[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 41 (Thursday, March 17, 2011)]
[House]
[Pages H1920-H1953]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   AFGHANISTAN WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the order of the House of 
March 16, 2011, I call up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 28) 
directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers 
Resolution, to remove the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan, 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Womack). Pursuant to the order of the 
House of Wednesday, March 16, 2011, the concurrent resolution is 
considered read.
  The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

                            H. Con. Res. 28

       Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring),

     SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM 
                   AFGHANISTAN.

       Pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution (50 
     U.S.C. 1544(c)), Congress directs the President to remove the 
     United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan--
       (1) by no later than the end of the period of 30 days 
     beginning on the day on which this concurrent resolution is 
     adopted; or
       (2) if the President determines that it is not safe to 
     remove the United States Armed Forces before the end of that 
     period, by no later than December 31, 2011, or such earlier 
     date as the President determines that the Armed Forces can 
     safely be removed.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The concurrent resolution shall be debatable 
for 2 hours, with 1 hour controlled by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) or his designee and 1 hour equally divided and controlled by 
the chair and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 
from North Carolina (Mr. Jones) be allowed to control half of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Jones) will control half the time allocated to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from 
Florida.

                              {time}  1100

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to this resolution, as it 
would undermine the efforts of our military and our international 
partners in Afghanistan and would gravely harm our Nation's security.
  Insanity has been described as doing the same thing over and over 
again and expecting different results. Three thousand people died on 
September 11 because we walked away once from Afghanistan, thinking 
that it didn't matter who controlled that country. We were wrong then. 
Let us not make the same mistake twice. Completing our mission in 
Afghanistan is essential to keeping our homeland safe.
  As Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy stated in testimony to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this week, ``The threat to 
our national security and the security of our friends and allies that 
emanates from the borderland of Afghanistan and Pakistan is not 
hypothetical.

[[Page H1921]]

There is simply no other place in the world that contains such a 
concentration of al Qaeda senior leaders and operational commanders. To 
allow these hostile organizations to flourish in this region is to put 
the security of the United States and our friends and allies at grave 
risk.''
  To quit the area before we have routed out the terrorists would not 
only hand al Qaeda a propaganda victory of immeasurable value, it would 
cede them a sanctuary from which they could mount fresh strikes at the 
west with virtual immunity. To withdraw from Afghanistan at this point, 
before we finish the job, is to pave the way for the next 9/11. 
Therefore, the question that we must consider is, Can we afford to 
abandon our mission in Afghanistan? General David Petraeus, commander, 
International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, commander, U.S. Forces 
Afghanistan, stated, ``I can understand the frustration. We have been 
at this for 10 years. We have spent an enormous amount of money. We 
have sustained very tough losses and difficult, life-changing wounds. 
But I think it is important to remember why we are there.''
  This is about our vital national security interests, Mr. Speaker. It 
is about doing what is necessary to ensure that al Qaeda and other 
extremists cannot reestablish safe havens such as the ones they had in 
Afghanistan when the 9/11 attacks were planned against our Nation and 
our people. The enemy, indeed, is on the run. It is demoralized and 
divided. Let us not give up now.
  Let us not betray the sacrifices of our men and women serving in 
harm's way, and they ask for nothing in return, except our full 
support. Dedicated servants such as my stepson Douglas and daughter-in-
law Lindsay, who served in Iraq--and Lindsay also served in 
Afghanistan. Dedicated servants such as Matt Zweig and Greg McCarthy of 
our Foreign Affairs Committee majority staff, who just returned from 
serving a year in Kandahar and Kabul. And we thank them for their 
service. Let us follow the lead of our wounded warriors who, after long 
and arduous recoveries, volunteer to return to the battlefield to 
finish their mission. I urge our colleagues to oppose this dangerous 
resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 2 minutes.
  In the next 2 hours, we are going to demonstrate that the American 
people oppose this war by a margin of two to one. I will enter into the 
Record this Washington Post poll that was published on March 15 which 
says that nearly two-thirds of Americans say the war isn't worth 
fighting.
  In the next 2 hours, we are going to demonstrate that we are spending 
$100 billion per year on this war. There are those who are saying the 
war could last at least another 10 years. Are we willing to spend 
another $1 trillion on a war that doesn't have any exit plan, for which 
there is no timeframe to get out, no endgame, where we haven't defined 
our mission? The question is not whether we can afford to leave. The 
question is, can we afford to stay? And I submit we cannot afford to 
stay.
  In the next 2 hours, we are going to demonstrate that the 
counterintelligence strategy of General Petraeus is an abysmal failure, 
and it needs to be called as such. So I want to conclude this part of 
my presentation with an article by Thomas Friedman in The New York 
Times, which says, ``What are we doing spending $110 billion this year 
supporting corrupt and unpopular regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
that are almost identical to the governments we are applauding the Arab 
people for overthrowing?''

               [From The Washington Post, Mar. 15, 2011]

    Poll: Nearly Two-Thirds of Americans Say Afghan War Isn't Worth 
                                Fighting

                    (By Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen)

       Nearly two-thirds of Americans now say the war in 
     Afghanistan is no longer worth fighting, the highest 
     proportion yet opposed to the conflict, according to a new 
     Washington Post-ABC News poll.
       The finding signals a growing challenge for President Obama 
     as he decides how quickly to pull U.S. forces from the 
     country beginning this summer. After nearly a decade of 
     conflict, political opposition to the battle breaks sharply 
     along partisan lines, with only 19 percent of Democratic 
     respondents and half of Republicans surveyed saying the war 
     continues to be worth fighting.
       Nearly three-quarters of Americans say Obama should 
     withdraw a ``substantial number'' of combat troops from 
     Afghanistan this summer, the deadline he set to begin pulling 
     out some forces. Only 39 percent of respondents, however, say 
     they expect him to withdraw large numbers.
       The Post-ABC News poll results come as Gen. David H. 
     Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, prepares to 
     testify before Congress on Tuesday about the course of the 
     war. He is expected to face tough questioning about a 
     conflict that is increasingly unpopular among a broad cross 
     section of Americans.
       Petraeus will tell Congress that ``things are progressing 
     very well,'' Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said Monday. 
     But because of battlefield gains made by U.S. and coalition 
     forces since last year, Morrell told MSNBC, ``it's going to 
     be heavy and intensive in terms of fighting'' once the winter 
     cold passes.
       The poll began asking only in 2007 whether the Afghan war 
     is worth fighting, but support has almost certainly never 
     been as low as it is in the most recent survey.
       The growing opposition presents Obama with a difficult 
     political challenge ahead of his 2012 reelection effort, 
     especially in his pursuit of independent voters.
       Since Democrats took a beating in last year's midterm 
     elections, Obama has appealed to independents with a middle-
     of-the-road approach to George W. Bush-era tax cuts and 
     budget negotiations with Republican leaders on Capitol Hil1. 
     He called a news conference last week to express concern 
     about rising gasoline prices, an economically pressing issue 
     for many independent voters.
       But his approach to the Afghan war has not won over the 
     independents or liberal Democrats who propelled his campaign 
     two years ago, and the most recent Post-ABC News poll 
     reinforces the importance of Republicans as the chief 
     constituency supporting his strategy. The results suggest 
     that the war will be an awkward issue for the president as he 
     looks for ways to end it. Nearly 1,500 U.S. troops have died 
     since the fighting began in 2001.
       During his 2008 campaign, Obama promised to withdraw 
     American forces from the Iraq war, which he opposed, and 
     devote more resources to the flagging effort in Afghanistan, 
     which he has called an essential front in combating Islamist 
     terrorism targeting the United States.
       After a months-long strategy review in the fall of 2009, he 
     announced the deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops 
     to Afghanistan--taking the total to more than 100,000--and a 
     July 2011 deadline for the start of their withdrawal.
       The number of respondents to the Post-ABC News poll who say 
     the war is not worth fighting has risen from 44 percent in 
     late 2009 to 64 percent in the survey conducted last week.
       Two-thirds of independents hold that position, according to 
     the poll, and nearly 80 percent said Obama should withdraw a 
     ``substantial number'' of troops from Afghanistan this 
     summer. Barely more than a quarter of independents say the 
     war is worth its costs, and for the first time a majority 
     feel ``strongly'' that it is not.
       Obama, who met with Petraeus on Monday at the White House, 
     has said he will determine the pace of the withdrawal by 
     assessing conditions on the ground.
       At the same time, U.S. and NATO forces have come under 
     sharp criticism from the Afghan government. Over the weekend, 
     after a NATO bombing killed nine children, Afghan President 
     Hamid Karzai demanded that international troops ``stop their 
     operations in our land,'' a more pointed call than previous 
     ones he has made following such deadly NATO mistakes.
       The telephone poll was conducted March 10 to 13 among a 
     random national sample of 1,005 adults. Results from the full 
     poll have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.5 
     percentage points.
       The survey also asked respondents to assess Obama's 
     performance in managing the political changes sweeping across 
     the Middle East and North Africa. Overall, 45 percent of 
     respondents approve of his handling of the situation, and 44 
     percent disapprove.
       In Libya, where Moammar Gaddafi is battling a rebel force 
     seeking to end his 41-year rule, Obama is under increasing 
     pressure to implement a no-fly zone over the country to 
     prevent the Libyan leader from taking back lost territory and 
     to protect civilians from government reprisals.
       Nearly six in 10 Americans say they would support U.S. 
     participation in a no-fly zone over Libya, the poll found, 
     despite recent warnings from Defense Secretary Robert M. 
     Gates that doing so would be a ``major operation.''
       But the survey found that American support dips under 50 
     percent when it comes to unilateral U.S. action, as Democrats 
     and independents peel away.
       When told that such a mission would entail U.S. warplanes 
     bombing Libyan antiaircraft positions and ``continuous 
     patrols,'' about a quarter of those initially advocating U.S. 
     participation turn into opponents.
       After a meeting Monday with Danish Prime Minister Lars 
     Loekke Rasmussen, Obama said, ``We will be continuing to 
     coordinate closely both through NATO as well as the United 
     Nations and other international fora to look at every single 
     option that's available to us in bringing about a better 
     outcome for the Libyan people.''
       In general, Americans do not think that the changes in the 
     Middle East and North Africa will prove beneficial to U.S. 
     economic and security interests.

