[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 73 (Wednesday, May 25, 2011)]
[House]
[Pages H3649-H3680]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  2000
   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012--Continued

  Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this 
amendment. As we debate detainee transfer policies today, and we try to 
determine the appropriate path forward, a picture stands out in my mind 
from a recent trip to Afghanistan. It is the face of a young marine who 
had just been killed by insurgents in Kandahar and whose photo was 
recently displayed on his unit's ``Hero Wall.''
  As I picture his face, I am reminded that the decisions we make here 
today directly impact our troops serving in Afghanistan and their 
families, particularly when we make decisions about detainee transfers.
  We know that the reengagement rate for former detainees is 
approximately 25 percent, but percentages are not informative in and of 
themselves. It helps to understand the facts supporting them.
  One fact we should keep in mind that is included in that 25 percent 
figure is Mullah Abdullah Zakir, internment serial No. 8 who was 
captured in Afghanistan in 2001, sent to Gitmo and released in 2007. 
Zakir is one of the most feared insurgents in Afghanistan and directs 
the Taliban's combat operations throughout the country.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. McKEON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. WITTMAN. It should be no surprise then that he has been targeting 
U.S. forces in Helmand province and has been directly linked to the 
deaths of at least 11 marines.
  This story highlights why it is time to strengthen the detainee 
transfer review process, not weaken it. It is time that Congress took a 
leadership role in shaping how transfers are negotiated and determining 
whether they are appropriate. This amendment takes away the strength to 
make sure that we are doing the right thing.
  It is time to move forward, not backward, and I hope you join me in 
opposing this amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am happy to yield the 
balance of my time to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from 
Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, we stood on this floor about a year ago 
when the minority was the majority, and the language they want to 
change now is the language they approved. In fact, the then-chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Skelton, said this: `` . . . we are 
in a position to accept this motion. I just wish to point out that 
there is no difference between the Democrats and the Republicans when 
it comes to fighting terrorism. I agree with the motion.''
  But, Mr. Chairman, what a difference a year makes because there is 
not just some difference; there is a huge gap now between the Democrats 
and the Republicans on fighting terrorism. And I have never heard so 
many red herrings, the red herrings of all of these people who have 
been tried here. Very few of them were detained under the authorization 
to use military force. Most of them were arrested and detained based on 
law enforcement, a huge difference.
  They raised the questions: Can we hold them here? Sure.
  They asked: Can we get a conviction? Possibly.
  But the real question is why would we want to bring them here to 
trial. There is no prosecutor who knows what he is talking about, no 
investigator who is going to walk in here today and tell you that it is 
easier to convict one of these detainees by bringing them to the United 
States and trying them in an Article III court than it is to do it in a 
military tribunal.
  And the reason is, they ask: Who wants it? I tell you who really 
wants it, the ACLU. Why do they want it? Because they don't want 
convictions. They have already said they want all of the detainees 
released. And they know the moment they hit U.S. soil, they will pick 
up a host of constitutional rights they don't now have. They know it 
will be harder to get conviction, and they also know this: that one of 
the trials that took place in AMF, the defendant was acquitted of over 
200 different counts.
  When, Mr. Chairman, is someone going to stand up for the rights of 
the victims of terror here who asked this question: When are we going 
to start getting prosecutions?
  My good friend from New Jersey talked about the fact oh, we want to 
let our prosecutors make these decisions. We want to let them go 
forward unfettered. What he didn't point out to you was that was 
happening. The prosecutors, a special prosecutor working under the 
current law at that time had worked for over 18 months, over 56 
motions. That prosecutor would have told you he would have had guilty 
pleas in 6 months, and this administration not only stopped him, not 
only took away his rights, but did away with the entire investigation 
and started from zero; and they have been 2\1/2\ years and haven't 
prosecuted.

  Mr. Chairman, the question for us today is very, very simple. We have 
got military tribunals. Nobody is truly questioning the 
constitutionality of those military tribunals. The question for us is 
when are we going to prosecute them. The other question is let's keep 
the terrorists out of the United States and let's vote against this 
amendment.

[[Page H3650]]

  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of 
my time.
  The gentleman from Virginia is right, it would be easier to try them 
under military commissions. In fact, it would be easier not to try them 
at all. It would be easier just to hold them forever. Why bother with 
the trials. Why bother with the trials: because in over 200 years of 
history in this country, we do have a fair justice system and that does 
matter.
  Military generals will tell you that Guantanamo Bay has been a major, 
major problem for them in the field, a major recruiting tool for our 
enemies because it undermines our values. Having a justice system that 
we can depend on matters. I trust everyone on that side would agree on 
that, that it is not just a matter of what is easiest to hold them. If 
that was the case, we wouldn't have courts at all; we wouldn't have 
military tribunals; we wouldn't have anything. We would just hold them. 
So it does matter.
  I will also point out that, yes, the gentleman was acquitted of a 
whole bunch of charges. He was also convicted and sentenced to life in 
our Article III courts. So the system worked in that case. We have over 
200 years of history with our Article III courts; and they have worked.
  By the way, the Constitution, as ruled by the court, applies in 
Guantanamo Bay. Habeas corpus was attached. It does apply there. They 
don't suddenly get constitutional rights coming here that they didn't 
have before.
  I will agree on one point: the scare campaign from last year 
certainly worked. People are afraid of the notion of bringing 
Guantanamo Bay inmates to this country. But they shouldn't be. As has 
been pointed out, over 300 of them, including Ramzi Yousef, the 
architect of the first attack on the World Trade Centers, is held here 
in the United States of America safely and without incident.
  We are tossing aside 200 years of constitutional and judicial history 
for no good reason. That is not a good idea. Let's give the President 
the option he needs to bring terrorists to justice within our system of 
values. The thing about our system of values, it works. We need to stop 
implying that somehow our Constitution doesn't work to protect us. It 
absolutely does. And it has for over 200 years. I urge support for this 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Woodall). The question is on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington 
will be postponed.


                Amendment No. 43 Offered by Mr. Buchanan

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 43 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk made in 
order by the rule.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 461, after line 24, insert the following:

     SEC. 1043. TRIAL OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS.

       After the date of the enactment of this Act, any foreign 
     national, who--
       (1) engages or has engaged in conduct constituting an 
     offense relating to a terrorist attack against persons or 
     property in the United States or against any United States 
     Government property or personnel outside the United States; 
     and
       (2) is subject to trial for that offense by a military 
     commission under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code;
     shall be tried for that offense only by a military commission 
     under that chapter.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Buchanan) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, my amendment requires foreign terrorists 
to be prosecuted and tried in military tribunals.
  The current policy, you have the ability to choose between a civilian 
court and a military tribunal. What my amendment does is it is easier 
to convict in a military tribunal. It is easier to protect sensitive, 
classified information. Foreign terrorists can be imprisoned 
indefinitely. Foreign terrorists are not allowed the same 
constitutional opportunities as U.S. citizens; and military tribunals 
have been used since George Washington.
  I commend the Obama administration for changing its mind and 
announcing it will send Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to military tribunals. 
Let's guard against this so that in the future other White Houses and 
administrations won't change their mind. This amendment makes it clear, 
a consistent policy moving forward in terms of prosecuting foreign 
terrorists.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in 
opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I oppose this for many of the same reasons I 
support the previous amendment. This is simply expanding a bad idea.
  I will point out that while it is true that it was contained in last 
year's National Defense Authorization Act, it is something that I, and 
a majority of Members on this side, never supported. So last year's law 
is not something that we wanted to see happen. There was a lot of other 
things in the National Defense Authorization Act which we did support, 
so we were forced to accept this not because we liked it, but because 
that is the way the system works occasionally.

                              {time}  2010

  This would simply expand that bad idea and deny an even larger 
segment of people access to Article 3 courts. And it's arguable whether 
or not it's constitutional. Because there's a little known fact about 
the Constitution: It doesn't just apply to U.S. citizens; it applies to 
persons in the United States. So once somebody from wherever they are 
is in the United States, the Constitution applies to them. And simply 
taking them out of the justice system and putting them in what I 
presume would have to be the military, since they are the ones that run 
our military commissions, I believe would violate the Constitution in 
this instance, taking away the rights from a person within the United 
States.
  But beyond all that, it's just a bad idea for the same reasons that I 
stated earlier. Our United States Constitution works. It convicts 
criminal after criminal after criminal and puts them away for a very 
long period of time. Let's not take it off the table.
  Even the majority party, as strongly as they feel about this area, 
did not include this particular provision in the bill that was before 
the Armed Services Committee. I think there was a good reason for that. 
I think we should strongly oppose this amendment.
  With that, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment for the reasons stated, but 
beyond that this is particularly badly done.
  This says that anyone who engages or is engaged in a terrorist attack 
in the United States is subject to a military commission. Well, anyone 
arrested in the United States for anything is subject to the 
Constitution of the United States. The Constitution guarantees an 
Article 3 trial. Even if someone is accused of terrorism, if this 
amendment were adopted, you would have to have a trial in an Article 3 
court to determine that he was guilty of a terrorist attack before you 
could then transfer him to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to 
try him for that, because until a court convicts him of the act of 
terrorism, he's simply another criminal defendant and, even under the 
terms of this amendment, entitled to all the protections that the 
Constitution gives him.
  Either the amendment is read, as it seems to say, that you first have 
to have an Article 3 trial to determine whether he engaged in conduct 
constituting a terrorist attack so you could then hand him over to the 
military tribunal, or it doesn't say that, in which case it's clearly 
unconstitutional.
  So this amendment is either unconstitutional or absurd because if 
it's unconstitutional--well, it is--but if it

[[Page H3651]]

isn't unconstitutional, its constitutionality can only be saved by 
reading it to say first you have an Article 3 court, a regular court 
trial, to convict him of terrorism so that you can then, instead of 
sentencing him, send him to a military tribunal to do it all over 
again.
  The amendment makes no sense. I urge its defeat.
  Mr. BUCHANAN. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of 
my time.
  I just want to restate the points that were made. I think Mr. Nadler 
and I both made the arguments that need to be made. This does go 
outside the Constitution. It is unnecessary. And it, again, further 
ties the hands of the President and the Department of Justice to 
adequately deal with the very real threat that we face from terrorism. 
It would tie that process up even worse. And I wish we would defeat 
this amendment and give the President and the Department of Justice the 
authority it needs to try people appropriately, convict them, and put 
them away and take the terrorists off the battlefield.
  I oppose this amendment. I urge the body to do so as well.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BUCHANAN. Again, I would just remind the gentleman that the Obama 
administration did make the change in New York in terms of Mohammed, 
and I just think it's the right amendment in terms of moving forward, 
and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Buchanan).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will 
be postponed.


                Amendment No. 47 Offered by Mrs. Maloney

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 47 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 507, line 21, insert after ``department'' the 
     following: ``that would reveal flight patterns, tactical 
     techniques, or tactical procedures''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentlewoman 
from New York (Mrs. Maloney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.
  Mrs. MALONEY. This amendment is about the need to continue to make 
information available to the public, to keep our uniformed military 
safe, and ensure tax dollars are not wasted on aircraft with serious 
performance and maintenance issues.
  It would simply narrow section 1081 of the act under consideration, 
and this amendment would ensure the military cannot hide subpar 
maintenance of military aircraft or other preventable shortcomings from 
disclosure under the guise of keeping important tactical information 
from our enemies. It ensures an adequate balance between the Defense 
Department's appropriate need to protect tactical information while 
ensuring the public can learn, for example, when the military is not 
putting our pilots in the best maintained aircraft in the world.
  Just ask the parents of Jeffrey Smith, with whom I have spoken, one 
of 45 pilots who died in noncombat accidents in Harrier jets. The Los 
Angeles Times' reporter Kevin Sack pored through military investigative 
records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to show military 
investigators believe a small shard of plastic clogged the fuel line of 
Smith's jet as it tore down the runway, leading the jet to crash at the 
end of the runway. The investigative series used the military's 
investigative records to show other problems with the Harrier jet, 
eventually winning a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. Such 
reporting does nothing to reveal tactical or strategic advantages to 
our adversaries, but it could save the lives of our pilots, and it goes 
a long way to ensure our airmen and women are given the very best 
equipment to protect our Nation.
  This amendment simply allows effective public oversight. And yet H.R. 
1540 would allow the military to exempt or hide exactly this kind of 
information. The exemption to the Freedom of Information Act in section 
1081 is extremely broad and would block access to information of public 
interest unnecessarily.
  As in the tragic death of Jeffrey Smith, some of this information is 
of important public interest. The public also has a vital interest in 
understanding how well the aircraft their taxpayer dollars buy are 
performing. The uniformed military also benefits from public scrutiny 
of complicated multibillion dollar weapons systems in which they trust 
their lives.
  This amendment is supported by many good government groups, and my 
amendment makes a simple but critically important clarification that 
the information from the military flight operations quality assurance 
systems that is exempted is information that would reveal flight 
patterns, tactical techniques, or tactical procedures. My amendment 
would exempt the truly sensitive information that allows reconstruction 
of flights that could reveal detailed flight tactics and the parameters 
of aircraft flight envelopes to enemies that could adapt accordingly.
  It appropriately narrows the exemption to apply particular criteria 
to strike the right balance between safeguarding military flights and 
tactics and the public's right to know if the equipment is faulty, as 
was in the case of the Harrier jets.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 
minutes.

                              {time}  2020

  Mr. FORBES. Once again the gentlelady raises a couple of very good 
points. We are all concerned about transparency. And as the chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Readiness, I can tell you that I live every day 
examining and being concerned that we have our fleet in a ready state 
to defend this country.
  But, Mr. Chairman, I'm also concerned about this: We fight oftentimes 
to keep our adversaries from gaining all the information that they try 
to gain about our military. We fight to protect our computers, and 
sometimes we don't succeed. But also at times we just have to step back 
and say we just give away way too much information.
  And the gentlelady is right, there is a possibility--however remote 
it might be--that we could find something in this data that may save a 
life. That is a possibility, but the far more likely scenario is that 
we will give away crucial information that could jeopardize our pilots, 
jeopardize our fleet, and also jeopardize the men and women that they 
fly to protect. We could jeopardize disclosed fleet readiness rates, 
critical parts failure rates, and other sensitive logistics and 
sustainment data that we just shouldn't be giving out.
  So, Mr. Chairman, while I wholeheartedly agree with the gentlelady's 
concern about transparency and readiness, I also realize that to run 
the greatest military in the world there are some pieces of 
information, some data points, that we don't want to make available to 
those who may use them against us. I think this is one of those, and I 
hope that we will defeat this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MALONEY. I appreciate the gentleman's sensitivity. I certainly 
share his concern in protecting data points that in any way would 
reveal information about our aircraft and ways that people could combat 
our aircraft. But the gentlemen represents, I know, many military 
families, and I'm sure you know as I do many military people who have 
died in aircraft that had faulty situations. For example, the Harrier 
aircraft that had 45 crashes because of faulty equipment, that if the 
public and others had known about, the military I believe would have 
been brought to stop the use of this and to save their lives.

[[Page H3652]]

  So I feel that we have the same goal. I certainly want to protect 
information that is very critical to our flight patterns and our 
military; but for information that is not such as that, but faulty 
equipment, that should be made available. And we feel that we have that 
balance in this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the time remaining.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. FORBES. Once again, I appreciate the gentlelady. And she is 
absolutely right, I represent a lot of military families. I just got 
back last week from talking to a lot of men and women in Afghanistan 
who are serving there; and I can tell you overwhelmingly, when you talk 
to those families, one of the things that came out just recently as we 
had the whole situation with the operation that killed bin Laden, over 
and over and over again those families were telling me the same thing--
too many people are giving too much information and saying too much, 
and they're not protecting the people in our family who are fighting to 
defend this country.
  And I would agree with the gentlelady that we need to be on top of 
this readiness issue, but it's not just our aircraft. It's our ships 
and the vessels that we have there. And I can assure her that our 
subcommittees on the Armed Services Committee, both the chairmen and 
the ranking members, are doing just that to make sure those vessels are 
safe, to make sure that information is available when it's needed, but 
at the same time, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that we're not giving out 
fleet readiness rates to people who could use them against us, critical 
parts failures to people who could use them against us, and other 
sensitive logistics and sustainment data which her amendment does not 
protect.
  Mr. Chairman, once again, I hope we will defeat this amendment and 
protect this sensitive information.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mrs. MALONEY. May I inquire as to the time remaining.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman has 30 seconds remaining.
  Mrs. MALONEY. I support this amendment. Instead of blocking access to 
all of this information, a more reasonable approach is to allow the DOD 
to perform these missions to maintain a tactical and technical 
advantage and to maintain effective, efficient, and safe aircraft units 
and aircraft tactical information without unnecessarily withholding 
information about the safety--in this case of aircraft--that the public 
and the pilots and others have a right to know. So I support this 
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to likewise support it.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I just renew my opposition to the amendment 
and I hope we will defeat it.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York 
will be postponed.


                  Amendment No. 48 Offered by Mr. Mack

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 48 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title X add the following:

     SEC. __. SUNKEN MILITARY CRAFT.

       Section 1408(3) of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (10 U.S.C. 113 note) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, that was'' before 
     ``on military noncommercial service''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting a comma before ``that 
     was owned or operated''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Mack) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is a mere 
clarification of the Sunken Military Craft Act. The fundamental 
objective of the Sunken Military Craft Act was to protect sunken United 
States military vessels, aircraft and spacecraft. This technical 
correction will make clear that the term ``sunken military craft'' will 
only include vessels, warships, naval auxiliaries or other vessels on 
military, noncommercial service at the time they were sunk.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend for offering the amendment.
  We are inclined to oppose the amendment on the following grounds: in 
2005, Congress enacted the Sunken Military Craft Act and the principal 
purpose of that law was to preserve U.S. sovereignty and Department of 
Defense sovereignty over sunken vessels and abandoned aircraft and the 
like for strategic and economic purposes, and also to protect the 
remains and property of those who may have perished on those sunken 
vessels.
  It's my understanding that this amendment draws a distinction between 
such vessels that were in noncommercial service versus commercial 
service. And although I think I understand the justification for that 
distinction, here is our concern with the consequence of that.
  It is our understanding there is pending litigation between the 
nation of Spain and a private venture over the disposition of rights to 
a sunken vessel that at least at one time--I suppose the time it was 
sunk--may have had some claim in the United States. I don't know if 
that is the case. Our concern is that by taking statutory action here, 
we may be in some way interfering with the outcome of that litigation 
or the process of that litigation.
  I would yield to my friend, the author of the amendment, to ask if 
that is his intention.
  Mr. MACK. The amendment is clearly to clarify that we are actually 
talking about military craft as it is a military craft. In other words, 
if it's involved in commercial activity, then it wouldn't be regarded 
as military craft. So it's really to make the distinction, which is why 
the act was put in place the first time, that it's not for commercial 
craft--it may at one time have been--but it is for actual military 
craft when they are sunk.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Reclaiming my time, I think the gentleman's distinction 
makes sense. We have spoken to the Navy about this, and the Navy's 
objection is predicated upon its concern that there could be an impact 
on the litigation that is pending that I made reference to and possibly 
claims of other sovereign nations in similar situations.
  So, reluctantly, we would be inclined to oppose the amendment, but 
obviously be willing to discuss with the gentleman as time goes forward 
ways that perhaps our concerns could be addressed. So for present 
purposes, we would be in opposition to the amendment for the reasons 
that I stated.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. MACK. I want to thank the gentleman for expressing his 
reservations.
  I would tell the gentleman and this body that I think it's clear that 
the understanding of this act is to protect military craft that has 
sunk; but when that military craft is no longer involved in the 
military but now is used for commercial activities, then it's no longer 
a military craft.

                              {time}  2030

  So the purpose of this amendment is to clarify this distinction.
  With that, Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. I think the intent 
here is just to clarify what is military versus commercial. I hope that 
I can get the support of the Members.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mack).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by

[[Page H3653]]

the gentleman from Florida will be postponed.


                Amendment No. 49 Offered by Mr. Langevin

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 49 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title X, add the following new subtitle:

             Subtitle J--Executive Cyberspace Coordination

     SEC. 1099C. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICY.

       Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking subchapters II and III and inserting the following:

                 ``SUBCHAPTER II--INFORMATION SECURITY

     ``Sec. 3551. Purposes

       ``The purposes of this subchapter are to--
       ``(1) provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the 
     effectiveness of information security controls over 
     information resources that support Federal operations and 
     assets;
       ``(2) recognize the highly networked nature of the current 
     Federal computing environment and provide effective 
     Governmentwide management and oversight of the related 
     information security risks, including coordination of 
     information security efforts throughout the civilian, 
     national security, and law enforcement communities;
       ``(3) provide for development and maintenance of minimum 
     controls required to protect Federal information and 
     information infrastructure;
       ``(4) provide a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal 
     agency information security programs;
       ``(5) acknowledge that commercially developed information 
     security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and 
     effective information security solutions, reflecting market 
     solutions for the protection of critical information 
     infrastructures important to the national defense and 
     economic security of the Nation that are designed, built, and 
     operated by the private sector; and
       ``(6) recognize that the selection of specific technical 
     hardware and software information security solutions should 
     be left to individual agencies from among commercially 
     developed products.

     ``Sec. 3552. Definitions

       ``(a) Section 3502 Definitions.--Except as provided under 
     subsection (b), the definitions under section 3502 shall 
     apply to this subchapter.
       ``(b) Additional Definitions.--In this subchapter:
       ``(1) The term `adequate security' means security that 
     complies with the regulations promulgated under section 3554 
     and the standards promulgated under section 3558.
       ``(2) The term `incident' means an occurrence that actually 
     or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or 
     availability of an information system, information 
     infrastructure, or the information the system processes, 
     stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or 
     imminent threat of violation of security policies, security 
     procedures, or acceptable use policies.
       ``(3) The term `information infrastructure' means the 
     underlying framework that information systems and assets rely 
     on in processing, storing, or transmitting information 
     electronically.
       ``(4) The term `information security' means protecting 
     information and information infrastructure from unauthorized 
     access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or 
     destruction in order to provide--
       ``(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper 
     information modification or destruction, and includes 
     ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
       ``(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized 
     restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for 
     protecting personal privacy and proprietary information;
       ``(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and 
     reliable access to and use of information; and
       ``(D) authentication, which means using digital credentials 
     to assure the identity of users and validate access of such 
     users.
       ``(5) The term `information technology' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 11101 of title 40.
       ``(6)(A) The term `national security system' means any 
     information infrastructure (including any telecommunications 
     system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of 
     an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency--
       ``(i) the function, operation, or use of which--
       ``(I) involves intelligence activities;
       ``(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national 
     security;
       ``(III) involves command and control of military forces;
       ``(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a 
     weapon or weapons system; or
       ``(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the 
     direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or
       ``(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established 
     for information that have been specifically authorized under 
     criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of 
     Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national 
     defense or foreign policy.
       ``(B) Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that 
     is to be used for routine administrative and business 
     applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and 
     personnel management applications).

     ``Sec. 3553. National Office for Cyberspace

       ``(a) Establishment.--There is established within the 
     Executive Office of the President an office to be known as 
     the National Office for Cyberspace.
       ``(b) Director.--
       ``(1) In general.--There shall be at the head of the 
     National Office for Cyberspace a Director, who shall be 
     appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent 
     of the Senate. The Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace shall administer all functions designated to such 
     Director under this subchapter and collaborate to the extent 
     practicable with the heads of appropriate agencies, the 
     private sector, and international partners. The Office shall 
     serve as the principal office for coordinating issues 
     relating to cyberspace, including achieving an assured, 
     reliable, secure, and survivable information infrastructure 
     and related capabilities for the Federal Government, while 
     promoting national economic interests, security, and civil 
     liberties.
       ``(2) Basic pay.--The Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace shall be paid at the rate of basic pay for level 
     III of the Executive Schedule.
       ``(c) Staff.--The Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace may appoint and fix the pay of additional 
     personnel as the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(d) Experts and Consultants.--The Director of the 
     National Office for Cyberspace may procure temporary and 
     intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5.

