.
(6) Iran's unconventional forces.--The term ``Iran's
unconventional forces''--
(A) means forces of Iran that carry out missions typically
associated with special operations forces; and
(B) includes--
(i) the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds
Force;
(ii) paramilitary organizations;
(iii) formal and informal intelligence agencies and
entities; and
(iv) any organization that--
(I) has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization
under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(8 U.S.C. 1189(a));
(II) receives assistance from Iran; and
(III) is assessed--
(aa) as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out
attacks on behalf of Iran; or
(bb) as likely to carry out attacks in response to an
attack by another country on Iran or its interests.
(7) Affiliate.--The term ``affiliate'' means any individual
or entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with, the company, including without limitation
direct and indirect subsidiaries of the company.
(8) Business operations.--The term ``business operations''
means--
(A) carrying out any of the activities described in section
105(a) and (b) of this Act that are sanctionable under such
section;
(B) providing sensitive technology (as defined in section
106(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C.
8515(c))) to the Government of Iran; and
(C) carrying out any of the activities described in section
304(a) of this Act.
(9) Company.--The term ``company'' means--
(A) a sole proprietorship, organization, association,
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, venture,
or other entity, its subsidiary or affiliate; and
(B) includes a company owned or controlled by the
government of a foreign country, that is established or
organized under the laws of, or has its principal place of
business in, such foreign country and includes United States
subsidiaries of the same.
(10) Entity.--The term ``entity'' means a sole
proprietorship, a partnership, limited liability corporation,
association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other
organization.
(11) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has
the meaning given the term in section 133 of title 41, United
States Code.
(12) Government of iran.--The term ``Government of Iran''
includes the Government of Iran, any political subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, and any person owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government
of Iran.
(13) Petroleum resources.--The term ``petroleum resources''
has the meaning given the term in section 112 of this Act.
(14) Sensitive technology.--The term ``sensitive
technology'' has the meaning given the term in section 106(c)
of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C.
8515(c)).
SEC. 310. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this title shall be construed to limit the
authority of the President to otherwise designate foreign
persons or foreign entities for inclusion in the Annex to
Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567; relating to
blocking property of weapons of mass destruction
proliferators and their supporters).
TITLE IV--IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS; DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES
THAT INVEST IN IRAN; AND PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS,
SERVICES, AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN
SEC. 401. IRAN FINANCIAL SANCTIONS.
(a) Financial Institution Certification.--Section 104(e) of
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and
Divestment Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C.
8513(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(3) Certification.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this paragraph, the Secretary of the
Treasury shall prescribe regulations to require any person
wholly owned or controlled by a domestic financial
institution to provide positive certification to the
Secretary if such person is engaged in corresponding
relations or business activity with a foreign person or
financial institution that facilitates transactions from
persons and domestic financial institutions described in
subsection (d).''.
(b) Central Bank of Iran.--Section 104(c) of the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513(a)) is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(4) Central bank of iran.--
``(A) Determination.--Not later than 30 days after the date
of the enactment of this paragraph, the President shall
determine whether the Central Bank of Iran has--
``(i) provided financial services in support of, or
otherwise facilitated, the ability of Iran to--
``(I) acquire or develop chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons, or related technologies;
``(II) construct, equip, operate, or maintain nuclear
enrichment facilities; or
``(III) acquire or develop ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, or destabilizing types and amounts of conventional
weapons; or
``(ii) facilitated a transaction or provided financial
services for--
``(I) Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; or
``(II) a financial institution whose property or interests
in property are subject to sanctions imposed pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act--
``(aa) in connection with Iran's proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction or delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction; or
``(bb) Iran's support for acts of international terrorism.
[[Page H8845]]
``(B) Submission to congress.--The President shall submit
the determination made under subparagraph (A) in writing to
the Congress, together with the reasons therefor.
``(C) Imposition of sanctions.--
``(i) In general.--If the President determines under
subparagraph (A) that the Central Bank of Iran has engaged in
any of the activities described in that paragraph, the
President shall apply to the Central Bank of Iran sanctions
pursuant to the International Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), including blocking of property and
restrictions or prohibitions on financial transactions and
the exportation of property.
``(ii) Effective period of designation.--The President
shall maintain the sanctions imposed under clause (i) until
such time as the President determines and certifies in
writing to the Congress that the Central Bank of Iran is no
longer engaged in any of the activities described in
subparagraph (A).''.
(c) Continuation in Effect.--Sections 104, 106, 107, 108,
109, 110, 111, and 115 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 shall remain in
effect until the President makes the certification described
in section 606(a) of this Act.
SEC. 402. DIVESTMENT FROM CERTAIN COMPANIES THAT INVEST IN
IRAN.
Title II of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 shall remain in
effect until the President makes the certification described
in section 606(a) of this Act.
SEC. 403. PREVENTION OF DIVERSION OF CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES,
AND TECHNOLOGIES TO IRAN.
Title III of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 shall remain in
effect until the President makes the certification described
in section 606(a) of this Act.
TITLE V--SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
SEC. 501. DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION RELATING TO SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES.
(a) In General.--Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(r) Disclosure of Certain Activities Relating to Iran,
Terrorism, and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction.--
``(1) In general.--The Commission shall, by rule, require
any issuer described in paragraph (2) to disclose on a
quarterly basis a detailed description of each activity
described in paragraph (2) engaged in by the issuer or its
affiliates during the period covered by the report,
including--
``(A) the nature and extent of the activity;
``(B) the revenues, if any, attributable to the activity;
and
``(C) whether the issuer or the affiliate of the issuer (as
the case may be) intends to continue the activity.
``(2) Issuer described.--An issuer is described in this
paragraph if the issuer is required to file reports with the
Commission under subsection (a) and the issuer or any of its
affiliates has, during the period covered by the report--
``(A) engaged in an activity described in section 105 of
the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011 for which sanctions may
be imposed;
``(B) knowingly engaged in an activity described in
subsection (c)(2) of section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (Public
Law 111-195; 22 U.S.C. 8513) or knowingly violated
regulations prescribed under subsection (d)(1) or (e)(1) of
such section 104; or
``(C) knowingly conducted any transaction or dealing with--
``(i) any person the property and interests in property of
which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed.
Reg. 49079; relating to blocking property and prohibiting
transacting with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or
support terrorism);
``(ii) any person the property and interests in property of
which are blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed.
Reg. 38567; relating to blocking of property of weapons of
mass destruction proliferators and their supporters); or
``(iii) any person on the list contained in Appendix A to
part 560 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly
known as the `Iranian Transactions Regulations').
``(3) Sunset.--The provisions of this subsection and the
rules issued by the Commission under paragraph (1) shall
terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which
the President makes the certification described in section
401(a) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)).
``(4) Investigation of disclosures.--When an issuer
reports, pursuant to this subsection, that it or any of its
affiliates has engaged in any activity described in paragraph
(2), the President shall--
``(A) initiate an investigation into the possible
imposition of sanctions under the Iran Threat Reduction Act
of 2011, section 104 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8513),
the Executive Orders or regulations specified in paragraph
(2)(C), or any other provision of law; and
``(B) not later than 180 days after initiating such an
investigation, make a determination with respect to whether
sanctions should be imposed with respect to the issuer or the
affiliate of the issuer (as the case may be).''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall take effect with respect to reports required to be
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission after the
date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
TITLE VI--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 601. DENIAL OF VISAS FOR CERTAIN PERSONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.
(a) In General.--Except as necessary to meet United States
obligations under the Agreement between the United Nations
and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters
of the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, and entered into
force November 21, 1947, and other applicable international
treaty obligations, the Secretary of State shall deny a visa
to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall deny
admission into the United States to, a person of the
Government of Iran pursuant to section 6(j)(1)(A) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (as in effect pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; 50 U.S.C.
1701 et seq.), section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), and section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), including a person
who is a senior official of the Government of Iran who is
specified in the list under section 205(a)(1), if the
Secretary determines that such person--
(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is
affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the
Government of Iran; and
(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated
with terrorist organizations.
(b) Restriction on Movement.--The Secretary of State shall
restrict in Washington, D.C., and at the United Nations in
New York City, the travel to only within a 25-mile radius of
Washington, D.C., or the United Nations headquarters
building, respectively, of any person identified in
subsection (a).
(c) Restriction on Contact.--No person employed with the
United States Government may contact in an official or
unofficial capacity any person that--
(1) is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is
affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the
Government of Iran; and
(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated
with terrorist organizations.
(d) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirements of
subsection (c) if the President determines and so reports to
the appropriate congressional committees 15 days prior to the
exercise of waiver authority that failure to exercise such
waiver authority would pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the vital national security interests of the United
States.
SEC. 602. INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN ALIENS WHO ENGAGE IN
CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO IRAN.
(a) In General.--Section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(H) Individuals who engage in certain activities with
respect to iran.--
``(i) In general.--Subject to clause (iii), any alien
described in clause (ii) is inadmissible.
``(ii) Aliens described.--An alien described in this clause
is an alien who the Secretary of State determines--
``(I) engages in--
``(aa) an activity for which sanctions may be imposed
pursuant to section 105(a) of the Iran Threat Reduction Act
of 2011;
``(bb) an activity--
``(AA) relating to the proliferation by Iran of weapons of
mass destruction or the means of delivery of such weapons;
and
``(BB) for which sanctions may be imposed pursuant to
Executive Order 13382 (70 Fed. Reg. 38567) (or any successor
thereto);
``(cc) an activity--
``(AA) relating to support for international terrorism by
the Government of Iran; and
``(BB) for which sanctions may be imposed pursuant to
Executive Order 13224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49079) (or any successor
thereto); or
``(dd) any other activity with respect to Iran for which
sanctions may be imposed pursuant to any other provision of
law;
``(II) is the chief executive officer, president, or other
individual in charge of overall management of, a member of
the board of directors of, or a shareholder with a
controlling interest in, an entity that engages in an
activity described in subclause (I); or
``(III) is a spouse or minor child of--
``(aa) an alien who engages in an activity described in
subclause (I); or
``(bb) the chief executive officer, president, or other
individual in charge of overall management of, a member of
the board of directors of, or a shareholder with a
controlling interest in, an entity that engages in an
activity described in subclause (I).
``(iii) Notice; waiver with respect to certain entities.--
``(I) Notice.--The Secretary of State may notify an alien
the Secretary determines may be inadmissible under this
subparagraph--
``(aa) that the alien may be inadmissible; and
``(bb) of the reason for the inadmissibility of the alien.
``(II) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
this subparagraph and admit an alien to the United States
if--
``(aa) the alien is described in subclause (II) or
(III)(bb) of clause (ii);
``(bb) the entity that engaged in the activity that would
otherwise result in the inadmissibility of the alien under
this subparagraph is no longer engaging the activity or
[[Page H8846]]
has taken significant steps toward stopping the activity; and
``(cc) the President has received reliable assurances that
the entity will not knowingly engage in an activity described
in clause (ii)(I) again.''.
(b) Regulations.--Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 236) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(j) Regulations With Respect to Inadmissibility of Aliens
Who Engage in Certain Transactions With Iran.--Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection,
the Secretary shall issue regulations and guidelines for
interpreting and enforcing the prohibition under subparagraph
(H) of section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) on the admissibility of aliens who
engage in certain sanctionable activities with respect to
Iran.''.
SEC. 603. AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES
PROVISIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC POWERS ACT.
(a) In General.--Section 206 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``attempt to violate,
conspire to violate'' and inserting ``attempt or conspire to
violate'';
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``not to exceed'' and
all that follows and inserting ``that is not less than twice
the value of the transaction that is the basis of the
violation.''; and
(3) in subsection (c) to read as follows:
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--A person who willfully commits,
attempts or conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the
commission of, an unlawful act described in subsection (a)
shall be fined not less than $1,000,000, imprisoned for not
more than 20 years, or both. A person other than a natural
person shall be fined in an amount not less than the greater
of half of the value of the transaction that is the basis of
the violation or $10,000,000.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and
apply with respect to any violation of section 206(a) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705(a)) that occurs on or after such date of enactment.
SEC. 604. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.
Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall
apply to--
(1) activities subject to the reporting requirements of
title V of the National Security Act of 1947; or
(2) involving a natural gas development and pipeline
project initiated prior to the date of enactment of this
Act--
(A) to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey;
(B) in furtherance of a production sharing agreement or
license awarded by a sovereign government, other than the
Iranian government, before the date of enactment of this Act;
and
(C) for the purpose of providing energy security and
independence from Russia and other governments engaged in
activities subject to sanctions under this Act.
SEC. 605. REGULATORY AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--The President shall, not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, promulgate
regulations as necessary for the implementation of this Act
and the amendments made by this Act.
(b) Consultation With Congress.--Not less than 10 days
prior to the promulgation of regulations under subsection
(a), the President shall notify the appropriate congressional
committees of the proposed regulations and the provisions of
this Act and the amendments made by this Act that the
regulations are implementing.
SEC. 606. SUNSET.
