[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 82 (Wednesday, June 8, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3615-S3620]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. BINGAMAN (for himself and Ms. Murkowski):
S. 1160. A bill to improve the administration of the Department of
Energy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Department of
Energy Administrative Improvement Act of 2011. The bill makes several
improvements to the way the Department of Energy, DOE, conducts its
business and in doing so is designed to give taxpayers a better return
on their investments in DOE programs. Senator Murkowski, who is the
ranking member of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, is a
cosponsor of this bill. These provisions were taken from the energy
bill, S. 1462, reported out of the Energy and Natural Resources
Committee last Congress. The provisions in this bill were adopted
unanimously in the last Congress by members of the Committee as part of
our work on S. 1462. Let me briefly highlight the sections of this
bill.
Section 3 was taken from the recommendations of a 2009 report by the
National Academy of Public Administration, which reviewed the business
practices of the Department. Similar to the Department of Defense, it
requires DOE to submit a 5-year budget profile for its programs with
the DOE's annual budget submission to Congress. A 5-year estimate will
encourage the Department to think about long-term budget implications
of programs rather than on a year-to-year basis.
Section 4 replaces a provision enacted into law in the section 1007
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 7256(g), relating to Other
Transactions Authority. Section 1007 was based on
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the similar authority applying to the Department of Defense. Section 4
is a fresh re-write of the authority so it is organic within the
Department of Energy Organization Act and not the Department of
Defense's authorities. The language is largely the same in content as
that in section 1007 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The DOE went
through an extensive comment period in developing rules for the use of
this authority after it was enacted into law in 2005 to ensure
transparency in its development and use. This section still contains
reporting requirements to Congress on the use of this authority to
ensure effective oversight. The Advanced Research Projects Agency--
Energy has used this authority to initiate projects with energy
companies that were not traditional government contractors and I
believe this is a sound addition to the contracting authorities
available to the Department.
Section 5 permits the DOE to designate and protect proprietary data
for a period of 5 years for transactions entered into by the
Department. Section 3001 of Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. 13541,
contained various provisions to protect results from industry
partnerships with the Department of Energy. The 1992 data protection
provision was carried forward implicitly in section 1005 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 16395. This section gives the Secretary
of Energy explicit authority to protect proprietary data in order to
promote commercialization of new technology arising from the public-
private partnerships in such areas as energy storage, smart grid and
advanced nuclear technologies.
Section 6 gives the Department direct hire authority for a period of
two years consistent with merit principles and public notice. Similar
authority, known as excepted personnel authority, originally was
available to the DOE's predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy
Commission. That authority transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NRC, but not the DOE. Interestingly, the NRC with its large
scientific and engineering workforce has been rated as one of the best
places to work in the federal government. While flexible personnel
authorities are not singularly determinative of agency performance, I
believe this pilot program will be an important tool for the Department
to attract the best and brightest engineers, scientists and specialized
technical personnel to work on its wide array of missions.
Section 7 gives the DOE critical pay authority to hire up to 40
highly skilled individuals for key or critical mission positions at the
Department, for a period of up to 4 years. This will enable DOE to
attract highly qualified individuals from industry and academia for
positions within the Department typical of its complicated science and
engineering missions.
Section 8 gives the DOE the authority to rehire retired DOE employees
for mission-critical positions without impacting their retirement
annuity. Many Department employees served in excess of 20 or 30 years
in programmatic positions managing large, technically complicated
projects. This authority will enable continuity of knowledge transfer
as newer employees are hired.
Section 9 updates the list of DOE National Laboratories in section 2
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 15801(3) to reflect the
name change of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center to ``SLAC
National Accelerator Laboratory''.
The Department of Energy has one of the most technical and
complicated missions in the Federal Government, which includes managing
our Nation's nuclear stockpile, basic and applied energy research,
environmental cleanup of former cold war nuclear weapons production
sites, and finally the management of large contracts spanning decades.
I hope that these provisions will be helpful to the Department to
efficiently conduct its missions.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 1160
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Energy
Administrative Improvement Act of 2011''.
SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF SECRETARY.
In this Act, the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of
Energy.
SEC. 3. FUTURE-YEARS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Part C of title VI of the Department of
Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7251 et seq.) is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``SEC. 664. FUTURE-YEARS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROGRAM.
``(a) In General.--At or about the time the budget of the
President is submitted to Congress for each year under
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the
Secretary shall submit to Congress a future-years Department
of Energy program (including associated annexes) reflecting
the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations
included in the budget.
``(b) Fiscal Year.--Any future-years Department of Energy
program submitted under subsection (a) shall cover--
``(1) the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is
submitted; and
``(2) at least the 4 succeeding fiscal years.
``(c) Consistent Amounts.--
``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall ensure that amounts
described in paragraph (2)(A) for any fiscal year are
consistent with amounts described in paragraph (2)(B) for
that fiscal year.
``(2) Amounts.--Amounts referred to in paragraph (1) are
the following:
``(A) The amounts specified in program and budget
information submitted to Congress by the Secretary in support
of expenditure estimates and proposed appropriations in the
budget submitted to Congress by the President under section
1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for any fiscal year,
as indicated in the future-years Department of Energy program
submitted pursuant to subsection (a).
``(B) The total amounts of estimated expenditures and
proposed appropriations necessary to support the programs,
projects, and activities of the Department of Energy included
pursuant to section 1105(a)(5) of title 31, United States
Code, in the budget submitted to Congress under that section
for any fiscal year.
``(d) Management Contingencies.--Subject to subsection (c),
nothing in this section prohibit the inclusion in the future-
years Department of Energy programs of amounts for management
contingencies.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of the Department of Energy Organization Act
(42 U.S.C. 7101) is amended by adding at the end of the items
relating to part C of title VI the following:
``Sec. 664. Future-years Department of Energy program.''.
SEC. 4. OTHER TRANSACTIONS AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Section 646 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7256) is amended by striking
subsection (g) and inserting the following:
``(g) Authority to Enter Into Other Transactions.--
``(1) In general.--In addition to any other authority
granted to the Secretary to enter into procurement contracts,
leases, cooperative agreements, grants, and certain
arrangements, the Secretary may enter into other transactions
with public agencies, private organizations, or other persons
on such terms as the Secretary considers appropriate to
further functions vested in the Secretary, including
research, development, or demonstration projects.
``(2) Advance payments.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Secretary may exercise authority
provided under paragraph (1) without regard to section 3324
of title 31, United States Code.
``(3) Relationship to other law.--The authority of the
Secretary under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to--
``(A) section 9 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research
and Development Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5908); or
``(B) section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2182).
``(4) Protection of certain information from disclosure.--
``(A) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, disclosure of information described in subparagraph (B)
is not required, and may not be compelled, under section 552
of title 5, United States Code, during the 5-year period
beginning on the date on which the information is received by
the Department.
``(B) Award information.--The information described in this
subparagraph is information in the records of the Department
that--
``(i) was submitted--
``(I) to the Department as part of a competitive or
noncompetitive process with the potential to result in an
award to the person submitting the information; and
``(II) in conjunction with a transaction entered into by
the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1); and
``(ii) is--
``(I) a proposal, proposal abstract, and supporting
documents;
``(II) a business plan submitted on a confidential basis;
or
``(III) technical information submitted on a confidential
basis.
``(5) Requirements.--
``(A) Selection procedures.--In entering into transactions
under paragraph (1), the
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Secretary shall use such competitive, merit-based selection
procedures as the Secretary determines in writing to be
practicable.
``(B) Determination.--Before entering into a transaction
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall determine in writing
that the use of a standard contract, grant, or cooperative
agreement for the project is not feasible or appropriate.
``(C) Cost sharing.--A transaction under paragraph (1)
shall be subject to cost sharing in accordance with section
988 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 16352).
``(D) Limitation on delegation.--The authority of the
Secretary under this subsection may be delegated only to an
officer of the Department who is appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and may not
be redelegated to any other person.