     ``Sec. 3554. Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board

       ``(a) Establishment.--Within the National Office for 
     Cyberspace, there shall be established a board to be known as 
     the `Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board' (in this section 
     referred to as the `Board').
       ``(b) Members.--The Board shall be chaired by the Director 
     of the National Office for Cyberspace and consist of not more 
     than 10 members, with at least one representative from--
       ``(1) the Office of Management and Budget;
       ``(2) civilian agencies;
       ``(3) the Department of Defense;
       ``(4) the Federal law enforcement community;
       ``(5) the Federal Chief Technology Office; and
       ``(6) such additional military and civilian agencies as the 
     Director considers appropriate.
       ``(c) Responsibilities.--
       ``(1) Development of policies and procedures.--Subject to 
     the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the 
     National Office for Cyberspace, the Board shall be 
     responsible for developing and periodically updating 
     information security policies and procedures relating to the 
     matters described in paragraph (2). In developing such 
     policies and procedures, the Board shall require that all 
     matters addressed in the policies and procedures are 
     consistent, to the maximum extent practicable and in 
     accordance with applicable law, among the civilian, military, 
     intelligence, and law enforcement communities.
       ``(2) Specific matters covered in policies and 
     procedures.--
       ``(A) Minimum security controls.--The Board shall be 
     responsible for developing and periodically updating 
     information security policies and procedures relating to 
     minimum security controls for information technology, in 
     order to--
       ``(i) provide Governmentwide protection of Government-
     networked computers against common attacks; and
       ``(ii) provide agencywide protection against threats, 
     vulnerabilities, and other risks to the information 
     infrastructure within individual agencies.
       ``(B) Measures of effectiveness.--The Board shall be 
     responsible for developing and periodically updating 
     information security policies and procedures relating to 
     measurements needed to assess the effectiveness of the 
     minimum security controls referred to in subparagraph (A). 
     Such measurements shall include a risk scoring system to 
     evaluate risk to information security both Governmentwide and 
     within contractors of the Federal Government.
       ``(C) Products and services.--The Board shall be 
     responsible for developing and periodically updating 
     information security policies, procedures, and minimum 
     security standards relating to criteria for products and 
     services to be used in agency information systems and 
     information infrastructure that will meet the minimum 
     security controls referred to in subparagraph (A). In 
     carrying out this subparagraph, the Board shall act in 
     consultation with the Office of Management and Budget and the 
     General Services Administration.
       ``(D) Remedies.--The Board shall be responsible for 
     developing and periodically updating information security 
     policies and procedures relating to methods for providing 
     remedies for security deficiencies identified in agency 
     information infrastructure.
       ``(3) Additional considerations.--The Board shall also 
     consider--
       ``(A) opportunities to engage with the international 
     community to set policies, principles, training, standards, 
     or guidelines for information security;

[[Page H3654]]

       ``(B) opportunities to work with agencies and industry 
     partners to increase information sharing and policy 
     coordination efforts in order to reduce vulnerabilities in 
     the national information infrastructure; and
       ``(C) options necessary to encourage and maintain 
     accountability of any agency, or senior agency official, for 
     efforts to secure the information infrastructure of such 
     agency.
       ``(4) Relationship to other standards.--The policies and 
     procedures developed under paragraph (1) are supplemental to 
     the standards promulgated by the Director of the National 
     Office for Cyberspace under section 3558.
       ``(5) Recommendations for regulations.--The Board shall be 
     responsible for making recommendations to the Director of the 
     National Office for Cyberspace on regulations to carry out 
     the policies and procedures developed by the Board under 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(d) Regulations.--The Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace, in consultation with the Director of the Office 
     of Management and the Administrator of General Services, 
     shall promulgate and periodically update regulations to carry 
     out the policies and procedures developed by the Board under 
     subsection (c).
       ``(e) Annual Report.--The Director of the National Office 
     for Cyberspace shall provide to Congress a report containing 
     a summary of agency progress in implementing the regulations 
     promulgated under this section as part of the annual report 
     to Congress required under section 3555(a)(8).
       ``(f) No Disclosure by Board Required.--The Board is not 
     required to disclose under section 552 of title 5 information 
     submitted by agencies to the Board regarding threats, 
     vulnerabilities, and risks.

     ``Sec. 3555. Authority and functions of the Director of the 
       National Office for Cyberspace

       ``(a) In General.--The Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace shall oversee agency information security policies 
     and practices, including--
       ``(1) developing and overseeing the implementation of 
     policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on 
     information security, including through ensuring timely 
     agency adoption of and compliance with standards promulgated 
     under section 3558;
       ``(2) requiring agencies, consistent with the standards 
     promulgated under section 3558 and other requirements of this 
     subchapter, to identify and provide information security 
     protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the 
     harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
     disruption, modification, or destruction of--
       ``(A) information collected or maintained by or on behalf 
     of an agency; or
       ``(B) information infrastructure used or operated by an 
     agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization 
     on behalf of an agency;
       ``(3) coordinating the development of standards and 
     guidelines under section 20 of the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) with agencies 
     and offices operating or exercising control of national 
     security systems (including the National Security Agency) to 
     assure, to the maximum extent feasible, that such standards 
     and guidelines are complementary with standards and 
     guidelines developed for national security systems;
       ``(4) overseeing agency compliance with the requirements of 
     this subchapter, including through any authorized action 
     under section 11303 of title 40, to enforce accountability 
     for compliance with such requirements;
       ``(5) reviewing at least annually, and approving or 
     disapproving, agency information security programs required 
     under section 3556(b);
       ``(6) coordinating information security policies and 
     procedures of the Federal Government with related information 
     resources management policies and procedures on the security 
     and resiliency of cyberspace;
       ``(7) overseeing the operation of the Federal information 
     security incident center required under section 3559;
       ``(8) reporting to Congress no later than March 1 of each 
     year on agency compliance with the requirements of this 
     subchapter, including--
       ``(A) a summary of the findings of audits required by 
     section 3557;
       ``(B) an assessment of the development, promulgation, and 
     adoption of, and compliance with, standards developed under 
     section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) and promulgated under 
     section 3558;
       ``(C) significant deficiencies in agency information 
     security practices;
       ``(D) planned remedial action to address such deficiencies; 
     and
       ``(E) a summary of, and the views of the Director of the 
     National Office for Cyberspace on, the report prepared by the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology under section 
     20(d)(10) of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3);
       ``(9) coordinating the defense of information 
     infrastructure operated by agencies in the case of a large-
     scale attack on information infrastructure, as determined by 
     the Director;
       ``(10) establishing a national strategy not later than 120 
     days after the date of the enactment of this section;
       ``(11) coordinating information security training for 
     Federal employees with the Office of Personnel Management;
       ``(12) ensuring the adequacy of protections for privacy and 
     civil liberties in carrying out the responsibilities of the 
     Director under this subchapter;
       ``(13) making recommendations that the Director determines 
     are necessary to ensure risk-based security of the Federal 
     information infrastructure and information infrastructure 
     that is owned, operated, controlled, or licensed for use by, 
     or on behalf of, the Department of Defense, a military 
     department, or another element of the intelligence community 
     to--
       ``(A) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
       ``(B) the head of an agency; or
       ``(C) to Congress with regard to the reprogramming of 
     funds;
       ``(14) ensuring, in consultation with the Administrator of 
     the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, that the 
     efforts of agencies relating to the development of 
     regulations, rules, requirements, or other actions applicable 
     to the national information infrastructure are complementary;
       ``(15) when directed by the President, carrying out the 
     responsibilities for national security and emergency 
     preparedness communications described in section 706 of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 606) to ensure 
     integration and coordination; and
       ``(16) as assigned by the President, other duties relating 
     to the security and resiliency of cyberspace.
       ``(b) Recruitment Program.--Not later than 1 year after 
     appointment, the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace shall establish a national program to conduct 
     competitions and challenges that instruct United States 
     students in cybersecurity education and computer literacy.
       ``(c) Budget Oversight and Reporting.--(1) The head of each 
     agency shall submit to the Director of the National Office 
     for Cyberspace a budget each year for the following fiscal 
     year relating to the protection of information infrastructure 
     for such agency, by a date determined by the Director that is 
     before the submission of such budget by the head of the 
     agency to the Office of Management and Budget.
       ``(2) The Director shall review and offer a non-binding 
     approval or disapproval of each agency's annual budget to 
     each such agency before the submission of such budget by the 
     head of the agency to the Office of Management and Budget.
       ``(3) If the Director offers a non-binding disapproval of 
     an agency's budget, the Director shall transmit 
     recommendations to the head of such agency for strengthening 
     its proposed budget with regard to the protection of such 
     agency's information infrastructure.
       ``(4) Each budget submitted by the head of an agency 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include--
       ``(A) a review of any threats to information technology for 
     such agency;
       ``(B) a plan to secure the information infrastructure for 
     such agency based on threats to information technology, using 
     the National Institute of Standards and Technology guidelines 
     and recommendations;
       ``(C) a review of compliance by such agency with any 
     previous year plan described in subparagraph (B); and
       ``(D) a report on the development of the credentialing 
     process to enable secure authentication of identity and 
     authorization for access to the information infrastructure of 
     such agency.
       ``(5) The Director of the National Office for Cyberspace 
     may recommend to the President monetary penalties or 
     incentives necessary to encourage and maintain accountability 
     of any agency, or senior agency official, for efforts to 
     secure the information infrastructure of such agency.

     ``Sec. 3556. Agency responsibilities

       ``(a) In General.--The head of each agency shall--
       ``(1) be responsible for--
       ``(A) providing information security protections 
     commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm 
     resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
     disruption, modification, or destruction of--
       ``(i) information collected or maintained by or on behalf 
     of the agency; and
       ``(ii) information infrastructure used or operated by an 
     agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization 
     on behalf of an agency;
       ``(B) complying with the requirements of this subchapter 
     and related policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines, 
     including--
       ``(i) the regulations promulgated under section 3554 and 
     the information security standards promulgated under section 
     3558;
       ``(ii) information security standards and guidelines for 
     national security systems issued in accordance with law and 
     as directed by the President; and
       ``(iii) ensuring the standards implemented for information 
     infrastructure and national security systems under the agency 
     head are complementary and uniform, to the extent 
     practicable; and
       ``(C) ensuring that information security management 
     processes are integrated with agency strategic and 
     operational planning processes;
       ``(2) ensure that senior agency officials provide 
     information security for the information and information 
     infrastructure that support the operations and assets under 
     their control, including through--
       ``(A) assessing the risk and magnitude of the harm that 
     could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
     disruption,

[[Page H3655]]

     modification, or destruction of such information or 
     information infrastructure;
       ``(B) determining the levels of information security 
     appropriate to protect such information and information 
     infrastructure in accordance with regulations promulgated 
     under section 3554 and standards promulgated under section 
     3558, for information security classifications and related 
     requirements;
       ``(C) implementing policies and procedures to cost 
     effectively reduce risks to an acceptable level; and
       ``(D) continuously testing and evaluating information 
     security controls and techniques to ensure that they are 
     effectively implemented;
       ``(3) delegate to an agency official, designated as the 
     `Chief Information Security Officer', under the authority of 
     the agency Chief Information Officer the responsibility to 
     oversee agency information security and the authority to 
     ensure and enforce compliance with the requirements imposed 
     on the agency under this subchapter, including--
       ``(A) overseeing the establishment and maintenance of a 
     security operations capability on an automated and continuous 
     basis that can--
       ``(i) assess the state of compliance of all networks and 
     systems with prescribed controls issued pursuant to section 
     3558 and report immediately any variance therefrom and, where 
     appropriate and with the approval of the agency Chief 
     Information Officer, shut down systems that are found to be 
     non-compliant;
       ``(ii) detect, report, respond to, contain, and mitigate 
     incidents that impair adequate security of the information 
     and information infrastructure, in accordance with policy 
     provided by the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace, in consultation with the Chief Information 
     Officers Council, and guidance from the National Institute of 
     Standards and Technology;
       ``(iii) collaborate with the National Office for Cyberspace 
     and appropriate public and private sector security operations 
     centers to address incidents that impact the security of 
     information and information infrastructure that extend beyond 
     the control of the agency; and
       ``(iv) not later than 24 hours after discovery of any 
     incident described under subparagraph (A)(ii), unless 
     otherwise directed by policy of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace, provide notice to the appropriate security 
     operations center, the National Cyber Investigative Joint 
     Task Force, and the Inspector General of the agency;
       ``(B) developing, maintaining, and overseeing an agency 
     wide information security program as required by subsection 
     (b);
       ``(C) developing, maintaining, and overseeing information 
     security policies, procedures, and control techniques to 
     address all applicable requirements, including those issued 
     under sections 3555 and 3558;
       ``(D) training and overseeing personnel with significant 
     responsibilities for information security with respect to 
     such responsibilities; and
       ``(E) assisting senior agency officials concerning their 
     responsibilities under paragraph (2);
       ``(4) ensure that the agency has trained and cleared 
     personnel sufficient to assist the agency in complying with 
     the requirements of this subchapter and related policies, 
     procedures, standards, and guidelines;
       ``(5) ensure that the Chief Information Security Officer, 
     in coordination with other senior agency officials, reports 
     biannually to the agency head on the effectiveness of the 
     agency information security program, including progress of 
     remedial actions; and
       ``(6) ensure that the Chief Information Security Officer 
     possesses necessary qualifications, including education, 
     professional certifications, training, experience, and the 
     security clearance required to administer the functions 
     described under this subchapter; and has information security 
     duties as the primary duty of that official.
       ``(b) Agency Program.--Each agency shall develop, document, 
     and implement an agencywide information security program, 
     approved by the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace under section 3555(a)(5), to provide information 
     security for the information and information infrastructure 
     that support the operations and assets of the agency, 
     including those provided or managed by another agency, 
     contractor, or other source, that includes--
       ``(1) continuous automated technical monitoring of 
     information infrastructure used or operated by an agency or 
     by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf 
     of an agency to assure conformance with regulations 
     promulgated under section 3554 and standards promulgated 
     under section 3558;
       ``(2) testing of the effectiveness of security controls 
     that are commensurate with risk (as defined by the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Office 
     for Cyberspace) for agency information infrastructure;
       ``(3) policies and procedures that--
       ``(A) mitigate and remediate, to the extent practicable, 
     information security vulnerabilities based on the risk posed 
     to the agency;
       ``(B) cost effectively reduce information security risks to 
     an acceptable level;
       ``(C) ensure that information security is addressed 
     throughout the life cycle of each agency information system 
     and information infrastructure;
       ``(D) ensure compliance with--
       ``(i) the requirements of this subchapter;
       ``(ii) policies and procedures as may be prescribed by the 
     Director of the National Office for Cyberspace, and 
     information security standards promulgated under section 
     3558;
       ``(iii) minimally acceptable system configuration 
     requirements, as determined by the Director of the National 
     Office for Cyberspace; and
       ``(iv) any other applicable requirements, including--

       ``(I) standards and guidelines for national security 
     systems issued in accordance with law and as directed by the 
     President;
       ``(II) the policy of the Director of the National Office 
     for Cyberspace;
       ``(III) the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
     guidance; and
       ``(IV) the Chief Information Officers Council recommended 
     approaches;

       ``(E) develop, maintain, and oversee information security 
     policies, procedures, and control techniques to address all 
     applicable requirements, including those issued under 
     sections 3555 and 3558; and
       ``(F) ensure the oversight and training of personnel with 
     significant responsibilities for information security with 
     respect to such responsibilities;
       ``(4) ensuring that the agency has trained and cleared 
     personnel sufficient to assist the agency in complying with 
     the requirements of this subchapter and related policies, 
     procedures, standards, and guidelines;
       ``(5) to the extent practicable, automated and continuous 
     technical monitoring for testing, and evaluation of the 
     effectiveness and compliance of information security 
     policies, procedures, and practices, including--
       ``(A) management, operational, and technical controls of 
     every information infrastructure identified in the inventory 
     required under section 3505(b); and
       ``(B) management, operational, and technical controls 
     relied on for an evaluation under section 3556;
       ``(6) a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and 
     documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in 
     the information security policies, procedures, and practices 
     of the agency;
       ``(7) to the extent practicable, continuous automated 
     technical monitoring for detecting, reporting, and responding 
     to security incidents, consistent with standards and 
     guidelines issued by the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace, including--
       ``(A) mitigating risks associated with such incidents 
     before substantial damage is done;
       ``(B) notifying and consulting with the appropriate 
     security operations response center; and
       ``(C) notifying and consulting with, as appropriate--
       ``(i) law enforcement agencies and relevant Offices of 
     Inspectors General;
       ``(ii) the National Office for Cyberspace; and
       ``(iii) any other agency or office, in accordance with law 
     or as directed by the President; and
       ``(8) plans and procedures to ensure continuity of 
     operations for information infrastructure that support the 
     operations and assets of the agency.
       ``(c) Agency Reporting.--Each agency shall--
       ``(1) submit an annual report on the adequacy and 
     effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, 
     and practices, and compliance with the requirements of this 
     subchapter, including compliance with each requirement of 
     subsection (b) to--
       ``(A) the National Office for Cyberspace;
       ``(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate;
       ``(C) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of 
     the House of Representatives;
       ``(D) other appropriate authorization and appropriations 
     committees of Congress; and
       ``(E) the Comptroller General;
       ``(2) address the adequacy and effectiveness of information 
     security policies, procedures, and practices in plans and 
     reports relating to--
       ``(A) annual agency budgets;
       ``(B) information resources management of this subchapter;
       ``(C) information technology management under this chapter;
       ``(D) program performance under sections 1105 and 1115 
     through 1119 of title 31, and sections 2801 and 2805 of title 
     39;
       ``(E) financial management under chapter 9 of title 31, and 
     the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (31 U.S.C. 501 note; 
     Public Law 101-576) (and the amendments made by that Act);
       ``(F) financial management systems under the Federal 
     Financial Management Improvement Act (31 U.S.C. 3512 note); 
     and
       ``(G) internal accounting and administrative controls under 
     section 3512 of title 31; and
       ``(3) report any significant deficiency in a policy, 
     procedure, or practice identified under paragraph (1) or 
     (2)--
       ``(A) as a material weakness in reporting under section 
     3512 of title 31; and
       ``(B) if relating to financial management systems, as an 
     instance of a lack of substantial compliance under the 
     Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (31 U.S.C. 3512 
     note).
       ``(d) Performance Plan.--(1) In addition to the 
     requirements of subsection (c), each agency, in consultation 
     with the National Office for Cyberspace, shall include as 
     part of the performance plan required under section 1115 of 
     title 31 a description of the resources,

[[Page H3656]]

     including budget, staffing, and training, that are necessary 
     to implement the program required under subsection (b).
       ``(2) The description under paragraph (1) shall be based on 
     the risk assessments required under subsection (a)(2).
       ``(e) Public Notice and Comment.--Each agency shall provide 
     the public with timely notice and opportunities for comment 
     on proposed information security policies and procedures to 
     the extent that such policies and procedures affect 
     communication with the public.

     ``Sec. 3557. Annual independent audit

       ``(a) In General.--(1) Each year each agency shall have 
     performed an independent audit of the information security 
     program and practices of that agency to determine the 
     effectiveness of such program and practices.
       ``(2) Each audit under this section shall include--
       ``(A) testing of the effectiveness of the information 
     infrastructure of the agency for automated, continuous 
     monitoring of the state of compliance of its information 
     infrastructure with regulations promulgated under section 
     3554 and standards promulgated under section 3558 in a 
     representative subset of--
       ``(i) the information infrastructure used or operated by 
     the agency; and
       ``(ii) the information infrastructure used, operated, or 
     supported on behalf of the agency by a contractor of the 
     agency, a subcontractor (at any tier) of such contractor, or 
     any other entity;
       ``(B) an assessment (made on the basis of the results of 
     the testing) of compliance with--
       ``(i) the requirements of this subchapter; and
       ``(ii) related information security policies, procedures, 
     standards, and guidelines;
       ``(C) separate assessments, as appropriate, regarding 
     information security relating to national security systems; 
     and
       ``(D) a conclusion regarding whether the information 
     security controls of the agency are effective, including an 
     identification of any significant deficiencies in such 
     controls.
       ``(3) Each audit under this section shall be performed in 
     accordance with applicable generally accepted Government 
     auditing standards.
       ``(b) Independent Auditor.--Subject to subsection (c)--
       ``(1) for each agency with an Inspector General appointed 
     under the Inspector General Act of 1978 or any other law, the 
     annual audit required by this section shall be performed by 
     the Inspector General or by an independent external auditor, 
     as determined by the Inspector General of the agency; and
       ``(2) for each agency to which paragraph (1) does not 
     apply, the head of the agency shall engage an independent 
     external auditor to perform the audit.
       ``(c) National Security Systems.--For each agency operating 
     or exercising control of a national security system, that 
     portion of the audit required by this section directly 
     relating to a national security system shall be performed--
       ``(1) only by an entity designated head; and
       ``(2) in such a manner as to ensure appropriate protection 
     for information associated with any information security 
     vulnerability in such system commensurate with the risk and 
     in accordance with all applicable laws.
       ``(d) Existing Audits.--The audit required by this section 
     may be based in whole or in part on another audit relating to 
     programs or practices of the applicable agency.
       ``(e) Agency Reporting.--(1) Each year, not later than such 
     date established by the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace, the head of each agency shall submit to the 
     Director the results of the audit required under this 
     section.
       ``(2) To the extent an audit required under this section 
     directly relates to a national security system, the results 
     of the audit submitted to the Director of the National Office 
     for Cyberspace shall contain only a summary and assessment of 
     that portion of the audit directly relating to a national 
     security system.
       ``(f) Protection of Information.--Agencies and auditors 
     shall take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of 
     information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect 
     information security. Such protections shall be commensurate 
     with the risk and comply with all applicable laws and 
     regulations.
       ``(g) National Office for Cyberspace Reports to Congress.--
     (1) The Director of the National Office for Cyberspace shall 
     summarize the results of the audits conducted under this 
     section in the annual report to Congress required under 
     section 3555(a)(8).
       ``(2) The Director's report to Congress under this 
     subsection shall summarize information regarding information 
     security relating to national security systems in such a 
     manner as to ensure appropriate protection for information 
     associated with any information security vulnerability in 
     such system commensurate with the risk and in accordance with 
     all applicable laws.
       ``(3) Audits and any other descriptions of information 
     infrastructure under the authority and control of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence or of National Foreign 
     Intelligence Programs systems under the authority and control 
     of the Secretary of Defense shall be made available to 
     Congress only through the appropriate oversight committees of 
     Congress, in accordance with applicable laws.
       ``(h) Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General shall 
     periodically evaluate and report to Congress on--
       ``(1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agency information 
     security policies and practices; and
       ``(2) implementation of the requirements of this 
     subchapter.
       ``(i) Contractor Audits.--Each year each contractor that 
     operates, uses, or supports an information system or 
     information infrastructure on behalf of an agency and each 
     subcontractor of such contractor--
       ``(1) shall conduct an audit using an independent external 
     auditor in accordance with subsection (a), including an 
     assessment of compliance with the applicable requirements of 
     this subchapter; and
       ``(2) shall submit the results of such audit to such agency 
     not later than such date established by the Agency.

     ``Sec. 3558. Responsibilities for Federal information systems 
       standards

       ``(a) Requirement To Prescribe Standards.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Requirement.--Except as provided under paragraph (2), 
     the Secretary of Commerce shall, on the basis of proposed 
     standards developed by the National Institute of Standards 
     and Technology pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
     20(a) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
     Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3(a)) and in consultation with the 
     Secretary of Homeland Security, promulgate information 
     security standards pertaining to Federal information systems.
       ``(B) Required standards.--Standards promulgated under 
     subparagraph (A) shall include--
       ``(i) standards that provide minimum information security 
     requirements as determined under section 20(b) of the 
     National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 
     278g-3(b)); and
       ``(ii) such standards that are otherwise necessary to 
     improve the efficiency of operation or security of Federal 
     information systems.
       ``(C) Required standards binding.--Information security 
     standards described under subparagraph (B) shall be 
     compulsory and binding.
       ``(2) Standards and guidelines for national security 
     systems.--Standards and guidelines for national security 
     systems, as defined under section 3552(b), shall be 
     developed, promulgated, enforced, and overseen as otherwise 
     authorized by law and as directed by the President.
       ``(b) Application of More Stringent Standards.--The head of 
     an agency may employ standards for the cost-effective 
     information security for all operations and assets within or 
     under the supervision of that agency that are more stringent 
     than the standards promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce 
     under this section, if such standards--
       ``(1) contain, at a minimum, the provisions of those 
     applicable standards made compulsory and binding by the 
     Secretary; and
       ``(2) are otherwise consistent with policies and guidelines 
     issued under section 3555.
       ``(c) Requirements Regarding Decisions by the Secretary.--
       ``(1) Deadline.--The decision regarding the promulgation of 
     any standard by the Secretary of Commerce under subsection 
     (b) shall occur not later than 6 months after the submission 
     of the proposed standard to the Secretary by the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology, as provided under 
     section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3).
       ``(2) Notice and comment.--A decision by the Secretary of 
     Commerce to significantly modify, or not promulgate, a 
     proposed standard submitted to the Secretary by the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology, as provided under 
     section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3), shall be made after the 
     public is given an opportunity to comment on the Secretary's 
     proposed decision.