(a) Sunset.--The provisions of this Act and the amendments
made by this Act shall terminate, and shall cease to be
effective, on the date that is 30 days after the date on
which the President certifies to Congress that Iran--
(1) has ceased and verifiably dismantled its efforts to
design, develop, manufacture, or acquire--
(A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials and
technology;
(B) chemical and biological weapons; and
(C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch
technology;
(2) no longer provides support for acts of international
terrorism; and
(3) poses no threat to United States national security,
interests, or allies.
(b) Notification.--The President shall notify the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate not later than
15 days before making a certification described in subsection
(a).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from
Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) and the gentleman from California (Mr.
Berman) each will control 20 minutes.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to claim time in opposition.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from California oppose
the motion?
Mr. BERMAN. I do not oppose the motion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. On that basis, the gentleman from Ohio will
control 20 minutes in opposition.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) be allowed to control half of
the time in the affirmative.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
General Leave
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on this bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentlewoman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I rise in strong support of the Iran Threat Reduction Act, which I
introduced together with the distinguished ranking member of our
committee, the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman). I would also
like to thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Sherman), the ranking
member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade,
for his key contributions on this bill.
As is well known and articulated in the Declaration of National
Emergency continued by successive U.S. Presidents, the Iranian regime
poses an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
The revelation in October of Iran's plot to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador to the United States on our soil and in the process murder
and maim countless Americans is a stark reminder of the regime's desire
of a world without America. The exemplary work of U.S. officials foiled
their plot, but the regime's threat remains. We would be naive to think
that they will not try again.
Meanwhile, Tehran continues to call for the destruction of our ally,
Israel, while denying the Holocaust and making every effort to isolate
the Jewish state. Ahmadinejad is more than willing to put Iran's money
where his mouth is, providing weapons, money, and support for several
terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Hamas, which are waging war
against Israel and our allies in the Middle East.
And last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency released a
report providing extensive evidence that Tehran has been working on
nuclear weapons for years, despite repeated calls for the regime to
abandon these efforts. Their hostility is evident, and their intentions
are crystal clear. We clearly understand the urgency of the Iranian
threat.
Many of our closest allies understand this sense of urgency--from the
Israelis to the British and the Canadians. We tried the olive branch of
engagement, negotiation, and diplomacy. And what did we get, Mr.
Speaker? Diatribes against the United States and our allies and a plot
to shed blood on our soil.
The resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors in November does
not even begin to cover the ground that we need. The resolution had no
deadline for compliance by the regime and no consequence, just
rhetoric. We need overwhelming, crippling sanctions against Iranian
officials and their nuclear program; and we need those sanctions to be
fully implemented with serious penalties for their violation.
{time} 2010
We must undermine the foundations of the Iranian regime in order to
compel it to abandon its deadly path. The Iran Threat Reduction Act
closes loopholes in existing sanctions against Iran's energy and
financial sectors, sanctions senior Iranian regime officials and
expands sanctions against those who help rogue regimes expand their
dangerous weapons programs.
I hope that our Members join us in stopping this dangerous regime in
its tracks.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record my correspondence
with the chairmen of other committees of referral on this bill.
[[Page H8847]]
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, November 4, 2011.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing concerning H.R.
1905, the ``Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011,'' which the
Committee on Foreign Affairs reported favorably. As a result
of your having consulted with us on provisions in H.R. 1905
that fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on
the Judiciary, we are able to agree to discharging our
Committee from further consideration of this bill in order
that it may proceed expeditiously to the House floor for
consideration.
The Judiciary Committee takes this action with our mutual
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 1905 at
this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over subject
matter contained in this or similar legislation, and that our
Committee will be appropriately consulted and involved as the
bill or similar legislation moves forward so that we may
address any remaining issues in our jurisdiction. Our
Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an
appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and
requests your support for any such request.
I would appreciate your response to this letter confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 1905, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in the Congressional Record during floor
consideration.
Sincerely,
Lamar Smith,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, November 4, 2011.
Hon. Lamar Smith,
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Smith: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011, and for
your agreement to discharge the Committee on the Judiciary
from further consideration of this bill so that it may
proceed expeditiously to the House floor.
I am writing to confirm our mutual understanding that, by
forgoing consideration of H.R. 1905 at this time, you are not
waiving any jurisdiction over the subject matter in that bill
or similar legislation. I look forward to continuing to
consult with your Committee as such legislation moves ahead,
and would be glad to support a request by your Committee for
conferees to a House-Senate conference on this, or any
similar, legislation.
I will seek to place a copy of our exchange of letters on
this matter into the Congressional Record during floor
consideration of H.R. 1905.
Sincerely,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, November 16, 2011.
Hon. Darrell E. Issa,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Issa: Thank you for your cooperation with the
Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran
Threat Reduction Act of 2011.
I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee regarding the final text of those sections of H.R.
1905 which the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the
jurisdiction of your Committee. In agreeing to waive
consideration of that bill, this Committee understands that
the Oversight and Government Reform Committee is not waiving
jurisdiction over the relevant provisions in that bill or any
other related matter. I will seek to place a copy of this
letter and your response in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of the bill. Additionally, I will support
your request for an appropriate appointment of outside
conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate
conference on this or similar legislation should such a
conference be convened.
Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in
this matter.
Sincerely,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform,
Washington, DC, November 18, 2011.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairwoman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Chairwoman: Thank you for your letter concerning
H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011. I concur in
your judgment that provisions of the bill are within the
jurisdiction of the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee.
I am willing to waive this committee's right to consider
the bill. In so doing, I do not waive its jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the bill. I appreciate your commitment
to insert this exchange of letters into the committee report
and the Congressional Record, and your support for outside
conferees from the Committee should a conference be convened.
Sincerely,
Darrell Issa,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, November 21, 2011.
Hon. Spencer Bachus,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Bachus: Thank you for your cooperation with
the Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran
Threat Reduction Act of 2011.
I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Financial Services Committee
regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1905 which
the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of
your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that
bill, this Committee understands that the Financial Services
Committee is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant
provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will
seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate
appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the
event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar
legislation should such a conference be convened.
Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in
this matter.
Sincerely,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, DC, November 23, 2011.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing concerning H.R.
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011. Based on the
agreement made by the staff of our two committees regarding
H.R. 1905 and in the interest of permitting your Committee to
proceed expeditiously with the bill, I am willing to forego
at this time the consideration of provisions in this bill
that fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Financial Services under Rule X of the Rules of the House of
Representatives.
The Committee on Financial Services takes this action with
our mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of
H.R. 1905 at this time, we do not waive any jurisdiction over
the subject matter contained in this or similar legislation,
and that our Committee will be appropriately consulted and
involved as the bill or similar legislation moves forward.
Our Committee reserves the right to seek appointment of an
appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate
conference involving this or similar legislation, and
requests your support for any such requests.
Further, I ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on
this matter be included in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of this bill. I look forward to working
with you as this important measure moves through the
legislative process.
Sincerely,
Spencer Bachus,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Legtinen,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: I am writing regarding H.R.
1905, the ``Iran Threat Reduction Act of 2011,'' which was
favorably reported out of your Committee on November 2, 2011.
I commend you on your efforts to make sure that the United
States is better able to address the critical threats that
Iran poses.
There have been productive conversations between the staffs
of our Committees, during which we have proposed changes to
provisions within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways
and Means in the bill to clarify the intent and scope of the
bill with respect to compliance with U.S. international trade
obligations, thereby reducing our exposure to trade sanctions
and retaliation against our exporters. I believe that
compliance with our trade obligations makes for a more
credible U.S. response to Iran's behavior and helps us
develop a stronger multilateral response to Iran.
Accordingly, I appreciate your commitment to address the
concerns raised by the Committee on Ways and Means in
sections 106, 205, 304, 305, 309 and 401 in H.R. 1905.
Assuming these issues are resolved satisfactorily, in order
to expedite floor consideration of the bill, the Committee on
Ways and Means will forgo action on H.R. 1905. Further, the
Committee will not oppose the bill's consideration on the
suspension calendar, based on our understanding that you will
work with the Committee as the legislative process moves
forward in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, to
ensure that the Committee's concerns continue to be
addressed. This is also being done with
[[Page H8848]]
the understanding that it does not in any way prejudice the
Committee with respect to the appointment of conferees or its
jurisdictional prerogatives on this or similar legislation.
I would appreciate your response to this letter, confirming
this understanding with respect to H.R. 1905, and would ask
that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be
included in the Congressional Record during Floor
consideration.
Sincerely,
Dave Camp,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2011.
Hon. Dave Camp,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, Longworth HOB,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Camp: Thank you for your cooperation with the
Foreign Affairs Committee regarding H.R. 1905, the Iran
Threat Reduction Act of 2011.
I am writing to confirm the agreement between the Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Committee on Ways and Means
regarding the final text of those sections of H.R. 1905 which
the Parliamentarian has indicated involve the jurisdiction of
your Committee. In agreeing to waive consideration of that
bill, this Committee understands that the Committee on Ways
and Means is not waiving jurisdiction over the relevant
provisions in that bill or any other related matter. I will
seek to place a copy of this letter and your response in the
Congressional Record during floor consideration of the bill.
Additionally, I will support your request for an appropriate
appointment of outside conferees from your Committee in the
event of a House-Senate conference on this or similar
legislation should such a conference be convened
Thank you again for your consideration and assistance in
this matter.
Sincerely,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to place in the Record an article from the
Christian Science Monitor entitled, ``Used-car salesman as Iran proxy?
Why assassination plot doesn't add up for experts,'' and also from
Mother Jones, ``Four Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb
Plot.''
[From The Christian Science Monitor--CSMonitor.com, Oct. 12, 2011]
Used-Car Salesman as Iran Proxy? Why Assassination Plot Doesn't Add Up
for Experts
(By Scott Peterson)
The U.S. has blamed the specialist Qods Force in an Iran
assassination plot. But those who track the group say the
plot doesn't reflect the careful planning, efficiency, and
strategy the Qods Force is known for.
How careful is Iran's Qods Force when it comes to covert
operations abroad?
This wing of the Revolutionary Guard was accused by U.S.
military commanders in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 of jeopardizing
the efforts of more than 150,000 American troops on the
ground, of backing militias of all stripes, and of exercising
strong influence on Baghdad's rulers.
Yet how many Iranian Qods Force operatives did that take?
One U.S. diplomat posted to Baghdad at the time had the
consensus answer: There were just eight Qods Force men in all
of Iraq.
IN PICTURES: Iran's military might
Indeed, the Qods Force has a reputation for careful,
methodical work--as well as effective use of local proxies,
and ultimately their pragmatic deployment by Tehran as covert
tools to expand Iran's influence across a region in flux.
That explains why Iran experts are raising questions about
fresh U.S. charges of an Iran-backed bomb plot, this time to
kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington and blow up the Saudi
and Israeli embassies.
A criminal complaint filed by U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday
charge Mansour Arbabsiar--a naturalized U.S. citizen with an
Iranian passport from Corpus Christi, Texas--and Gholam
Shakuri, ``an Iran-based member of Iran's Qods Force,'' with
plotting to kill the Saudi diplomat on U.S. soil in an
operation ``directed by factions of the Iranian government.''
Details of alleged plot
Those who know Iran well are skeptical, but do not rule out
any possibility. Mr. Arbabsiar may have arranged for $100,000
to be transferred from Iran as a downpayment of $1.5 million
for the hit, as U.S. charges indicate.
Arbabsiar may also have boasted to one alleged accomplice
in the plot--an associate of Mexico's Zeta drug cartel, who
also happened to be an informant of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration--that his cousin was a ``big general'' in the
Iranian military.
While also describing a series of potential attacks to the
associate, he may even have stated--apparently in secretly
taped conversations--that mass American casualties as a
result were not a problem: ``They want that guy [the
ambassador] done [killed], if the hundred go with him f* *k
'em,'' reads the legal complaint.
Why the plot doesn't add up
But Iran specialists who have followed the Islamic Republic
for years say that many details in the alleged plot just
don't add up.
``It's a very strange case, it doesn't really fit Iran's
mode of operation,'' says Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at
the Rand Corp. in Arlington. Va., and coauthor of studies
about the Revolutionary Guard.
``When you look at Iranian use of terrorism, it has some
very specific objectives, whether it's countering the United
States in Iraq or Afghanistan, or retaliating against
perceived Israeli actions,'' says Mr. Nader.
``This [plot] doesn't seem to serve Iran's interests in any
conceivable way,'' says Nader. ``Assassinating the Saudi
ambassador would increase international pressure against
Iran, could be considered an act of war . . . by Saudi
Arabia, it could really destabilize the government in Iran;
and this is a political system that is interested in its own
survival.''
No apparent cost-benefit analysis
Iran has been trying to evade sanctions, strengthen
relations with non-Western partners, while continuing with
its nuclear program, notes Nader.
He says it is ``difficult'' to believe that either Qassim
Soleimani--the canny commander of the Qods Force--or Iran's
deliberative supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali
Khamenei, would order such an attack that ``would put all of
Iran's objectives and strategies at risk.''