[[Page H1922]]

       More than seven in 10 respondents said demonstrators are 
     interested in building new governments, although not 
     necessarily democratic ones. Almost half of those surveyed 
     view the turmoil as undermining the United States' ability to 
     fight terrorist groups in the region.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, March 6, 2011]

                       The $110 Billion Question

                        (By Thomas L. Friedman)

       When one looks across the Arab world today at the stunning 
     spontaneous democracy uprisings, it is impossible to not ask: 
     What are we doing spending $110 billion this year supporting 
     corrupt and unpopular regimes in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
     that are almost identical to the governments we're applauding 
     the Arab people for overthrowing?
       Ever since 9/11, the West has hoped for a war of ideas 
     within the Muslim world that would feature an internal 
     challenge to the violent radical Islamic ideology of Osama 
     bin Laden and Al Qaeda. That contest, though, never really 
     materialized because the regimes we counted on to promote it 
     found violent Muslim extremism a convenient foil, so they 
     allowed it to persist. Moreover, these corrupt, crony 
     capitalist Arab regimes were hardly the ideal carriers for an 
     alternative to bin Ladenism. To the contrary, it was their 
     abusive behavior and vicious suffocation of any kind of 
     independent moderate centrist parties that fueled the 
     extremism even more.
       Now the people themselves have taken down those regimes in 
     Egypt and Tunisia, and they're rattling the ones in Libya, 
     Yemen, Bahrain, Oman and Iran. They are not doing it for us, 
     or to answer bin Laden. They are doing it by themselves for 
     themselves--because they want their freedom and to control 
     their own destinies. But in doing so they have created a 
     hugely powerful, modernizing challenge to bin Ladenism, which 
     is why Al Qaeda today is tongue-tied. It's a beautiful thing 
     to watch.
       Al Qaeda's answer to modern-day autocracy was its version 
     of the seventh-century Caliphate. But the people--from 
     Tunisia to Yemen--have come up with their own answer to 
     violent extremism and the abusive regimes we've been propping 
     up. It's called democracy. They have a long way to go to lock 
     it in. It may yet be hijacked by religious forces. But, for 
     now, it is clear that the majority wants to build a future in 
     the 21st century, not the seventh.
       In other words, the Arab peoples have done for free, on 
     their own and for their own reasons, everything that we were 
     paying their regimes to do in the ``war on terrorism'' but 
     they never did.
       And that brings me back to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Last 
     October, Transparency International rated the regime of 
     President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan as the second most 
     corrupt in the world after Somalia's. That is the Afghan 
     regime we will spend more than $110 billion in 2011 to 
     support.
       And tell me that Pakistan's intelligence service, ISI, 
     which dominates Pakistani politics, isn't the twin of Hosni 
     Mubarak's security service. Pakistan's military leaders play 
     the same game Mubarak played with us for years. First, they 
     whisper in our ears: ``Psst, without us, the radical 
     Islamists will rule. So we may not be perfect, but we're the 
     only thing standing in the way of the devil.'' In reality, 
     though, they are nurturing the devil. The ISI is long alleged 
     to have been fostering anti-Indian radical Muslim groups and 
     masterminding the Afghan Taliban.
       Apart from radical Islam, the other pretext the Pakistani 
     military uses for its inordinate grip on power is the 
     external enemy. Just as Arab regimes used the conflict with 
     Israel for years to keep their people distracted and to 
     justify huge military budgets, Pakistan's ISI tells itself, 
     the Pakistani people and us that it can't stop sponsoring 
     proxies in Afghanistan because of the ``threat'' from India.
       Here's a secret: India is not going to invade Pakistan. It 
     is an utterly bogus argument. India wants to focus on its own 
     development, not owning Pakistan's problems. India has the 
     second-largest Muslim population on the planet, more even 
     than Pakistan. And while Indian Muslims are not without their 
     economic and political grievances, they are, on the whole, 
     integrated into India's democracy because it is a democracy. 
     There are no Indian Muslims in Guantanamo Bay.
       Finally, you did not need to dig very far in Egypt or 
     Jordan to hear that one reason for the rebellion in Egypt and 
     protests in Jordan was the in-your-face corruption and crony 
     capitalism that everyone in the public knew about.
       That same kind of pillaging of assets--natural resources, 
     development aid, the meager savings of a million Kabul Bank 
     depositors and crony contracts--has fueled a similar anger 
     against the regime in Afghanistan and undermined our nation-
     building efforts there.
       The truth is we can't do much to consolidate the democracy 
     movements in Egypt and Tunisia. They'll have to make it work 
     themselves. But we could do what we can, which is divert some 
     of the $110 billion we're lavishing on the Afghan regime and 
     the Pakistani Army and use it for debt relief, schools and 
     scholarships to U.S. universities for young Egyptians and 
     Tunisians who had the courage to take down the very kind of 
     regimes we're still holding up in Kabul and Islamabad.
       I know we can't just walk out of Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
     there are good people, too, in both places. But our 
     involvement in these two countries--150,000 troops to 
     confront Al Qaeda--is totally out of proportion today with 
     our interests and out of all sync with our values.

  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith), the ranking member of the Armed 
Services Committee.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this 
resolution, and I do so as one who does firmly believe that we need to, 
as soon as we responsibly can, end our military engagement in 
Afghanistan. The cost is very real.
  I represent Joint Base Lewis-McChord, which includes Fort Lewis Army 
Base, and we have lost many soldiers in Afghanistan. The families 
understand the cost. We need to wind down this war as quickly and as 
responsibly as we can. Unfortunately, this resolution does not give us 
the opportunity to do that. And we have clear national security 
interests in Afghanistan.
  While I may agree with many of the statements about the troubles and 
challenges that we face in that region, the one thing that you will 
hear today that I cannot agree with is the idea that we have no 
national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or that we 
somehow do not have a clear mission. We have a clear mission. We do not 
want the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies back in charge of 
Afghanistan or any significant part of Afghanistan from which they 
could plot attacks against us, as they are still trying to do in the 
parts of Pakistan that they are in.
  We need to get an Afghanistan Government that can stand up, and they 
are going to need our help to get there. Now there are many who have 
argued--and I am sure some on both sides of the aisle would be 
sympathetic with the notion that we need to reduce our commitment 
there--that a full-scale counterinsurgency effort, or 100,000 U.S. 
troops and 150,000 NATO and U.S. troops combined, is too much. Let's go 
with a much lighter footprint. Many have advocated that. Focuses on 
counterterrorism, focuses on going after the terrorists, and allows the 
Afghans to take the lead on everything else. And there is a plausible 
argument for that. This resolution does not allow that.
  I want the Members of this Chamber to understand this resolution 
requires complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces by the end of this 
year. And I can tell you, as the ranking member on the Armed Services 
Committee, that is not in the national security interest of this 
country.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.
  Mr. SMITH of Washington. We may have a legitimate debate about what 
our presence should be, how we should change it, but the notion that we 
can simply walk away from this problem, as Ms. Ros-Lehtinen pointed 
out, is simply not true. And it is a problem that, believe me, I, as 
much as anyone in this body, would love to be able to walk away from. 
It is an enormous challenge. And what Mr. Friedman has to say about the 
governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan is spot on. But the problem is, 
we can't simply walk away from them and let them fall because of the 
national security implications that that has for us right here at home, 
given what the Taliban and al Qaeda would plan. I am all in favor of a 
more reasonable plan for how we go forward in Afghanistan, but simply 
heading for the hills and leaving is not a responsible plan. It's not 
even really a plan for how to deal with the very difficult challenges 
that we face in that region, and I urge this body to oppose this 
resolution.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
Kucinich) for yielding me half of his time, and I yield myself such 
time as I may consume.

