[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 143 (Friday, September 23, 2011)]
[House]
[Pages H6447-H6448]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE AL QAEDA-QODS FORCE NEXUS
(Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina asked and was given permission to
address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, with the U.N. General
Assembly meeting in New York this week and with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of
the Islamic Republic of Iran giving his usual anti-American rant
yesterday, I would like to make a few points about my concerns over
Iran's strategic aims in the Middle East and here in the Western
Hemisphere.
My friends at Kronos Advisory, including Medal of Honor winner Major
General James Livingston of Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, released
their Al Qaeda-Qods Force Nexus report in April, the text of which I
ask to be inserted into the Record. Their report goes to the heart of
the matter detailing that ``Iran has quietly forged a strong working
relationship with core al Qaeda leaders.''
I am greatly concerned about Iran's growing influence in Latin
America. The Treasury Department has stated that Hezbollah's operating
center is in the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.
Hezbollah's state sponsor, Iran, has opened six embassies in South
America over the last 5 years.
When the lives of Americans could face threats from Iran's growing
reach through Hezbollah, why would this administration even consider
giving President Ahmadinejad a visa to attend the United Nations
General Assembly meeting?
[From Kronos]
The Al-Qa'ida-Qods Force Nexus
SCRATCHING THE SURFACE OF A ``KNOWN UNKNOWN''
Kronos is a strategic advisory firm founded by
Congressional Medal of Honor recipient MajGen James E.
Livingston, USMC (Ret), Mallory Factor, and Michael S. Smith
II to provide global stakeholders the situational awareness
solutions they need to address strategic and tactical threats
to their interests. We help our clients achieve their
organizational goals by providing them the resources they
need to better understand and define their operational
environments--rather than allowing their organizational
capabilities and goals to be defined by them.
Kronos harnesses the resources of a diverse international
network of talented professionals with highly valuable skill
sets who have extensive experience helping officials address
complex national security threats, both domestic and foreign.
Kronos investigative project case teams consist of counter-
intelligence professionals, accomplished field investigators,
seasoned security analysts, and preeminent subject experts.
We seek to help our clients detect, deter, and neutralize
eminent challenges posed by gray area phenomena and collusive
adversarial regimes.
Through independent missions, our teams collect and analyze
unique and often otherwise inaccessible information that
reveals key threat features like emerging partnerships,
operational capabilities and the objectives of transnational
terrorist networks. Our teams also gather information that
exposes implications of important emerging theater-specific
and regional trends. We then use this data to produce tailor
made strategic threat assessments that provide holistic
explanations of imminent threats, and can be used by
officials to identify new opportunities to reduce them.
Kronos is strongly positioned to assist private companies
who support official missions, defense and intelligence
organizations operating in mission critical zones, as well as
policy makers in Washington. Our principals can also help
officials identify strategic opportunities to strengthen
relationships with key foreign partners.
____
The Al-Qa'ida-Qods Force Nexus
ISSUE SUMMARY, KRONOSADVISORY.COM
Despite a nearly decade-long effort to dismantle al-Qa'ida
and its affiliates, these terrorists still pose the most
immediate threats to America's security. Al-Qa'ida and
affiliated movements also threaten many other major and
emerging powers alike. Yet one ascendant power, Iran, has
quietly forged a strong working relationship with Core al-
Qa'ida's leaders. This relationship has been established to
counter American influence in the Middle East and South Asia.
Through it, Iran will likely also help al-Qa'ida mobilize
terrorists to carry out attacks against the U.S. and our
allies, providing the support required to extend al-Qa'ida's
operational reach.
[[Page H6448]]
Attention to the longstanding ties between top Iranian
officials and al-Qa'ida leaders, including Osama bin Laden's
top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has been eschewed by a
pervasive fundamental attribution error: ``Shiite Iran will
not work with Sunni militants comprising the ranks of al-
Qa'ida.'' This assessment fully ignores readily available
evidence to the contrary. Indeed, such relationships span
back to the early 1990s, when top officials from the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps' clandestine Qods Force, working
in concert with Iran's chief global terrorist proxy, Lebanese
Hizballah, began training and equipping bin Laden's warriors.
Then, following the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi
Arabia that killed 19 Americans, more evidence surfaced of
operational linkages between al-Qa'ida and the Qods Force, an
official Iranian paramilitary organization which possesses a
mandate from Iran's Supreme Leader to fund, train, and equip
Islamist terrorists. These very operational linkages are
referenced within the 9/11 Commission Report, whose authors
acknowledged the relationship between al-Qa'ida and Iran
demonstrates that Sunni-Shiite divisions ``did not
necessarily pose an insurmountable barrier to cooperation in
terrorist operations.''
Since 9/11, these partnerships have become all the more
pronounced. Hundreds of al-Qa'ida members, along with family
members of Core al-Qa'ida leaders like Osama bin Laden, have
found refuge inside Iran. Officials now know Iran's minister
of defense, formerly a commander of the Qods Force, furnished
safe houses for many of these terrorists. Officials also know
that while under ``house arrest'' inside Iran al-Qa'ida's top
military commanders like Saif al-Adl were able to coordinate
attacks against Western targets. Examples of these attacks
include the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that
killed eight Americans.
Since 2005, Iran has rapidly evolved from a theocracy into
a garrison state. With help from the Islamic Republic's
unelected officials, notably Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamene'i, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (a
former member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps), the
IRGC has seized control of most critical sectors inside Iran.
Having secured their future grips on power by elevating the
domestic roles of the IRGC, Iran's leaders are now pursuing
their lust for regional hegemonic status. Their strategy
entails both a persistent quest for nuclear weapons--the
acquisition of which Iran's leaders view as the means to
ensure their recent regional gains will be irreversible--and
support of terrorist organizations which are able to help
Iran destabilize unfriendly states, and perhaps even Iran's
entire neighborhood.
Today, the Middle East is more volatile than at any time
since the Islamic Revolution's leaders seized control of
Iran, and hardliners in Tehran are better positioned than
ever before to influence the future of this critical region.
Concurrently, with support from a state sponsor like Iran,
al-Qa'ida will be better positioned than ever before to
strike the West and our allies, and to foment chaos in both
the Arab world and South Asia that would ultimately benefit
Iran. As the implications of working partnerships between
Iran and al-Qa'ida carry weighty implications for not just
the security of the Middle East and South Asia, but also
America's national security interests, it is incumbent upon
policy makers in Washington to address this issue. For if
left unchecked, Iran's relationship with al-Qa'ida could cost
America and our allies dearly.
This report focuses on the history of Iran's relationship
with al-Qa'ida, and briefly addresses potential implications
of these ties. Additionally, its author provides a list of
recommended action items for Members of the United States
Congress, as well as a list of questions that may help
Members develop a better understanding of this issue through
interactions with defense and intelligence officials.
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