     ``Sec. 3559. Federal information security incident center

       ``(a) In General.--The Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace shall ensure the operation of a central Federal 
     information security incident center to--
       ``(1) provide timely technical assistance to operators of 
     agency information systems and information infrastructure 
     regarding security incidents, including guidance on detecting 
     and handling information security incidents;
       ``(2) compile and analyze information about incidents that 
     threaten information security;
       ``(3) inform operators of agency information systems and 
     information infrastructure about current and potential 
     information security threats, and vulnerabilities; and
       ``(4) consult with the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology, agencies or offices operating or exercising 
     control of national security systems (including the National 
     Security Agency), and such other agencies or offices in 
     accordance with law and as directed by the President 
     regarding information security incidents and related matters.
       ``(b) National Security Systems.--Each agency operating or 
     exercising control of a national security system shall share 
     information about information security incidents, threats, 
     and vulnerabilities with the Federal information security 
     incident center to the extent consistent with standards and 
     guidelines for national security systems,

[[Page H3657]]

     issued in accordance with law and as directed by the 
     President.
       ``(c) Review and Approval.--In coordination with the 
     Administrator for Electronic Government and Information 
     Technology, the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace shall review and approve the policies, procedures, 
     and guidance established in this subchapter to ensure that 
     the incident center has the capability to effectively and 
     efficiently detect, correlate, respond to, contain, mitigate, 
     and remediate incidents that impair the adequate security of 
     the information systems and information infrastructure of 
     more than one agency. To the extent practicable, the 
     capability shall be continuous and technically automated.

     ``Sec. 3560. National security systems

       ``The head of each agency operating or exercising control 
     of a national security system shall be responsible for 
     ensuring that the agency--
       ``(1) provides information security protections 
     commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm 
     resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, 
     disruption, modification, or destruction of the information 
     contained in such system;
       ``(2) implements information security policies and 
     practices as required by standards and guidelines for 
     national security systems, issued in accordance with law and 
     as directed by the President; and
       ``(3) complies with the requirements of this subchapter.''.

     SEC. 1099D. INFORMATION SECURITY ACQUISITION REQUIREMENTS.

       Chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end of subchapter II the following new section:

     ``Sec. 11319. Information security acquisition requirements.

       ``(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, beginning one year after the date of the enactment of 
     the Executive Cyberspace Coordination Act of 2011, no agency 
     may enter into a contract, an order under a contract, or an 
     interagency agreement for--
       ``(1) the collection, use, management, storage, or 
     dissemination of information on behalf of the agency;
       ``(2) the use or operation of an information system or 
     information infrastructure on behalf of the agency; or
       ``(3) information technology;

     unless such contract, order, or agreement includes 
     requirements to provide effective information security that 
     supports the operations and assets under the control of the 
     agency, in compliance with the policies, standards, and 
     guidance developed under subsection (b), and otherwise 
     ensures compliance with this section.
       ``(b) Coordination of Secure Acquisition Policies.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Director of the Office of Management 
     and Budget, in consultation with the Director of the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology, the Director of the 
     National Office for Cyberspace, and the Administrator of 
     General Services, shall oversee the development and 
     implementation of policies, standards, and guidance, 
     including through revisions to the Federal Acquisition 
     Regulation and the Department of Defense supplement to the 
     Federal Acquisition Regulation, to cost effectively enhance 
     agency information security, including--
       ``(A) minimum information security requirements for agency 
     procurement of information technology products and services; 
     and
       ``(B) approaches for evaluating and mitigating significant 
     supply chain security risks associated with products or 
     services to be acquired by agencies.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of 
     the enactment of the Executive Cyberspace Coordination Act of 
     2011, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
     shall submit to Congress a report describing--
       ``(A) actions taken to improve the information security 
     associated with the procurement of products and services by 
     the Federal Government; and
       ``(B) plans for overseeing and coordinating efforts of 
     agencies to use best practice approaches for cost-effectively 
     purchasing more secure products and services.
       ``(c) Vulnerability Assessments of Major Systems.--
       ``(1) Requirement for initial vulnerability assessments.--
     The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall 
     require each agency to conduct an initial vulnerability 
     assessment for any major system and its significant items of 
     supply prior to the development of the system. The initial 
     vulnerability assessment of a major system and its 
     significant items of supply shall include use of an analysis-
     based approach to--
       ``(A) identify vulnerabilities;
       ``(B) define exploitation potential;
       ``(C) examine the system's potential effectiveness;
       ``(D) determine overall vulnerability; and
       ``(E) make recommendations for risk reduction.
       ``(2) Subsequent vulnerability assessments.--
       ``(A) The Director shall require a subsequent vulnerability 
     assessment of each major system and its significant items of 
     supply within a program if the Director determines that 
     circumstances warrant the issuance of an additional 
     vulnerability assessment.
       ``(B) Upon the request of a congressional committee, the 
     Director may require a subsequent vulnerability assessment of 
     a particular major system and its significant items of supply 
     within the program.
       ``(C) Any subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major 
     system and its significant items of supply shall include use 
     of an analysis-based approach and, if applicable, a testing-
     based approach, to monitor the exploitation potential of such 
     system and reexamine the factors described in subparagraphs 
     (A) through (E) of paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Congressional oversight.--The Director shall provide 
     to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of each 
     vulnerability assessment conducted under paragraph (1) or (2) 
     not later than 10 days after the date of the completion of 
     such assessment.
       ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Item of supply.--The term `item of supply'--
       ``(A) means any individual part, component, subassembly, 
     assembly, or subsystem integral to a major system, and other 
     property which may be replaced during the service life of the 
     major system, including a spare part or replenishment part; 
     and
       ``(B) does not include packaging or labeling associated 
     with shipment or identification of an item.
       ``(2) Vulnerability assessment.--The term `vulnerability 
     assessment' means the process of identifying and quantifying 
     vulnerabilities in a major system and its significant items 
     of supply.
       ``(3) Major system.--The term `major system' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 4 of the Office of Federal 
     Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).''.

     SEC. 1099E. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Sections in Title 44.--The table of sections 
     for chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking the matter relating to subchapters II and III and 
     inserting the following:

                  ``subchapter ii--information security

``3551. Purposes.
``3552. Definitions.
``3553. National Office for Cyberspace.
``3554. Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board.
``3555. Authority and functions of the Director of the National Office 
              for Cyberspace.
``3556. Agency responsibilities.
``3557. Annual independent audit.
``3558. Responsibilities for Federal information systems standards.
``3559. Federal information security incident center.
``3560. National security systems.''.

       (b) Table of Sections in Title 40.--The table of sections 
     for chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended 
     by inserting after the item relating to section 11318 the 
     following new item:

``Sec. 11319. Information security acquisition requirements.''.

       (c) Other References.--
       (1) Section 1001(c)(1)(A) of the Homeland Security Act of 
     2002 (6 U.S.C. 511(c)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``section 
     3532(3)'' and inserting ``section 3552(b)''.
       (2) Section 2222(j)(6) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``section 3542(b)(2))'' and inserting 
     ``section 3552(b)''.
       (3) Section 2223(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended, by striking ``section 3542(b)(2))'' and inserting 
     ``section 3552(b)''.
       (4) Section 2315 of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``section 3542(b)(2))'' and inserting 
     ``section 3552(b)''.
       (5) Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) is amended--
       (A) in subsections (a)(2) and (e)(5), by striking ``section 
     3532(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3552(b)'';
       (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 3532(1)'' 
     and inserting ``section 3552(b)''; and
       (C) in subsections (c)(3) and (d)(1), by striking ``section 
     11331 of title 40'' and inserting ``section 3558 of title 
     44''.
       (6) Section 8(d)(1) of the Cyber Security Research and 
     Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7406(d)(1)) is amended by striking 
     ``section 3534(b)'' and inserting ``section 3556(b)''.
       (d) Repeal.--
       (1) Subchapter III of chapter 113 of title 40, United 
     States Code, is repealed.
       (2) The table of sections for chapter 113 of such title is 
     amended by striking the matter relating to subchapter III.
       (e) Executive Schedule Pay Rate.--Section 5314 of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``Director of the National Office for Cyberspace.''.
       (f) Membership on the National Security Council.--Section 
     101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     402(a)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs 
     (8) and (9), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
       ``(7) the Director of the National Office for 
     Cyberspace;''.

     SEC. 1099F. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER.

       (a) Establishment and Staff.--
       (1) Establishment.--

[[Page H3658]]

       (A) In general.--There is established in the Executive 
     Office of the President an Office of the Federal Chief 
     Technology Officer (in this section referred to as the 
     ``Office'').
       (B) Head of the office.--
       (i) Federal chief technology officer.--The President shall 
     appoint a Federal Chief Technology Officer (in this section 
     referred to as the ``Federal CTO'') who shall be the head of 
     the Office.
       (ii) Compensation.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``Federal Chief Technology Officer.''.
       (2) Staff of the office.--The President may appoint 
     additional staff members to the Office.
       (b) Duties of the Office.--The functions of the Federal CTO 
     are the following:
       (1) Undertake fact-gathering, analysis, and assessment of 
     the Federal Government's information technology 
     infrastructures, information technology strategy, and use of 
     information technology, and provide advice on such matters to 
     the President, heads of Federal departments and agencies, and 
     government chief information officers and chief technology 
     officers.
       (2) Lead an interagency effort, working with the chief 
     technology and chief information officers of each of the 
     Federal departments and agencies, to develop and implement a 
     planning process to ensure that they use best-in-class 
     technologies, share best practices, and improve the use of 
     technology in support of Federal Government requirements.
       (3) Advise the President on information technology 
     considerations with regard to Federal budgets and with regard 
     to general coordination of the research and development 
     programs of the Federal Government for information 
     technology-related matters.
       (4) Promote technological innovation in the Federal 
     Government, and encourage and oversee the adoption of robust 
     cross-governmental architectures and standards-based 
     information technologies, in support of effective operational 
     and management policies, practices, and services across 
     Federal departments and agencies and with the public and 
     external entities.
       (5) Establish cooperative public-private sector partnership 
     initiatives to achieve knowledge of technologies available in 
     the marketplace that can be used for improving governmental 
     operations and information technology research and 
     development activities.
       (6) Gather timely and authoritative information concerning 
     significant developments and trends in information 
     technology, and in national priorities, both current and 
     prospective, and analyze and interpret the information for 
     the purpose of determining whether the developments and 
     trends are likely to affect achievement of the priority goals 
     of the Federal Government.
       (7) Develop, review, revise, and recommend criteria for 
     determining information technology activities warranting 
     Federal support, and recommend Federal policies designed to 
     advance the development and maintenance of effective and 
     efficient information technology capabilities, including 
     human resources, at all levels of government, academia, and 
     industry, and the effective application of the capabilities 
     to national needs.
       (8) Any other functions and activities that the President 
     may assign to the Federal CTO.
       (c) Policy Planning; Analysis and Advice.--The Office shall 
     serve as a source of analysis and advice for the President 
     and heads of Federal departments and agencies with respect to 
     major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government 
     in accordance with the functions described in subsection (b).
       (d) Coordination of the Office With Other Entities.--
       (1) Federal cto on domestic policy council.--The Federal 
     CTO shall be a member of the Domestic Policy Council.
       (2) Federal cto on cyber security practice board.--The 
     Federal CTO shall be a member of the Federal Cybersecurity 
     Practice Board.
       (3) Obtain information from agencies.--The Office may 
     secure, directly from any department or agency of the United 
     States, information necessary to enable the Federal CTO to 
     carry out this section. On request of the Federal CTO, the 
     head of the department or agency shall furnish the 
     information to the Office, subject to any applicable 
     limitations of Federal law.
       (4) Staff of federal agencies.--On request of the Federal 
     CTO, to assist the Office in carrying out the duties of the 
     Office, the head of any Federal department or agency may 
     detail personnel, services, or facilities of the department 
     or agency to the Office.
       (e) Annual Report.--
       (1) Publication and contents.--The Federal CTO shall 
     publish, in the Federal Register and on a public Internet 
     website of the Federal CTO, an annual report that includes 
     the following:
       (A) Information on programs to promote the development of 
     technological innovations.
       (B) Recommendations for the adoption of policies to 
     encourage the generation of technological innovations.
       (C) Information on the activities and accomplishments of 
     the Office in the year covered by the report.
       (2) Submission.--The Federal CTO shall submit each report 
     under paragraph (1) to--
       (A) the President;
       (B) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (C) the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (D) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
     of the Senate.

     SEC. 1099G. AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY.

       (a) In General.--The Secretary shall have primary 
     authority, in consultation with the Director of the National 
     Office for Cyberspace and the Federal Cyberspace Practice 
     Board, in the executive branch of the Federal Government in 
     creation, verification, and enforcement of measures with 
     respect to the protection of critical information 
     infrastructure, including promulgating risk-informed 
     information security practices and standards applicable to 
     critical information infrastructures that are not owned by or 
     under the direct control of the Federal Government. The 
     Secretary should consult with appropriate private sector 
     entities, including private owners and operators of the 
     affected infrastructure, to carry out this section.
       (b) Other Federal Agencies.--In establishing measures with 
     respect to the protection of critical information 
     infrastructure the Secretary shall--
       (1) consult with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary 
     of Defense, the National Institute of Standards and 
     Technology, and other sector specific Federal regulatory 
     agencies in exercising the authority referred to in 
     subsection (a); and
       (2) coordinate, though the Executive Office of the 
     President, with sector specific Federal regulatory agencies, 
     including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in 
     establishing enforcement mechanisms under the authority 
     referred to in subsection (a).
       (c) Auditing Authority.--The Secretary may--
       (1) conduct such audits as are necessary to ensure that 
     appropriate measures are taken to secure critical information 
     infrastructure;
       (2) issue such subpoenas as are necessary to determine 
     compliance with Federal regulatory requirements for securing 
     critical information infrastructure; and
       (3) authorize sector specific Federal regulatory agencies 
     to undertake such audits.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Critical information infrastructure.--The term 
     ``critical information infrastructure'' means the electronic 
     information and communications systems, software, and assets 
     that control, protect, process, transmit, receive, program, 
     or store information in any form, including data, voice, and 
     video, relied upon by critical infrastructure, industrial 
     control systems such as supervisory control and data 
     acquisition systems, and programmable logic controllers. This 
     shall also include such systems of the Federal Government.
       (2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Homeland Security.

     SEC. 1099H. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) In General.--Unless otherwise specified in this 
     section, this subtitle (including the amendments made by this 
     subtitle) shall take effect 30 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) National Office for Cyberspace.--Section 3553 of title 
     44, United States Code, as added by section 1099C of this 
     subtitle, shall take effect 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
       (c) Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board.--Section 3554 of 
     title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1099C of 
     this subtitle, shall take effect one year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 1099I. FUNDING OFFSETTING REDUCTION.

       Notwithstanding the amounts set forth in the funding tables 
     in division D, the amount authorized to be appropriated in 
     section 4301 for Operations and Maintenance, as specified in 
     the corresponding funding table in division D, is hereby 
     reduced by $1,500,000,000.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin) and a Member opposed each will control 
5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. I rise today to urge my colleagues to join me in 
support of my amendment to help secure and protect our Nation from 
cyber attacks. My amendment would basically coordinate Federal 
information security policy by creating a National Office for 
Cyberspace, update our Federal information security management 
practices, and establish measures for the protection of critical 
infrastructure from cyber attacks.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment passed the House of Representatives last 
year without objection.
  In the intervening year, the threats that we face in cyberspace have 
clearly multiplied. Three months ago, the director of the CIA told the 
Congress that the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber attack. 
Shortly after, the Los Angeles Times reported on a computer hacker who, 
in a test of a southern California water system, took control of the 
equipment that added chemicals to the water. The article stated, ``with 
a few mouse clicks, he could have rendered the water undrinkable for 
millions of homes.''

[[Page H3659]]

  Mr. Chairman, my amendment would secure our government-owned IT 
networks against massive data breaches and attacks by implementing 
recommendations of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity, which I 
cochaired last year's committee work on Oversight and Government Reform 
and several recent White House proposals.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment focuses on coordination of efforts to 
secure our Federal networks, develop smarter cyber policies, and 
protect critical infrastructure like the power grid. It also 
establishes a Senate-confirmed National Cyberspace Office in the 
Executive Office of the President.
  This amendment was included in the House-passed fiscal year 2011 
National Defense Authorization Act and helped spark renewed action in 
Congress on this critical issue. Now, with so much underway in the 
executive branch and in the other Chamber, I believe it is critical for 
the House to once again take a stand on this issue and make the 
investments necessary to protect our networks in cyberspace.
  I would note here that my offset is based on previous estimates of 
the cost of these provisions, which I firmly believe will actually be 
lowered once it is rescored. However, even this cost is dwarfed by the 
tremendous cost of inaction, which, if a successful cyber attack were 
carried out on critical infrastructure, could result in hundreds of 
billions of dollars in losses.
  Last year alone, researchers recorded 662 breaches at large companies 
or Federal agencies that left 16.2 million records exposed. Now, this 
data enabled cyber criminals to prey on citizens and companies with 
some estimates putting the cost of cyber threats to our economy at $8 
billion annually.
  But these threats don't just come from criminals. It's believed that 
there are approximately 1.8 billion attacks on our government servers 
every month. And the cyber incidents have targeted some of the most 
sensitive national security data, potentially allowing a foreign 
intelligence agency to gain a ``digital beachhead'' on our classified 
and unclassified networks. A larger investment in the security of these 
networks, which has already been initiated at the direction of the 
White House, will yield huge efficiencies for our IT systems in the 
long run while protecting information critical to our security.
  Traditionally, no matter how fractious the debate in Washington 
becomes, Mr. Chairman, we have put aside partisanship when it comes to 
protecting the American people.
  Mr. Chairman, cyber attacks pose a clear and present danger to the 
national security of the United States, and this legislation takes 
significant steps toward stopping these threats.
  I urge your support of this amendment to keep our Nation safe from 
cyber attacks.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition 
to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment because I believe that this is 
the wrong bill and it's the wrong time to consider it.
  But I should say that there is no one in this House who has more 
respect from both sides of the aisle on cyber issues than the gentleman 
from Rhode Island. He and I, I know, started working together on cyber 
issues as far back as 2003. We continue to work together in leading the 
Emerging Threats Subcommittee, as well as both of us being members of 
the Intelligence Committee. But the gentleman from Rhode Island has 
clearly been one of the country's leaders on cyber, as he mentioned, 
cochairing the CSIS Commission on Cyber, which was a very important 
contribution to the proposals and the urgency with which this issue 
must be dealt.
  And so I would say that he and I are in total agreement on the 
importance of this issue and the necessity of this country and this 
government and this Congress taking action on cyber. I would say he and 
I are largely in agreement on the things that should be done.
  But having said that, I must remind everyone that just a few days ago 
the White House sent to Congress a substantial list of proposals on 
what it believes should be done on cybersecurity. I think the thing 
that makes the most sense is for us to take a little time and look at 
what the White House proposed, look at what the gentleman from Rhode 
Island has proposed, and I think there are some other suggestions out 
there that need to be considered and need to be in the mix.
  It is certainly true that some sort of organizational reform may be 
needed here. But if so, it extends far beyond the Department of 
Defense, and that is the subject of this bill, which is one of the 
reasons I believe that this is an inappropriate place to take up the 
wide-ranging proposals that the gentleman from Rhode Island has put 
before us today.
  As a matter of fact, other than the FISMA language, which I think 
there is widespread agreement needs to be updated, other than that, 
most of this other language that the gentleman has proposed is outside 
the Department of Defense and, therefore, I would suggest is not 
appropriate for this bill.
  The other thing I've got to mention is that the gentleman's amendment 
does come at a cost and the offset of the amendment is to reduce the 
O&M funds from the Department of Defense by $1.5 billion. So, in 
effect, we are making the Department of Defense be the bill payer for 
the rest of the government to get its act together. And I think given 
our serious financial constraints in defense, given the appropriate 
equities involved, that that would be a mistake.
  But I want to be clear that the gentleman from Rhode Island has been 
a, if not the, leader in the House on putting forward important 
proposals to improve our cybersecurity. I think his proposals 
definitely need to be seriously considered. But in this bill, it is 
inappropriate. And at this time, I also believe it would be premature.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. First of all, I want to thank the gentleman from Texas 
for his kind comments and supportive comments of the work I've done on 
cybersecurity. And likewise, I want to acknowledge his leadership and 
the cooperation that we've had on this issue and many others both on 
the Armed Services Committee and the House Intelligence Committee. I 
clearly respect the work the gentleman has done, his passion and hard 
work on protecting the Nation on cyber, and I look forward to our 
continued work together.

                              {time}  2040

  I would, of course, just respectfully disagree that we should hold 
off and actually take steps to act on this critical issue now. I have 
worked on, as the gentleman has noted, and have studied this issue for 
quite some time. I know that this is a moving target, moving faster 
than what we are prepared for right now in terms of how we are 
organized and how we are defending ourselves. We are too vulnerable. 
Our enemies are too aggressive and too far ahead. We need to get better 
organized and have a more effective response. This amendment would 
clearly get us further down the road in terms of where we need to be in 
terms of protecting ourselves.
  With that, I would urge my colleagues to support it, and I yield back 
the balance of my time.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that there are 
provisions in this bill related to cybersecurity. It is not as if we 
are doing nothing. Yet, as I noted in the comments I made in the 
general debate portion of this bill, there is much work ahead. I have 
no doubt the gentleman from Rhode Island, as well as the other Members 
interested in cyber, will be participating in that.
  As I mentioned at the beginning, however, I believe this is not the 
proper bill nor the proper time to take up this very comprehensive, 55-
page thoughtful amendment that the gentleman has offered.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

[[Page H3660]]

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode Island 
will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 50 Offered by Mr. Amash

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 50 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Strike section 1034 (page 440, line 16 through page 441, 
     line 21).

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Amash) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the debate 
time for consideration of amendment No. 50 be expanded by 10 minutes 
and that such time shall be equally divided and controlled by the 
gentleman from Michigan and myself.
  The Acting CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
from California?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, my amendment is simple. It deletes section 
1034, the new Authorization for Use of Military Force.
  Section 1034 contains, perhaps, the broadest authorization for use of 
military force Congress has ever considered. In doing so, it 
essentially delegates nearly all of Congress' constitutional war powers 
to the President. It expands Congress' use of force to include 
``associated forces,'' a group the bill does not define. Under section 
1034, associated forces don't need to be connected to 9/11. Associated 
forces don't need to have fought against the United States, and 
associated forces may even include American citizens.
  There is no geographical limit to the authorization. Force may be 
used worldwide at the President's discretion. Please join me in 
opposing this broad, new AUMF. Please support amendment No. 50.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, section 1034 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act would affirm the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force and the ability to go after terrorists who are part of 
or substantially supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces.
  I want to be very clear. This section does not alter the way the war 
on terror is currently being fought. Our members and staff have spent 
many weeks and months discussing the proposed text of section 1034 with 
Ranking Member Smith, his staff, outside experts, and legal scholars. 
In the end, we decided to use the same interpretation used by the Obama 
administration so as not to create any confusion or any doubt as to the 
legal authorities our military is currently operating under.
  That is my priority first and always--to ensure our troops have 
Congress' express affirmation that they are fighting the war and 
risking their lives in our defense on solid legal ground.
  While courts have accepted the administration's position, this could 
change any day. I am not willing to take that chance when it comes to 
something as critical as defending the United States against terrorism. 
As former CIA Director Michael Hayden said in a letter to me this week, 
section 1034 ``will send a powerful statement to those on whom we 
depend for our defense. Press on with our support. It also sends a 
powerful message to our adversaries in this conflict. The American 
people remain united in their resolve to see this through to success.'' 
I stand in strong opposition to this amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. AMASH. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment, 
which strikes the dangerous, far-reaching section 1034 of this Defense 
bill.
  I thank my colleague Mr. Amash for his leadership and for working 
with all of us in a bipartisan fashion on this effort.
  On September 14, 2011, which was 3 days after the horrific events of 
9/11, the Authorization of Use of Force was brought to the floor. I 
voted against this because it was overly broad, and it amounted to a 
blank check to wage war at any time, anywhere and at any place.
  It was the most difficult vote that I had cast because I was the only 
one to vote against this resolution, and I will always remember that 
sad evening when we returned from the National Cathedral memorial 
services for the victims and the families of 9/11. The entire country 
was angry and in mourning for the senseless loss of life and injuries 
resulting from such a brutal terrorist attack. There was very little 
debate on this resolution then, which took us to what has become the 
longest war in American history.
  So let's be clear. Section 1034 goes even beyond that original 
authorization. It amounts to a declaration of war--without end, 
anywhere in the world, regardless of whether there is a danger to the 
United States. If the original authorization were a blank check, 
section 1034 would amount to an entire checkbook of blank checks.
  This sweeping provision is dangerous. It should not be included in 
such a massive bill with, once again, little or no debate. It should be 
removed. I urge every Member of the House to consider carefully the 
ramifications of destroying the balance of powers that exist to protect 
this democracy and our Nation. So I urge an aye vote on this amendment.
  I want to thank Mr. Amash, once again, for trying to strike this so 
that we can move in the right direction to really begin to end the 
longest war in American history.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield at this time 2 minutes 
to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
  I have just five questions. I understand we've got people on both 
sides of this issue, and I respect them; but if we ask the five 
questions, I think we'd vote against this amendment.
  The first one is this: Do we need to use military force against al 
Qaeda, the Taliban and the people who are supporting them, or don't we?
  There are some in here, as they just talked about, who didn't support 
using military force at the beginning, and they don't support it now. I 
respect them. I just think we're not going to defeat these forces 
through our words or by ignoring them. I think the answer is clear. We 
need to use all the force that is necessary and appropriate to defeat 
them. This legislation does that.
  Second: Should Congress write the language to authorize that or leave 
it solely to the executive and judicial branches? I think we ought to 
do it.
  Third: Is this the right language? It is the exact same language that 
the executive has put forward and that the judiciary has put forward. 
We are marrying them.
  Four: Does it go too far? It doesn't go too far. With all the red 
herrings that are there, if you go back and read the language, it 
clearly says it does not supersede or change the War Powers Act. The 
War Powers Act was violated then, and it is violated now with this 
language.
  The final question, Mr. Chairman, is simple: Should we adopt this 
amendment? The answer is just as simple: not if we want to do 
everything necessary to defend and protect the United States of America 
against terrorist attacks.