                              {time}  1110

  Mr. Speaker, we are debating how long we are going to be in 
Afghanistan. Recently, Secretary Gates testified before the Armed 
Services Committee, which I serve on, and said that he thought by 2014 
we could start substantial reduction in our troop strength in

[[Page H1923]]

Afghanistan, 2014, that it might be 2015, 2016.
  That's why this debate and this resolution is so important, not 
important for those of us in the House, but important for our military 
and the American people.
  And Mr. Kucinich did make reference to The Washington Post-ABC poll 
that was taken a couple of days ago that said 73 percent of the 
American people said it's time, this year, to bring our troops home.
  In addition, I would like to share a quote from the leader of 
Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai. He's our man in Afghanistan. All right, now, 
he's our man. This was his quote 3 days ago: ``I request that NATO and 
America should stop these operations on our soil,'' Karzai said. ``This 
war is not on our soil. If this war is against terror, then this war is 
not here. Terror is not here.''
  The number of al Qaeda and their presence in Afghanistan is about 20 
or 30. Most of them are in Pakistan. I would agree with that. But this 
debate is critical.
  Before I reserve the balance of my time, I want to share very quickly 
a letter from a retired colonel who's a marine that lives in my 
district: ``I am writing this letter to express my concern over the 
current Afghanistan war. I am a retired marine officer with 31-plus 
years of active duty. I retired in 2004 due to service limitations, or 
I am sure I would have been on my third or fourth deployment by now to 
a war that has gone on too long.''
  And I'll go to the bottom of this: ``It makes no sense if we're there 
4 years or 40. The results will be the same.''
  And he closed his letter this way: ``This war is costing the United 
States billions of dollars a month to wage, and we still continue to 
get more young Americans killed. The Afghan war has no end state for 
us.
  ``I urge you to make contact with all the current and newly elected 
men and women in Congress and ask them to end this war and bring our 
young men and women home. If any of my comments will assist in this 
effort, you are welcome to use them and my name.
  ``Respectfully, Dennis G. Adams, Lieutenant Colonel retired, United 
States Marine Corps.''
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California 
(Ms. Woolsey).
  Ms. WOOLSEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in absolute support of the 
resolution offered by the gentleman from Ohio.
  The war in Afghanistan, almost 10 years old, has been an utter 
failure in every possible way. It hasn't eliminated the terrorist 
threat. It hasn't destroyed the Taliban. It hasn't advanced national 
security objectives. It hasn't promoted a vibrant democracy in 
Afghanistan. It hasn't done any of the things it was supposed to do.
  And General Petraeus' testimony this week didn't inspire much 
confidence either. He continues to offer the same vague reassurances 
about progress we've supposedly made, while being sure to say that 
challenges remain so he can continue justifying a substantial troop 
presence in Afghanistan. But I'm not reassured in the least. And much 
more importantly, the American people aren't reassured.
  After 9\1/2\ years, after seeing 1,500 of their fellow citizens 
killed, after writing a check to the tune of $386 billion, they've had 
enough. They are angry, they are frustrated, as well they should be.
  A new poll shows that nearly two-thirds of Americans, 64 percent, 
think the war isn't worth fighting. This is one of the least popular 
things our government is doing, and yet it's just about the only one 
Republicans don't want to cut.
  I think it's about time the people's House listened to the people on 
the issue of war and peace and life and death. We need to negotiate, 
and we need to sign the Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA, with 
Afghanistan.
  We need to move quickly toward the massive redeployment in July, as 
the President promised more than a year ago. In the name of moral 
decency, fiscal sanity and constitutional integrity, it's time to bring 
our troops home.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, before I yield to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. McKeon), the chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, it is important to underscore, as the Under Secretary of 
Defense Michele Flournoy has, that to withdraw from Afghanistan at this 
time, before we finish the job, is to pave the way for the next 9/11.
  She and other U.S. and allied officials note that we need look no 
further than the example of Ahmad Siddiqui, a 36-year-old German of 
Afghan origin who U.S. interrogators talked to, and he revealed Osama 
bin Laden was planning an attack on Europe. Without our boots on the 
ground in Afghanistan the plot against Europe might never have been 
uncovered. Without our boots on the ground, we will not be able to stop 
the next wave of attacks against our homeland, our citizens, our 
families, and ourselves.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. 
McKeon), the esteemed chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. McKEON. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues from the Foreign 
Services Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, and my colleagues from 
the Armed Services Committee in opposition to this resolution. This 
resolution would undermine the efforts of our military commanders and 
troops as they work side by side with their Afghan and coalition 
partners.
  Yesterday, in his testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee, General Petraeus, commander of the U.S. and allied forces in 
Afghanistan, described significant progress made by our troops and 
Afghan forces. But while the United States is on track to accomplish 
our objectives by 2014, the general also warned that this hard-fought 
progress is fragile and reversible; and he urged that continued support 
from this Congress for our mission in Afghanistan is vital to success.
  When asked specifically how our troops and enemies would view the 
resolution before us today, General Petraeus stated: The Taliban and al 
Qaeda obviously would trumpet this as a victory. Needless to say, it 
would completely undermine everything our troopers have fought so much 
and sacrificed so much for.
  Mr. Speaker, when the President authorized a surge of 30,000 
additional troops, he reminded us of why we are in Afghanistan. It's 
the epicenter of where al Qaeda planned and launched the 9/11 attacks 
against innocent Americans. It remains vital to the national security 
of this country to prohibit the Taliban from once again providing 
sanctuary to al Qaeda leaders.
  Moreover, withdrawing before completing our mission would reinforce 
extremist propaganda that Americans are weak and unreliable allies and 
could facilitate extremist recruiting and future attacks.
  Like most Republicans, I supported the President's decision to surge 
in Afghanistan. I believe that with additional forces, combined with 
giving General Petraeus the time, space and resources he needs, we can 
win this conflict.
  During a visit last week with our troops in Afghanistan, Secretary 
Gates observed the closer you get to this fight, the better it looks. 
Having just returned myself from Afghanistan a few weeks ago, I 
couldn't agree more.
  Our delegation to Afghanistan met with senior military commanders and 
diplomats, talked to airmen at Bagram, marines in Helmand and soldiers 
in Kandahar. It was clear to our delegation that our forces have made 
significant gains and have reversed the Taliban's momentum.

                              {time}  1120

  Our forces and their Afghan partners have cleared enemy strongholds, 
swept up significant weapons caches, and given more Afghans the 
confidence to defy the Taliban. We have made considerable progress in 
growing and professionalizing Afghanistan's army and police so these 
forces are more capable and reliable partners to our own troops.
  As significant as our troops' achievements in the fields are, they 
can easily be undone by poor decisions made here in Washington. Today's 
debate is not being conducted in a vacuum. Our troops are listening. 
Our allies are listening.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. McKEON. The Taliban and al Qaeda are also listening. And, 
finally, the Afghan people are listening.

[[Page H1924]]

  Mr. Speaker, I want to send a clear message to the Afghan people and 
government, our coalition partners, our military men and women that 
this Congress will stand firm in our commitment to free us from the 
problems that the Taliban created for us on 9/11. We will not have this 
sanctuary ever happen again.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this resolution.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in opposition to the resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the third debate we have had pursuant to a war 
powers resolution in the last year.
  I completely agree with the gentleman from Ohio that as we are moving 
into the 10th year of this conflict, it is critical--not just nice, it 
is really critical for the House to have an open and honest debate on 
the merits of our ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, and that 
debate should be outside of the context of a defense spending bill.
  But what I also do is take strong issue with the invocation of 
section 5(c) of the War Powers Act as the basis for this debate. If we 
are here to respect the law and the procedures, you have to remember 
that it is that section which authorizes a privileged resolution, like 
the one we have before us today, to require the withdrawal of U.S. 
Forces when they are engaged in hostilities and Congress has not 
authorized the use of military force.
  There may be aspects of our operations around the world that people 
can claim under section 5(c) have not been authorized. No one can make 
a contention that what we are now doing in Afghanistan was not 
authorized by the Congress. There can be no doubt this military action 
in Afghanistan was authorized. It was authorized in 2001, soon after 9/
11.
  But let's set aside the procedure and the specific dictates of the 
statute. I do think and share my concerns, well articulated by the 
ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, that it is not 
responsible to demand a complete withdrawal of our troops from 
Afghanistan by the end of the year without regard to the consequence of 
our withdrawal, without regard to the situation on the ground, 
including efforts to promote economic development and expand the rule 
of law, and without any measurement of whether the current strategy is 
indeed working.
  I am very sensitive to the arguments posed by the gentleman from 
Ohio. The cost of human life due to the war and the heavy costs 
incurred by our country at a time of great economic hardship should 
give any Member of Congress pause.
  I am also keenly aware of the concerns regarding our overall U.S. 
strategy in Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether a 
counterinsurgency strategy will succeed there and, equally important, 
whether the Afghans are taking sufficient responsibility for this war. 
I am troubled that the war very much remains an American-led effort and 
that the U.S. presence has created a culture of dependency in 
Afghanistan.
  Notwithstanding all that, I won't support a call for a full 
withdrawal until we give the President's strategy additional time, at 
least through the spring, to show results or, without a responsible 
withdrawal strategy, to ensure gains made thus far will not be lost.
  A number of positive developments make me unwilling to throw in the 
towel just yet. For example, as noted by General Petraeus in testimony 
yesterday, coalition forces have been making some progress against 
Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan. In addition, the training of 
Afghan security forces has exceeded targets, and we are inching slowly 
toward the point at which they may be able to secure their own borders.
  A final plea to my colleagues, and that is to some of my colleagues 
who are joining me in opposing this resolution. I am sure we are not 
going to succeed in Afghanistan unless our civilian efforts are fully 
resourced. When I traveled to Afghanistan last April, I was encouraged 
to see our military forces, diplomats, and development experts working 
closely together in the field.
  General Petraeus couldn't have been more clear in his testimony: We 
are setting ourselves up for failure if we fully fund the clear part of 
the President's counterinsurgency strategy, the part carried out by the 
military, but shortchange the hold-and-build portions of the strategy, 
like economic development and building good governance. These are the 
keys to lasting success in Afghanistan. These are the keys to a 
successful counterinsurgency strategy. And when we meet those tests and 
do those works, we may be able to create the environment that will 
allow our troops to return home.
  For all these reasons, I oppose the resolution.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, we will be debating this probably in 2015 or 
2016. If I am not here, somebody else will be, because that is how long 
we are going to be there.
  This general that served in the Marine Corps that has advised me for 
11 months, back in November I asked: ``What do you think about 4 more 
years?''
  I am just going to read part of his email:
  ``I do not believe that 40 more years would guarantee victory, 
whatever that is; so 4 will do nothing. The war is costing money and 
lives, all in short supply.''
  I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan).
  Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
this resolution.
  First, I want to thank the gentleman from North Carolina for yielding 
me this time. And I want to pay tribute to the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Jones), who is one of the kindest, most sincere, and most 
courageous Members that we have in this body.
  I voted, Mr. Speaker, for this war, but I sure didn't vote for a 10-
year war or a forever or a permanent or an endless war.
  There is nothing fiscally conservative about this war, and I think 
conservatives should be the people most horrified by this war.
  Alfred Regnery, the publisher of the Conservative American Spectator 
magazine, wrote last October: ``Afghanistan has little strategic value, 
and the war is one of choice rather than necessity.'' And he added that 
it has been a ``wasteful and frustrating decade.''
  The worst thing about Iraq and Afghanistan is all the young people 
who have been killed. But it is also very sad, Mr. Speaker, that we 
have spent hundreds of billions of dollars--in fact, some estimates are 
$2 trillion or $3 trillion now in indirect costs--to carry on these two 
very unnecessary wars.
  Our Constitution does not give us the authority to run another 
country, and that is basically what we have been doing. We have been 
doing more nation building and more civilian functions than anything 
else, and we have been turning the Department of Defense, at least in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, into the Department of Foreign Aid.
  I had a conservative Republican elected official from my district in 
my office this past Monday. His son is in Afghanistan in the Army, and 
he said he asked his son recently what we were accomplishing there, and 
he said his son said, ``Dad, we're accomplishing nothing.''
  We seem to be making the same mistakes in our policies toward 
Afghanistan that we made in Iraq. Even General Petraeus has said some 
time ago that we should never forget that Afghanistan has been known as 
the ``graveyard of empires.''
  George C. Wilson, a military columnist for the Congress Daily, wrote 
a few months ago: ``The American military's mission to pacify the 
40,000 tiny villages in Afghanistan will look like mission impossible, 
especially if our bombings keep killing Afghan civilians and 
infuriating the ones who survive.''
  The Center for Defense Information said late last year we have now 
spent $439.8 billion on war and war-related costs in Afghanistan, and 
$1.63 trillion so far on the war and war-related costs in Iraq. As I 
said a moment ago, these figures should astound fiscal conservatives.
  Georgie Anne Geyer, a syndicated columnist, wrote a few years ago: 
``Critics of the war have said since the beginning of the conflict that 
Americans, still strangely complacent about overseas wars being waged 
by minorities in their name, will inevitably come to a point where they 
will see they have to have a government that provides services at home 
or one that seeks empire across the globe.''