That view has been echoed by many Iran watchers, who are
raising doubts about the assassination plot allegations.
``This plot, if true, departs from all known Iranian
policies and procedures,'' writes Gary Sick, an Iran expert
at Columbia University and principal White House aide during
the 1979 Iranian revolution and hostage crisis.
While Iran may have many reasons to be angry at the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia, Mr. Sick notes in a posting on the
Gulf2000/Columbia experts list that he moderates, ``it is
difficult to believe that they would rely on a non-Islamic
criminal gang to carry out this most sensitive of all
possible missions.''
Relying on ``at least one amateur and a Mexican criminal
drug gang that is known to be riddled with both Mexican and
U.S. intelligence agents'' appears to be sloppy, adds Sick.
``Whatever else may be Iran's failings, they are not noted
for utter disregard of the most basic intelligence
tradecraft.''
The odd set of details means that the usual cost-benefit
calculation that experts often attribute to Tehran's
decisionmaking does not apply here, says Muhammad Sahimi, in
an analysis for the Tehran Bureau website.
At a time when pressure is building on Iran over ``gross
human rights violations,'' sanctions are showing signs of
working, Iran is ``deeply worried about the fate of its
strategic partner in Syria . . . tensions with Turkey are
increasing . . . and a fierce power struggle is under way
within Iran,'' says Mr. Sahimi, ``it is essentially
impossible to believe that the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran]
would act in such a way as to open a major new front against
itself.''
Previous assassinations only targeted Iranians
Sahimi also notes that, even at the height of the regime's
assassinations of opponents in the past, it did not target
non-Iranians.
``It is keenly aware that it is under the American
microscope,'' says Sahimi, making even less likely Iran
embarking ``on such a useless assassination involving a low-
level, non-player individual.''
Such reservations are not the same ones given by Iranian
officials when they dismiss the charges of a murder plot. But
analysts suggest more information will need to be revealed
before judgment can be made.
``Iran does have a history of terrorism, but they also like
to go through proxies--and true and tested proxies, not
necessarily just anybody,'' says Nader of Rand, citing
Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, or Iraqi Shiite insurgents
trained in Iranian camps.
The man arrested by U.S. law enforcement at JFK airport on
Sept. 29 does not seem to fit that mold.
Not your average proxy
Arbabsiar, a former used car salesman, would appear to have
been a surprise choice of the Qods Force. Yet he apparently
traveled several times to Mexico to recruit drug-cartel hit
men, had $100,000 from Iran paid into a U.S. account and
promised much more, and discussed the plot on a normal
telephone.
``The Iranian modus operandi is only to trust sensitive
plots to their own employees, or to trusted proxies such as
Hezbollah, Saudi Hezbollah, Hamas, the Sadr faction in Iraq,
Iran-friendly extremist Muslims in Afghanistan and other pro-
Iranian Muslim groups,'' wrote Kenneth Katzman of the
Congressional Research Service on Gulf2000 on Wednesday.
``Are we to believe that this Texas car seller was a Qods
sleeper agent for many years resident in the U.S.?
Ridiculous,'' said Mr. Katzman, who authored a study of the
Revolutionary Guard in the 1990s. ``They (the Iranian command
system) never ever use such has-beens or loosely connected
people for sensitive plots such as this.''
And what kind of man is he? The Associated Press spoke to
Arbabsiar's friend and former Texas business partner David
Tomscha, who said he was ``sort of a hustler.'' The Iranian-
American, the AP reported, ``was likable, albeit a bit
lazy.''
[[Page H8849]]
``He's no mastermind,'' Mr. Tomscha told the AP. ``I can't
imagine him thinking up a plan like that. I mean, he didn't
seem all that political. He was more of a businessman.''
____
[From Mother Jones, Oct. 12, 2011]
4 Things You Need to Know About the Iran Bomb Plot
(By Adam Serwer)
The assassination was never going to take place. On
Tuesday, FBI Director Robert Mueller described Iranian
American Mansour Arbabsiar's alleged plot to assassinate the
Saudi Ambassador to the United States as straight out of a
``Hollywood script.'' In a sense he was right--because the
plot was controlled from the beginning by the FBI. According
to the criminal complaint, when Arbabsiar traveled to Mexico
in May 2011, to allegedly find an assassin from the ranks of
Mexican drug cartels, he ended up talking to a paid DEA
informant who dodged drug charges in exchange for cooperating
with authorities. In keeping with previous sting cases, the
FBI was careful to record statements from Arbabsiar
dismissing the possibility of numerous civilian casualties,
something that makes an entrapment defense all but impossible
to mount.
The US thinks Iran is responsible. The criminal complaint
states that Arbabsiar believed his cousin, Ali Gholam
Shakcuri, was a member of the al-Quds Force, an elite faction
of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Under interrogation,
Arbabsiar allegedly identified two men who were ``known to
the United States to be senior members of the Quds Force,''
one of whom allegedly met with Arbabsiar and Shakcuri in Iran
to discuss the operation. Despite the al-Quds Force's
reputation for lethal effectiveness however, Arbabsiar and
his cousin don't come off as any more competent than the
average target of an FBI sting. They discuss the plot in ham-
handed ``code'' in telephone conversations, and Shakcuri
allegedly wires $100,000 to an American bank controlled by
the FBI. That's not exactly the kind of subtlety you expect
from an ``elite unit'' made up of Iranian Revolutionary
Guard's ``most skilled warriors,'' a group so effective that
attacks in Iraq were attributed to them on the basis of their
lethality and sophistication. (Iran's government has denied
involvement.)
So much for Miranda rights halting interrogation. Arbabsiar
was arrested in late September, but he wasn't brought before
a judge until Tuesday. That's because when he was arrested at
the airport upon returning from another trip to Mexico, he
``knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and his
right to speedy presentment.'' Not only did he cooperate with
interrogators, he flipped and implicated his cousin Shakuri
by calling him and discussing the plot while the FBI was
listening in. And all without waterboarding.
So, about targeted killing . . . The New York Times'
Charlie Savage recently reported on the contents of the legal
memo authorizing the targeting of recently killed radical
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, which concluded that ``Mr. Awlaki
could be legally killed, if it was not feasible to capture
him, because intelligence agencies said he was taking part in
the war between the United States and Al Qaeda and posed a
significant threat to Americans, as well as because Yemeni
authorities were unable or unwilling to stop him.'' Iran
could make similar arguments about the Saudi ambassador if
they felt so inclined, if they wanted to justify the plot,
true or otherwise. All of which is to say that those rules
may not be enough of a framework to prevent a future in which
other countries that acquire drone technology decide to use
them to eliminate their stated enemies as frequently as the
U.S. does.
I would also like to place in the Record a quote from Mr. Greg
Thielmann, the former State Department and Senate Intelligence
Committee analyst who says that ``studies are still going on, but
there's nothing that indicates Iran is really building a bomb.''
Mr. Speaker, U.S. policy towards Iran for the last three decades has
primarily taken the form of economic sanctions, threats, and
isolationism. While U.S. sanctions have been effective at hurting
Iran's economy and ordinary Iranian people, it can be argued that U.S.
policy over the last 30 years has not been effective at creating any
meaningful change in the conduct of the Iranian Government.
I would like to place in the Record a reprint from Foreign Affairs
magazine, November 2011, which cites the ineffectiveness of the United
States sanctions policy.
[From Brookings, Dec. 13, 2011, Reprinted by permission of Foreign
Affairs, November 2011, Vol 87, No 6. Copyright 2011 by the Council on
Foreign Relations, Inc.]
The Self-Limiting Success of Iran Sanctions
(By Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for
Middle East Policy; Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations)
Since the 1979 revolution that ousted Iran's pro-American
monarchy and replaced it with a theocratic regime hostile to
the West, the United States has sought to temper Iran's
geopolitical ambitions through a combination of tough
rhetoric and economic sanctions. After more than 30 years,
the cycle is as unsurpising as it is ineffective; the United
States and its allies orchestrate stringent economic measures
through the United Nations, and then await concessions that
somehow never materialize. Indeed, as UN proscriptions have
amassed and Iran's trade with its traditional partners
withers, there is no indication that the theocratic state is
prepared to adjust its aspirations with respect to either its
nuclear programme or its claims to regional power.
A closer look reveals that the international community
missed a critical turning point in Iran's international
orientation, and squandered the single obvious opportunity to
shift Iranian policies towards a more constructive direction.
In the 1990s, Iran appeared to be on the verge of discarding
its radical patrimony, at least with respect to its foreign
policy, much as other revolutionary states such as China and
Vietnam have done. The end of the long war with Iraq and the
death of the Islamic Republic's charismatic founder
facilitated a period of reconstruction, a respite from the
state's existential insecurities, and a predictable
reconsideration of the regime's ideological verities. By the
end of the decade, a reformist cadre led by President
Muhammad Khatami sought to rejoin the international community
by conceding to its mandates and adhering to its conventions.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Iran finally
appeared ready to usher in its own Thermidorian Reaction.
Yet this prospect appeared to fade after the election of
hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to succeed Khatami in 2005. In
the succeeding years, the Islamic Republic has regressed
towards policies that resemble the worst excesses of its
zealous early years: at home, unambiguous repression of any
dissent and an insistence on absolute fealty to an aging
clerical tyrant; abroad, provocative policies towards its
neighbours and belligerence towards Washington. Unexpectedly,
it has been a younger generation of Iranian politicians--
Ahmadinejad and his cohort--who have rejected the nascent
pragmatism of their elders; these children of the revolution
are seeking to revive its mandates rather than to restrain
them.
At the same moment as Iran's formidable new right wing came
to the fore, the region began an even more dramatic set of
political transformations, first with the US interventions to
Iran's east and west that removed the theocracy's most
menacing adversaries, and later with the advent of a
powerful, far-reaching movement for democratic accountability
across the Arab world. As a result of these intersecting
trends, Iran's paranoid, combative leadership has been
emboldened to take advantage of the opportunities to be found
in an uncertain regional environment with a shifting balance
of power. For this reason, the threats posed by Iran's
domestic and regional policies loom ever larger for
Washington and the broader international community.
To date, however, the Obama administration has stuck to the
essential framework of the carrot-and-stick diplomacy it
adopted upon taking office in 2009--an approach that differs
merely in style from that of the Bush administration during
its second term. This self-described `dual-track' strategy
relies on economic pressure to persuade Tehran to enter
negotiations and moderate its policies, consistent with the
basic American formula for dealing with Iran since 1979. The
achievements of such an approach have always been open to
question.
Even as the Obama administration has imposed the broadest
and most robust multilateral restrictions on Iran in history,
all of Tehran's most disturbing policies, including its
aggressive nuclear programme, proceed apace. Sanctions have
imposed heavy financial and political costs on the Islamic
Republic, but they have not convinced Iranian leaders that
their interests would be better served by relinquishing their
nuclear ambitions, abandoning their other reckless policies,
or even opening a serious dialogue with Washington. This
obduracy is a function of the complex political
transformation within Iran over the course of the past
decade, the regime's well-honed capabilities for evading and
insulating itself against sanctions, and of course the
momentous changes that have swept the broader region. As a
result, in dealing with the Islamic Republic of 2011 economic
sanctions can have little expectation of achieving meaningful
changes in Tehran's policies. This article examines the
history of sanctioning the Islamic Republic, and argues that
despite their increasing severity, sanctions have failed to
achieve their intended policy results thanks to the regime's
capacity for resisting international pressure. Moreover, the
rise of a new generation of hard-liners and the uncertain
aftermath of the Arab Spring has exacerbated the regime's
aversion to compromise.
U.S. policy towards Iran has failed to ensure a peaceful Iran that
aids regional security. Yet today we are considering legislation that
significantly restricts any efforts by the U.S. Government, including
Members of Congress, to engage Iran diplomatically, and it further
hurts ordinary Iranian
[[Page H8850]]
people by imposing indiscriminate sanctions. Proponents of the Iran
Threat Reduction Act claim that it's a last ditch effort to prevent
military confrontation with Iran. Yet, this bill takes away the most
effective tool to prevent war--diplomacy. As the United States only now
begins to extricate itself from the highly questionable military
campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot allow the United States to
be plunged into yet another disastrous war.
I oppose nuclear proliferation for military purposes for all
countries and believe that sanctions have proven to be a failed policy.
We must rely on diplomacy, not outlaw it, and avoid taking steps which
push us closer to military confrontation.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
This bill may represent our last chance to find a peaceful means to
pressure the Iranian regime into stopping its nuclear weapons program.
Within the next year, possibly in the next 6 months, this program may
become irreversible unless we act now.
We know that sanctions are having an impact in Iran. President
Ahmadinejad recently said that Iranian banks ``cannot make
international transactions anymore.'' Just this weekend, Iran's Central
Bank governor said ``the situation of sanctions is harder than a
physical fight.'' With this bill before us today, we intend to make his
fight much harder.
No sanctions can be deemed truly effective until Iran ends its
nuclear weapons program. We know that Iran is steadily increasing its
stockpile of low-enriched uranium, moving its centrifuges to a hardened
underground facility and making progress in other ways towards a
nuclear-weapons capability. We need to do more and faster.
