[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 82 (Wednesday, June 8, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3615-S3620]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. BINGAMAN (for himself and Ms. Murkowski):
  S. 1160. A bill to improve the administration of the Department of 
Energy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Department of 
Energy Administrative Improvement Act of 2011. The bill makes several 
improvements to the way the Department of Energy, DOE, conducts its 
business and in doing so is designed to give taxpayers a better return 
on their investments in DOE programs. Senator Murkowski, who is the 
ranking member of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, is a 
cosponsor of this bill. These provisions were taken from the energy 
bill, S. 1462, reported out of the Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee last Congress. The provisions in this bill were adopted 
unanimously in the last Congress by members of the Committee as part of 
our work on S. 1462. Let me briefly highlight the sections of this 
bill.
  Section 3 was taken from the recommendations of a 2009 report by the 
National Academy of Public Administration, which reviewed the business 
practices of the Department. Similar to the Department of Defense, it 
requires DOE to submit a 5-year budget profile for its programs with 
the DOE's annual budget submission to Congress. A 5-year estimate will 
encourage the Department to think about long-term budget implications 
of programs rather than on a year-to-year basis.
  Section 4 replaces a provision enacted into law in the section 1007 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 7256(g), relating to Other 
Transactions Authority. Section 1007 was based on

[[Page S3616]]

the similar authority applying to the Department of Defense. Section 4 
is a fresh re-write of the authority so it is organic within the 
Department of Energy Organization Act and not the Department of 
Defense's authorities. The language is largely the same in content as 
that in section 1007 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The DOE went 
through an extensive comment period in developing rules for the use of 
this authority after it was enacted into law in 2005 to ensure 
transparency in its development and use. This section still contains 
reporting requirements to Congress on the use of this authority to 
ensure effective oversight. The Advanced Research Projects Agency--
Energy has used this authority to initiate projects with energy 
companies that were not traditional government contractors and I 
believe this is a sound addition to the contracting authorities 
available to the Department.
  Section 5 permits the DOE to designate and protect proprietary data 
for a period of 5 years for transactions entered into by the 
Department. Section 3001 of Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. 13541, 
contained various provisions to protect results from industry 
partnerships with the Department of Energy. The 1992 data protection 
provision was carried forward implicitly in section 1005 of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 16395. This section gives the Secretary 
of Energy explicit authority to protect proprietary data in order to 
promote commercialization of new technology arising from the public-
private partnerships in such areas as energy storage, smart grid and 
advanced nuclear technologies.
  Section 6 gives the Department direct hire authority for a period of 
two years consistent with merit principles and public notice. Similar 
authority, known as excepted personnel authority, originally was 
available to the DOE's predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy 
Commission. That authority transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, NRC, but not the DOE. Interestingly, the NRC with its large 
scientific and engineering workforce has been rated as one of the best 
places to work in the federal government. While flexible personnel 
authorities are not singularly determinative of agency performance, I 
believe this pilot program will be an important tool for the Department 
to attract the best and brightest engineers, scientists and specialized 
technical personnel to work on its wide array of missions.
  Section 7 gives the DOE critical pay authority to hire up to 40 
highly skilled individuals for key or critical mission positions at the 
Department, for a period of up to 4 years. This will enable DOE to 
attract highly qualified individuals from industry and academia for 
positions within the Department typical of its complicated science and 
engineering missions.
  Section 8 gives the DOE the authority to rehire retired DOE employees 
for mission-critical positions without impacting their retirement 
annuity. Many Department employees served in excess of 20 or 30 years 
in programmatic positions managing large, technically complicated 
projects. This authority will enable continuity of knowledge transfer 
as newer employees are hired.
  Section 9 updates the list of DOE National Laboratories in section 2 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 15801(3) to reflect the 
name change of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center to ``SLAC 
National Accelerator Laboratory''.
  The Department of Energy has one of the most technical and 
complicated missions in the Federal Government, which includes managing 
our Nation's nuclear stockpile, basic and applied energy research, 
environmental cleanup of former cold war nuclear weapons production 
sites, and finally the management of large contracts spanning decades. 
I hope that these provisions will be helpful to the Department to 
efficiently conduct its missions.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1160

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Energy 
     Administrative Improvement Act of 2011''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF SECRETARY.

       In this Act, the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of 
     Energy.

     SEC. 3. FUTURE-YEARS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM.

