[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 54 (Wednesday, April 13, 2011)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E707-E710]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              TIME FOR AN AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN STUDY GROUP

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. FRANK R. WOLF

                              of virginia

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, April 13, 2011

  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to bring to the attention of my 
colleagues legislation I am introducing to create an Afghanistan-
Pakistan Study Group, APSG, modeled after the Iraq Study Group, ISG, to 
bring ``fresh eyes'' to the war effort in Afghanistan which is now in 
its 10 year.
  Last August, I began pressing the administration to convene an 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group. I submit a copy of my initial letter 
to the President.
  In the letter, I outlined the genesis of the Iraq Study Group, ISG--
an idea which was born in 2005 after my third visit to Iraq, during 
which I witnessed firsthand the deteriorating security situation. While 
reticent at first, to their credit President Bush, Secretary of State 
Rice and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld came to support the ISG, ably led 
by bipartisan co-chairs, former Secretary of State James Baker and 
former Congressman Lee Hamilton.
  It has been my hope that the Obama administration would come to view 
this bipartisan ``fresh eyes'' approach as something which is 
ultimately good for our men and women in uniform and good for the 
country as a whole.
  Aside from the specific policy recommendations of the ISG, the 
formation of the group and the issuance of the report helped force a 
moment of truth in our national conversation about the war effort.
  It was apparent last summer, and it is truer still today, that with 
roughly 100,000 U.S. troops presently in Afghanistan, no clear end in 
sight to our nation's longest running war at 10 years and counting, and 
public support for the war at an all-time low, a national conversation 
about Afghanistan is what is in fact urgently needed.
  Before proposing this idea to the Obama administration I spoke with a 
number of knowledgeable individuals including former senior diplomats, 
public policy experts and retired and active military. Many believed 
our Afghanistan policy was adrift, and there was near unanimity that an 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group was needed. Among those distinguished 
individuals who embraced the idea was former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan 
Crocker. I also sought input from senior foreign policy experts, among 
them former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann, who now 
serves as president of the American Academy of Diplomacy, regarding the 
implications of failure in Afghanistan. I submit for the record 
Ambassador Neumann's letter which lays out in sobering detail all that 
is at stake in that country.
  I also submit for the record a letter I received last year from a 
constituent who is the mother of six children, all of whom are 
currently serving or have served in the U.S. military. She wrote of 
being troubled by ``how distant this war is for so many Americans'' and

[[Page E708]]

she offered her wholehearted support for ``the formation of an 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group in the hope that it will turn the tide 
of this war . . .'' I shared this constituent correspondence, too, with 
the administration last September and again urged them to take action.
  The war has remained distant for many Americans. It is rarely spoken 
of from the presidential bully pulpit. In fact a recent Fox News piece 
reported that ``The last time Obama specifically devoted a full public 
speech to Afghanistan was December 9, 2009, 16 months ago, when he 
announced at West Point that he was sending an additional 30,000 U.S. 
troops to that war-torn country.''
  Further, the war is seldom covered in great depth in the news. And 
yet for the husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters who 
have sent off a loved one in uniform, the war in Afghanistan is 
anything but distant. It is uncertainty and sacrifice, it is separation 
and worry, it is life and death.
  Despite my several letters to the President and other senior 
administration officials calling for a ``vigorous, thoughtful and 
principled debate and discussion among some of our nation's greatest 
minds,'' the idea for a study group has languished.
  And so today I am introducing legislation to create an Afghanistan-
Pakistan Study Group, comprised of nationally known and respected 
individuals who love their country more than their political party, and 
who would, I believe, serve to provide much-needed clarity to a policy 
that appears adrift at best and highly politicized at worst.
  In reading Obama's Wars, I was deeply troubled by Bob Woodward's 
reporting which indicated that discussions of the war strategy were 
infused with political calculations. Woodward also wrote of an 
administration that ``wrestled with the most basic questions about the 
war . . . What is the mission? What are we trying to do? What will 
work?''
  These are questions that demand answers.
  I believe that Americans of all political viewpoints can embrace this 
``fresh eyes'' approach--for it is always in our national interest to 
openly assess the challenges before us and to chart a clear course to 
success. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this 
legislation.