                              {time}  2050

  Mr. AMASH. Recognizing that this new AUMF goes beyond the original 
AUMF, at this time I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
  (Mr. JONES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of striking section 
1034.
  I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan for this time. I was so 
concerned about this provision that I contacted a professor that I know 
very well, Jules Lobel, a noted constitutional professor at the 
University of Pittsburgh. And at my request, he has examined this 
provision and has provided me the following analysis. Again,

[[Page H3661]]

I cannot give all the analysis because of limited time, but I want to 
read this point to you:
  ``Section 1034 authorization for the President to use force against 
any group or individual that he determines is associated with al Qaeda 
or the Taliban is overbroad and could potentially permit a President to 
expansively use force against terrorist groups around the world. Under 
international law, you cannot kill someone anywhere in the world simply 
because of their association with an entity against which you are at 
war, although under certain circumstances, you can detain them, if 
captured. This authorization is too vague and expansive.''
  I hope that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will look at 
this very carefully and join us in trying to strike this provision. 
Again, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for this time.
  Section 1034 is mixing up two different things--detention authority 
and the authorization to use force--and could therefore authorize 
something which the Administration has not yet claimed the power to do. 
The Administration's March 13 filing in court recognized this 
distinction, and explicitly limited that filing to its authority to 
detain people at Guantanamo:
  ``This position is limited to the authority upon which the Government 
is relying to detain the persons now being held at Guantanamo Bay. It 
is not, at this point, meant to define the contours of authority for 
military operations generally, or detention in other contexts.''
  But the new authorization, with the Chairman's remarks, takes a 
government position that was ``limited'' to the authority to detain 
persons at Guantanamo, and uses it ``to define the contours of 
authority for military operations generally'', which has potentially 
expansive and unforeseen consequences in the future. Congress should 
not be authorizing war against all groups vaguely ``associated'' with 
Al Qaeda anywhere in the world, even if, in certain circumstances we 
can detain persons captured in battle who are associated with the 
enemy, or persons who are detained by other nations and transferred to 
us.
  Moreover, the Administration's detention authority over persons 
detained at Guantanamo is subject to habeas review by federal courts. 
Therefore, a person who the government claims is ``associated'' with 
the enemy in such a manner as to justify detention, can challenge the 
government claim in court. However, a Presidential use of force against 
associated forces around the world would not likely be subject to 
judicial review, and therefore Congress could be authorizing 
essentially unfettered Executive discretion in using force against 
unnamed and undefined people or groups worldwide, under standards that 
the Administration has thus far not clearly defined.
  Second, even were the provision limited to detention, it would still 
be problematic. The Obama Administration's claim to detention authority 
is more limited in some respects than Bush Administration's was, and 
that some judges of the D.C. Circuit would allow. But there remain 
disputes over the breadth of the government's power to detain people as 
enemy combatants who are captured outside of any battlefield or are 
detained because they are ``supporting'' or ``associated'' with the 
enemy. The Supreme Court has not yet decided these issues. This bill 
seems to affirm the Obama Administration's and D.C. Circuit view, and 
apply it to detainees more generally, although it adds vagueness 
because the chairman says that ``this affirmation is not intended to 
limit or alter the President's existing authority pursuant to the 
AUMF''.
  In sum, my main point is that section 1034 is flawed because it is 
codifies a detention-specific standard to apply to the use of force 
more generally, including the targeting people living in other nations, 
with potentially expansive and unforeseen consequences in the future.
  Congress should be limiting the President's authority to engage in 
this limitless, undefined war--not affirming and potentially expanding 
it.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to insert into 
the Record a letter from former Attorney General of the United States 
Michael B. Mukasey. Just one short thing. He says, ``Your new 
legislation would not confer new powers, but rather would add order and 
rationality to what has been an improvisational exercise overseen by 
judges who do not have the fact-finding.''
                                                     May 20, 2011.
     Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The legislation you have proposed to 
     update and clarify the Authorization for the Use of Military 
     Force (``AUMF''), passed in September 2001 in the wake of the 
     attacks on the United States that occurred that month, is 
     both timely and constructive.
       Since its passage, the AUMF has not been updated to reflect 
     the evolving nature and origin of the Islamist threat against 
     this country. Indeed, there are organizations, including the 
     Pakistani Taliban, that are arguably not within its reach, 
     and although we have fought and detained thousands of enemy 
     fighters captured not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also 
     in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan, and continue to detain 
     hundreds, the AUMF does not even refer to detention, let 
     alone prescribe standards for detention. As a result of this 
     inaction, we have simply allowed policy makers and judges to 
     improvise how we deal with the evolving terrorist threat and 
     how we treat those we encounter on the battlefield. The 
     increased use of remotely piloted aircraft--drones--has 
     allowed us to strike lethally, but because dead men tell no 
     tales and records destroyed in drone attacks cannot be 
     exploited, we may unconsciously be defaulting toward 
     strategies that do not allow us to act as effectively as we 
     might if we captured terrorists instead of killing them.
       Your new legislation would not confer new powers, but 
     rather would add order and rationality to what has been an 
     improvisational exercise overseen by judges who do not have 
     the fact-finding resources of Congress, or the accountability 
     that comes from being responsible for protecting the national 
     security.
       I cannot for the life of me understand the opposition to 
     this measure that is coming from people who profess to be 
     concerned with civil liberties and the rule of law, and yet 
     seem to prefer an improvisational arrangement that does not 
     make us face up to the fact that we are detaining people. If 
     anything, such a system creates the occasion for offloading 
     our detention responsibility to countries that will treat 
     detainees much less humanely than we would, or killing 
     instead of capturing, which can hardly be said to present a 
     humane alternative or one governed by legal principles.
       I would welcome the opportunity to provide whatever help 
     and input I can.
           Yours sincerely,
                                               Michael B. Mukasey.

  I yield 1 minute to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. West).
  Mr. WEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I 
think as we look across this Chamber, there are very few Members that 
have ever served on a 21st century battlefield, a 21st century 
battlefield that is comprised of nonstate, nonuniform belligerents who 
have no respect for borders or boundaries.
  All this amendment in section 1034 says is that we affirm that we are 
engaged in an armed conflict. It has a very narrow definition. And it 
also looks at the global conflagration in which we are in. And it also 
addresses that we should be seeking to remove these belligerents off of 
the battlefield.
  I have had the experience in 2003 in Iraq. I have had the experience 
for 2\1/2\ years in Afghanistan. And if we allow an amendment such as 
this to go forth, it would have precluded us from going in and killing 
the world's number one terrorist, Osama bin Laden. And if this 
amendment is allowed to pass, then we will not be able to go after al-
Awlaki and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We will not be able to go 
after Mullah Omar, who is the head of the Taliban. We will not be able 
to go after Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is in charge of the Haqqani 
Islamic terrorist network. It would not allow us to go and deny this 
enemy sanctuary.
  I want to say this one last thing. There are two West Point cadets 
that are interns that are serving with me. If we do not have the 
courage to affirm and declare there is an enemy, how can we send them 
onto the battlefield?
  Mr. AMASH. Recognizing that Osama bin Laden was killed under the old 
AUMF, not the new broader language, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
distinguished ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I think the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
Forbes) raises the right questions. And definitely, we do need to go 
after these folks militarily. Clearly, it would also be better if 
Congress spoke. But where I disagree with him is on the question of 
whether or not this goes too far and expands that authority. And I do 
very strongly disagree with the arguments of Mr. West from Florida.
  The President does have the authority. He had the authority to do the 
bin Laden raid, as Mr. Amash just pointed out, within the existing 
branch of authority. I do want to compliment the chairman of this 
committee for his hard work in working on this issue. I think it would 
be an important thing for the Armed Services Committee, for this 
Congress to speak on what the authorization of use of military force

[[Page H3662]]

should be beyond just linking it back to 9/11.
  But when you put in associated forces, and when you don't have any 
end date, it does confer upon the President the potential for a great 
deal of power over a long period of time. And it is important to point 
out the President right now, forget the original AUMF, the President 
under just the interpretation of the Constitution and laws of this 
country absent of that has a great deal of authority.

  Let's remember President Clinton was the first person to take a shot 
at Osama bin Laden back in 1998, when we launched cruise missiles at a 
compound where we thought he was in Afghanistan. There was no AUMF at 
that point. The President has fairly broad authorities conferred by the 
Constitution and the Court's interpretation of it to prosecute that war 
in the way that we want it to be done. The question is whether or not 
this language broadens that authority to the point where we all have to 
be concerned about the level of power that we are turning over to the 
Executive. That's really the balance we're trying to strike here.
  Yes, Congress should speak. But Congress should also not speak in a 
way that gives the executive branch too broad authority. I believe the 
language in the bill goes too far in that direction, and therefore I 
support the amendment.
  Mr. McKEON. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert 
another letter into the Record. This is from General Michael Hayden, 
former CIA director. I will quote just a part. ``Those whom we have 
charged with protecting us need clarity in both their mission and in 
the legal underpinning that justifies it. This act does exactly that.''
                                                      24 May 2011.
     Hon. Howard P. McKeon,
     House of Representatives, Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to offer my support and, 
     frankly, my thanks for the language in the National Defense 
     Authorization Act that reaffirms and updates the language in 
     the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.
       In 2007, speaking to the representatives of our European 
     allies, I attempted to outline for them how we at the CIA--
     and, indeed, how we throughout the American security 
     community--viewed our task operationally, ethically and 
     legally: winning a conflict against al Qa'eda and its 
     affiliates, a conflict that was global in its scope and which 
     therefore required us to take the fight to this enemy.
       Two Presidents, the Congress and the Courts have affirmed 
     that this is indeed true, but this is a different kind of 
     conflict, against a non-state adversary, and there are those 
     who would cloud this question and claim that the laws at 
     armed conflict do not apply and that we should confine our 
     response to other (e.g., law enforcement) models. As time has 
     passed since 9-11, these arguments have become more 
     commonplace and frankly more confusing to those on whom we 
     depend for our safety.
       Those whom we have charged with protecting us need clarity 
     in both their mission and in the legal underpinning that 
     justifies it. This Act does exactly that, in unambiguous 
     language, adding yet another Congressional sanction to 
     Presidential statements that a state of armed conflict exists 
     between the United States and al Qa'eda, and its affiliates. 
     The Act also reaffirms that activities routinely incident to 
     such conflicts--like detention of enemy combatants for the 
     duration of the conflict--are inherently justified.
       This will send a powerful statement to those on whom we 
     depend for our defense: ``Press on with our support!'' it 
     also sends a powerful message to our adversaries in this 
     conflict: ``The American people remain united in their 
     resolve to see this through to success.''
           Yours Sincerely,
                                                 Michael V. Hayden

  I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Griffin).
  Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this 
amendment. The U.S. has been detaining individuals pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force which was passed by Congress, 
signed into law. We have been detaining those individuals for almost 10 
years now. The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted that the AUMF provides 
the authority to detain these individuals. Congress, however, has never 
explicitly recognized this detention authority.
  In a March 13, 2009 memo, the President stated that he has the 
authority to detain persons who planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist acts that occurred on 9/11, and persons who 
harbored those responsible. It also stated that the President has the 
authority to detain persons who were part of or substantially supported 
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.
  The affirmation from Congress that section 1034 provides is essential 
to supporting the President's own interpretation of his detention 
authority, and will clarify for the courts the legal authority for the 
detention of these individuals. Congress has been silent for nearly 10 
years, silent for too long on specifying the President's authority to 
detain these individuals.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. McKEON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas. Congress has left it to the courts to make 
wartime policy. The military relies on the same interpretation when 
deciding whom it can lawfully target or detain, and the military 
deserves a clear and concise interpretation from Congress. It is time 
that we give them this clear interpretation.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the time remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has 4\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. AMASH. I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, we support the authority of our President 
to relentlessly hunt down those who attacked us on 9/11 anywhere, at 
any time. But we do not support the right of this or any future 
President to wage war anywhere, at any time, and I believe that's what 
the underlying bill does.
  The underlying bill says that you can engage in the current armed 
conflict against a nation that has substantially supported al Qaeda. 
There is a record that suggests that Iran has substantially supported 
al Qaeda in Iraq. I don't think the Members of this body think that we 
have the power to attack Iran without further congressional action.
  There is evidence that Hezbollah has supported al Qaeda and similar 
organizations. I don't think the Members of this body think that we 
have the right to attack Lebanon and Hezbollah without further action 
of this Congress.
  We should never relent in going after those who attacked us on 9/11, 
but we should never ignore the constitutional prerogative of this House 
and the Senate to engage in the declaration of war.

                              {time}  2100

  Mr. McKEON. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
  Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment to delete section 1034.
  Section 1034 is the equivalent of a new declaration of war, but it 
contains no clear objective. No longer would we be seeking out those 
responsible for the attacks of September 11. In fact, all references to 
September 11 are removed. Instead, it merely affirms that the United 
States is at war. But it doesn't say why. It doesn't say what we are 
trying to achieve. It doesn't even mention an identifiable whom, with 
whom we are at war.
  Unlike the 2001 AUMF, it does not contain any description of harm 
that has occurred or that we are seeking to prevent. How will anyone be 
able to declare success when the objective itself is so amorphous? How 
will we know when we have won the war?
  Section 1034 expands the targets of military action from those 
responsible for the September 11 attacks to all members of al Qaeda, 
the Taliban and ``associated forces'' and those who ``directly support 
associated forces.'' But ``associated forces'' is undefined and so is 
``directly support.''
  Does it mean providing a meal to a person who later becomes a suicide 
bomber, even though they are not affiliated with al Qaeda or the 
Taliban, and you had no means of knowing that they were a suicide 
bomber in the future? Does the President have unfettered discretion to 
take this country to war against any country or any group he deems 
associated with the Taliban? Under this section, it would seem so.

[[Page H3663]]

  Mr. Chairman, we must not delegate such power to the President. 
Indeed, such a broad unlimited delegation is probably unconstitutional. 
We haven't considered this section in any committee as far as I know, 
and yet it could profoundly change the scope and duration of our 
military efforts.
  Mr. Chairman, we should pass this amendment, scrap this provision, 
and send it back to committee to start all over again if we need a 
redefinition of the existing AUMF.
  But this amendment must pass; this section must not pass. The 
President must not have the total discretion to take this country to 
war with anybody, at any time, under any circumstances, under his sole 
discretion.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert at this time an 
editorial from the Los Angeles Times into the Record, and I will read 
just a little bit of it:
  ``The New York Times sees the term `associated forces' as so vague 
that it could include `anyone who doesn't like America, even if they 
are not connected in any way with the 2001 attacks. It could even apply 
to domestic threats.' That is an exaggerated, if not paranoid, 
characterization of the language.''

               [From the Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011]

            A War Against Anyone Who Doesn't Like the U.S.?

                          (By Michael McGough)

       Language in a new defense bill could authorize the military 
     ``to pursue anyone suspected of terrorism, anywhere on earth, 
     from now to the end of time.'' So says a New York Times 
     editorial, but the issue is not so-clear cut.
       New language contained in a defense bill does tweak the 
     Authorization for Use of Military Force approved by Congress 
     after 9/11, but it does so to shore up existing policies, not 
     to license a broader war on terror.
       What's the difference between the two documents?
       The AUMF, as it's called, authorized the president to ``use 
     all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
     organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
     committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
     September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
     persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
     terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
     organizations or persons.''
       The House Defense Authorization bill says this: ``As the 
     United States nears the 10th anniversary of the attacks on 
     September 11, 2001, the terrorist threat has evolved as a 
     result of intense military and diplomatic pressure from the 
     United States and its coalition partners. However, Al Qaeda, 
     the Taliban, and associated forces still pose a grave threat 
     to U.S. national security. The Authorization for Use of 
     Military Force necessarily includes the authority to address 
     the continuing and evolving threat posed by these groups.''
       The New York Times sees the term ``associated forces'' as 
     so vague that it could include ``anyone who doesn't like 
     America, even if they are not connected in any way with the 
     2001 attacks. It could even apply to domestic threats.'' That 
     is an exaggerated, if not paranoid, characterization of the 
     language which seems designed to cover groups like Al Qaeda 
     in the Arabian Peninsula.
       There is one problematic section of the authorization: 
     language saying that the president has the authority ``to 
     detain certain belligerents until the termination of 
     hostilities.'' This language is a significant departure from 
     the AUMF, though it comports with President Obama's view of 
     his authority to hold ``the worst of the worst'' 
     indefinitely.
       The real news about the language of the defense bill is 
     that it codifies Obama's view of what he can do.

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. AMASH. In closing, Mr. Chair, make no mistake: the power we were 
asked to give the President is beyond the power Congress gave the 
President in the wake of the largest terrorist attack in our history. 
Support amendment No. 50 and turn back this broad delegation of 
Congress' constitutional authority.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. May I ask how much time remains?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California has 4 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my friend 
and colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, there have clearly been a number of 
wild exaggerations and mischaracterizations about the effect of section 
1034. If Members have any doubt about where the truth lies, I recommend 
you look at editorials in The Washington Post, the L. A. Times, The 
Wall Street Journal, all of which support modernizing and updating the 
authorization for the use of military force. They clearly debunk some 
of the wild accusations that have been made.
  Let's take it back for just a second to the basics here. The current 
authorization for the use of military force passed this Congress on 
September 14, 2001. Now, smoke was still rising from the ruins of the 
Twin Towers in New York. The Taliban was still the Government of 
Afghanistan at that time. The Madrid train bombing, the London subway 
bombing, Indonesia nightclub bombing had yet to occur.
  But Congress believed that action should be taken giving the 
President the authority to go after those who perpetrated 9/11, and the 
AUMF authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those whom he determines authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
them.
  Now it is absolutely true, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee) 
voted against that. I believe she was the only one. Everybody else 
supported that authorization, and that was a decade ago. It has not 
changed since then.
  In the decade since, al Qaeda has changed. As a matter of fact, we 
have had testimony this year from the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center that the most serious threat to our homeland 
actually comes from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula headquartered in 
Yemen. They are the most serious threat now. With the death of Osama 
bin Laden, al Qaeda will change more. But yet the language that passed 
September 14, 2001, has not changed.
  One article noted that it is increasingly strained and artificial to 
tie everything the military is doing back to 9/11, and yet that's what 
the lawyers have to do now. They have to tie it all back to those 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Doing so depends upon the court 
interpretation of those lawyers' arguments. That's what our national 
security authority is dependent on at the moment.
  I believe it's clear we have got to update the authority. The 
question is: How do we update it?
  Now, here is one option. The gentleman said you remove all reference 
to 9/11. Well, we could add a list of other dates. We could say 
Congress gives the President the authority to go after those who aided, 
abetted, or committed the attacks of September 25, 2009, and the 
attacks of May 1, 2010--Times Square bombing, by the way, and the first 
one was the underwear bombing in Detroit--and the attacks of October 
29, 2010. That was the attempted toner cartridge bombing attack. Most 
of those, by the way, we think came from AQAP.

  The point is I don't think it's a very good way to legislate, to put 
a bunch of dates in there of the various attacks and the President is 
authorized to go over who did those various attacks. That's not a good 
way to do it.
  A much better approach is to take the exact arguments this 
administration is using in court to justify what it's doing right now 
and saying, yes, we will take that language. It makes it clear. It's 
what we are doing now, but Congress will do it this time rather than 
rely on court interpretations of what they are doing.
  So, somebody might ask, well, why bother if that's what they are 
doing now? You know, why do you mess with it? Well, number one, it's 
less time with the lawyers straining and stretching language to fit 
back to the attacks of September 11. I would say, number two, nearly 
everybody in this House is concerned about our relevance in authorizing 
the use of military force in various engagements.
  Now, are we going to sit back there and stick our heads in the sand 
while the courts do all our work for us, or are we going to take action 
to reflect what's really happened?
  It's time to take action now.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.

[[Page H3664]]

                Amendment No. 53 Offered by Mr. Campbell

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 53 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 548, after line 8, add the following new section:

     SEC. 1115. TERMINATION OF HUMAN, SOCIAL, AND CULTURE BEHAVIOR 
                   (HSCB) MODELING PROGRAM.

       Effective as of October 1, 2011, or the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the program of the 
     Department of Defense commonly known as the Human, Social, 
     and Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program is terminated.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Campbell) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

                              {time}  2110

  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, we have a huge deficit. Everybody knows 
that. We have a terribly enormous debt. Everybody knows that. None 
other than the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State have 
said that our national debt is, in fact, a national security issue and 
we need to deal with it. And we are. We are reducing spending in a 
number of Departments in a number of areas. We're talking about 
reforming entitlement programs in order to save them. And we are asking 
lots of Departments and lots of areas to reduce waste and duplication 
and to operate more efficiently and do the things they are doing with 
less money.
  There is no reason, Mr. Chairman, that we should not look for said 
duplication, said waste and ask the Department of Defense to do the 
same so that we can attack this deficit and this debt.
  This amendment would terminate the Human Social and Cultural Behavior 
Modeling program at the Department of Defense. Now as kind of obtuse as 
the name of that program sounds, I'm actually not going to criticize 
the value of some of the information in the program of the Defense 
Department. The reason I'm offering this amendment to terminate this 
program is because it's entirely duplicative, because these things are 
done elsewhere and by other people, and we don't need to spend the 
millions and millions of dollars that we are currently in the 
Department of Defense on grant programs.
  There are currently university research initiatives at the Army, Navy 
and the Department of the Air Force that are duplicative of this 
general Defense Department. There are Department events, university and 
industry research centers which conduct university research which can 
and do some of this work and are totally duplicative of what this 
program does.
  And I'm going to read you a list of things that this program does 
research on. And as I read you this list, think about how universities 
in the normal course of their business know this stuff, research this 
stuff, figure this stuff out, and we don't have to have a separate 
program to do it. Topography, that is part of this program, small 
business innovation, human behavior, socioeconomics, sociocultural 
response studies, engineering, globalization, population research, 
morality and values, and the quality of government, politics and 
education.
  Now, these are all things I'm sure the Department of Defense needs to 
know to do their job, but they can get this information from any number 
of other programs currently in the Department of Defense or from 
universities that are doing this research on their own. This will save 
millions of dollars and help with one of the greatest national security 
threats we have, which is our deficit and our debt.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I certainly appreciate the gentleman from California's 
commitment to deficit reduction, but I'm afraid that this particular 
amendment is short-sighted. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, more and more 
of what our troops are doing is living with, working with, and 
cooperating with the Afghans or the native peoples wherever they happen 
to be. Helping those peoples to defend themselves is far better and 
cheaper for us than having us defend them ourselves.
  But a basic tenet to make that work is to understand the culture and 
the social dynamics of those various populations, which are different, 
of course, from one place to another. It is a basic tenet of 
counterinsurgency that you have to understand the population you are 
there to protect.
  This program that the gentleman wants to eliminate is a significant 
research program to see if modeling that sort of social dynamics will 
work. And I would say to the gentleman that the Defense Science Board 
looked at this very program earlier this year and found that it was one 
of the emerging technologies where investment is likely to have the 
highest payoff--the highest payoff.
  The report went further to say, consistent to some extent with what 
the gentleman was saying, that there is other work being done in this 
area. But the Defense Science Board found there is a major shortfall in 
the availability and maturity of these capabilities, and these 
simulations do not generalize to other environments and require further 
investment to make them useful for the next potential conflict.
  So there is work being done in this area in a civilian context, but 
it does not automatically translate to the military context, and that 
is why the Defense Science Board says that this emerging technology is 
one investment likely to have the highest payoff.
  And so the bottom line is that we need to pursue this to reduce the 
danger to our troops and to make sure that their work is more 
effective. This is a good investment by the Defense Science Board and I 
believe by other studies as well.
  With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. May I inquire as to how much time I have remaining.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my colleague from Texas's remarks. Again, 
just to reiterate, I am not challenging the value or the use to the 
Department of Defense of some of the information. What I am challenging 
is whether we need an entirely separate program. We have been talking 
about the Department of Education, multiple programs in that Department 
that do the same thing, the Department of Energy, the Department of 
Agriculture. All kinds of Departments have duplicative programs because 
we built these things up over the years.
  This is one of those programs. None other than the Heritage 
Foundation has identified this as a program that is entirely 
duplicative and that this work is and can be done and is being done 
through other DOD programs or for private research that doesn't have to 
be funded by DOD. And I think everyone here knows the Heritage 
Foundation is not exactly a bastion of anti-defense or weak on our 
national security.
  So my argument here is that if we don't look at this sort of thing in 
every Department, including in the Department of Defense, we're never 
going to get a handle on this deficit. There is waste in Defense too. 
There is duplication in Defense too. And we need to start to begin to 
reduce it. I think this is a small step. I would ask for Members' 
support.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. How much time remains for me?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would yield myself 30 seconds simply 
to say I understand the gentleman's argument. I would simply say the 
Defense Science Board has looked at this program, and it comes to a 
different conclusion. They believe this program has potentially the 
highest payoff, that it is unique and beyond what is happening in the 
civilian sector or other defense Departments. And that was February 
2011 when the Defense Science Board report came out.
  Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remaining time to the ranking member,

[[Page H3665]]

the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I just want to rise to speak 
on this matter. This is a critically important issue. And I worked with 
Mr. Thornberry on this when I chaired the terrorism subcommittee and he 
was the ranking member of the subcommittee that has since been renamed 
and that he now chairs.
  This is not duplicative. This is an area where, frankly, we weren't 
spending enough time early enough in Iraq or in Afghanistan to 
understand the people that we were working with and to get ourselves 
into a better position to turn over responsibility for security and 
governance in Iraq and Afghanistan as quickly as possible. We didn't 
understand what we were getting into because we didn't have the social 
and cultural awareness. We need to gain greater understanding in those 
areas.
  And one particularly important aspect of this is as you gather the 
information, how do you compile it in such a way that's useful. That's 
what this modeling program is supposed to do. You can gather all kinds 
of information all over the place, but if nobody knows how to actually 
use that information, compile it, put it together and pick out what is 
most important to get the lessons learned out of that, then you're not 
getting the true benefit of the program, which is a big part of what 
this does. It uses updated technology and updated software to figure 
out how to find the patterns that are critical to helping us do our 
job.
  So I would simply agree with the gentleman from Texas and urge a 
``no'' vote on this amendment. It is a relatively small program that 
makes a very, very big difference and hopefully will save us money by 
keeping us out of conflicts that we would rather not get into and 
enabling us to do this working through the local populations by having 
a better understanding of them.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
will be postponed.