       (a) In General.--Part C of title VI of the Department of 
     Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7251 et seq.) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 664. FUTURE-YEARS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM.

       ``(a) In General.--At or about the time the budget of the 
     President is submitted to Congress for each year under 
     section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the 
     Secretary shall submit to Congress a future-years Department 
     of Energy program (including associated annexes) reflecting 
     the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations 
     included in the budget.
       ``(b) Fiscal Year.--Any future-years Department of Energy 
     program submitted under subsection (a) shall cover--
       ``(1) the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is 
     submitted; and
       ``(2) at least the 4 succeeding fiscal years.
       ``(c) Consistent Amounts.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that amounts 
     described in paragraph (2)(A) for any fiscal year are 
     consistent with amounts described in paragraph (2)(B) for 
     that fiscal year.
       ``(2) Amounts.--Amounts referred to in paragraph (1) are 
     the following:
       ``(A) The amounts specified in program and budget 
     information submitted to Congress by the Secretary in support 
     of expenditure estimates and proposed appropriations in the 
     budget submitted to Congress by the President under section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for any fiscal year, 
     as indicated in the future-years Department of Energy program 
     submitted pursuant to subsection (a).
       ``(B) The total amounts of estimated expenditures and 
     proposed appropriations necessary to support the programs, 
     projects, and activities of the Department of Energy included 
     pursuant to section 1105(a)(5) of title 31, United States 
     Code, in the budget submitted to Congress under that section 
     for any fiscal year.
       ``(d) Management Contingencies.--Subject to subsection (c), 
     nothing in this section prohibit the inclusion in the future-
     years Department of Energy programs of amounts for management 
     contingencies.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the 
     first section of the Department of Energy Organization Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 7101) is amended by adding at the end of the items 
     relating to part C of title VI the following:

``Sec. 664. Future-years Department of Energy program.''.

     SEC. 4. OTHER TRANSACTIONS AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 646 of the Department of Energy 
     Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7256) is amended by striking 
     subsection (g) and inserting the following:
       ``(g) Authority to Enter Into Other Transactions.--
       ``(1) In general.--In addition to any other authority 
     granted to the Secretary to enter into procurement contracts, 
     leases, cooperative agreements, grants, and certain 
     arrangements, the Secretary may enter into other transactions 
     with public agencies, private organizations, or other persons 
     on such terms as the Secretary considers appropriate to 
     further functions vested in the Secretary, including 
     research, development, or demonstration projects.
       ``(2) Advance payments.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, the Secretary may exercise authority 
     provided under paragraph (1) without regard to section 3324 
     of title 31, United States Code.
       ``(3) Relationship to other law.--The authority of the 
     Secretary under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to--
       ``(A) section 9 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research 
     and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5908); or
       ``(B) section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2182).
       ``(4) Protection of certain information from disclosure.--
       ``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, disclosure of information described in subparagraph (B) 
     is not required, and may not be compelled, under section 552 
     of title 5, United States Code, during the 5-year period 
     beginning on the date on which the information is received by 
     the Department.
       ``(B) Award information.--The information described in this 
     subparagraph is information in the records of the Department 
     that--
       ``(i) was submitted--

       ``(I) to the Department as part of a competitive or 
     noncompetitive process with the potential to result in an 
     award to the person submitting the information; and
       ``(II) in conjunction with a transaction entered into by 
     the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1); and

       ``(ii) is--

       ``(I) a proposal, proposal abstract, and supporting 
     documents;
       ``(II) a business plan submitted on a confidential basis; 
     or
       ``(III) technical information submitted on a confidential 
     basis.

       ``(5) Requirements.--
       ``(A) Selection procedures.--In entering into transactions 
     under paragraph (1), the

[[Page S3617]]

