[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 80 (Monday, June 6, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3482-S3485]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEW START TREATY
Mr. KYL. The other subject I would like to address today is news on a
totally different front, but it is a subject that will be familiar to
us from last December when the Senate argued the New START treaty and
ultimately passed it. I am going to speak primarily about questions of
missile defense cooperation with Russia, which was a big part of that
discussion.
I wanted to first call attention to the fact that the Department of
State released a fact sheet last Wednesday. It was entitled ``New START
Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offense Arms''--a long title. But
the statement from the State Department confirmed what we had argued
during the time of this START debate and what I thought was pretty
widely understood at the time, despite administration protestations to
the contrary; namely that the New START treaty is perhaps the first
bilateral treaty that resulted in U.S. unilateral reductions in nuclear
forces.
As this fact sheet makes clear, Russia was already below the deployed
strategic forces and deployed delivery vehicle limits of the treaty
when we ratified the treaty. This is something we tried to point out.
We said this is not a two-way street. Russia has already reduced its
weapons below the levels called for in the treaty. The only country
that will have to reduce levels from what currently exists is the
United States. Now this information is confirmed by the State
Department. Even the Arms Control Association recognized this when it
posted on its blog recently, on June 1:
Why has Russia already met its obligations? Because Moscow
was in the process of retiring older strategic missiles while
the treaty was under negotiation.
Exactly correct. This fact should not be overlooked, especially not
as the administration undertakes a review of the nuclear deployment
guidance and targeting and deterrence doctrines, which are designed, or
so the administration claims, to be ``preparations for the next round
of nuclear reductions.'' That is according to the President's National
Security Adviser.
I worry that the next round may also be a unilateral round where the
United States makes all of the concessions, as occurred under the New
START treaty.
According to Gary Samore of the national security staff, at an Arms
Control Association Conference, he said
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these may be ``unilateral steps that the U.S. could take.''
Obviously, that is something we would be concerned about if we are
making unilateral concessions while the Russians make none. He made one
other point at the Arms Control Association. He said:
We've reached the level in our forces where further
reductions will raise questions about whether we retain the
triad or whether we go to a system that is only a dyad. Those
are important considerations. Reductions below the level that
we have now are going to require some more fundamental
questions about force structure.
When we speak of the triad or the dyad, remember the triad is the
system we have had all throughout the Cold War that relies on a
combination of ICBMs on land, submarine-based missiles at sea, and a
bomber force that can deliver weapons from the air.
As Mr. Samore points out, if we reduce our weapons levels even
further, we will probably reach a point where instead of all three
systems, we will only have two. So I think it is clear we have reached
a breaking point where further reductions will require significant
changes to the U.S. nuclear deterrent and could presumably alter the
commitments that the administration made to the Senate as to the
modernization of deterrent.
During our debate on the START treaty, there were a lot of promises
made about how we were going to retain the triad, and we were not going
to eliminate further strategic weapons. Now those matters seem to be in
doubt, and this is why, one of the reasons why, 41 Senators wrote to
the President on March 22 and asked that the Senate be consulted about
any further changes that the administration may choose to embark upon.
And I want to be clear, it is a choice. There is no compelling
justification to change the current U.S. nuclear posture. So this would
be something the administration would be doing on its own.
But I am concerned that in the National Security Adviser's letter--
responding to ours--on May 31 there was no reference to how the
administration intended to keep the Senate involved as this process
goes forward. I think it makes all the more clear the need to pass S.
1097, the New START Implementation Act, which provides, as one of its
provisions, for the Congress to be consulted before any changes are
made to the nuclear guidance.
I also look forward to an opportunity to discuss these matters with
the President's nominee for Secretary of Defense, Mr. Leon Panetta. I
will be curious to learn if he agrees with the 10-year commitments made
to the Senate last year regarding the modernization of the nuclear
deterrent, if he agrees with General Chilton who told the Senate that
current levels of nuclear forces are exactly what is needed for
deterrence, and also whether he agrees with Secretary Gates' recent
comments at the American Enterprise Institute that nuclear
modernization programs are absolutely critical.
So it was on the basis of the administration's commitments to our
nuclear modernization program that some Senators agreed to support or
to ratify the New START treaty.