``(6) Annual reports.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of enactment of the Department of Energy Administrative
Improvement Act of 2011 and annually thereafter, the
Secretary shall submit to Congress an annual report on the
transactions entered into by the Secretary pursuant to the
authorities provided under this subsection.
``(7) Report.--
``(A) Definition of nontraditional government contractor.--
In this paragraph, the term `nontraditional Government
contractor' has the meaning given the term `nontraditional
defense contractor' in section 845(f) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160;
10 U.S.C. 2371 note).
``(B) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of
enactment of this subparagraph, and 2 years thereafter, the
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to
Congress a report describing--
``(i) the use by the Department of authorities under this
section, including the ability to attract nontraditional
Government contractors; and
``(ii) whether additional safeguards are necessary to carry
out the authorities.''.
(b) Implementation.--
(1) In general.--The final rule of the Department of Energy
entitled ``Assistance Regulations'' (71 Fed. Reg. 27158 (May
9, 2006)) shall be applicable to transactions under section
646 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C.
7256) (as amended by subsection (a)).
(2) Regulations.--The Secretary may revise, supplement, or
replace such regulations as the Secretary determines
necessary to implement the amendment made by subsection (a).
SEC. 5. PROTECTION OF RESULTS.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b) and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, during a period
of not more than 5 years after the development of information
in any transaction authorized to be entered into by the
Department of Energy, the Secretary may provide appropriate
protections against the dissemination of the information,
including exemption from subchapter II of chapter 5 of title
5, United States Code.
(b) Applicable Information.--This section applies to
information that--
(1) results from a transaction entered into by the
Secretary pursuant to this title or an amendment made by this
title; and
(2) is of a character that would be protected from
disclosure under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States
Code, if the information had been obtained from a person
other than an agent or employee of the Federal Government.
SEC. 6. DIRECT HIRE AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding sections 3304 and 3309
through 3318 of title 5, United States Code, the Secretary
may, upon a determination that there is a severe shortage of
candidates or a critical hiring need for particular
positions, recruit and directly appoint highly qualified
scientists, engineers, or critical technical personnel into
the competitive service.
(b) Exception.--The authority granted under subsection (a)
shall not apply to positions in the excepted service or the
Senior Executive Service.
(c) Requirements.--In exercising the authority granted
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall ensure that any
action taken by the Secretary--
(1) is consistent with the merit principles of section 2301
of title 5, United States Code; and
(2) complies with the public notice requirements of section
3327 of title 5, United States Code.
(d) Termination of Effectiveness.--The authority provided
by this section terminates effective on the date that is 2
years after the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 7. CRITICAL PAY AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding section 5377 of title 5,
United States Code, and without regard to the provisions of
that title governing appointments in the competitive service
or the Senior Executive Service and chapters 51 and 53 of
that title (relating to classification and pay rates), the
Secretary may establish, fix the compensation of, and appoint
individuals to critical positions needed to carry out the
functions of the Department of Energy, if the Secretary
certifies that--
(1) the positions--
(A) require expertise of an extremely high level in a
scientific or technical field; and
(B) the Department of Energy would not successfully
accomplish an important mission without such an individual;
and
(2) exercise of the authority is necessary to recruit an
individual exceptionally well qualified for the position.
(b) Limitations.--The authority granted under subsection
(a) shall be subject to the following conditions:
(1) The number of critical positions authorized by
subsection (a) may not exceed 40 at any 1 time in the
Department of Energy.
(2) The term of an appointment under subsection (a) may not
exceed 4 years.
(3) An individual appointed under subsection (a) may not
have been a Department of Energy employee within the 2 years
prior to the date of appointment.
(4) Total annual compensation for any individual appointed
under subsection (a) may not exceed the highest total annual
compensation payable at the rate determined under section 104
of title 3, United States Code.
(5) An individual appointed under subsection (a) may not be
considered to be an employee for purposes of subchapter II of
chapter 75 of title 5, United States Code.
(c) Notification.--Each year, the Secretary shall submit to
Congress a notification that lists each individual appointed
under this section.