     Secretary shall use such competitive, merit-based selection 
     procedures as the Secretary determines in writing to be 
     practicable.
       ``(B) Determination.--Before entering into a transaction 
     under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall determine in writing 
     that the use of a standard contract, grant, or cooperative 
     agreement for the project is not feasible or appropriate.
       ``(C) Cost sharing.--A transaction under paragraph (1) 
     shall be subject to cost sharing in accordance with section 
     988 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 16352).
       ``(D) Limitation on delegation.--The authority of the 
     Secretary under this subsection may be delegated only to an 
     officer of the Department who is appointed by the President 
     by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and may not 
     be redelegated to any other person.
       ``(6) Annual reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     of enactment of the Department of Energy Administrative 
     Improvement Act of 2011 and annually thereafter, the 
     Secretary shall submit to Congress an annual report on the 
     transactions entered into by the Secretary pursuant to the 
     authorities provided under this subsection.
       ``(7) Report.--
       ``(A) Definition of nontraditional government contractor.--
     In this paragraph, the term `nontraditional Government 
     contractor' has the meaning given the term `nontraditional 
     defense contractor' in section 845(f) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 
     10 U.S.C. 2371 note).
       ``(B) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
     enactment of this subparagraph, and 2 years thereafter, the 
     Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to 
     Congress a report describing--
       ``(i) the use by the Department of authorities under this 
     section, including the ability to attract nontraditional 
     Government contractors; and
       ``(ii) whether additional safeguards are necessary to carry 
     out the authorities.''.
       (b) Implementation.--
       (1) In general.--The final rule of the Department of Energy 
     entitled ``Assistance Regulations'' (71 Fed. Reg. 27158 (May 
     9, 2006)) shall be applicable to transactions under section 
     646 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 
     7256) (as amended by subsection (a)).
       (2) Regulations.--The Secretary may revise, supplement, or 
     replace such regulations as the Secretary determines 
     necessary to implement the amendment made by subsection (a).

     SEC. 5. PROTECTION OF RESULTS.

       (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b) and 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, during a period 
     of not more than 5 years after the development of information 
     in any transaction authorized to be entered into by the 
     Department of Energy, the Secretary may provide appropriate 
     protections against the dissemination of the information, 
     including exemption from subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 
     5, United States Code.
       (b) Applicable Information.--This section applies to 
     information that--
       (1) results from a transaction entered into by the 
     Secretary pursuant to this title or an amendment made by this 
     title; and
       (2) is of a character that would be protected from 
     disclosure under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States 
     Code, if the information had been obtained from a person 
     other than an agent or employee of the Federal Government.

     SEC. 6. DIRECT HIRE AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding sections 3304 and 3309 
     through 3318 of title 5, United States Code, the Secretary 
     may, upon a determination that there is a severe shortage of 
     candidates or a critical hiring need for particular 
     positions, recruit and directly appoint highly qualified 
     scientists, engineers, or critical technical personnel into 
     the competitive service.
       (b) Exception.--The authority granted under subsection (a) 
     shall not apply to positions in the excepted service or the 
     Senior Executive Service.
       (c) Requirements.--In exercising the authority granted 
     under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure that any 
     action taken by the Secretary--
       (1) is consistent with the merit principles of section 2301 
     of title 5, United States Code; and
       (2) complies with the public notice requirements of section 
     3327 of title 5, United States Code.
       (d) Termination of Effectiveness.--The authority provided 
     by this section terminates effective on the date that is 2 
     years after the date of enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 7. CRITICAL PAY AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 5377 of title 5, 
     United States Code, and without regard to the provisions of 
     that title governing appointments in the competitive service 
     or the Senior Executive Service and chapters 51 and 53 of 
     that title (relating to classification and pay rates), the 
     Secretary may establish, fix the compensation of, and appoint 
     individuals to critical positions needed to carry out the 
     functions of the Department of Energy, if the Secretary 
     certifies that--
       (1) the positions--
       (A) require expertise of an extremely high level in a 
     scientific or technical field; and
       (B) the Department of Energy would not successfully 
     accomplish an important mission without such an individual; 
     and
       (2) exercise of the authority is necessary to recruit an 
     individual exceptionally well qualified for the position.
       (b) Limitations.--The authority granted under subsection 
     (a) shall be subject to the following conditions:
       (1) The number of critical positions authorized by 
     subsection (a) may not exceed 40 at any 1 time in the 
     Department of Energy.
       (2) The term of an appointment under subsection (a) may not 
     exceed 4 years.
       (3) An individual appointed under subsection (a) may not 
     have been a Department of Energy employee within the 2 years 
     prior to the date of appointment.
       (4) Total annual compensation for any individual appointed 
     under subsection (a) may not exceed the highest total annual 
     compensation payable at the rate determined under section 104 
     of title 3, United States Code.
       (5) An individual appointed under subsection (a) may not be 
     considered to be an employee for purposes of subchapter II of 
     chapter 75 of title 5, United States Code.
       (c) Notification.--Each year, the Secretary shall submit to 
     Congress a notification that lists each individual appointed 
     under this section.

