Congressional Record, Volume 157 Issue 73 (Wednesday, May 25, 2011)

[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 73 (Wednesday, May 25, 2011)]
[House]
[Pages H3649-H3680]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

{time} 2000
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012--Continued

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this
amendment. As we debate detainee transfer policies today, and we try to
determine the appropriate path forward, a picture stands out in my mind
from a recent trip to Afghanistan. It is the face of a young marine who
had just been killed by insurgents in Kandahar and whose photo was
recently displayed on his unit's ``Hero Wall.''
As I picture his face, I am reminded that the decisions we make here
today directly impact our troops serving in Afghanistan and their
families, particularly when we make decisions about detainee transfers.
We know that the reengagement rate for former detainees is
approximately 25 percent, but percentages are not informative in and of
themselves. It helps to understand the facts supporting them.
One fact we should keep in mind that is included in that 25 percent
figure is Mullah Abdullah Zakir, internment serial No. 8 who was
captured in Afghanistan in 2001, sent to Gitmo and released in 2007.
Zakir is one of the most feared insurgents in Afghanistan and directs
the Taliban's combat operations throughout the country.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. McKEON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. WITTMAN. It should be no surprise then that he has been targeting
U.S. forces in Helmand province and has been directly linked to the
deaths of at least 11 marines.
This story highlights why it is time to strengthen the detainee
transfer review process, not weaken it. It is time that Congress took a
leadership role in shaping how transfers are negotiated and determining
whether they are appropriate. This amendment takes away the strength to
make sure that we are doing the right thing.
It is time to move forward, not backward, and I hope you join me in
opposing this amendment.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am happy to yield the
balance of my time to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, we stood on this floor about a year ago
when the minority was the majority, and the language they want to
change now is the language they approved. In fact, the then-chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, Mr. Skelton, said this: `` . . . we are
in a position to accept this motion. I just wish to point out that
there is no difference between the Democrats and the Republicans when
it comes to fighting terrorism. I agree with the motion.''
But, Mr. Chairman, what a difference a year makes because there is
not just some difference; there is a huge gap now between the Democrats
and the Republicans on fighting terrorism. And I have never heard so
many red herrings, the red herrings of all of these people who have
been tried here. Very few of them were detained under the authorization
to use military force. Most of them were arrested and detained based on
law enforcement, a huge difference.
They raised the questions: Can we hold them here? Sure.
They asked: Can we get a conviction? Possibly.
But the real question is why would we want to bring them here to
trial. There is no prosecutor who knows what he is talking about, no
investigator who is going to walk in here today and tell you that it is
easier to convict one of these detainees by bringing them to the United
States and trying them in an Article III court than it is to do it in a
military tribunal.
And the reason is, they ask: Who wants it? I tell you who really
wants it, the ACLU. Why do they want it? Because they don't want
convictions. They have already said they want all of the detainees
released. And they know the moment they hit U.S. soil, they will pick
up a host of constitutional rights they don't now have. They know it
will be harder to get conviction, and they also know this: that one of
the trials that took place in AMF, the defendant was acquitted of over
200 different counts.
When, Mr. Chairman, is someone going to stand up for the rights of
the victims of terror here who asked this question: When are we going
to start getting prosecutions?
My good friend from New Jersey talked about the fact oh, we want to
let our prosecutors make these decisions. We want to let them go
forward unfettered. What he didn't point out to you was that was
happening. The prosecutors, a special prosecutor working under the
current law at that time had worked for over 18 months, over 56
motions. That prosecutor would have told you he would have had guilty
pleas in 6 months, and this administration not only stopped him, not
only took away his rights, but did away with the entire investigation
and started from zero; and they have been 2\1/2\ years and haven't
prosecuted.

Mr. Chairman, the question for us today is very, very simple. We have
got military tribunals. Nobody is truly questioning the
constitutionality of those military tribunals. The question for us is
when are we going to prosecute them. The other question is let's keep
the terrorists out of the United States and let's vote against this
amendment.

[[Page H3650]]

Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of
my time.
The gentleman from Virginia is right, it would be easier to try them
under military commissions. In fact, it would be easier not to try them
at all. It would be easier just to hold them forever. Why bother with
the trials. Why bother with the trials: because in over 200 years of
history in this country, we do have a fair justice system and that does
matter.
Military generals will tell you that Guantanamo Bay has been a major,
major problem for them in the field, a major recruiting tool for our
enemies because it undermines our values. Having a justice system that
we can depend on matters. I trust everyone on that side would agree on
that, that it is not just a matter of what is easiest to hold them. If
that was the case, we wouldn't have courts at all; we wouldn't have
military tribunals; we wouldn't have anything. We would just hold them.
So it does matter.
I will also point out that, yes, the gentleman was acquitted of a
whole bunch of charges. He was also convicted and sentenced to life in
our Article III courts. So the system worked in that case. We have over
200 years of history with our Article III courts; and they have worked.
By the way, the Constitution, as ruled by the court, applies in
Guantanamo Bay. Habeas corpus was attached. It does apply there. They
don't suddenly get constitutional rights coming here that they didn't
have before.
I will agree on one point: the scare campaign from last year
certainly worked. People are afraid of the notion of bringing
Guantanamo Bay inmates to this country. But they shouldn't be. As has
been pointed out, over 300 of them, including Ramzi Yousef, the
architect of the first attack on the World Trade Centers, is held here
in the United States of America safely and without incident.
We are tossing aside 200 years of constitutional and judicial history
for no good reason. That is not a good idea. Let's give the President
the option he needs to bring terrorists to justice within our system of
values. The thing about our system of values, it works. We need to stop
implying that somehow our Constitution doesn't work to protect us. It
absolutely does. And it has for over 200 years. I urge support for this
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Woodall). The question is on the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Washington
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 43 Offered by Mr. Buchanan

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 43
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk made in
order by the rule.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 461, after line 24, insert the following:

SEC. 1043. TRIAL OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS.

After the date of the enactment of this Act, any foreign
national, who--
(1) engages or has engaged in conduct constituting an
offense relating to a terrorist attack against persons or
property in the United States or against any United States
Government property or personnel outside the United States;
and
(2) is subject to trial for that offense by a military
commission under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code;
shall be tried for that offense only by a military commission
under that chapter.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Buchanan) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, my amendment requires foreign terrorists
to be prosecuted and tried in military tribunals.
The current policy, you have the ability to choose between a civilian
court and a military tribunal. What my amendment does is it is easier
to convict in a military tribunal. It is easier to protect sensitive,
classified information. Foreign terrorists can be imprisoned
indefinitely. Foreign terrorists are not allowed the same
constitutional opportunities as U.S. citizens; and military tribunals
have been used since George Washington.
I commend the Obama administration for changing its mind and
announcing it will send Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to military tribunals.
Let's guard against this so that in the future other White Houses and
administrations won't change their mind. This amendment makes it clear,
a consistent policy moving forward in terms of prosecuting foreign
terrorists.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in
opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I oppose this for many of the same reasons I
support the previous amendment. This is simply expanding a bad idea.
I will point out that while it is true that it was contained in last
year's National Defense Authorization Act, it is something that I, and
a majority of Members on this side, never supported. So last year's law
is not something that we wanted to see happen. There was a lot of other
things in the National Defense Authorization Act which we did support,
so we were forced to accept this not because we liked it, but because
that is the way the system works occasionally.

{time} 2010

This would simply expand that bad idea and deny an even larger
segment of people access to Article 3 courts. And it's arguable whether
or not it's constitutional. Because there's a little known fact about
the Constitution: It doesn't just apply to U.S. citizens; it applies to
persons in the United States. So once somebody from wherever they are
is in the United States, the Constitution applies to them. And simply
taking them out of the justice system and putting them in what I
presume would have to be the military, since they are the ones that run
our military commissions, I believe would violate the Constitution in
this instance, taking away the rights from a person within the United
States.
But beyond all that, it's just a bad idea for the same reasons that I
stated earlier. Our United States Constitution works. It convicts
criminal after criminal after criminal and puts them away for a very
long period of time. Let's not take it off the table.
Even the majority party, as strongly as they feel about this area,
did not include this particular provision in the bill that was before
the Armed Services Committee. I think there was a good reason for that.
I think we should strongly oppose this amendment.
With that, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose this amendment for the reasons stated, but
beyond that this is particularly badly done.
This says that anyone who engages or is engaged in a terrorist attack
in the United States is subject to a military commission. Well, anyone
arrested in the United States for anything is subject to the
Constitution of the United States. The Constitution guarantees an
Article 3 trial. Even if someone is accused of terrorism, if this
amendment were adopted, you would have to have a trial in an Article 3
court to determine that he was guilty of a terrorist attack before you
could then transfer him to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to
try him for that, because until a court convicts him of the act of
terrorism, he's simply another criminal defendant and, even under the
terms of this amendment, entitled to all the protections that the
Constitution gives him.
Either the amendment is read, as it seems to say, that you first have
to have an Article 3 trial to determine whether he engaged in conduct
constituting a terrorist attack so you could then hand him over to the
military tribunal, or it doesn't say that, in which case it's clearly
unconstitutional.
So this amendment is either unconstitutional or absurd because if
it's unconstitutional--well, it is--but if it

[[Page H3651]]

isn't unconstitutional, its constitutionality can only be saved by
reading it to say first you have an Article 3 court, a regular court
trial, to convict him of terrorism so that you can then, instead of
sentencing him, send him to a military tribunal to do it all over
again.
The amendment makes no sense. I urge its defeat.
Mr. BUCHANAN. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of
my time.
I just want to restate the points that were made. I think Mr. Nadler
and I both made the arguments that need to be made. This does go
outside the Constitution. It is unnecessary. And it, again, further
ties the hands of the President and the Department of Justice to
adequately deal with the very real threat that we face from terrorism.
It would tie that process up even worse. And I wish we would defeat
this amendment and give the President and the Department of Justice the
authority it needs to try people appropriately, convict them, and put
them away and take the terrorists off the battlefield.
I oppose this amendment. I urge the body to do so as well.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Again, I would just remind the gentleman that the Obama
administration did make the change in New York in terms of Mohammed,
and I just think it's the right amendment in terms of moving forward,
and I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Buchanan).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 47 Offered by Mrs. Maloney

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 47
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 507, line 21, insert after ``department'' the
following: ``that would reveal flight patterns, tactical
techniques, or tactical procedures''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentlewoman
from New York (Mrs. Maloney) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from New York.
Mrs. MALONEY. This amendment is about the need to continue to make
information available to the public, to keep our uniformed military
safe, and ensure tax dollars are not wasted on aircraft with serious
performance and maintenance issues.
It would simply narrow section 1081 of the act under consideration,
and this amendment would ensure the military cannot hide subpar
maintenance of military aircraft or other preventable shortcomings from
disclosure under the guise of keeping important tactical information
from our enemies. It ensures an adequate balance between the Defense
Department's appropriate need to protect tactical information while
ensuring the public can learn, for example, when the military is not
putting our pilots in the best maintained aircraft in the world.
Just ask the parents of Jeffrey Smith, with whom I have spoken, one
of 45 pilots who died in noncombat accidents in Harrier jets. The Los
Angeles Times' reporter Kevin Sack pored through military investigative
records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to show military
investigators believe a small shard of plastic clogged the fuel line of
Smith's jet as it tore down the runway, leading the jet to crash at the
end of the runway. The investigative series used the military's
investigative records to show other problems with the Harrier jet,
eventually winning a Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. Such
reporting does nothing to reveal tactical or strategic advantages to
our adversaries, but it could save the lives of our pilots, and it goes
a long way to ensure our airmen and women are given the very best
equipment to protect our Nation.
This amendment simply allows effective public oversight. And yet H.R.
1540 would allow the military to exempt or hide exactly this kind of
information. The exemption to the Freedom of Information Act in section
1081 is extremely broad and would block access to information of public
interest unnecessarily.
As in the tragic death of Jeffrey Smith, some of this information is
of important public interest. The public also has a vital interest in
understanding how well the aircraft their taxpayer dollars buy are
performing. The uniformed military also benefits from public scrutiny
of complicated multibillion dollar weapons systems in which they trust
their lives.
This amendment is supported by many good government groups, and my
amendment makes a simple but critically important clarification that
the information from the military flight operations quality assurance
systems that is exempted is information that would reveal flight
patterns, tactical techniques, or tactical procedures. My amendment
would exempt the truly sensitive information that allows reconstruction
of flights that could reveal detailed flight tactics and the parameters
of aircraft flight envelopes to enemies that could adapt accordingly.
It appropriately narrows the exemption to apply particular criteria
to strike the right balance between safeguarding military flights and
tactics and the public's right to know if the equipment is faulty, as
was in the case of the Harrier jets.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5
minutes.

{time} 2020

Mr. FORBES. Once again the gentlelady raises a couple of very good
points. We are all concerned about transparency. And as the chairman of
the Subcommittee on Readiness, I can tell you that I live every day
examining and being concerned that we have our fleet in a ready state
to defend this country.
But, Mr. Chairman, I'm also concerned about this: We fight oftentimes
to keep our adversaries from gaining all the information that they try
to gain about our military. We fight to protect our computers, and
sometimes we don't succeed. But also at times we just have to step back
and say we just give away way too much information.
And the gentlelady is right, there is a possibility--however remote
it might be--that we could find something in this data that may save a
life. That is a possibility, but the far more likely scenario is that
we will give away crucial information that could jeopardize our pilots,
jeopardize our fleet, and also jeopardize the men and women that they
fly to protect. We could jeopardize disclosed fleet readiness rates,
critical parts failure rates, and other sensitive logistics and
sustainment data that we just shouldn't be giving out.
So, Mr. Chairman, while I wholeheartedly agree with the gentlelady's
concern about transparency and readiness, I also realize that to run
the greatest military in the world there are some pieces of
information, some data points, that we don't want to make available to
those who may use them against us. I think this is one of those, and I
hope that we will defeat this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MALONEY. I appreciate the gentleman's sensitivity. I certainly
share his concern in protecting data points that in any way would
reveal information about our aircraft and ways that people could combat
our aircraft. But the gentlemen represents, I know, many military
families, and I'm sure you know as I do many military people who have
died in aircraft that had faulty situations. For example, the Harrier
aircraft that had 45 crashes because of faulty equipment, that if the
public and others had known about, the military I believe would have
been brought to stop the use of this and to save their lives.

[[Page H3652]]

So I feel that we have the same goal. I certainly want to protect
information that is very critical to our flight patterns and our
military; but for information that is not such as that, but faulty
equipment, that should be made available. And we feel that we have that
balance in this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, could I inquire as to the time remaining.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. FORBES. Once again, I appreciate the gentlelady. And she is
absolutely right, I represent a lot of military families. I just got
back last week from talking to a lot of men and women in Afghanistan
who are serving there; and I can tell you overwhelmingly, when you talk
to those families, one of the things that came out just recently as we
had the whole situation with the operation that killed bin Laden, over
and over and over again those families were telling me the same thing--
too many people are giving too much information and saying too much,
and they're not protecting the people in our family who are fighting to
defend this country.
And I would agree with the gentlelady that we need to be on top of
this readiness issue, but it's not just our aircraft. It's our ships
and the vessels that we have there. And I can assure her that our
subcommittees on the Armed Services Committee, both the chairmen and
the ranking members, are doing just that to make sure those vessels are
safe, to make sure that information is available when it's needed, but
at the same time, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that we're not giving out
fleet readiness rates to people who could use them against us, critical
parts failures to people who could use them against us, and other
sensitive logistics and sustainment data which her amendment does not
protect.
Mr. Chairman, once again, I hope we will defeat this amendment and
protect this sensitive information.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MALONEY. May I inquire as to the time remaining.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman has 30 seconds remaining.
Mrs. MALONEY. I support this amendment. Instead of blocking access to
all of this information, a more reasonable approach is to allow the DOD
to perform these missions to maintain a tactical and technical
advantage and to maintain effective, efficient, and safe aircraft units
and aircraft tactical information without unnecessarily withholding
information about the safety--in this case of aircraft--that the public
and the pilots and others have a right to know. So I support this
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to likewise support it.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I just renew my opposition to the amendment
and I hope we will defeat it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Maloney).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 48 Offered by Mr. Mack

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 48
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title X add the following:

SEC. __. SUNKEN MILITARY CRAFT.

Section 1408(3) of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (10 U.S.C. 113 note)
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, that was'' before
``on military noncommercial service''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting a comma before ``that
was owned or operated''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Mack) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is a mere
clarification of the Sunken Military Craft Act. The fundamental
objective of the Sunken Military Craft Act was to protect sunken United
States military vessels, aircraft and spacecraft. This technical
correction will make clear that the term ``sunken military craft'' will
only include vessels, warships, naval auxiliaries or other vessels on
military, noncommercial service at the time they were sunk.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend for offering the amendment.
We are inclined to oppose the amendment on the following grounds: in
2005, Congress enacted the Sunken Military Craft Act and the principal
purpose of that law was to preserve U.S. sovereignty and Department of
Defense sovereignty over sunken vessels and abandoned aircraft and the
like for strategic and economic purposes, and also to protect the
remains and property of those who may have perished on those sunken
vessels.
It's my understanding that this amendment draws a distinction between
such vessels that were in noncommercial service versus commercial
service. And although I think I understand the justification for that
distinction, here is our concern with the consequence of that.
It is our understanding there is pending litigation between the
nation of Spain and a private venture over the disposition of rights to
a sunken vessel that at least at one time--I suppose the time it was
sunk--may have had some claim in the United States. I don't know if
that is the case. Our concern is that by taking statutory action here,
we may be in some way interfering with the outcome of that litigation
or the process of that litigation.
I would yield to my friend, the author of the amendment, to ask if
that is his intention.
Mr. MACK. The amendment is clearly to clarify that we are actually
talking about military craft as it is a military craft. In other words,
if it's involved in commercial activity, then it wouldn't be regarded
as military craft. So it's really to make the distinction, which is why
the act was put in place the first time, that it's not for commercial
craft--it may at one time have been--but it is for actual military
craft when they are sunk.
Mr. ANDREWS. Reclaiming my time, I think the gentleman's distinction
makes sense. We have spoken to the Navy about this, and the Navy's
objection is predicated upon its concern that there could be an impact
on the litigation that is pending that I made reference to and possibly
claims of other sovereign nations in similar situations.
So, reluctantly, we would be inclined to oppose the amendment, but
obviously be willing to discuss with the gentleman as time goes forward
ways that perhaps our concerns could be addressed. So for present
purposes, we would be in opposition to the amendment for the reasons
that I stated.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MACK. I want to thank the gentleman for expressing his
reservations.
I would tell the gentleman and this body that I think it's clear that
the understanding of this act is to protect military craft that has
sunk; but when that military craft is no longer involved in the
military but now is used for commercial activities, then it's no longer
a military craft.

{time} 2030

So the purpose of this amendment is to clarify this distinction.
With that, Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. I think the intent
here is just to clarify what is military versus commercial. I hope that
I can get the support of the Members.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mack).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by

[[Page H3653]]

the gentleman from Florida will be postponed.

Amendment No. 49 Offered by Mr. Langevin

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 49
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title X, add the following new subtitle:

Subtitle J--Executive Cyberspace Coordination

SEC. 1099C. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICY.

Chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by
striking subchapters II and III and inserting the following:

``SUBCHAPTER II--INFORMATION SECURITY

``Sec. 3551. Purposes

``The purposes of this subchapter are to--
``(1) provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the
effectiveness of information security controls over
information resources that support Federal operations and
assets;
``(2) recognize the highly networked nature of the current
Federal computing environment and provide effective
Governmentwide management and oversight of the related
information security risks, including coordination of
information security efforts throughout the civilian,
national security, and law enforcement communities;
``(3) provide for development and maintenance of minimum
controls required to protect Federal information and
information infrastructure;
``(4) provide a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal
agency information security programs;
``(5) acknowledge that commercially developed information
security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and
effective information security solutions, reflecting market
solutions for the protection of critical information
infrastructures important to the national defense and
economic security of the Nation that are designed, built, and
operated by the private sector; and
``(6) recognize that the selection of specific technical
hardware and software information security solutions should
be left to individual agencies from among commercially
developed products.

``Sec. 3552. Definitions

``(a) Section 3502 Definitions.--Except as provided under
subsection (b), the definitions under section 3502 shall
apply to this subchapter.
``(b) Additional Definitions.--In this subchapter:
``(1) The term `adequate security' means security that
complies with the regulations promulgated under section 3554
and the standards promulgated under section 3558.
``(2) The term `incident' means an occurrence that actually
or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of an information system, information
infrastructure, or the information the system processes,
stores, or transmits or that constitutes a violation or
imminent threat of violation of security policies, security
procedures, or acceptable use policies.
``(3) The term `information infrastructure' means the
underlying framework that information systems and assets rely
on in processing, storing, or transmitting information
electronically.
``(4) The term `information security' means protecting
information and information infrastructure from unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction in order to provide--
``(A) integrity, which means guarding against improper
information modification or destruction, and includes
ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity;
``(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized
restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for
protecting personal privacy and proprietary information;
``(C) availability, which means ensuring timely and
reliable access to and use of information; and
``(D) authentication, which means using digital credentials
to assure the identity of users and validate access of such
users.
``(5) The term `information technology' has the meaning
given that term in section 11101 of title 40.
``(6)(A) The term `national security system' means any
information infrastructure (including any telecommunications
system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of
an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency--
``(i) the function, operation, or use of which--
``(I) involves intelligence activities;
``(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national
security;
``(III) involves command and control of military forces;
``(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a
weapon or weapons system; or
``(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the
direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or
``(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established
for information that have been specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of
Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy.
``(B) Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that
is to be used for routine administrative and business
applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and
personnel management applications).

``Sec. 3553. National Office for Cyberspace

``(a) Establishment.--There is established within the
Executive Office of the President an office to be known as
the National Office for Cyberspace.
``(b) Director.--
``(1) In general.--There shall be at the head of the
National Office for Cyberspace a Director, who shall be
appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. The Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace shall administer all functions designated to such
Director under this subchapter and collaborate to the extent
practicable with the heads of appropriate agencies, the
private sector, and international partners. The Office shall
serve as the principal office for coordinating issues
relating to cyberspace, including achieving an assured,
reliable, secure, and survivable information infrastructure
and related capabilities for the Federal Government, while
promoting national economic interests, security, and civil
liberties.
``(2) Basic pay.--The Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace shall be paid at the rate of basic pay for level
III of the Executive Schedule.
``(c) Staff.--The Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace may appoint and fix the pay of additional
personnel as the Director considers appropriate.
``(d) Experts and Consultants.--The Director of the
National Office for Cyberspace may procure temporary and
intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5.