SEC. 8. REEMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN RETIREES.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding part 553 of title 5, Code
of Federal Regulations (relating to reemployment of civilian
retirees to meet exceptional employment needs), or successor
regulations, the Secretary may approve the reemployment of an
individual to a particular position without reduction or
termination of annuity if the hiring of the individual is
necessary to carry out a critical function of the Department
of Energy for which the Department has encountered
exceptional difficulty in recruiting or retaining suitably
qualified candidates.
(b) Limitations.--An annuitant hired with full salary and
annuities under the authority granted by subsection (a)--
(1) shall not be considered an employee for purposes of
subchapter III of chapter 83 and chapter 84 of title 5,
United States Code;
(2) may not elect to have retirement contributions withheld
from the pay of the annuitant;
(3) may not use any employment under this section as a
basis for a supplemental or recomputed annuity; and
(4) may not participate in the Thrift Savings Plan under
subchapter III of chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code.
(c) Limitation on Term.--The term of employment of any
individual hired under subsection (a) may not exceed an
initial term of 2 years, with an additional 2-year
appointment under exceptional circumstances.
SEC. 9. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL LABORATORY.
Section 2(3) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C.
15801(3)) is amended by striking subparagraph (P) and
inserting the following:
``(P) SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory.''.
______
By Mr. WEBB (for himself and Mr. Corker):
S.J. Res. 18. A joint resolution prohibiting the deployment,
establishment, or maintenance of a presence of units and members of the
United States Armed Forces on the ground in Libya, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I am pleased to come to the Senate floor,
along with my colleague, Senator Corker, a fellow member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, to speak about a joint resolution we are
introducing today that deals with the situation in Libya.
This is introduced as a joint resolution rather than as an amendment
on the current legislation because I believe this matter is serious
enough that our body should actually consider this as a stand-alone
piece of legislation and coordinate it with the House and get this
passed with due speed.
This resolution, first of all, contains a statement of policy that
American Armed Forces should be used exclusively to defend and advance
our national security interests.
Second, it prohibits the deployment, establishment, or maintenance of
ground troops in Libya, with two notable exceptions. The first would be
for the purpose of the immediate personal defense of American
Government officials, including diplomatic representatives, which I
believe would be an important exclusion once and if we decide to
conduct negotiations or reestablish our Embassy inside Libya. The other
exception would be for the purpose of rescuing members of our Armed
Forces who would be in Libya and would be under imminent danger.
It also prohibits the awarding of a contract to private security
contractors to conduct, establish, or maintain any activities on the
ground in Libya.
This language in section 2 is similar to language that passed the
House last week with a vote of 416 to 5.
Section 3 includes a sense of Congress that the President should
request congressional authorization for the continuation of American
involvement in
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ongoing activities in Libya, and that the Congress, in its
constitutional role, should debate and consider this matter
expeditiously.
Sections 4 and 5 require the transmission of information to the
Congress on a wide variety of information that, to this point, we have
not been properly included on. That language, in some form, passed the
House last Friday with a vote of 268 to 145.
Again, I appreciate very much Senator Corker joining me as the
principal cosponsor of this joint resolution.
I would like to explain why I believe it is important we take this
measure as a body, as a Congress, in response to the actions the
President took in Libya nearly 3 months ago.
First, we know, and we are reminded every day, that our economy is
going through a terrible crisis, even as we are expending hundreds of
billions of dollars every year on wars in the most vitriolic and
contentious parts of the world.
Second, our military has been engaged in continuous combat operations
for nearly 10 years. We still have 45,000 military members in Iraq
despite a stated commitment for a full withdrawal by the end of this
year. We have about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, and the prospect for
a meaningful withdrawal in the short term does not look good.
When we examine the conditions under which the President ordered our
military into action in Libya, we are faced, in my view, with the
prospect of a very troubling, if not downright odd, historical
precedent that has the potential to haunt us for decades.
The issue in play is not simply whether the President should ask the
Congress for a declaration of war, nor is it wholly about whether the
President has violated the edicts of the War Powers Act, which, in my
view, he clearly has. The issue for us to consider is whether a
President--any President--can unilaterally begin, and continue, a
military campaign for reasons that he alone defines as meeting the
demanding standards of a vital national interest worthy of risking
American lives and expending billions of dollars of our taxpayers'
money.
