[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 45 (Thursday, March 31, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2017-S2019]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                                 LIBYA

  Mr. KIRK. Madam President, this morning our former National Security 
Adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State 
Colin Powell will visit the White House, and I expect they will discuss 
the current mission against the Qadhafi dictatorship in Libya.
  When we look at this mission, I think it is important to review the 
wise words of General Powell in his recommendation in considering any 
military mission for the United States in her coming years. When we 
think about his advice--many times, it has been called the Powell 
doctrine, and it was memorialized in a 1992 article in Foreign Affairs 
magazine called ``U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead.'' This article became 
known very much as the Powell doctrine, with two additions that the 
public and press often put on his thoughts about military missions for 
the United States.
  In short, the Powell doctrine includes answers to a number of 
questions that any President, Secretary of State, or Secretary of 
Defense should answer prior to or at the very least during a military 
mission involving the United States. Those questions are as follows:
  Is the political objective we seek important, clearly defined, and 
understood?
  Next, have all other nonviolent policy means failed?
  Third, will military force achieve the objective?
  Fourth, at what cost?
  Next, have the gains and risks been analyzed?
  Finally, how might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is 
altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?
  Added to this, the press and public have offered two more additions 
often called part of the Powell doctrine: Can we hit the enemy with 
overwhelming force, and can we demonstrate the support of the American 
people for the mission as shown by a vote of the U.S. Congress?
  When we look at the current Libyan mission and apply the Powell 
doctrine, we see a mixed picture, one that should be fixed by a rigid 
application of its questions and answers to them reported back to the 
American people.
  I support our mission in Libya, and I think the President's address 
to the Nation was a good start. But I think we

[[Page S2018]]

would serve our troops well if we proceeded to answer the Powell 
doctrine questions rigidly.
  First, is the political objective we seek to achieve important, 
clearly defined, and understood?
  I think the end of the Qadhafi regime is important. I think the 
protection of civilians from an impeding massacre is also important. 
And I think it would be clearly understood by the American people. But 
in practical terms, we cannot protect, for example, the people of 
Benghazi unless we stop the killer, and the only way to stop him is to 
disarm him and remove him from power. I think that objective would be 
clearly understood, would be welcomed by our European and Arab allies, 
and would bring about the long-term protection of the civilian 
communities by which the administration first justified this action.
  Secondly, have all nonviolent policies means failed?
  There is a 30-year record of diplomacy with regard to the Libyan 
dictatorship. Muammar Qadhafi has shown himself to be one of the most 
violent, corrupt, and at times even crazy leaders from the continent of 
Africa. While the United States has had difficulties with him for three 
decades, while Secretary Gates has referred to the imposition of Jersey 
barriers here in Washington, DC, as early as 1983 when there were 
reports of potential Qadhafi threats to our President--at the time, 
President Reagan--it took several decades for the rest of the world to 
lose patience with Muammar Qadhafi.
  The decision by the United Nations and Arab League and surrounding 
nations not just to support resolutions in internal forums but then for 
some of those nations, numbering over a dozen, to take military action, 
shows that finally the international community has broken with Muammar 
Qadhafi and feels that diplomacy and nonviolent means no longer can 
work with regard to managing him and the threat he poses.
  Will military force achieve the objective?
  I think it can. But here is a situation that is somewhat mixed. If 
air power is only applied to a combat air patrol to enforce a no-fly 
zone, there is the potential for Libyan armor and artillery to 
overwhelm what is a very disorganized and rag-tag civilian army that 
initially made gains against Qadhafi, then lost them and stood at the 
gates of Benghazi, then retook key communities, such as al-Bayda, 
Brega, and came to the outskirts of Sirte, then relost nearly all of 
those gains this week.
  When we look at how we should support the end of this dictatorship 
and the final protection of civilians in Libya, we should understand 
that the provision of close air support to take out Libyan armor and 
artillery is essential to this mission and that we should develop the 
means to command, control, and direct this effort.
  I am concerned that today, I am unsure--maybe uninformed but unsure--
as to how the close air support mission is handled. Originally when 
this mission was undertaken, it was falling under the command and 
control of standard U.S. military doctrine. Since Libya is part of the 
AFRICOM combatant command area of operations, this operation, as I 
understood it, fell under the command of the President of the United 
States, to the Secretary of Defense, to GEN Carter Ham, commander of 
AFRICOM. As the United States then moved to more internationalize 
internalize the military effort, it sought to transfer command to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and its commander, who also 
happens to be an American, Admiral Stavridis, who stands not only as 
the commander of U.S. forces in Europe but as Supreme Allied Commander 
of NATO.
  I understand the administration has put forward a task force to be 
commanded potentially by a senior Canadian general who would command 
this operation. I understand that diplomacy went well with regard to 
the command of the anti-air operation in this endeavor, but the 
negotiations with regard to the provision of close air support were 
much more difficult.
  Today, I am not exactly sure who is in command of those operations. 
Is it General Ham at AFRICOM? Is it the Canadian general at the joint 
task force? Is it Admiral Stavridis, as the Supreme Allied Commander of 
Europe? My hope is that we identify one key allied commander who is not 
just in charge of combat air patrol enforcing a no-fly zone but also 
close air support to ensure that the rebels are not defeated, to 
attrite armor and artillery from Muammar Qadhafi's army, and to 
eventually achieve a lasting victory, which, in my mind, could only 
mean the end of the Qadhafi dictatorship.
  I am particularly concerned today about key weapons systems that are 
available to the United States and not to other countries, particularly 
the A-10 Warthog and the AC-130 gunship. These are unique assets, 
critical in the ability to take out Libyan tanks and artillery.
  If we internationalize this conflict and as I have heard potential 
talk of removing combat platforms of the United States from executing 
close air support missions, my question is, Would AC-130 gunships and 
A-10s be available for these missions? They are uniquely effective and 
would make this conflict shorter and more likely to end victoriously. 
And my hope is that they would continue to be provided to the allied 
commander so that the progress could move forward on eventually ending 
this conflict.
  General Powell also asked that we estimate the cost of this 
operation. My understanding this morning is that this operation has 
cost roughly about $500 million and would likely entail greater cost if 
it lasts for a long time.
  We should estimate this cost, and we should also tell the Congress 
how we are going to pay for it. My understanding right now is that the 
administration will not seek a supplemental and will take this out of 
the core budget of the Department of Defense. What implications does 
this have for procurement, for military construction, for pay and 
benefits, and for other critical operations of the United States, led, 
in order of importance, the Afghan mission, the Iraq mission, and the 
dozen-plus ships that are now providing the critical humanitarian 
relief and nuclear recovery of our allies in Japan?
  General Powell also asked us to ask the question, have the gains and 
risks been thoroughly analyzed?
  While they may not have been thoroughly analyzed, I am comfortable 
with the administration's answers to those questions. Had Qadhafi taken 
Benghazi, had he defeated the rebel government, I think he would have 
then moved, over time, to destabilize the new government in Egypt.
  An end to the Camp David peace accords would be a strategic reversal 
for the United States. It would put at jeopardy the operations of the 
Suez Canal. It would have increased the dangers to our allies in the 
State of Israel. And I think the administration was wise to see a 
tremendous additional risk had Qadhafi won this war. Now, at least we 
know the rebels are likely not to be defeated, but a stalemate is also 
not in our interest. And I would hope we would recall the advice of 
General Sherman, who said that we should make this as rough and as 
difficult as possible to the enemy so that, ironically, in most 
humanitarian terms, it ends, and it ends on the terms of the United 
States, our allies, and the new rebel government.
  Powell also asked us how we might see the situation, once it is 
altered by force, further develop and what consequences there are 
there.
  My hope is that we would quickly follow the direction of the French 
Government and recognize the Jalil government, to see that government 
as a growing potential partner for the United States and the allies so 
that the people of Libya would see who their potential transitional 
leaders are and so that we would have clear political authority for 
them. My hope is that a U.S. envoy would deal directly with the Jalil 
government and that we would follow the suit of our allies and we would 
make sure there are clear lines of authority, not just on the military 
side for combat air patrol and close air support but also political 
direction for the potential new leaders of Libya.
  Added to the Powell doctrine are the two other points often included. 
One is, can we hit the enemy with overwhelming force?
  I strongly support the administration's limitation on no combat boots 
on the ground. I think that is a wise decision by the United States, 
and I think we can still direct terrific, tremendous, overwhelming, and 
decisive