H.R. 1905 builds on past efforts by imposing sanctions on foreign
commercial enterprises that do business with Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps, by widening the scope of sanctions on
human-rights abusers, and by other means. But one of the most important
elements of this bill is my measure to impose sanctions on Iran's
Central Bank, which provides key financial support for Iran's nuclear-
weapons and terrorism activities. This measure would cut Iran entirely
off from the world's banking system, dealing an unprecedented blow to
Iran's economy.
This may cause short-term difficulties for the world's oil market.
And it may rankle some of our allies. But it is necessary because
stopping Iran's nuclear program is of paramount strategic importance--
and we are running out of time.
Mr. Speaker, our absolute goal must be to stop Iran's nuclear weapons
program. That's the goal of this bill. We may have only a few more
months to deal peacefully with this crisis. There is no time to lose.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I would like to place in the Record an
article from the Washington Post ombudsman entitled, ``Getting ahead of
the facts on Iran,'' which states that the IAEA report does not say
Iran has a bomb nor does it say it is building one.
[From The Washington Post, December 9, 2011]
Getting Ahead of the Facts on Iran
(By Patrick B. Pexton)
Headlines are tricky and difficult. They're written
quickly, with print and Web publishing deadlines always
looming, and with space limitations, yet headline writers try
to be creative, informative, and occasionally, humorous.
Few readers remember the hundreds of well-crafted headlines
that entice yet describe a story accurately. But when a
headline is bad, it sticks with you, like a burr you can't
get out of your sock.
So it was with recent headlines that appeared on one of The
Post's online photo galleries.
I was bombarded--about 1,500 e-mails--with complaints about
this headline (it was an organized campaign, but more about
that in a minute).
The photo slideshow depicted Iran's nuclear research
facilities and originally had a headline and subhead that
readers felt were misleading: ``Iran's quest to possess
nuclear weapons, the main headline said, followed by this
subhead: ``Intelligence shows that Iran received foreign
assistance to overcome key hurdles in acquiring a nuclear
weapon, according to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.''
The gallery was linked to two stories by The Post's
national intelligence reporter, Joby Warrick, one on Nov. 6
and one on Nov. 8 describing the latest IAEA report, in which
the U.N. agency said that Iran's drive for nuclear technology
has military aspects that could bring it to the threshold of
a nuclear bomb.
``But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor
does it say it is building one, only that its multiyear
effort pursuing nuclear technology is sophisticated and broad
enough that it could be consistent with building a bomb.
Iran steadfastly denies it is aiming for a nuclear bomb and
says its program is aimed at civilian nuclear energy and
research. Of course, Tehran could be lying. But no one knows
for sure.
This is what the U.S. director of national intelligence,
James R. Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in
March: ``We continue to assess [that] Iran is keeping open
the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing
various nuclear capabilities that better position it to
produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not
know, however, if Iran will evantually decide to build
nuclear weapons.''
So are there 1,500 Post readers so attuned to headlines
that they wrote me spontaneously to object? Well, no.
This was an effort organized by a left-leaning nonprofit
goup called Just Foreign Policy. On the group's board, among
others, are Julian Bond, longtime NAACP chairman, and Tom
Hayden, former California legislator and 1960s activist.
Founded in 2006, Just Foreign Policy is a shoestring
operation, and it has no staff in Washington.
Robert Naiman, a recent master's degree graduate from the
University of Illinois, runs the group's online campaigns
from his home in Urbana.
``We're not a super-sophisticated operation,'' Neiman
acknowledged with a chuckle. But it is savvy enough to use
the Web effectively. ``We try to inform and agitate,'' he
added. The group works mainly to end the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and to prevent new ones, such as with Iran.
``Most of what I do is read the newspaper and try to tell
people about what I read,'' Naiman said. ``I stumbled on the
headline, and was astonished, even knowing The Post's
editorial line on Iran. I'm old-fashioned. The editorial page
is one thing and the news is the other. The gallery headlines
belonged more in the former and not the latter.''
So he spotlighted the headline on the top of Just Foreign
Policy's home page, with this message: ``U.S. media helped
railroad the nation into war with Iraq by treating unproven
claims about Iraq's alleged [weapons of mass destruction]
program as facts. Now we're seeing the same behavior
concerning Iran.''
Visitors to Naiman's site could click on a link that sent a
pre-written e-mail urging yours truly to fact-check the
headline. Daily Kos and other left-leaning Web sites picked
it up, adding fuel to the fire. Pretty soon, the ombudsman's
inbox was crammed.
I think Naiman and his Web army were right. The headline
and subhead were misleading.
Photo galleries generally are built by photo editors and
then passed to copy editors for captions and headlines. I
couldn't identify exactly where in the process these
headlines went wrong, but when I raised the issue it was
quickly fixed.
In a Web-driven world, one bad headline can check the globe
in minutes and undermine The Post's credibility. It can also
play into the hands of those who are seeking further
confrontaion with Iran.
I would like to place in the Record an article, ``Experts Cast Doubt
on Iran Sanction Strategy'' which raises questions about the Iranian
stockpile and how much enriched uranium they actually have.
Experts Cast Doubt on Iran Sanctions Strategy
Monday, November 28, 2011
(By Ardavon Naimi)
Washington, DC.--``We have succeeded in imposing the
strongest sanctions to date on the Iranian regime,'' said Tom
Donilon, National Security Advisor, last week at the
Brookings Institution. Donilon, addressing the
administration's concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program in
light of the latest IAEA report, stated that sanctions have
isolated Iran internationally, helped delay Iran's nuclear
program, and facilitated divisions inside Iran's political
establishment.
But according to some of the experts participating in a
panel discussion preceding Donilon's keynote address, the
sanctions have largely punished ordinary Iranians and have
united, not divided, political factions in Iran.
According to Kevan Harris, U.S. Institute of Peace Jennings
Randolph peace scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the Johns
Hopkins University, the sanctions are ``not as smart as we
think.''
Harris described the effects of sanctions inside of Iran.
``Sanctions are having an impact . . . in what I like to call
`trickle down' sanctions.'' Sanctions affect the ability of
certain banks and large enterprises to obtain foreign
exchange and goods, consequently affecting small and medium
sized enterprises
[[Page H8851]]
inside Iran--such as the construction and automobile
industry. This process has resulted in the rising cost of
business. This trickling down helps to rise ``unemployed to a
certain extent, and also decreases wages,'' affecting
everyday Iranians.
Harris challenged the assumption that sanctions facilitate
divisions inside Iran's political elite. ``If you threaten
countries . . . all of a sudden they have a real big
incentive to start working together,'' said Harris. ``At high
peaks of perceived external threat, the discourse of unity
raises and the discourse of factionalism dies down.''
We spend a lot of resources on sanctions . . . political
and economic . . . we need to ask ourselves, what's the cost
benefit of that versus spending resources on diplomatic
options.''
Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations believes that ``Iran's nuclear
program is driven by domestic political factors.'' Yet,
Takeyh takes the argument against sanctions a step further.
He believes that Iran's nuclear program is actually the
Islamic Republic's only perceived path to ``international
legitimacy.'' By withstanding sanctions and obtaining a
nuclear weapon, Iran would ``extract tributes from
international concession.'' ``This program . . . may be
beyond diplomatic mediation . . . underpinned by economic
coercion,'' said Takeyh.
Harris challenged Takeyh's assertion, stating ``if the goal
of the program is their perceived only path to international
legitimacy, then it seems like an alternative policy would be
to provide a different path to international legitimacy for
Iran that they don't perceive as open.''
Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American
Scientists, discussed the latest IAEA report on Iran's
nuclear program. ``Is there anything really new in the annex
of the IAEA report?'' asked Ferguson, ``you have to say, not
really. There's not a whole lot of new stuff in there.''
Although there are reasons for concern regarding Iran's
ongoing efforts, Ferguson says that ``most of the things that
are documented, that we know well, happened prior to 2004.''
Iran continues to build up its stockpile of 19.75 percent
enriched uranium, yet Ferguson acknowledges that ``even at 20
percent enrichment, it's still going to take a few hundred
kilos of that amount of material to have enough for one bomb
. . . and Iran so far according to the IAEA, has something
like 80 kilograms enriched to that level.'' Even when
factoring in Iran's 4900 kilograms of 3.5 percent low
enriched uranium, Ferguson concludes that it is ``still not
enough material to provide Iran with a true breakout
capability.'' Ferguson suggested that the best response to
Iran's defiance is not further isolation, but creating
openings for dialogue to facilitate increased safeguards and
limits on Iran's nuclear program.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in permitting
me to speak on the bill. We will postulate that Iran has been a
terrible actor and that having nuclear weapons is a threat to
international stability and something that we should resist.
I am concerned about the legislation that is before us being
potentially counterproductive in two areas. It's not something that we
ought to be coming forward with here at 8:15 at night on the unanimous
consent calendar. There are legitimate issues here, and there is
controversy. My friend from California said, well, there may be
disruptions in the oil markets. Well, I think of what has motivated
people in terms of their concern about what has happened; according to
an article in the Wall Street Journal, new sanctions could raise the
price of gas in the United States by a dollar a gallon. An article in
The New York Times estimated it could cost Americans $100 billion a
year. This is not inconsequential. At a time when our economy is in
tough shape, when we are concerned about being able to move forward, we
ought to think carefully about doing something.
Now, if it would stop nuclear weapons for Iran, it might be worth it.
There's no evidence that that is the case. We look only at the failed
policy with Cuba where we have had massive efforts at sanctioning Cuba,
a little, tiny island off the American coast, and what we have done,
most independent experts agree, is that we have propped up Castro. We
have given him a reason. If we had been freely trading and interacting
with the Cuban people, I think Castro would have been a thing of the
past.
Being careful about what we do with Iran matters. But I'm deeply
concerned about language here that would prohibit any official or
unofficial capacity--having no person employed by the United States
contacting in an official or unofficial capacity.
My reading of this is that it is inappropriate to tie the hands of
the administration to require 15 days' notice to exercise a waiver
authority. Where we have been successful in the past, for example, in
defusing a real nuclear problem with Cuba, there was actual engagement
with the administration. President Kennedy and others were able to work
dealing with the real problem, dealing with the Soviet Union, our
adversaries, people who could actually destroy us.
I am deeply concerned that we not forestall opportunities to engage
in diplomacy, which needs to be a part of any reasonable sanction
policy going forward trying to deal with Iran.
{time} 2020
From my vantage point, I think we need to be careful about how we
move forward dealing with sanctions policies: sanctions first, ask
questions later. My hope is that we'll have an opportunity to deal with
this issue with the gravity that it requires, have interaction on the
floor, be careful about what we're doing going forward with the
economic impacts and the fact that it may very well likely further
embolden this administration, the administration of Iran. I don't think
that's something that is appropriate to us.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
A nuclear Iran is unacceptable. Our fundamental strategic objective
must be to stop Iran before it obtains nuclear weapons capabilities and
to compel it to permanently dismantle its pursuit of such weapons. That
is the test we face. And if we fail, it will come as no consolation to
the families of the victims of past and future Iranian attacks or to
our allies.
We don't know how much time we have left. In its report on Iran's
nuclear program last November, the International Atomic Energy Agency
stated that not only has Iran continued to make significant progress
regarding its nuclear program, but the IAEA said that it had uncovered
solid evidence that Iran has been working on a nuclear explosive device
as well.
Given the Iranian regime's history of concealing its clandestine
nuclear activities, Tehran may very well be closer to a nuclear weapons
capability than we even assume. Some estimates now place them a mere 6
months to a year away from having all the ingredients in place to build
a nuclear weapon. Every day they move closer and closer to realizing
their nuclear ambitions, and our nightmare scenario moves closer and
closer to becoming a reality.
The Iranian regime is not interested in any outcome other than a
nuclear Iran, though they are happy to use negotiations to buy time to
make progress in their nuclear program. Yet we know that when sanctions
have been applied, even limited sanctions, they have had an impact on
the Iranian regime.
It is time to build on this lesson and apply crippling sanctions
against the regime and its enablers. That is the purpose of the bill
before us, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, which our Foreign Affairs
Committee adopted unanimously last month. This legislation updates and
strengthens previous Iran sanctions laws so that the United States can
take effective action to address the multiple threats posed by the
regime in Tehran.
The bill closes loopholes in the energy and financial sanctions that
are in place now and counters the regime's efforts to evade them,
including by targeting the Central Bank of Iran. The bill also focuses
on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the senior Iranian regime
officials.
Over 350 Members of Congress have cosponsored this strongly
bipartisan legislation. Let us meet our responsibilities to the
American people and protect the security of our Nation from this
growing threat.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KUCINICH. I realize, Mr. Speaker, that there are a number of
people who want to speak on this who are in favor of this resolution.
In order to make sure that everyone is provided a chance, although I
may disagree with what Mr. Sherman is about to say, I'll defend his
right to speak, and so I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Sherman).
Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the gentleman for his generous grant of time,
[[Page H8852]]
especially because he will probably disagree with almost everything I
have to say.
I'd like to thank Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for bringing together
the best ideas of so many Members--and, of course, of her own--to move
toward another important step toward dissuading Iran from developing
nuclear weapons and for her ability to build a coalition that has over
300 Members cosponsoring this bill.
We have to create circumstances where the regime in Tehran has to
choose between its nuclear weapons program and regime survival. We owe
a special debt of gratitude to the mullahs who are running Iran,
because it is their incompetence and their corruption that creates a
risk to regime survival even at a time of very high oil prices. And we
owe a debt of gratitude to the Iranian people, who rose upon against
this regime in the summer of 2009 and whose desire for freedom poses a
real threat to regime survival.
Looking at the particulars of this bill, I want to thank the
chairwoman for including in this bill, in title III, provisions dealing
with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. These are based on the
Revolutionary Guard Corps Designation Implementation Act, which I
introduced in 2009 along with the chairwoman, Ed Royce, and Dan Burton.
This title III makes it clear to foreign companies that, if they do
business with the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, they cannot do
business in the United States.
I also want to thank the chairwoman for cosponsoring, both last year
and this year, my bill, the Stop Iran's Nuclear Program Act, and for
including many of those provisions in this legislation that's before us
today, in particular, including a provision that would sanction those
companies that loan money to Iran, whether in dollars or in euros or in
any other currency, that tell the foreign incorporated subsidiaries of
U.S. multinational corporations that they, too, cannot do business with
Iran.
To build upon the provision that Chuck Schumer and I were able to
write and was included in CISADA, which was adopted last year, to
indicate that those who give Iran the technologies to suppress the
Internet and to apprehend dissidents through the Internet will be
sanctioned. Companies should not be providing that kind of technology
to Iran. Now, this bill would require the State Department to actually
implement those provisions by designating the technologies that cannot
be sold to Iran.
This bill also includes the provision of the Stop Iran's Nuclear
Weapons Program Act that allows States to do even more to help this
Federal policy, by providing that those insurance companies that are
helping Iran may not be able to do business in their particular State.
Finally, I want to point out that this bill includes provisions aimed
at the Central Bank of Iran, but that is not a reason for us not to
also pass the Menendez-Kirk language that's in the Defense
authorization bill.
The Menendez-Kirk language would, like this bill, sanction those U.S.
banks that violate our law by doing business with Iran and would freeze
those assets that the Central Bank of Iran has foolishly left in the
United States or may have done so. But the key thing about the Kirk-
Menendez language is that it tells European and Asian and other non-
U.S. banks that they must stop their business with the Central Bank of
Iran and virtually all the major banks of Iran as well. It imposes
secondary sanctions. And I believe the Kirk-Menendez language will make
it difficult for Iran to sell oil or to buy anything with its oil
revenue.
I urge the passage of this bill, the Kirk-Menendez language, and
other sanctions against Iran.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
Democratic whip for the House, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) for
yielding. I also want to thank him and my dear friend Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen for their leadership on this bill. I know that Mr. Berman, in
particular, is very focused on the central bank and sanctioning of
them, and so I thank him for his leadership.
Mr. Speaker, last month the IAEA released a report on Iran's covert
nuclear program that was troubling, to say the least. Not only is Iran
continuing to enrich uranium, but they're also believed to be pursuing
the development of delivery technologies to create a warhead that could
threaten Israel and our allies in Europe and the Persian Gulf, not to
mention the over 200,000 Americans that are in the region.
{time} 2030
On top of these dangerous risks, Iran's continued nuclear development
runs the risk, of course, of launching a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East. Indeed, just last week, a former Saudi Arabian Ambassador
to the United States, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, confirmed our worst
fears, suggesting that his country might begin to pursue a nuclear
capability in response to Iranian nuclear development.
Iran has continued its sponsorship of terrorism against our ally,
Israel, and carries out gross human rights abuses against its own
people. Sanctions against Iran's energy, transportation, and financial
sectors are intended to, and I believe, will make clear to Iran the
steep costs of its choices. That is why I am in strong support of this
resolution, the Iran Threat Reduction Act and the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act, and I urge my
colleagues to vote ``yes'' on both.
We know from history that ignoring the threats of leaders, ignoring
their building up of capabilities to threaten the rest of the world, is
done so at great peril and at great cost.
I urge my colleagues to support this very important piece of
legislation. I thank Mr. Berman and Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask, Mr. Speaker, how much time all parties
have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 9\3/4\ minutes,
the gentleman from California has 6 minutes, and the gentlewoman from
Florida has 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to place in the Record an article from the Arms Control
Association which states that the IAEA board resolution avoided direct
censure of Iran, and did not declare Iran to be in noncompliance with
its nonproliferation activities.
[From armscontrol.org, Nov. 8, 2011]
The IAEA's Iran Report: Assessment and Implications
The IAEA report and annex released today provides
disturbing and ``credible'' additional details regarding
Iranian nuclear warhead development efforts that have allowed
Tehran to acquire some of the expertise needed to build
nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so.
The broad outline in the IAEA' s latest report on the
military dimensions of Iran's program is not new, but rather,
provides greater detail regarding weapons-related activities
outlined in previous public reports.
The IAEA report and annex reinforce what the
nonproliferation community has recognized for some time: that
Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons development
activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but
continued other.
The activities documented in the IAEA report, including
research related to nuclear warheads, underscore that
Tehran's claims that it is only seeking the peaceful use of
nuclear energy are false.
Iran's warhead work also contradicts its obligation not to
pursue nuclear weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT), under which states parties commit ``not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.''
The report suggests that Iran is working to shorten the
timeframe to building the bomb once and if it makes that
decision. But it remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran
is still not imminent nor is it inevitable.
The report should prompt greater international pressure on
Tehran to respond more fully to the IAEA's questions, allow
for more extensive inspections of its nuclear facilities,
engage more seriously in talks on its nuclear program, and to
agree to confidence building steps to help resolve the
crisis.
Comparison of the IAEA's Findings with Public U.S. Intelligence
Assessments
Because the IAEA report is based largely on intelligence
the United States and other IAEA member states have been
sharing with the agency for some time, in addition to the
agency's own investigations, the information in the report
likely provides greater insight into current U.S. assessments
about Iran's nuclear program.
The U.S. intelligence community appears to stand by the
judgment made in the 2007 NIE that Iran had a nuclear weapons
program that was halted in the fall of 2003.
[[Page H8853]]
Moreover, in his testimony before a Senate committee in March
2011, U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
confirmed that the intelligence community still had a high
level of confidence that Iran has not yet made a decision to
restart its nuclear weapons program.
Because the weapons program is believed to refer to the
series of projects the IAEA report details, Clapper's
statement is not inconsistent with the notion that some
weapons-related R&D has resumed which is not part of a
determined, integrated weapons-development program of the
type that Iran maintained prior to 2003.
Consistent with the finding of the 2007 U.S. National
Intelligence Estimate, the IAEA report says that a
comprehensive weapons program (known as the AMAD Plan) ``was
stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a `halt order,' '' in
late 2003, but that some of the program's activities were
resumed later. Key personnel are still involved in those
renewed activities apparently tying up loose ends regarding
their prior research and development work.
Summary of Key IAEA Findings on Weapons-Related Activities
The IAEA deserves credit for continuing to press the issue
and to present this important information to the IAEA Board
of Governors in spite of Tehran's unwillingness to cooperate
with the investigation. This resolve helps to bolster the
integrity of the agency and show that countries cannot simply
get away with nonproliferation violations by denial and
obfuscation.
According to the report, Iran was engaged in an effort
prior to the end of 2003 which ran the full range of nuclear
weapons development, from acquiring the raw nuclear material
to working on a weapon they could eventually deliver via a
missile. Just as important as the type of work being carried
out is how that work was organized. The series of projects
that made up Iran's nuclear program appears to have been
overseen by ``senior Iranian figures'' and engaged in
``working level correspondence'' consistent with a
coordinated program.
Key components of this program include:
Fissile Material Production: As documented in previous
reports, Iran ran an undeclared effort to produce
uraniumtetrafluoride (also known as Green Salt), a precursor
for the uranium used in the enrichment process. The
affiliation between this project and other projects directly
related to warhead development suggests that Iran's nuclear
weapons program included both fissile material production and
warhead development Although the report does not detail a
uranium enrichment effort as part of the AMAD Plan, the
secret nature of the Natanz enrichment plant prior to 2002
suggests that it was originally intended to produce the
highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons.
High Explosives Testing: Iran's experiments involving
exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators and the simultaneous
firing of explosives around a hemispherical shape points to
work on nuclear warhead design. The agency says that the type
of high explosives testing matches an existing nuclear weapon
design. Iran admits to carrying out such work, but claims it
is for conventional military purposes and disputes some of
the technical details.
Warhead Design Verification: Iran carried out experiments
using high explosives to test the validity of its warhead
design and engaged in preparatory work to carry out a full-
scale underground nuclear test explosion.
Shahab-3 Re-entry Vehicle: Documentation reviewed by the
IAEA has suggested that, as late as 2003, Iran sought to
develop a nuclear warhead small enough to ft on the Shahab-3
missile. Confronted with some of the studies, Iran admitted
to the IAEA that such work would constitute nuclear weapons
development, but Tehran denies carrying out the research.
The IAEA admits that it has less information regarding
warhead-related work Iran has continued to pursue since 2003,
but the report has provided some insight into the type of
activities that Iran subsequently resumed, which seems to be
focused on warhead design verification. The act that the
agency was able to detail some of the organizational changes
that have taken place since 2003, including the current
position of the person who formerly oversaw the AMAD Plan,
suggests that intelligence agencies still have considerable
insight into Iran's nuclear program. Tehran will likely be
concerned about its inability to hide such important
information and will likely engage in further restructuring
following this report, which may delay its efforts once
again.
Considering the IAEA's reliance on intelligence information
from states, it went through considerable length to
demonstrate why it thought this information was credible. It
was not just a matter of acquiring consistent information
from over 10 countries, but it seems some of the most
incriminating evidence comes from the AQ Khan network, which
Iran admits it relied upon. The information from the Khan
network includes details about nuclear warhead designs the
network gave Iran that match up to the research and
experiments detailed in the intelligence information.
The IAEA Board of Governors Needs to Respond
The report will be considered by the IAEA Board of
Governors at its next meeting Nov. 17-18, along with a draft
resolution censuring Iran for violating its nonproliferation
commitments. The Board's 35 members cannot ignore Iran's
warhead development activities or Tehran's refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA's investigation into that work. It
must also insist that Iran improve its cooperation with the
agency prior to the next board meeting.
A consensus response is unlikely given existing divisions
among the 35 countries, and in particular, Cuba's current
membership on the board. Beijing and Moscow have also
unfortunately played an unhelpful role prior to the release
of the report by calling on Director-General Yukiya Amano to
limit the information detailed it contains.
However, it is important that the board's response receives
support from as many countries as possible to demonstrate to
Tehran that it cannot engage in work directly related to
nuclear weapons with impunity.
In particular, developing countries on the IAEA Board of
Governors should no longer treat the Iran nuclear issue as a
test case for preserving the right to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Rather, it is time that all states insist
that Iran stop abusing that right for the development of a
nuclear weapons capability and take meaningful steps to
cooperate with the IAEA and suspend enrichment work,
particularly enrichment of uranium at the 20% level.
Rights and Responsibilities
Iran cannot complain that Western states are trying to deny
the Islamic Republic its nuclear ``rights.'' The U.S.
position, consistent with the 2006 offer by the P5+1, has
been that Iran could resume enrichment some time in the
future after it reestablishes confidence with the
international community that it is not pursuing nuclear
weapons.
As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton explained it
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 1, 2011,
it is the U.S. Government's position is that ``under very
strict conditions'' and ``having responded to the
international community's concerns,'' Iran would have a
``right'' to enrich uranium under IAEA inspections.
In response to the IAEA's report, the international
community should redouble efforts to implement existing U.N.
Security Council-mandated sanctions on Iran's nuclear and
missile sectors and, if Iran remains unwilling to cooperate
with the IAEA and ignore the Security Council, further
isolate Iran diplomatically and economically.
Maintain Pressure and Engage
In response to the report, the White House has
appropriately underscored that the United States continues to
focus on using diplomatic channels to pressure Iran to
abandon its sensitive nuclear activities.
To keep open the option for an effective negotiated
resolution to the crisis, President Barack Obama should also
reiterate the willingness of the United States and its P5+1
partners to follow-through on the recent letter from the EU's
Catherine Ashton to Iran's leaders offering to engage them in
further talks to address the nuclear program.
Continuing pressure through targeted sanctions against
Iran's nuclear and missile sectors, coupled with the pursuit
of a negotiated agreement to resolve serious concerns over
Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and to limit its uranium
enrichment capacity provides the best chance of preventing a
nuclear-armed Iran.