What was the standard in this case? The initial justification was
that a dictator might retaliate against people who rebelled against
him. I do not make light of the potential tragedy involved in such a
possibility, although it should be pointed out that there are a lot of
dictators in this world and very few democracies in this particular
region, which gives this standard a pretty broad base if a President
decides to use it again. Then, predictably, once military operations
began in Libya, the stated goal became regime change, with combat now
having dragged on for nearly 3 months.
So in a world filled with cruelty, the question becomes whether a
President--any President--should be able to pick and choose when and
where to use military force using such a vague standard. Actually that
is the most important question. Given our system of government, who
should decide? Even if a President should unilaterally decide on the
basis of overwhelming, vital national interests that requires immediate
action, how long should that decision be honored, and to what lengths
should our military go before the matter is able to come under the
proper scrutiny and boundaries of our Congress?
Let's review the bidding. What did it look like when our President
ordered our military into action in Libya, and what has happened since?
Was our country under attack or under the threat of an imminent attack?
Was a clearly vital national interest at stake? Were we invoking the
inherent right of self-defense as outlined in the United Nations
charter? Were we called upon by treaty commitments to come to the aid
of an ally? Were we responding in kind to an attack on our forces
elsewhere as we did in the 1986 raids in Libya when I was in the
Pentagon, after American soldiers had been killed in a disco in Berlin?
Were we rescuing Americans in distress as we did in Grenada in 1983?
No, we were not.
The President followed no clear historical standard when he
unilaterally decided to use force in Libya. Once this action continued
beyond his original definition of ``days, not weeks,'' he did not seek
the approval of Congress. While he has discussed this matter with some
Members of Congress, he has not formally conferred with the legislative
branch.
I believe it is appropriate to question on whose behalf this
continuing action is being taken, and, most importantly at this point,
what is going to be asked of our military in the coming months,
assuming the Qadhafi regime does fall? This is not even a civil war.
As Secretary of Defense Gates commented to me when I asked him that
question during a hearing on the Armed Services Committee recently: You
don't have a civil war when there is no clearly formed opposition
movement. It has been a random rebellion. We can empathize with the
frustrations of this rebellion, but looking into the future, the only
thing the opponents of the present regime all seem to agree on is that
Qadhafi should go.
As I have said repeatedly over the past few months, this matters
greatly when one considers what the aftermath of this action could
entail for the international community.
An additional curiosity is that we still recognize this regime even
as we have been participating for nearly 3 months in actions designed
to destroy it. I have raised this matter repeatedly with our State
Department. We have not severed relations with this regime, nor have we
recognized a successor regime. We have merely suspended our relations.
So we are looking at something of a historical anomaly. We are
participating in attacks on a regime that we recognize, on behalf of
rebel forces that are so amorphous that we don't, and we really do not
know what is going to replace the regime that we recognize once it is
gone.
Obviously, I am not raising these points out of any lasting love for
Mr. Qadhafi or any hopes that he continues in his present position. But
let's be very clear. This is a region rife with tribalism, fierce
loyalties, and brutal retaliation. In this part of the world the lust
for revenge upon those who try to destroy you is not a characteristic
that is unique to Mr. Qadhafi. Whether Qadhafi stays or falls, that is
very likely going to be the future at some level in Libya, and this is
not a place for American troops to be sent in order to sort out this
mess. If other nations decide to do so, I certainly have no objection.
But our military is stretched too thin, our economy is too fragile, and
the reasons for us to continue in this effort are too ill-defined.
So it is important for the Congress to step in and to clearly define
the boundaries of our involvement. We should be saying without
hesitation that no American ground personnel should be introduced into
Libya, now or in the future. We should also be insisting on fair and
open communication from this administration to the Congress rather than
the stonewalling that has characterized the past 3 months.