[[Page S2019]]

force to end this conflict as quickly as possible. My understanding is 
that other allied governments may not be so completely constricted on 
their ability to provide especially the critical role of forward air 
controllers, who will direct allied air power to the most effective 
targets to attrite and eventually eliminate the Libyan military. My 
hope is, though, that we bring all combat assets to bear of the United 
States and our allies so that we quickly eliminate especially Qadhafi's 
armor and artillery force and so that this comes to a quick end on the 
military battlefield.
  Finally, the Powell doctrine often has included a final point, which 
is, Can the support of the American people be demonstrated?
  I think in this case we have fallen short. While the Congress and the 
Senate have adopted a resolution calling for a no-fly zone in Libya, 
cosponsored by myself and the Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez, I 
think this is inadequate in fully demonstrating the American people's 
support for what our troops are doing over in Libya.
  I think it is clear that our mission is sustained, and the critical 
political will of the United States is enhanced if we can formally 
express support for what our men and women are doing overseas. This has 
been done in some pretty tough conflicts in the past, particularly 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
  For this conflict, the administration should call for a resolution of 
approval, and the elected representatives of the American people should 
vote. In general, I support the President's policy and would vote for 
this resolution. But I think it is essential for those who are on the 
field to understand that the Congress is formally with them in a vote 
cast up or down for this mission and for all of its unintended 
consequences, potential upsides or downsides.
  As Colin Powell leaves the White House today, I hope he carries this 
advice. I hope all of us recall the key points he laid out. He has 
wisely put forward for past Presidents and this President a key 
checklist that all of us as citizens, or those of us who are Senators, 
as policymakers, can have in reviewing the Powell doctrine.
  In the end, the Powell doctrine is a key checklist to use to make 
sure we resist the call for military action until absolutely necessary; 
but once necessary, that we hit the enemy with everything we have; that 
we make the conflict as short and, therefore, as humanitarian as 
possible; that we demonstrate the full support of the American people 
for the men and women of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and that we 
give them a clear mission with one allied commander. I hope the 
President gets this advice directly from the general today. I hope the 
President and the Senate follow it.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to 
speak for up to 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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