                              {time}  2120


                Amendment No. 54 Offered by Mr. Campbell

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 54 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 548, after line 8, add the following new section:

     SEC. 1115. REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN POSITIONS 
                   WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Definitions, etc.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Defense;
       (2) the term ``civilian position'' means a position that is 
     required to be filled by a civilian employee of the 
     Department of Defense;
       (3) the term ``baseline number'' means the number of 
     civilian positions within the Department of Defense as of the 
     last day of the fiscal year in which occurs the date of 
     enactment of this Act; and
       (4) the number of civilian positions within the Department 
     of Defense as of any given date shall be determined and 
     expressed on a full-time equivalent basis.
       (b) Reductions.--The Secretary shall take appropriate 
     measures to ensure that the total number of civilian 
     positions within the Department of Defense does not exceed--
       (1) at the end of the 1st fiscal year beginning after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by 
     1 percent;
       (2) at the end of the 2nd fiscal year beginning after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by 
     2 percent;
       (3) at the end of the 3rd fiscal year beginning after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by 
     3 percent;
       (4) at the end of the 4th fiscal year beginning after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by 
     4 percent; and
       (5) at the end of the 5th fiscal year beginning after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by 
     5 percent.
       (c) Restriction.--The Secretary shall take appropriate 
     measures to ensure that no increase occurs in the procurement 
     of personal services by contract by reason of the enactment 
     of this section.
       (d) Regulations.--Any regulations necessary to carry out 
     this section shall be prescribed by the Secretary.
       (e) Termination.--The provisions of this section shall 
     terminate after the end of the 5th fiscal year beginning 
     after the date of enactment of this Act.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Campbell) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, as identified during the last amendment, 
we have debt, we have deficit, we need to look for things in the 
Department of Defense as well where we can look for efficiencies and 
expense reductions and still defend the country.
  Currently in the Department of Defense, we have somewhere approaching 
800,000 civilian employees. Let me repeat that. In the Department of 
Defense today, we have approximately 800,000 full-time, nonuniformed 
civilian employees. This does not include the roughly 1.5 million men 
and women in uniform, and it does not include all of the defense 
contractors. And I would love to tell you how many of those there are, 
but because we do not audit the Department of Defense, that information 
is not available so I don't know.
  So we have 800,000 people not uniformed working in the Department of 
Defense, not doing any of the stuff done by the contractors. Now, I 
could go through a long analysis of do we really need one nonuniformed 
person for every two uniformed people in the Department of Defense. Do 
we really need that many? But this amendment is very small in its scope 
and very small in what it intends to do.
  All it says is let's reduce that 800,000 head count by 1 percent a 
year for the next 5 years. So all this amendment says is: Next year, 
can we accomplish the mission of the U.S. military in the Department of 
Defense without touching anything having to do with a single man or 
woman in uniform, but with 99 percent of the nonuniformed personnel 
that we currently have? Somehow, I do not believe that is going to 
devastate our ability to defend this country. It is 1 percent a year 
for the next 5 years.
  So it is saying, 5 years from now, yes, we will have to do with 95 
percent of the nonuniformed personnel. But I think that is something we 
can do and something, again, where we can begin to save some money and 
deal with our greatest national security threat, which is our debt.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FORBES. I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
  (Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend from Virginia for yielding.
  I am entirely sympathetic to my friend from California's view that it 
is probable, maybe even certain, the Defense Department could function 
with fewer civilian employees than it does right now. And I think the 
Secretary of Defense shares our conviction because he has frozen the 
number of civilian employees at FY 2010 levels.
  Now, here is my concern with the gentleman's amendment. The 
gentleman's amendment makes it the law of the land that the correct 
number of civilian employees in the Department of Defense 5 years from 
now should be 40,000 persons, more or less, fewer than we have right 
now. I don't know if that is the right or the wrong number. And I would 
suggest, frankly, that none of us here know if that is the right or the 
wrong number.
  The proper way to go about this, which the Secretary has in fact 
done, is to make an assessment of the needs of the Department and the 
functions that it serves and then to balance those needs against the 
three ways you can serve those needs. You can either have civilian 
employees perform the task, you can hire outside contractors to perform 
the task, or you can delegate the task to uniformed employees. By 
choosing an arbitrary number of 40,000 civilian employees fewer than 
what we

[[Page H3666]]

have right now, it seems to me that we don't know if that fits the size 
of the job we have; and if it doesn't fit the size of the job that we 
have, it necessitates an increase of contracts or an increase of duties 
for uniformed personnel, the consequences of which none of us, frankly, 
have the ability to know.

  So I share the desire to properly fit the size of the civilian 
workforce to the job that has to be done. I just can't concluded with 
any degree of confidence that a workforce that is 40,000 persons fewer 
is the right fit. My concern is this would have the effect of shifting 
responsibilities to uniformed personnel when they have more urgent 
priorities to achieve.
  I would urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my colleague's comments; 
and, frankly, I don't disagree that it is arbitrary. I would argue that 
perhaps how we got to this 800,000 was not by anybody doing a great 
deal of planning either, so perhaps that is arbitrary.
  But, you know, if you want someone to start to be more efficient, you 
have to set some goals. You have to set some targets. This number has 
been growing, and growing steadily for years. Probably for decades, but 
it has certainly been growing for years. It has been unchecked. There 
has been no real review or evaluation of it.
  What I am trying to do here, and I am not arguing that there is 
anything scientific to the 1 percent, but it is to say: Let's start to 
get this under control. Let's start to evaluate this. And you know 
what? If we need to reevaluate it, we can reevaluate it. But let's say 
to the Department of Defense: You know what? This is a lot of people. 
We think that you can get by with less.
  I have talked to a number of uniformed personnel who believe a lot of 
these people actually get in their way, and they would much prefer that 
some of them were not there because they actually create a bureaucracy 
that interferes with the ability of the uniformed people to accomplish 
their mission.
  So what this amendment is trying to do, it is saying: Let's get into 
this and let's set a target and let's see if we can't get there, and 
let's see if we can't save some money along the way.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FORBES. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, it is a rare opportunity that you get to stand up and 
agree with two friends that you have on the floor, and the only thing 
we disagree with is the approach.
  I would say to the gentleman from California that he is absolutely 
right. We do need to start this. We need to set those targets. But the 
great news is that the chairman and the ranking member have done just 
that in this bill, because of all of the agencies, of all of the 
departments that we look at across the government, the one that we 
absolutely cannot be arbitrary on, the one that we cannot guess about, 
the target we cannot be off on is the Department of Defense. We have to 
be right there.
  And what we realize is that you cannot do this by setting an 
arbitrary target and working backwards. That gets you huge problems, 
exposes us to huge risks. We have to do it the opposite way.
  The first thing we have to do is we have to ascertain what the true 
risk assessment is, the threat assessment we have to this country, 
which we have not done because, quite honestly, it has been more 
budget driven than it has been threat assessment driven. But this bill 
moves us closer to doing that and finding out what that risk assessment 
is.

  The second thing after we do that is we have to determine what does 
it take to meet that risk, and what do we risk exposing the country to 
if we don't do it.
  The third thing is we have to find out where we are spending our 
money now and where that money is going, which we don't know. The 
gentleman is correct. We need to audit the DOD. That is where we are 
moving in this bill to do.
  After we have done those three steps, then we can come back, and the 
Congress ought to be a part of this, of saying here is the target and 
the number of employees we think that you need to get that job done.
  But, Mr. Chairman, I agree wholeheartedly with my good friend from 
New Jersey. This is not the right approach. It is a dangerous approach 
to arbitrarily look and say we are going to begin cutting these 
employees. We don't know what that will end up doing to the Department 
of Defense and to the defense of this country.
  So I hope we will reject this amendment, but continue along the line 
of what the gentleman has talked about, and make sure that we are 
moving toward defending this country in the most efficient way 
possible.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate both gentlemen's comments 
and their remarks and their tone and their tenor. I respectfully 
disagree because I think that, again, not a single uniformed person is 
being affected. This has nothing to do with that. I think 1 percent at 
least sends a message and is a start. And it is difficult to argue that 
it is going to devastate anything. I would ask support on the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California 
will be postponed.

                              {time}  2130

  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 55 printed in House 
Report 112-88.


                Amendment No. 56 Offered by Mr. Chaffetz

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 56 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 1217. SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES 
                   FROM AFGHANISTAN.

       (a) Commencement of Withdrawal.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
     with military commanders and the Government of Afghanistan, 
     shall commence a safe, responsible, and phased withdrawal of 
     units and members of the Army and Marine Corps deployed in 
     Afghanistan and military contractors operating in Afghanistan 
     and funded using amounts appropriated to the Department of 
     Defense.
       (b) Retention of Forces for Counter-terrorism Operations.--
     The Secretary of Defense may continue to deploy units and 
     members of the Army and Marine Corps in Afghanistan, and 
     military contractors supporting such forces, to conduct 
     small, targeted counter-terrorism operations.
       (c) Withdrawal Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     submit to Congress the plan for implementing the withdrawal 
     of United States ground forces, military equipment, and 
     military contractors supporting such forces from Afghanistan 
     as safely and quickly as possible pursuant to subsection (a). 
     The Secretary shall submit additional reports on the progress 
     of implementing the plan every 180 days thereafter.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Welch), and I ask unanimous consent 
that he be allowed to control that time.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Vermont will 
control the time.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. WELCH. I thank the gentleman from Utah.
  Members of the Committee, a test of a great democracy is its capacity 
to make the grave decision to send its citizens to war. Such a decision 
was made after the attack on September 11 of 2001. It was a bipartisan 
decision. It was made for the right reasons at the right time and for 
the right result.
  Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden planned and executed the


[[Page H3667]]

 9/11 mission from Afghanistan. And we sent our soldiers to war. 
Vermont soldiers and soldiers from all around the country sacrificed 
bravely and served well.

  But an equally grave challenge and test for a democracy is whether 
once that machinery of war has been put in gear, when circumstances 
change as the national security requires, can that democracy amend its 
decision, amend its policy as conditions have changed?
  We are at that moment today. It is a bipartisan question that faces 
us all. And the amendment that Mr. Chaffetz and I offer suggests that 
the policy that we are now pursuing, nation building in Afghanistan, is 
no longer the policy that is either financially sustainable nor in our 
best national security interests.
  There are three reasons: number one, the threat of al Qaeda has 
diminished in Afghanistan; the threat of terrorism in the world has 
not. This is not a nation state-centered threat. It is dispersed and 
decentralized. Mr. Chaffetz and I say let us have a decentralized and 
dispersed response.
  The tactics that were so successful in eliminating Osama bin Laden, 
excellent and coordinated intelligence and excellent and fierce special 
forces, was successful. Mr. Chaffetz and I, in our amendment, believe 
it is time for America to move from nation-state building to 
counterterrorism.
  Second, the situation in Afghanistan with an unreliable partner, 
incredible corruption that has been going from bad to worse, does not 
allow our military or our taxpayers to have any confidence that that 
nation-building strategy can be successful.
  So we call upon Congress to face this grave national security 
question from the perspective of is it time to change.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 1\1/2\ 
minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Coffman).
  Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Somebody asked me, as an Iraq war veteran, if I had learned any 
lessons from that war, and I said, Yes, never do it again.
  But I volunteered for Iraq because I believed that once we were 
involved in the fight that we had to reasonably finish that job. And my 
concern about Afghanistan is the fact that we are pretty far down this 
road. We know that the President's going to reduce the conventional 
footprint in July of this year. The President has already stated, as 
Commander in Chief, that he expects Afghan security forces to take 
operational control by 2014.
  And let me tell you something that I think we're not thinking about 
tonight, and that is, as a United States Marine Corps civil affairs 
officer working in Iraq, part of my job was to convince Iraqis to 
cooperate and to side with us, knowing that if we left expeditiously 
before the situation stabilized that they would be killed. And my 
counterparts, doing the same job in Afghanistan that I did in Iraq, 
have that challenge of convincing the people, the civilian population, 
to cooperate and to side with us. And if, in fact, we do an 
expeditious withdrawal and revert to counterterrorism, there will be 
many lives lost unnecessarily due to our conduct here tonight.

  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  I appreciate Mr. Welch for doing this in a bipartisan way.
  This amendment does a couple of basic things: one, it says we are 
going to withdraw our troops. It's trying to bring our troops home. 
Nobody should be disappointed in that. That in many ways is victory.
  But, number two, it does give the President and the Secretary of 
Defense the flexibility to conduct counterterrorism activities.
  The reality in today's world is that terrorism is real. There are 
people that want to kill and destroy the United States of America. And 
the death of Osama bin Laden, unfortunately, has not put an end to 
that. In many ways, it is a global war on terror.
  We've had 10 years of great success; and what this amendment does, in 
my opinion, is recognize the success that our troops have had over the 
last 10 years, the longest war in the history of the United States of 
America.
  Unfortunately, terrorism is not confined to the boundaries of just 
Afghanistan. We have to have the very best intelligence, both human and 
electronic. And when we have intelligence that shows that there is a 
clear and present danger to the United States of America, our special 
forces need to take out that threat. That requires deadly force. But 
that does not necessarily require a hundred thousand of our men and 
women serving in Afghanistan in what I believe has expanded into 
mission creep that is just allowing people to participate in nation 
building.
  I feel for the people of Afghanistan. They have lived for more than 
30 years in war. It is a difficult, difficult situation. But we have 
the very best fighting force in the world. If we're going to use those 
men and women and that fighting force in the right way, then we're 
going to have to deal with it differently.
  We should be proud of the fact that bringing our troops home is not 
putting our tail between our legs. It is victory. It is success. And we 
will continue to fight the fight.
  But it's global in nature. It's time to bring our troops home. Give 
the President and the Secretary the flexibility to take out the threat 
as it arrives in Afghanistan, and that's why I think this amendment is 
so important.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my friend from 
Virginia (Mr. Wittman).
  Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  I want to remind folks that we've learned some lessons through these 
years of conflict. I want to remind folks of what General Petraeus has 
learned through that process and knowing that counterterrorism has not 
been successful in the long term in getting us to where we need to be 
strategically in these areas and that the counterinsurgency strategy 
has worked. What we are seeing in Afghanistan is just that. Let's make 
sure that we're allowing that to work.
  When I was there recently, we've seen what's happening. We are 
training the Afghans to be able to take over their country, to make 
sure that they're going to be successful in maintaining order in that 
country; making sure that, as we have pushed terrorists out, those 
terrorists stay out. That is a long-term successful strategy--to 
secure, hold, build, and transition. Let's make sure that we allow that 
to happen.
  It's critical that we don't make an arbitrary transition to another 
strategy that we've seen in the past hasn't worked. And all of us want 
to make sure that we are getting our troops out of there.

                              {time}  2140

  But we also want to make sure that those sacrifices are not in vain. 
And we can go back and forth about what the end result is, but the end 
result is that we want to make sure that we're successful there in the 
long term.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have 
remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, we need to understand that we don't need 
to treat Afghanistan any different than we do the rest of the world. 
The reality is we have the very best fighting force in the world. We 
have been highly successful, but let's understand that bringing our 
troops home is something we should all be proud of.
  What we are failing to do right now, what this administration is 
failing to do--nobody has ever defined success, nobody has ever defined 
success. Let's bring our troops home. We are doing this in a bipartisan 
way. It's a reasonable and balanced approach to say, in 
counterterrorism, let's fight the terrorism that's out there, but let's 
also bring our troops home.
  May God bless the troops, and may God bless the United States of 
America. I appreciate the opportunity to present this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time we have 
remaining on our side?

[[Page H3668]]

  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
ranking member of the full committee, my friend, Mr. Smith.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I want to thank the Members who offered this 
amendment. I too support a drawdown in Afghanistan. I want to see us 
get to the point where we can bring our troops home, and I think we're 
making progress in that direction, but there are two things that I do 
want to correct. One, it's a little bit of a myth that no one has ever 
defined success. Success has been defined by the President clearly. We 
want a government in Afghanistan that can stand so that the Taliban and 
al Qaeda do not come back to power. That is success--when we are 
confident that that government can stand and we can draw down so that 
we don't go right back to where we were before 9/11. That is what we 
are trying to accomplish.
  And the second thing is, we all want to transition to a lesser 
mission, to be able to bring our troops home, and counterterrorism is 
the focus. We would not, however, have been able to run the mission 
against bin Laden that we did if we didn't have the broader support in 
Afghanistan. If we pull out and think that we can run a 
counterterrorism mission with a government that is collapsing around us 
and that does not support us, then we kid ourselves. That's why it is 
so important, as Mr. Coffman said so well, to make sure that we 
complete the mission and we have a government that can stand so that we 
can begin to responsibly draw down. I think it's important we draw 
down, but we have to do so in a responsible way.

  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my 
friend from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
  Mr. FORBES. I thank my friend from New Jersey.
  A week ago today I was in Afghanistan, and Mr. Chairman, I can tell 
you that if you listen to our troops there, if you talk to our general, 
they don't want us to pull the rug out from under them.
  Years ago, there were a group of planes that were lost off the coast 
of Florida and they were heading back toward the coastline and they 
lost their communications. Everything within them kept telling them 
turn around, turn around, you're heading in the wrong direction. 
Unfortunately, right before they reached the shoreline they did turn 
around and they ended up going back out to sea and getting lost.
  We have a timetable of 2014 that both our troops and the Afghans are 
working together to make that 2014 deadline. The last thing we want to 
do is pull that rug out from them now. And I know the temptation to say 
let's quit, we've put a lot of investment in there, it's too hard, 
let's turn around, but we need to be cautious that we don't do it too 
quickly because Afghanistan is different than the rest of the world, 
because the two greatest dangers we face in the world today are Iran 
getting nuclear weapons and extremists taking over nuclear weapons in 
Pakistan. Afghanistan is the bridge that could connect both of those.
  It's important, Mr. Chairman, that we not quit. Ask our troops. We 
have invested too much in lives, time, and money. Let's not turn back 
now. Let's get the job done--2014 is going to be here soon enough.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah will be 
postponed.


              Amendment No. 59 Offered by Mr. Rohrabacher

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 59 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title XII of division A of the 
     bill, add the following:

     SEC. 12XX. AUTHORITY TO REMOVE SATELLITES AND RELATED 
                   COMPONENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS 
                   LIST.

       (a) Authority.--Except as provided in subsection (b) and 
     subject to subsection (d), the President is authorized to 
     remove satellites and related components from the United 
     States Munitions List, consistent with the procedures in 
     section 38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2778(f)).
       (b) Exception.--The authority of subsection (a) may not be 
     exercised with respect to any satellite or related component 
     that may, directly or indirectly, be transferred to, or 
     launched into outer space by--
       (1) the People's Republic of China, including restrictions 
     contained in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
     Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), the Strom Thurmond 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
     (Public Law 105-261), and the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65); or
       (2) Burma, North Korea, Pakistan, or Venezuela or any 
     country that is a state sponsor of terrorism.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section--
       (1) the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means any 
     country the government of which the Secretary of State 
     determines has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
     international terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect 
     pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), 
     section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other provision of 
     law; and
       (2) the term ``United States Munitions List'' means the 
     list referred to in section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
       (d) Effective Date.--The President may not exercise the 
     authority provided in this section before the date that is 90 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, my amendment focuses on an issue that 
reflects a concern not only for our national security, but also for the 
prosperity of our country. I would like to thank the chairman and 
ranking member for agreeing to discuss this important issue with me 
tonight as part of my time. And I do intend at the end of this 
discussion, which should be considered a colloquy, my intent is to 
withdraw my amendment.
  What we are talking about is an important issue. We are talking about 
the President's authority to move satellites and related components 
from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. And this may 
sound rather bureaucratic, but it means whether or not there is going 
to be the transfer and sale of technology that we have developed with 
billions of dollars of Federal investment that is very important to our 
technology and the jobs in California, but also very important to our 
national security if these technologies would be put into the wrong 
hands.
  We have heard expert witness testimony that current regulations are 
harmful to national security, cost American jobs, and encourage other 
nations to develop competing technologies. Since Congress placed these 
items on the U.S. Munitions List--meaning satellites and these other 
technologies that we're referring to today--our worldwide market share 
for the manufacture of satellites and components has dropped 
dramatically.
  It has been widely reported that while U.S. firms accounted for 73 
percent of the world market for commercial satellites in 1998, that 
figure has since dropped below 30 percent. Global satellite 
manufacturers often pursue alternate ITAR-free sources, especially for 
commodity components and related items, simply to eliminate any risks 
associated with licensing delays, even if the export license is likely 
to be approved by U.S. regulators.
  The U.S. regulatory environment has particularly affected small U.S. 
satellite suppliers, which lack the organizational structure, staff, 
and marketing resources to offset the added burden of export control 
barriers in such a close, competitive climate in this high-tech 
business.
  Current U.S. satellite export controls are not slowing foreign space 
capabilities, but encouraging them. Foreign manufacturers now market 
ITAR-free satellites, and we are encouraging non-U.S. satellite 
research and development with the controls that are in place. But the 
national security concerns that led Congress to create the

[[Page H3669]]

current regulatory wall are still in place, and yet there are 
significant concerns existing regarding China, Iran, North Korea, 
Venezuela, and other terrorist-supporting states. We must continue to 
prohibit the transfer of these technologies to these nations, and we 
must prohibit U.S. satellite sales, I believe, to China. We especially 
must not permit U.S. satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets.
  Last year, the House endorsed the removal of satellites and 
components from the Munitions List, but it was clearly stated that 
there was an exception barring any transfers to generous nations and 
allowing no launches of American satellites on Chinese rockets. That 
should remain our position.
  At this time, I would yield several minutes to Mr. McKeon, the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. McKEON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California has 1 minute 
remaining.
  Mr. McKEON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. There has been no 
Member of Congress more active in promoting the space enterprise than 
my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher. He has also been a leader in ensuring U.S. 
space technology is not transferred to China. We share the same belief 
that a strong space industrial base is in the national security and 
economic interests of the United States, and that there is an 
opportunity to revise U.S. satellite export control policy. However, 
space technology is a U.S. technological crown jewel. Any revisions to 
our satellite export control policy must account for the national 
security risks of removing satellites and related components from the 
United States Munitions List.
  The Defense Department has begun a risk assessment and about 2 weeks 
ago provided Congress with an interim report, but their work is not yet 
complete. The interim report suggests that some satellite components 
could be removed from the U.S. Munitions List without posing an 
unacceptable security risk, but it also concludes that several 
components are critical to U.S. national security and should remain on 
the U.S. Munitions List.
  Before making significant changes in legislation, I would prefer that 
the committee do its due diligence. We need to allow the department to 
finish its risk assessment and conduct oversight hearings and briefings 
on this issue.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I will claim the time in 
opposition. I am not opposed, but I am happy to yield 30 seconds of 
that time to Mr. McKeon to finish his statement.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Washington is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
California.
  Mr. McKEON. I am committed to working with the gentleman from 
California and my ranking member to review our Nation's satellite 
export control policies and identify policy recommendations that would 
facilitate greater export opportunities for our aerospace companies 
while also preserving our national security.