Talk of military strikes against Iranian nuclear and
military targets is unhelpful and counterproductive. Military
strikes by the United States and/or Israel would only achieve
a temporary delay in Iran's nuclear activities, convince
Iran's leadership to openly pursue nuclear weapons, rally
domestic support behind a corrupt regime, and would result in
costly long-term consequences for U.S. and regional security
and the U.S. and global economy.
Ultimately, resolving the nuclear issue will require
sufficient pressure and inducement to convince Iran that it
stands more to gain from forgoing a nuclear-weapons option
and much to lose from any decision to build them.
My friend from Oregon earlier mentioned the question of oil prices,
and it's something that we ought to be concerned about.
I would like to place in the Record an article from Slate that says
that this sanction could lead to an increase in the price of gasoline
that could be as much as $1.25 a gallon.
[From Slate, Dec. 2, 2011]
Will Sanctions Against Iran Raise Gas Prices?
(By Brian Palmer)
The Senate unanimous passed a bill Thursday that would
impose economic sanctions on Iran, over the objection of the
White House. One of the administration's complaints was that
the move could increase oil prices. How much could
sanctioning Iran cost us at the pump?
The nightmare scenario would be an additional $1.25 per
gallon. Iran produces just over 5 percent of the world's
crude, which doesn't seem like a lot. But oil demand is
price-insensitive--people and businesses refuse to change
their fuel-buying habits until the costs go way up. That
means a reduction in supply will have a disproportionate
affect on prices. In the past, price increases have been
about 10 times greater than their precipitating drops in
production. Based on the same historical data, and given
[[Page H8854]]
that oil is currently hovering at around $100 per barrel, a
complete shutdown of Iranian exports could force prices as
high as $150. (That's 5 percent, times the tenfold
multiplier, times the current price of $100.) Since a one-
dollar change in the cost of a barrel of oil usually
translates to a two-and-a-half-cent surge in retail gas
prices, cutting Iran off from world oil markets could
increase the price of gasoline by a dollar and a quarter.
This theoretical scenario is extremely unlikely, however.
The Senate bill permits the president to delay the sanctions
if there isn't adequate supply on the market. In addition,
the bill would make it harder for foreign banks to deal with
the Iranian central bank, which acts as a middle man in oil
transactions. But it wouldn't make buying Iranian crude
impossible, and sanctioned countries have historically found
ways to sell their oil. (Consider, for example, the oil for
food program that undermined sanctions against Iraq. The
Senate sanctions against Iran also have a humanitarian
exemption.) There hasn't been a truly effective, worldwide
boycott of a country's oil exports since 1951-53, when Iran
nationalized its oil industry. As long as Iranian oil
continues to flow to Asia and parts of Europe, the sanctions
would have a relatively small impact on prices.
There's also the possibility that Saudi Arabia could make
up for some of the banned Iranian oil, as it did during the
first and second Persian Gulf wars. The Saudis wouldn't be
able to plug the gap entirely, because they don't have as
much excess capacity as they used to. They could soften the
blow, though.
There is one long-shot scenario that should be mentioned,
in which oil prices go even higher than $150 per barrel. When
pressured in the past, Iran has threatened to block oil
deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz. Around 17 percent of
oil traded globally passes through that waterway.
While such an occurrence could theoretically lead to $8-
per-gallon gasoline, based on the historic relationship
between supply and price, it's a practical impossibility.
Demand would drop significantly at those dizzying prices,
causing the cost of a barrel of oil to increase more in
proportion with changes to supply. More importantly, the
economic shock of such a scenario would likely trigger a
naval response from the U.S. and its allies.
Mr. Speaker, an article in the Wall Street Journal raises this
question as well. It says that crude flirts with $100 a barrel on
geopolitical unrest. And it also quotes a commodity strategist at the
Standard Bank in London as saying the timing of an Iranian embargo
could hardly be worse. Relatively small disruptions could cause spikes
in oil prices.
A director of the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Mr. Adam Szubin, stated that there are real scenarios in which
an oil spike might hit. This is from an article: U.S. officials warn
that new sanctions could be a boon to Iran. There's another article
that cites that, and an article from The New York Times which states
that U.S. officials have declared they'd hold Iran accountable for a
purported plot, but they've now decided that a proposed move against
Iran's central bank would disrupt international oil markets and further
damage the reeling American and world economies. I think that's
something that we ought to be concerned about; that if, in fact, we are
moving forward with sanctions, sanctions which will have an effect on
the price of oil, is this the timing to do that kind of thing, and are
we prepared in this Congress to accept the responsibility for a sharp
increase in the price of oil?
Here's a quote from a blog called San Francisco Gate quoting the
Undersecretary of State, Wendy Sherman, telling the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, ``There's absolutely a risk the price of oil would
go up, which would mean that Iran, would, in fact, have more money to
fuel its nuclear ambitions, not less.''
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel), a senior member of the committee,
a leader in these efforts for many years, the ranking member of the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee.
Mr. ENGEL. I rise in strong support of this legislation.
Under no circumstances should Iran be allowed to develop a nuclear
weapon. This is a dangerous regime which supports terrorism and calls
for the destruction of Israel. And every day they're getting closer to
weaponizing a stockpile of enriched uranium.
No amount of naivete or wishful thinking will get the Iranian regime
to back down. They are liars, and diplomacy hasn't worked and won't
work. They'll only play for time.
We heard the same arguments about not putting the sanctions on the
apartheid regime in South Africa. Now we hear that oil is going to go
sky high.
Well, you know what? I think morality is more important than the
price of oil. I think morality says that this terrible regime should
not be allowed to have nuclear weapons, should not be allowed to wipe
Israel off the face of the Earth, should not be allowed to do the
horrible things that it does.
This important bill imposes tough sanctions on Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and against the Central Bank of Iran, and the
Iranians have to know our sanctions will only be increased if they
don't back off soon.
We have bipartisan support here. People say Congress doesn't work
together. We worked together on this. This is important. We need to
pass this bill.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
I would respectfully respond to my friend from New York that the
price of oil is, in fact, a moral question.
I want to raise the question of the constitutionality of this
particular proposal. I believe that it's unconstitutional because it is
an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech and freedom of
association. It is an unconstitutional abridgement of the right of free
expression by Federal employees. It is a violation of whistleblower
protections which have been granted a constitutional basis; that, in
fact, it violates our own speech and debate clause of the Constitution
of the United States because we have an obligation to inquire and to
ask questions; that it violates the Constitution's separation of powers
and challenges the President's power to engage in foreign diplomacy;
that it is operationally impossible; that you can have even Admiral
Mullen, former Chair of the Joint Chiefs, point out that with the
miscommunications that can occur from a lack of diplomacy, we could be
putting our own people at risk.
In fact, there was an article that was published that deals with a
scenario that would happen in the Gulf where there are run-ins between
American and Iranian vessels. The no contact provision, if enacted,
could outlaw the U.S. Navy's bridge-to-bridge communications with
Iranian vessels.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Deutch), someone who has provided a major
contribution to this legislation that's now before the House.
Mr. DEUTCH. I thank the ranking member, my friend, Mr. Berman.
The legislation before us today will give the United States the tools
to impose the most stringent, the most crippling sanctions aimed at
cracking down on what is the greatest threat to international security,
a nuclear armed Iran.
The Iran Threat Reduction Act builds on the already significant steps
this Congress took, along with our partners in the EU and at the United
Nations last year, to dramatically ratchet up pressure on the Iranian
regime in order to thwart its illicit quest for nuclear weapons. The
bill comes on the heels of the IAEA report that confirmed what we
already knew--the Iranian regime is pursuing nuclear weapons. It comes
on the heels of the foiled Iranian assassination plot and the dangerous
attack coordinated by the regime on the British Embassy. And it comes
even as the Iranian regime contributes to the brutal crackdown on the
Syrian people that has left over 5,000 dead, so that the regime can
continue to use Syria as a conduit for routing weapons to Hezbollah and
Hamas to be used against Israel.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to have authored two provisions contained in
this bill. And I would like to thank the bill's sponsors, Chairman Ros-
Lehtinen and Ranking Member Berman, for working with me to include the
Iran Transparency and Accountability Act and the Iran Human Rights
Democracy Promotion Act.
{time} 2040
The requirements of these provisions put the onus of determining the
extent and nature of a company's involvement in Iran on that company by
requiring the disclosure of all material business
[[Page H8855]]
with Iran on its SEC filings. This forced disclosure will accelerate
the imposition of sanctions.
Mr. Speaker, this legislation also includes mandatory sanctions on
those who perpetrate the most egregious human rights abuses. This
regime's use of intimidation and brutality to suppress its opposition
must be stopped, and the United States must stand with the people of
Iran in their quest for democracy and freedom. Mr. Speaker, a nuclear
armed Iran is unacceptable, and we cannot permit it to happen. We must
make it clear that we are serious, determined, and aggressive in our
approach to halt Iran's illegal, destabilizing, and dangerous pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to place in the Record an article by Seymour Hersh which
cites the IAE's report suggesting, according to the Arms Control
Association, that Iran is working to shorten a time frame to build a
bomb once and if it makes the decision. But it remains apparent that a
nuclear-armed Iran is still not imminent, nor is it inevitable.
[The New Yorker Online Only Daily Comment, November 18, 2011]
Iran and The I.A.E.A.
(Posted by Seymour M. Hersh)
The first question in last Saturday night's Republican
debate on foreign policy dealt with Iran, and a newly
published report by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The report, which raised renewed concern about the ``possible
existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in
Iran,'' struck a darker tone than previous assessments. But
it was carefully hedged. On the debate platform, however, any
ambiguity was lost. One of the moderators said that the
I.A.E.A. report had provided ``additional credible evidence
that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon'' and asked what
various candidates, upon winning the Presidency, would do to
stop Iran. Herman Cain said he would assist those who are
trying to overthrow the government. Newt Gingrich said he
would coordinate with the Israeli government and maximize
covert operations to block the Iranian weapons program. Mitt
Romney called the state of Iran's nuclear program Obama's
``greatest failing, from a foreign-policy standpoint'' and
added, ``Look, one thing you can know . . . and that is if we
reelect Barack Obama Iran will have a nuclear weapon.'' The
Iranian bomb was a sure thing Saturday night.
I've been reporting on Iran and the bomb for The New Yorker
for the past decade, with a focus on the repeatedly inability
of the best and the brightest of the Joint Special Operations
Command to find definitive evidence of a nuclear-weapons
production program in Iran. The goal of the high-risk
American covert operations was to find something physical--a
``smoking calutron,'' as a knowledgeable official once told
me--to show the world that Iran was working on warheads at an
undisclosed site, to make the evidence public, and then to
attack and destroy the site.
The Times reported, in its lead story the day after the
report came out, that I.A.E.A. investigators ``have amassed a
trove of new evidence that, they say, makes a `credible'
case'' that Iran may be carrying out nuclear-weapons
activities. The newspaper quoted a Western diplomat as
declaring that ``the level of detail is unbelievable. . . .
The report describes virtually all the steps to make a
nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each of
those steps. It reads like a menu.'' The Times set the tone
for much of the coverage. (A second Times story that day on
the I.A.E.A. report noted, more cautiously, that ``it is true
that the basic allegations in the report are not
substantially new, and have been discussed by experts for
years.'')
But how definitive, or transformative, were the findings?
The I.A.E.A. said it had continued in recent years ``to
receive, collect and evaluate information relevant to
possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program'' and,
as a result, it has been able ``to refine its analysis.'' The
net effect has been to create ``more concern.'' But Robert
Kelley, a retired I.A.E.A. director and nuclear engineer who
previously spent more than thirty years with the Department
of Energy's nuclear-weapons program, told me that he could
find very little new information in the I.A.E.A. report. He
noted that hundreds of pages of material appears to come from
a single source: a laptop computer, allegedly supplied to the
I.A.E.A. by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance
could not be established. Those materials, and others, ``were
old news,'' Kelley said, and known to many journalists. ``I
wonder why this same stuff is now considered `new
information' by the same reporters.''
A nuanced assessment of the I.A.E.A. report was published
by the Arms Control Association (A.C.A.), a nonprofit whose
mission is to encourage public support for effective arms
control. The A.C.A. noted that the I.A.E.A. did ``reinforce
what the nonproliferation community has recognized for some
times: that Iran engaged in various nuclear weapons
development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them,
but continued others.'' (The American intelligence community
reached the same conclusion in a still classified 2007
estimate.) The I.A.E.A.'s report ``suggests,'' the A.C.A.
paper said, that Iran ``is working to shorten the timeframe
to build the bomb once and if it makes that decision. But it
remains apparent that a nuclear-armed Iran is still not
imminent nor is it inevitable.'' Greg Thielmann, a former
State Department and Senate Intelligence Committee analyst
who was one of the authors of the A.C.A. assessment, told me,
``There is troubling evidence suggesting that studies are
still going on, but there is nothing that indicates that Iran
is really building a bomb.'' He added, ``Those who want to
drum up support for a bombing attack on Iran sort of
aggressively misrepresented the report.''