                                    Congress of the United States,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                                   August 4, 2010.
     Hon. Barack H. Obama,
     The President, The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: On September 14, 2001, following the 
     catastrophic and deliberate terrorist attack on our country, 
     I voted to go to war in Afghanistan. I stand by that decision 
     and have the utmost confidence in General Petraeus's proven 
     leadership. I also remain unequivocally committed to the 
     success of our mission there and to the more than 100,000 
     American troops sacrificing toward that end. In fact, it is 
     this commitment which has led me to write to you. While I 
     have been a consistent supporter of the war effort in both 
     Afghanistan and Iraq, I believe that with this support comes 
     a responsibility. This was true during a Republican 
     administration in the midst of the wars, and it remains true 
     today.
       In 2005, I returned from my third trip to Iraq where I saw 
     firsthand the deteriorating security situation. I was deeply 
     concerned that Congress was failing to exercise the necessary 
     oversight of the war effort. Against this backdrop I authored 
     the legislation that created the Iraq Study Group (ISO). The 
     ISG was a 10-member bipartisan group of well-respected, 
     nationally known figures who were brought together with the 
     help of four reputable organizations--the U.S. Institute for 
     Peace, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, the Center 
     for Strategic and International Studies, and the Baker 
     Institute for Public Policy at Rice University--and charged 
     with undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S. efforts 
     there. This panel was intended to serve as ``fresh eyes on 
     the target''--the target being success in Iraq.
       While reticent at first, to their credit President Bush, 
     State Secretary Rice and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld came to 
     support the ISG, ably led by bipartisan co-chairs, former 
     Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee 
     Hamilton. Two members of your national security team, 
     Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and CIA Director Leon 
     Panetta, saw the merit of the ISO and, in fact, served on the 
     panel. Vice President Biden, too, then serving in the Senate, 
     was supportive and saw it as a means to unite the Congress at 
     a critical time. A number of the ISG's recommendations and 
     ideas were adopted. Retired General Jack Keane, senior 
     military adviser to the ISG, was a lead proponent of ``the 
     surge,'' and the ISG referenced the possibility on page 73. 
     Aside from the specific policy recommendations of the panel, 
     the ISG helped force a moment of truth in our national 
     conversation about the war effort.
       I believe our nation is again facing such a moment in the 
     Afghanistan war effort, and that a similar model is needed. 
     In recent days I have spoken with a number of knowledgeable 
     individuals including former senior diplomats, public policy 
     experts and retired and active military. Many believe our 
     Afghanistan policy is adrift, and all agreed that there is an 
     urgent need for what I call an Afghanistan-Pakistan Study 
     Group (APSG). We must examine our efforts in the region 
     holistically, given Pakistan's strategic significance to 
     our efforts in Afghanistan and the Taliban's presence in 
     that country as well, especially in the border areas.
       This likely will not come as a surprise to you as commander 
     in chief. You are well acquainted with the sobering 
     statistics of the past several weeks--notably that July 
     surpassed June as the deadliest month for U.S. troops. There 
     is a palpable shift in the nation's mood and in the halls of 
     Congress. A July 2010 CBS news poll found that 62 percent of 
     Americans say the war is going badly in Afghanistan, up from 
     49 percent in May. Further, last week, 102 Democrats voted 
     against the war spending bill, which is 70 more than last 
     year, and they were joined by 12 members of my own party. 
     Senator Lindsay Graham, speaking last Sunday on CNN's ``State 
     of the Union,'' candidly expressed concern about an ``unholy 
     alliance'' emerging of anti-war Democrats and Republicans.
       I have heard it said that Vietnam was not lost in Saigon; 
     rather, it was lost in Washington. While the Vietnam and 
     Afghanistan parallels are imperfect at best, the shadow of 
     history looms large. Eroding political will has 
     consequences--and in the case of Afghanistan, the stakes 
     could not be higher. A year ago, speaking before the Veterans 
     of Foreign War National Convention, you rightly said, ``Those 
     who attacked America on 9/11 are plotting to do so again. If 
     left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even 
     larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more 
     Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting . . . 
     this is fundamental to the defense of our people.'' Indeed it 
     is fundamental. We must soberly consider the implications of 
     failure in Afghanistan. Those that we know for certain are 
     chilling--namely an emboldened al-Qaeda, a reconstituted 
     Taliban with an open staging ground for future worldwide 
     attacks, and a destabilized, nuclear-armed Pakistan.
       Given these realities and wavering public and political 
     support, I urge you to act immediately, through executive 
     order, to convene an Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group modeled 
     after the Iraq Study Group. The participation of nationally 
     known and respected individuals is of paramount importance. 
     Among the names that surfaced in my discussions with others, 
     all of whom more than meet the criteria described above, are 
     ISG co-chairs Baker and Hamilton; former Senators Chuck Robb, 
     Bob Kerrey and Sam Nunn; former Congressman Duncan Hunter; 
     former U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker; former Secretary of 
     Defense James Schlesinger, and General Keane. These names are 
     simply suggestions among a cadre of capable men and women, as 
     evidenced by the make-up of the ISG, who would be more than 
     up to the task.
       I firmly believe that an Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group 
     could reinvigorate national confidence in how America can be 
     successful and move toward a shared mission in Afghanistan. 
     This is a crucial task. On the Sunday morning news shows this 
     past weekend, it was unsettling to hear conflicting 
     statements from within the leadership of the administration 
     that revealed a lack of clarity about the end game in 
     Afghanistan. How much more so is this true for the rest of 
     the country? An APSG is necessary for precisely that reason. 
     We are nine years into our nation's longest running war and 
     the American people and their elected representatives do not 
     have a clear sense of what we are aiming to achieve, why it 
     is necessary and how far we are from attaining that goal. 
     Further, an APSG could strengthen many of our NATO allies in 
     Afghanistan who are also facing dwindling public support, as 
     evidenced by the recent Dutch troop withdrawal, and would 
     give them a tangible vision to which to commit.
       Just as was true at the time of the Iraq Study Group, I 
     believe that Americans of all political viewpoints, liberals 
     and conservatives alike, and varied opinions on the war will 
     embrace this ``fresh eyes'' approach. Like the previous 
     administration's support of the Iraq Study Group, which 
     involved taking the group's members to Iraq and providing 
     high-level access to policy and decision makers, I urge you 
     to embrace an Afghanistan-Pakistan Study Group. It is always 
     in our national interest to openly assess the challenges 
     before us and to chart a clear course to success.
       As you know, the full Congress comes back in session in 
     mid-September--days after Americans around the country will 
     once again pause and remember that horrific morning nine 
     years ago when passenger airlines became weapons, when the 
     skyline of one of America's greatest cities was forever 
     changed, when a symbol of America's military might was left 
     with a gaping hole. The experts with whom I have spoken in 
     recent days believe that time is of the essence in moving 
     forward with a study panel, and waiting for Congress to 
     reconvene is too long to wait. As such, I am hopeful you will 
     use an executive order and the power of the bully pulpit to 
     convene this group in short order, and explain to the 
     American people why it is both necessary and timely. Should 
     you choose not to take this path, respectfully, I intend to 
     offer an amendment by whatever vehicle necessary to mandate 
     the group's creation at the earliest possible opportunity.
       The ISG's report opened with a letter from the co-chairs 
     that read, ``There is no magic formula to solve the problems 
     of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to