                              {time}  2150

  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  As I mentioned, I'm not opposed to this amendment. In fact, I would 
support Mr. Rohrabacher's amendment. I understand the concerns of the 
chairman, but there is one point that I really want to make clear in 
this.
  Throughout this whole process, well over, gosh, I guess it's been 12 
years now since we passed this restriction, there has always been this 
notion that somehow we have to wait in order to be extra cautious--as 
if there is no risk in waiting. And that is where I think we are 
completely wrong. Absolutely. There is a risk in selling technology 
that could wind up in the wrong hands. And in the world we live in 
today, that's a risk we have to live with and attempt to manage.
  But what has never been properly understood in this body, and 
particularly on the Armed Services Committee, is the risk of excessive 
restrictions on U.S. companies' ability to export technology. And it is 
a risk precisely to our national security. It is not just a matter of 
jobs or business or the economy. This isn't national security versus 
economic strength.
  One of our great strengths as a Nation in terms of our defense is the 
superiority of our technology companies. We have companies here in the 
U.S. that we can rely on to give us the best equipment, the best 
technology to protect us. But, as Mr. Rohrabacher pointed out, we are 
losing that edge. We are ceasing to be the leaders in critical areas of 
technology, and nowhere is this more painfully clear than in the area 
of satellites. We have lost over 40 percent market share during that 
period to our competitors.
  When I was in Europe visiting some satellite companies 2 years ago, I 
came across an advertisement, something that was being put out in the 
trade papers by a European satellite company for an ITAR-free 
satellite. Well, what is an ITAR-free satellite? It's a satellite that 
has not one single U.S. component in it. Why? Because if it were ITAR-
free, they could much more freely export it and much, much more easily 
be competitive in selling that satellite technology. We were blocking 
out all U.S. companies from anything that goes into a satellite. And 
trust me, I've seen satellites. There is a heck of a lot that goes into 
them.
  Our companies are being severely disadvantaged, and that is 
undermining our ability to get access to those companies to build 
technologies we need to defend ourselves. Inaction is not the safe and 
correct course here.
  We have the evidence we need. I believe we need to go forward. And 
Mr. Rohrabacher's amendment makes sure that we're not selling this to 
China and other places we don't want to, but it does free up our 
companies to begin to compete before it's too late, before we lose that 
edge.
  Now, we've got the interim report. We don't have the final report. 
We've analyzed this thing for a long period of time. I personally don't 
think we need to wait for the final report. But I will be optimistic 
that we will get that final report between now and when we go to 
conference. And we'll get something done on this critical issue--
critical not just for U.S. companies, though certainly jobs and 
economic strength are matters of national security, but also critical 
for national security, itself, to make sure that U.S. companies can 
maintain the leadership role to help provide for our defense, to help 
work with our Defense Department as they do.
  So I would hope that we would adopt this. I know Mr. Rohrabacher is 
planning on withdrawing it, but I hope we continue to work on this 
issue.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I agree with the gentleman's assessment.
  Out of respect for the judgment of the chairman and his desire to 
make sure that the full interim report that the Congress has on this 
issue is studied and that the Defense Department finishes that report, 
I am willing to withdraw my amendment, but I agree with the points that 
you've made. I have great respect for the chairman and his care and 
concern about the safety of our country.
  I would, at this point, ask unanimous consent to withdraw my 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  There was no objection.


                 Amendment No. 60 Offered by Mr. Polis

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 60 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title XII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 12__. REDUCTION IN END STRENGTH LEVEL OF MEMBERS OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ASSIGNED TO 
                   PERMANENT DUTY IN EUROPE AND CORRESPONDING 
                   GENERAL END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS.

       (a) European End Strength Level.--Effective September 30, 
     2012, the end strength level of members of the Armed Forces 
     of the United States assigned to permanent duty ashore in 
     Europe may not exceed a permanent ceiling of 30,000 in any 
     fiscal year.

[[Page H3670]]

       (b) Exclusion of Certain Members.--For purposes of this 
     section, the following members of the Armed Forces are 
     excluded in calculating the end strength level of members of 
     the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent 
     duty ashore in Europe:
       (1) Members assigned to permanent duty ashore in Iceland, 
     Greenland, and the Azores.
       (2) Members performing duties in Europe for more than 179 
     days under a military-to-military contact program under 
     section 168 of title 10, United States Code.
       (c) Exceptions; Waiver.--This section shall not apply in 
     the event of a declaration of war or an armed attack on any 
     European member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization. The President may waive operation of this 
     section if the President declares an emergency and 
     immediately informs the Congress of the waiver band the 
     reasons therefor.
       (d) Repeal of Superceded End Strength Limitation.--Section 
     1002 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (22 
     U.S.C. 1928 note) is repealed.
       (e) Conforming Changes to Overall End Strength Levels.--
       (1) End strengths for active forces for fiscal year 2012 
     .--Notwithstanding section 401, the Armed Forces are 
     authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of 
     September 30, 2012, as follows:
       (A) The Army, 556,600.
       (B) The Navy, 325,239.
       (C) The Marine Corps, 202,000.
       (D) The Air Force, 328,800.
       (2) Continuation of reductions in subsequent fiscal 
     years.--For each of fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the end 
     strength numbers shall be reduced by an additional 10,000 a 
     year, as follows:
       (A) 5,400 a year from the Army.
       (B) 4,000 a year from the Air Force.
       (C) 500 a year from the Navy.
       (D) 100 a year from the Marine Corps.
       (3) Revision in permanent active duty end strength minimum 
     levels.--Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, as 
     amended by section 402, is amended by striking paragraphs (1) 
     through (4) and inserting the following new paragraphs:
       ``(1) For the Army, 535,000.
       ``(2) For the Navy, 323,239.
       ``(3) For the Marine Corps, 201,600.
       ``(4) For the Air Force, 312,800.''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Colorado (Mr. Polis) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado for 5 minutes.
  Mr. POLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  Given our looming fiscal crisis and record deficits, it's critical 
that we look at smart spending cuts in a responsible way that doesn't 
hurt our national security--in fact, the budget deficit and our huge 
national debt are a threat to national security by making us 
economically beholden to foreign powers--and I propose an amendment 
that would do just that.
  My amendment would get most of the 80,000 troops, U.S. troops, out of 
Europe where they're no longer needed. We will save over $1 billion. My 
amendment would reduce the total amount of troops stationed in Europe 
to 30,000 troops from 80,000, which would not affect the troops being 
used in our wars in the Middle East. That's estimated to be about 
12,000 to 15,000 of those troops. We would also leave ample troops to 
be part of NATO joint exercises and fulfill our obligations to our 
European allies.
  My amendment would allow the Department of Defense to save money by 
closing bases across Europe that are simply no longer needed. They have 
no strategic rationale. By pulling some of our troops out of Europe and 
closing these bases, we can save money and reduce our redundant 
military force. My amendment would gradually cut the 50,000 troops from 
our force in Europe, would save over $1.3 billion over 10 years, reduce 
overall troop levels in phases so we can responsibly draw down the 
troops without impacting those who are currently deployed.
  On top of the savings by reducing troop level, my amendment allows us 
to close bases across Europe that are, frankly, relics from World War 
II and the Cold War and currently serve no strategic purpose for our 
country. The need for these bases was understandable in the shadow of 
the threat of the Nazis and when Europe was rebuilding from the 
devastation from World War II. The presence of the troops was 
understandable when we faced the menace of the Soviet Union. What is 
the justification for our ongoing presence now? U.S. taxpayers did not 
sign up to defend Europe from a nonexistent threat forever at our own 
expense when we can't afford it.
  These bases cost U.S. taxpayers millions upon millions of dollars. On 
top of that, they're often unpopular with local people in the countries 
we're protecting. I don't understand why we're wasting so much money to 
maintain bases where they aren't needed, aren't wanted, and don't 
fulfill any of our strategic objectives.
  Our European allies, Madam Chair, are some of the richest countries 
in the world. So why are we subsidizing their defense spending? Our 
European allies have enjoyed a free ride on the American dime for years 
now. The average American spends over $2,500 on defense; the average 
European $500. If Europe, itself, has made the decision it can afford 
to spend less on defense, shouldn't we be confident that we can spend 
less on their defense as well?
  Now, I understand that many of the troops in Europe support the 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and personally, while I hope this 
won't be an issue soon as we begin to withdraw our troops from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, my amendment leaves in place enough troops to fully 
support the ongoing operations even at their current levels in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
  My amendment does not weaken our commitment to NATO. With modern 
technology, we can move troops and weapons quickly across the globe. We 
fulfill our responsibilities with troops stationed at NATO headquarters 
and fully participate in joint exercises.
  My amendment also allows for a war emergency if, for instance, there 
was really a reason to station troops in Europe. If our European allies 
were attacked, my amendment allows the President to waive the 
requirements of the bill.
  It's time to think about our priorities in defense spending. We're 
not under threat, Madam Chair, from the Nazis. We're not under threat, 
Madam Chair, from the Soviets. We are under threat from a global 
terrorist threat that is a stateless menace. And, in fact, less of that 
menace emanates from Europe than it does from Asia and Africa. 
Maintaining a network of bases across Europe is simply not a sane 
response to the terrorist threat, nor is it fiscally responsible.
  These cuts are based on the recommendations of the Sustainable 
Defense Task Force, a bipartisan project organized by Congressman 
Frank, Congressman Paul, and Congressman Jones, as well as Senator 
Wyden. The Sustainable Defense Task Force brought together defense 
experts across the ideological spectrum and proposed commonsense 
recommendations for saving taxpayer money and improving our national 
security.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote on my amendment, Madam Chair.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. I claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Foxx). The gentleman from Ohio is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. TURNER. The gentleman is correct that this is a time of deficits 
and concerns about spending, but he is not correct that this doesn't 
hurt our national security.
  He also states that our troops in Europe are not needed, and that is 
absolutely not the case. Those troops that are there not only protect 
us and our European allies, but they also are essential to the 
operations that we're supporting around the globe, including the 
important operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

                              {time}  2200

  He claims this amendment will save money, but in fact, this will 
increase our costs as we look to how we serve our allies, how we 
initiate our ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and how we 
support our men and women in uniform.
  The essential problem with this amendment is that it's arbitrary. Our 
troop strengths are based on extensive studies. There are whole books 
written about how you look to assessing threats, how you look to our 
overall assets, how you support the capabilities that we have in 
supporting our national defense. These are just arbitrary numbers that 
have been picked as to our withdrawal from Europe.
  But it goes further.
  Besides having the great effect of reducing the reassurance of our 
allies in the region, this amendment goes further and sets troop limits 
from 2013 through 2016. It requires that 10,000 of our troops be 
reduced in end strength numbers a year, and it goes on to say

[[Page H3671]]

that 5,400 of them are to come from the Army, that 4,000 a year are to 
come from the Air Force, 500 a year from the Navy, 100 from the Marine 
Corps. There certainly is not a decreasing threat in our national 
security; yet there will be decreasing troops, not just those who are 
in Europe. This means that we will have increased dwell time and an 
increased greater burden upon the troops who are serving.
  As we look to these numbers again being arbitrary, you have to 
wonder: How was it determined that 5,400 would come from the Army and 
4,000 would come from the Air Force and 500 from the Navy? This has no 
correlation not only to the threat but even to the assets and the 
capabilities that we need. I think everyone knows that our troops that 
we have in Europe serve our full national security and are not there 
for the reasons of defending Europe.
  As the gentleman stated, the other thing that is important is that 
this is something knowable. I mean, you could pick up a Quadrennial 
Defense Review or threat assessments, from which our troop strengths 
are based, not these arbitrary numbers from this amendment which would 
restrict our ability to respond, greatly impact our national security 
and would certainly not save money.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. POLIS. I would like to inquire as to how much time remains on 
both sides.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Colorado has 1 minute remaining. 
The gentleman from Ohio has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. POLIS. Madam Chair, these specific suggestions that are based on 
the Sustainable Defense Task Force may not be a book, but it is 30-
pages' long, and, without objection, I would like to submit its 
``Executive Summary'' for the Record.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman's request will be covered under 
general leave.


                         Parliamentary Inquiry

  Mr. POLIS. Parliamentary inquiry, Madam Chair.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. POLIS. Would the Chair specify the definition of her last 
statement.
  The Acting CHAIR. All Members were given authority to insert such 
material by an order of the House.

                           Executive Summary


               DEBT, DEFICITS, AND DEFENSE: A WAY FORWARD

      [Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, 11 June 2010]

       At a time of growing concern over federal deficits, it is 
     essential that all elements of the federal budget be 
     subjected to careful scrutiny. The Pentagon budget should be 
     no exception. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in a 
     recent speech, paraphrasing President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
     ``The United States should spend as much as necessary on 
     national defense, but not one penny more.''
       This report presents a series of options which, taken 
     together, could save up to $960 billion between 2011 and 
     2020. The proposals cover the full range of Pentagon 
     expenditures--procurement, research and development, 
     personnel, operations and maintenance, and infrastructure. 
     Some involve changes in our military posture and force 
     structure; others are more limited in scope, focusing on 
     outdated, wasteful, and ineffective systems that have long 
     been the subject of criticism by congressional research 
     agencies and others. Taken together or in part, they could 
     make a significant contribution to any deficit reduction 
     plan.
       There is no doubt that defense expenditure has contributed 
     significantly to our current fiscal burden. This is true even 
     aside from war costs. Today, annual discretionary spending is 
     $583 billion above the level set in 2001. Overall, the rise 
     in defense spending accounts for almost 65% of this increase. 
     Non-war defense spending is responsible for 37%. These 
     portions are much greater than any other category of 
     discretionary spending. The savings options that we have 
     developed focus mostly on the ``base'' portion of the 
     Pentagon budget, excluding expenditures slated to support 
     overseas contingency operations. Those that would affect such 
     operations are pegged explicitly to progress in concluding 
     today's wars.
       Our recommendations fall in 6 areas: Strategic forces; 
     Conventional force structure; Procurement, research, and 
     development; Personnel costs; Reform of DoD maintenance and 
     supply systems; Command, support, and infrastructure 
     expenditures.
       In developing its options, the Task Force has used a set of 
     criteria to identify savings that could be achieved without 
     compromising the essential security of the United States. We 
     have focused especially on:
       Department of Defense programs that are based on unreliable 
     or unproven technologies;
       Missions that exhibit a poor cost-benefit payoff and 
     capabilities that fail the test of cost-effectiveness or that 
     possess a very limited utility;
       Assets and capabilities that mismatch or substantially 
     over-match current and emerging military challenges, and
       Opportunities for providing needed capabilities and assets 
     at lower cost via management reforms.
       Table ES-1 (page vi) provides an overview of the savings 
     options we propose. Not all the contributors endorse all the 
     options, but all agree they offer genuine possibilities for 
     resource savings and deserve serious consideration. They are 
     described in more detail below.
       The option set could be implemented in whole or part. As an 
     integrated set, it would entail:
       Reducing the US nuclear arsenal to 1000 warheads deployed 
     on 160 Minuteman missiles and seven nuclear submarines,
       Curtailing nuclear weapons research and the planned 
     modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure;
       Curtailing national missile defense efforts;
       A reduction of approximately 200,000 military personnel, 
     yielding a peacetime US military active-duty end-strength of 
     approximately 1.3 million;
       Capping routine peacetime US military presence in Europe at 
     35,000 and in Asia at 65,000, including afloat;
       Reducing the size of the US Navy from its current strength 
     of 287 battle force ships and 10 naval air wings to a future 
     posture of 230 ships and 8 air wings;
       Rolling back the number of US Army active-component brigade 
     combat teams from the current 45 to between 39 and 41;
       Retiring four of the 27 US Marine Corps infantry battalions 
     along with a portion of the additional units that the Corps 
     employs to constitute air-land task forces;
       Retiring three US Air Force tactical fighter wings;
       Ending or delaying procurement of a number of military 
     systems--the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22 Osprey, KC-X 
     Aerial Refueling Tanker, and the Expeditionary Fighting 
     Vehicle--and fielding less expensive alternatives;
       Reducing base budget spending on R&D by $5 billion 
     annually;
       Resetting the calculation of military compensation and 
     reforming the provision of military health care;
       Implementing a variety of measures aiming to achieve new 
     efficiencies in DoD's supply and equipment maintenance 
     systems; and
       Setting a cost reduction imperative for command, support, 
     and infrastructure expenditures.


                 sustainable defense task force options

     Strategic capabilities
       Our options in this area would save nearly $195 billion 
     during the next decade. The United States should act now to 
     accelerate the drawdown of nuclear weapons to a level of 
     1,000 warheads deployed on seven Ohio-class submarines and 
     160 Minuteman missiles. This is more than enough to ensure 
     deterrence. Shifting to a nuclear ``dyad'' of land- and sea-
     based missiles would provide an optimal balance between 
     efficiency and flexibility.
       Missile defense efforts should be curtailed to focus on 
     those systems and those missions most likely to succeed and 
     provide real protection for our troops in the field. And we 
     should roll back nuclear weapons research and limit efforts 
     to modernize the weapon infrastructure. This best accords 
     with a reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons, the smaller 
     arsenal, and the general trend of arms control efforts.
     Conventional force structure
       No other nation or likely combination of nations comes 
     close to matching US conventional warfare capabilities. Our 
     options in this area seek to match conventional force 
     capabilities more closely with the actual requirements of 
     defense and deterrence. These are the tasks most appropriate 
     to the armed forces and most essential to the nation. 
     Focusing on them helps ensure that our investments are cost-
     effective. Our options on conventional forces would save the 
     United States almost $395 billion from 2011-2020.
       Ground forces: We propose capping routine US military 
     presence in Europe at 35,000 personnel and in Asia at 65,000 
     troops, and then reducing some force structure accordingly. 
     We can rely on our incomparable capacities for rapid 
     deployment to flexibly send more troops and assets to these 
     regions if and when needed.
       We also propose rolling back the recent growth in the Army 
     and Marine Corps as progress in winding-down our Iraq and 
     Afghanistan commitments allows. This option views future 
     conduct of protracted, large-scale counterinsurgency 
     campaigns by the United States as strategically unwise and 
     largely avoidable. Certainly, there are better, more cost-
     effective ways to fight terrorism.
       Air forces: The experience of the United States in recent 
     conventional wars, including the first two months of the Iraq 
     conflict, show that we can safely reduce our tactical air 
     power--both Air Force and Navy. The capacity of the US 
     military to deliver weapons by plane or missile substantially 
     overmatches existing and emerging threats. And the gap 
     continues to grow. Also, entirely new capabilities, notably 
     remotely piloted vehicles, are joining our air fleets in 
     growing numbers. This option envisions a future air

[[Page H3672]]

     attack capability comprising between 1,600 and 1,750 Air 
     Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighter-attack aircraft and 
     bombers in combat squadrons. Remotely-piloted vehicles would 
     be additional.
       Sea power: We can reduce the size of our Navy from the 
     current fleet of 287 battle force ships to 230, although this 
     will require using our naval power differently. Included in 
     this fleet would be nine aircraft carriers. This option would 
     keep fewer of our war ships permanently ``on station,'' 
     partly by having them operate in smaller groups. It would put 
     greater emphasis on surging naval power as needed. The 
     firepower of our naval assets has grown dramatically during 
     the past 20 years. In this light, the smaller fleet that we 
     propose can meet America's warfighting needs. The reduction 
     in fleet size also reflects a smaller contingent of nuclear 
     ballistic missile submarines, as proposed in the section on 
     strategic capabilities.
     Procurement
       Regarding procurement, our options for saving $88.7 billion 
     from 2011-2020 focus mostly on canceling or reducing systems 
     with long histories of trouble and cost growth, such as the 
     MV-22 Osprey and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. These 
     embody all that is wrong with the acquisition process. We 
     also include the option of canceling the F-35 Lightning and 
     replacing it, for the time being, with advanced versions of 
     aircraft already in service. Development of the F-35 is 
     rapidly going the way of the F-22 Raptor: late, over cost, 
     and less capable than promised. However, even if this 
     aircraft performed according to specifications, it would not 
     be needed in order for us to defeat current and emerging 
     challengers. America's air forces are today the best in the 
     world by a wide margin--not principally due to our 
     technology, but instead due to the combination of technology, 
     skill, training, morale, support, and coordination.
     Research and development
       Research and development has experienced more spending 
     growth since 2001 than any other major DoD appropriation 
     category. Today it stands at $80 billion annually--33% above 
     the Cold War peak in real terms. And yet, today, we face no 
     competitor in military technology comparable to the Soviet 
     Union. We seem increasingly in a race with ourselves. The 
     results have been uneven in terms of producing affordable 
     capabilities that serve the needs of war fighters, however. 
     Individual efforts by the armed services and defense agencies 
     are too often disjointed and seemingly at odds with each 
     other. In our view, DoD needs to exercise more discipline in 
     this area and Congress needs to exercise more oversight. Our 
     modest proposal is that DoD set clearer priorities and seek 
     $5 billion in savings per year or $50 billion during the 
     coming decade.
     Command, support, and infrastructure
       We propose that DoD seek more than $100 billion in savings 
     over the next decade in the areas of command, infrastructure, 
     maintenance, supply, and other forms of support. The 
     Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability 
     Office have both outlined a variety of measures to achieve 
     savings in these areas by means of streamlining, 
     consolidation, and privatization. Additionally, the 
     reductions we have proposed in force structure and 
     procurement will reduce the demand on support services and 
     infrastructure (albeit not proportionately). The goal we have 
     set for savings in these areas is only 15% as much as what we 
     propose for force structure and procurement. This much should 
     be easily in DoD's reach.
     Personnel costs
       Cost growth in military compensation and health care is a 
     serious and increasing concern of military planners and 
     leaders. Over the past decade personnel costs rose by more 
     than 50% in real terms, while health care costs rose 100%. 
     Secretary of Defense Gates recently described the problem as 
     ``eating the Defense Department alive.''
       The Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation has 
     proposed that we recalibrate how military pay raises are set 
     and that we increase health care fees and co-pays for some 
     former military personnel between the ages of 38 and 65. The 
     estimate for potential savings from such measures is $120 
     billion over the decade, assuming gradual implementation as 
     the wars wind-down. In our opinion, however, these options 
     involve more than matters of simple economics. They can only 
     go forward as part of a broader program of change.
       We are a nation at war and these measures affect those who 
     are making the greatest sacrifice. We have a responsibility 
     to them and, thus, great care is due. If the rise in 
     personnel costs has been extraordinary, so have been the 
     demands placed on our military personnel. It is not simply 
     war that bears down on them, but also the way we have 
     conducted it. Some force utilization policies have been 
     unwise and some personnel policies have been both unwise and 
     unfair.
       If cost growth in this area is to be addressed, it must be 
     addressed as part of a compact that relieves our military 
     personnel of the undue burdens of routine ``stop loss'' 
     orders and long, repeated war rotations. Compensation levels 
     for those fighting overseas must be protected and health care 
     for the injured improved. Finally, we must accept that if we 
     are to deploy 175,000 active-duty troops to war (as we do 
     today), then we cannot also maintain another 142,000 troops 
     overseas doing other jobs. Fiscal realities and proper 
     treatment of our military personnel demand that we make 
     choices.