This is not a political issue for me. Rather, it is an issue of how
our government is structured. I would submit that this issue has
historical consequences. Our three branches of government were
carefully designed by the Founding Fathers to guard against hasty
decisions or judgments that would not be fully in our national
interest. For centuries, the English monarchs had been able to wage
wars of choice, with the only restriction being whether Parliament
would raise enough taxes to fund their adventurous armies. Our Founding
Fathers said no. The Framers of the Constitution deliberately gave the
Congress the specific power to rein in such conduct and to protect our
people from unwise choices by insisting on a democratic consensus.
The structure of international relations has become much more complex
since then, but the principle is still vital, and it still must hold.
Over the past 10 years, in pursuit of a workable formula with which
to defend our Nation against legitimate threats, we have allowed the
balance of power in our constitutional system to tilt far too heavily
to the executive branch. There could be no clearer example of why the
Congress must finally say ``enough is enough'' than the situation we
now face in Libya. We must clearly say, as a governing body, that there
are boundaries on the conduct of a President--any President--when it
comes to his or her unilateral decision to use military force. We
should be clear that American military forces--in uniform or not--do
not belong on the ground in Libya.
[[Page S3619]]
We should make it clear that we will not be deterred in requests for
information that allow us to perform our responsibilities. To do less
than that would bring us back in time, to a system of government our
forefathers risked their lives to improve upon. We are not the
Parliament of King Charles. I believe my fellow Members would agree
that our role as a legislative body is more than that of collecting
taxes so that the President--any President--can raise armies and fight
wars of his own choosing. And that is why I am asking every Senator to
support this legislation.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the distinguished
Senator from Virginia, the former Secretary of the Navy, in the
introduction of this joint resolution, along with Senator Lee from
Utah. I look forward to a debate of this resolution next week which I
hope will end up passing both bodies and which calls for a number of
answers we have been requesting to come forth.
I wish to discuss the ongoing situation in Libya where--specifically
U.S. participation in NATO military operations authorized by the United
Nations' Security Council resolution passed on March 17, 2011. For
those of you listening, you heard me correctly. It was authorized by
the United Nations, not the U.S. Congress. We are spending roughly $2
million per day on a mission on which the President has yet to broadly
consult Congress.
I find it unbelievable that the President would seek the approval of
the United Nations and the Arab League for military operations over
Libya while sidelining the body that speaks for the American people,
not even answering our questions. This is not consultation, nor is the
President heeding the concerns of his own constituents.
For many weeks now, I and many colleagues, for that matter, have
attempted to gain answers to some of the most basic questions about
what we are doing in Libya. Through hearings in the Foreign Relations
Committee, we have not received these answers. We have asked for
specific witnesses and received no response. This is not consultation.
In my ongoing attempts to receive answers to these questions, I sent
a letter to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates on April 14, 2011,
specifically outlining five questions. I have the letter here and ask
unanimous consent to have this letter printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, April 14, 2011.
Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.
Hon. Robert M. Gates,
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington,
DC.
Dear Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates: It has now been
nearly one month since the United States first engaged in
coalition operations in Libya. Since that time, there has
been relatively infrequent information sharing with the
Congress regarding the full scope of U.S. involvement in the
conflict. Administration officials have assured Congress that
the United States was playing only a supporting role in
ongoing operations in Libya, and those operations did not
include kinetic operations. Yesterday, April 13, 2011, it was
revealed during a Pentagon briefing that three U.S. aircraft
assigned to NATO had fired ordnance. This seems contradictory
to the information we have previously received and is an
example of the disconnect between Congress and the
administration on the nature of the U.S. role in Libya. To
that end, I ask that you provide the following:
(1) A full accounting of U.S. assets assigned to the
mission and how they are being utilized.
(2) Requests the U.S. has received from coalition partners
and Libyan opposition forces for materiel and support--both
fulfilled and denied.
(3) The contents of additional U.S. offers of assistance.
(4) Plans to offer additional assistance to Libyan
opposition forces.
(5) All meetings that the administration has engaged in
with coalition partners, the Libya contact group and the
Libyan opposition forces to discuss the operations and
political future of Libya.