Joseph Cirincione, the president of the Ploughshare Fund, a
disarmament group, who serves on Hillary Clinton's
International Security Advisory Board, said, ``I was briefed
on most of this stuff several years ago at the I.A.E.A.
headquarters in Vienna. There's little new in the report.
Most of this information is well known to experts who follow
the issue.'' Cirincione noted that ``post-2003, the report
only cites computer modelling and a few other experiments.''
(A senior I.A.E.A. official similarly told me, ``I was
underwhelmed by the information.'')
The report did note that its on-site camera inspection
process of Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment facilities--
mandated under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which
Iran is a signatory--``continues to verify the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material.'' In other words, all of the
low enriched uranium now known to be produced inside Iran is
accounted for; if highly enriched uranium is being used for
the manufacture of a bomb, it would have to have another,
unknown source.
The shift in tone at the I.A.E.A. seems linked to a change
at the top. The I.A.E.A.'s report had extra weight because
the Agency has had a reputation for years as a reliable
arbiter on Iran. Mohammed ElBaradei, who retired as the
I.A.E.A.'s Director General two years ago, was viewed
internationally, although not always in Washington, as an
honest broker--a view that lead to the awarding of a Nobel
Peace Prize in 2005. ElBaradei's replacement is Yukiya Amano
of Japan. Late last year, a classified U.S. Embassy cable
from Vienna, the site of the I.A.E.A. headquarters, described
Amano as being ``ready for prime time.'' According to the
cable, which was obtained by WikiLeaks, in a meeting in
September, 2009, with Glyn Davies, the American permanent
representative to the I.A.E.A., said, ``Amano reminded
Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make
concessions to the G-77 [the group of developing countries],
which correctly required him to be fair-minded and
independent, but that he was solidly in the U.S. court on
every strategic decision, from high-level personnel
appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged nuclear
weapons program.'' The cable added that Amano's ``willingness
to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his strategy . .
. bodes well for our future relationship.''
It is possible, of course, that Iran has simply
circumvented the reconnaissance efforts of America and the
I.A.E.A., perhaps even building Dick Cheney's nightmare: a
hidden underground nuclear-weapons fabrication facility.
Iran's track record with the I.A.E.A. has been far from good:
its leadership began construction of its initial uranium
facilities in the nineteen-eighties without informing the
Agency, in violation of the nonproliferation treaty. Over the
next decade and a half, under prodding from ElBaradei and the
West, the Iranians began acknowledging their deceit and
opened their enrichment facilities, and their records, to
I.A.E.A. inspectors.
The new report, therefore, leaves us where we've been since
2002, when George Bush declared Iran to be a member of the
Axis of Evil--with lots of belligerent talk but no definitive
evidence of a nuclear-weapons program.
I would ask how much time is left on all sides.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Schweikert). The gentleman from Ohio has
6 minutes. The gentlewoman from Florida has 3\1/2\ minutes. The
gentleman from California has 3 minutes.
Mr. KUCINICH. I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Olson), an esteemed member of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce.
Mr. OLSON. I thank the chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
the ranking member for the opportunity to speak here tonight on H.R.
1905.
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight in strong support of H.R. 1905, the Iran
Threat Reduction Act. While Iranian leadership continues to give public
assurances that their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, their
words don't match their actions.
A recent International Atomic Energy Agency report makes it clear
that Iran is developing advanced delivery systems for nuclear weapons.
Mr. Speaker, the only reason why Iran would develop advanced delivery
systems is to have the means to deliver a
[[Page H8856]]
nuclear bomb on peaceful neighbors like Israel. This outcome is
unacceptable, and the United States must continue to enact tougher
sanctions to ensure that this never happens.
H.R. 1905 will add new sanctions targeting the Central Bank of Iran,
making it difficult for foreign companies to do business with Iran.
H.R. 1905 will also increase sanctions on members of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Mr. Speaker, the biggest threat to world peace is the religious
fanatics in Iran having a nuclear bomb. Iran's acquisition of nuclear
weapons simply cannot happen. Not on our watch. I implore my colleagues
to support this bipartisan legislation which will force Iran to abandon
its quest for nuclear weapons.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to place in the Record a letter from 26 organizations
that urge Congress to oppose the provision restricting contact with
Iranian officials.
December 8, 2011.
Dear Representative: We urge you to oppose the provision
restricting contact with Iranian officials in the Iran
sanctions bill H.R. 1905 and to work with your colleagues to
remove it from the bill when it comes to the House floor. We
are concerned that Section 601c of this legislation would
undermine prospects for a diplomatic resolution of Iran's
disputed nuclear program, increasing the threat of war.
This provision was inserted into the bill during committee
markup, after most of the cosponsors had already signed onto
H.R. 1905. Section 601c of H.R. 1905 would expressly prohibit
contact between U.S. government officials and certain Iranian
officials, as noted below:
(c) Restriction on contact.--No person employed with the
United States Government may contact in an official or
unofficial capacity any person that--(1) is an agent,
instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is
serving as a representative of the Government of Iran; and
(2) presents a threat to the United States or is affiliated
with terrorist organizations. (d) Waiver.--The President may
waive the requirements of subsection (c) if the President
determines and so reports to the appropriate congressional
committees 15 days prior to the exercise of waiver authority
that failure to exercise such waiver authority would pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the vital national
security interests of the United States.
If this provision were to be enacted into law, it could
have a chilling effect on any diplomatic engagement that this
or any future administration might wish to pursue to address
Iran's nuclear program, its role in exacerbating or de-
escalating regional conflicts, and its failure to respect the
human rights of its citizens. It would also place
restrictions on members of Congress, likely precluding the
potential for inter-parliamentary dialogue with Iranian
parliamentarians.
As Ambassadors Thomas Pickering and William Luers have
pointed out, this provision also raises ``serious
constitutional issues over the separation of powers''. For
the administration to exercise its waiver authority, the
President would have to certify 15 days in advance that the
failure to do so would ``pose an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the vital national security interests of the United
States''.
At a time of heightened tensions between the U.S. and Iran,
sustained and flexible diplomacy is an essential tool to
prevent war. Just before he retired from the position of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen called
for an established channel of communications with Iran,
noting that: ``We haven't had a connection with Iran since
1979. Even in the darkest days of the Cold War we had links
of the Soviet Union . . . If something happens it's virtually
assured that we won't get it right, that there will be
miscalculations which would be extremely dangerous in that
part of world . . . I think any channel would be terrific.''
We urge every member of Congress to oppose Section 601c of
H.R. 1905 speak out on the House floor against efforts
designed to constrain diplomatic engagement with Iran.
Sincerely,
Friends Committee on National Legislation; Americans for
Peace Now; Arms Control Association; Center for
Interfaith Engagement, Eastern Mennonite University;
Church of the Brethren; Council for a Livable World;
Fellowship of Reconciliation; Just Foreign Policy;
Lancaster Interchurch Peace Witness; Mainstream Media
Project; Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns;
Mennonite Central Committee; Minnesota Peace Project.
Middle East Peace Now; National Iranian American Council;
New Internationalism Project, Institute for Policy
Studies; Peace Action; Peace Action West; Peace
Catalyst International; Progressive Democrats for
America; Project on Middle East Democracy; Student
Peace Alliance; United Church of Christ, Justice and
Witness Ministries; United Methodist Church, General
Board of Church and Society; Women's Action for New
Directions; 3P Human Security: Partners for
Peacebuilding Policy.
It's interesting that what we're actually suggesting here is taking
diplomacy off the table. I was here for the debate in Iraq. I led the
effort in this Congress in challenging the then-Bush administration's
assertions that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction which they
intended to use against the United States. I was here. I don't know how
many of you were here. But I saw a case being made for war, and that
case was based on exaggerations and unfortunately in some cases
distortions and lies.
We have to be very careful that we're not setting the stage for still
another war. We must be very careful that when we assert a certain
level of preparedness on the part of Iran with respect to their nuclear
capability that we aren't actually shutting the door that needs to be
open in order to try to resolve any difficulty between our nations. We
can say, well, we want to get them back to the table, but then don't
talk to them.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 1 minute to one
of the cofounders of the Iran Working Group, someone who has brought
the issue of Iran, its policies, and particularly it's nuclear weapons
program, to the attention of this body and the public, the gentleman
from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. I'd like to thank the chairlady from Florida and the
ranking member, Mr. Berman from California, for their very forceful and
effective advocacy.
Iran made a choice to ignore international standards and comity and
secretly develop a nuclear weapon. Iran made a choice to eschew sincere
diplomatic efforts to come up with a deal, an agreement where they
could have their civilian nuclear energy program but have the fuel
manufactured outside of Iran. Now, Iran must, in my view, be confronted
with a choice as to whether it will enjoy economic stability or give up
its nuclear weapons ambitions.
I think the time is here to force that choice upon the Iranians. I
think it's unfortunate it has to be done, but it has to be done. We
cannot let the world's most horrific weapon fall into the hands of one
of the world's most horrendous regimes. For that reason, I strongly
support the legislation by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. Berman and urge a
``yes'' vote.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to say I have respect for all of my colleagues who are
concerned about nuclear proliferation. We all ought to be concerned
about nuclear proliferation. We can start with our own country. Right
now we've set the stage for continuing to develop nuclear weapons. It's
very difficult to be able to have a strong position of standing on this
issue if we have one set of rules for ourselves and another set of
rules for the rest of the world.
I don't want to see a nuclear proliferation in Iran, but I think that
if we want to have a standing where people want to take what we say, we
have to be consistent. We have to make sure that what we do is
consistent with what we say.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I have no further requests for time, and I reserve
the balance of my time to close.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to my
distinguished colleague and good friend who's been very active on these
issues, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone).
Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
I want to take issue with my colleague from Ohio. I don't think there
is a comparison between the situation in Iraq and Iran because it has
become abundantly clear that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons; and a
nuclear Iran would not only threaten the United States but democratic
nations all across the globe.
The legislation before us builds on the comprehensive Iran Sanctions
Act passed last Congress and imposes new and stronger sanctions, and
this bill is the next logical step in U.S. policy to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons.
[[Page H8857]]
The Iranian President, a Holocaust denier, has stated that a nuclear
Iran would use the weapons at its disposal and has even called for the
destruction of the State of Israel. And I don't think we can let a
nuclear Iran become a reality.
I would urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on H.R. 1905.
{time} 2050
Mr. KUCINICH. I would ask how much time is remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 6 minutes
remaining.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would respectfully suggest to my friend from New
Jersey that the certainty that Congress had in the debate in October of
2002 with respect to Iraq is very much paralleled with the certainty
that some of my friends here have about not only Iran's intention to
have a bomb but an intention to use it. That's why we need diplomacy.
That's why the provisions of this bill in section 603(c), which say
U.S. Government employees can't have any contact with Iranians, is
really upside down.
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate that very much.
Just on this one issue, there is nothing in this bill that prohibits
Americans from having contact with Iranians. There is nothing in this
bill that prohibits the President of the United States or his Secretary
of State or such other emissaries or agencies he chooses from engaging
diplomatically on the issue of ending Iran's nuclear weapons program. I
would not support a bill that prohibited that.
Mr. KUCINICH. In reclaiming my time, section 603(c) was added in
committee. I would inquire of the gentleman, was it stripped from the
bill?
Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate the gentleman for yielding.
Section 603 was not stripped from the bill, and section 603 does not
prohibit the administration from engaging diplomatically on this issue.
Mr. KUCINICH. I reclaim my time.
Perhaps the President is not restricted, which is good for the
gentleman to say; but the very clear and plain reading of that is that
it says no U.S. Government employee.
I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. At this time, the Chair needs to make a time
correction.
The remaining time for the gentleman from Ohio is 2 minutes.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think I am the last speaker on my side of
our side who intends to speak on this issue.
How much time remains?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 1 minute
remaining, and the gentleman from Ohio has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. BERMAN. The chairman of the committee, the gentlelady from
Florida, has the right to close. Am I correct in that assumption?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Yes.
Mr. BERMAN. Is the gentleman from Ohio, if I may ask through the
Chair, the last speaker on his side?
Mr. KUCINICH. Correct.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, in that case I yield myself the balance of
my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California is recognized
for 1 minute.
Mr. BERMAN. Again, I would like to repeat that this crisis only ends
one of three ways.
Iran gets a nuclear weapons capability, and don't listen to straw man
arguments. No one is saying Iran today has a nuclear bomb, but the IAEA
has made it perfectly clear they are pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability. Once they have that capability, they throw out the
inspectors; they shut off the cameras; and they get the bomb.
Either we stop them from getting the bomb; we have a military
confrontation; or we have a diplomatic resolution where they end their
nuclear weapons program through diplomacy.
The provision the gentleman cited does not prohibit diplomacy by the
President or his emissaries. Time will not permit me to read the
statute, itself, right now, but I would be happy to show any of my
members why diplomacy is still allowed.
This is not a unilateral effort. This administration and this
Congress, in working with them, have pursued a multilateral effort with
the international community to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,
and we will continue to do that.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
I am quoting from an article in The Hill, which I cited earlier:
Section 601 would prohibit U.S. Government employees in any official
or unofficial capacity from contacting anyone who is affiliated with
the Iranian Government who presents a threat to the United States or is
affiliated with a terrorist organization.