     SEC. 8. REEMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN RETIREES.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding part 553 of title 5, Code 
     of Federal Regulations (relating to reemployment of civilian 
     retirees to meet exceptional employment needs), or successor 
     regulations, the Secretary may approve the reemployment of an 
     individual to a particular position without reduction or 
     termination of annuity if the hiring of the individual is 
     necessary to carry out a critical function of the Department 
     of Energy for which the Department has encountered 
     exceptional difficulty in recruiting or retaining suitably 
     qualified candidates.
       (b) Limitations.--An annuitant hired with full salary and 
     annuities under the authority granted by subsection (a)--
       (1) shall not be considered an employee for purposes of 
     subchapter III of chapter 83 and chapter 84 of title 5, 
     United States Code;
       (2) may not elect to have retirement contributions withheld 
     from the pay of the annuitant;
       (3) may not use any employment under this section as a 
     basis for a supplemental or recomputed annuity; and
       (4) may not participate in the Thrift Savings Plan under 
     subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code.
       (c) Limitation on Term.--The term of employment of any 
     individual hired under subsection (a) may not exceed an 
     initial term of 2 years, with an additional 2-year 
     appointment under exceptional circumstances.

     SEC. 9. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL LABORATORY.

       Section 2(3) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 
     15801(3)) is amended by striking subparagraph (P) and 
     inserting the following:
       ``(P) SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. WEBB (for himself and Mr. Corker):
  S.J. Res. 18. A joint resolution prohibiting the deployment, 
establishment, or maintenance of a presence of units and members of the 
United States Armed Forces on the ground in Libya, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I am pleased to come to the Senate floor, 
along with my colleague, Senator Corker, a fellow member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, to speak about a joint resolution we are 
introducing today that deals with the situation in Libya.
  This is introduced as a joint resolution rather than as an amendment 
on the current legislation because I believe this matter is serious 
enough that our body should actually consider this as a stand-alone 
piece of legislation and coordinate it with the House and get this 
passed with due speed.
  This resolution, first of all, contains a statement of policy that 
American Armed Forces should be used exclusively to defend and advance 
our national security interests.
  Second, it prohibits the deployment, establishment, or maintenance of 
ground troops in Libya, with two notable exceptions. The first would be 
for the purpose of the immediate personal defense of American 
Government officials, including diplomatic representatives, which I 
believe would be an important exclusion once and if we decide to 
conduct negotiations or reestablish our Embassy inside Libya. The other 
exception would be for the purpose of rescuing members of our Armed 
Forces who would be in Libya and would be under imminent danger.
  It also prohibits the awarding of a contract to private security 
contractors to conduct, establish, or maintain any activities on the 
ground in Libya.
  This language in section 2 is similar to language that passed the 
House last week with a vote of 416 to 5.
  Section 3 includes a sense of Congress that the President should 
request congressional authorization for the continuation of American 
involvement in

[[Page S3618]]