[[Page E709]]

     improve the situation and protect American interests.'' The 
     same can be said of Afghanistan.
       I understand that you are a great admirer of Abraham 
     Lincoln. He, too, governed during a time of war, albeit a war 
     that pitted brother against brother, and father against son. 
     In the midst of that epic struggle, he relied on a cabinet 
     with strong, often times opposing viewpoints. Historians 
     assert this served to develop his thinking on complex 
     matters. Similarly, while total agreement may not emerge from 
     a study group for Afghanistan and Pakistan, I believe that 
     vigorous, thoughtful and principled debate and discussion 
     among some of our nation's greatest minds on these matters 
     will only serve the national interest. The biblical 
     admonition that iron sharpens iron rings true.
       Best wishes.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Frank R. Wolf,
                                               Member of Congress.
       P.S. We as a nation must be successful in Afghanistan. We 
     owe this to our men and women in the military serving in 
     harm's way and to the American people.
                                  ____

                                              The American Academy


                                                 of Diplomacy,

                               Washington, DC, September 27, 2010.
     Hon. Frank Wolf,
     Cannon House Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Representative Wolf, I am responding to your letter of 
     September 16 requesting my personal views on the consequences 
     should our mission in Afghanistan fail. I believe the answer 
     must examine both the likely results in Afghanistan and 
     Central Asia on the one hand, as well as the risks to direct 
     American security through terrorism on the other.
       Should we withdraw our forces before the Afghan army is 
     ready to assume the internal defense of Afghanistan--an issue 
     of force quality and support services, not just numbers--I 
     believe there is every reason to assume a civil war will 
     occur in Afghanistan. The Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and even 
     some of the Pushtun population, having experienced Taliban 
     rule once will not submit again. However, lacking an adequate 
     army with which to resist they will fall back on armed 
     militias as they have in the past. This will have several 
     consequences..
       Such militia bodies inevitably empower warlords who seek 
     power on their own. They will, at times, collude against each 
     other. Similar infighting led to the initial acceptance of 
     the Taliban by many Afghans in their desperate search for 
     peace at any price.
       The civil war will draw in outside powers to further or 
     defend their own interests. At a minimum, the Russians will 
     support forces in order to build a buffer between Afghanistan 
     and the Central Asian states that Russia sees as its zone of 
     influence. Iran will reenter the fray, as it did before, to 
     protect Shia co-religionists and to extend its power. 
     Pakistan will be a major player, quite possibly reverting to 
     the effort to back a Taliban victory as Pakistan did in the 
     past. The Indians will be drawn in to counter the Pakistanis 
     since India fears the growth of terrorist movements that have 
     found sanctuary in Afghanistan in the past. The involvement 
     of both India and Pakistan in a contest that each views as a 
     zero sum game presents additional dangers of conflict between 
     the two nuclear armed states (although I would put this risk 
     as low).
       It has been argued that the Taliban and al-Qaida have 
     different goals and, therefore, that a return of the Taliban 
     to Afghanistan would not bring back al-Qaida. The first is 
     true but immaterial. The second conclusion is false. 
     The tactical alliance between the two movements is strong 
     and has been intensified during the insurgency. This is 
     particularly true of the areas of Haqqani's influence 
     where we see a steady growth in the presence of foreign 
     fighters as I learned in my visit to Afghanistan in May of 
     this year. In the context of the likely civil war the 
     Taliban will have every incentive to maintain their 
     alliance with al-Qaida since the latter bring with them 
     resources, recruits and fanaticism. Indeed, before our 
     entry into Afghanistan, al-Qaida often constituted the 
     shock troops of the Taliban. There is every reason to 
     believe they will return to this role in their alliance.
       It is important to consider the likely consequences within 