``Sec. 3554. Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board

``(a) Establishment.--Within the National Office for
Cyberspace, there shall be established a board to be known as
the `Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board' (in this section
referred to as the `Board').
``(b) Members.--The Board shall be chaired by the Director
of the National Office for Cyberspace and consist of not more
than 10 members, with at least one representative from--
``(1) the Office of Management and Budget;
``(2) civilian agencies;
``(3) the Department of Defense;
``(4) the Federal law enforcement community;
``(5) the Federal Chief Technology Office; and
``(6) such additional military and civilian agencies as the
Director considers appropriate.
``(c) Responsibilities.--
``(1) Development of policies and procedures.--Subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Director of the
National Office for Cyberspace, the Board shall be
responsible for developing and periodically updating
information security policies and procedures relating to the
matters described in paragraph (2). In developing such
policies and procedures, the Board shall require that all
matters addressed in the policies and procedures are
consistent, to the maximum extent practicable and in
accordance with applicable law, among the civilian, military,
intelligence, and law enforcement communities.
``(2) Specific matters covered in policies and
procedures.--
``(A) Minimum security controls.--The Board shall be
responsible for developing and periodically updating
information security policies and procedures relating to
minimum security controls for information technology, in
order to--
``(i) provide Governmentwide protection of Government-
networked computers against common attacks; and
``(ii) provide agencywide protection against threats,
vulnerabilities, and other risks to the information
infrastructure within individual agencies.
``(B) Measures of effectiveness.--The Board shall be
responsible for developing and periodically updating
information security policies and procedures relating to
measurements needed to assess the effectiveness of the
minimum security controls referred to in subparagraph (A).
Such measurements shall include a risk scoring system to
evaluate risk to information security both Governmentwide and
within contractors of the Federal Government.
``(C) Products and services.--The Board shall be
responsible for developing and periodically updating
information security policies, procedures, and minimum
security standards relating to criteria for products and
services to be used in agency information systems and
information infrastructure that will meet the minimum
security controls referred to in subparagraph (A). In
carrying out this subparagraph, the Board shall act in
consultation with the Office of Management and Budget and the
General Services Administration.
``(D) Remedies.--The Board shall be responsible for
developing and periodically updating information security
policies and procedures relating to methods for providing
remedies for security deficiencies identified in agency
information infrastructure.
``(3) Additional considerations.--The Board shall also
consider--
``(A) opportunities to engage with the international
community to set policies, principles, training, standards,
or guidelines for information security;

[[Page H3654]]

``(B) opportunities to work with agencies and industry
partners to increase information sharing and policy
coordination efforts in order to reduce vulnerabilities in
the national information infrastructure; and
``(C) options necessary to encourage and maintain
accountability of any agency, or senior agency official, for
efforts to secure the information infrastructure of such
agency.
``(4) Relationship to other standards.--The policies and
procedures developed under paragraph (1) are supplemental to
the standards promulgated by the Director of the National
Office for Cyberspace under section 3558.
``(5) Recommendations for regulations.--The Board shall be
responsible for making recommendations to the Director of the
National Office for Cyberspace on regulations to carry out
the policies and procedures developed by the Board under
paragraph (1).
``(d) Regulations.--The Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace, in consultation with the Director of the Office
of Management and the Administrator of General Services,
shall promulgate and periodically update regulations to carry
out the policies and procedures developed by the Board under
subsection (c).
``(e) Annual Report.--The Director of the National Office
for Cyberspace shall provide to Congress a report containing
a summary of agency progress in implementing the regulations
promulgated under this section as part of the annual report
to Congress required under section 3555(a)(8).
``(f) No Disclosure by Board Required.--The Board is not
required to disclose under section 552 of title 5 information
submitted by agencies to the Board regarding threats,
vulnerabilities, and risks.

``Sec. 3555. Authority and functions of the Director of the
National Office for Cyberspace

``(a) In General.--The Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace shall oversee agency information security policies
and practices, including--
``(1) developing and overseeing the implementation of
policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on
information security, including through ensuring timely
agency adoption of and compliance with standards promulgated
under section 3558;
``(2) requiring agencies, consistent with the standards
promulgated under section 3558 and other requirements of this
subchapter, to identify and provide information security
protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the
harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction of--
``(A) information collected or maintained by or on behalf
of an agency; or
``(B) information infrastructure used or operated by an
agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization
on behalf of an agency;
``(3) coordinating the development of standards and
guidelines under section 20 of the National Institute of
Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) with agencies
and offices operating or exercising control of national
security systems (including the National Security Agency) to
assure, to the maximum extent feasible, that such standards
and guidelines are complementary with standards and
guidelines developed for national security systems;
``(4) overseeing agency compliance with the requirements of
this subchapter, including through any authorized action
under section 11303 of title 40, to enforce accountability
for compliance with such requirements;
``(5) reviewing at least annually, and approving or
disapproving, agency information security programs required
under section 3556(b);
``(6) coordinating information security policies and
procedures of the Federal Government with related information
resources management policies and procedures on the security
and resiliency of cyberspace;
``(7) overseeing the operation of the Federal information
security incident center required under section 3559;
``(8) reporting to Congress no later than March 1 of each
year on agency compliance with the requirements of this
subchapter, including--
``(A) a summary of the findings of audits required by
section 3557;
``(B) an assessment of the development, promulgation, and
adoption of, and compliance with, standards developed under
section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) and promulgated under
section 3558;
``(C) significant deficiencies in agency information
security practices;
``(D) planned remedial action to address such deficiencies;
and
``(E) a summary of, and the views of the Director of the
National Office for Cyberspace on, the report prepared by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology under section
20(d)(10) of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3);
``(9) coordinating the defense of information
infrastructure operated by agencies in the case of a large-
scale attack on information infrastructure, as determined by
the Director;
``(10) establishing a national strategy not later than 120
days after the date of the enactment of this section;
``(11) coordinating information security training for
Federal employees with the Office of Personnel Management;
``(12) ensuring the adequacy of protections for privacy and
civil liberties in carrying out the responsibilities of the
Director under this subchapter;
``(13) making recommendations that the Director determines
are necessary to ensure risk-based security of the Federal
information infrastructure and information infrastructure
that is owned, operated, controlled, or licensed for use by,
or on behalf of, the Department of Defense, a military
department, or another element of the intelligence community
to--
``(A) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
``(B) the head of an agency; or
``(C) to Congress with regard to the reprogramming of
funds;
``(14) ensuring, in consultation with the Administrator of
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, that the
efforts of agencies relating to the development of
regulations, rules, requirements, or other actions applicable
to the national information infrastructure are complementary;
``(15) when directed by the President, carrying out the
responsibilities for national security and emergency
preparedness communications described in section 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 606) to ensure
integration and coordination; and
``(16) as assigned by the President, other duties relating
to the security and resiliency of cyberspace.
``(b) Recruitment Program.--Not later than 1 year after
appointment, the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace shall establish a national program to conduct
competitions and challenges that instruct United States
students in cybersecurity education and computer literacy.
``(c) Budget Oversight and Reporting.--(1) The head of each
agency shall submit to the Director of the National Office
for Cyberspace a budget each year for the following fiscal
year relating to the protection of information infrastructure
for such agency, by a date determined by the Director that is
before the submission of such budget by the head of the
agency to the Office of Management and Budget.
``(2) The Director shall review and offer a non-binding
approval or disapproval of each agency's annual budget to
each such agency before the submission of such budget by the
head of the agency to the Office of Management and Budget.
``(3) If the Director offers a non-binding disapproval of
an agency's budget, the Director shall transmit
recommendations to the head of such agency for strengthening
its proposed budget with regard to the protection of such
agency's information infrastructure.
``(4) Each budget submitted by the head of an agency
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include--
``(A) a review of any threats to information technology for
such agency;
``(B) a plan to secure the information infrastructure for
such agency based on threats to information technology, using
the National Institute of Standards and Technology guidelines
and recommendations;
``(C) a review of compliance by such agency with any
previous year plan described in subparagraph (B); and
``(D) a report on the development of the credentialing
process to enable secure authentication of identity and
authorization for access to the information infrastructure of
such agency.
``(5) The Director of the National Office for Cyberspace
may recommend to the President monetary penalties or
incentives necessary to encourage and maintain accountability
of any agency, or senior agency official, for efforts to
secure the information infrastructure of such agency.

``Sec. 3556. Agency responsibilities

``(a) In General.--The head of each agency shall--
``(1) be responsible for--
``(A) providing information security protections
commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm
resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction of--
``(i) information collected or maintained by or on behalf
of the agency; and
``(ii) information infrastructure used or operated by an
agency or by a contractor of an agency or other organization
on behalf of an agency;
``(B) complying with the requirements of this subchapter
and related policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines,
including--
``(i) the regulations promulgated under section 3554 and
the information security standards promulgated under section
3558;
``(ii) information security standards and guidelines for
national security systems issued in accordance with law and
as directed by the President; and
``(iii) ensuring the standards implemented for information
infrastructure and national security systems under the agency
head are complementary and uniform, to the extent
practicable; and
``(C) ensuring that information security management
processes are integrated with agency strategic and
operational planning processes;
``(2) ensure that senior agency officials provide
information security for the information and information
infrastructure that support the operations and assets under
their control, including through--
``(A) assessing the risk and magnitude of the harm that
could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption,

[[Page H3655]]

modification, or destruction of such information or
information infrastructure;
``(B) determining the levels of information security
appropriate to protect such information and information
infrastructure in accordance with regulations promulgated
under section 3554 and standards promulgated under section
3558, for information security classifications and related
requirements;
``(C) implementing policies and procedures to cost
effectively reduce risks to an acceptable level; and
``(D) continuously testing and evaluating information
security controls and techniques to ensure that they are
effectively implemented;
``(3) delegate to an agency official, designated as the
`Chief Information Security Officer', under the authority of
the agency Chief Information Officer the responsibility to
oversee agency information security and the authority to
ensure and enforce compliance with the requirements imposed
on the agency under this subchapter, including--
``(A) overseeing the establishment and maintenance of a
security operations capability on an automated and continuous
basis that can--
``(i) assess the state of compliance of all networks and
systems with prescribed controls issued pursuant to section
3558 and report immediately any variance therefrom and, where
appropriate and with the approval of the agency Chief
Information Officer, shut down systems that are found to be
non-compliant;
``(ii) detect, report, respond to, contain, and mitigate
incidents that impair adequate security of the information
and information infrastructure, in accordance with policy
provided by the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace, in consultation with the Chief Information
Officers Council, and guidance from the National Institute of
Standards and Technology;
``(iii) collaborate with the National Office for Cyberspace
and appropriate public and private sector security operations
centers to address incidents that impact the security of
information and information infrastructure that extend beyond
the control of the agency; and
``(iv) not later than 24 hours after discovery of any
incident described under subparagraph (A)(ii), unless
otherwise directed by policy of the National Office for
Cyberspace, provide notice to the appropriate security
operations center, the National Cyber Investigative Joint
Task Force, and the Inspector General of the agency;
``(B) developing, maintaining, and overseeing an agency
wide information security program as required by subsection
(b);
``(C) developing, maintaining, and overseeing information
security policies, procedures, and control techniques to
address all applicable requirements, including those issued
under sections 3555 and 3558;
``(D) training and overseeing personnel with significant
responsibilities for information security with respect to
such responsibilities; and
``(E) assisting senior agency officials concerning their
responsibilities under paragraph (2);
``(4) ensure that the agency has trained and cleared
personnel sufficient to assist the agency in complying with
the requirements of this subchapter and related policies,
procedures, standards, and guidelines;
``(5) ensure that the Chief Information Security Officer,
in coordination with other senior agency officials, reports
biannually to the agency head on the effectiveness of the
agency information security program, including progress of
remedial actions; and
``(6) ensure that the Chief Information Security Officer
possesses necessary qualifications, including education,
professional certifications, training, experience, and the
security clearance required to administer the functions
described under this subchapter; and has information security
duties as the primary duty of that official.
``(b) Agency Program.--Each agency shall develop, document,
and implement an agencywide information security program,
approved by the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace under section 3555(a)(5), to provide information
security for the information and information infrastructure
that support the operations and assets of the agency,
including those provided or managed by another agency,
contractor, or other source, that includes--
``(1) continuous automated technical monitoring of
information infrastructure used or operated by an agency or
by a contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf
of an agency to assure conformance with regulations
promulgated under section 3554 and standards promulgated
under section 3558;
``(2) testing of the effectiveness of security controls
that are commensurate with risk (as defined by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Office
for Cyberspace) for agency information infrastructure;
``(3) policies and procedures that--
``(A) mitigate and remediate, to the extent practicable,
information security vulnerabilities based on the risk posed
to the agency;
``(B) cost effectively reduce information security risks to
an acceptable level;
``(C) ensure that information security is addressed
throughout the life cycle of each agency information system
and information infrastructure;
``(D) ensure compliance with--
``(i) the requirements of this subchapter;
``(ii) policies and procedures as may be prescribed by the
Director of the National Office for Cyberspace, and
information security standards promulgated under section
3558;
``(iii) minimally acceptable system configuration
requirements, as determined by the Director of the National
Office for Cyberspace; and
``(iv) any other applicable requirements, including--

``(I) standards and guidelines for national security
systems issued in accordance with law and as directed by the
President;
``(II) the policy of the Director of the National Office
for Cyberspace;
``(III) the National Institute of Standards and Technology
guidance; and
``(IV) the Chief Information Officers Council recommended
approaches;

``(E) develop, maintain, and oversee information security
policies, procedures, and control techniques to address all
applicable requirements, including those issued under
sections 3555 and 3558; and
``(F) ensure the oversight and training of personnel with
significant responsibilities for information security with
respect to such responsibilities;
``(4) ensuring that the agency has trained and cleared
personnel sufficient to assist the agency in complying with
the requirements of this subchapter and related policies,
procedures, standards, and guidelines;
``(5) to the extent practicable, automated and continuous
technical monitoring for testing, and evaluation of the
effectiveness and compliance of information security
policies, procedures, and practices, including--
``(A) management, operational, and technical controls of
every information infrastructure identified in the inventory
required under section 3505(b); and
``(B) management, operational, and technical controls
relied on for an evaluation under section 3556;
``(6) a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and
documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in
the information security policies, procedures, and practices
of the agency;
``(7) to the extent practicable, continuous automated
technical monitoring for detecting, reporting, and responding
to security incidents, consistent with standards and
guidelines issued by the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace, including--
``(A) mitigating risks associated with such incidents
before substantial damage is done;
``(B) notifying and consulting with the appropriate
security operations response center; and
``(C) notifying and consulting with, as appropriate--
``(i) law enforcement agencies and relevant Offices of
Inspectors General;
``(ii) the National Office for Cyberspace; and
``(iii) any other agency or office, in accordance with law
or as directed by the President; and
``(8) plans and procedures to ensure continuity of
operations for information infrastructure that support the
operations and assets of the agency.
``(c) Agency Reporting.--Each agency shall--
``(1) submit an annual report on the adequacy and
effectiveness of information security policies, procedures,
and practices, and compliance with the requirements of this
subchapter, including compliance with each requirement of
subsection (b) to--
``(A) the National Office for Cyberspace;
``(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate;
``(C) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of
the House of Representatives;
``(D) other appropriate authorization and appropriations
committees of Congress; and
``(E) the Comptroller General;
``(2) address the adequacy and effectiveness of information
security policies, procedures, and practices in plans and
reports relating to--
``(A) annual agency budgets;
``(B) information resources management of this subchapter;
``(C) information technology management under this chapter;
``(D) program performance under sections 1105 and 1115
through 1119 of title 31, and sections 2801 and 2805 of title
39;
``(E) financial management under chapter 9 of title 31, and
the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (31 U.S.C. 501 note;
Public Law 101-576) (and the amendments made by that Act);
``(F) financial management systems under the Federal
Financial Management Improvement Act (31 U.S.C. 3512 note);
and
``(G) internal accounting and administrative controls under
section 3512 of title 31; and
``(3) report any significant deficiency in a policy,
procedure, or practice identified under paragraph (1) or
(2)--
``(A) as a material weakness in reporting under section
3512 of title 31; and
``(B) if relating to financial management systems, as an
instance of a lack of substantial compliance under the
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (31 U.S.C. 3512
note).
``(d) Performance Plan.--(1) In addition to the
requirements of subsection (c), each agency, in consultation
with the National Office for Cyberspace, shall include as
part of the performance plan required under section 1115 of
title 31 a description of the resources,

[[Page H3656]]

including budget, staffing, and training, that are necessary
to implement the program required under subsection (b).
``(2) The description under paragraph (1) shall be based on
the risk assessments required under subsection (a)(2).
``(e) Public Notice and Comment.--Each agency shall provide
the public with timely notice and opportunities for comment
on proposed information security policies and procedures to
the extent that such policies and procedures affect
communication with the public.

``Sec. 3557. Annual independent audit

``(a) In General.--(1) Each year each agency shall have
performed an independent audit of the information security
program and practices of that agency to determine the
effectiveness of such program and practices.
``(2) Each audit under this section shall include--
``(A) testing of the effectiveness of the information
infrastructure of the agency for automated, continuous
monitoring of the state of compliance of its information
infrastructure with regulations promulgated under section
3554 and standards promulgated under section 3558 in a
representative subset of--
``(i) the information infrastructure used or operated by
the agency; and
``(ii) the information infrastructure used, operated, or
supported on behalf of the agency by a contractor of the
agency, a subcontractor (at any tier) of such contractor, or
any other entity;
``(B) an assessment (made on the basis of the results of
the testing) of compliance with--
``(i) the requirements of this subchapter; and
``(ii) related information security policies, procedures,
standards, and guidelines;
``(C) separate assessments, as appropriate, regarding
information security relating to national security systems;
and
``(D) a conclusion regarding whether the information
security controls of the agency are effective, including an
identification of any significant deficiencies in such
controls.
``(3) Each audit under this section shall be performed in
accordance with applicable generally accepted Government
auditing standards.
``(b) Independent Auditor.--Subject to subsection (c)--
``(1) for each agency with an Inspector General appointed
under the Inspector General Act of 1978 or any other law, the
annual audit required by this section shall be performed by
the Inspector General or by an independent external auditor,
as determined by the Inspector General of the agency; and
``(2) for each agency to which paragraph (1) does not
apply, the head of the agency shall engage an independent
external auditor to perform the audit.
``(c) National Security Systems.--For each agency operating
or exercising control of a national security system, that
portion of the audit required by this section directly
relating to a national security system shall be performed--
``(1) only by an entity designated head; and
``(2) in such a manner as to ensure appropriate protection
for information associated with any information security
vulnerability in such system commensurate with the risk and
in accordance with all applicable laws.
``(d) Existing Audits.--The audit required by this section
may be based in whole or in part on another audit relating to
programs or practices of the applicable agency.
``(e) Agency Reporting.--(1) Each year, not later than such
date established by the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace, the head of each agency shall submit to the
Director the results of the audit required under this
section.
``(2) To the extent an audit required under this section
directly relates to a national security system, the results
of the audit submitted to the Director of the National Office
for Cyberspace shall contain only a summary and assessment of
that portion of the audit directly relating to a national
security system.
``(f) Protection of Information.--Agencies and auditors
shall take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of
information which, if disclosed, may adversely affect
information security. Such protections shall be commensurate
with the risk and comply with all applicable laws and
regulations.
``(g) National Office for Cyberspace Reports to Congress.--
(1) The Director of the National Office for Cyberspace shall
summarize the results of the audits conducted under this
section in the annual report to Congress required under
section 3555(a)(8).
``(2) The Director's report to Congress under this
subsection shall summarize information regarding information
security relating to national security systems in such a
manner as to ensure appropriate protection for information
associated with any information security vulnerability in
such system commensurate with the risk and in accordance with
all applicable laws.
``(3) Audits and any other descriptions of information
infrastructure under the authority and control of the
Director of Central Intelligence or of National Foreign
Intelligence Programs systems under the authority and control
of the Secretary of Defense shall be made available to
Congress only through the appropriate oversight committees of
Congress, in accordance with applicable laws.
``(h) Comptroller General.--The Comptroller General shall
periodically evaluate and report to Congress on--
``(1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agency information
security policies and practices; and
``(2) implementation of the requirements of this
subchapter.
``(i) Contractor Audits.--Each year each contractor that
operates, uses, or supports an information system or
information infrastructure on behalf of an agency and each
subcontractor of such contractor--
``(1) shall conduct an audit using an independent external
auditor in accordance with subsection (a), including an
assessment of compliance with the applicable requirements of
this subchapter; and
``(2) shall submit the results of such audit to such agency
not later than such date established by the Agency.

``Sec. 3558. Responsibilities for Federal information systems
standards

``(a) Requirement To Prescribe Standards.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Requirement.--Except as provided under paragraph (2),
the Secretary of Commerce shall, on the basis of proposed
standards developed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
20(a) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3(a)) and in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, promulgate information
security standards pertaining to Federal information systems.
``(B) Required standards.--Standards promulgated under
subparagraph (A) shall include--
``(i) standards that provide minimum information security
requirements as determined under section 20(b) of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C.
278g-3(b)); and
``(ii) such standards that are otherwise necessary to
improve the efficiency of operation or security of Federal
information systems.
``(C) Required standards binding.--Information security
standards described under subparagraph (B) shall be
compulsory and binding.
``(2) Standards and guidelines for national security
systems.--Standards and guidelines for national security
systems, as defined under section 3552(b), shall be
developed, promulgated, enforced, and overseen as otherwise
authorized by law and as directed by the President.
``(b) Application of More Stringent Standards.--The head of
an agency may employ standards for the cost-effective
information security for all operations and assets within or
under the supervision of that agency that are more stringent
than the standards promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce
under this section, if such standards--
``(1) contain, at a minimum, the provisions of those
applicable standards made compulsory and binding by the
Secretary; and
``(2) are otherwise consistent with policies and guidelines
issued under section 3555.
``(c) Requirements Regarding Decisions by the Secretary.--
``(1) Deadline.--The decision regarding the promulgation of
any standard by the Secretary of Commerce under subsection
(b) shall occur not later than 6 months after the submission
of the proposed standard to the Secretary by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, as provided under
section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3).
``(2) Notice and comment.--A decision by the Secretary of
Commerce to significantly modify, or not promulgate, a
proposed standard submitted to the Secretary by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, as provided under
section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3), shall be made after the
public is given an opportunity to comment on the Secretary's
proposed decision.

``Sec. 3559. Federal information security incident center

``(a) In General.--The Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace shall ensure the operation of a central Federal
information security incident center to--
``(1) provide timely technical assistance to operators of
agency information systems and information infrastructure
regarding security incidents, including guidance on detecting
and handling information security incidents;
``(2) compile and analyze information about incidents that
threaten information security;
``(3) inform operators of agency information systems and
information infrastructure about current and potential
information security threats, and vulnerabilities; and
``(4) consult with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, agencies or offices operating or exercising
control of national security systems (including the National
Security Agency), and such other agencies or offices in
accordance with law and as directed by the President
regarding information security incidents and related matters.
``(b) National Security Systems.--Each agency operating or
exercising control of a national security system shall share
information about information security incidents, threats,
and vulnerabilities with the Federal information security
incident center to the extent consistent with standards and
guidelines for national security systems,

[[Page H3657]]

issued in accordance with law and as directed by the
President.
``(c) Review and Approval.--In coordination with the
Administrator for Electronic Government and Information
Technology, the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace shall review and approve the policies, procedures,
and guidance established in this subchapter to ensure that
the incident center has the capability to effectively and
efficiently detect, correlate, respond to, contain, mitigate,
and remediate incidents that impair the adequate security of
the information systems and information infrastructure of
more than one agency. To the extent practicable, the
capability shall be continuous and technically automated.