ongoing activities in Libya, and that the Congress, in its 
constitutional role, should debate and consider this matter 
expeditiously.
  Sections 4 and 5 require the transmission of information to the 
Congress on a wide variety of information that, to this point, we have 
not been properly included on. That language, in some form, passed the 
House last Friday with a vote of 268 to 145.
  Again, I appreciate very much Senator Corker joining me as the 
principal cosponsor of this joint resolution.
  I would like to explain why I believe it is important we take this 
measure as a body, as a Congress, in response to the actions the 
President took in Libya nearly 3 months ago.
  First, we know, and we are reminded every day, that our economy is 
going through a terrible crisis, even as we are expending hundreds of 
billions of dollars every year on wars in the most vitriolic and 
contentious parts of the world.
  Second, our military has been engaged in continuous combat operations 
for nearly 10 years. We still have 45,000 military members in Iraq 
despite a stated commitment for a full withdrawal by the end of this 
year. We have about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, and the prospect for 
a meaningful withdrawal in the short term does not look good.
  When we examine the conditions under which the President ordered our 
military into action in Libya, we are faced, in my view, with the 
prospect of a very troubling, if not downright odd, historical 
precedent that has the potential to haunt us for decades.
  The issue in play is not simply whether the President should ask the 
Congress for a declaration of war, nor is it wholly about whether the 
President has violated the edicts of the War Powers Act, which, in my 
view, he clearly has. The issue for us to consider is whether a 
President--any President--can unilaterally begin, and continue, a 
military campaign for reasons that he alone defines as meeting the 
demanding standards of a vital national interest worthy of risking 
American lives and expending billions of dollars of our taxpayers' 
money.
  What was the standard in this case? The initial justification was 
that a dictator might retaliate against people who rebelled against 
him. I do not make light of the potential tragedy involved in such a 
possibility, although it should be pointed out that there are a lot of 
dictators in this world and very few democracies in this particular 
region, which gives this standard a pretty broad base if a President 
decides to use it again. Then, predictably, once military operations 
began in Libya, the stated goal became regime change, with combat now 
having dragged on for nearly 3 months.
  So in a world filled with cruelty, the question becomes whether a 
President--any President--should be able to pick and choose when and 
where to use military force using such a vague standard. Actually that 
is the most important question. Given our system of government, who 
should decide? Even if a President should unilaterally decide on the 
basis of overwhelming, vital national interests that requires immediate 
action, how long should that decision be honored, and to what lengths 
should our military go before the matter is able to come under the 
proper scrutiny and boundaries of our Congress?
  Let's review the bidding. What did it look like when our President 
ordered our military into action in Libya, and what has happened since? 
Was our country under attack or under the threat of an imminent attack? 
Was a clearly vital national interest at stake? Were we invoking the 
inherent right of self-defense as outlined in the United Nations 
charter? Were we called upon by treaty commitments to come to the aid 
of an ally? Were we responding in kind to an attack on our forces 
elsewhere as we did in the 1986 raids in Libya when I was in the 
Pentagon, after American soldiers had been killed in a disco in Berlin? 
Were we rescuing Americans in distress as we did in Grenada in 1983? 
No, we were not.
  The President followed no clear historical standard when he 
unilaterally decided to use force in Libya. Once this action continued 
beyond his original definition of ``days, not weeks,'' he did not seek 
the approval of Congress. While he has discussed this matter with some 
Members of Congress, he has not formally conferred with the legislative 
branch.
  I believe it is appropriate to question on whose behalf this 
continuing action is being taken, and, most importantly at this point, 
what is going to be asked of our military in the coming months, 
assuming the Qadhafi regime does fall? This is not even a civil war.
  As Secretary of Defense Gates commented to me when I asked him that 
question during a hearing on the Armed Services Committee recently: You 
don't have a civil war when there is no clearly formed opposition 
movement. It has been a random rebellion. We can empathize with the 
frustrations of this rebellion, but looking into the future, the only 
thing the opponents of the present regime all seem to agree on is that 
Qadhafi should go.
  As I have said repeatedly over the past few months, this matters 
greatly when one considers what the aftermath of this action could 
entail for the international community.
  An additional curiosity is that we still recognize this regime even 
as we have been participating for nearly 3 months in actions designed 
to destroy it. I have raised this matter repeatedly with our State 
Department. We have not severed relations with this regime, nor have we 
recognized a successor regime. We have merely suspended our relations. 
So we are looking at something of a historical anomaly. We are 
participating in attacks on a regime that we recognize, on behalf of 
rebel forces that are so amorphous that we don't, and we really do not 
know what is going to replace the regime that we recognize once it is 
gone.
  Obviously, I am not raising these points out of any lasting love for 
Mr. Qadhafi or any hopes that he continues in his present position. But 
let's be very clear. This is a region rife with tribalism, fierce 
loyalties, and brutal retaliation. In this part of the world the lust 
for revenge upon those who try to destroy you is not a characteristic 
that is unique to Mr. Qadhafi. Whether Qadhafi stays or falls, that is 
very likely going to be the future at some level in Libya, and this is 
not a place for American troops to be sent in order to sort out this 
mess. If other nations decide to do so, I certainly have no objection. 
But our military is stretched too thin, our economy is too fragile, and 
the reasons for us to continue in this effort are too ill-defined.
  So it is important for the Congress to step in and to clearly define 
the boundaries of our involvement. We should be saying without 
hesitation that no American ground personnel should be introduced into 
Libya, now or in the future. We should also be insisting on fair and 
open communication from this administration to the Congress rather than 
the stonewalling that has characterized the past 3 months.
  This is not a political issue for me. Rather, it is an issue of how 
our government is structured. I would submit that this issue has 
historical consequences. Our three branches of government were 
carefully designed by the Founding Fathers to guard against hasty 
decisions or judgments that would not be fully in our national 
interest. For centuries, the English monarchs had been able to wage 
wars of choice, with the only restriction being whether Parliament 
would raise enough taxes to fund their adventurous armies. Our Founding 
Fathers said no. The Framers of the Constitution deliberately gave the 
Congress the specific power to rein in such conduct and to protect our 
people from unwise choices by insisting on a democratic consensus.
  The structure of international relations has become much more complex 
since then, but the principle is still vital, and it still must hold.
  Over the past 10 years, in pursuit of a workable formula with which 
to defend our Nation against legitimate threats, we have allowed the 
balance of power in our constitutional system to tilt far too heavily 
to the executive branch. There could be no clearer example of why the 
Congress must finally say ``enough is enough'' than the situation we 
now face in Libya. We must clearly say, as a governing body, that there 
are boundaries on the conduct of a President--any President--when it 
comes to his or her unilateral decision to use military force. We 
should be clear that American military forces--in uniform or not--do 
not belong on the ground in Libya.