[[Page H1925]]

  I just finished, Mr. Speaker, a few weeks ago doing field hearings 
around the country in relation to the transportation and highway bill. 
These were done in Oklahoma, Arkansas, West Virginia, and west 
Tennessee--very conservative districts. And in each of those places, I 
said that it's time that we stop spending hundreds of billions on these 
unnecessary foreign wars and stop rebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and start rebuilding the United States of America.

                              {time}  1130

  In each of those conservative districts, the people erupted into 
applause. Only 31 percent of the American people, according to the 
latest ABC/Newsweek poll that just came out, think this war is still 
worth it.
  William F. Buckley, the conservative icon, wrote a few years ago that 
he supported the war in Iraq and then he became disillusioned by it, 
and he wrote these words:
  ``A respect for the power of the United States is engendered by our 
success in engagements in which we take part.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. JONES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee. William Buckley said:
  ``A point is reached when tenacity conveys steadfastness of purpose 
but misapplication of pride.''
  President Karzai last year told ABC News he wanted us to stay there 
another 15 or 20 more years. That's because he wants our money. This 
war is more about money and power. Every gigantic bureaucracy always 
wants more money, but this war has gone too far and too long, and I 
support this resolution.


                             General Leave

  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all 
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their 
remarks and include extraneous material on House Concurrent Resolution 
28.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentlewoman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), the chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.
  Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for your steadfast 
commitment to the men and women who gallantly serve our country on the 
battlefield.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution. First, let me 
get one argument out of the way. I've heard before some of my 
colleagues who support an American retreat from Afghanistan describe 
this effort as a fiscal matter. I would respond to that argument by 
simply stating that it's not a question of whether we can afford to 
fund a military presence in Afghanistan, it's a matter of whether we 
can afford not to, particularly at this point.
  I think my colleagues know that I'm very uncomfortable spending 
taxpayer dollars without a solid justification, and I would match my 
fiscal conservative credentials with anybody in this body. But when it 
comes to national security and when it comes to the care and protection 
of our troops in harm's way, we must not be, to use a phrase that you 
often hear on this floor, penny wise and pound foolish.
  Further, a premature withdrawal of American troops from the Afghan 
theater would send a terrible message to both our friends and also to 
our adversaries. To our allies in the war on terrorism whom we would 
leave essentially twisting in the wind, to those 47 other nations that 
have joined the coalition in Afghanistan, we would essentially be 
saying, ``Good luck. You're on your own.'' Not exactly what they had in 
mind when they joined us in this fight.
  And, of course, to al Qaeda and to the Taliban, whom we would 
embolden by adopting this ill-advised resolution, we would be 
providing, once again, the sanctuary which they enjoyed in Afghanistan 
before our Armed Forces reversed their momentum.
  I don't often find myself in agreement with President Obama's 
policies, but I did agree with him when he said a little more than a 
year ago, ``I am convinced that our security is at risk in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by 
al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is here 
that new attacks are being plotted as I speak.'' That was President 
Obama.
  I also agree with General Petraeus who said last week that ``our core 
objective in Afghanistan, needless to say, is to ensure that the 
country does not become a sanctuary once again for al Qaeda, the way it 
was prior to 9/11.''
  I know memories fade with time, but it's been not quite 10 years 
since 3,000 lives were lost on American soil--in New York, in 
Pennsylvania, and just minutes from here down the street at the 
Pentagon. Let's not forget what al Qaeda did then and let's keep 
working to prevent it from happening again. Let's not quit until the 
job is done.
  Vote ``no'' on this resolution.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to insert into the Record a report from 
the United Nations that says that 2010 was the worst year for civilian 
casualties in Afghanistan with nearly 3,000 civilians killed.

Afghanistan--Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
                                  2010

                     Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2011

     Executive Summary
       The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan grew in 
     2010. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and 
     UNAMA Human Rights recorded 2,777 civilian deaths in 2010, an 
     increase of 15 per cent compared to 2009. Over the past four 
     years, 8,832 civilians have been killed in the conflict, with 
     civilian deaths increasing each year. The worsening human 
     impact of the conflict reinforces the urgent need for parties 
     to the conflict to do more to protect Afghan civilians, who, 
     in 2010, were killed and injured in their homes and 
     communities in even greater numbers. UNAMA Human Rights and 
     the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission urge the 
     Anti-Government Elements and Pro-Government Forces to 
     strengthen civilian protection and fully comply legal 
     obligations to minimize civilian casualties.


                            civilian deaths

       Of the total number of 2,777 civilians killed in 2010, 
     2,080 deaths (75 per cent of total civilian deaths) were 
     attributed to Anti-Government Elements, up 28 per cent from 
     2009. Suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
     caused the most civilian deaths, totaling 1,141 deaths (55 
     per cent of civilian deaths attributed to Anti-Government 
     Elements). The most alarming trend in 2010 was the huge 
     number of civilians assassinated by Anti-Government Elements. 
     Four hundred and sixty two civilians were assassinated 
     representing an increase of more than 105 per cent compared 
     to 2009. Half of all civilian assassinations occurred in 
     southern Afghanistan. Helmand province saw a 588 per cent 
     increase in the number of civilians assassinated by Anti-
     Government Elements and Kandahar province experienced a 248 
     per cent increase compared to 2009.
       Afghan national security and international military forces 
     (Pro-Government Forces) were linked to 440 deaths or 16 per 
     cent of total civilian deaths, a reduction of 26 per cent 
     from 2009. Aerial attacks claimed the largest percentage of 
     civilian deaths caused by Pro-Government Forces in 2010, 
     causing 171 deaths (39 per cent of the total number of 
     civilian deaths attributed to Pro-Government Forces). 
     Notably, there was a 52 per cent decline in civilian deaths 
     from air attacks compared to 2009. Nine per cent of civilian 
     deaths in 2010 could not be attributed to any party to the 
     conflict.

  I would like to put into the Record a report from the Afghanistan 
Rights Monitor relating to the number of civilians killed and wounded 
and displaced.