                            systemic change

       The savings options we have outlined promise to provide 
     immediate fiscal relief. They would help to bring the goal of 
     meaningful deficit reduction within reach.
       Nonetheless, they remain ad hoc steps. For the longer term, 
     putting America's defense establishment on a more sustainable 
     path depends on our willingness to:
       Rethink our national security commitments and goals to 
     ensure that they focus clearly on what concerns us the most 
     and what we most need in the realm of security;
       Reset our national security strategy so that it reflects a 
     cost-effective balance among the security instruments at our 
     disposal and also uses those instruments in cost-effective 
     ways; and
       Reform our system of producing defense assets so that it is 
     more likely to provide what we truly need at an affordable 
     cost.
     Reform efforts
       With regard to the third of these systemic goals, there is 
     today renewed interest in reforming the ways we produce and 
     sustain military power. However, those efforts have not yet 
     gone far enough to assuredly deliver the type and degree of 
     change needed. Among the tasks ahead, several imperatives 
     stand out:
       Audit the Pentagon: Today, DoD is one of only a few federal 
     agencies that cannot pass the test of an independent auditor. 
     This means that DoD cannot accurately track its assets--a 
     condition that not only opens the door to waste and fraud, 
     but also makes it difficult to gauge progress in other areas 
     of reform, including acquisition. DoD has been under 
     obligation to get its books in order for 20 years, but has 
     enjoyed the benefit of special dispensations and rolling 
     deadlines: Most recently, a new deadline of September 2017 
     for audit readiness. Given current and emerging fiscal 
     pressures, this is too generous. Moreover, strong incentives 
     for compliance are lacking.
       Determine mission costs: Beyond accurately accounting for 
     its assets, the Pentagon needs to provide cost estimates for 
     its core missions and activities, as suggested in 2001 by the 
     Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security. Lawmakers might 
     ask, How much of the defense dollar do we presently invest in 
     counterterrorism, counterproliferation, the defense of 
     Europe, or nuclear deterrence? At present, no one really 
     knows. And until we do know, it will be difficult to make 
     fully rational decisions about the allocation of defense 
     resources.
       Strengthen acquisition reform: The finding by the 
     Government Accountability Office that major weapons programs 
     are suffering $300 billion in cost overruns has sparked 
     renewed interest in acquisition reform. Defense Secretary 
     Gates and the Obama administration have promised to 
     vigorously pursue such reforms. Congress has responded with 
     the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. However, 
     the Act needs to be strengthened if it is to substantially 
     deliver on its promise. It creates the position of Director 
     of Independent Cost Assessment, but there needs to be a 
     mechanism for reconciling differences between the Director's 
     estimates and those of the Pentagon. With regard to 
     competition requirements, it gives DoD too easy recourse to 
     invoking waivers. The bar must be set higher. And there needs 
     to be a simple prohibition on giving an outside contractor 
     responsibility for evaluating the work or managing the 
     contract of any entity with which that contractor is linked.


                           other option sets

       We include in our report two other sets of savings options 
     that reflect different perspectives. Table ES-2 summarizes 
     options developed in 2009 by the Task Force for a Unified 
     Security Budget. These are part of its ongoing efforts to 
     rebalance our security investments, which presently are 
     weighted too heavily to the military side.
       Table ES-3 presents a set of options developed by scholars 
     of the Cato Institute. It suggests the budget implications of 
     a shift in US global strategy to a stance of ``Offshore 
     Balancing'' or what the authors call a ``strategy of 
     restraint.''
       The reductions in military spending summarized in Table ES-
     3 reflect a security strategy that aims to bring force from 
     the sea to defeat and deter enemies, rather than keeping 
     troops ashore in semi-permanent presence missions or in long-
     term policing roles.

  Mr. POLIS. Madam Chair, even Donald Rumsfeld believes it is time to 
change this policy.
  In his recent book, he wrote, ``Of the quarter million troops 
deployed abroad in 2001, more than 100,000 were in Europe, the vast 
majority stationed in Germany . . . Those deployments were obviously 
not taking into account the 21st century reality that Germany was now 
one of the wealthier nations in Europe . . . I believed our troops had 
to do more than serve as symbols of security blankets for wealthy 
allied nations.''
  Madam Chair, experts across the ideological spectrum agree that the 
time is right for these smart cuts that will improve our national 
security, allow us to fulfill all our obligations to NATO, as well as 
include the 10,000 to 15,000 troops that experts say are necessary

[[Page H3673]]

to fully support operations at our current levels in the Middle East 
and Africa.
  Again, I express my own personal desire that less is needed in that 
regard, and it seems to be our direction; but even at those current 
levels, we would fully support those operations. This is a smart cut, 
one of the easier ones we could go to. It improves our national 
security, and I urge a ``yes'' vote.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
  Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, it is true that the Department of 
Defense ought to always be examining where we have troops deployed 
around the world, and that is appropriate for them. It is not 
appropriate, however, for us to arbitrarily tell them that they will 
have 30,000 troops in Europe, X number of troops in Asia and so forth.
  I think that it is important to emphasize that among the important 
functions that our troops in Europe perform are joint training--
building partnership with our European partnerships. Just a few weeks 
ago, I was at the NATO SOF Training facility where European allies 
train with our Special Operations Forces before they have to actually 
be engaged in the battlefield in Afghanistan and elsewhere. That sort 
of joint training is made possible because our troops are there.
  As the gentleman from Ohio mentioned, direct support of our 
deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya incredibly simplifies, or makes 
easier, our deployments for logistics and other transportation needs 
when we are able to base things in Europe and go from there rather than 
having to come all the way from the United States.
  Madam Chair, I think we need to remind ourselves that, since 1945, 
when the U.S. has had substantial troop numbers in Europe, there has 
not been another general European war. Yet millions upon millions of 
people died in previous years because of those general European wars.
  The other key point is that this amendment decreases end strength 
over a period of 5 years. That has real consequences for real soldiers 
and marines and sailors and airmen all across the world. As the 
gentleman mentioned, it means they are going to have to spend more time 
in deployments.
  Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Colorado (Mr. Coffman).
  Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for 
yielding.
  I also thank the gentleman from Colorado for raising this issue and 
particularly for questioning our military forward-basing in Europe. I 
think it's certainly time to do that. I'm not sure about the 30,000 
number, but I question whether our NATO allies are dedicating the 
appropriate percentage, in terms of their budgets, towards maintaining 
defense and not becoming far too reliant upon the United States.
  Where I differ in the amendment is with this arbitrary reduction of 
10,000 a year for 5 years. The Secretary of Defense, I think, has 
thoughtfully put forward a plan that would, based on conditions, reduce 
the United States Army's end strength by 27,000 in FY 2015-2016; and 
the United States Marine Corps is somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000, 
in that same fiscal year, based on conditions. So I certainly oppose 
the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I would like to point out again that these 
are arbitrary numbers. Our troops in Europe pose an important asset for 
all of our operations in the protection of national security, 
including, as has been stated, training troops that go into Afghanistan 
and Iraq.
  This amendment would not save money. It would, in fact, increase our 
overall cost. It also includes an arbitrary reduction in our overall 
end strength that would have a negative impact on our national 
security.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Polis).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. POLIS. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Colorado 
will be postponed.


                Amendment No. 61 Offered by Mr. Conyers

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 61 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title XII, add the following new section:

     SEC. 12__. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES GROUND COMBAT 
                   PRESENCE IN LIBYA.

       No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of 
     appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended for 
     the purpose of--
       (1) deploying members of the United States Armed Forces on 
     to the ground of Libya for the purposes of engaging in ground 
     combat operations, unless the purpose of such deployment is 
     limited solely to rescuing members of the United States Armed 
     Forces from imminent danger;
       (2) awarding a contract to a private security contractor to 
     conduct any activity on the ground of Libya; or
       (3) otherwise establishing or maintaining any presence of 
     members of the United States Armed Forces or private security 
     contractors on the ground of Libya, unless the purpose of 
     such presence is limited solely to rescuing members of the 
     United States Armed Forces from imminent danger.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

                              {time}  2210

  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment, which 
would prevent funds authorized in the National Defense Authorization 
Act from being used to fund any type of ground combat operations in 
Libyan territory. My amendment would simply codify the policy endorsed 
by our President and the international community, and thereby ensure 
that our involvement in Libya remains limited in scope. I am proud to 
report that this amendment enjoys the support of 16 bipartisan 
cosponsors.
  My proposal would prevent funds from being used to deploy, establish, 
or maintain a presence of members of the armed services or private 
security contractors on the ground in Libya. It also contains an 
exception that would allow for the rescue of members of the Armed 
Forces participating in the NATO no-fly zone operation.
  I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlelady from 
California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Madam Chairman, let me thank the gentleman for yielding and 
for his leadership. This is such an important amendment, such an 
important debate. No one in this House would ever defend the deplorable 
actions of Colonel Qadhafi and the decades he has spent repressing the 
Libyan people. But no one should fail to recognize that the actions we 
have taken in Libya since March 19 amount to a war. Missile strikes, 
naval attacks, bombing of strategic military targets, all of these 
actions would be a declaration of war if a foreign country launched 
such attacks on our soil.
  Congress should have debated this prior to any military actions in 
Libya. While some of us can disagree as to whether or not we should be 
involved in a military action in Libya, we can all agree that we should 
prevent mission creep or any military expansion to include combat 
troops on the ground in Libya.
  This simple amendment does exactly that by codifying the President's 
commitment, as Mr. Conyers just said, to not put troops on the ground 
in Libya. So I urge a strong ``yes'' vote on this amendment. I thank 
the gentleman for his leadership.
  Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chairman, although I am not opposed to the 
amendment, I request time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Virginia is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. WITTMAN. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We are certainly in agreement with the intention of this amendment, 
by requiring appropriations not be authorized for operations on the 
ground there in Libya. We believe that preventing

[[Page H3674]]

these funds purposely puts in place Congress as a decision-maker. We 
believe that that is critical in this situation, and we believe that 
it's very appropriate that Congress assume its role in decision-making 
involving U.S. conflict in Libya.
  I think that we all know that decisions are difficult with these 
sorts of conflicts and that Congress does have a very specific role in 
this effort. So we want to make sure that that's preserved. Certainly 
this amendment does that. So we are in agreement with the amendment.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chairman, how much time have I remaining?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has 2\1/4\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield as much time as she may consume to the 
gentlelady from California, the head of the Progressive Caucus for so 
many years, Ms. Lynn Woolsey.
  Ms. WOOLSEY. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding time to 
me.
  Madam Chair, more than 2 months after the military campaign in Libya 
began, it's time to start defining its parameters and its limitations. 
Most importantly, we must provide assurance that this will not mushroom 
into a full blown ground war and military occupation. That's why I am 
proud to cosponsor the amendment offered by my friend from Michigan.
  Are two wars not enough? We can't keep doing this. Our military is at 
a breaking point. The American people's patience is wearing thin. They 
know the costs in life and tender coming from these wars that we have 
in Iraq and in Afghanistan; and now what we're doing in Libya comes 
from important domestic programs right here at home. They don't want to 
replay Iraq and Afghanistan in Libya.
  In fact, we all know that it's time to bring our troops home out of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is time to engage in smart security for 
diplomacy, where human and economic assistance are used instead of 
bombs and weapons, costing us pennies on the dollar. No more wars, no 
boots on the ground in Libya, and as much as we can do to take care of 
our business here at home.
  Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentlelady. The time has come for Congress 
to once again exercise its constitutional authority to place boundaries 
on the use of our military forces overseas and clearly state that this 
conflict in Libya will not escalate into an expensive occupation that 
could strain our resources and harm our national security interests.
  I beg the Members of this House to give favorable consideration to 
our amendment.
  Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and 
I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan 
will be postponed.


                 Amendment No. 62 Offered by Mr. Flake

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 62 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       At the end of section 1433, relating to the Mission Force 
     Enhancement Transfer Fund, add the following new subsection:
       (h) Elimination of Remaining Funds.--The amount otherwise 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Mission Force 
     Enhancement Transfer Fund for fiscal year 2012, as specified 
     in the funding table in section 4501, is reduced by 
     $348,256,000, which represents the amount of funds not needed 
     to carry out projects identified in H.R. 1540 of the 112th 
     Congress, as reported by the Committee on Armed Services of 
     the House of Representatives.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Arizona (Mr. Flake) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
  Mr. FLAKE. This amendment would simply eliminate funding for the 
Mission Force Enhancement Transfer Fund, which amounts to more than 
$348 million. The fund was created in this bill in order to ensure that 
additional funding remain available for the Secretary of Defense to 
transfer, if he needed to, to other accounts to ``mitigate unfunded 
requirements'' according to the committee report. The report also 
contains a list of seven priorities that the Secretary can transfer 
these funds in support of.
  I am not sure about this concept myself, particularly in this budget 
climate, of providing the Pentagon an authorization that essentially 
amounts to a blank check for a couple of hundred million dollars. It's 
my understanding that the committee identified $1 billion in savings in 
the underlying bill and created the fund using these savings. It's also 
my understanding, however, that during the full committee markup more 
than $650 million of that money was moved out of this fund by members 
of the committee seeking to increase funding for their own priorities 
in the bill.

                              {time}  2220

  I understand that Members want to retain the ability to move money 
around to areas they feel are underfunded and that should receive 
additional funding. However, if the committee was able to identify $1 
billion in savings, I think it ought to put that savings toward 
decreasing the underlying, or, I am sorry, the cost of the underlying 
bill. We have to make tough choices all around in this budget, and 
Americans across the country are making tough choices with their 
budget.
  But to identify a billion dollars in savings, then to move it into a 
new fund and then allow Members to designate their own priorities and 
take 650, I am just not sure what this is all about.
  There are some concerns out there, there was a news article a couple 
of days ago that said that some people think this is some kind of slush 
fund designed to provide Members with a pot of money from which they 
can transfer money to fund their own projects. This would be similar to 
the earmarking culture that we have had around here, a culture that 
hopefully has ended and that we can move beyond. So I hope this is not 
what we are seeing here.
  I have two amendments that will be considered later, I believe in the 
en bloc portion, that will seek for more transparency moving ahead to 
see how these funds are actually used and awarded.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to Mr. Flake's 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. McKEON. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The gentleman from Arizona's amendment would eliminate resources for 
the Mission Force Enhancement Transfer Fund. I commend Mr. Flake for 
taking a serious issue, namely, deficit reduction. However, his 
amendment could do serious harm to our national security. I believe the 
Mission Force Enhancement Transfer Fund can be an important tool for 
the Defense Department to help keep America safe.
  We set this fund up at the start of the process so that we wouldn't 
be tied to the President's budget request so that we could, the members 
of the committee that have the expertise, move the funding around to 
more important items. Resources from this fund will be used to power 
programs vital to our homeland defense such as Navy shipbuilding, 
strike aircraft, and ballistic missile defense, systems that the 
members of the Armed Services Committee agreed were not sufficiently 
funded by the President's budget. As you know, there are no earmarks in 
this bill.
  We have worked very hard to move away from the system that you worked 
so hard to eliminate, and we have done a great job on that. But we do 
not feel bound by the President's request that we will just be a 
rubberstamp committee to just do what he expects us to do.
  Madam Chair, I must repeat my concerns about stripping money from our 
troops and sending it back to the

[[Page H3675]]

Treasury. I know how important deficit reduction is. We do need to 
focus on that, but we have stressed very strongly, we will look at 
everything that the Pentagon spends, we will go through it with a fine-
tooth comb, but the money we save we know we will put to areas that the 
Quadrennial Defense Review and our independent panel showed that we 
need just to bring us up to what our defense should have been 20 years 
ago.
  I strongly oppose any amendment that would reduce the defense top 
line. And while I support Mr. Flake, as we all endeavor to get our 
spending under control, I must oppose this amendment, as it would strip 
our fighting force of the tools they need to get the job done and to 
keep America safe.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. FLAKE. May I inquire as to how much time remains?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Arizona has 2\1/2\ minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. FLAKE. I appreciate the gentleman's efforts to get rid of 
earmarks. I do have some concern about this. The guidance from the 
HASC, from the committee, says that the request may not direct funds 
to, or any funds with or to, any entity or locality.
  It's been the practice in the past that when Members get their 
earmarks in a bill, they will take a victory lap, put out a press 
release. I have seen one of these already, and it says funding for a 
nonprofit charitable foundation, Technology Ventures Corporation, TVC, 
to help expand innovation in New Mexico's emerging satellite industry. 
This names both an entity and a locality. And this is a Member who got 
a particular request.
  Mr. McKEON. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FLAKE. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. McKEON. This is on page 692, ``Merit-Based or Competitive 
Decisions. A decision to commit, obligate, or expend funds referred to 
in the second sentence of subsection (a) with or to a specific entity 
shall
  ``(1) be based on merit-based selection procedures in accordance with 
the requirements of'' the company's sections and
  ``(2) comply with other applicable provisions of law.''
  And if we find any Member pressuring the Department of Defense to use 
any funds other than to comply with competitive merit-based solutions, 
we will go after them. We have a strong oversight committee that will 
do this.
  Mr. FLAKE. I appreciate the Member's commitment on that, and I 
appreciate also--I believe they are accepting the amendments that I 
have offered later, which would set up a process whereby we can see how 
these funds were actually disposed of, and that will help a great deal. 
I appreciate the chairman working on that.
  I would just say, in closing, this amendment specifically is to save 
the money that is still left in that account. If the concern is not to 
give the President the ability to direct all of these funds or the 
Secretary of Defense, then this accomplishes it. There is $350 million 
left in this account. Let's apply that to pay down the debt and 
deficit.
  That's what this amendment actually does. It takes the remaining 
money that has not been designated in that fund and applies it to 
deficit reduction. So that's what this amendment does, and I would 
appreciate support for it.
  I thank the chairman for his comments, and I thank the chairman for 
his commitment to get away from this earmark culture.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. McKEON. I yield 1 minute to my friend and colleague, the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
  Mr. FORBES. Madam Chairman, I am always reluctant to oppose my good 
friend from Arizona, even when he is wrong, and he is dead wrong 
tonight.
  As you heard him mention, there was a billion dollar savings. If that 
billion dollars hadn't been there, he would have been telling us all, 
can't you find $100 million, can't you find $200 million? But they find 
$1 billion, and no good deed goes unpunished.
  And, basically, Madam Chairman, the purpose of this fund is to make 
sure we are doing the tough choices. And he is right; these Members 
look every day at the priorities we need for the Department of Defense.
  Let me just tell you one of those, shipbuilding. You and I today are 
living in a world for the first time where the Chinese have more ships 
in their Navy than we have in our Navy. The independent panel says we 
need 346 ships in our fleet, the Navy says 313, but their plan doesn't 
even get us there.
  And so I am proud of the fact that we come together and say let's 
find savings in one area so we can put them in priorities such as 
shipbuilding. We ought not to cut these funds. It will be a 
disincentive for the Department of Defense to find those savings in the 
future.
  Mr. McKEON. Madam Chairman, may I ask how much time remains?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California has 2 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. McKEON. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Missouri 
(Mr. Akin).
  Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  I have to say that I understand the importance of trying to control 
spending in this government, and I am very much thankful to the 
gentleman from Arizona to be wanting to do that.
  The concern that we have is that when you take a look at where we are 
in terms of our military right now, we have some very big problems. 
Just standing back away from it and looking at it for a little bit, if 
you say, how many troops do we have, how many ships do we have, how 
many aircraft do we have, and you compare where we are today with where 
we were 20 years ago, in 1990, we have half of what we had in 1990.
  So we have reduced our military in half. We have the same number of 
ships today as what we had in 1916.
  Now, one of the reasons for paying attention to earmarks was so that 
we would pay more attention to doing a good job of oversight. This 
committee has really worked hard at oversight. We have identified areas 
where we think the Pentagon was wrong, where the President was wrong, 
and we have taken that money out. Now we are going to be punished for 
taking it out by having it taken away.
  The point of the matter is we are redirecting the money, but we are 
allowing a certain amount of flexibility. The places where this money 
has got to be spent are, first, ballistic and cruise missile defense. 
This is a very, very big deal for the Navy. The Chinese have very high-
speed cruise missiles. We have to be able to defend against them.

                              {time}  2230

  Navy shipbuilding, we have already talked about that. We have the 
same number of ships as we had in 1916.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  The gentleman from California has 30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. McKEON. In the time I've been in Congress, as the gentleman said, 
our military has basically been cut in half, and yet we are fighting 
two wars and half of a third. And Ronald Reagan said that during his 
lifetime he never saw us get into a war that we were overprepared for. 
We cut back after every war. This is the first time I have seen us 
trying to cut back during wartime.
  I ask that we defeat the gentleman's amendment. As well intended as 
it is, we need the money for the defense of this Nation.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona will 
be postponed.


                Amendment No. 63 Offered by Mr. Ellison

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 63 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 616, strike line 18 and all that follows through line 
     13 on page 617.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison) and a

[[Page H3676]]

Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment that will cut 
$150 million in unnecessary defense funding.
  Congress must reassess our budgetary priorities. We should not be in 
the business of needlessly increasing defense spending while 
simultaneously cutting spending for critical services that Americans 
depend upon. Without my amendment, Congress will needlessly approve 
$150 million for the LHA 7 amphibious warship program. Now, let me be 
clear. I'm not against such a program in its own right, but I am 
against authorizing this funding for FY12 because the Government 
Accountability Office and the Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower 
said we shouldn't do it. And they have very good reasons for coming to 
that conclusion.
  First of all, according to the Government Accountability Office 
report, which I have in my hand and I intend to submit into the Record, 
these funds won't even be used in fiscal year 2012. The report states 
that contractor delays and labor shortages ``will likely have 
implications on the ability of the shipbuilder to start construction of 
LHA 7 as currently planned.''
  If we do not authorize these funds, our national security will not be 
harmed. The GAO reports that FY11 funds already appropriated will be 
sufficient to cover the costs of the program and expenses for LHA 7 in 
FY12. As the report makes clear, and I quote again, Madam Chair, ``most 
of the construction costs for LHA 7 will not be incurred until fiscal 
year 2013.''
  Given the GAO's recommendation, the Armed Services Subcommittee on 
Seapower did the right thing. They cut funding for the LHA 7. However, 
that funding was reinstated in the full committee. Given that the funds 
will not even be able to be used in FY12 due to contractor delays, why 
was $150 million reinstated in the full committee? Well, I can tell you 
that a Republican gentleman from Mississippi sits on the Armed Services 
Committee, and he represents a district on the coast with a very large 
shipbuilder in it.
  Let's review momentarily. At a time when Congress is cutting critical 
heating assistance programs, education, and health care, why should it 
authorize defense spending for work that military contractors aren't 
even prepared to do?
  Without my amendment, Congress is set to increase funding for the LHA 
7 warship at a time when we are slashing critical domestic spending 
programs that Americans count on.
  This is a commonsense amendment, Madam Chair, and it follows that the 
GAO and the Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower said we should do. 
We should cut $150 million for the LHA 7 warship program. I'll leave it 
to you and your imagination as to why the funding was reinstated at the 
full committee.
  I urge my colleagues to reassess our budgetary priorities and 
authorize funds for when they can actually be used. Spending should not 
be authorized prematurely, especially when Congress is cutting other 
critical programs.

 LHA Replacement, Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN), Fiscal Year 2012--
                               Line 3041


                            program overview

       The LHA program will provide the functional replacement for 
     the LHA 1 Class ships which are reaching the end of their 
     extended service lives. The program is to ensure that the 
     amphibious fleet remains capable of Expeditionary Warfare 
     well into the 21st century and provide for an affordable and 
     sustainable amphibious ship development program. LHA 6, the 
     lead ship, was authorized in fiscal year 2007. Fabrication of 
     LHA 6 started in January 2008 and it is currently scheduled 
     for delivery in October 2013. The Navy requested funding for 
     the first follow-on ship, LHA 7, in its fiscal year 2011 
     budget request and requested an additional $2018.7 million in 
     fiscal year 2012 to fully fund the ship. The Navy awarded an 
     advance procurement contract for LHA 7 in June 2010, and 
     planned to award the construction contract in November 2010.

                          [Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Fiscal year
                                            ----------------------------
                                               2010     2011      2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding/Request............................   $169.5   $942.8   $2,018.7
Potential Reduction........................  .......  .......  $2,018.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source for Funding/Request: Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2012
  Budget Estimates for Shipbuilding and Conversion programs (P-1);
  Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
  2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10 .