``Sec. 3560. National security systems

``The head of each agency operating or exercising control
of a national security system shall be responsible for
ensuring that the agency--
``(1) provides information security protections
commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm
resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction of the information
contained in such system;
``(2) implements information security policies and
practices as required by standards and guidelines for
national security systems, issued in accordance with law and
as directed by the President; and
``(3) complies with the requirements of this subchapter.''.

SEC. 1099D. INFORMATION SECURITY ACQUISITION REQUIREMENTS.

Chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end of subchapter II the following new section:

``Sec. 11319. Information security acquisition requirements.

``(a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, beginning one year after the date of the enactment of
the Executive Cyberspace Coordination Act of 2011, no agency
may enter into a contract, an order under a contract, or an
interagency agreement for--
``(1) the collection, use, management, storage, or
dissemination of information on behalf of the agency;
``(2) the use or operation of an information system or
information infrastructure on behalf of the agency; or
``(3) information technology;

unless such contract, order, or agreement includes
requirements to provide effective information security that
supports the operations and assets under the control of the
agency, in compliance with the policies, standards, and
guidance developed under subsection (b), and otherwise
ensures compliance with this section.
``(b) Coordination of Secure Acquisition Policies.--
``(1) In general.--The Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, in consultation with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, the Director of the
National Office for Cyberspace, and the Administrator of
General Services, shall oversee the development and
implementation of policies, standards, and guidance,
including through revisions to the Federal Acquisition
Regulation and the Department of Defense supplement to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, to cost effectively enhance
agency information security, including--
``(A) minimum information security requirements for agency
procurement of information technology products and services;
and
``(B) approaches for evaluating and mitigating significant
supply chain security risks associated with products or
services to be acquired by agencies.
``(2) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of
the enactment of the Executive Cyberspace Coordination Act of
2011, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall submit to Congress a report describing--
``(A) actions taken to improve the information security
associated with the procurement of products and services by
the Federal Government; and
``(B) plans for overseeing and coordinating efforts of
agencies to use best practice approaches for cost-effectively
purchasing more secure products and services.
``(c) Vulnerability Assessments of Major Systems.--
``(1) Requirement for initial vulnerability assessments.--
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
require each agency to conduct an initial vulnerability
assessment for any major system and its significant items of
supply prior to the development of the system. The initial
vulnerability assessment of a major system and its
significant items of supply shall include use of an analysis-
based approach to--
``(A) identify vulnerabilities;
``(B) define exploitation potential;
``(C) examine the system's potential effectiveness;
``(D) determine overall vulnerability; and
``(E) make recommendations for risk reduction.
``(2) Subsequent vulnerability assessments.--
``(A) The Director shall require a subsequent vulnerability
assessment of each major system and its significant items of
supply within a program if the Director determines that
circumstances warrant the issuance of an additional
vulnerability assessment.
``(B) Upon the request of a congressional committee, the
Director may require a subsequent vulnerability assessment of
a particular major system and its significant items of supply
within the program.
``(C) Any subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major
system and its significant items of supply shall include use
of an analysis-based approach and, if applicable, a testing-
based approach, to monitor the exploitation potential of such
system and reexamine the factors described in subparagraphs
(A) through (E) of paragraph (1).
``(3) Congressional oversight.--The Director shall provide
to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of each
vulnerability assessment conducted under paragraph (1) or (2)
not later than 10 days after the date of the completion of
such assessment.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Item of supply.--The term `item of supply'--
``(A) means any individual part, component, subassembly,
assembly, or subsystem integral to a major system, and other
property which may be replaced during the service life of the
major system, including a spare part or replenishment part;
and
``(B) does not include packaging or labeling associated
with shipment or identification of an item.
``(2) Vulnerability assessment.--The term `vulnerability
assessment' means the process of identifying and quantifying
vulnerabilities in a major system and its significant items
of supply.
``(3) Major system.--The term `major system' has the
meaning given that term in section 4 of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).''.

SEC. 1099E. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Table of Sections in Title 44.--The table of sections
for chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, is amended by
striking the matter relating to subchapters II and III and
inserting the following:

``subchapter ii--information security

``3551. Purposes.
``3552. Definitions.
``3553. National Office for Cyberspace.
``3554. Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board.
``3555. Authority and functions of the Director of the National Office
for Cyberspace.
``3556. Agency responsibilities.
``3557. Annual independent audit.
``3558. Responsibilities for Federal information systems standards.
``3559. Federal information security incident center.
``3560. National security systems.''.

(b) Table of Sections in Title 40.--The table of sections
for chapter 113 of title 40, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 11318 the
following new item:

``Sec. 11319. Information security acquisition requirements.''.

(c) Other References.--
(1) Section 1001(c)(1)(A) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 511(c)(1)(A)) is amended by striking ``section
3532(3)'' and inserting ``section 3552(b)''.
(2) Section 2222(j)(6) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 3542(b)(2))'' and inserting
``section 3552(b)''.
(3) Section 2223(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended, by striking ``section 3542(b)(2))'' and inserting
``section 3552(b)''.
(4) Section 2315 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 3542(b)(2))'' and inserting
``section 3552(b)''.
(5) Section 20 of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) is amended--
(A) in subsections (a)(2) and (e)(5), by striking ``section
3532(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 3552(b)'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``section 3532(1)''
and inserting ``section 3552(b)''; and
(C) in subsections (c)(3) and (d)(1), by striking ``section
11331 of title 40'' and inserting ``section 3558 of title
44''.
(6) Section 8(d)(1) of the Cyber Security Research and
Development Act (15 U.S.C. 7406(d)(1)) is amended by striking
``section 3534(b)'' and inserting ``section 3556(b)''.
(d) Repeal.--
(1) Subchapter III of chapter 113 of title 40, United
States Code, is repealed.
(2) The table of sections for chapter 113 of such title is
amended by striking the matter relating to subchapter III.
(e) Executive Schedule Pay Rate.--Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``Director of the National Office for Cyberspace.''.
(f) Membership on the National Security Council.--Section
101(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
402(a)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as paragraphs
(8) and (9), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
``(7) the Director of the National Office for
Cyberspace;''.

SEC. 1099F. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER.

(a) Establishment and Staff.--
(1) Establishment.--

[[Page H3658]]

(A) In general.--There is established in the Executive
Office of the President an Office of the Federal Chief
Technology Officer (in this section referred to as the
``Office'').
(B) Head of the office.--
(i) Federal chief technology officer.--The President shall
appoint a Federal Chief Technology Officer (in this section
referred to as the ``Federal CTO'') who shall be the head of
the Office.
(ii) Compensation.--Section 5314 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Federal Chief Technology Officer.''.
(2) Staff of the office.--The President may appoint
additional staff members to the Office.
(b) Duties of the Office.--The functions of the Federal CTO
are the following:
(1) Undertake fact-gathering, analysis, and assessment of
the Federal Government's information technology
infrastructures, information technology strategy, and use of
information technology, and provide advice on such matters to
the President, heads of Federal departments and agencies, and
government chief information officers and chief technology
officers.
(2) Lead an interagency effort, working with the chief
technology and chief information officers of each of the
Federal departments and agencies, to develop and implement a
planning process to ensure that they use best-in-class
technologies, share best practices, and improve the use of
technology in support of Federal Government requirements.
(3) Advise the President on information technology
considerations with regard to Federal budgets and with regard
to general coordination of the research and development
programs of the Federal Government for information
technology-related matters.
(4) Promote technological innovation in the Federal
Government, and encourage and oversee the adoption of robust
cross-governmental architectures and standards-based
information technologies, in support of effective operational
and management policies, practices, and services across
Federal departments and agencies and with the public and
external entities.
(5) Establish cooperative public-private sector partnership
initiatives to achieve knowledge of technologies available in
the marketplace that can be used for improving governmental
operations and information technology research and
development activities.
(6) Gather timely and authoritative information concerning
significant developments and trends in information
technology, and in national priorities, both current and
prospective, and analyze and interpret the information for
the purpose of determining whether the developments and
trends are likely to affect achievement of the priority goals
of the Federal Government.
(7) Develop, review, revise, and recommend criteria for
determining information technology activities warranting
Federal support, and recommend Federal policies designed to
advance the development and maintenance of effective and
efficient information technology capabilities, including
human resources, at all levels of government, academia, and
industry, and the effective application of the capabilities
to national needs.
(8) Any other functions and activities that the President
may assign to the Federal CTO.
(c) Policy Planning; Analysis and Advice.--The Office shall
serve as a source of analysis and advice for the President
and heads of Federal departments and agencies with respect to
major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government
in accordance with the functions described in subsection (b).
(d) Coordination of the Office With Other Entities.--
(1) Federal cto on domestic policy council.--The Federal
CTO shall be a member of the Domestic Policy Council.
(2) Federal cto on cyber security practice board.--The
Federal CTO shall be a member of the Federal Cybersecurity
Practice Board.
(3) Obtain information from agencies.--The Office may
secure, directly from any department or agency of the United
States, information necessary to enable the Federal CTO to
carry out this section. On request of the Federal CTO, the
head of the department or agency shall furnish the
information to the Office, subject to any applicable
limitations of Federal law.
(4) Staff of federal agencies.--On request of the Federal
CTO, to assist the Office in carrying out the duties of the
Office, the head of any Federal department or agency may
detail personnel, services, or facilities of the department
or agency to the Office.
(e) Annual Report.--
(1) Publication and contents.--The Federal CTO shall
publish, in the Federal Register and on a public Internet
website of the Federal CTO, an annual report that includes
the following:
(A) Information on programs to promote the development of
technological innovations.
(B) Recommendations for the adoption of policies to
encourage the generation of technological innovations.
(C) Information on the activities and accomplishments of
the Office in the year covered by the report.
(2) Submission.--The Federal CTO shall submit each report
under paragraph (1) to--
(A) the President;
(B) the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the
House of Representatives;
(C) the Committee on Science and Technology of the House of
Representatives; and
(D) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
of the Senate.

SEC. 1099G. AUTHORITY OF SECRETARY.

(a) In General.--The Secretary shall have primary
authority, in consultation with the Director of the National
Office for Cyberspace and the Federal Cyberspace Practice
Board, in the executive branch of the Federal Government in
creation, verification, and enforcement of measures with
respect to the protection of critical information
infrastructure, including promulgating risk-informed
information security practices and standards applicable to
critical information infrastructures that are not owned by or
under the direct control of the Federal Government. The
Secretary should consult with appropriate private sector
entities, including private owners and operators of the
affected infrastructure, to carry out this section.
(b) Other Federal Agencies.--In establishing measures with
respect to the protection of critical information
infrastructure the Secretary shall--
(1) consult with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary
of Defense, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, and other sector specific Federal regulatory
agencies in exercising the authority referred to in
subsection (a); and
(2) coordinate, though the Executive Office of the
President, with sector specific Federal regulatory agencies,
including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in
establishing enforcement mechanisms under the authority
referred to in subsection (a).
(c) Auditing Authority.--The Secretary may--
(1) conduct such audits as are necessary to ensure that
appropriate measures are taken to secure critical information
infrastructure;
(2) issue such subpoenas as are necessary to determine
compliance with Federal regulatory requirements for securing
critical information infrastructure; and
(3) authorize sector specific Federal regulatory agencies
to undertake such audits.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Critical information infrastructure.--The term
``critical information infrastructure'' means the electronic
information and communications systems, software, and assets
that control, protect, process, transmit, receive, program,
or store information in any form, including data, voice, and
video, relied upon by critical infrastructure, industrial
control systems such as supervisory control and data
acquisition systems, and programmable logic controllers. This
shall also include such systems of the Federal Government.
(2) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary
of Homeland Security.

SEC. 1099H. EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) In General.--Unless otherwise specified in this
section, this subtitle (including the amendments made by this
subtitle) shall take effect 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.
(b) National Office for Cyberspace.--Section 3553 of title
44, United States Code, as added by section 1099C of this
subtitle, shall take effect 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.
(c) Federal Cybersecurity Practice Board.--Section 3554 of
title 44, United States Code, as added by section 1099C of
this subtitle, shall take effect one year after the date of
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 1099I. FUNDING OFFSETTING REDUCTION.

Notwithstanding the amounts set forth in the funding tables
in division D, the amount authorized to be appropriated in
section 4301 for Operations and Maintenance, as specified in
the corresponding funding table in division D, is hereby
reduced by $1,500,000,000.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I rise today to urge my colleagues to join me in
support of my amendment to help secure and protect our Nation from
cyber attacks. My amendment would basically coordinate Federal
information security policy by creating a National Office for
Cyberspace, update our Federal information security management
practices, and establish measures for the protection of critical
infrastructure from cyber attacks.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment passed the House of Representatives last
year without objection.
In the intervening year, the threats that we face in cyberspace have
clearly multiplied. Three months ago, the director of the CIA told the
Congress that the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber attack.
Shortly after, the Los Angeles Times reported on a computer hacker who,
in a test of a southern California water system, took control of the
equipment that added chemicals to the water. The article stated, ``with
a few mouse clicks, he could have rendered the water undrinkable for
millions of homes.''

[[Page H3659]]

Mr. Chairman, my amendment would secure our government-owned IT
networks against massive data breaches and attacks by implementing
recommendations of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity, which I
cochaired last year's committee work on Oversight and Government Reform
and several recent White House proposals.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment focuses on coordination of efforts to
secure our Federal networks, develop smarter cyber policies, and
protect critical infrastructure like the power grid. It also
establishes a Senate-confirmed National Cyberspace Office in the
Executive Office of the President.
This amendment was included in the House-passed fiscal year 2011
National Defense Authorization Act and helped spark renewed action in
Congress on this critical issue. Now, with so much underway in the
executive branch and in the other Chamber, I believe it is critical for
the House to once again take a stand on this issue and make the
investments necessary to protect our networks in cyberspace.
I would note here that my offset is based on previous estimates of
the cost of these provisions, which I firmly believe will actually be
lowered once it is rescored. However, even this cost is dwarfed by the
tremendous cost of inaction, which, if a successful cyber attack were
carried out on critical infrastructure, could result in hundreds of
billions of dollars in losses.
Last year alone, researchers recorded 662 breaches at large companies
or Federal agencies that left 16.2 million records exposed. Now, this
data enabled cyber criminals to prey on citizens and companies with
some estimates putting the cost of cyber threats to our economy at $8
billion annually.
But these threats don't just come from criminals. It's believed that
there are approximately 1.8 billion attacks on our government servers
every month. And the cyber incidents have targeted some of the most
sensitive national security data, potentially allowing a foreign
intelligence agency to gain a ``digital beachhead'' on our classified
and unclassified networks. A larger investment in the security of these
networks, which has already been initiated at the direction of the
White House, will yield huge efficiencies for our IT systems in the
long run while protecting information critical to our security.
Traditionally, no matter how fractious the debate in Washington
becomes, Mr. Chairman, we have put aside partisanship when it comes to
protecting the American people.
Mr. Chairman, cyber attacks pose a clear and present danger to the
national security of the United States, and this legislation takes
significant steps toward stopping these threats.
I urge your support of this amendment to keep our Nation safe from
cyber attacks.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition
to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the Chair.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment because I believe that this is
the wrong bill and it's the wrong time to consider it.
But I should say that there is no one in this House who has more
respect from both sides of the aisle on cyber issues than the gentleman
from Rhode Island. He and I, I know, started working together on cyber
issues as far back as 2003. We continue to work together in leading the
Emerging Threats Subcommittee, as well as both of us being members of
the Intelligence Committee. But the gentleman from Rhode Island has
clearly been one of the country's leaders on cyber, as he mentioned,
cochairing the CSIS Commission on Cyber, which was a very important
contribution to the proposals and the urgency with which this issue
must be dealt.
And so I would say that he and I are in total agreement on the
importance of this issue and the necessity of this country and this
government and this Congress taking action on cyber. I would say he and
I are largely in agreement on the things that should be done.
But having said that, I must remind everyone that just a few days ago
the White House sent to Congress a substantial list of proposals on
what it believes should be done on cybersecurity. I think the thing
that makes the most sense is for us to take a little time and look at
what the White House proposed, look at what the gentleman from Rhode
Island has proposed, and I think there are some other suggestions out
there that need to be considered and need to be in the mix.
It is certainly true that some sort of organizational reform may be
needed here. But if so, it extends far beyond the Department of
Defense, and that is the subject of this bill, which is one of the
reasons I believe that this is an inappropriate place to take up the
wide-ranging proposals that the gentleman from Rhode Island has put
before us today.
As a matter of fact, other than the FISMA language, which I think
there is widespread agreement needs to be updated, other than that,
most of this other language that the gentleman has proposed is outside
the Department of Defense and, therefore, I would suggest is not
appropriate for this bill.
The other thing I've got to mention is that the gentleman's amendment
does come at a cost and the offset of the amendment is to reduce the
O&M funds from the Department of Defense by $1.5 billion. So, in
effect, we are making the Department of Defense be the bill payer for
the rest of the government to get its act together. And I think given
our serious financial constraints in defense, given the appropriate
equities involved, that that would be a mistake.
But I want to be clear that the gentleman from Rhode Island has been
a, if not the, leader in the House on putting forward important
proposals to improve our cybersecurity. I think his proposals
definitely need to be seriously considered. But in this bill, it is
inappropriate. And at this time, I also believe it would be premature.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANGEVIN. First of all, I want to thank the gentleman from Texas
for his kind comments and supportive comments of the work I've done on
cybersecurity. And likewise, I want to acknowledge his leadership and
the cooperation that we've had on this issue and many others both on
the Armed Services Committee and the House Intelligence Committee. I
clearly respect the work the gentleman has done, his passion and hard
work on protecting the Nation on cyber, and I look forward to our
continued work together.

{time} 2040

I would, of course, just respectfully disagree that we should hold
off and actually take steps to act on this critical issue now. I have
worked on, as the gentleman has noted, and have studied this issue for
quite some time. I know that this is a moving target, moving faster
than what we are prepared for right now in terms of how we are
organized and how we are defending ourselves. We are too vulnerable.
Our enemies are too aggressive and too far ahead. We need to get better
organized and have a more effective response. This amendment would
clearly get us further down the road in terms of where we need to be in
terms of protecting ourselves.
With that, I would urge my colleagues to support it, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that there are
provisions in this bill related to cybersecurity. It is not as if we
are doing nothing. Yet, as I noted in the comments I made in the
general debate portion of this bill, there is much work ahead. I have
no doubt the gentleman from Rhode Island, as well as the other Members
interested in cyber, will be participating in that.
As I mentioned at the beginning, however, I believe this is not the
proper bill nor the proper time to take up this very comprehensive, 55-
page thoughtful amendment that the gentleman has offered.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

[[Page H3660]]

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode Island
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 50 Offered by Mr. Amash

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 50
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Strike section 1034 (page 440, line 16 through page 441,
line 21).

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Amash) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the debate
time for consideration of amendment No. 50 be expanded by 10 minutes
and that such time shall be equally divided and controlled by the
gentleman from Michigan and myself.
The Acting CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman
from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, my amendment is simple. It deletes section
1034, the new Authorization for Use of Military Force.
Section 1034 contains, perhaps, the broadest authorization for use of
military force Congress has ever considered. In doing so, it
essentially delegates nearly all of Congress' constitutional war powers
to the President. It expands Congress' use of force to include
``associated forces,'' a group the bill does not define. Under section
1034, associated forces don't need to be connected to 9/11. Associated
forces don't need to have fought against the United States, and
associated forces may even include American citizens.
There is no geographical limit to the authorization. Force may be
used worldwide at the President's discretion. Please join me in
opposing this broad, new AUMF. Please support amendment No. 50.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McKEON. I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, section 1034 of the National Defense
Authorization Act would affirm the 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force and the ability to go after terrorists who are part of
or substantially supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces.
I want to be very clear. This section does not alter the way the war
on terror is currently being fought. Our members and staff have spent
many weeks and months discussing the proposed text of section 1034 with
Ranking Member Smith, his staff, outside experts, and legal scholars.
In the end, we decided to use the same interpretation used by the Obama
administration so as not to create any confusion or any doubt as to the
legal authorities our military is currently operating under.
That is my priority first and always--to ensure our troops have
Congress' express affirmation that they are fighting the war and
risking their lives in our defense on solid legal ground.
While courts have accepted the administration's position, this could
change any day. I am not willing to take that chance when it comes to
something as critical as defending the United States against terrorism.
As former CIA Director Michael Hayden said in a letter to me this week,
section 1034 ``will send a powerful statement to those on whom we
depend for our defense. Press on with our support. It also sends a
powerful message to our adversaries in this conflict. The American
people remain united in their resolve to see this through to success.''
I stand in strong opposition to this amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment,
which strikes the dangerous, far-reaching section 1034 of this Defense
bill.
I thank my colleague Mr. Amash for his leadership and for working
with all of us in a bipartisan fashion on this effort.
On September 14, 2011, which was 3 days after the horrific events of
9/11, the Authorization of Use of Force was brought to the floor. I
voted against this because it was overly broad, and it amounted to a
blank check to wage war at any time, anywhere and at any place.
It was the most difficult vote that I had cast because I was the only
one to vote against this resolution, and I will always remember that
sad evening when we returned from the National Cathedral memorial
services for the victims and the families of 9/11. The entire country
was angry and in mourning for the senseless loss of life and injuries
resulting from such a brutal terrorist attack. There was very little
debate on this resolution then, which took us to what has become the
longest war in American history.
So let's be clear. Section 1034 goes even beyond that original
authorization. It amounts to a declaration of war--without end,
anywhere in the world, regardless of whether there is a danger to the
United States. If the original authorization were a blank check,
section 1034 would amount to an entire checkbook of blank checks.
This sweeping provision is dangerous. It should not be included in
such a massive bill with, once again, little or no debate. It should be
removed. I urge every Member of the House to consider carefully the
ramifications of destroying the balance of powers that exist to protect
this democracy and our Nation. So I urge an aye vote on this amendment.
I want to thank Mr. Amash, once again, for trying to strike this so
that we can move in the right direction to really begin to end the
longest war in American history.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield at this time 2 minutes
to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
I have just five questions. I understand we've got people on both
sides of this issue, and I respect them; but if we ask the five
questions, I think we'd vote against this amendment.
The first one is this: Do we need to use military force against al
Qaeda, the Taliban and the people who are supporting them, or don't we?
There are some in here, as they just talked about, who didn't support
using military force at the beginning, and they don't support it now. I
respect them. I just think we're not going to defeat these forces
through our words or by ignoring them. I think the answer is clear. We
need to use all the force that is necessary and appropriate to defeat
them. This legislation does that.
Second: Should Congress write the language to authorize that or leave
it solely to the executive and judicial branches? I think we ought to
do it.
Third: Is this the right language? It is the exact same language that
the executive has put forward and that the judiciary has put forward.
We are marrying them.
Four: Does it go too far? It doesn't go too far. With all the red
herrings that are there, if you go back and read the language, it
clearly says it does not supersede or change the War Powers Act. The
War Powers Act was violated then, and it is violated now with this
language.
The final question, Mr. Chairman, is simple: Should we adopt this
amendment? The answer is just as simple: not if we want to do
everything necessary to defend and protect the United States of America
against terrorist attacks.