     Pakistan of a US defeat and a civil war involving the 
     Taliban. It is not simply that Pakistan has a previous stake 
     in a Taliban victory. The Pakistani army has shown itself 
     deeply fearful of Indian influence with the largely Tajik 
     Northern Alliance. The combination of fear and history is 
     very likely to lead the Pakistanis to support the Taliban, 
     notwithstanding whatever pressures we might bring to bear 
     against this. Under these circumstances it is entirely 
     possible that Pakistan will slow down or back off from its 
     active military campaign against extremists within Pakistan. 
     This was the pattern of the past. Pakistan tried repeatedly 
     to put together short term alliances with domestic extremists 
     to keep peace inside Pakistan while concurrently supporting 
     or tolerating their activities in Afghanistan. The history of 
     these alliances is that each one failed, extremism spread out 
     of the tribal areas and into the Punjab and the major 
     Pakistani cities where it now threatens the Pakistani state. 
     This scenario is not guaranteed but it is certainly possible 
     and, indeed, it is difficult to see how Pakistan could refuse 
     to support the Taliban in Afghanistan or do so without 
     compromising with the Taliban's backers in Pakistan. Of 
     course, such actions would render the current US-Pakistani 
     relationship difficult to sustain.
       Renewed insurgencies in Central Asia are also possible. In 
     the period of Taliban rule extreme Islamist movements gained 
     support in Afghanistan for insurgencies in Uzbekistan and 
     Tajikistan. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan still exists. 
     Within the last week, Tajik insurgents have mounted an attack 
     that appears to have come from an unsecured area in 
     Afghanistan. Instability in Central Asia will have 
     unpredictable consequences for everything from political 
     reform to gas pipelines.
       In short, the future of civil war in Afghanistan, 
     involvement of outside powers, increased extremism in 
     Pakistan, and unrest in Central Asia could continue for 
     years. The civil war in Lebanon involved fewer outside 
     players, a smaller country and population, and less difficult 
     terrain--and it lasted 15 years. The consequences in 
     Afghanistan could easily challenge that record.
       A second set of challenges involves our direct struggle 
     with Islamist extremist terrorism directed against US and 
     American interests. The goal of these self proclaimed 
     jihadist movements is the reshaping of the Islamic world. 
     Everywhere they look they think they see us in their way; our 
     military presence in the region, support of Israel, ties with 
     moderate Arab and Muslim governments, and even our very 
     culture are seen by them as a threat. So their war with us 
     will go on even if we retreat from Afghanistan.
       The difference will be that the extremists will have gained 
     their largest propaganda victory since the fall of the Soviet 
     Union. They will trumpet the defeat of the second superpower 
     to fall to their arms. They will use this to rally support 
     and adherents and to discredit those Muslims who oppose them 
     in the name of religion, moderation and modernity.
       One cannot predict the results with specificity. 
     Nevertheless, I think it would be extremely naive to believe 
     that we can unilaterally cease fighting, those who are waging 
     a continuing, violent war of terrorism against us and not pay 
     a heightened price in attacks against us in the future. It is 
     important to remember that on jihadist web sites the incident 
     we refer to as the terrorist attack of 9/11 is referred to as 
     ``the raid on New York,'' a chilling reminder of how they see 
     that incident as part of a continuing war.
       In sum, sir, should we be defeated in Afghanistan I foresee 
     a substantial period of civil war, regional instability and 
     enhanced risk to American lives and interests. All the 
     dominoes did not fall in Vietnam, a war I fought as a 
     soldier. It is possible that not all the disasters I foresee 
     in Afghanistan will come to pass. Yet even a portion of them 
     would be a considerable calamity for the region and our 
     interests. That is why I believe we must persevere in 
     Afghanistan. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to 
     express my views.
           Sincerely,
                                                Ronald E. Neumann,
     Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan.
                                  ____