Look, if you want to stop war, you have to have communication with
people. I mean, if you look back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is
one of the gravest crises of the 20th century, it was the fact that the
United States and Russia were able to engage in a communication.
So we have to be very careful that we don't pass any kind of a law
that would restrict, not just First Amendment rights and not just
freedom of association, but would restrict the basic kind of diplomacy
that's used, because everyone here knows that diplomacy is not just
leaders talking to leaders. All kinds of backdoor diplomacy goes on,
and I think that that needs to be taken into consideration.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As I said, Mr. Speaker, I am going to close; so the
gentleman from Ohio must use his time.
I reserve the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my colleagues very much, for whom I have the
greatest respect, for the opportunity to discuss this; although I
painfully must disagree with you here.
Broad sanctions against Iran can only further isolate Iran from the
international community and cause the regime to be increasingly
secretive. The sanctions actually play directly into the hands of the
Iranian Government. They directly undermine the efforts of the Iranian
people, who have courageously challenged their government often at the
cost of their lives. The sanctions could be seen as a gift to the
regime, not just a political gift for polarization within their country
to cross opposition, but also an economic gift because the price of oil
will go up, and Iran will cash in on that.
Section 302 of this bill revokes the President's authority to license
the export of civilian aircraft parts and repairs for Iranian civil
aircraft, authority which would ensure the safety of flight for
humanitarian purposes. This provision recklessly places the lives of
Iranian Americans in danger. We ought to defeat this bill and stand for
diplomacy.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Iran remains the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism.
According to our Treasury Department, Iran is a critical transit point
for funding to support al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This
network serves as the core pipeline through which al Qaeda moves money,
facilitators, and operatives from across the Middle East to South Asia,
including al Qaeda's operational commander. Also, Tehran is providing
key support to the regime in Damascus, another state sponsor of
terrorism that is of proliferation concern and which is currently
engaged in the violent repression of the people of Syria.
Iran is also directly responsible for the deaths of many Americans.
It continues to sponsor violent extremist groups in Iraq and
Afghanistan that have killed our men and women in uniform. Just last
week, a Federal judge found that the Iranian regime provided material
aid and support for al Qaeda's 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania.
Just imagine what an emboldened Iran would do if allowed to obtain
nuclear weapons and the means by which to deliver them. Remember what
the regime has already said that it wants to do. Ahmadinejad has openly
proclaimed that Iran seeks a world without America and Zionism; and
Iran's so-called supreme leader has stated
[[Page H8858]]
that Iran is prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge, and
technology of its scientists.
We should take them at their word and impose crippling sanctions on
this regime, and it starts tonight, Mr. Speaker, with this bill, H.R.
1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act. Let's pass it tonight.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Speaker, last year, when we passed the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act, I came to the floor stating that we
must go further. Our stated goal then, as it is now, was to protect
Americans, our allies, and the Iranians who suffer under a tyrannical
regime. We have made it clear that it is unacceptable for Iran to
develop nuclear weapons.
While a step in the right direction, last year's version of Iran
Sanctions gave too much flexibility to the administration and included
vast loopholes that weakened the law's effectiveness. As I speak now,
the Obama administration has only applied sanctions to ten foreign
companies and has given leeway to companies operating in Iran. Iran has
continued development of nuclear weapons and poses an even greater
threat to America and her allies.
Today's bill, H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, takes the
threat of Iran's nuclear program seriously. This legislation would
mandate sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran. It would also
impose sanctions on foreign banks that continue to do business with the
Iranian Central Bank. Just last week the Senate unanimously supported
sanctioning the Iranian Central Bank. As the House and Senate are
deeply divided on other major issues, we all believe that Iran is a
threat that must be dealt with swiftly and that the Central Bank must
be sanctioned. H.R. 1905 also would reassert that it is U.S. policy to
ensure Iran does not obtain the ability to produce nuclear weapons.
Finally, the bill would close the loophole in current U.S. law that
allows foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations to bypass U.S.
sanctions.
Will this legislation single-handedly prevent a nuclear Iran from
emerging? Likely it will not. We may have waited too long for our
actions today to single-handedly dismantle Iran's nuclear ambitions.
However, with this legislation, allies are already indicating they will
follow our lead and potentially sanction the Iranian Central Bank as
well. As we show the rest of the world we take this threat seriously,
they will too. I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of
the Iran Threat Reduction Act, though I do have concerns about new
language added to the bill in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It is
my hope that this language will be corrected before this bill advances.
The passage last year of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was a key step in the
effort to prevent Iran from gaining the ability to develop a nuclear
weapon and it is important that we continue to apply pressure to the
Iranian regime.
It is clear that if President Ahmadinejad and his regime were allowed
to access a nuclear weapon, Iran would pose a significant threat to
global stability and security and a threat to the security of the State
of Israel.
This bill is an appropriate next step as we work to increase pressure
on Iran to end its nuclear program and end its open hostility toward
Israel and the United States. By authorizing new sanctions against Iran
and by imposing sanctions against additional activities, this bill
successfully expands on the precedent set by CISADA and sends the right
message to Iran and to the international community.
However, as I said, changes were made to this bill during the
committee process that raise questions about whether or not the bill
inappropriately limits the ability of any American President and his or
her entire Administration to conduct diplomacy with Iran. This new
language could end up jeopardizing American security by preventing our
diplomats from resolving minor issues before they become more serious
disputes.
The Obama Administration, for example, has done an excellent job to
this point in addressing the threat of a nuclear Iran. Just last month,
the Administration imposed additional sanctions on Iran, including
labeling Iran as a ``primary money-laundering concern.'' The
Administration should also be commended for ensuring the success of
sanctions by securing the cooperation of the international community in
imposing serious sanctions that had not even been considered by many of
our allies until President Obama's pressure led them to toughen their
stance against Iran. It makes no sense to tie the Administration's
hands now, particularly given the successful efforts by President Obama
to toughen the international community's stand against Iran.
The lead Democratic sponsor of this bill and the senior Democrat on
the Foreign Affairs Committee, my good friend Mr. Berman, has made
clear that he does not believe that this bill should limit the
President's ability to conduct diplomacy as he sees fit, and I agree
with that assessment. Like Mr. Berman, I believe that this issue must
be clarified in conference to ensure that this bill does not
inadvertently exacerbate problems that it is intended to fix.
I believe that it is imperative that we continue working
constructively with our allies to strengthen sanctions against Iran and
so I urge my colleagues to support this bill and to ensure going
forward that it is implemented in a productive way.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation whose
purpose is to deny Iran both the ability to support terrorist
organizations and to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
I want to express my strong admiration and support for Representative
Howard Berman, the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee. Without Representative Berman's forceful and steadfast
leadership, this legislation to impose the most stringent sanctions yet
on Iran would not have come before us. We are standing firm against
Iran because of Representative Berman's ceaseless efforts to forge a
bipartisan consensus to act against the grave threat to Israel and
other allies that is posed by Iran and its leadership.
Iran is a growing danger to peace and stability in the Middle East
and beyond. Its nuclear program in and of itself is the most dangerous
threat to peace in the world today. Together with its support for Hamas
in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime, Iran is an ongoing
and growing danger to the region and the world.
Iran's unremitting hostility to the United States, to Israel and
others requires the most forceful response.
It is clear that Iran's leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear
weapon. All of the independent international assessments, including
from the International Atomic Energy Agency, attest to a steady
progression to weaponize its uranium assets. At the same time, Iran is
perfecting its medium and long-range missile capabilities.
Together, these initiatives can only have one purpose: at the least,
to enable Iran to exercise nuclear blackmail in pursuit of its extreme
agenda. But this also means that Iran will have the Iranian people.
capability to actually use a nuclear weapon, and bring a catastrophe
upon us all--and upon the Iranian people.
This is unacceptable. Iran's nuclear program must be stopped. Iran
simply must not be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon.
President Obama has been exceptionally clear on Iran. Just last week,
on December 8, President Obama again was emphatic in stating U.S.
policy:
``. . . What I can say with respect to Iran, I think it's very
important to remember, particularly given some of the political noise
out there, that this administration has systematically imposed the
toughest sanctions on Iraq--on Iran ever.
``When we came into office, the world was divided, Iran was unified
and moving aggressively on its own agenda. Today, Iran is isolated, and
the world is unified in applying the toughest sanctions that Iran has
ever experienced. And it's having an impact inside of Iran. And that's
as a consequence of the extraordinary work that's been done by our
national security team.
``Now, Iran understands that they have a choice: They can break that
isolation by acting responsibly and foreswearing the development of
nuclear weapons, which would still allow them to pursue peaceful
nuclear power, like every other country that's a member of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, or they can continue to operate in a fashion that
isolates them from the entire world. And if they are pursuing nuclear
weapons, then I have said very clearly, that is contrary to the
national security interests of the United States; it's contrary to the
national security interests of our allies, including Israel; and we are
going to work with the world community to prevent that.''
With respect to what the United States is willing to do to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, President Obama said, ``No options
off the table means I'm considering all options.''
The best way to avoid getting to that point is to do everything we
can to impose the harshest pressure on Iran in order to make its
present nuclear course unsustainable to the regime.
The Iran Threat Reduction Act will put into force the strongest
sanctions yet against Iran. It imposes sanctions on Iran's oil
industry, including sanctions on the importation of gasoline, which
Iran desperately needs. There are increased sanctions on defense
products and technology.
Sanctions are also imposed on the Central Bank of Iran and across the
financial and banking sectors. Because Iran is pursuing a nuclear
weapon, it will become exceedingly impossible for Iran to engage in
international commerce.
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The best alternative to the present regime is to encourage Iranians
opposed to its brutal repression to continue to work for democracy and
freedom. To this end, this bill provides financial and political
assistance to individuals and organizations that support democracy in
Iran.
In addition, the legislation specifically targets for sanctions those
who are part of, or associated with, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps--the Iranian regime's arm of repression who wantonly violate the
human rights of the Iranian people.
Taken together, these measures constitute the imposition of crippling
sanctions against the Iranian government and those who do business with
it.
This bill delivers one message to the Iran's leaders: stop now.
We cannot tolerate an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, and the means
to deliver them against Israel and other countries, such as Saudi
Arabia, in the Middle East.
The very best strategy to stop Iran's nuclear program is to make
business and commerce in Iran untenable for as long as Iran is pursuing
a nuclear capability, and to target the regime's repressive elements--
the Revolutionary Guard--with massive penalties.
By every indication, time--and patience--with Iran is growing
shorter. This legislation is the least we can do to bring relentless
pressure on Iran to change course.
I support this bill and once again thank Representative Howard Berman
for his courageous leadership in helping us face the most dangerous
foreign policy crisis in the world today.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, the recent IAEA report on Iran's nuclear
program indicates that Iran continues to pursue a clandestine nuclear
weapons program. Specifically, the IAEA's November 2011 report noted
that Iran has carried out a number of activities that are relevant to
the development of a nuclear explosive device. These include efforts,
some successful, to procure nuclear related and dual-use equipment and
materials by military related individuals; efforts to develop
undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material; the
acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and
documentation from a clandestine nuclear supply network; and work on
the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including
the testing of components.
These are ominous developments that the House simply cannot ignore.
I am glad that the House is considering this legislation. I recognize
that sanctions like this are crude instruments, but the threatening
actions of the government of Iran must be countered. This bill will
help increase diplomatic pressure on Iran by further tightening
sanctions, particularly on entities associated with Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is a key player in Iran's
nuclear weapons acquisition effort. The IRGC's activities are a key
reason why this legislation is necessary.
I recognize that this legislation is not perfect. I am particularly
troubled by a provision that was added during the committee mark up
that would make it extremely difficult for American officials to meet
directly or indirectly with some Iranian officials. I vote for this
with the expectation that this particular provision will be modified
before it goes to the President for his signature.
Today we are also considering H.R. 2105, which would strengthen our
nonproliferation regime against Iran, North Korea, and Syria. It's
worth remembering that Syria had an undeclared nuclear facility under
construction at the time it was bombed a few years ago. This bill would
impose a series of new constraints on countries that may be thinking
about, or are known or suspected to be, supplying proliferation-related
technology to any of these three states. One provision would prohibit
U.S. nuclear cooperation with a country that is assisting the nuclear
program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced
conventional weapons to such countries.
I regret that these bills are necessary. I wish that our past
peaceful, diplomatic efforts had produced changes in their
proliferation-related behavior. Unfortunately, they have not. These
rogue regimes are willing to tolerate considerable international
isolation as they continue to pursue prohibited weapons programs. But I
believe there is a point at which the diplomatic and economic isolation
will begin to threaten their hold on power, and it is when that point
is reached that we will likely have our best chance of peacefully
disarming these rogue states. That is why I still believe that
diplomacy, backed by enforceable sanctions, can ultimately achieve the
goal we all share, and why I will support these bills.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) that the House suspend the
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1905, as amended.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
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