{time} 2050

Mr. AMASH. Recognizing that this new AUMF goes beyond the original
AUMF, at this time I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Jones).
(Mr. JONES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of striking section
1034.
I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan for this time. I was so
concerned about this provision that I contacted a professor that I know
very well, Jules Lobel, a noted constitutional professor at the
University of Pittsburgh. And at my request, he has examined this
provision and has provided me the following analysis. Again,

[[Page H3661]]

I cannot give all the analysis because of limited time, but I want to
read this point to you:
``Section 1034 authorization for the President to use force against
any group or individual that he determines is associated with al Qaeda
or the Taliban is overbroad and could potentially permit a President to
expansively use force against terrorist groups around the world. Under
international law, you cannot kill someone anywhere in the world simply
because of their association with an entity against which you are at
war, although under certain circumstances, you can detain them, if
captured. This authorization is too vague and expansive.''
I hope that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will look at
this very carefully and join us in trying to strike this provision.
Again, I thank the gentleman from Michigan for this time.
Section 1034 is mixing up two different things--detention authority
and the authorization to use force--and could therefore authorize
something which the Administration has not yet claimed the power to do.
The Administration's March 13 filing in court recognized this
distinction, and explicitly limited that filing to its authority to
detain people at Guantanamo:
``This position is limited to the authority upon which the Government
is relying to detain the persons now being held at Guantanamo Bay. It
is not, at this point, meant to define the contours of authority for
military operations generally, or detention in other contexts.''
But the new authorization, with the Chairman's remarks, takes a
government position that was ``limited'' to the authority to detain
persons at Guantanamo, and uses it ``to define the contours of
authority for military operations generally'', which has potentially
expansive and unforeseen consequences in the future. Congress should
not be authorizing war against all groups vaguely ``associated'' with
Al Qaeda anywhere in the world, even if, in certain circumstances we
can detain persons captured in battle who are associated with the
enemy, or persons who are detained by other nations and transferred to
us.
Moreover, the Administration's detention authority over persons
detained at Guantanamo is subject to habeas review by federal courts.
Therefore, a person who the government claims is ``associated'' with
the enemy in such a manner as to justify detention, can challenge the
government claim in court. However, a Presidential use of force against
associated forces around the world would not likely be subject to
judicial review, and therefore Congress could be authorizing
essentially unfettered Executive discretion in using force against
unnamed and undefined people or groups worldwide, under standards that
the Administration has thus far not clearly defined.
Second, even were the provision limited to detention, it would still
be problematic. The Obama Administration's claim to detention authority
is more limited in some respects than Bush Administration's was, and
that some judges of the D.C. Circuit would allow. But there remain
disputes over the breadth of the government's power to detain people as
enemy combatants who are captured outside of any battlefield or are
detained because they are ``supporting'' or ``associated'' with the
enemy. The Supreme Court has not yet decided these issues. This bill
seems to affirm the Obama Administration's and D.C. Circuit view, and
apply it to detainees more generally, although it adds vagueness
because the chairman says that ``this affirmation is not intended to
limit or alter the President's existing authority pursuant to the
AUMF''.
In sum, my main point is that section 1034 is flawed because it is
codifies a detention-specific standard to apply to the use of force
more generally, including the targeting people living in other nations,
with potentially expansive and unforeseen consequences in the future.
Congress should be limiting the President's authority to engage in
this limitless, undefined war--not affirming and potentially expanding
it.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to insert into
the Record a letter from former Attorney General of the United States
Michael B. Mukasey. Just one short thing. He says, ``Your new
legislation would not confer new powers, but rather would add order and
rationality to what has been an improvisational exercise overseen by
judges who do not have the fact-finding.''
May 20, 2011.
Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The legislation you have proposed to
update and clarify the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (``AUMF''), passed in September 2001 in the wake of the
attacks on the United States that occurred that month, is
both timely and constructive.
Since its passage, the AUMF has not been updated to reflect
the evolving nature and origin of the Islamist threat against
this country. Indeed, there are organizations, including the
Pakistani Taliban, that are arguably not within its reach,
and although we have fought and detained thousands of enemy
fighters captured not only in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also
in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan, and continue to detain
hundreds, the AUMF does not even refer to detention, let
alone prescribe standards for detention. As a result of this
inaction, we have simply allowed policy makers and judges to
improvise how we deal with the evolving terrorist threat and
how we treat those we encounter on the battlefield. The
increased use of remotely piloted aircraft--drones--has
allowed us to strike lethally, but because dead men tell no
tales and records destroyed in drone attacks cannot be
exploited, we may unconsciously be defaulting toward
strategies that do not allow us to act as effectively as we
might if we captured terrorists instead of killing them.
Your new legislation would not confer new powers, but
rather would add order and rationality to what has been an
improvisational exercise overseen by judges who do not have
the fact-finding resources of Congress, or the accountability
that comes from being responsible for protecting the national
security.
I cannot for the life of me understand the opposition to
this measure that is coming from people who profess to be
concerned with civil liberties and the rule of law, and yet
seem to prefer an improvisational arrangement that does not
make us face up to the fact that we are detaining people. If
anything, such a system creates the occasion for offloading
our detention responsibility to countries that will treat
detainees much less humanely than we would, or killing
instead of capturing, which can hardly be said to present a
humane alternative or one governed by legal principles.
I would welcome the opportunity to provide whatever help
and input I can.
Yours sincerely,
Michael B. Mukasey.

I yield 1 minute to my friend and colleague, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. West).
Mr. WEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. I
think as we look across this Chamber, there are very few Members that
have ever served on a 21st century battlefield, a 21st century
battlefield that is comprised of nonstate, nonuniform belligerents who
have no respect for borders or boundaries.
All this amendment in section 1034 says is that we affirm that we are
engaged in an armed conflict. It has a very narrow definition. And it
also looks at the global conflagration in which we are in. And it also
addresses that we should be seeking to remove these belligerents off of
the battlefield.
I have had the experience in 2003 in Iraq. I have had the experience
for 2\1/2\ years in Afghanistan. And if we allow an amendment such as
this to go forth, it would have precluded us from going in and killing
the world's number one terrorist, Osama bin Laden. And if this
amendment is allowed to pass, then we will not be able to go after al-
Awlaki and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. We will not be able to go
after Mullah Omar, who is the head of the Taliban. We will not be able
to go after Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is in charge of the Haqqani
Islamic terrorist network. It would not allow us to go and deny this
enemy sanctuary.
I want to say this one last thing. There are two West Point cadets
that are interns that are serving with me. If we do not have the
courage to affirm and declare there is an enemy, how can we send them
onto the battlefield?
Mr. AMASH. Recognizing that Osama bin Laden was killed under the old
AUMF, not the new broader language, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I think the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Forbes) raises the right questions. And definitely, we do need to go
after these folks militarily. Clearly, it would also be better if
Congress spoke. But where I disagree with him is on the question of
whether or not this goes too far and expands that authority. And I do
very strongly disagree with the arguments of Mr. West from Florida.
The President does have the authority. He had the authority to do the
bin Laden raid, as Mr. Amash just pointed out, within the existing
branch of authority. I do want to compliment the chairman of this
committee for his hard work in working on this issue. I think it would
be an important thing for the Armed Services Committee, for this
Congress to speak on what the authorization of use of military force

[[Page H3662]]

should be beyond just linking it back to 9/11.
But when you put in associated forces, and when you don't have any
end date, it does confer upon the President the potential for a great
deal of power over a long period of time. And it is important to point
out the President right now, forget the original AUMF, the President
under just the interpretation of the Constitution and laws of this
country absent of that has a great deal of authority.

Let's remember President Clinton was the first person to take a shot
at Osama bin Laden back in 1998, when we launched cruise missiles at a
compound where we thought he was in Afghanistan. There was no AUMF at
that point. The President has fairly broad authorities conferred by the
Constitution and the Court's interpretation of it to prosecute that war
in the way that we want it to be done. The question is whether or not
this language broadens that authority to the point where we all have to
be concerned about the level of power that we are turning over to the
Executive. That's really the balance we're trying to strike here.
Yes, Congress should speak. But Congress should also not speak in a
way that gives the executive branch too broad authority. I believe the
language in the bill goes too far in that direction, and therefore I
support the amendment.
Mr. McKEON. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert
another letter into the Record. This is from General Michael Hayden,
former CIA director. I will quote just a part. ``Those whom we have
charged with protecting us need clarity in both their mission and in
the legal underpinning that justifies it. This act does exactly that.''
24 May 2011.
Hon. Howard P. McKeon,
House of Representatives, Rayburn HOB, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to offer my support and,
frankly, my thanks for the language in the National Defense
Authorization Act that reaffirms and updates the language in
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.
In 2007, speaking to the representatives of our European
allies, I attempted to outline for them how we at the CIA--
and, indeed, how we throughout the American security
community--viewed our task operationally, ethically and
legally: winning a conflict against al Qa'eda and its
affiliates, a conflict that was global in its scope and which
therefore required us to take the fight to this enemy.
Two Presidents, the Congress and the Courts have affirmed
that this is indeed true, but this is a different kind of
conflict, against a non-state adversary, and there are those
who would cloud this question and claim that the laws at
armed conflict do not apply and that we should confine our
response to other (e.g., law enforcement) models. As time has
passed since 9-11, these arguments have become more
commonplace and frankly more confusing to those on whom we
depend for our safety.
Those whom we have charged with protecting us need clarity
in both their mission and in the legal underpinning that
justifies it. This Act does exactly that, in unambiguous
language, adding yet another Congressional sanction to
Presidential statements that a state of armed conflict exists
between the United States and al Qa'eda, and its affiliates.
The Act also reaffirms that activities routinely incident to
such conflicts--like detention of enemy combatants for the
duration of the conflict--are inherently justified.
This will send a powerful statement to those on whom we
depend for our defense: ``Press on with our support!'' it
also sends a powerful message to our adversaries in this
conflict: ``The American people remain united in their
resolve to see this through to success.''
Yours Sincerely,
Michael V. Hayden

I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Griffin).
Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this
amendment. The U.S. has been detaining individuals pursuant to the
Authorization for Use of Military Force which was passed by Congress,
signed into law. We have been detaining those individuals for almost 10
years now. The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted that the AUMF provides
the authority to detain these individuals. Congress, however, has never
explicitly recognized this detention authority.
In a March 13, 2009 memo, the President stated that he has the
authority to detain persons who planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist acts that occurred on 9/11, and persons who
harbored those responsible. It also stated that the President has the
authority to detain persons who were part of or substantially supported
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.
The affirmation from Congress that section 1034 provides is essential
to supporting the President's own interpretation of his detention
authority, and will clarify for the courts the legal authority for the
detention of these individuals. Congress has been silent for nearly 10
years, silent for too long on specifying the President's authority to
detain these individuals.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. McKEON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas. Congress has left it to the courts to make
wartime policy. The military relies on the same interpretation when
deciding whom it can lawfully target or detain, and the military
deserves a clear and concise interpretation from Congress. It is time
that we give them this clear interpretation.
I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing this amendment.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the time remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has 4\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, we support the authority of our President
to relentlessly hunt down those who attacked us on 9/11 anywhere, at
any time. But we do not support the right of this or any future
President to wage war anywhere, at any time, and I believe that's what
the underlying bill does.
The underlying bill says that you can engage in the current armed
conflict against a nation that has substantially supported al Qaeda.
There is a record that suggests that Iran has substantially supported
al Qaeda in Iraq. I don't think the Members of this body think that we
have the power to attack Iran without further congressional action.
There is evidence that Hezbollah has supported al Qaeda and similar
organizations. I don't think the Members of this body think that we
have the right to attack Lebanon and Hezbollah without further action
of this Congress.
We should never relent in going after those who attacked us on 9/11,
but we should never ignore the constitutional prerogative of this House
and the Senate to engage in the declaration of war.

{time} 2100

Mr. McKEON. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment to delete section 1034.
Section 1034 is the equivalent of a new declaration of war, but it
contains no clear objective. No longer would we be seeking out those
responsible for the attacks of September 11. In fact, all references to
September 11 are removed. Instead, it merely affirms that the United
States is at war. But it doesn't say why. It doesn't say what we are
trying to achieve. It doesn't even mention an identifiable whom, with
whom we are at war.
Unlike the 2001 AUMF, it does not contain any description of harm
that has occurred or that we are seeking to prevent. How will anyone be
able to declare success when the objective itself is so amorphous? How
will we know when we have won the war?
Section 1034 expands the targets of military action from those
responsible for the September 11 attacks to all members of al Qaeda,
the Taliban and ``associated forces'' and those who ``directly support
associated forces.'' But ``associated forces'' is undefined and so is
``directly support.''
Does it mean providing a meal to a person who later becomes a suicide
bomber, even though they are not affiliated with al Qaeda or the
Taliban, and you had no means of knowing that they were a suicide
bomber in the future? Does the President have unfettered discretion to
take this country to war against any country or any group he deems
associated with the Taliban? Under this section, it would seem so.

[[Page H3663]]

Mr. Chairman, we must not delegate such power to the President.
Indeed, such a broad unlimited delegation is probably unconstitutional.
We haven't considered this section in any committee as far as I know,
and yet it could profoundly change the scope and duration of our
military efforts.
Mr. Chairman, we should pass this amendment, scrap this provision,
and send it back to committee to start all over again if we need a
redefinition of the existing AUMF.
But this amendment must pass; this section must not pass. The
President must not have the total discretion to take this country to
war with anybody, at any time, under any circumstances, under his sole
discretion.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to insert at this time an
editorial from the Los Angeles Times into the Record, and I will read
just a little bit of it:
``The New York Times sees the term `associated forces' as so vague
that it could include `anyone who doesn't like America, even if they
are not connected in any way with the 2001 attacks. It could even apply
to domestic threats.' That is an exaggerated, if not paranoid,
characterization of the language.''

[From the Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2011]

A War Against Anyone Who Doesn't Like the U.S.?

(By Michael McGough)

Language in a new defense bill could authorize the military
``to pursue anyone suspected of terrorism, anywhere on earth,
from now to the end of time.'' So says a New York Times
editorial, but the issue is not so-clear cut.
New language contained in a defense bill does tweak the
Authorization for Use of Military Force approved by Congress
after 9/11, but it does so to shore up existing policies, not
to license a broader war on terror.
What's the difference between the two documents?
The AUMF, as it's called, authorized the president to ``use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.''
The House Defense Authorization bill says this: ``As the
United States nears the 10th anniversary of the attacks on
September 11, 2001, the terrorist threat has evolved as a
result of intense military and diplomatic pressure from the
United States and its coalition partners. However, Al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and associated forces still pose a grave threat
to U.S. national security. The Authorization for Use of
Military Force necessarily includes the authority to address
the continuing and evolving threat posed by these groups.''
The New York Times sees the term ``associated forces'' as
so vague that it could include ``anyone who doesn't like
America, even if they are not connected in any way with the
2001 attacks. It could even apply to domestic threats.'' That
is an exaggerated, if not paranoid, characterization of the
language which seems designed to cover groups like Al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula.
There is one problematic section of the authorization:
language saying that the president has the authority ``to
detain certain belligerents until the termination of
hostilities.'' This language is a significant departure from
the AUMF, though it comports with President Obama's view of
his authority to hold ``the worst of the worst''
indefinitely.
The real news about the language of the defense bill is
that it codifies Obama's view of what he can do.

I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. AMASH. In closing, Mr. Chair, make no mistake: the power we were
asked to give the President is beyond the power Congress gave the
President in the wake of the largest terrorist attack in our history.
Support amendment No. 50 and turn back this broad delegation of
Congress' constitutional authority.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McKEON. May I ask how much time remains?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California has 4 minutes
remaining.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my friend
and colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, there have clearly been a number of
wild exaggerations and mischaracterizations about the effect of section
1034. If Members have any doubt about where the truth lies, I recommend
you look at editorials in The Washington Post, the L. A. Times, The
Wall Street Journal, all of which support modernizing and updating the
authorization for the use of military force. They clearly debunk some
of the wild accusations that have been made.
Let's take it back for just a second to the basics here. The current
authorization for the use of military force passed this Congress on
September 14, 2001. Now, smoke was still rising from the ruins of the
Twin Towers in New York. The Taliban was still the Government of
Afghanistan at that time. The Madrid train bombing, the London subway
bombing, Indonesia nightclub bombing had yet to occur.
But Congress believed that action should be taken giving the
President the authority to go after those who perpetrated 9/11, and the
AUMF authorized the President to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those whom he determines authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
them.
Now it is absolutely true, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee)
voted against that. I believe she was the only one. Everybody else
supported that authorization, and that was a decade ago. It has not
changed since then.
In the decade since, al Qaeda has changed. As a matter of fact, we
have had testimony this year from the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center that the most serious threat to our homeland
actually comes from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula headquartered in
Yemen. They are the most serious threat now. With the death of Osama
bin Laden, al Qaeda will change more. But yet the language that passed
September 14, 2001, has not changed.
One article noted that it is increasingly strained and artificial to
tie everything the military is doing back to 9/11, and yet that's what
the lawyers have to do now. They have to tie it all back to those
attacks of September 11, 2001. Doing so depends upon the court
interpretation of those lawyers' arguments. That's what our national
security authority is dependent on at the moment.
I believe it's clear we have got to update the authority. The
question is: How do we update it?
Now, here is one option. The gentleman said you remove all reference
to 9/11. Well, we could add a list of other dates. We could say
Congress gives the President the authority to go after those who aided,
abetted, or committed the attacks of September 25, 2009, and the
attacks of May 1, 2010--Times Square bombing, by the way, and the first
one was the underwear bombing in Detroit--and the attacks of October
29, 2010. That was the attempted toner cartridge bombing attack. Most
of those, by the way, we think came from AQAP.

The point is I don't think it's a very good way to legislate, to put
a bunch of dates in there of the various attacks and the President is
authorized to go over who did those various attacks. That's not a good
way to do it.
A much better approach is to take the exact arguments this
administration is using in court to justify what it's doing right now
and saying, yes, we will take that language. It makes it clear. It's
what we are doing now, but Congress will do it this time rather than
rely on court interpretations of what they are doing.
So, somebody might ask, well, why bother if that's what they are
doing now? You know, why do you mess with it? Well, number one, it's
less time with the lawyers straining and stretching language to fit
back to the attacks of September 11. I would say, number two, nearly
everybody in this House is concerned about our relevance in authorizing
the use of military force in various engagements.
Now, are we going to sit back there and stick our heads in the sand
while the courts do all our work for us, or are we going to take action
to reflect what's really happened?
It's time to take action now.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. McKEON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.

[[Page H3664]]

Amendment No. 53 Offered by Mr. Campbell

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 53
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 548, after line 8, add the following new section:

SEC. 1115. TERMINATION OF HUMAN, SOCIAL, AND CULTURE BEHAVIOR
(HSCB) MODELING PROGRAM.

Effective as of October 1, 2011, or the date of the
enactment of this Act, whichever is later, the program of the
Department of Defense commonly known as the Human, Social,
and Culture Behavior (HSCB) Modeling Program is terminated.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Campbell) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.

{time} 2110

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, we have a huge deficit. Everybody knows
that. We have a terribly enormous debt. Everybody knows that. None
other than the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State have
said that our national debt is, in fact, a national security issue and
we need to deal with it. And we are. We are reducing spending in a
number of Departments in a number of areas. We're talking about
reforming entitlement programs in order to save them. And we are asking
lots of Departments and lots of areas to reduce waste and duplication
and to operate more efficiently and do the things they are doing with
less money.
There is no reason, Mr. Chairman, that we should not look for said
duplication, said waste and ask the Department of Defense to do the
same so that we can attack this deficit and this debt.
This amendment would terminate the Human Social and Cultural Behavior
Modeling program at the Department of Defense. Now as kind of obtuse as
the name of that program sounds, I'm actually not going to criticize
the value of some of the information in the program of the Defense
Department. The reason I'm offering this amendment to terminate this
program is because it's entirely duplicative, because these things are
done elsewhere and by other people, and we don't need to spend the
millions and millions of dollars that we are currently in the
Department of Defense on grant programs.
There are currently university research initiatives at the Army, Navy
and the Department of the Air Force that are duplicative of this
general Defense Department. There are Department events, university and
industry research centers which conduct university research which can
and do some of this work and are totally duplicative of what this
program does.
And I'm going to read you a list of things that this program does
research on. And as I read you this list, think about how universities
in the normal course of their business know this stuff, research this
stuff, figure this stuff out, and we don't have to have a separate
program to do it. Topography, that is part of this program, small
business innovation, human behavior, socioeconomics, sociocultural
response studies, engineering, globalization, population research,
morality and values, and the quality of government, politics and
education.
Now, these are all things I'm sure the Department of Defense needs to
know to do their job, but they can get this information from any number
of other programs currently in the Department of Defense or from
universities that are doing this research on their own. This will save
millions of dollars and help with one of the greatest national security
threats we have, which is our deficit and our debt.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. THORNBERRY. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I certainly appreciate the gentleman from California's
commitment to deficit reduction, but I'm afraid that this particular
amendment is short-sighted. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, more and more
of what our troops are doing is living with, working with, and
cooperating with the Afghans or the native peoples wherever they happen
to be. Helping those peoples to defend themselves is far better and
cheaper for us than having us defend them ourselves.
But a basic tenet to make that work is to understand the culture and
the social dynamics of those various populations, which are different,
of course, from one place to another. It is a basic tenet of
counterinsurgency that you have to understand the population you are
there to protect.
This program that the gentleman wants to eliminate is a significant
research program to see if modeling that sort of social dynamics will
work. And I would say to the gentleman that the Defense Science Board
looked at this very program earlier this year and found that it was one
of the emerging technologies where investment is likely to have the
highest payoff--the highest payoff.
The report went further to say, consistent to some extent with what
the gentleman was saying, that there is other work being done in this
area. But the Defense Science Board found there is a major shortfall in
the availability and maturity of these capabilities, and these
simulations do not generalize to other environments and require further
investment to make them useful for the next potential conflict.
So there is work being done in this area in a civilian context, but
it does not automatically translate to the military context, and that
is why the Defense Science Board says that this emerging technology is
one investment likely to have the highest payoff.
And so the bottom line is that we need to pursue this to reduce the
danger to our troops and to make sure that their work is more
effective. This is a good investment by the Defense Science Board and I
believe by other studies as well.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CAMPBELL. May I inquire as to how much time I have remaining.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. CAMPBELL. I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my colleague from Texas's remarks. Again,
just to reiterate, I am not challenging the value or the use to the
Department of Defense of some of the information. What I am challenging
is whether we need an entirely separate program. We have been talking
about the Department of Education, multiple programs in that Department
that do the same thing, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Agriculture. All kinds of Departments have duplicative programs because
we built these things up over the years.
This is one of those programs. None other than the Heritage
Foundation has identified this as a program that is entirely
duplicative and that this work is and can be done and is being done
through other DOD programs or for private research that doesn't have to
be funded by DOD. And I think everyone here knows the Heritage
Foundation is not exactly a bastion of anti-defense or weak on our
national security.
So my argument here is that if we don't look at this sort of thing in
every Department, including in the Department of Defense, we're never
going to get a handle on this deficit. There is waste in Defense too.
There is duplication in Defense too. And we need to start to begin to
reduce it. I think this is a small step. I would ask for Members'
support.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. THORNBERRY. How much time remains for me?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would yield myself 30 seconds simply
to say I understand the gentleman's argument. I would simply say the
Defense Science Board has looked at this program, and it comes to a
different conclusion. They believe this program has potentially the
highest payoff, that it is unique and beyond what is happening in the
civilian sector or other defense Departments. And that was February
2011 when the Defense Science Board report came out.
Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remaining time to the ranking member,

[[Page H3665]]

the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I just want to rise to speak
on this matter. This is a critically important issue. And I worked with
Mr. Thornberry on this when I chaired the terrorism subcommittee and he
was the ranking member of the subcommittee that has since been renamed
and that he now chairs.
This is not duplicative. This is an area where, frankly, we weren't
spending enough time early enough in Iraq or in Afghanistan to
understand the people that we were working with and to get ourselves
into a better position to turn over responsibility for security and
governance in Iraq and Afghanistan as quickly as possible. We didn't
understand what we were getting into because we didn't have the social
and cultural awareness. We need to gain greater understanding in those
areas.
And one particularly important aspect of this is as you gather the
information, how do you compile it in such a way that's useful. That's
what this modeling program is supposed to do. You can gather all kinds
of information all over the place, but if nobody knows how to actually
use that information, compile it, put it together and pick out what is
most important to get the lessons learned out of that, then you're not
getting the true benefit of the program, which is a big part of what
this does. It uses updated technology and updated software to figure
out how to find the patterns that are critical to helping us do our
job.
So I would simply agree with the gentleman from Texas and urge a
``no'' vote on this amendment. It is a relatively small program that
makes a very, very big difference and hopefully will save us money by
keeping us out of conflicts that we would rather not get into and
enabling us to do this working through the local populations by having
a better understanding of them.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
will be postponed.