Let me turn now to the question of missile defense. During the
consideration of the New START treaty, many of us made the fundamental
point that with respect to missile defense, there was no meeting of the
minds between Russia and the United States.
While the administration insisted that there were no restrictions on
missile defense, either legal or otherwise, the Russian side believed
that ``the linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the
accord and is legally binding.'' That was noted by Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov on April 6 of last year.
Of course, the administration was never willing to share with the
Senate the negotiating record that the Russian negotiators obviously
were aware of. Sharing the record with us might have cleared up just
what understandings the Russians think they received during the
negotiation of the treaty.
In order to secure Russian support for the New START treaty and
assuage their misplaced concern about U.S. missile defense activities,
the administration initiated talks with Russia to find common ground on
missile defense cooperation, and it cancelled a third site deployment
in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Or, as Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher characterized the
purpose of missile defense cooperation in a speech of May 19, 2010:
``to turn what has been an irritant to U.S.-Russian relations into a
shared interest.''
Although administration officials might deny this, I believe Russian
officials were under the impression that in return for Russian support
for New START, the United States would provide Russia not only the
opportunity for missile defense technical cooperation, but that Russia
would also play a role in defining future U.S. and NATO missile defense
plans. Thus, President Medvedev told the Russian General Assembly in
December 2010:
I'd like to speak plainly about the choice we face in the
next ten years: either we reach an agreement on missile
defense and create a meaningful joint mechanism for
cooperation, or if we fail to do so, a new round of the arms
race will begin and we will have to make decisions on the
deployment of new strike weapons.
As it turns out, we didn't have long to wait until the Russians
threatened this ``choice.'' In response to the recently concluded U.S.
and Romanian agreement to base SM-3 block TB missiles in Romania in
2015, President Medvedev has again threatened the U.S. and NATO with an
arms race if these planned deployments go forward.
On May 18, 2011, President Medvedev told a gathering of journalists
in Moscow that ``if we don't [forge a missile defense cooperation
model], we will have to take retaliatory measures, which we do not want
to have to do. This will mean forcing the development of our strike
nuclear potential.
Medvedev went on to reiterate a warning issued by the Foreign
Ministry that Moscow may pull out of the new START disarmament
agreement in response to the United States' position on missile
defense.
This is precisely what many of us predicted would happen if we
ratified the New START treaty in December. I didn't think it would
happen quite so quickly.
This point was reiterated by President Medvedev following the recent
G-8 summit in Deauville, France when he said, ``We're wasting time . .
. if we do not reach agreement by 2020, a new arms race will begin . .
. I would like my partners to bear this in mind constantly.''
The Russians are of one point of mind at the top of their leadership.
They are threatening a new arms race. What they mean by that is, the
United States reduces our capability to defend against missiles that
could theoretically come from Russia.
Is this the reset in relationships the administration promised? Did
they manage to reset our relationship right back to the dark days of
the Cold War?
It appears from the comments of the President of the Russian
Federation that this is precisely what happened.
The Russian Foreign Minister has further said Russia needed ``legal
assurances,'' that the proposed U.S. missile defense deployments were
not aimed at Russian territory.
Presumably, even the administration would agree no such ``legal
assurance'' can be made.
But, then again, could the administration include such an assurance
in the Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement, MDCA, or the Defense
Technology Cooperation Agreement, DTCA, the administration is
discussing with the Russian Federation?
Again, no Senator nor Senate staffer has been able to see the
document that the administration has shared with Russian counterparts.
So, we are left to wonder.
Here we are, and the Senate, being part of the American Government,
isn't even privy to what our administration is talking to the Russians
about--matters on which eventually the administration is likely to seek
our consent to. Remember, the Constitution provides for Senate advice
and consent. What I have said before is if the Senate is to give its
consent, we need an opportunity to provide some advice before the
administration negotiates its agreements with Russia.
Why not share these documents with the Senate--and the House--and
remove any cause for concern, if, in fact, there is none?
I also note Russian President Medvedev has sent a letter to the
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NATO-Russia Counsel outlining Moscow's position on a common missile
defense system--which differs significantly from NATO's conception of
two independently operated missile defense systems sharing some form of
early warning data. These are two very different things.
And, it is not as if Members of Congress have been ambiguous about
our concerns.