                           ARM Annual Report

                       Civilian Casualties of War

                         January--December 2010

                   Kabul, Afghanistan, February 2011

     Executive Summary
       Over nine years after the internationally-celebrated demise 
     of the repressive Taliban regime in Afghanistan, civilian 
     Afghans increasingly suffer from the armed violence and 
     rights violations committed by various internal and external 
     armed actors. More ordinary Afghans were killed and injured 
     in 2010 than a year before. And while US officials dubbed 
     Afghanistan as their longest foreign war, Afghans suffered it 
     for 32 years relentlessly.
       Almost everything related to the war surged in 2010: the 
     combined numbers of Afghan and foreign forces surpassed 
     350,000; security incidents mounted to over 100 per week; 
     more fighters from all warring side were killed; and the 
     number of civilian people killed, wounded and displaced hit 
     record levels.
       Collecting information about every security incident and 
     verifying the often conflicting reports about their impacts 
     on civilian people were extremely difficult and risky. The 
     war was as heatedly fought

[[Page H1926]]

     through propaganda and misinformation as it was in the 
     battlefields thus making independent and impartial war 
     reporting tricky and complex.
       Despite all the challenges, we spared no efforts in 
     gathering genuine information, facts and figures about the 
     impacts of war on civilian communities. Our resources were 
     limited and we lacked the luxury of strategic/political 
     support from one or another side of the conflict because we 
     stood by our professional integrity. We, however, managed to 
     use our indigenous knowledge and delved into a wealth of 
     local information available in the conflict-affected villages 
     in order to seek more reliable facts about the war.
       From 1 January to 31 December 2010, at least 2,421 civilian 
     Afghans were killed and over 3,270 were injured in conflict-
     related security incidents across Afghanistan. This means 
     everyday 6-7 noncombatants were killed and 8-9 were wounded 
     in the war.
       ARM does not claim that these numbers--although collected 
     and verified to the best of our efforts--are comprehensive 
     and perfect. Actual numbers of the civilian victims of war in 
     2010 could be higher than what we gathered and present in 
     this report.
       Unsurprisingly, about 63 percent of the reported civilian 
     deaths and 70 percent of the injuries were attributed to the 
     Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) (Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami and 
     the Haqqani Group); 21 percent of deaths (512 individuals) 
     and 22 percent of injuries (655) were attributed to US/NATO 
     forces; and 12 percent of deaths (278 individuals) and 7 
     percent (239) injuries were caused by pro-government Afghan 
     troops and their allied local militia forces.
       In addition to civilian casualties, hundreds of thousands 
     of people were affected in various ways by the intensified 
     armed violence in Afghanistan in 2010. Tens of thousands of 
     people were forced out of their homes or deprived of 
     healthcare and education services and livelihood 
     opportunities due to the continuation of war in their home 
     areas.
       In November 2010, ARM was the first organization to voice 
     concerns about the destruction of hundreds of houses, 
     pomegranate trees and orchards in several districts in 
     Kandahar Province by US-led forces as part of their 
     counterinsurgency operations. In January 2011, an Afghan 
     Government delegation reported the damage costs at over 
     US$100 million. In compensation, US/NATO forces have doled 
     out less than $2 million.
       Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are widely considered 
     as the most lethal tools which killed over 690 civilians in 
     2010. However, as you will read in this report, there is 
     virtually no information about the use of cluster munitions 
     by US/NATO forces. Despite Afghanistan's accession to the 
     international Anti-Cluster Bomb Treaty in 2008, the US 
     military has allegedly maintained stockpiles of cluster 
     munitions in Afghanistan.
       A second key issue highlighted in this report is the 
     emergence of the irregular armed groups in parts of 
     Afghanistan which are backed by the Afghan Government and its 
     foreign allies. These groups have been deplored as criminal 
     and predatory by many Afghans and have already been accused 
     of severe human rights violations such as child recruitment 
     and sexual abuse.

  I would like to put into the Record a report from the Congressional 
Research Service that the war in Afghanistan has cost over $454 billion 
to date.


                   Introduction: War Funding to Date

       Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
     United States has initiated three military operations: 
     Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) covering primarily 
     Afghanistan and other small Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
     operations ranging from the Philippines to Djibouti that 
     began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continues; 
     Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for 
     U.S. military bases and other homeland security that was 
     launched in response to the attacks and continues at a modest 
     level; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the 
     fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 
     invasion of Iraq, continued with counter-insurgency and 
     stability operations, and is slated to be renamed Operation 
     New Dawn as U.S. troops focus on an advisory and assistance 
     role.
       In the ninth year of operations since the 9/11 attacks 
     while troops are being withdrawn in Iraq and increased in 
     Afghanistan, the cost of war continues to be a major issue 
     including the total amount appropriated, the amount for each 
     operation, average monthly spending rates, and the scope and 
     duration of future costs. Information on costs is useful to 
     Congress to assess the FY2010 Supplemental for war costs for 
     the Department of Defense (DOD) and State/USAID, FY2011 war 
     requests, conduct oversight of past war costs, and consider 
     the longer-term costs implications of the buildup of troops 
     in Afghanistan and potential problems in the withdrawal of 
     U.S. troops from Iraq. This report analyzes war funding for 
     the Defense Department and tracks funding for USAID and VA 
     Medical funding.


                     Total War Funding by Operation

       Based on DOD estimates and budget submissions, the 
     cumulative total for funds appropriated from the 9/11 attacks 
     through the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Acts for DOD, 
     State/USAID and VA for medical costs for the wars in Iraq, 
     Afghanistan and enhanced security is $1,121 billion 
     including: $751 billion for Iraq; $336 billion for 
     Afghanistan; $29 billion for enhanced security; and $6 
     billion unallocated.
       Of this total, 67% is for Iraq, 30% for Afghanistan, 3% for 
     enhanced security and 1/2% unallocated. Almost all of the 
     funding for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is for 
     Afghanistan.
       This total includes funding provided in H.R. 4899/P.L. 111-
     212, the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act enacted July 
     29, 2010.
       Some 94% of this funding goes to the Department of Defense 
     (DOD) to cover primarily incremental war-related costs, that 
     is, costs that are in addition to DOD's normal peacetime 
     activities. These costs include: military personnel funds to 
     provide special pay for deployed personnel such as hostile 
     fire or separation pay and to cover the additional cost of 
     activating reservists, as well pay for expanding the Army and 
     Marine Corps to reduce stress on troops; Operation and 
     Maintenance (O&M) funds to transport troops and their 
     equipment to Iraq and Afghanistan, conduct military 
     operations, provide in-country support at bases, and 
     repairing war-worn equipment; Procurement funding to cover 
     buying new weapons systems to replace war losses, and upgrade 
     equipment, pay modernization costs associated with expanding 
     and changing the structure of the size of the Army and Marine 
     Corps; Research, Development, Test & Evaluation costs to 
     develop more effective ways to combat war threats such as 
     roadside bombs; Working Capital Funds to cover expanding the 
     size of inventories of spare parts and fuel to provide 
     wartime support; and Military construction primarily to 
     construct facilities in bases in Iraq or Afghanistan or 
     neighboring countries.
       In addition, the Administration initiated several programs 
     specifically targeted at problems that developed in the 
     Afghan and Iraq wars: Coalition support to cover the 
     logistical costs of allies, primarily Pakistan, conducting 
     counter-terror operations in support of U.S. efforts; 
     Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) providing funds 
     to individual commanders for small reconstruction projects 
     and to pay local militias in Iraq and Afghanistan to counter 
     insurgent or Taliban groups; Afghan Security Forces Fund and 
     the Iraq Security Forces Fund to pay the cost of training, 
     equipping and expanding the size of the Afghan and Iraqi 
     armies and police forces; and Joint Improvised Explosive 
     Device (IEDs) Defeat Fund to develop, buy, and deploy new 
     devices to improve force protection for soldiers against 
     roadside bombs or IEDs.

  I would like to put into the Record an article by Nobel prize-winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes in the Washington Post that 
says there is no question the Iraq war added substantially to the 
Federal debt.

                    [From the Times, Feb. 23, 2008]

  The Three Trillion Dollar War--The Cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
             Conflicts Have Grown to Staggering Proportions

                 (By Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes)

       The Bush Administration was wrong about the benefits of the 
     war and it was wrong about the costs of the war. The 
     president and his advisers expected a quick, inexpensive 
     conflict. Instead, we have a war that is costing more than 
     anyone could have imagined.
       The cost of direct US military operations--not even 
     including long-term costs such as taking care of wounded 
     veterans--already exceeds the cost of the 12-year war in 
     Vietnam and is more than double the cost of the Korean War.
       And, even in the best case scenario, these costs are 
     projected to be almost ten times the cost of the first Gulf 
     War, almost a third more than the cost of the Vietnam War, 
     and twice that of the First World War. The only war in our 
     history which cost more was the Second World War, when 16.3 
     million U.S. troops fought in a campaign lasting four years, 
     at a total cost (in 2007 dollars, after adjusting for 
     inflation) of about $5 trillion (that's $5 million million, 
     or K2.5 million million). With virtually the entire armed 
     forces committed to fighting the Germans and Japanese, the 
     cost per troop (in today's dollars) was less than $100,000 in 
     2007 dollars. By contrast, the Iraq war is costing upward of 
     $400,000 per troop.
       Most Americans have yet to feel these costs. The price in 
     blood has been paid by our voluntary military and by hired 
     contractors. The price in treasure has, in a sense, been 
     financed entirely by borrowing. Taxes have not been raised to 
     pay for it--in fact, taxes on the rich have actually fallen. 
     Deficit spending gives the illusion that the laws of 
     economics can be repealed, that we can have both guns and 
     butter. But of course the laws are not repealed. The costs of 
     the war are real even if they have been deferred, possibly to 
     another generation.
     Background
       American voters must choose: more benefits or more defence; 
     $3 trillion budget leaves little for Bush to bank on; MoD 
     forced to cut budget by K1.5bn; they're running our tanks on 
     empty.
       On the eve of war, there were discussions of the likely 
     costs. Larry Lindsey, President Bush's economic adviser and 
     head of the National Economic Council, suggested that they 
     might reach $200 billion. But this estimate was dismissed as 
     ``baloney'' by the Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. His 
     deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, suggested that postwar reconstruction 
     could pay for itself