{time} 2120

Amendment No. 54 Offered by Mr. Campbell

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 54
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 548, after line 8, add the following new section:

SEC. 1115. REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN POSITIONS
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

(a) Definitions, etc.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Defense;
(2) the term ``civilian position'' means a position that is
required to be filled by a civilian employee of the
Department of Defense;
(3) the term ``baseline number'' means the number of
civilian positions within the Department of Defense as of the
last day of the fiscal year in which occurs the date of
enactment of this Act; and
(4) the number of civilian positions within the Department
of Defense as of any given date shall be determined and
expressed on a full-time equivalent basis.
(b) Reductions.--The Secretary shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that the total number of civilian
positions within the Department of Defense does not exceed--
(1) at the end of the 1st fiscal year beginning after the
date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by
1 percent;
(2) at the end of the 2nd fiscal year beginning after the
date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by
2 percent;
(3) at the end of the 3rd fiscal year beginning after the
date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by
3 percent;
(4) at the end of the 4th fiscal year beginning after the
date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by
4 percent; and
(5) at the end of the 5th fiscal year beginning after the
date of enactment of this Act, the baseline number reduced by
5 percent.
(c) Restriction.--The Secretary shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that no increase occurs in the procurement
of personal services by contract by reason of the enactment
of this section.
(d) Regulations.--Any regulations necessary to carry out
this section shall be prescribed by the Secretary.
(e) Termination.--The provisions of this section shall
terminate after the end of the 5th fiscal year beginning
after the date of enactment of this Act.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Campbell) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, as identified during the last amendment,
we have debt, we have deficit, we need to look for things in the
Department of Defense as well where we can look for efficiencies and
expense reductions and still defend the country.
Currently in the Department of Defense, we have somewhere approaching
800,000 civilian employees. Let me repeat that. In the Department of
Defense today, we have approximately 800,000 full-time, nonuniformed
civilian employees. This does not include the roughly 1.5 million men
and women in uniform, and it does not include all of the defense
contractors. And I would love to tell you how many of those there are,
but because we do not audit the Department of Defense, that information
is not available so I don't know.
So we have 800,000 people not uniformed working in the Department of
Defense, not doing any of the stuff done by the contractors. Now, I
could go through a long analysis of do we really need one nonuniformed
person for every two uniformed people in the Department of Defense. Do
we really need that many? But this amendment is very small in its scope
and very small in what it intends to do.
All it says is let's reduce that 800,000 head count by 1 percent a
year for the next 5 years. So all this amendment says is: Next year,
can we accomplish the mission of the U.S. military in the Department of
Defense without touching anything having to do with a single man or
woman in uniform, but with 99 percent of the nonuniformed personnel
that we currently have? Somehow, I do not believe that is going to
devastate our ability to defend this country. It is 1 percent a year
for the next 5 years.
So it is saying, 5 years from now, yes, we will have to do with 95
percent of the nonuniformed personnel. But I think that is something we
can do and something, again, where we can begin to save some money and
deal with our greatest national security threat, which is our debt.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FORBES. I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
(Mr. ANDREWS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ANDREWS. I thank my friend from Virginia for yielding.
I am entirely sympathetic to my friend from California's view that it
is probable, maybe even certain, the Defense Department could function
with fewer civilian employees than it does right now. And I think the
Secretary of Defense shares our conviction because he has frozen the
number of civilian employees at FY 2010 levels.
Now, here is my concern with the gentleman's amendment. The
gentleman's amendment makes it the law of the land that the correct
number of civilian employees in the Department of Defense 5 years from
now should be 40,000 persons, more or less, fewer than we have right
now. I don't know if that is the right or the wrong number. And I would
suggest, frankly, that none of us here know if that is the right or the
wrong number.
The proper way to go about this, which the Secretary has in fact
done, is to make an assessment of the needs of the Department and the
functions that it serves and then to balance those needs against the
three ways you can serve those needs. You can either have civilian
employees perform the task, you can hire outside contractors to perform
the task, or you can delegate the task to uniformed employees. By
choosing an arbitrary number of 40,000 civilian employees fewer than
what we

[[Page H3666]]

have right now, it seems to me that we don't know if that fits the size
of the job we have; and if it doesn't fit the size of the job that we
have, it necessitates an increase of contracts or an increase of duties
for uniformed personnel, the consequences of which none of us, frankly,
have the ability to know.

So I share the desire to properly fit the size of the civilian
workforce to the job that has to be done. I just can't concluded with
any degree of confidence that a workforce that is 40,000 persons fewer
is the right fit. My concern is this would have the effect of shifting
responsibilities to uniformed personnel when they have more urgent
priorities to achieve.
I would urge a ``no'' vote.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my colleague's comments;
and, frankly, I don't disagree that it is arbitrary. I would argue that
perhaps how we got to this 800,000 was not by anybody doing a great
deal of planning either, so perhaps that is arbitrary.
But, you know, if you want someone to start to be more efficient, you
have to set some goals. You have to set some targets. This number has
been growing, and growing steadily for years. Probably for decades, but
it has certainly been growing for years. It has been unchecked. There
has been no real review or evaluation of it.
What I am trying to do here, and I am not arguing that there is
anything scientific to the 1 percent, but it is to say: Let's start to
get this under control. Let's start to evaluate this. And you know
what? If we need to reevaluate it, we can reevaluate it. But let's say
to the Department of Defense: You know what? This is a lot of people.
We think that you can get by with less.
I have talked to a number of uniformed personnel who believe a lot of
these people actually get in their way, and they would much prefer that
some of them were not there because they actually create a bureaucracy
that interferes with the ability of the uniformed people to accomplish
their mission.
So what this amendment is trying to do, it is saying: Let's get into
this and let's set a target and let's see if we can't get there, and
let's see if we can't save some money along the way.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FORBES. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, it is a rare opportunity that you get to stand up and
agree with two friends that you have on the floor, and the only thing
we disagree with is the approach.
I would say to the gentleman from California that he is absolutely
right. We do need to start this. We need to set those targets. But the
great news is that the chairman and the ranking member have done just
that in this bill, because of all of the agencies, of all of the
departments that we look at across the government, the one that we
absolutely cannot be arbitrary on, the one that we cannot guess about,
the target we cannot be off on is the Department of Defense. We have to
be right there.
And what we realize is that you cannot do this by setting an
arbitrary target and working backwards. That gets you huge problems,
exposes us to huge risks. We have to do it the opposite way.
The first thing we have to do is we have to ascertain what the true
risk assessment is, the threat assessment we have to this country,
which we have not done because, quite honestly, it has been more
budget driven than it has been threat assessment driven. But this bill
moves us closer to doing that and finding out what that risk assessment
is.

The second thing after we do that is we have to determine what does
it take to meet that risk, and what do we risk exposing the country to
if we don't do it.
The third thing is we have to find out where we are spending our
money now and where that money is going, which we don't know. The
gentleman is correct. We need to audit the DOD. That is where we are
moving in this bill to do.
After we have done those three steps, then we can come back, and the
Congress ought to be a part of this, of saying here is the target and
the number of employees we think that you need to get that job done.
But, Mr. Chairman, I agree wholeheartedly with my good friend from
New Jersey. This is not the right approach. It is a dangerous approach
to arbitrarily look and say we are going to begin cutting these
employees. We don't know what that will end up doing to the Department
of Defense and to the defense of this country.
So I hope we will reject this amendment, but continue along the line
of what the gentleman has talked about, and make sure that we are
moving toward defending this country in the most efficient way
possible.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate both gentlemen's comments
and their remarks and their tone and their tenor. I respectfully
disagree because I think that, again, not a single uniformed person is
being affected. This has nothing to do with that. I think 1 percent at
least sends a message and is a start. And it is difficult to argue that
it is going to devastate anything. I would ask support on the
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Campbell).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California
will be postponed.

{time} 2130

It is now in order to consider amendment No. 55 printed in House
Report 112-88.

Amendment No. 56 Offered by Mr. Chaffetz

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 56
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle B of title XII, add the following
new section:

SEC. 1217. SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES
FROM AFGHANISTAN.

(a) Commencement of Withdrawal.--Except as provided in
subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with military commanders and the Government of Afghanistan,
shall commence a safe, responsible, and phased withdrawal of
units and members of the Army and Marine Corps deployed in
Afghanistan and military contractors operating in Afghanistan
and funded using amounts appropriated to the Department of
Defense.
(b) Retention of Forces for Counter-terrorism Operations.--
The Secretary of Defense may continue to deploy units and
members of the Army and Marine Corps in Afghanistan, and
military contractors supporting such forces, to conduct
small, targeted counter-terrorism operations.
(c) Withdrawal Plan.--Not later than 60 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to Congress the plan for implementing the withdrawal
of United States ground forces, military equipment, and
military contractors supporting such forces from Afghanistan
as safely and quickly as possible pursuant to subsection (a).
The Secretary shall submit additional reports on the progress
of implementing the plan every 180 days thereafter.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Welch), and I ask unanimous consent
that he be allowed to control that time.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Vermont will
control the time.
There was no objection.
Mr. WELCH. I thank the gentleman from Utah.
Members of the Committee, a test of a great democracy is its capacity
to make the grave decision to send its citizens to war. Such a decision
was made after the attack on September 11 of 2001. It was a bipartisan
decision. It was made for the right reasons at the right time and for
the right result.
Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden planned and executed the

[[Page H3667]]

9/11 mission from Afghanistan. And we sent our soldiers to war.
Vermont soldiers and soldiers from all around the country sacrificed
bravely and served well.

But an equally grave challenge and test for a democracy is whether
once that machinery of war has been put in gear, when circumstances
change as the national security requires, can that democracy amend its
decision, amend its policy as conditions have changed?
We are at that moment today. It is a bipartisan question that faces
us all. And the amendment that Mr. Chaffetz and I offer suggests that
the policy that we are now pursuing, nation building in Afghanistan, is
no longer the policy that is either financially sustainable nor in our
best national security interests.
There are three reasons: number one, the threat of al Qaeda has
diminished in Afghanistan; the threat of terrorism in the world has
not. This is not a nation state-centered threat. It is dispersed and
decentralized. Mr. Chaffetz and I say let us have a decentralized and
dispersed response.
The tactics that were so successful in eliminating Osama bin Laden,
excellent and coordinated intelligence and excellent and fierce special
forces, was successful. Mr. Chaffetz and I, in our amendment, believe
it is time for America to move from nation-state building to
counterterrorism.
Second, the situation in Afghanistan with an unreliable partner,
incredible corruption that has been going from bad to worse, does not
allow our military or our taxpayers to have any confidence that that
nation-building strategy can be successful.
So we call upon Congress to face this grave national security
question from the perspective of is it time to change.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 1\1/2\
minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Coffman).
Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey.
Somebody asked me, as an Iraq war veteran, if I had learned any
lessons from that war, and I said, Yes, never do it again.
But I volunteered for Iraq because I believed that once we were
involved in the fight that we had to reasonably finish that job. And my
concern about Afghanistan is the fact that we are pretty far down this
road. We know that the President's going to reduce the conventional
footprint in July of this year. The President has already stated, as
Commander in Chief, that he expects Afghan security forces to take
operational control by 2014.
And let me tell you something that I think we're not thinking about
tonight, and that is, as a United States Marine Corps civil affairs
officer working in Iraq, part of my job was to convince Iraqis to
cooperate and to side with us, knowing that if we left expeditiously
before the situation stabilized that they would be killed. And my
counterparts, doing the same job in Afghanistan that I did in Iraq,
have that challenge of convincing the people, the civilian population,
to cooperate and to side with us. And if, in fact, we do an
expeditious withdrawal and revert to counterterrorism, there will be
many lives lost unnecessarily due to our conduct here tonight.

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
I appreciate Mr. Welch for doing this in a bipartisan way.
This amendment does a couple of basic things: one, it says we are
going to withdraw our troops. It's trying to bring our troops home.
Nobody should be disappointed in that. That in many ways is victory.
But, number two, it does give the President and the Secretary of
Defense the flexibility to conduct counterterrorism activities.
The reality in today's world is that terrorism is real. There are
people that want to kill and destroy the United States of America. And
the death of Osama bin Laden, unfortunately, has not put an end to
that. In many ways, it is a global war on terror.
We've had 10 years of great success; and what this amendment does, in
my opinion, is recognize the success that our troops have had over the
last 10 years, the longest war in the history of the United States of
America.
Unfortunately, terrorism is not confined to the boundaries of just
Afghanistan. We have to have the very best intelligence, both human and
electronic. And when we have intelligence that shows that there is a
clear and present danger to the United States of America, our special
forces need to take out that threat. That requires deadly force. But
that does not necessarily require a hundred thousand of our men and
women serving in Afghanistan in what I believe has expanded into
mission creep that is just allowing people to participate in nation
building.
I feel for the people of Afghanistan. They have lived for more than
30 years in war. It is a difficult, difficult situation. But we have
the very best fighting force in the world. If we're going to use those
men and women and that fighting force in the right way, then we're
going to have to deal with it differently.
We should be proud of the fact that bringing our troops home is not
putting our tail between our legs. It is victory. It is success. And we
will continue to fight the fight.
But it's global in nature. It's time to bring our troops home. Give
the President and the Secretary the flexibility to take out the threat
as it arrives in Afghanistan, and that's why I think this amendment is
so important.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my friend from
Virginia (Mr. Wittman).
Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to remind folks that we've learned some lessons through these
years of conflict. I want to remind folks of what General Petraeus has
learned through that process and knowing that counterterrorism has not
been successful in the long term in getting us to where we need to be
strategically in these areas and that the counterinsurgency strategy
has worked. What we are seeing in Afghanistan is just that. Let's make
sure that we're allowing that to work.
When I was there recently, we've seen what's happening. We are
training the Afghans to be able to take over their country, to make
sure that they're going to be successful in maintaining order in that
country; making sure that, as we have pushed terrorists out, those
terrorists stay out. That is a long-term successful strategy--to
secure, hold, build, and transition. Let's make sure that we allow that
to happen.
It's critical that we don't make an arbitrary transition to another
strategy that we've seen in the past hasn't worked. And all of us want
to make sure that we are getting our troops out of there.

{time} 2140

But we also want to make sure that those sacrifices are not in vain.
And we can go back and forth about what the end result is, but the end
result is that we want to make sure that we're successful there in the
long term.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time I have
remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, we need to understand that we don't need
to treat Afghanistan any different than we do the rest of the world.
The reality is we have the very best fighting force in the world. We
have been highly successful, but let's understand that bringing our
troops home is something we should all be proud of.
What we are failing to do right now, what this administration is
failing to do--nobody has ever defined success, nobody has ever defined
success. Let's bring our troops home. We are doing this in a bipartisan
way. It's a reasonable and balanced approach to say, in
counterterrorism, let's fight the terrorism that's out there, but let's
also bring our troops home.
May God bless the troops, and may God bless the United States of
America. I appreciate the opportunity to present this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time we have
remaining on our side?

[[Page H3668]]

The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
ranking member of the full committee, my friend, Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I want to thank the Members who offered this
amendment. I too support a drawdown in Afghanistan. I want to see us
get to the point where we can bring our troops home, and I think we're
making progress in that direction, but there are two things that I do
want to correct. One, it's a little bit of a myth that no one has ever
defined success. Success has been defined by the President clearly. We
want a government in Afghanistan that can stand so that the Taliban and
al Qaeda do not come back to power. That is success--when we are
confident that that government can stand and we can draw down so that
we don't go right back to where we were before 9/11. That is what we
are trying to accomplish.
And the second thing is, we all want to transition to a lesser
mission, to be able to bring our troops home, and counterterrorism is
the focus. We would not, however, have been able to run the mission
against bin Laden that we did if we didn't have the broader support in
Afghanistan. If we pull out and think that we can run a
counterterrorism mission with a government that is collapsing around us
and that does not support us, then we kid ourselves. That's why it is
so important, as Mr. Coffman said so well, to make sure that we
complete the mission and we have a government that can stand so that we
can begin to responsibly draw down. I think it's important we draw
down, but we have to do so in a responsible way.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to my
friend from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
Mr. FORBES. I thank my friend from New Jersey.
A week ago today I was in Afghanistan, and Mr. Chairman, I can tell
you that if you listen to our troops there, if you talk to our general,
they don't want us to pull the rug out from under them.
Years ago, there were a group of planes that were lost off the coast
of Florida and they were heading back toward the coastline and they
lost their communications. Everything within them kept telling them
turn around, turn around, you're heading in the wrong direction.
Unfortunately, right before they reached the shoreline they did turn
around and they ended up going back out to sea and getting lost.
We have a timetable of 2014 that both our troops and the Afghans are
working together to make that 2014 deadline. The last thing we want to
do is pull that rug out from them now. And I know the temptation to say
let's quit, we've put a lot of investment in there, it's too hard,
let's turn around, but we need to be cautious that we don't do it too
quickly because Afghanistan is different than the rest of the world,
because the two greatest dangers we face in the world today are Iran
getting nuclear weapons and extremists taking over nuclear weapons in
Pakistan. Afghanistan is the bridge that could connect both of those.
It's important, Mr. Chairman, that we not quit. Ask our troops. We
have invested too much in lives, time, and money. Let's not turn back
now. Let's get the job done--2014 is going to be here soon enough.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah will be
postponed.

Amendment No. 59 Offered by Mr. Rohrabacher

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 59
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title XII of division A of the
bill, add the following:

SEC. 12XX. AUTHORITY TO REMOVE SATELLITES AND RELATED
COMPONENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS
LIST.

(a) Authority.--Except as provided in subsection (b) and
subject to subsection (d), the President is authorized to
remove satellites and related components from the United
States Munitions List, consistent with the procedures in
section 38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2778(f)).
(b) Exception.--The authority of subsection (a) may not be
exercised with respect to any satellite or related component
that may, directly or indirectly, be transferred to, or
launched into outer space by--
(1) the People's Republic of China, including restrictions
contained in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
(Public Law 105-261), and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106-65); or
(2) Burma, North Korea, Pakistan, or Venezuela or any
country that is a state sponsor of terrorism.
(c) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means any
country the government of which the Secretary of State
determines has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect
pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act),
section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other provision of
law; and
(2) the term ``United States Munitions List'' means the
list referred to in section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
(d) Effective Date.--The President may not exercise the
authority provided in this section before the date that is 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, my amendment focuses on an issue that
reflects a concern not only for our national security, but also for the
prosperity of our country. I would like to thank the chairman and
ranking member for agreeing to discuss this important issue with me
tonight as part of my time. And I do intend at the end of this
discussion, which should be considered a colloquy, my intent is to
withdraw my amendment.
What we are talking about is an important issue. We are talking about
the President's authority to move satellites and related components
from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. And this may
sound rather bureaucratic, but it means whether or not there is going
to be the transfer and sale of technology that we have developed with
billions of dollars of Federal investment that is very important to our
technology and the jobs in California, but also very important to our
national security if these technologies would be put into the wrong
hands.
We have heard expert witness testimony that current regulations are
harmful to national security, cost American jobs, and encourage other
nations to develop competing technologies. Since Congress placed these
items on the U.S. Munitions List--meaning satellites and these other
technologies that we're referring to today--our worldwide market share
for the manufacture of satellites and components has dropped
dramatically.
It has been widely reported that while U.S. firms accounted for 73
percent of the world market for commercial satellites in 1998, that
figure has since dropped below 30 percent. Global satellite
manufacturers often pursue alternate ITAR-free sources, especially for
commodity components and related items, simply to eliminate any risks
associated with licensing delays, even if the export license is likely
to be approved by U.S. regulators.
The U.S. regulatory environment has particularly affected small U.S.
satellite suppliers, which lack the organizational structure, staff,
and marketing resources to offset the added burden of export control
barriers in such a close, competitive climate in this high-tech
business.
Current U.S. satellite export controls are not slowing foreign space
capabilities, but encouraging them. Foreign manufacturers now market
ITAR-free satellites, and we are encouraging non-U.S. satellite
research and development with the controls that are in place. But the
national security concerns that led Congress to create the

[[Page H3669]]

current regulatory wall are still in place, and yet there are
significant concerns existing regarding China, Iran, North Korea,
Venezuela, and other terrorist-supporting states. We must continue to
prohibit the transfer of these technologies to these nations, and we
must prohibit U.S. satellite sales, I believe, to China. We especially
must not permit U.S. satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets.
Last year, the House endorsed the removal of satellites and
components from the Munitions List, but it was clearly stated that
there was an exception barring any transfers to generous nations and
allowing no launches of American satellites on Chinese rockets. That
should remain our position.
At this time, I would yield several minutes to Mr. McKeon, the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. McKEON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. McKEON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. There has been no
Member of Congress more active in promoting the space enterprise than
my friend, Mr. Rohrabacher. He has also been a leader in ensuring U.S.
space technology is not transferred to China. We share the same belief
that a strong space industrial base is in the national security and
economic interests of the United States, and that there is an
opportunity to revise U.S. satellite export control policy. However,
space technology is a U.S. technological crown jewel. Any revisions to
our satellite export control policy must account for the national
security risks of removing satellites and related components from the
United States Munitions List.
The Defense Department has begun a risk assessment and about 2 weeks
ago provided Congress with an interim report, but their work is not yet
complete. The interim report suggests that some satellite components
could be removed from the U.S. Munitions List without posing an
unacceptable security risk, but it also concludes that several
components are critical to U.S. national security and should remain on
the U.S. Munitions List.
Before making significant changes in legislation, I would prefer that
the committee do its due diligence. We need to allow the department to
finish its risk assessment and conduct oversight hearings and briefings
on this issue.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I will claim the time in
opposition. I am not opposed, but I am happy to yield 30 seconds of
that time to Mr. McKeon to finish his statement.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Washington is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
California.
Mr. McKEON. I am committed to working with the gentleman from
California and my ranking member to review our Nation's satellite
export control policies and identify policy recommendations that would
facilitate greater export opportunities for our aerospace companies
while also preserving our national security.