Following a 14 April letter to the President signed by 39 Senators, 4
Senators met with Senior Defense and State Department officials on May
15 to again express our concerns about sharing sensitive missile
defense technical and sensor data with the Russians, and to better
understand the content and legal authority of the draft Defense
Technology Cooperation Agreement and Missile Defense Cooperation
Agreement being discussed with the Russians.
Moreover, the House Armed Services Committee just incorporated the
New START Implementation Act into its version of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as well as the amendment
offered by Representative Brooks that will prohibit the sharing of
sensitive missile defense technology and data.
How will the United States and NATO respond to this latest Russian
intimidation?
Will NATO alter its plans to accommodate the Russian objective of a
``sectoral'' defense system?
Will the United States and NATO curtail deployment of phases III and
IV of the European Phased Adaptive Approach? Phase IV is, of course,
still just a paper missile, not something we developed, but it is part
of our ultimate plan.
Will the United States agree to share sensitive information or
technology with Russia for the sake of a missile defense agreement?
The administration informs us that these Russian threats are mere
rhetoric, associated more with the upcoming presidential elections in
Russia than with any true threats. And that Russia will not pull out of
New START or begin a new arms race in response to U.S. missile defense
plans. The administration assures us the United States will not alter
its missile defense plans to accommodate Russian concerns.
Nevertheless, the Congress needs better insight into administration
plans for missile defense cooperation and missile defense talks with
Russia than has thus far been the case.
At the very outset, the administration created a separate venue from
New START to discuss missile defense cooperation with Russia--this was
the so-called Tauscher-Ryabkov track; despite repeated inquiries from
Congress, the administration still refuses to provide meaningful
details about the nature of these discussions.
Likewise, we are interested to know where the administration will
recommend basing a new missile defense early-warning radar, called a
TPY-2 radar. Will it put the radar in the Caucasus, as the Bush
administration planned to do, or will it seek instead to base the radar
in a location less advantageous to the missile defense of the United
States homeland, but more acceptable to the Russians--even if that
means that an ally like Israel will be denied access to the data
generated, by the radar, as Turkey has said it requires?
To this end, and as I referenced earlier, 39 Senators sent a letter
to the President on April 14 to inquire whether, contrary to the
President's December 18, 2010 letter, we will make our missile defense
decisions ``regardless of Russia's actions.''
The letter expresses serious concerns about reports the
administration may provide Russia with access to sensitive satellite
data and U.S. hit-to-kill missile defense technology, and urges the
administration to share with Congress the materials on U.S. missile
defense cooperation that have been provided, or will shortly be
provided, to the Russian government. We still await these materials.
Lastly, the administration owes Senators information about what
national security staff member Michael McFaul, whom I understand has
been recently nominated by the President to be the U.S. Ambassador to
Russia, meant when he briefed the press on May 26 that ``we got a new
signal on missile defense cooperation that as soon as I'm done here
I'll be engaging on that with the rest of the U.S. government.''
I am concerned that my staff asked the National Security staff about
this almost a week ago and have heard nothing back.
I hope to hear back from the administration soon, especially if the
administration expects the Senate to act promptly on Mr. McFaul's
nomination.
Mr. President I am deeply skeptical about the course the United
States and Russia are on concerning missile defense.
I think it should be abundantly clear that Senators and House Members
will be paying very close attention to the development and deployment
of the European phased adaptive approach to make sure it is done in a
manner consistent with the security of the United States, without
consideration to Russian ``understanding'' of what they think has been
agreed to between the United States and Russia.
I will be working with my House colleagues to ensure that it is very
clear that the United States will accept no limitations on its missile
defenses. But I note, as I said at the outset, it is interesting that
things that were told to us at the time the Senate was debating the New
START agreement have turned out not to be true, just as many of us
predicted, starting with the proposition that the United States would
be drawing our weapons down while Russia would not. It turns out that
is what happened because the Russians were already at the level they
negotiated us down to.
So the question is, What did we get for our unilateral concessions?
It appears to me that the only thing we got is an understanding by
Russia that they are also going to be able to talk us down from our
missile defense plans that could protect both the United States and
allies in Europe or that as an alternative Russians would be part of a
cooperative missile defense program which would, of necessity, require
the sharing of economic data that would be inimical to the U.S.
national interests.