                          Reason for Reduction

       The Navy's fiscal year 2012 shipbuilding and conversion 
     budget request for LHA 7 could be reduced by $2018.7 million 
     because the funds are premature to program needs. The Navy 
     expected to award a contract for construction of LHA 7 in 
     November 2010--at the start of fiscal year 2011--but the 
     contract award has been delayed and is unlikely to occur 
     until fiscal year 2012. While the Navy currently plans to 
     begin construction of LHA 7 in May 2012, it is likely that 
     construction will be delayed. Ongoing shipyard labor 
     shortages have resulted in schedule delays on LHA 6 and will 
     likely have implications on the ability of the shipbuilder to 
     start construction of LHA 7 as currently planned. Given the 
     delay in contract award and the likelihood that the start of 
     construction may slip, the program will not need the majority 
     of funding until fiscal year 2013. Fiscal year 2011 funding 
     will be available in fiscal year 2012 to ensure that the 
     shipbuilder can purchase materials necessary to meet its 
     build schedule--activities originally scheduled to take place 
     in fiscal year 2011. The National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 2011 authorized the Navy to split funding for 
     LHA 7 construction over fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Should 
     Congress choose to take the suggested action, LHA may need 
     multiyear contracting authority that includes fiscal year 
     2013.
       The Navy anticipated awarding a contract for LHA 7 
     construction in November 2010--at the start of fiscal year 
     2011. To date, the Navy has not yet awarded a contract--a 
     delay of at least rive months. According to the Navy, it 
     received the shipbuilder's proposal in April 2011. The 
     program office reported that they would like to award the 
     contract by the end of fiscal year 2011--5 months or less 
     after receiving the shipbuilder's proposal--but acknowledged 
     that they would most likely award a contract in fiscal year 
     2012. By comparison, the construction contract for LHA 6 was 
     not awarded until over 14 months after receiving the 
     contractor's proposal. Program officials believe that the 
     construction contract for LHA 7 will take less time to 
     negotiate than the lead ship. However, even if the Navy 
     reduced the time to award to 7 months, half the time required 
     to negotiate the LHA 6 contract, the award would still occur 
     in November 2011--in fiscal year 2012 and a full year later 
     than planned.
       Further, it is likely that the start of construction for 
     LHA 7 will be delayed past its current estimated date of May 
     2012 due to ongoing shipyard labor shortages. Delivery of LHA 
     6 has been delayed twice primarily as a result of labor 
     issues. The most recent delay, announced in the fiscal year 
     2012 budget, pushed delivery of the ship from April to 
     October 2013. Program officials reported that the shipyard is 
     currently drawing down labor, but will have to increase labor 
     resources to meet the increased shipyard demand starting in 
     fiscal year 2013. However, the shipbuilder may have 
     difficulty effectively increasing labor resources to meet the 
     needs of Navy programs. In addition to the LHA class, 
     construction of LPD 26 and LPD 27 is expected to begin in 
     late 2011 and 2012. The program office acknowledged that the 
     construction start date for LHA 7 may slip past its current 
     estimate, and some Navy estimates put construction start in 
     early 2013. The actual construction start date will be 
     negotiated as part of the LHA contract award.
       Since activities originally planned to take place in 2011 
     will most likely occur in 2012, 2011 funding should be 
     sufficient for the program through 2012.


                        program office comments

       The Navy indicated that it strongly disagrees with GAO's 
     assessment of the LHA(R) program and the proposed reduction 
     of fiscal year 2012 funding. The Navy believes it can award 
     the contract by the end of this fiscal year, in August or 
     September 2011. According to the Navy, construction will 
     start as currently planned in May 2012, as it has worked with 
     the contractor to mitigate construction schedule risk by 
     using the advance procurement funds to buy long lead time 
     materials. According to the Navy, a reduction to fiscal year 
     2012 funding would impact the program's ability to procure 
     required Contractor Furnished Equipment, disrupt the ship's 
     engineering and production schedule and cause significant 
     disruption in the industrial base. The Navy believes there is 
     significant risk that fiscal year 2011 funds would not cover 
     required expenditures if the second increment of funds were 
     not appropriated until fiscal year 2013. According to the 
     Navy, failure to procure government furnished equipment 
     systems as planned will negatively affect the unit cost of 
     these systems for LHA 7 and other platforms. The Navy also 
     states that the entire shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2013 
     and later years would be impacted by a delay of LHA 7 
     funding.


                              gao response

       Although the Navy believes it can award a construction 
     contract for LHA 7 within four to five months, past 
     experiences negotiating contracts with the shipbuilder have 
     taken considerably longer. As we stated previously, the LHA 6 
     contract was awarded 14 months after the Navy received the 
     initial proposal from the shipbuilder. While the Navy 
     indicates that it has mitigated construction schedule risk by 
     procuring long lead time materials, there is still 
     significant risk of construction delays associated with 
     ongoing

[[Page H3677]]

     labor shortages and a projected increase in shipyard demand 
     starting in fiscal year 2013 due to construction on multiple 
     ship programs. The shipbuilder has been unable to effectively 
     manage labor resources on LHA 6. Ongoing labor shortages 
     increase the risk that the shipbuilder will remain unable to 
     meet increased shipyard demand in fiscal year 2013, which 
     increases the likelihood that construction start of LHA 7 
     will also be delayed.
       In its comments, the Navy indicated concerns about having 
     enough funding to acquire equipment and materials for LHA 7. 
     However, program officials previously reported to GAO that 
     fiscal year 2011 funding will cover materials and that the 
     program was waiting for the construction contract award 
     before placing some orders for materials. The program has 
     already received $169.5 million in advance procurement money 
     to acquire long lead time materials, and received $942.8 
     million in fiscal year 2011.
       The program can use this money to purchase materials as 
     planned. Most of the construction costs for LHA 7 will not be 
     incurred until fiscal year 2013. Accordingly, the fiscal year 
     2012 budget request could be reduced by $2018.7 million.

  At this time, I would yield 1 minute to the ranking member on the 
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Adam Smith.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Madam Chair, I support the gentleman's 
amendment. I think it's really important to understand what's going on 
here. The gentleman is absolutely correct. The original purpose for 
this money, it was $200 million, it was determined to no longer be 
valid for all the reasons that were stated. They couldn't spend the 
money. But we had $200 million floating around, and they hate to give 
back $200 million in the Defense Committee, so they grabbed $150 
million of it and simply designated it, broadly speaking, to 
shipbuilding. We do this a lot. Mr. Flake spoke about this in the other 
amendment. And I understand there are Members who are concerned about 
the top line within the defense budget and holding it.
  I think it's important where we spend the money. We have to have a 
reason to spend it. We just have to say, well, there's $150 million. We 
would kind of like to have it because who knows? We might need it at 
some point.
  We can't afford that in our current deficit environment, to simply 
set aside $150 million. I know we're going to talk about shipbuilding. 
I heard about it a little bit before. Yes, we have fewer ships than we 
had in 1916. I would submit that our Navy today is vastly more capable 
than our Navy back in 1916 because our sheer numbers of ships is not 
the only factor that matters. It kind of matters what their 
capabilities are.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Throughout the bill--and we have an 
amendment coming up after this that is the same sort of thing. There is 
a lot of money in the defense budget that gets appropriated, and then 
for whatever reason we find out we can't actually build what it was 
intended for, and then we just hold on to the money because we might 
use it later. That is not an efficient way to spend money.
  And I'm sorry. The deficit does matter to our national security. As 
has been quoted earlier, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said 
that our deficit, in fact, is the number one threat to our national 
security. So we have to save money where we can. Clearly, this is a 
place where we can save money.
  I urge support for the gentleman's amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has 
expired.
  Mr. PALAZZO. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. PALAZZO. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the gentleman from Minnesota's 
amendment. Put simply, the gentleman's amendment would further delay 
the funding of a ship that our Navy and Marine Corps wants and needs.
  LHA 7 is a part of the next generation of large deck amphibious 
assault ships, just similar to the USS Kearsarge, which just returned 
after an 8\1/2\-month-long deployment to where they participated in 
strikes in Libya and humanitarian assistance and other missions. This 
America class amphibious assault ship will be serving our country and 
providing a vital mission capability for years to come.
  The President's very own 2012 budget request included $2 billion for 
the second year of incremental funding for LHA 7. Previous Congresses 
have supported this ship and her procurement, and further delays to 
this funding are opposed by this administration, the Navy, the Marine 
Corps, and the House Armed Services Committee.
  My colleague mentioned, by the way, the GAO report. The Navy strongly 
disagrees with the GAO report that the gentleman has pointed to. The 
Navy has the shipbuilder's proposal in hand and at this point is 
working to complete negotiations to get this ship under contract this 
year, which may happen as soon as August.
  The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps have all endorsed a minimum naval fleet 
of 313 ships, of which 33 of those ships are going to be amphibious in 
nature. If the gentleman's amendment were to become law, the contract 
for this amphibious ship could be delayed. The ship's delivery to the 
fleet would be delayed, and the overall cost of the ship would go up.
  It seems to me, as a Member of Congress, that we need to support 
programs and policies that enable our men and women in uniform to get 
the best possible equipment at the lowest cost to the taxpayer. The 
gentleman's amendment does just the opposite.
  This amendment also jeopardizes American jobs. Nearly 3,500 
shipbuilders depend on the ship for work. Cuts to this ship's funding, 
delays in contracting, and political gamesmanship put these jobs at 
risk.

                              {time}  2240

  Furthermore, the gentleman's amendment provides absolutely no cost 
savings. It just forces the Navy to budget more for the ship next year, 
and overall it increases the cost to the taxpayer. This amendment does 
not just delay LHA-7; this amendment potentially delays our next 
aircraft carrier, our next submarine, and our next destroyer.
  Finally, the gentleman's amendment is not good for the taxpayer, and 
it is not good for the Navy or the Marine Corps. Previous Congresses 
have endorsed the procurement of this ship, the administration and the 
Navy have endorsed the procurement of this ship, and American jobs 
depend on the procurement of this ship.
  I urge my colleagues in the House to vote ``no'' on this amendment.
  Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
Akin), the chairman of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces 
Subcommittee.
  Mr. AKIN. As the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, we have taken 
a good look at LHA-7, and this is an absolutely essential ship. Nobody 
is arguing that point. It is a large deck amphib assault.
  What has happened, though, is that the Marine Corps decided that they 
wanted to put a well deck in the original design, which has caused some 
additional negotiations and slowed things down a little bit. But the 
point of this amendment is to strip $150 million away from this 
project. That is a very big problem. It is a big problem because next 
year we have got an aircraft carrier to build, a nuclear-powered 
submarine, and a destroyer, and this money needs to come from the 
budget this year in order to keep the LHA-7 on track.
  As we have talked about earlier this evening, we are in a bad 
position in terms of number of ships in the Navy. LHA-7 is critical, it 
is important, and stripping $150 million does tend to threaten the 
project, or at least push it off, and then you have to try and fund it 
in a year when we don't have the funds because we are building a bunch 
of other ships. So what this does is it guarantees that LHA-7 is going 
to proceed, but we have to allow enough time for the negotiations.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, will the gentleman yield for a question?
  Mr. AKIN. No, I don't yield.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Missouri controls the time.
  Mr. AKIN. The point of the matter is that LHA-7 has to go forward, 
and we have to make sure that we have the

[[Page H3678]]

funding. As soon as the negotiations are finished between the Navy and 
the contractor, then we can move ahead on this project. So the $150 
million is important. The exact timing of when it is going to be spent 
is in question, but the necessity to have the money is not in doubt. 
That is why we oppose this amendment.
  Mr. ELLISON. Would the gentleman yield now for a question?
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has 
expired.
  The gentleman from Mississippi has 30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. PALAZZO. Madam Chair, I would like to yield the 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wittman).
  Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chair, I just want to emphasize the need for our 
amphibious ships. The requirement, the national requirement is 38 
ships. The Marine Corps says they can live with 33. We have 28 today.
  Mr. ELLISON. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WITTMAN. No, I will not yield.
  Mr. ELLISON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
  Mr. WITTMAN. The requirement is 33. We have 28.
  Mr. ELLISON. Will the gentleman yield for a question, Madam Chair?
  Mr. WITTMAN. The math is very, very simple. It is a specific need.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, will the gentleman yield?
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia controls the time.
  Mr. WITTMAN. We have to make sure that we meet that need. Our Marine 
Corps travels around the world needing this ship capability. It is 
critical to this Nation, critical to our defense. This must be funded 
today.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota 
will be postponed.


     Amendment No. 64 Offered by Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 64 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I have an amendment 
at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 708, after line 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 1699F-1. BUDGET REDUCTION FOR GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE 
                   DEFENSE SYSTEM.

       Notwithstanding the amounts set forth in the funding tables 
     in division D, the amount authorized to be appropriated in 
     section 201 for research, development, test, and evaluation, 
     Defense-Wide, as specified in the corresponding funding table 
     in division D, is hereby reduced by $100,000,000, with the 
     amount of the reduction to be derived from Line 084 Ground-
     Based Midcourse Defense Segment, PE 0603882C, as set forth in 
     the table under section 4201.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez) and a Member opposed each will 
control 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chair, this Congress' number one responsibility is to defend 
and protect our Nation. As we all know, the United States faces 
incredible threats within and from abroad, and it is the responsibility 
of the House Armed Services Committee to assess the threats that we 
face and to look at the limited resources we have and to allocate them 
in the most effective way we can.
  So in the full committee mark, my Republican colleagues increased the 
funding of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system by $100 million. 
My amendment would simply take out that $100 million and give it 
towards savings for our country to bring down the deficit.
  We Democrats support progress on homeland missile defense. We want to 
see that the technology is proven and reliable, and that it is cost 
effective. However, additional funds for the GMD are not needed and 
would be wasteful. The head of the Missile Defense Agency, the 
director, General O'Reilly, has stated that he does not need the 
increase in these funds for fiscal year 2012. In fact, in front of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on April 15, he said: 
``Right now, sir, I've got the funding I need to address this 
problem,'' meaning some of the failure problems we have, ``because I've 
stopped my production line. My production line was stopped not to save 
money. It is solely driven by what we need to confirm the design works 
before we go back into production.''
  So additional funding is not needed, and aside from the GAO saying 
that Congress should reduce by over $400 million the budget for this, I 
am only talking about the $100 million that in that hearing the General 
said we don't need it.
  Why don't we need it? Because the last two intercept test flights of 
this system did not work. They failed. And so the agency has gone back 
to do systems testing. They don't want to produce if it is not working. 
In fact, they have said that we must fly, i.e. it must work, before we 
buy.
  So, the fiscal year 2011 appropriations has allowed the MDA to focus 
on resolving the technical challenges from the failed test, and we will 
proceed with planned projects and avoid delays. Now is the time to get 
it right. We don't want to build something that just isn't working. I 
hope that my colleagues will understand that this money is not needed 
at this time.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. TURNER. This amendment has been previously debated in committee 
and was defeated and should be defeated here. There are three reasons 
why this amendment should be defeated.
  This is a program that has had past cuts that have endangered the 
program. These are dollars that are needed, and the threat that we have 
is increasing. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is the only 
missile defense system that we have that currently protects the 
American people from long-range ballistic missile threats, a threat 
that is increasing.
  This is a program that has had successive cuts in the past. In fiscal 
year 2010, the administration slashed GMD by 35 percent or $445 million 
in the same year that program had setbacks. This year's fiscal year 
2012 request cuts GMD by 14 percent, or $185 million. The Department's 
5-year spending projection cuts Ground-based Missile Defense by an 
additional billion, or nearly 20 percent. This is a program that is 
having setbacks, but it is the only program that we have. We can't cut 
it and expect to fix it. We can't cut it and expect it get it right.

                              {time}  2250

  We can't cut it and expect it to be a system that we can depend on on 
growing threats.
  Now, General O'Reilly has testified that he needs four additional 
ground-based interceptors and an additional 150 to 200 million would be 
needed for another flight testing and more ground testing. In fact, he 
just testified today in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee 
that proposed cuts could threaten the program and set it back by an 
additional year.
  Secretary Gates has testified repeatedly that if we look to the 
growing threats from North Korea and Iran, these are threats that must 
be responded to. Our only system to do that is this ground-based 
missile defense system. We should not cut it. We did not cut it in 
committee, and we should not cut it here.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to 
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), who also sits on our 
committee.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Chairwoman, as we meet tonight in support of the 
Sanchez amendment, we have 30 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely 
and at Vandenberg. We have an Aegis Array at sea. We have other radar 
protections for this country. And we have an effort to give $100 
million to a military leader who said the following

[[Page H3679]]

in April when he was talking about what he needed, referring to Senator 
Levin in the Senate, ``Right now, sir, I've got the funding I need to 
address the problem of the FTG-06 failure because I've stopped my 
production line. That was not to save any money. It was solely driven 
by the need to confirm the design works before we go back into 
production.''
  Let's not give a military leader $100 million he didn't ask for, for 
something that doesn't work yet, that isn't needed to defend the 
country.
  Vote for the Sanchez amendment.
  Mr. TURNER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Lamborn).
  Mr. LAMBORN. Madam Chair, I oppose this amendment and consider it 
harmful to our Nation's defense.
  We already know President Obama is no fan of missile defense based on 
his budget priorities. He cut this same program, Ground Based Midcourse 
Defense, by $445 million in fiscal year 2010. His request for 2012 cuts 
this program by another $185 million.
  Remember, this program is the only defense we have against an 
intercontinental ballistic missile fired by a rogue country or a 
terrorist group. On top of Obama's cuts, this amendment would cut 
another $100 million. All we have today is a couple of dozen 
Interceptors on the west coast. We have nothing on the east coast. We 
should be adding money, not slashing it.
  The general in charge of the Missile Defense Agency said in April in 
a hearing before our subcommittee that he wants more money than what 
the President requested for testing and additional Interceptors. The 
Secretary of Defense said in January we have underestimated the threat 
from North Korea from its missile and nuclear programs. The Director of 
National Intelligence said in February that Iran's missile technology 
could be used for ICBMs.
  Now is not the time to slash our only defense for intercontinental 
threats from countries like North Korea or Iran. The threat is real. 
The consequences would be devastating. We must reject this reckless 
amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from California has 30 seconds 
remaining.
  Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I yield the balance 
of my time to the ranking member of the Armed Forces Committee, the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Madam Chair, this is a very frustrating 
debate because nobody's questioning the importance of missile defense. 
There is $1.1 billion in this bill precisely for this missile defense.
  The reason that funds have been cut for this program isn't because 
it's less of a priority; it's because the program wasn't working as it 
was intended.
  As I have discussed earlier, this happens frequently in the Defense 
Department. We don't get a program up to where it's supposed to be. We 
are appropriating money, authorizing money, in this bill that cannot be 
spent not because we simply want to cut it because we don't have a 
priority but because it isn't working at the pace that we expected it 
to be. We are giving $100 million that isn't needed even to continue 
the program. We need to be more fiscally responsible with our money.
  We support this program. We support $1.1 billion.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks).
  The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Arizona is recognized for 1\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Madam Chair, I would just seek to put this in 
some kind of perspective.
  Ever since mankind took up arms against his fellow human beings, 
there has always been an offensive weapon met with some type of 
defensive weapon. The spear brought the shield. The artillery brought 
armed battle tanks. And now we face the world's most dangerous weapons 
in the history of mankind in the form of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles armed with nuclear warheads that in a blinding flash could 
kill hundreds of thousands of people in a city. Or over our Nation's 
continent, an Exo-atmospheric blast could perhaps over time, through 
destroying our electric infrastructure, kill tens of millions of 
people. And the only system that we have to defend ourselves against 
that type of weapon is our Ground Based Midcourse Defense System. And 
this amendment seeks to cut that another $100 million on top of the 
cuts that the administration has constantly done throughout its tenure.
  Madam Chair, I would just suggest to you that that is the height of 
irresponsibility. The fact is when two airplanes hit two buildings, it 
cost this economy $2 trillion. This is not the way to have priorities 
for a budget. Our primary duty in this body is to make sure that we 
protect the lives and the constitutional rights of Americans, and we 
must protect our ability to stop intercontinental nuclear-armed 
missiles. This is the only system that we have to do it.
  Vote down this amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).
  The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded 
vote.
  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further 
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California 
will be postponed.


                    Announcement by the Acting Chair

  The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that the proponents of 
remaining amendments through amendment No. 97 will not individually 
offer their amendments.


                Amendment No. 100 Offered by Ms. Edwards

  The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 100 
printed in House Report 112-88.
  Ms. EDWARDS. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
  The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Page 762, line 3, strike ``and'' and insert the following:
       ``(3) analyzes the impact of the action on local 
     businesses, neighborhoods, and local governments; and''.
       Page 762, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.

  The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentlewoman 
from Maryland (Ms. Edwards) and a Member opposed each will control 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Maryland.
  Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the chairman 
and the ranking member.
  I represent the Fourth Congressional District of Maryland, which is 
home to Joint Base Andrews. Joint Base Andrews is home to Air Force 
One, the 11th Wing, and the 113th Wing that supports air sovereignty 
over the Mid-Atlantic region, including the National Capital region.
  Currently, 15,000 personnel work at Joint Base Andrews, including 
7,000 active duty servicemembers. When the 2005 BRAC process is 
complete, an additional 3,000 personnel will work at Joint Base 
Andrews, bringing the total to 18,000 personnel. Unfortunately, when 
considering shifting resources, the commission did not account for 
changes outside the gate required to deliver increased personnel to the 
installation.

                              {time}  2300

  And I refer to the activity at Joint Base Andrews as one of many 
examples across the country of these significant BRAC impacts on local 
infrastructure.
  The underlying bill goes a long way toward correcting significant 
transportation infrastructure impacts related to installation 
realignment. My amendment clarifies that if a significant 
transportation impact will occur as a result of a realignment action, 
the action may not be taken unless and until the Secretary analyzes the 
potential impact of the action on local businesses, neighborhoods, and 
local government. These can sometimes be quite significant and 
unaccounted for.
  My amendment keeps with the spirit of the bill, addressing 
transportation infrastructure, and simply ensures that our constituents 
and local congressional districts will have the assurance that their 
livelihoods are kept in mind when realignment activities are taken.
  A GAO study published in 2009 found that BRAC growth will result in 
increased traffic in communities ranging

[[Page H3680]]

from very large metropolitan areas to small communities, further 
congesting roads. This has certainly been the case in my community. 
According to a Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment 
survey, 17 of 18 BRAC growth communities identified transportation as 
one of their top challenges. The priority is most clear for us around 
Joint Base Andrews. Traffic entering and exiting the installation 
contributes to regional congestion, resulting in the average Washington 
metropolitan region driver wasting almost 70 hours in traffic per year 
not just at Andrews, but throughout the region.
  The Federal Government has provided very limited direct assistance to 
help communities address BRAC transportation impacts, and State and 
local governments have adopted strategies to expedite projects within 
the time frame allowed by BRAC. In years past, this has happened 
through the earmark process, a process that is no longer available. In 
other areas, the Department of Defense's Defense Access Roads program 
has certified transportation projects for funding at three affected 
communities.
  OEA has also provided planning grants and funded traffic studies and 
local planning positions. And while Federal highway and transit 
programs can be used for many BRAC-related transportation needs, 
dedicated funds are not available. Instead, BRAC-related transportation 
projects must compete with other proposed transportation projects in a 
given State or community.
  By 2009, communities that identified funding for about only $500 
million of the estimated $2 billion needed to address their near-term 
project needs. In fact, some States and local governments have adopted 
strategies to expedite highway projects, such as prioritizing short-
term high-impact projects because the time frames for completing BRAC 
personnel moves are much shorter than the time frames for such 
projects.
  While legislation mandates that BRAC growth be completed by 2011, 
major highway and transit projects typically take anywhere from 9 to 19 
years to complete, and near-term transportation projects to address 
these challenges could cost about $2 billion, of which $1.1 billion is 
related to projects solely in the Washington metropolitan area.
  BRAC-related transportation infrastructure costs are subject to a 
number of uncertainties. According to the GAO, and I quote: ``Not all 
potential projects are included in the estimate. Military staffing 
levels at some growth installations are in flux, and location decisions 
of military and civilian personnel have not yet been made. And 
preexisting, nonmilitary community growth makes a direct link between 
transportation projects to military growth very difficult.''
  To complete some critical projects before BRAC growth occurs, State 
and local officials are reprioritizing planned projects and 
implementing those projects that can be completed quickly. GAO, in 
fact, cited projects from Maryland to Texas and all across the country 
where the States prioritized certain lower cost intersection projects 
to improve traffic. This takes away from other planned priorities that 
States may have had on the books.
  The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Ms. EDWARDS. I ask for consideration of the amendment.
  Mr. McKEON. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I 
am not opposed to the amendment.
  The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  There was no objection.
  Mr. McKEON. When I conclude my remarks, Madam Chair, this will 
conclude our work for the day. We will come in and, my understanding 
is, start at 10 in the morning. We have seven more amendments to 
address in the morning plus four en bloc amendments.
  I would just like to, at this time, thank all of those Members who 
have participated. Especially I want to thank Ranking Member Smith and 
all of our staff. They have put in long, hard hours and great work. I 
think we have come out with, so far, a very good bill. I look forward 
to finishing it up tomorrow morning.
  Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from Maryland (Ms. Edwards).
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. McKEON. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Thornberry) having assumed the chair, Ms. Foxx, Acting Chair of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1540) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for military activities 
of the Department of Defense and for military construction, to 
prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2012, and for 
other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________