{time} 2150

Mr. SMITH of Washington. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
As I mentioned, I'm not opposed to this amendment. In fact, I would
support Mr. Rohrabacher's amendment. I understand the concerns of the
chairman, but there is one point that I really want to make clear in
this.
Throughout this whole process, well over, gosh, I guess it's been 12
years now since we passed this restriction, there has always been this
notion that somehow we have to wait in order to be extra cautious--as
if there is no risk in waiting. And that is where I think we are
completely wrong. Absolutely. There is a risk in selling technology
that could wind up in the wrong hands. And in the world we live in
today, that's a risk we have to live with and attempt to manage.
But what has never been properly understood in this body, and
particularly on the Armed Services Committee, is the risk of excessive
restrictions on U.S. companies' ability to export technology. And it is
a risk precisely to our national security. It is not just a matter of
jobs or business or the economy. This isn't national security versus
economic strength.
One of our great strengths as a Nation in terms of our defense is the
superiority of our technology companies. We have companies here in the
U.S. that we can rely on to give us the best equipment, the best
technology to protect us. But, as Mr. Rohrabacher pointed out, we are
losing that edge. We are ceasing to be the leaders in critical areas of
technology, and nowhere is this more painfully clear than in the area
of satellites. We have lost over 40 percent market share during that
period to our competitors.
When I was in Europe visiting some satellite companies 2 years ago, I
came across an advertisement, something that was being put out in the
trade papers by a European satellite company for an ITAR-free
satellite. Well, what is an ITAR-free satellite? It's a satellite that
has not one single U.S. component in it. Why? Because if it were ITAR-
free, they could much more freely export it and much, much more easily
be competitive in selling that satellite technology. We were blocking
out all U.S. companies from anything that goes into a satellite. And
trust me, I've seen satellites. There is a heck of a lot that goes into
them.
Our companies are being severely disadvantaged, and that is
undermining our ability to get access to those companies to build
technologies we need to defend ourselves. Inaction is not the safe and
correct course here.
We have the evidence we need. I believe we need to go forward. And
Mr. Rohrabacher's amendment makes sure that we're not selling this to
China and other places we don't want to, but it does free up our
companies to begin to compete before it's too late, before we lose that
edge.
Now, we've got the interim report. We don't have the final report.
We've analyzed this thing for a long period of time. I personally don't
think we need to wait for the final report. But I will be optimistic
that we will get that final report between now and when we go to
conference. And we'll get something done on this critical issue--
critical not just for U.S. companies, though certainly jobs and
economic strength are matters of national security, but also critical
for national security, itself, to make sure that U.S. companies can
maintain the leadership role to help provide for our defense, to help
work with our Defense Department as they do.
So I would hope that we would adopt this. I know Mr. Rohrabacher is
planning on withdrawing it, but I hope we continue to work on this
issue.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I agree with the gentleman's assessment.
Out of respect for the judgment of the chairman and his desire to
make sure that the full interim report that the Congress has on this
issue is studied and that the Defense Department finishes that report,
I am willing to withdraw my amendment, but I agree with the points that
you've made. I have great respect for the chairman and his care and
concern about the safety of our country.
I would, at this point, ask unanimous consent to withdraw my
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
There was no objection.

Amendment No. 60 Offered by Mr. Polis

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 60
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following new section:

SEC. 12__. REDUCTION IN END STRENGTH LEVEL OF MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ASSIGNED TO
PERMANENT DUTY IN EUROPE AND CORRESPONDING
GENERAL END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS.

(a) European End Strength Level.--Effective September 30,
2012, the end strength level of members of the Armed Forces
of the United States assigned to permanent duty ashore in
Europe may not exceed a permanent ceiling of 30,000 in any
fiscal year.

[[Page H3670]]

(b) Exclusion of Certain Members.--For purposes of this
section, the following members of the Armed Forces are
excluded in calculating the end strength level of members of
the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent
duty ashore in Europe:
(1) Members assigned to permanent duty ashore in Iceland,
Greenland, and the Azores.
(2) Members performing duties in Europe for more than 179
days under a military-to-military contact program under
section 168 of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Exceptions; Waiver.--This section shall not apply in
the event of a declaration of war or an armed attack on any
European member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. The President may waive operation of this
section if the President declares an emergency and
immediately informs the Congress of the waiver band the
reasons therefor.
(d) Repeal of Superceded End Strength Limitation.--Section
1002 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (22
U.S.C. 1928 note) is repealed.
(e) Conforming Changes to Overall End Strength Levels.--
(1) End strengths for active forces for fiscal year 2012
.--Notwithstanding section 401, the Armed Forces are
authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of
September 30, 2012, as follows:
(A) The Army, 556,600.
(B) The Navy, 325,239.
(C) The Marine Corps, 202,000.
(D) The Air Force, 328,800.
(2) Continuation of reductions in subsequent fiscal
years.--For each of fiscal years 2013 through 2016, the end
strength numbers shall be reduced by an additional 10,000 a
year, as follows:
(A) 5,400 a year from the Army.
(B) 4,000 a year from the Air Force.
(C) 500 a year from the Navy.
(D) 100 a year from the Marine Corps.
(3) Revision in permanent active duty end strength minimum
levels.--Section 691(b) of title 10, United States Code, as
amended by section 402, is amended by striking paragraphs (1)
through (4) and inserting the following new paragraphs:
``(1) For the Army, 535,000.
``(2) For the Navy, 323,239.
``(3) For the Marine Corps, 201,600.
``(4) For the Air Force, 312,800.''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Colorado (Mr. Polis) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Colorado for 5 minutes.
Mr. POLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Given our looming fiscal crisis and record deficits, it's critical
that we look at smart spending cuts in a responsible way that doesn't
hurt our national security--in fact, the budget deficit and our huge
national debt are a threat to national security by making us
economically beholden to foreign powers--and I propose an amendment
that would do just that.
My amendment would get most of the 80,000 troops, U.S. troops, out of
Europe where they're no longer needed. We will save over $1 billion. My
amendment would reduce the total amount of troops stationed in Europe
to 30,000 troops from 80,000, which would not affect the troops being
used in our wars in the Middle East. That's estimated to be about
12,000 to 15,000 of those troops. We would also leave ample troops to
be part of NATO joint exercises and fulfill our obligations to our
European allies.
My amendment would allow the Department of Defense to save money by
closing bases across Europe that are simply no longer needed. They have
no strategic rationale. By pulling some of our troops out of Europe and
closing these bases, we can save money and reduce our redundant
military force. My amendment would gradually cut the 50,000 troops from
our force in Europe, would save over $1.3 billion over 10 years, reduce
overall troop levels in phases so we can responsibly draw down the
troops without impacting those who are currently deployed.
On top of the savings by reducing troop level, my amendment allows us
to close bases across Europe that are, frankly, relics from World War
II and the Cold War and currently serve no strategic purpose for our
country. The need for these bases was understandable in the shadow of
the threat of the Nazis and when Europe was rebuilding from the
devastation from World War II. The presence of the troops was
understandable when we faced the menace of the Soviet Union. What is
the justification for our ongoing presence now? U.S. taxpayers did not
sign up to defend Europe from a nonexistent threat forever at our own
expense when we can't afford it.
These bases cost U.S. taxpayers millions upon millions of dollars. On
top of that, they're often unpopular with local people in the countries
we're protecting. I don't understand why we're wasting so much money to
maintain bases where they aren't needed, aren't wanted, and don't
fulfill any of our strategic objectives.
Our European allies, Madam Chair, are some of the richest countries
in the world. So why are we subsidizing their defense spending? Our
European allies have enjoyed a free ride on the American dime for years
now. The average American spends over $2,500 on defense; the average
European $500. If Europe, itself, has made the decision it can afford
to spend less on defense, shouldn't we be confident that we can spend
less on their defense as well?
Now, I understand that many of the troops in Europe support the
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and personally, while I hope this
won't be an issue soon as we begin to withdraw our troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan, my amendment leaves in place enough troops to fully
support the ongoing operations even at their current levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
My amendment does not weaken our commitment to NATO. With modern
technology, we can move troops and weapons quickly across the globe. We
fulfill our responsibilities with troops stationed at NATO headquarters
and fully participate in joint exercises.
My amendment also allows for a war emergency if, for instance, there
was really a reason to station troops in Europe. If our European allies
were attacked, my amendment allows the President to waive the
requirements of the bill.
It's time to think about our priorities in defense spending. We're
not under threat, Madam Chair, from the Nazis. We're not under threat,
Madam Chair, from the Soviets. We are under threat from a global
terrorist threat that is a stateless menace. And, in fact, less of that
menace emanates from Europe than it does from Asia and Africa.
Maintaining a network of bases across Europe is simply not a sane
response to the terrorist threat, nor is it fiscally responsible.
These cuts are based on the recommendations of the Sustainable
Defense Task Force, a bipartisan project organized by Congressman
Frank, Congressman Paul, and Congressman Jones, as well as Senator
Wyden. The Sustainable Defense Task Force brought together defense
experts across the ideological spectrum and proposed commonsense
recommendations for saving taxpayer money and improving our national
security.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on my amendment, Madam Chair.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. I claim the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Foxx). The gentleman from Ohio is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. TURNER. The gentleman is correct that this is a time of deficits
and concerns about spending, but he is not correct that this doesn't
hurt our national security.
He also states that our troops in Europe are not needed, and that is
absolutely not the case. Those troops that are there not only protect
us and our European allies, but they also are essential to the
operations that we're supporting around the globe, including the
important operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

{time} 2200

He claims this amendment will save money, but in fact, this will
increase our costs as we look to how we serve our allies, how we
initiate our ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and how we
support our men and women in uniform.
The essential problem with this amendment is that it's arbitrary. Our
troop strengths are based on extensive studies. There are whole books
written about how you look to assessing threats, how you look to our
overall assets, how you support the capabilities that we have in
supporting our national defense. These are just arbitrary numbers that
have been picked as to our withdrawal from Europe.
But it goes further.
Besides having the great effect of reducing the reassurance of our
allies in the region, this amendment goes further and sets troop limits
from 2013 through 2016. It requires that 10,000 of our troops be
reduced in end strength numbers a year, and it goes on to say

[[Page H3671]]

that 5,400 of them are to come from the Army, that 4,000 a year are to
come from the Air Force, 500 a year from the Navy, 100 from the Marine
Corps. There certainly is not a decreasing threat in our national
security; yet there will be decreasing troops, not just those who are
in Europe. This means that we will have increased dwell time and an
increased greater burden upon the troops who are serving.
As we look to these numbers again being arbitrary, you have to
wonder: How was it determined that 5,400 would come from the Army and
4,000 would come from the Air Force and 500 from the Navy? This has no
correlation not only to the threat but even to the assets and the
capabilities that we need. I think everyone knows that our troops that
we have in Europe serve our full national security and are not there
for the reasons of defending Europe.
As the gentleman stated, the other thing that is important is that
this is something knowable. I mean, you could pick up a Quadrennial
Defense Review or threat assessments, from which our troop strengths
are based, not these arbitrary numbers from this amendment which would
restrict our ability to respond, greatly impact our national security
and would certainly not save money.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. POLIS. I would like to inquire as to how much time remains on
both sides.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Colorado has 1 minute remaining.
The gentleman from Ohio has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. POLIS. Madam Chair, these specific suggestions that are based on
the Sustainable Defense Task Force may not be a book, but it is 30-
pages' long, and, without objection, I would like to submit its
``Executive Summary'' for the Record.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman's request will be covered under
general leave.

Parliamentary Inquiry

Mr. POLIS. Parliamentary inquiry, Madam Chair.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. POLIS. Would the Chair specify the definition of her last
statement.
The Acting CHAIR. All Members were given authority to insert such
material by an order of the House.

Executive Summary

DEBT, DEFICITS, AND DEFENSE: A WAY FORWARD

[Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, 11 June 2010]

At a time of growing concern over federal deficits, it is
essential that all elements of the federal budget be
subjected to careful scrutiny. The Pentagon budget should be
no exception. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in a
recent speech, paraphrasing President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
``The United States should spend as much as necessary on
national defense, but not one penny more.''
This report presents a series of options which, taken
together, could save up to $960 billion between 2011 and
2020. The proposals cover the full range of Pentagon
expenditures--procurement, research and development,
personnel, operations and maintenance, and infrastructure.
Some involve changes in our military posture and force
structure; others are more limited in scope, focusing on
outdated, wasteful, and ineffective systems that have long
been the subject of criticism by congressional research
agencies and others. Taken together or in part, they could
make a significant contribution to any deficit reduction
plan.
There is no doubt that defense expenditure has contributed
significantly to our current fiscal burden. This is true even
aside from war costs. Today, annual discretionary spending is
$583 billion above the level set in 2001. Overall, the rise
in defense spending accounts for almost 65% of this increase.
Non-war defense spending is responsible for 37%. These
portions are much greater than any other category of
discretionary spending. The savings options that we have
developed focus mostly on the ``base'' portion of the
Pentagon budget, excluding expenditures slated to support
overseas contingency operations. Those that would affect such
operations are pegged explicitly to progress in concluding
today's wars.
Our recommendations fall in 6 areas: Strategic forces;
Conventional force structure; Procurement, research, and
development; Personnel costs; Reform of DoD maintenance and
supply systems; Command, support, and infrastructure
expenditures.
In developing its options, the Task Force has used a set of
criteria to identify savings that could be achieved without
compromising the essential security of the United States. We
have focused especially on:
Department of Defense programs that are based on unreliable
or unproven technologies;
Missions that exhibit a poor cost-benefit payoff and
capabilities that fail the test of cost-effectiveness or that
possess a very limited utility;
Assets and capabilities that mismatch or substantially
over-match current and emerging military challenges, and
Opportunities for providing needed capabilities and assets
at lower cost via management reforms.
Table ES-1 (page vi) provides an overview of the savings
options we propose. Not all the contributors endorse all the
options, but all agree they offer genuine possibilities for
resource savings and deserve serious consideration. They are
described in more detail below.
The option set could be implemented in whole or part. As an
integrated set, it would entail:
Reducing the US nuclear arsenal to 1000 warheads deployed
on 160 Minuteman missiles and seven nuclear submarines,
Curtailing nuclear weapons research and the planned
modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure;
Curtailing national missile defense efforts;
A reduction of approximately 200,000 military personnel,
yielding a peacetime US military active-duty end-strength of
approximately 1.3 million;
Capping routine peacetime US military presence in Europe at
35,000 and in Asia at 65,000, including afloat;
Reducing the size of the US Navy from its current strength
of 287 battle force ships and 10 naval air wings to a future
posture of 230 ships and 8 air wings;
Rolling back the number of US Army active-component brigade
combat teams from the current 45 to between 39 and 41;
Retiring four of the 27 US Marine Corps infantry battalions
along with a portion of the additional units that the Corps
employs to constitute air-land task forces;
Retiring three US Air Force tactical fighter wings;
Ending or delaying procurement of a number of military
systems--the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, MV-22 Osprey, KC-X
Aerial Refueling Tanker, and the Expeditionary Fighting
Vehicle--and fielding less expensive alternatives;
Reducing base budget spending on R&D by $5 billion
annually;
Resetting the calculation of military compensation and
reforming the provision of military health care;
Implementing a variety of measures aiming to achieve new
efficiencies in DoD's supply and equipment maintenance
systems; and
Setting a cost reduction imperative for command, support,
and infrastructure expenditures.

sustainable defense task force options

Strategic capabilities
Our options in this area would save nearly $195 billion
during the next decade. The United States should act now to
accelerate the drawdown of nuclear weapons to a level of
1,000 warheads deployed on seven Ohio-class submarines and
160 Minuteman missiles. This is more than enough to ensure
deterrence. Shifting to a nuclear ``dyad'' of land- and sea-
based missiles would provide an optimal balance between
efficiency and flexibility.
Missile defense efforts should be curtailed to focus on
those systems and those missions most likely to succeed and
provide real protection for our troops in the field. And we
should roll back nuclear weapons research and limit efforts
to modernize the weapon infrastructure. This best accords
with a reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons, the smaller
arsenal, and the general trend of arms control efforts.
Conventional force structure
No other nation or likely combination of nations comes
close to matching US conventional warfare capabilities. Our
options in this area seek to match conventional force
capabilities more closely with the actual requirements of
defense and deterrence. These are the tasks most appropriate
to the armed forces and most essential to the nation.
Focusing on them helps ensure that our investments are cost-
effective. Our options on conventional forces would save the
United States almost $395 billion from 2011-2020.
Ground forces: We propose capping routine US military
presence in Europe at 35,000 personnel and in Asia at 65,000
troops, and then reducing some force structure accordingly.
We can rely on our incomparable capacities for rapid
deployment to flexibly send more troops and assets to these
regions if and when needed.
We also propose rolling back the recent growth in the Army
and Marine Corps as progress in winding-down our Iraq and
Afghanistan commitments allows. This option views future
conduct of protracted, large-scale counterinsurgency
campaigns by the United States as strategically unwise and
largely avoidable. Certainly, there are better, more cost-
effective ways to fight terrorism.
Air forces: The experience of the United States in recent
conventional wars, including the first two months of the Iraq
conflict, show that we can safely reduce our tactical air
power--both Air Force and Navy. The capacity of the US
military to deliver weapons by plane or missile substantially
overmatches existing and emerging threats. And the gap
continues to grow. Also, entirely new capabilities, notably
remotely piloted vehicles, are joining our air fleets in
growing numbers. This option envisions a future air

[[Page H3672]]

attack capability comprising between 1,600 and 1,750 Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighter-attack aircraft and
bombers in combat squadrons. Remotely-piloted vehicles would
be additional.
Sea power: We can reduce the size of our Navy from the
current fleet of 287 battle force ships to 230, although this
will require using our naval power differently. Included in
this fleet would be nine aircraft carriers. This option would
keep fewer of our war ships permanently ``on station,''
partly by having them operate in smaller groups. It would put
greater emphasis on surging naval power as needed. The
firepower of our naval assets has grown dramatically during
the past 20 years. In this light, the smaller fleet that we
propose can meet America's warfighting needs. The reduction
in fleet size also reflects a smaller contingent of nuclear
ballistic missile submarines, as proposed in the section on
strategic capabilities.
Procurement
Regarding procurement, our options for saving $88.7 billion
from 2011-2020 focus mostly on canceling or reducing systems
with long histories of trouble and cost growth, such as the
MV-22 Osprey and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. These
embody all that is wrong with the acquisition process. We
also include the option of canceling the F-35 Lightning and
replacing it, for the time being, with advanced versions of
aircraft already in service. Development of the F-35 is
rapidly going the way of the F-22 Raptor: late, over cost,
and less capable than promised. However, even if this
aircraft performed according to specifications, it would not
be needed in order for us to defeat current and emerging
challengers. America's air forces are today the best in the
world by a wide margin--not principally due to our
technology, but instead due to the combination of technology,
skill, training, morale, support, and coordination.
Research and development
Research and development has experienced more spending
growth since 2001 than any other major DoD appropriation
category. Today it stands at $80 billion annually--33% above
the Cold War peak in real terms. And yet, today, we face no
competitor in military technology comparable to the Soviet
Union. We seem increasingly in a race with ourselves. The
results have been uneven in terms of producing affordable
capabilities that serve the needs of war fighters, however.
Individual efforts by the armed services and defense agencies
are too often disjointed and seemingly at odds with each
other. In our view, DoD needs to exercise more discipline in
this area and Congress needs to exercise more oversight. Our
modest proposal is that DoD set clearer priorities and seek
$5 billion in savings per year or $50 billion during the
coming decade.
Command, support, and infrastructure
We propose that DoD seek more than $100 billion in savings
over the next decade in the areas of command, infrastructure,
maintenance, supply, and other forms of support. The
Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability
Office have both outlined a variety of measures to achieve
savings in these areas by means of streamlining,
consolidation, and privatization. Additionally, the
reductions we have proposed in force structure and
procurement will reduce the demand on support services and
infrastructure (albeit not proportionately). The goal we have
set for savings in these areas is only 15% as much as what we
propose for force structure and procurement. This much should
be easily in DoD's reach.
Personnel costs
Cost growth in military compensation and health care is a
serious and increasing concern of military planners and
leaders. Over the past decade personnel costs rose by more
than 50% in real terms, while health care costs rose 100%.
Secretary of Defense Gates recently described the problem as
``eating the Defense Department alive.''
The Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation has
proposed that we recalibrate how military pay raises are set
and that we increase health care fees and co-pays for some
former military personnel between the ages of 38 and 65. The
estimate for potential savings from such measures is $120
billion over the decade, assuming gradual implementation as
the wars wind-down. In our opinion, however, these options
involve more than matters of simple economics. They can only
go forward as part of a broader program of change.
We are a nation at war and these measures affect those who
are making the greatest sacrifice. We have a responsibility
to them and, thus, great care is due. If the rise in
personnel costs has been extraordinary, so have been the
demands placed on our military personnel. It is not simply
war that bears down on them, but also the way we have
conducted it. Some force utilization policies have been
unwise and some personnel policies have been both unwise and
unfair.
If cost growth in this area is to be addressed, it must be
addressed as part of a compact that relieves our military
personnel of the undue burdens of routine ``stop loss''
orders and long, repeated war rotations. Compensation levels
for those fighting overseas must be protected and health care
for the injured improved. Finally, we must accept that if we
are to deploy 175,000 active-duty troops to war (as we do
today), then we cannot also maintain another 142,000 troops
overseas doing other jobs. Fiscal realities and proper
treatment of our military personnel demand that we make
choices.

systemic change

The savings options we have outlined promise to provide
immediate fiscal relief. They would help to bring the goal of
meaningful deficit reduction within reach.
Nonetheless, they remain ad hoc steps. For the longer term,
putting America's defense establishment on a more sustainable
path depends on our willingness to:
Rethink our national security commitments and goals to
ensure that they focus clearly on what concerns us the most
and what we most need in the realm of security;
Reset our national security strategy so that it reflects a
cost-effective balance among the security instruments at our
disposal and also uses those instruments in cost-effective
ways; and
Reform our system of producing defense assets so that it is
more likely to provide what we truly need at an affordable
cost.
Reform efforts
With regard to the third of these systemic goals, there is
today renewed interest in reforming the ways we produce and
sustain military power. However, those efforts have not yet
gone far enough to assuredly deliver the type and degree of
change needed. Among the tasks ahead, several imperatives
stand out:
Audit the Pentagon: Today, DoD is one of only a few federal
agencies that cannot pass the test of an independent auditor.
This means that DoD cannot accurately track its assets--a
condition that not only opens the door to waste and fraud,
but also makes it difficult to gauge progress in other areas
of reform, including acquisition. DoD has been under
obligation to get its books in order for 20 years, but has
enjoyed the benefit of special dispensations and rolling
deadlines: Most recently, a new deadline of September 2017
for audit readiness. Given current and emerging fiscal
pressures, this is too generous. Moreover, strong incentives
for compliance are lacking.
Determine mission costs: Beyond accurately accounting for
its assets, the Pentagon needs to provide cost estimates for
its core missions and activities, as suggested in 2001 by the
Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security. Lawmakers might
ask, How much of the defense dollar do we presently invest in
counterterrorism, counterproliferation, the defense of
Europe, or nuclear deterrence? At present, no one really
knows. And until we do know, it will be difficult to make
fully rational decisions about the allocation of defense
resources.
Strengthen acquisition reform: The finding by the
Government Accountability Office that major weapons programs
are suffering $300 billion in cost overruns has sparked
renewed interest in acquisition reform. Defense Secretary
Gates and the Obama administration have promised to
vigorously pursue such reforms. Congress has responded with
the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. However,
the Act needs to be strengthened if it is to substantially
deliver on its promise. It creates the position of Director
of Independent Cost Assessment, but there needs to be a
mechanism for reconciling differences between the Director's
estimates and those of the Pentagon. With regard to
competition requirements, it gives DoD too easy recourse to
invoking waivers. The bar must be set higher. And there needs
to be a simple prohibition on giving an outside contractor
responsibility for evaluating the work or managing the
contract of any entity with which that contractor is linked.

other option sets

We include in our report two other sets of savings options
that reflect different perspectives. Table ES-2 summarizes
options developed in 2009 by the Task Force for a Unified
Security Budget. These are part of its ongoing efforts to
rebalance our security investments, which presently are
weighted too heavily to the military side.
Table ES-3 presents a set of options developed by scholars
of the Cato Institute. It suggests the budget implications of
a shift in US global strategy to a stance of ``Offshore
Balancing'' or what the authors call a ``strategy of
restraint.''
The reductions in military spending summarized in Table ES-
3 reflect a security strategy that aims to bring force from
the sea to defeat and deter enemies, rather than keeping
troops ashore in semi-permanent presence missions or in long-
term policing roles.

