[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 178 (Tuesday, November 22, 2011)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E2111-E2112]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      U.S. POLICY TOWARD ZIMBABWE

                                 ______
                                 

                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, November 22, 2011

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, on November 2, our Subcommittee 
held a hearing to examine the current U.S. government policy toward the 
Republic of Zimbabwe and to consider how our policy toward this 
southern African nation may develop in the years ahead. Zimbabwe is 
considering a new constitution that will lead to the elections in 2012 
that had been postponed from this year.
  There has been mutual hostility between the United States government 
and the Zimbabwe government of Robert Mugabe since that country became 
independent in 1980, although Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie 
Carson said in his testimony that the relationship worsened with the 
extra-legal seizures of white-owned land in the 1990s. Mugabe and his 
supporters blame America for not supporting its liberation struggle, 
while the United States has criticized Mugabe's government consistently 
for human rights abuses, especially against its political opponents. 
With U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe Charles Ray encouraging U.S. 
businesses to invest in Zimbabwe last month, it would seem that U.S. 
policy is in the midst of a transformation.
  Following independence from Great Britain in 1980, Prime Minister 
Robert Mugabe's policy of political reconciliation was generally 
successful during the next two years, as the former political and 
military competitors within ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front and the rival Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African Peoples 
Union began to work together. Splits soon developed, however, and PF-
ZAPU's leader, Joshua Nkomo was removed from government.
  When PF-ZAPU was accused of initiating a rebellion due to the removal 
of Nkomo from the cabinet, government military forces began a 
pacification campaign primarily in his base in the Matabeleland area, 
which resulted in as many as 20,000 civilian deaths.
  In part through its control of the media, the huge parastatal sector 
of the economy and the security forces, the Mugabe government managed 
to keep organized political opposition to a minimum through most of the 
1990s. Beginning in 1999, however, Zimbabwe experienced a period of 
considerable political and economic upheaval. Opposition to President 
Mugabe and the ZANU-PF government had grown, in part due to the 
worsening economic governance issues. At one point, one U.S. dollar was 
worth more than 2.6 billion Zimbabwe dollars. Following the seizure of 
white-owned commercial farms beginning in the 1990s, food output 
capacity fell 45 percent, manufacturing output dropped by 29 percent 
and unemployment rose to 80 percent.
  The opposition was led by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), 
which was established in September 1999. The MDC led the campaign to 
handily defeat a referendum that would have permitted President Mugabe 
to seek two additional terms in office. Parliamentary elections held in 
June 2000 were marred by localized violence and claims of electoral 
irregularities and government intimidation of opposition supporters. 
Still, the MDC succeeded in capturing 57 of 120 seats in the National 
Assembly.
  The last four national elections--the presidential election in 2002, 
parliamentary elections in 2005, harmonized presidential and 
parliamentary elections in March 2008, and the presidential run-off in 
June 2008--were judged to be not free and fair by observers. In the 
March 2008 elections, two factions of the opposition MDC, known as MDC-
T to denote Morgan Tsvangirai's faction and MDC-M for the group led by 
Arthur Mutambara, gained a combined parliamentary majority. Mugabe was 
declared the winner of the June 2008 run-off election after opposing 
candidate Tsvangirai withdrew due to ZANU-PF-directed violence that 
made a free and fair election impossible. Mark Schneider, Senior Vice 
President for the International Crisis Group, told the Subcommittee 
that as many as a third of MDC

[[Page E2112]]

Parliamentarians have been arrested since the 2008 election.
  Negotiations subsequently took place, and in September 2008 the three 
parties signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA), a power-sharing 
agreement under which Mugabe would retain the presidency and Tsvangirai 
would become prime minister. In February 2009 Tsvangirai was sworn in 
as prime minister, and new cabinet ministers and deputy ministers from 
the two IvIDC factions and the ruling party also were sworn in. 
According to Dewa Mavhinga, Regional Information and Advocacy 
Coordinator for the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, stated that key state 
institutions remain unreformed despite the change in the composition of 
the government.
  There is serious contention within the ruling party for the right to 
succeed President Mugabe once he leaves office, and added to the 
division within the opposition, politics in Zimbabwe is in flux to say 
the least. Paul Fagan, Regional Director for Africa for the 
International Republican Institute, testified that the ``imminent 
constitutional referendum and national elections have the potential to 
graduate the crisis in Zimbabwe from a steady but manageable simmer to 
boiling over.''
  It is in this environment that the United States faces the challenge 
of examining our current policy and determining how it might best be 
adjusted. I appreciated hearing from our witnesses on how the U.S. 
policy toward Zimbabwe may change to help that nation reach the desired 
goals of democracy and good governance. Sharon Cromer, Senior Deputy 
Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International 
Development's Africa Bureau, told us that her agency is finalizing a 
democracy and governance assessment that ``highlights impediments and 
opportunities for us to promote democratic institutions in Zimbabwe.'' 
We eagerly await the release of that assessment for its impact on U.S. 
policy in Zimbabwe.

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