I express these concerns in the hope that we can receive information
from the administration that might allay our concerns, persuade us that
it is not involved right now in negotiations, in effect, behind the
Senate's back, and the best way to assure us is to share the
information with us that we requested in letters we sent previously. I
hope the administration will, next time it asks for our consent, be
able to say it had already asked for our advice because I am afraid, if
it does not, the Senate is much less likely to provide its consent to
any agreements that might be submitted.
Exhibit 1
[From RealClearPolitics.com, June 6, 2011]
Obama Tunes Out, and Business Goes on Hiring Strike
(By Michael Barone)
Last week, I noted that various forms of the word
``unexpected'' almost inevitably appeared in news stories
about unfavorable economic developments.
You can find them again in stories about Friday's shocking
news, that only 54,000 net new jobs were created in the month
of May and that unemployment rose to 9.1 percent.
But with news that bad, maybe bad economic numbers will no
longer be ``unexpected.'' You can only expect a robust
economic recovery for so long before you figure out, as
Herbert Hoover eventually did, that it is not around the
corner.
Exogenous factors explain some part of the current economic
stagnation. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused a
slowdown in manufacturing. Horrendous tornados did not help.
Nor did bad weather, though only a few still bitterly cling
to the theory that it's caused by manmade global warming.
But poor public policy is surely one reason why the
American economy has not rebounded from recession as it has
in the past. And political posturing has also played a major
role.
Barack Obama and the Democratic congressional
supermajorities of 2009-10 raised federal spending from 21
percent to 25 percent of gross domestic product. Their
stimulus package stopped layoffs of public employees for a
while, even as private sector payrolls plummeted.
And the Obama Democrats piled further burdens on would-be
employers in the private sector. Obamacare and the Dodd-Frank
financial regulation bill are scheduled to be followed by
thousands of regulations that will impose impossible-to-
estimate costs on the economy.
That seems to have led to a hiring freeze. The Obama
Democrats can reasonably claim not to be responsible for the
huge number of layoffs that occurred in the months following
the financial crisis of fall 2008. And
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Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke did manage to help stabilize financial
markets.
But while the number of layoffs is now vastly less than in
the first half of 2009, the number of new hires has not
increased appreciably. Many more people have been unemployed
for longer periods than in previous recessions, and many more
have stopped looking for work altogether.
It's hard to avoid the conclusion that the threat of tax
increases and increased regulatory burdens have produced
something in the nature of a hiring strike.
And then there is the political posturing. On April 13,
Barack Obama delivered a ballyhooed speech at George
Washington University. The man who conservatives as well as
liberal pundits told us was a combination of Edmund Burke and
Reinhold Niebuhr was widely expected to present a serious
plan to address the budget deficits and entitlement spending.
Instead, the man who can call on talented career
professionals at the Office of Management and Budget to
produce detailed blueprints gave us something in the nature
of a few numbers scrawled on a paper napkin.
The man depicted as pragmatic and free of ideological cant
indulged in cheap political rhetoric, accusing Republicans,
including House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, who was
in the audience, of pushing old ladies in wheelchairs down
the hill and starving autistic children.
The signal was clear. Obama had already ignored his own
deficit reduction commission in preparing his annual budget,
which was later rejected 97-0 in the Senate. Now he was
signaling that the time for governing was over and that he
was entering campaign mode 19 months before the November 2012
election.
People took notice, especially those people who decide
whether to hire or not. Goldman Sachs' Current Activity
Indicator stood at 4.2 percent in March. In April--in the
middle of which came Obama's GW speech--it was 1.6 percent.
For May, it is 1.0 percent.
``That is a major drop in no time at all,'' wrote Business
Insider's Joe Weisenthal.
After April 13, Obama Democrats went into campaign mode.
They staged a poll-driven Senate vote to increase taxes on
oil companies.
They launched a Mediscare campaign against Ryan's budget
resolution that all but four House Republicans had voted for.
That seemed to pay off with a special election victory in the
New York 26th congressional district.
The message to job creators was clear. Hire at your own
risk. Higher taxes, more burdensome regulation and crony
capitalism may be here for some time to come.
One possible upside is that economic bad news may no longer
be ``unexpected.'' Another is that voters may figure out what
is going on.
Mr. KYL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Blumenthal). The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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