Mr. POLIS. Madam Chair, even Donald Rumsfeld believes it is time to
change this policy.
In his recent book, he wrote, ``Of the quarter million troops
deployed abroad in 2001, more than 100,000 were in Europe, the vast
majority stationed in Germany . . . Those deployments were obviously
not taking into account the 21st century reality that Germany was now
one of the wealthier nations in Europe . . . I believed our troops had
to do more than serve as symbols of security blankets for wealthy
allied nations.''
Madam Chair, experts across the ideological spectrum agree that the
time is right for these smart cuts that will improve our national
security, allow us to fulfill all our obligations to NATO, as well as
include the 10,000 to 15,000 troops that experts say are necessary

[[Page H3673]]

to fully support operations at our current levels in the Middle East
and Africa.
Again, I express my own personal desire that less is needed in that
regard, and it seems to be our direction; but even at those current
levels, we would fully support those operations. This is a smart cut,
one of the easier ones we could go to. It improves our national
security, and I urge a ``yes'' vote.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, it is true that the Department of
Defense ought to always be examining where we have troops deployed
around the world, and that is appropriate for them. It is not
appropriate, however, for us to arbitrarily tell them that they will
have 30,000 troops in Europe, X number of troops in Asia and so forth.
I think that it is important to emphasize that among the important
functions that our troops in Europe perform are joint training--
building partnership with our European partnerships. Just a few weeks
ago, I was at the NATO SOF Training facility where European allies
train with our Special Operations Forces before they have to actually
be engaged in the battlefield in Afghanistan and elsewhere. That sort
of joint training is made possible because our troops are there.
As the gentleman from Ohio mentioned, direct support of our
deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya incredibly simplifies, or makes
easier, our deployments for logistics and other transportation needs
when we are able to base things in Europe and go from there rather than
having to come all the way from the United States.
Madam Chair, I think we need to remind ourselves that, since 1945,
when the U.S. has had substantial troop numbers in Europe, there has
not been another general European war. Yet millions upon millions of
people died in previous years because of those general European wars.
The other key point is that this amendment decreases end strength
over a period of 5 years. That has real consequences for real soldiers
and marines and sailors and airmen all across the world. As the
gentleman mentioned, it means they are going to have to spend more time
in deployments.
Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Colorado (Mr. Coffman).
Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for
yielding.
I also thank the gentleman from Colorado for raising this issue and
particularly for questioning our military forward-basing in Europe. I
think it's certainly time to do that. I'm not sure about the 30,000
number, but I question whether our NATO allies are dedicating the
appropriate percentage, in terms of their budgets, towards maintaining
defense and not becoming far too reliant upon the United States.
Where I differ in the amendment is with this arbitrary reduction of
10,000 a year for 5 years. The Secretary of Defense, I think, has
thoughtfully put forward a plan that would, based on conditions, reduce
the United States Army's end strength by 27,000 in FY 2015-2016; and
the United States Marine Corps is somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000,
in that same fiscal year, based on conditions. So I certainly oppose
the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I would like to point out again that these
are arbitrary numbers. Our troops in Europe pose an important asset for
all of our operations in the protection of national security,
including, as has been stated, training troops that go into Afghanistan
and Iraq.
This amendment would not save money. It would, in fact, increase our
overall cost. It also includes an arbitrary reduction in our overall
end strength that would have a negative impact on our national
security.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Polis).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. POLIS. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Colorado
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 61 Offered by Mr. Conyers

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 61
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following new section:

SEC. 12__. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES GROUND COMBAT
PRESENCE IN LIBYA.

No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of
appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended for
the purpose of--
(1) deploying members of the United States Armed Forces on
to the ground of Libya for the purposes of engaging in ground
combat operations, unless the purpose of such deployment is
limited solely to rescuing members of the United States Armed
Forces from imminent danger;
(2) awarding a contract to a private security contractor to
conduct any activity on the ground of Libya; or
(3) otherwise establishing or maintaining any presence of
members of the United States Armed Forces or private security
contractors on the ground of Libya, unless the purpose of
such presence is limited solely to rescuing members of the
United States Armed Forces from imminent danger.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

{time} 2210

Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chair, I rise in support of my amendment, which
would prevent funds authorized in the National Defense Authorization
Act from being used to fund any type of ground combat operations in
Libyan territory. My amendment would simply codify the policy endorsed
by our President and the international community, and thereby ensure
that our involvement in Libya remains limited in scope. I am proud to
report that this amendment enjoys the support of 16 bipartisan
cosponsors.
My proposal would prevent funds from being used to deploy, establish,
or maintain a presence of members of the armed services or private
security contractors on the ground in Libya. It also contains an
exception that would allow for the rescue of members of the Armed
Forces participating in the NATO no-fly zone operation.
I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlelady from
California (Ms. Lee).
Ms. LEE. Madam Chairman, let me thank the gentleman for yielding and
for his leadership. This is such an important amendment, such an
important debate. No one in this House would ever defend the deplorable
actions of Colonel Qadhafi and the decades he has spent repressing the
Libyan people. But no one should fail to recognize that the actions we
have taken in Libya since March 19 amount to a war. Missile strikes,
naval attacks, bombing of strategic military targets, all of these
actions would be a declaration of war if a foreign country launched
such attacks on our soil.
Congress should have debated this prior to any military actions in
Libya. While some of us can disagree as to whether or not we should be
involved in a military action in Libya, we can all agree that we should
prevent mission creep or any military expansion to include combat
troops on the ground in Libya.
This simple amendment does exactly that by codifying the President's
commitment, as Mr. Conyers just said, to not put troops on the ground
in Libya. So I urge a strong ``yes'' vote on this amendment. I thank
the gentleman for his leadership.
Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chairman, although I am not opposed to the
amendment, I request time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Virginia is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. WITTMAN. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
We are certainly in agreement with the intention of this amendment,
by requiring appropriations not be authorized for operations on the
ground there in Libya. We believe that preventing

[[Page H3674]]

these funds purposely puts in place Congress as a decision-maker. We
believe that that is critical in this situation, and we believe that
it's very appropriate that Congress assume its role in decision-making
involving U.S. conflict in Libya.
I think that we all know that decisions are difficult with these
sorts of conflicts and that Congress does have a very specific role in
this effort. So we want to make sure that that's preserved. Certainly
this amendment does that. So we are in agreement with the amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chairman, how much time have I remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has 2\1/4\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. CONYERS. I yield as much time as she may consume to the
gentlelady from California, the head of the Progressive Caucus for so
many years, Ms. Lynn Woolsey.
Ms. WOOLSEY. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for yielding time to
me.
Madam Chair, more than 2 months after the military campaign in Libya
began, it's time to start defining its parameters and its limitations.
Most importantly, we must provide assurance that this will not mushroom
into a full blown ground war and military occupation. That's why I am
proud to cosponsor the amendment offered by my friend from Michigan.
Are two wars not enough? We can't keep doing this. Our military is at
a breaking point. The American people's patience is wearing thin. They
know the costs in life and tender coming from these wars that we have
in Iraq and in Afghanistan; and now what we're doing in Libya comes
from important domestic programs right here at home. They don't want to
replay Iraq and Afghanistan in Libya.
In fact, we all know that it's time to bring our troops home out of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and it is time to engage in smart security for
diplomacy, where human and economic assistance are used instead of
bombs and weapons, costing us pennies on the dollar. No more wars, no
boots on the ground in Libya, and as much as we can do to take care of
our business here at home.
Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentlelady. The time has come for Congress
to once again exercise its constitutional authority to place boundaries
on the use of our military forces overseas and clearly state that this
conflict in Libya will not escalate into an expensive occupation that
could strain our resources and harm our national security interests.
I beg the Members of this House to give favorable consideration to
our amendment.
Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CONYERS. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 62 Offered by Mr. Flake

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 62
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

At the end of section 1433, relating to the Mission Force
Enhancement Transfer Fund, add the following new subsection:
(h) Elimination of Remaining Funds.--The amount otherwise
authorized to be appropriated for the Mission Force
Enhancement Transfer Fund for fiscal year 2012, as specified
in the funding table in section 4501, is reduced by
$348,256,000, which represents the amount of funds not needed
to carry out projects identified in H.R. 1540 of the 112th
Congress, as reported by the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Arizona (Mr. Flake) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. FLAKE. This amendment would simply eliminate funding for the
Mission Force Enhancement Transfer Fund, which amounts to more than
$348 million. The fund was created in this bill in order to ensure that
additional funding remain available for the Secretary of Defense to
transfer, if he needed to, to other accounts to ``mitigate unfunded
requirements'' according to the committee report. The report also
contains a list of seven priorities that the Secretary can transfer
these funds in support of.
I am not sure about this concept myself, particularly in this budget
climate, of providing the Pentagon an authorization that essentially
amounts to a blank check for a couple of hundred million dollars. It's
my understanding that the committee identified $1 billion in savings in
the underlying bill and created the fund using these savings. It's also
my understanding, however, that during the full committee markup more
than $650 million of that money was moved out of this fund by members
of the committee seeking to increase funding for their own priorities
in the bill.

{time} 2220

I understand that Members want to retain the ability to move money
around to areas they feel are underfunded and that should receive
additional funding. However, if the committee was able to identify $1
billion in savings, I think it ought to put that savings toward
decreasing the underlying, or, I am sorry, the cost of the underlying
bill. We have to make tough choices all around in this budget, and
Americans across the country are making tough choices with their
budget.
But to identify a billion dollars in savings, then to move it into a
new fund and then allow Members to designate their own priorities and
take 650, I am just not sure what this is all about.
There are some concerns out there, there was a news article a couple
of days ago that said that some people think this is some kind of slush
fund designed to provide Members with a pot of money from which they
can transfer money to fund their own projects. This would be similar to
the earmarking culture that we have had around here, a culture that
hopefully has ended and that we can move beyond. So I hope this is not
what we are seeing here.
I have two amendments that will be considered later, I believe in the
en bloc portion, that will seek for more transparency moving ahead to
see how these funds are actually used and awarded.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McKEON. Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to Mr. Flake's
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. McKEON. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The gentleman from Arizona's amendment would eliminate resources for
the Mission Force Enhancement Transfer Fund. I commend Mr. Flake for
taking a serious issue, namely, deficit reduction. However, his
amendment could do serious harm to our national security. I believe the
Mission Force Enhancement Transfer Fund can be an important tool for
the Defense Department to help keep America safe.
We set this fund up at the start of the process so that we wouldn't
be tied to the President's budget request so that we could, the members
of the committee that have the expertise, move the funding around to
more important items. Resources from this fund will be used to power
programs vital to our homeland defense such as Navy shipbuilding,
strike aircraft, and ballistic missile defense, systems that the
members of the Armed Services Committee agreed were not sufficiently
funded by the President's budget. As you know, there are no earmarks in
this bill.
We have worked very hard to move away from the system that you worked
so hard to eliminate, and we have done a great job on that. But we do
not feel bound by the President's request that we will just be a
rubberstamp committee to just do what he expects us to do.
Madam Chair, I must repeat my concerns about stripping money from our
troops and sending it back to the

[[Page H3675]]

Treasury. I know how important deficit reduction is. We do need to
focus on that, but we have stressed very strongly, we will look at
everything that the Pentagon spends, we will go through it with a fine-
tooth comb, but the money we save we know we will put to areas that the
Quadrennial Defense Review and our independent panel showed that we
need just to bring us up to what our defense should have been 20 years
ago.
I strongly oppose any amendment that would reduce the defense top
line. And while I support Mr. Flake, as we all endeavor to get our
spending under control, I must oppose this amendment, as it would strip
our fighting force of the tools they need to get the job done and to
keep America safe.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. FLAKE. May I inquire as to how much time remains?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Arizona has 2\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. FLAKE. I appreciate the gentleman's efforts to get rid of
earmarks. I do have some concern about this. The guidance from the
HASC, from the committee, says that the request may not direct funds
to, or any funds with or to, any entity or locality.
It's been the practice in the past that when Members get their
earmarks in a bill, they will take a victory lap, put out a press
release. I have seen one of these already, and it says funding for a
nonprofit charitable foundation, Technology Ventures Corporation, TVC,
to help expand innovation in New Mexico's emerging satellite industry.
This names both an entity and a locality. And this is a Member who got
a particular request.
Mr. McKEON. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FLAKE. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. McKEON. This is on page 692, ``Merit-Based or Competitive
Decisions. A decision to commit, obligate, or expend funds referred to
in the second sentence of subsection (a) with or to a specific entity
shall
``(1) be based on merit-based selection procedures in accordance with
the requirements of'' the company's sections and
``(2) comply with other applicable provisions of law.''
And if we find any Member pressuring the Department of Defense to use
any funds other than to comply with competitive merit-based solutions,
we will go after them. We have a strong oversight committee that will
do this.
Mr. FLAKE. I appreciate the Member's commitment on that, and I
appreciate also--I believe they are accepting the amendments that I
have offered later, which would set up a process whereby we can see how
these funds were actually disposed of, and that will help a great deal.
I appreciate the chairman working on that.
I would just say, in closing, this amendment specifically is to save
the money that is still left in that account. If the concern is not to
give the President the ability to direct all of these funds or the
Secretary of Defense, then this accomplishes it. There is $350 million
left in this account. Let's apply that to pay down the debt and
deficit.
That's what this amendment actually does. It takes the remaining
money that has not been designated in that fund and applies it to
deficit reduction. So that's what this amendment does, and I would
appreciate support for it.
I thank the chairman for his comments, and I thank the chairman for
his commitment to get away from this earmark culture.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McKEON. I yield 1 minute to my friend and colleague, the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes).
Mr. FORBES. Madam Chairman, I am always reluctant to oppose my good
friend from Arizona, even when he is wrong, and he is dead wrong
tonight.
As you heard him mention, there was a billion dollar savings. If that
billion dollars hadn't been there, he would have been telling us all,
can't you find $100 million, can't you find $200 million? But they find
$1 billion, and no good deed goes unpunished.
And, basically, Madam Chairman, the purpose of this fund is to make
sure we are doing the tough choices. And he is right; these Members
look every day at the priorities we need for the Department of Defense.
Let me just tell you one of those, shipbuilding. You and I today are
living in a world for the first time where the Chinese have more ships
in their Navy than we have in our Navy. The independent panel says we
need 346 ships in our fleet, the Navy says 313, but their plan doesn't
even get us there.
And so I am proud of the fact that we come together and say let's
find savings in one area so we can put them in priorities such as
shipbuilding. We ought not to cut these funds. It will be a
disincentive for the Department of Defense to find those savings in the
future.
Mr. McKEON. Madam Chairman, may I ask how much time remains?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from California has 2 minutes
remaining.
Mr. McKEON. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Missouri
(Mr. Akin).
Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have to say that I understand the importance of trying to control
spending in this government, and I am very much thankful to the
gentleman from Arizona to be wanting to do that.
The concern that we have is that when you take a look at where we are
in terms of our military right now, we have some very big problems.
Just standing back away from it and looking at it for a little bit, if
you say, how many troops do we have, how many ships do we have, how
many aircraft do we have, and you compare where we are today with where
we were 20 years ago, in 1990, we have half of what we had in 1990.
So we have reduced our military in half. We have the same number of
ships today as what we had in 1916.
Now, one of the reasons for paying attention to earmarks was so that
we would pay more attention to doing a good job of oversight. This
committee has really worked hard at oversight. We have identified areas
where we think the Pentagon was wrong, where the President was wrong,
and we have taken that money out. Now we are going to be punished for
taking it out by having it taken away.
The point of the matter is we are redirecting the money, but we are
allowing a certain amount of flexibility. The places where this money
has got to be spent are, first, ballistic and cruise missile defense.
This is a very, very big deal for the Navy. The Chinese have very high-
speed cruise missiles. We have to be able to defend against them.

{time} 2230

Navy shipbuilding, we have already talked about that. We have the
same number of ships as we had in 1916.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California has 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. McKEON. In the time I've been in Congress, as the gentleman said,
our military has basically been cut in half, and yet we are fighting
two wars and half of a third. And Ronald Reagan said that during his
lifetime he never saw us get into a war that we were overprepared for.
We cut back after every war. This is the first time I have seen us
trying to cut back during wartime.
I ask that we defeat the gentleman's amendment. As well intended as
it is, we need the money for the defense of this Nation.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona will
be postponed.

Amendment No. 63 Offered by Mr. Ellison

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 63
printed in House Report 112-88.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 616, strike line 18 and all that follows through line
13 on page 617.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentleman
from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison) and a

[[Page H3676]]

Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment that will cut
$150 million in unnecessary defense funding.
Congress must reassess our budgetary priorities. We should not be in
the business of needlessly increasing defense spending while
simultaneously cutting spending for critical services that Americans
depend upon. Without my amendment, Congress will needlessly approve
$150 million for the LHA 7 amphibious warship program. Now, let me be
clear. I'm not against such a program in its own right, but I am
against authorizing this funding for FY12 because the Government
Accountability Office and the Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower
said we shouldn't do it. And they have very good reasons for coming to
that conclusion.
First of all, according to the Government Accountability Office
report, which I have in my hand and I intend to submit into the Record,
these funds won't even be used in fiscal year 2012. The report states
that contractor delays and labor shortages ``will likely have
implications on the ability of the shipbuilder to start construction of
LHA 7 as currently planned.''
If we do not authorize these funds, our national security will not be
harmed. The GAO reports that FY11 funds already appropriated will be
sufficient to cover the costs of the program and expenses for LHA 7 in
FY12. As the report makes clear, and I quote again, Madam Chair, ``most
of the construction costs for LHA 7 will not be incurred until fiscal
year 2013.''
Given the GAO's recommendation, the Armed Services Subcommittee on
Seapower did the right thing. They cut funding for the LHA 7. However,
that funding was reinstated in the full committee. Given that the funds
will not even be able to be used in FY12 due to contractor delays, why
was $150 million reinstated in the full committee? Well, I can tell you
that a Republican gentleman from Mississippi sits on the Armed Services
Committee, and he represents a district on the coast with a very large
shipbuilder in it.
Let's review momentarily. At a time when Congress is cutting critical
heating assistance programs, education, and health care, why should it
authorize defense spending for work that military contractors aren't
even prepared to do?
Without my amendment, Congress is set to increase funding for the LHA
7 warship at a time when we are slashing critical domestic spending
programs that Americans count on.
This is a commonsense amendment, Madam Chair, and it follows that the
GAO and the Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower said we should do.
We should cut $150 million for the LHA 7 warship program. I'll leave it
to you and your imagination as to why the funding was reinstated at the
full committee.
I urge my colleagues to reassess our budgetary priorities and
authorize funds for when they can actually be used. Spending should not
be authorized prematurely, especially when Congress is cutting other
critical programs.

LHA Replacement, Shipbuilding and Conversion (SCN), Fiscal Year 2012--
Line 3041

program overview

The LHA program will provide the functional replacement for
the LHA 1 Class ships which are reaching the end of their
extended service lives. The program is to ensure that the
amphibious fleet remains capable of Expeditionary Warfare
well into the 21st century and provide for an affordable and
sustainable amphibious ship development program. LHA 6, the
lead ship, was authorized in fiscal year 2007. Fabrication of
LHA 6 started in January 2008 and it is currently scheduled
for delivery in October 2013. The Navy requested funding for
the first follow-on ship, LHA 7, in its fiscal year 2011
budget request and requested an additional $2018.7 million in
fiscal year 2012 to fully fund the ship. The Navy awarded an
advance procurement contract for LHA 7 in June 2010, and
planned to award the construction contract in November 2010.

[Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
----------------------------
2010 2011 2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding/Request............................ $169.5 $942.8 $2,018.7
Potential Reduction........................ ....... ....... $2,018.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source for Funding/Request: Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2012
Budget Estimates for Shipbuilding and Conversion programs (P-1);
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10 .