[[Page S3619]]

  We should make it clear that we will not be deterred in requests for 
information that allow us to perform our responsibilities. To do less 
than that would bring us back in time, to a system of government our 
forefathers risked their lives to improve upon. We are not the 
Parliament of King Charles. I believe my fellow Members would agree 
that our role as a legislative body is more than that of collecting 
taxes so that the President--any President--can raise armies and fight 
wars of his own choosing. And that is why I am asking every Senator to 
support this legislation.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia, the former Secretary of the Navy, in the 
introduction of this joint resolution, along with Senator Lee from 
Utah. I look forward to a debate of this resolution next week which I 
hope will end up passing both bodies and which calls for a number of 
answers we have been requesting to come forth.
  I wish to discuss the ongoing situation in Libya where--specifically 
U.S. participation in NATO military operations authorized by the United 
Nations' Security Council resolution passed on March 17, 2011. For 
those of you listening, you heard me correctly. It was authorized by 
the United Nations, not the U.S. Congress. We are spending roughly $2 
million per day on a mission on which the President has yet to broadly 
consult Congress.
  I find it unbelievable that the President would seek the approval of 
the United Nations and the Arab League for military operations over 
Libya while sidelining the body that speaks for the American people, 
not even answering our questions. This is not consultation, nor is the 
President heeding the concerns of his own constituents.
  For many weeks now, I and many colleagues, for that matter, have 
attempted to gain answers to some of the most basic questions about 
what we are doing in Libya. Through hearings in the Foreign Relations 
Committee, we have not received these answers. We have asked for 
specific witnesses and received no response. This is not consultation.
  In my ongoing attempts to receive answers to these questions, I sent 
a letter to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates on April 14, 2011, 
specifically outlining five questions. I have the letter here and ask 
unanimous consent to have this letter printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 2011.
     Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
     Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Robert M. Gates,
     Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates: It has now been 
     nearly one month since the United States first engaged in 
     coalition operations in Libya. Since that time, there has 
     been relatively infrequent information sharing with the 
     Congress regarding the full scope of U.S. involvement in the 
     conflict. Administration officials have assured Congress that 
     the United States was playing only a supporting role in 
     ongoing operations in Libya, and those operations did not 
     include kinetic operations. Yesterday, April 13, 2011, it was 
     revealed during a Pentagon briefing that three U.S. aircraft 
     assigned to NATO had fired ordnance. This seems contradictory 
     to the information we have previously received and is an 
     example of the disconnect between Congress and the 
     administration on the nature of the U.S. role in Libya. To 
     that end, I ask that you provide the following:
       (1) A full accounting of U.S. assets assigned to the 
     mission and how they are being utilized.
       (2) Requests the U.S. has received from coalition partners 
     and Libyan opposition forces for materiel and support--both 
     fulfilled and denied.
       (3) The contents of additional U.S. offers of assistance.
       (4) Plans to offer additional assistance to Libyan 
     opposition forces.
       (5) All meetings that the administration has engaged in 
     with coalition partners, the Libya contact group and the 
     Libyan opposition forces to discuss the operations and 
     political future of Libya.
       I thank you for your service to our country, and I look 
     forward to your prompt reply to my request.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bob Corker,
                                                     U.S. Senator.