[[Page H1927]]

     through increased oil revenues. Mitch Daniels, the Office of 
     Management and Budget director, and Secretary Rumsfeld 
     estimated the costs in the range of $50 to $60 billion, a 
     portion of which they believed would be financed by other 
     countries. (Adjusting for inflation, in 2007 dollars, they 
     were projecting costs of between $57 and $69 billion.) The 
     tone of the entire administration was cavalier, as if the 
     sums involved were minimal.
       Even Lindsey, after noting that the war could cost $200 
     billion, went on to say: ``The successful prosecution of the 
     war would be good for the economy.'' In retrospect, Lindsey 
     grossly underestimated both the costs of the war itself and 
     the costs to the economy. Assuming that Congress approves the 
     rest of the $200 billion war supplemental requested for 
     fiscal year 2008, as this book goes to press Congress will 
     have appropriated a total of over $845 billion for military 
     operations, reconstruction, embassy costs, enhanced security 
     at US bases, and foreign aid programmes in Iraq and 
     Afghanistan.
       As the fifth year of the war draws to a close, operating 
     costs (spending on the war itself, what you might call 
     ``running expenses'') for 2008 are projected to exceed $12.5 
     billion a month for Iraq alone, up from $4.4 billion in 2003, 
     and with Afghanistan the total is $16 billion a month. 
     Sixteen billion dollars is equal to the annual budget of the 
     United Nations, or of all but 13 of the US states. Even so, 
     it does not include the $500 billion we already spend per 
     year on the regular expenses of the Defence Department. Nor 
     does it include other hidden expenditures, such as 
     intelligence gathering, or funds mixed in with the budgets of 
     other departments.
       Because there are so many costs that the Administration 
     does not count, the total cost of the war is higher than the 
     official number. For example, government officials frequently 
     talk about the lives of our soldiers as priceless. But from a 
     cost perspective, these ``priceless'' lives show up on the 
     Pentagon ledger simply as $500,000--the amount paid out to 
     survivors in death benefits and life insurance. After the war 
     began, these were increased from $12,240 to $100,000 (death 
     benefit) and from $250,000 to $400,000 (life insurance). Even 
     these increased amounts are a fraction of what the survivors 
     might have received had these individuals lost their lives in 
     a senseless automobile accident. In areas such as health and 
     safety regulation, the US Government values a life of a young 
     man at the peak of his future earnings capacity in excess of 
     $7 million--far greater than the amount that the military 
     pays in death benefits. Using this figure, the cost of the 
     nearly 4,000 American troops killed in Iraq adds up to some 
     $28 billion.
       The costs to society are obviously far larger than the 
     numbers that show up on the government's budget. Another 
     example of hidden costs is the understating of U.S. military 
     casualties. The Defense Department's casualty statistics 
     focus on casualties that result from hostile (combat) 
     action--as determined by the military. Yet if a soldier is 
     injured or dies in a night-time vehicle accident, this is 
     officially dubbed ``noncombat related''--even though it may 
     be too unsafe for soldiers to travel during daytime.
       In fact, the Pentagon keeps two sets of books. The first is 
     the official casualty list posted on the DOD Web site. The 
     second, hard-to-find, set of data is available only on a 
     different website and can be obtained under the Freedom of 
     Information Act. This data shows that the total number of 
     soldiers who have been wounded, injured, or suffered from 
     disease is double the number wounded in combat. Some will 
     argue that a percentage of these noncombat injuries might 
     have happened even if the soldiers were not in Iraq. Our new 
     research shows that the majority of these injuries and 
     illnesses can be tied directly to service in the war.
       From the unhealthy brew of emergency funding, multiple sets 
     of books, and chronic underestimates of the resources 
     required to prosecute the war, we have attempted to identify 
     how much we have been spending--and how much we will, in the 
     end, likely have to spend. The figure we arrive at is more 
     than $3 trillion. Our calculations are based on conservative 
     assumptions. They are conceptually simple, even if 
     occasionally technically complicated. A $3 trillion figure 
     for the total cost strikes us as judicious, and probably errs 
     on the low side. Needless to say, this number represents the 
     cost only to the United States. It does not reflect the 
     enormous cost to the rest of the world, or to Iraq.
       From the beginning, the United Kingdom has played a pivotal 
     role--strategic, military, and political--in the Iraq 
     conflict. Militarily, the UK contributed 46,000 troops, 10 
     per cent of the total. Unsurprisingly, then, the British 
     experience in Iraq has paralleled that of America: rising 
     casualties, increasing operating costs, poor transparency 
     over where the money is going, overstretched military 
     resources, and scandals over the squalid conditions and 
     inadequate medical care for some severely wounded veterans.
       Before the war, Gordon Brown set aside  1 
     billion for war spending. As of late 2007, the UK had spent 
     an estimated  7 billion in direct operating 
     expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan (76 per cent of it in 
     Iraq). This includes money from a supplemental ``special 
     reserve'', plus additional spending from the Ministry of 
     Defense.
       The special reserve comes on top of the UK's regular 
     defense budget. The British system is particularly opaque: 
     funds from the special reserve are ``drawn down'' by the 
     Ministry of Defense when required, without specific approval 
     by Parliament. As a result, British citizens have little 
     clarity about how much is actually being spent.
       In addition, the social costs in the UK are similar to 
     those in the U.S.--families who leave jobs to care for 
     wounded soldiers, and diminished quality of life for those 
     thousands left with disabilities.
       By the same token, there are macroeconomic costs to the UK 
     as there have been to America, though the long-term costs may 
     be less, for two reasons. First, Britain did not have the 
     same policy of fiscal profligacy; and second, until 2005, the 
     United Kingdom was a net oil exporter.
       We have assumed that British forces in Iraq are reduced to 
     2,500 this year and remain at that level until 2010. We 
     expect that British forces in Afghanistan will increase 
     slightly, from 7,000 to 8,000 in 2008, and remain stable for 
     three years. The House of Commons Defense Committee has 
     recently found that despite the cut in troop levels, Iraq war 
     costs will increase by 2 per cent this year and personnel 
     costs will decrease by only 5 per cent. Meanwhile, the cost 
     of military operations in Afghanistan is due to rise by 39 
     per cent. The estimates in our model may be significantly too 
     low if these patterns continue.
       Based on assumptions set out in our book, the budgetary 
     cost to the UK of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through 
     2010 will total more than  18 billion. If we 
     include the social costs, the total impact on the UK will 
     exceed  20 billion.

  I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Barney 
Frank.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, first, any suggestion that 
this is any way disrespectful of the sacrifice of our troops is 
nonsense. Saying that we do not want brave Americans to continue in a 
very difficult situation in which they are at a great disadvantage and 
that in fact we would like to bring them home is no criticism of them 
at all, and nothing undermines their ability to be there. There is a 
policy decision as to whether they should be there.
  Now my friend from Washington and my friend from California have 
said, well, this isn't the right forum parliamentarily, and my friend 
from Washington said, yes, we should have a change in strategy but not 
this way. But this is all we've got.
  Right now, the Members have a choice, and that's the way this place 
is now being run: Either you vote for this resolution or you vote it 
down and you give an implicit and, in some cases, explicit approval to 
the administration to stay there indefinitely. General Petraeus said 
the other day he sees us jointly there with the Afghans well after 
2014.
  Now, yes, there is some gain we could get in deterring terrorism 
there, although the notion that if we stop terrorism in Afghanistan, 
that's going to be the end of it when there are unfortunately other 
places in the world--Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, elsewhere. We can't plug 
every hole in the world. And in fact this is an effort that, having 
been tried for 10 years, has not, unfortunately, looked to me like it's 
going to succeed.
  We're told, well, but this was important because we deterred an 
attack on Europe. But where are the Europeans? The thing that most 
astounded me today was when my friend from Ohio (Mr. Chabot) said, 
well, what about our 47 coalition partners? What about them? They're 
sitting this one out. They're pulling out. This is a virtually 
unilateral American action with a couple of flags that we fly for a few 
other countries. Some of them did have people there and they've 
suffered casualties, but they're all withdrawing, leaving us alone.
  And then let's talk about the cost of this war. The gentleman from 
Ohio said it's not a fiscal issue. Of course it is. This war costs us 
well over $100 billion a year. You will see Americans die from a lack 
of police and fire and public safety here if you continue to fund this 
futile war.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I am grateful that we are having this debate from both sides, those 
that want to stay there for another 4 or 5 years versus those of us who 
would like to bring our troops home. I want to put a face on this 
debate if I may, Mr. Speaker.
  This young man's name is Tyler Jordan from Cincinnati, Ohio. He is 
attending his father's funeral. He was a gunnery sergeant, Phillip 
Jordan, who was killed for this country. The 6-year-

[[Page H1928]]

old little boy, you can't see his eyes, but they hurt. They're pained.
  How many more Tyler Jordans are going to be waiting for their daddy 
or mom to come home to be buried if we stay there 4, 5, 6, or 7 more 
years? And that is what has been indicated by the leadership of the 
military and this administration.