Reason for Reduction

The Navy's fiscal year 2012 shipbuilding and conversion
budget request for LHA 7 could be reduced by $2018.7 million
because the funds are premature to program needs. The Navy
expected to award a contract for construction of LHA 7 in
November 2010--at the start of fiscal year 2011--but the
contract award has been delayed and is unlikely to occur
until fiscal year 2012. While the Navy currently plans to
begin construction of LHA 7 in May 2012, it is likely that
construction will be delayed. Ongoing shipyard labor
shortages have resulted in schedule delays on LHA 6 and will
likely have implications on the ability of the shipbuilder to
start construction of LHA 7 as currently planned. Given the
delay in contract award and the likelihood that the start of
construction may slip, the program will not need the majority
of funding until fiscal year 2013. Fiscal year 2011 funding
will be available in fiscal year 2012 to ensure that the
shipbuilder can purchase materials necessary to meet its
build schedule--activities originally scheduled to take place
in fiscal year 2011. The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2011 authorized the Navy to split funding for
LHA 7 construction over fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Should
Congress choose to take the suggested action, LHA may need
multiyear contracting authority that includes fiscal year
2013.
The Navy anticipated awarding a contract for LHA 7
construction in November 2010--at the start of fiscal year
2011. To date, the Navy has not yet awarded a contract--a
delay of at least rive months. According to the Navy, it
received the shipbuilder's proposal in April 2011. The
program office reported that they would like to award the
contract by the end of fiscal year 2011--5 months or less
after receiving the shipbuilder's proposal--but acknowledged
that they would most likely award a contract in fiscal year
2012. By comparison, the construction contract for LHA 6 was
not awarded until over 14 months after receiving the
contractor's proposal. Program officials believe that the
construction contract for LHA 7 will take less time to
negotiate than the lead ship. However, even if the Navy
reduced the time to award to 7 months, half the time required
to negotiate the LHA 6 contract, the award would still occur
in November 2011--in fiscal year 2012 and a full year later
than planned.
Further, it is likely that the start of construction for
LHA 7 will be delayed past its current estimated date of May
2012 due to ongoing shipyard labor shortages. Delivery of LHA
6 has been delayed twice primarily as a result of labor
issues. The most recent delay, announced in the fiscal year
2012 budget, pushed delivery of the ship from April to
October 2013. Program officials reported that the shipyard is
currently drawing down labor, but will have to increase labor
resources to meet the increased shipyard demand starting in
fiscal year 2013. However, the shipbuilder may have
difficulty effectively increasing labor resources to meet the
needs of Navy programs. In addition to the LHA class,
construction of LPD 26 and LPD 27 is expected to begin in
late 2011 and 2012. The program office acknowledged that the
construction start date for LHA 7 may slip past its current
estimate, and some Navy estimates put construction start in
early 2013. The actual construction start date will be
negotiated as part of the LHA contract award.
Since activities originally planned to take place in 2011
will most likely occur in 2012, 2011 funding should be
sufficient for the program through 2012.

program office comments

The Navy indicated that it strongly disagrees with GAO's
assessment of the LHA(R) program and the proposed reduction
of fiscal year 2012 funding. The Navy believes it can award
the contract by the end of this fiscal year, in August or
September 2011. According to the Navy, construction will
start as currently planned in May 2012, as it has worked with
the contractor to mitigate construction schedule risk by
using the advance procurement funds to buy long lead time
materials. According to the Navy, a reduction to fiscal year
2012 funding would impact the program's ability to procure
required Contractor Furnished Equipment, disrupt the ship's
engineering and production schedule and cause significant
disruption in the industrial base. The Navy believes there is
significant risk that fiscal year 2011 funds would not cover
required expenditures if the second increment of funds were
not appropriated until fiscal year 2013. According to the
Navy, failure to procure government furnished equipment
systems as planned will negatively affect the unit cost of
these systems for LHA 7 and other platforms. The Navy also
states that the entire shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2013
and later years would be impacted by a delay of LHA 7
funding.

gao response

Although the Navy believes it can award a construction
contract for LHA 7 within four to five months, past
experiences negotiating contracts with the shipbuilder have
taken considerably longer. As we stated previously, the LHA 6
contract was awarded 14 months after the Navy received the
initial proposal from the shipbuilder. While the Navy
indicates that it has mitigated construction schedule risk by
procuring long lead time materials, there is still
significant risk of construction delays associated with
ongoing

[[Page H3677]]

labor shortages and a projected increase in shipyard demand
starting in fiscal year 2013 due to construction on multiple
ship programs. The shipbuilder has been unable to effectively
manage labor resources on LHA 6. Ongoing labor shortages
increase the risk that the shipbuilder will remain unable to
meet increased shipyard demand in fiscal year 2013, which
increases the likelihood that construction start of LHA 7
will also be delayed.
In its comments, the Navy indicated concerns about having
enough funding to acquire equipment and materials for LHA 7.
However, program officials previously reported to GAO that
fiscal year 2011 funding will cover materials and that the
program was waiting for the construction contract award
before placing some orders for materials. The program has
already received $169.5 million in advance procurement money
to acquire long lead time materials, and received $942.8
million in fiscal year 2011.
The program can use this money to purchase materials as
planned. Most of the construction costs for LHA 7 will not be
incurred until fiscal year 2013. Accordingly, the fiscal year
2012 budget request could be reduced by $2018.7 million.

At this time, I would yield 1 minute to the ranking member on the
Armed Services Committee, Mr. Adam Smith.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Madam Chair, I support the gentleman's
amendment. I think it's really important to understand what's going on
here. The gentleman is absolutely correct. The original purpose for
this money, it was $200 million, it was determined to no longer be
valid for all the reasons that were stated. They couldn't spend the
money. But we had $200 million floating around, and they hate to give
back $200 million in the Defense Committee, so they grabbed $150
million of it and simply designated it, broadly speaking, to
shipbuilding. We do this a lot. Mr. Flake spoke about this in the other
amendment. And I understand there are Members who are concerned about
the top line within the defense budget and holding it.
I think it's important where we spend the money. We have to have a
reason to spend it. We just have to say, well, there's $150 million. We
would kind of like to have it because who knows? We might need it at
some point.
We can't afford that in our current deficit environment, to simply
set aside $150 million. I know we're going to talk about shipbuilding.
I heard about it a little bit before. Yes, we have fewer ships than we
had in 1916. I would submit that our Navy today is vastly more capable
than our Navy back in 1916 because our sheer numbers of ships is not
the only factor that matters. It kind of matters what their
capabilities are.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ELLISON. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Throughout the bill--and we have an
amendment coming up after this that is the same sort of thing. There is
a lot of money in the defense budget that gets appropriated, and then
for whatever reason we find out we can't actually build what it was
intended for, and then we just hold on to the money because we might
use it later. That is not an efficient way to spend money.
And I'm sorry. The deficit does matter to our national security. As
has been quoted earlier, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said
that our deficit, in fact, is the number one threat to our national
security. So we have to save money where we can. Clearly, this is a
place where we can save money.
I urge support for the gentleman's amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has
expired.
Mr. PALAZZO. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. PALAZZO. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the gentleman from Minnesota's
amendment. Put simply, the gentleman's amendment would further delay
the funding of a ship that our Navy and Marine Corps wants and needs.
LHA 7 is a part of the next generation of large deck amphibious
assault ships, just similar to the USS Kearsarge, which just returned
after an 8\1/2\-month-long deployment to where they participated in
strikes in Libya and humanitarian assistance and other missions. This
America class amphibious assault ship will be serving our country and
providing a vital mission capability for years to come.
The President's very own 2012 budget request included $2 billion for
the second year of incremental funding for LHA 7. Previous Congresses
have supported this ship and her procurement, and further delays to
this funding are opposed by this administration, the Navy, the Marine
Corps, and the House Armed Services Committee.
My colleague mentioned, by the way, the GAO report. The Navy strongly
disagrees with the GAO report that the gentleman has pointed to. The
Navy has the shipbuilder's proposal in hand and at this point is
working to complete negotiations to get this ship under contract this
year, which may happen as soon as August.
The Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps have all endorsed a minimum naval fleet
of 313 ships, of which 33 of those ships are going to be amphibious in
nature. If the gentleman's amendment were to become law, the contract
for this amphibious ship could be delayed. The ship's delivery to the
fleet would be delayed, and the overall cost of the ship would go up.
It seems to me, as a Member of Congress, that we need to support
programs and policies that enable our men and women in uniform to get
the best possible equipment at the lowest cost to the taxpayer. The
gentleman's amendment does just the opposite.
This amendment also jeopardizes American jobs. Nearly 3,500
shipbuilders depend on the ship for work. Cuts to this ship's funding,
delays in contracting, and political gamesmanship put these jobs at
risk.

{time} 2240

Furthermore, the gentleman's amendment provides absolutely no cost
savings. It just forces the Navy to budget more for the ship next year,
and overall it increases the cost to the taxpayer. This amendment does
not just delay LHA-7; this amendment potentially delays our next
aircraft carrier, our next submarine, and our next destroyer.
Finally, the gentleman's amendment is not good for the taxpayer, and
it is not good for the Navy or the Marine Corps. Previous Congresses
have endorsed the procurement of this ship, the administration and the
Navy have endorsed the procurement of this ship, and American jobs
depend on the procurement of this ship.
I urge my colleagues in the House to vote ``no'' on this amendment.
Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Akin), the chairman of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces
Subcommittee.
Mr. AKIN. As the chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, we have taken
a good look at LHA-7, and this is an absolutely essential ship. Nobody
is arguing that point. It is a large deck amphib assault.
What has happened, though, is that the Marine Corps decided that they
wanted to put a well deck in the original design, which has caused some
additional negotiations and slowed things down a little bit. But the
point of this amendment is to strip $150 million away from this
project. That is a very big problem. It is a big problem because next
year we have got an aircraft carrier to build, a nuclear-powered
submarine, and a destroyer, and this money needs to come from the
budget this year in order to keep the LHA-7 on track.
As we have talked about earlier this evening, we are in a bad
position in terms of number of ships in the Navy. LHA-7 is critical, it
is important, and stripping $150 million does tend to threaten the
project, or at least push it off, and then you have to try and fund it
in a year when we don't have the funds because we are building a bunch
of other ships. So what this does is it guarantees that LHA-7 is going
to proceed, but we have to allow enough time for the negotiations.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, will the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. AKIN. No, I don't yield.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Missouri controls the time.
Mr. AKIN. The point of the matter is that LHA-7 has to go forward,
and we have to make sure that we have the

[[Page H3678]]

funding. As soon as the negotiations are finished between the Navy and
the contractor, then we can move ahead on this project. So the $150
million is important. The exact timing of when it is going to be spent
is in question, but the necessity to have the money is not in doubt.
That is why we oppose this amendment.
Mr. ELLISON. Would the gentleman yield now for a question?
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has
expired.
The gentleman from Mississippi has 30 seconds remaining.
Mr. PALAZZO. Madam Chair, I would like to yield the 30 seconds to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wittman).
Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chair, I just want to emphasize the need for our
amphibious ships. The requirement, the national requirement is 38
ships. The Marine Corps says they can live with 33. We have 28 today.
Mr. ELLISON. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WITTMAN. No, I will not yield.
Mr. ELLISON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. WITTMAN. The requirement is 33. We have 28.
Mr. ELLISON. Will the gentleman yield for a question, Madam Chair?
Mr. WITTMAN. The math is very, very simple. It is a specific need.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, will the gentleman yield?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Virginia controls the time.
Mr. WITTMAN. We have to make sure that we meet that need. Our Marine
Corps travels around the world needing this ship capability. It is
critical to this Nation, critical to our defense. This must be funded
today.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Ellison).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. ELLISON. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota
will be postponed.

Amendment No. 64 Offered by Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 64
printed in House Report 112-88.
Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I have an amendment
at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 708, after line 12, insert the following:

SEC. 1699F-1. BUDGET REDUCTION FOR GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE
DEFENSE SYSTEM.

Notwithstanding the amounts set forth in the funding tables
in division D, the amount authorized to be appropriated in
section 201 for research, development, test, and evaluation,
Defense-Wide, as specified in the corresponding funding table
in division D, is hereby reduced by $100,000,000, with the
amount of the reduction to be derived from Line 084 Ground-
Based Midcourse Defense Segment, PE 0603882C, as set forth in
the table under section 4201.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Madam Chair, this Congress' number one responsibility is to defend
and protect our Nation. As we all know, the United States faces
incredible threats within and from abroad, and it is the responsibility
of the House Armed Services Committee to assess the threats that we
face and to look at the limited resources we have and to allocate them
in the most effective way we can.
So in the full committee mark, my Republican colleagues increased the
funding of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system by $100 million.
My amendment would simply take out that $100 million and give it
towards savings for our country to bring down the deficit.
We Democrats support progress on homeland missile defense. We want to
see that the technology is proven and reliable, and that it is cost
effective. However, additional funds for the GMD are not needed and
would be wasteful. The head of the Missile Defense Agency, the
director, General O'Reilly, has stated that he does not need the
increase in these funds for fiscal year 2012. In fact, in front of the
Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing on April 15, he said:
``Right now, sir, I've got the funding I need to address this
problem,'' meaning some of the failure problems we have, ``because I've
stopped my production line. My production line was stopped not to save
money. It is solely driven by what we need to confirm the design works
before we go back into production.''
So additional funding is not needed, and aside from the GAO saying
that Congress should reduce by over $400 million the budget for this, I
am only talking about the $100 million that in that hearing the General
said we don't need it.
Why don't we need it? Because the last two intercept test flights of
this system did not work. They failed. And so the agency has gone back
to do systems testing. They don't want to produce if it is not working.
In fact, they have said that we must fly, i.e. it must work, before we
buy.
So, the fiscal year 2011 appropriations has allowed the MDA to focus
on resolving the technical challenges from the failed test, and we will
proceed with planned projects and avoid delays. Now is the time to get
it right. We don't want to build something that just isn't working. I
hope that my colleagues will understand that this money is not needed
at this time.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. TURNER. This amendment has been previously debated in committee
and was defeated and should be defeated here. There are three reasons
why this amendment should be defeated.
This is a program that has had past cuts that have endangered the
program. These are dollars that are needed, and the threat that we have
is increasing. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is the only
missile defense system that we have that currently protects the
American people from long-range ballistic missile threats, a threat
that is increasing.
This is a program that has had successive cuts in the past. In fiscal
year 2010, the administration slashed GMD by 35 percent or $445 million
in the same year that program had setbacks. This year's fiscal year
2012 request cuts GMD by 14 percent, or $185 million. The Department's
5-year spending projection cuts Ground-based Missile Defense by an
additional billion, or nearly 20 percent. This is a program that is
having setbacks, but it is the only program that we have. We can't cut
it and expect to fix it. We can't cut it and expect it get it right.

{time} 2250

We can't cut it and expect it to be a system that we can depend on on
growing threats.
Now, General O'Reilly has testified that he needs four additional
ground-based interceptors and an additional 150 to 200 million would be
needed for another flight testing and more ground testing. In fact, he
just testified today in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee
that proposed cuts could threaten the program and set it back by an
additional year.
Secretary Gates has testified repeatedly that if we look to the
growing threats from North Korea and Iran, these are threats that must
be responded to. Our only system to do that is this ground-based
missile defense system. We should not cut it. We did not cut it in
committee, and we should not cut it here.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I yield 1 minute to
the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Andrews), who also sits on our
committee.
Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Chairwoman, as we meet tonight in support of the
Sanchez amendment, we have 30 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely
and at Vandenberg. We have an Aegis Array at sea. We have other radar
protections for this country. And we have an effort to give $100
million to a military leader who said the following

[[Page H3679]]

in April when he was talking about what he needed, referring to Senator
Levin in the Senate, ``Right now, sir, I've got the funding I need to
address the problem of the FTG-06 failure because I've stopped my
production line. That was not to save any money. It was solely driven
by the need to confirm the design works before we go back into
production.''
Let's not give a military leader $100 million he didn't ask for, for
something that doesn't work yet, that isn't needed to defend the
country.
Vote for the Sanchez amendment.
Mr. TURNER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr.
Lamborn).
Mr. LAMBORN. Madam Chair, I oppose this amendment and consider it
harmful to our Nation's defense.
We already know President Obama is no fan of missile defense based on
his budget priorities. He cut this same program, Ground Based Midcourse
Defense, by $445 million in fiscal year 2010. His request for 2012 cuts
this program by another $185 million.
Remember, this program is the only defense we have against an
intercontinental ballistic missile fired by a rogue country or a
terrorist group. On top of Obama's cuts, this amendment would cut
another $100 million. All we have today is a couple of dozen
Interceptors on the west coast. We have nothing on the east coast. We
should be adding money, not slashing it.
The general in charge of the Missile Defense Agency said in April in
a hearing before our subcommittee that he wants more money than what
the President requested for testing and additional Interceptors. The
Secretary of Defense said in January we have underestimated the threat
from North Korea from its missile and nuclear programs. The Director of
National Intelligence said in February that Iran's missile technology
could be used for ICBMs.
Now is not the time to slash our only defense for intercontinental
threats from countries like North Korea or Iran. The threat is real.
The consequences would be devastating. We must reject this reckless
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentlewoman from California has 30 seconds
remaining.
Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I yield the balance
of my time to the ranking member of the Armed Forces Committee, the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of Washington. Madam Chair, this is a very frustrating
debate because nobody's questioning the importance of missile defense.
There is $1.1 billion in this bill precisely for this missile defense.
The reason that funds have been cut for this program isn't because
it's less of a priority; it's because the program wasn't working as it
was intended.
As I have discussed earlier, this happens frequently in the Defense
Department. We don't get a program up to where it's supposed to be. We
are appropriating money, authorizing money, in this bill that cannot be
spent not because we simply want to cut it because we don't have a
priority but because it isn't working at the pace that we expected it
to be. We are giving $100 million that isn't needed even to continue
the program. We need to be more fiscally responsible with our money.
We support this program. We support $1.1 billion.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. TURNER. Madam Chair, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Franks).
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Arizona is recognized for 1\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. Madam Chair, I would just seek to put this in
some kind of perspective.
Ever since mankind took up arms against his fellow human beings,
there has always been an offensive weapon met with some type of
defensive weapon. The spear brought the shield. The artillery brought
armed battle tanks. And now we face the world's most dangerous weapons
in the history of mankind in the form of intercontinental ballistic
missiles armed with nuclear warheads that in a blinding flash could
kill hundreds of thousands of people in a city. Or over our Nation's
continent, an Exo-atmospheric blast could perhaps over time, through
destroying our electric infrastructure, kill tens of millions of
people. And the only system that we have to defend ourselves against
that type of weapon is our Ground Based Midcourse Defense System. And
this amendment seeks to cut that another $100 million on top of the
cuts that the administration has constantly done throughout its tenure.
Madam Chair, I would just suggest to you that that is the height of
irresponsibility. The fact is when two airplanes hit two buildings, it
cost this economy $2 trillion. This is not the way to have priorities
for a budget. Our primary duty in this body is to make sure that we
protect the lives and the constitutional rights of Americans, and we
must protect our ability to stop intercontinental nuclear-armed
missiles. This is the only system that we have to do it.
Vote down this amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Loretta Sanchez).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded
vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California
will be postponed.

Announcement by the Acting Chair

The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that the proponents of
remaining amendments through amendment No. 97 will not individually
offer their amendments.

Amendment No. 100 Offered by Ms. Edwards

The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 100
printed in House Report 112-88.
Ms. EDWARDS. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:

Page 762, line 3, strike ``and'' and insert the following:
``(3) analyzes the impact of the action on local
businesses, neighborhoods, and local governments; and''.
Page 762, line 4, strike ``(3)'' and insert ``(4)''.

The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 276, the gentlewoman
from Maryland (Ms. Edwards) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Maryland.
Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the chairman
and the ranking member.
I represent the Fourth Congressional District of Maryland, which is
home to Joint Base Andrews. Joint Base Andrews is home to Air Force
One, the 11th Wing, and the 113th Wing that supports air sovereignty
over the Mid-Atlantic region, including the National Capital region.
Currently, 15,000 personnel work at Joint Base Andrews, including
7,000 active duty servicemembers. When the 2005 BRAC process is
complete, an additional 3,000 personnel will work at Joint Base
Andrews, bringing the total to 18,000 personnel. Unfortunately, when
considering shifting resources, the commission did not account for
changes outside the gate required to deliver increased personnel to the
installation.

{time} 2300

And I refer to the activity at Joint Base Andrews as one of many
examples across the country of these significant BRAC impacts on local
infrastructure.
The underlying bill goes a long way toward correcting significant
transportation infrastructure impacts related to installation
realignment. My amendment clarifies that if a significant
transportation impact will occur as a result of a realignment action,
the action may not be taken unless and until the Secretary analyzes the
potential impact of the action on local businesses, neighborhoods, and
local government. These can sometimes be quite significant and
unaccounted for.
My amendment keeps with the spirit of the bill, addressing
transportation infrastructure, and simply ensures that our constituents
and local congressional districts will have the assurance that their
livelihoods are kept in mind when realignment activities are taken.
A GAO study published in 2009 found that BRAC growth will result in
increased traffic in communities ranging

[[Page H3680]]

from very large metropolitan areas to small communities, further
congesting roads. This has certainly been the case in my community.
According to a Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment
survey, 17 of 18 BRAC growth communities identified transportation as
one of their top challenges. The priority is most clear for us around
Joint Base Andrews. Traffic entering and exiting the installation
contributes to regional congestion, resulting in the average Washington
metropolitan region driver wasting almost 70 hours in traffic per year
not just at Andrews, but throughout the region.
The Federal Government has provided very limited direct assistance to
help communities address BRAC transportation impacts, and State and
local governments have adopted strategies to expedite projects within
the time frame allowed by BRAC. In years past, this has happened
through the earmark process, a process that is no longer available. In
other areas, the Department of Defense's Defense Access Roads program
has certified transportation projects for funding at three affected
communities.
OEA has also provided planning grants and funded traffic studies and
local planning positions. And while Federal highway and transit
programs can be used for many BRAC-related transportation needs,
dedicated funds are not available. Instead, BRAC-related transportation
projects must compete with other proposed transportation projects in a
given State or community.
By 2009, communities that identified funding for about only $500
million of the estimated $2 billion needed to address their near-term
project needs. In fact, some States and local governments have adopted
strategies to expedite highway projects, such as prioritizing short-
term high-impact projects because the time frames for completing BRAC
personnel moves are much shorter than the time frames for such
projects.
While legislation mandates that BRAC growth be completed by 2011,
major highway and transit projects typically take anywhere from 9 to 19
years to complete, and near-term transportation projects to address
these challenges could cost about $2 billion, of which $1.1 billion is
related to projects solely in the Washington metropolitan area.
BRAC-related transportation infrastructure costs are subject to a
number of uncertainties. According to the GAO, and I quote: ``Not all
potential projects are included in the estimate. Military staffing
levels at some growth installations are in flux, and location decisions
of military and civilian personnel have not yet been made. And
preexisting, nonmilitary community growth makes a direct link between
transportation projects to military growth very difficult.''
To complete some critical projects before BRAC growth occurs, State
and local officials are reprioritizing planned projects and
implementing those projects that can be completed quickly. GAO, in
fact, cited projects from Maryland to Texas and all across the country
where the States prioritized certain lower cost intersection projects
to improve traffic. This takes away from other planned priorities that
States may have had on the books.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Ms. EDWARDS. I ask for consideration of the amendment.
Mr. McKEON. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition, although I
am not opposed to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from California is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. McKEON. When I conclude my remarks, Madam Chair, this will
conclude our work for the day. We will come in and, my understanding
is, start at 10 in the morning. We have seven more amendments to
address in the morning plus four en bloc amendments.
I would just like to, at this time, thank all of those Members who
have participated. Especially I want to thank Ranking Member Smith and
all of our staff. They have put in long, hard hours and great work. I
think we have come out with, so far, a very good bill. I look forward
to finishing it up tomorrow morning.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Maryland (Ms. Edwards).
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. McKEON. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Thornberry) having assumed the chair, Ms. Foxx, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1540) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for military activities
of the Department of Defense and for military construction, to
prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2012, and for
other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

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