       Dear Congressman Wolf: I have read your proposal for the 
     formation of an Afghanistan/Pakistan Study Group with deep 
     personal interest and approbation. I applaud its respectful, 
     well-reasoned, bipartisan approach to rethinking the war in 
     Afghanistan. The following are my personal thoughts regarding 
     this war. Please accept them as the insights of an average 
     American mother.
       It has been troubling to me how distant this war is for so 
     many Americans. Many are only vaguely aware of the events 
     taking place, other than perhaps the recent increase in the 
     number of casualties. Even gathering information of what is 
     daily happening in Afghanistan hasn't been easy. I comb the 
     internet daily searching many different online news sources 
     in an attempt to be informed. Our country is at war and yet 
     so often the top news items contain nothing regarding it. 
     Often it is the local papers in towns with soldiers, sailors 
     and marines serving in Afghanistan that contain the most 
     news. Other times it is the news stations with an embedded 
     reporter who will have a flurry of articles while the 
     reporter is there but then nothing once they return.
       The War on Terror is not just impersonal news but it is a 
     war that strikes very close to home. My father has a dear 
     friend whose son-in-law died in the Twin Towers. I have a 
     friend who lost a son in Iraq during the battle for Fallujah. 
     A student of mine lost her fiancee in the war. My children 
     and son-in-law have served in both Iraq and Afghanistan and 
     have buddies injured or killed in action.
       One of my daughters is currently serving in Afghanistan in 
     a Combat Support Hospital. She arrived in time to experience 
     first hand the peak number of casualties in June and July. In 
     a recent news interview her Commanding Officer said they are 
     seeing an almost constant stream of casualties; something 
     that none of them were prepared for, but will remember the 
     horrors of the rest of their lives.
       It has sometimes appeared that the efforts in Afghanistan 
     have trudged along, with success measured in part by the 
     areas in which we have gained some measure of control versus 
     the price paid in human lives both civilian and military. The 
     casualties suffered aren't just numbers to me; each name, 
     each face, represents a family who is paying the ultimate 
     price, the loss of a son or daughter, brother or sister, 
     father or mother; a family that will never be the same. 
     Therefore, I

[[Page E710]]

     wholeheartedly support the formation of an Afghanistan/
     Pakistan Study Group in the hope that it will help to turn 
     the tide of this war and lessen the number of casualties as 
     well.
       I, too, have a deep respect and confidence in Gen. Petraus 
     and would not want my comments to be construed as being 
     critical of the leadership of our military. I have no formal 
     training in political science or history so please accept 
     these comments as simply the perspective of an American 
     mother with children glad to serve our country.
       God bless you and give you wisdom as you serve in the 
     leadership of our country.
           Sincerely,
                                                             * * *
       PS It meant so much to see my sons receive a standing 
     ovation when introduced during last weeks luncheon. It is 
     these very Lance Corporals, Corporals and Sergeants who are 
     almost daily listed among the casualties. My son, * * *, 
     remarked that listening to your speech ``restored his faith 
     in the republic''. Thank you again for recognizing their 
     service.

                          ____________________