[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 55 (Thursday, April 14, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2518-S2520]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. COLLINS (for herself and Mrs. Murray):
  S. 832. A bill to reauthorize certain port security programs, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the SAFE Port 
Reauthorization Act of 2011. This bill extends important programs that 
help to protect our nation's critical shipping lanes and seaports from 
attack and sabotage.
  The SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2011 is cosponsored by my 
colleague,

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Senator Murray. Senator Murray and I drafted the original SAFE Port Act 
in 2005, leading to its enactment in 2006. I am pleased that she has 
again joined me to extend and strengthen this important law. Several 
stakeholders have expressed their support for our efforts, including 
the American Waterways Operators, National Association of Boating Law 
Administrators, Retail Industry Leaders Association, Association of 
Marina Industries, National Boating Federation, and National Marine 
Manufacturers Association.
  The scope of what we need to protect is broad. America has 361 
seaports--each vital links in our Nation's transportation network. Our 
seaports move more than 95 percent of overseas trade. In 2010, United 
States ports logged 57,600 ports-of-call by foreign-flagged cargo 
vessels, bringing 11 million shipping containers to our shores.
  Coming from a State with three international cargo ports--including 
Portland, the largest port by tonnage in New England--I am keenly aware 
of the importance of seaports to our national economy and to the 
communities in which they are located.
  Our seaports operate as vital centers of economic activity; they also 
represent vulnerable targets. As the air cargo plot emanating from 
Yemen last fall demonstrated, terrorists remain committed to exploiting 
commercial shipments as a way of moving explosives or weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Maritime shipping containers are a special source of concern. A 
single obscure container, hidden among a ship's cargo of several 
hundred containers, could be used to conceal a dirty bomb. In other 
words, a container could be turned into a 21st century Trojan horse.
  The shipping container's security vulnerabilities are so well known 
that it has also been called ``the poor man's missile,'' because for 
only a few thousand dollars, a terrorist could ship a weapon or 
explosive across the Atlantic or the Pacific to a U.S. port.
  And the contents of such a container don't have to be something as 
complex as a nuclear or biological weapon. As former Customs and Border 
Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner told The New York Times, a single 
container packed with readily available ammonium sulfate fertilizer and 
a detonation system could produce 10 times the blast that destroyed the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
  Whatever the type of weapon, an attack on one or more U.S. ports 
could cause great loss of life and large numbers of injuries; it could 
damage our energy supplies and infrastructure; it could cripple 
retailers and manufacturers dependent on incoming inventory; and it 
could hamper our ability to move and supply American military forces 
fighting against the forces of terrorism.
  I have had the opportunity to visit seaports and, as one examines 
some of the Nation's busiest harbors, one sees what a terrorist might 
call ``high-value targets.'' In February, while touring the Port of 
Miami and Port Everglades with the Coast Guard, I witnessed firsthand 
the large and sprawling urban populations, cruise ship docks, container 
terminals, and bulk fuel facilities that are situated around these 
ports. At other locations, there are large sports stadiums and ferries 
operating nearby as well.
  Add up these factors, and one realizes immediately the death and 
destruction that a ship carrying a container hiding a weapon of mass 
destruction could inflict at a single port.
  Of course, a port can be a conduit for an attack as well as a target. 
A container with dangerous cargo could be loaded on a truck or rail 
car, or have its contents unpacked at the port and distributed to 
support attacks elsewhere. In 2008, we saw that the port in Mumbai, 
India, offered the means for a gang of terrorists to launch an attack 
on a section of the city's downtown. That attack killed more than 170 
people and wounded hundreds more.
  To address these security threats, our bill would reauthorize these 
SAFE Port Act cargo security programs that have proven to be successful 
the Automated Targeting System that identifies high-risk cargo; the 
Container Security Initiative that ensures high-risk cargo containers 
are inspected at ports overseas before they travel to the United 
States; and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, 
that provides incentives to importers to enhance the security of their 
cargo from point of origin to destination.
  The bill would also strengthen the C-TPAT program by providing new 
benefits, including offering voluntary security training to industry 
participants and providing participants an information sharing 
mechanism on maritime and port security threats, and authorizing 
Customs and Border Protection to conduct unannounced inspections to 
ensure that security practices are robust. The cooperation of private 
industry is vital to protecting supply chains, and C-TPAT is a 
necessary tool for securing their active cooperation in supply chain 
security efforts.
  The bill also would extend the competitive, risk-based, port security 
grants that have improved the security of our ports. An authorization 
for the next 5 years at $300 million per year, as included in the 
President's budget, is lower than the current $400 million 
authorization in recognition of the severe budget constraints we face. 
To address concerns expressed by port authorities and terminal 
operators from across the country, the bill places deadlines on the 
Department of Homeland Security to ensure a timely response is provided 
to port security grant applications, extensions, and cost-share waiver 
requests.
  In addition to continuing and improving critical port security 
programs, the bill also would strengthen the America's Waterway Watch 
Program, which promotes voluntary reporting of suspected terrorist 
activity or suspicious behavior against a vessel, facility, port, or 
waterway.
  Our bill would protect citizens from frivolous lawsuits when they 
report, in good faith, suspicious behavior that may indicate terrorist 
activity against the United States. It builds on a provision from the 
2007 homeland security law that encourages people to report potential 
terrorist threats directed against transportation systems by protecting 
people from those who would misuse our legal system in an attempt to 
chill the willingness of citizens to come forward and report possible 
dangers.
  In addition, this legislation enhances research and development 
efforts to improve maritime cargo security. The demonstration project 
authorized by this law would study the feasibility of using composite 
materials in cargo containers to improve container integrity and deploy 
next-generation sensors.
  This legislation also addresses the difficulties in administering the 
mandate of x-raying and scanning for radiation all cargo containers 
overseas that are destined for the United States by July 2012. Until x-
ray scanning technology is proven effective at detecting radiological 
material and not disruptive of trade, requiring the x-raying of all 
U.S. bound cargo, regardless of its risk, at every foreign port, is 
misguided and provides a false sense of security. It would also impose 
onerous restrictions on the flow of commerce, costing billions with 
little additional security benefit.
  Under the original provisions of the SAFE Port Act, all cargo 
designated as high-risk at foreign ports is already scanned for 
radiation and x-rayed. In addition, cargo entering the U.S. at all 
major seaports is scanned for radiation. These security measures 
currently in place are part of a layered, risk-based method to ensure 
cargo entering the U.S. is safe.
  This legislation would eliminate the deadline for 100 percent x-
raying of containers if the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies 
the effectiveness of individual security measures of that layered 
security approach. This is a more reasonable method to secure our cargo 
until a new method of x-raying containers is proven effective and 
feasible.
  The SAFE Port Reauthorization Act of 2011 will help us to continue an 
effective, layered, coordinated security system that extends from point 
of origin to point of destination, and that covers the people, the 
vessels, the cargo, and the facilities involved in our maritime 
commerce. It will continue to address a major vulnerability in our 
homeland security critical infrastructure while preserving the flow of 
goods on which our economy depends.
  I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation.

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