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, today, 1 day shy of 8 weeks later, I 
finally received a response. This response did not come from Secretary 
Clinton. It did not come from Secretary Gates. This response came from 
the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs and 
only paid lipservice to one of my five specific requests for 
information.
  I ask unanimous consent to have this ``nonresponse'' printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                     Washington, DC, June 6, 2011.
     Hon. Bob Corker,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Corker: Thank you for your letter of April 14 
     regarding the State Department's effort to assist the 
     coalition and support the people of Libya. The past three 
     months have demonstrated Colonel Qadhafi's unrelenting 
     efforts to kill those who wish to instill democracy in Libya 
     and the use of barbarous, indiscriminant bombing of cities 
     and vital civilian infrastructure. These acts further 
     delegitimize Qadhafi as a leader of the Libyan people.
       The State Department is working to ensure the coalition 
     remains united behind the goal of protecting the people of 
     Libya. We continue to work closely with coalition and 
     regional governments to isolate Qadhafi and create support 
     for the opposition. This effort includes the termination of 
     diplomatic status for Libyan diplomats still supporting the 
     regime and the freezing of all regime assets. As the 
     situation evolves, we continue to evaluate further options to 
     increase pressure on Qadhafi to step down. We are also 
     considering options to provide the opposition the financial 
     wherewithal it needs to support itself.
       Along with looking at multiple ways to increase pressure on 
     the Qadhafi regime, the State Department is looking at better 
     ways to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in 
     conflict areas. We are assessing options for assistance we 
     could provide to the Libyan people and are consulting 
     directly with the opposition and our international partners. 
     Some aid has been identified; the President directed up to 
     $25 million in non-lethal items from U.S. government stocks, 
     including medical supplies, uniforms, boots, tents, personal 
     protective gear, and prepackaged rations.
       We continue working with the international community to 
     determine the best way to support the Transitional National 
     Council (TNC) in meeting its financial needs. The May 5 Libya 
     Contact Group meeting in Rome endorsed the creation of a 
     Temporary Financial Mechanism, which will help facilitate and 
     coordinate financial assistance. Additionally, the United 
     States is providing $53.5 million in humanitarian assistance 
     to support people affected by the crisis.
       Chris Stevens, U.S. Envoy to the TNC, remains in Benghazi 
     and continues to hold productive meetings with high-level 
     members of the TNC. In addition to Secretary Clinton's 
     meetings with TNC leadership, Mr. Stevens regularly meets 
     with senior TNC leaders to better understand the steps they 
     are undertaking to build a democracy based on universal 
     principles of respect for human rights and rule of law. While 
     we are working closely with the TNC, we also continue to meet 
     with a broad spectrum of Libyans involved in the opposition 
     writ large.
       Thank you again for your interest and support for Libya. 
     Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of 
     further assistance on this or any other matter.
           Sincerely,

                                           Joseph E. MacManus,

                                       Acting Assistant Secretary,
                                              Legislative Affairs.

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, this is unacceptable. This is an 
unacceptable way to treat a coequal branch of the U.S. Government that 
is granted certain responsibilities to our Armed Forces by the Founders 
of our country. Without these answers, Members of Congress are unable 
to assess critical questions and debate whether we should continue to 
engage in military operations in Libya.
  That is why I am pleased to join my colleagues, Senator Webb and 
Senator Lee, in introducing S.J. Res. 18 today. This is a joint 
resolution drawing on language that already passed the House of 
Representatives last week, and it requires the President to answer 21 
questions critical to determining whether engagement in Libya is in the 
vital national interest of the United States.
  This joint resolution further expresses the sense of Congress that 
the President should request authorization from Congress for the 
continuation of U.S. involvement in ongoing NATO activities in Libya.

[[Page S3620]]

  It says Congress should fully debate and consider such a request in 
an expedient manner. I can't imagine there is anybody in this body who 
would not like to debate this issue on the floor, regardless of how 
they may feel about this conflict. We owe it to every man and woman who 
puts on a uniform to serve our country and to every taxpayer who funds 
the operation to be clear that our entry into any conflict has been 
thoughtfully considered, contains clear justification, a clear mission, 
and a clear debate of the risks and benefits. The information sought by 
this joint resolution will help us meet those obligations.
  I look forward to the Senate considering this joint resolution in the 
near future--hopefully next week.

                          ____________________