                              {time}  1140

  How many more moms and dads and wives and husbands are going to be at 
Dover Air Force Base to receive the remains of their loved ones? That 
is why this debate is so important, and why we need to have a date and 
a time to start bringing them home.
  My last poster: this absolutely handsome couple. The marine went out 
with PTSD. His beautiful wife, Katie, and his little boy. Last year at 
Camp Lejeune, McHugh Boulevard, he pulls his car over in the middle of 
the day, and he shoots himself in the head and kills himself.
  How many more Tom Bagosys will commit suicide? How many Tyler Jordans 
will not have their daddies coming home? How many moms and dads, wives 
and husbands will be at Dover to see those in a flag-draped coffin?
  I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Chaffetz).
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, I am going to be voting in favor of this 
resolution.
  The United States military is the greatest fighting force on the face 
of the planet. I could not be more proud of our troops who have served 
our country with such valor and such vigor.
  This is the longest war in the history of the United States of 
America. And let there be no mistake, the global war on terror is real. 
It is very real.
  I reject the notion that polls should matter in any way, shape, or 
form in this debate. That is not how the United States operates. This 
is not how we decide whether or not we go to war or we bring our troops 
home.
  I reject the notion that bringing our troops home at some point, 
which I consider to be victory, is somehow a pathway or paving a 
pathway to another 9/11. I think that is offensive, and I think it is 
inaccurate.
  Now, in many ways we have had success over the course of the years. 
Let's understand that according to the National Intelligence Estimate, 
which has been printed in many newspapers, that the Taliban poses no 
clear and present danger to the current Afghan Government, nor do they 
pose a danger to the United States of America. Further, we have had our 
CIA Director state that there are less than 50 al-Qaeda in the entire 
boundaries of Afghanistan.
  I believe it should be the policy of the United States of America 
that if we send our troops to war, we go with everything we have. We do 
not hold back. A politically correct war is a lost war, and at the 
present time we are playing politics. We aren't going with everything 
we have. If we are serious about doing it, Mr. President, you go with 
everything. And until this President attends more funerals than he does 
rounds of golf, this person will be highly offended.
  We have to define the mission. The President of the United States has 
failed to define success in Afghanistan. We are participating in the 
business of nation building, and I reject that. We are propping up a 
government that is fundamentally corrupt, and we all know it. It will 
not get us to where we want to go.
  We must redefine the rules of engagement. Even when I was in 
Afghanistan visiting with General Petraeus, he admitted that we are 
using smaller caliber rounds. Again, we are trying to be more 
politically correct instead of actually protecting American lives.
  Let me also say again that terrorism is a global threat. We must use 
our forces around the world when there is a direct threat on the United 
States of America. That is not confined to just the boundaries of 
Afghanistan. It is happening globally, and it is real. We have to deal 
with the threats in Iran and not take our eye off the ball.
  Finally, I would say that our national debt is a clear and present 
danger to the United States of America, and we must pay attention to 
that.


                Announcement By the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair notes a disturbance in the gallery 
in contravention of the law and rules of the House. The Sergeant-at-
Arms will remove those persons responsible for the disturbance and 
restore order to the gallery.
  The gentleman may continue.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Speaker, before I continue, may I inquire as to how 
much time I have left?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman has 15 seconds remaining.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. May I ask the gentleman to yield me an additional 15 
seconds?
  Mr. JONES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. CHAFFETZ. Aaron Nemelka, Carlos Aragon, Nigel Olsen, Matthew 
Wagstaff: Since I have been in office, these are the gentleman who have 
lost their lives in Afghanistan. I honor them. I thank them. And as I 
have talked to each of their parents, they want those rules of 
engagement changed, and they want to end this war in Afghanistan, with 
victory. With victory.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), the chairman of the Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.
  Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, this week General Petraeus testified before Congress, 
and the essence of his testimony was that we are just now getting the 
necessary assets in place to make a difference in Afghanistan; that our 
troops and coalition partners are making a significant difference; that 
the progress is fragile and reversible; but that it is essential that 
we keep it up because vital national interests are at stake.
  I fear that as time has passed over the last 10 years and so many 
other events come and go in our Nation's life, that it is all too easy 
to forget that this country was attacked on 9/11 and that 3,000 
Americans lost their lives. And we could come to the floor and hold up 
their pictures and the pictures of their children, of those who were 
killed on that day by terrorists, the attacks that were launched from 
Afghanistan, that were planned in Afghanistan and directed from 
Afghanistan.
  This Congress at the time voted virtually unanimously that we would 
take military action to go make sure that Afghanistan would no longer 
be used as a launching pad for attacks against us and that from 
Afghanistan, people would no longer come here to kill Americans. That 
is the reason we are still there today, and that is the purpose of our 
military actions there today.
  It is true that we may have a hard time plugging all the holes that 
could develop somewhere in the world where terrorist groups could 
squirt out to, but it is also true, in my view, that if we don't plug 
this hole, if we don't fulfill the mission that we have set out to 
fulfill in Afghanistan, we are going to have more holes all over the 
world developing, because people will know that we are not serious 
about doing what we say, and our security will be severely affected if 
that happens.
  There have clearly been ups and downs in our military efforts there, 
just as there were in Iraq. But I believe that from General Petraeus on 
down, we have our best. They deserve our support to fulfill the mission 
the country has given them.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record a report from the 
Afghanistan Study Group that says that the current U.S. military effort 
is helping to fuel the very insurgency we are attempting to defeat.


                                SUMMARY

       At nine years and counting, the U.S. war in Afghanistan is 
     the longest in our history, surpassing even the Vietnam War, 
     and it will shortly surpass the Soviet Union's own extended 
     military campaign there. With the surge, it will cost the 
     U.S. taxpayers nearly $100 billion per year, a sum roughly 
     seven times larger than Afghanistan's annual gross national 
     product (GNP) of $14 billion and greater than the total 
     annual cost of the new U.S. health insurance program. 
     Thousands of American and allied personnel have been killed 
     or gravely wounded.
       The U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan do not warrant 
     this level of sacrifice. President Obama justified expanding 
     our commitment by saying the goal was eradicating Al Qaeda. 
     Yet Al Qaeda is no longer a significant presence in 
     Afghanistan, and there are only some 400 hard-core Al Qaeda 
     members remaining in the entire Af/Pak theater, most of them 
     hiding in Pakistan's northwest provinces.

[[Page H1929]]