I thank you for your service to our country, and I look
forward to your prompt reply to my request.
Sincerely,
Bob Corker,
U.S. Senator.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, today, 1 day shy of 8 weeks later, I
finally received a response. This response did not come from Secretary
Clinton. It did not come from Secretary Gates. This response came from
the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs and
only paid lipservice to one of my five specific requests for
information.
I ask unanimous consent to have this ``nonresponse'' printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, June 6, 2011.
Hon. Bob Corker,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Senator Corker: Thank you for your letter of April 14
regarding the State Department's effort to assist the
coalition and support the people of Libya. The past three
months have demonstrated Colonel Qadhafi's unrelenting
efforts to kill those who wish to instill democracy in Libya
and the use of barbarous, indiscriminant bombing of cities
and vital civilian infrastructure. These acts further
delegitimize Qadhafi as a leader of the Libyan people.
The State Department is working to ensure the coalition
remains united behind the goal of protecting the people of
Libya. We continue to work closely with coalition and
regional governments to isolate Qadhafi and create support
for the opposition. This effort includes the termination of
diplomatic status for Libyan diplomats still supporting the
regime and the freezing of all regime assets. As the
situation evolves, we continue to evaluate further options to
increase pressure on Qadhafi to step down. We are also
considering options to provide the opposition the financial
wherewithal it needs to support itself.
Along with looking at multiple ways to increase pressure on
the Qadhafi regime, the State Department is looking at better
ways to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in
conflict areas. We are assessing options for assistance we
could provide to the Libyan people and are consulting
directly with the opposition and our international partners.
Some aid has been identified; the President directed up to
$25 million in non-lethal items from U.S. government stocks,
including medical supplies, uniforms, boots, tents, personal
protective gear, and prepackaged rations.
We continue working with the international community to
determine the best way to support the Transitional National
Council (TNC) in meeting its financial needs. The May 5 Libya
Contact Group meeting in Rome endorsed the creation of a
Temporary Financial Mechanism, which will help facilitate and
coordinate financial assistance. Additionally, the United
States is providing $53.5 million in humanitarian assistance
to support people affected by the crisis.
Chris Stevens, U.S. Envoy to the TNC, remains in Benghazi
and continues to hold productive meetings with high-level
members of the TNC. In addition to Secretary Clinton's
meetings with TNC leadership, Mr. Stevens regularly meets
with senior TNC leaders to better understand the steps they
are undertaking to build a democracy based on universal
principles of respect for human rights and rule of law. While
we are working closely with the TNC, we also continue to meet
with a broad spectrum of Libyans involved in the opposition
writ large.
Thank you again for your interest and support for Libya.
Please do not hesitate to contact us again if we can be of
further assistance on this or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Joseph E. MacManus,
Acting Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, this is unacceptable. This is an
unacceptable way to treat a coequal branch of the U.S. Government that
is granted certain responsibilities to our Armed Forces by the Founders
of our country. Without these answers, Members of Congress are unable
to assess critical questions and debate whether we should continue to
engage in military operations in Libya.
That is why I am pleased to join my colleagues, Senator Webb and
Senator Lee, in introducing S.J. Res. 18 today. This is a joint
resolution drawing on language that already passed the House of
Representatives last week, and it requires the President to answer 21
questions critical to determining whether engagement in Libya is in the
vital national interest of the United States.
This joint resolution further expresses the sense of Congress that
the President should request authorization from Congress for the
continuation of U.S. involvement in ongoing NATO activities in Libya.
[[Page S3620]]
It says Congress should fully debate and consider such a request in
an expedient manner. I can't imagine there is anybody in this body who
would not like to debate this issue on the floor, regardless of how
they may feel about this conflict. We owe it to every man and woman who
puts on a uniform to serve our country and to every taxpayer who funds
the operation to be clear that our entry into any conflict has been
thoughtfully considered, contains clear justification, a clear mission,
and a clear debate of the risks and benefits. The information sought by
this joint resolution will help us meet those obligations.
I look forward to the Senate considering this joint resolution in the
near future--hopefully next week.
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