       America's armed forces have fought bravely and well, and 
     their dedication is unquestioned. But we should not ask them 
     to make sacrifices unnecessary to our core national 
     interests, particularly when doing so threatens long-term 
     needs and priorities both at home and abroad.
       Instead of toppling terrorists, America's Afghan war has 
     become an ambitious and fruitless effort at ``nation-
     building.'' We are mired in a civil war in Afghanistan and 
     are struggling to establish an effective central government 
     in a country that has long been fragmented and decentralized.
       No matter how desirable this objective might be in the 
     abstract, it is not essential to U.S. security and it is not 
     a goal for which the U.S. military is well suited. There is 
     no clear definition of what would comprise ``success'' in 
     this endeavor. Creating a unified Afghan state would require 
     committing many more American lives and hundreds of billions 
     of additional U.S. dollars for many years to come.
       As the WikiLeaks war diary comprised of more than 91,000 
     secret reports on the Afghanistan War makes clear, any sense 
     of American and allied progress in the conflict has been 
     undermined by revelations that many more civilian deaths have 
     occurred than have been officially acknowledged as the result 
     of U.S. and allied strike accidents. The Pakistan Inter-
     Services Intelligence continued to provide logistics and 
     financial support to the Afghan Taliban even as U.S. soldiers 
     were fighting these units. It is clear that Karzai government 
     affiliates and appointees in rural Afghanistan have often 
     proven to be more corrupt and ruthless than the Taliban.
       Prospects for success are dim. As former Secretary of State 
     Henry Kissinger recently warned, ``Afghanistan has never been 
     pacified by foreign forces.'' The 2010 spring offensive in 
     Marjah was inconclusive, and a supposedly ``decisive'' summer 
     offensive in Kandahar has been delayed and the expectations 
     downgraded. U.S. and allied casualties reached an all-time 
     high in July, and several NATO allies have announced plans to 
     withdraw their own forces.
       The conflict in Afghanistan is commonly perceived as a 
     struggle between the Karzai government and an insurgent 
     Taliban movement, allied with international terrorists, that 
     is seeking to overthrow that government. In fact, the 
     conflict is a civil war about power-sharing with lines of 
     contention that are 1) partly ethnic, chiefly, but not 
     exclusively, between Pashtuns who dominate the south and 
     other ethnicities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks who are more 
     prevalent in the north, 2) partly rural vs. urban, 
     particularly within the Pashtun community, and 3) partly 
     sectarian.
       The Afghanistan conflict also includes the influence of 
     surrounding nations with a desire to advance their own 
     interests--including India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
     others. And with the U.S. intervention in force, the conflict 
     includes resistance to what is seen as foreign military 
     occupation.
       Resolving the conflict in Afghanistan has primarily to do 
     with resolving the distribution of power among these factions 
     and between the central government and the provinces, and 
     with appropriately decentralizing authority.
       Negotiated resolution of these conflicts will reduce the 
     influence of extremists more readily than military action 
     will. The Taliban itself is not a unified movement but 
     instead a label that is applied to many armed groups and 
     individuals that are only loosely aligned and do not 
     necessarily have a fondness for the fundamentalist ideology 
     of the most prominent Taliban leaders.
       The Study Group believes the war in Afghanistan has reached 
     a critical crossroads. Our current path promises to have 
     limited impact on the civil war while taking more American 
     lives and contributing to skyrocketing taxpayer debt. We 
     conclude that a fundamentally new direction is needed, one 
     that recognizes the United States' legitimate interests in 
     Central Asia and is fashioned to advance them. Far from 
     admitting ``defeat,'' the new way forward acknowledges the 
     manifold limitations of a military solution in a region where 
     our interests lie in political stability. Our recommended 
     policy shifts our resources to focus on U.S. foreign policy 
     strengths in concert with the international community to 
     promote reconciliation among the warring parties, advance 
     economic development, and encourage region-wide diplomatic 
     engagement.
       We base these conclusions on the following key points 
     raised in the Study Group's research and discussions:
       The United States has only two vital interests in the Af/
     Pak region: 1) preventing Afghanistan from being a ``safe 
     haven'' from which Al Qaeda or other extremists can organize 
     more effective attacks on the U.S. homeland; and 2) ensuring 
     that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal does not fall into hostile 
     hands.
       Protecting our interests does not require a U.S. military 
     victory over the Taliban. A Taliban takeover is unlikely even 
     if the United States reduces its military commitment. The 
     Taliban is a rural insurgency rooted primarily in 
     Afghanistan's Pashtun population, and succeeded due in some 
     part to the disenfranchisement of rural Pashtuns. The 
     Taliban's seizure of power in the 1990s was due to an unusual 
     set of circumstances that no longer exist and are unlikely to 
     be repeated.
       There is no significant Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan 
     today, and the risk of a new ``safe haven'' there under more 
     ``friendly'' Taliban rule is overstated. Should an Al Qaeda 
     cell regroup in Afghanistan, the U.S. would have residual 
     military capability in the region sufficient to track and 
     destroy it.
       Al Qaeda sympathizers are now present in many locations 
     globally, and defeating the Taliban will have little effect 
     on Al Qaeda's global reach. The ongoing threat from Al Qaeda 
     is better met via specific counter-terrorism measures, a 
     reduced U.S. military ``footprint'' in the Islamic world, and 
     diplomatic efforts to improve America's overall image and 
     undermine international support for militant extremism.
       Given our present economic circumstances, reducing the 
     staggering costs of the Afghan war is an urgent priority. 
     Maintaining the long-term health of the U.S. economy is just 
     as important to American strength and security as protecting 
     U.S. soil from enemy (including terrorist) attacks.
       The continuation of an ambitious U.S. military campaign in 
     Afghanistan will likely work against U.S. interests. A large 
     U.S. presence fosters local (especially Pashtun) resentment 
     and aids Taliban recruiting. It also fosters dependence on 
     the part of our Afghan partners and encourages closer 
     cooperation among a disparate array of extremist groups in 
     Afghanistan and Pakistan alike.
       Past efforts to centralize power in Afghanistan have 
     provoked the same sort of local resistance that is convulsing 
     Afghanistan today. There is ample evidence that this effort 
     will join others in a long line of failed incursions.
       Although the United States should support democratic rule, 
     human rights and economic development, its capacity to mold 
     other societies is inherently limited. The costs of trying 
     should be weighed against our need to counter global 
     terrorist threats directly, reduce America's $1.4 trillion 
     budget deficit, repair eroding U.S. infrastructure, and other 
     critical national purposes. Our support of these issues will 
     be better achieved as part of a coordinated international 
     group with which expenses and burdens can be shared.
       The bottom line is clear: Our vital interests in 
     Afghanistan are limited and military victory is not the key 
     to achieving them.
       On the contrary, waging a lengthy counterinsurgency war in 
     Afghanistan may well do more to aid Taliban recruiting than 
     to dismantle the group, help spread conflict further into 
     Pakistan, unify radical groups that might otherwise be 
     quarreling amongst themselves, threaten the long-term health 
     of the U.S. economy, and prevent the U.S. government from 
     turning its full attention to other pressing problems.
       The more promising path for the U.S. in the Af/Pak region 
     would reverse the recent escalation and move away from a 
     counterinsurgency effort that is neither necessary nor likely 
     to succeed. Instead, the U.S. should:
       1. Emphasize power-sharing and political inclusion. The 
     U.S. should fast-track a peace process designed to 
     decentralize power within Afghanistan and encourage a power-
     sharing balance among the principal parties.
       2. Downsize and eventually end military operations in 
     southern Afghanistan, and reduce the U.S. military footprint. 
     The U.S. should draw down its military presence, which 
     radicalizes many Pashtuns and is an important aid to Taliban 
     recruitment.
       3. Focus security efforts on Al Qaeda and Domestic 
     Security. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. 
     capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al 
     Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after Al 
     Qaeda should they attempt to relocate elsewhere or build new 
     training facilities. In addition, part of the savings from 
     our drawdown should be reallocated to bolster U.S. domestic 
     security efforts and to track nuclear weapons globally.
       4. Encourage economic development. Because destitute states 
     can become incubators for terrorism, drug and human 
     trafficking, and other illicit activities, efforts at 
     reconciliation should be paired with an internationally-led 
     effort to develop Afghanistan's economy.
       5. Engage regional and global stakeholders in a diplomatic 
     effort designed to guarantee Afghan neutrality and foster 
     regional stability. Despite their considerable differences, 
     neighboring states such as India, Pakistan, China, Iran and 
     Saudi Arabia share a common interest in preventing 
     Afghanistan from being dominated by any single power or being 
     a permanently failed state that exports instability to 
     others.
       We believe this strategy will best serve the interests of 
     women in Afghanistan as well. The worst thing for women is 
     for Afghanistan to remain paralyzed in a civil war in which 
     there evolves no organically rooted support for their social 
     advancement.
       The remainder of this report elaborates the logic behind 
     these recommendations. It begins by summarizing U.S. vital 
     interests, including our limited interests in Afghanistan 
     itself and in the region more broadly. It then considers why 
     the current strategy is failing and why the situation is 
     unlikely to improve even under a new commander. The final 
     section outlines ``A New Way Forward'' and explains how a 
     radically different approach can achieve core U.S. goals at 
     an acceptable cost.


                          AMERICA'S INTERESTS

       The central goal of U.S. foreign and defense policy is to 
     ensure the safety and prosperity of the American people. In 
     practical terms, this means deterring or thwarting direct 
     attacks on the U.S. homeland, while at the same time 
     maintaining the long-term

[[Page H1930]]

     health of the U.S. economy. A sound economy is the foundation 
     of all national power, and it is critical to our ability to 
     shape the global order and preserve our core values and 
     independence over the long-term. The United States must 
     therefore avoid an open-ended commitment in Afghanistan, 
     especially when the costs of military engagement exceed the 
     likely benefits.
       What Is at Stake in Afghanistan?
       The United States has only two vital strategic interests in 
     Afghanistan. Its first strategic interest is to reduce the 
     threat of successful terrorist attacks against the United 
     States. In operational terms, the goal is to prevent 
     Afghanistan from again becoming a ``safe haven'' that could 
     significantly enhance Al Qaeda's ability to organize and 
     conduct attacks on the United States.
       The United States drove Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan in 
     2002, and Al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is now 
     negligible. Al Qaeda's remaining founders are believed to be 
     in hiding in northwest Pakistan, though affiliated cells are 
     now active in Somalia, Yemen, and several other countries. 
     These developments suggest that even a successful 
     counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan would have only a 
     limited effect on Al Qaeda's ability to conduct terrorist 
     attacks against the United States and its allies. To the 
     extent that our presence facilitates jihadi recruitment and 
     draws resources away from focused counter-terror efforts, it 
     may even be counterproductive.
       The second vital U.S. interest is to keep the conflict in 
     Afghanistan from sowing instability elsewhere in Central 
     Asia. Such discord might one day threaten the stability of 
     the Pakistani state and the security of Pakistan's nuclear 
     arsenal. If the Pakistani government were to fall to radical 
     extremists, or if terrorists were able to steal or seize 
     either a weapon or sufficient nuclear material, then the 
     danger of a nuclear terrorist incident would increase 
     significantly. It is therefore important that our strategy in 
     Afghanistan avoids making the situation in Pakistan worse.
       Fortunately, the danger of a radical takeover of the 
     Pakistani government is small. Islamist extremism in Pakistan 
     is concentrated within the tribal areas in its northwest 
     frontier, and largely confined to its Pashtun minority (which 
     comprises about 15 percent of the population). The Pakistani 
     army is primarily Punjabi (roughly 44 percent of the 
     population) and remains loyal. At present, therefore, this 
     second strategic interest is not seriously threatened.
       Beyond these vital strategic interests, the United States 
     also favors democratic rule, human rights, and economic 
     development. These goals are consistent with traditional U.S. 
     values and reflect a longstanding belief that democracy and 
     the rule of law are preferable to authoritarianism. The U.S. 
     believes that stable and prosperous democracies are less 
     likely to threaten their neighbors or to challenge core U.S. 
     interests. Helping the Afghan people rebuild after decades of 
     war is also appealing on purely moral grounds.
       Yet these latter goals, however worthy in themselves, do 
     not justify a costly and open-ended commitment to war in 
     Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries 
     in the world and is of little intrinsic strategic value to 
     the United States. (Recent reports of sizeable mineral 
     resources do not alter this basic reality.) Afghan society is 
     divided into several distinct ethnic groups with a long 
     history of conflict, it lacks strong democratic traditions, 
     and there is a deeply rooted suspicion of foreign 
     interference.
       It follows that a strategy for Afghanistan must rest on a 
     clear-eyed assessment of U.S. interests and a realistic 
     appraisal of what outside help can and cannot accomplish. It 
     must also take care to ensure that specific policy actions do 
     not undermine the vital interests identified above. The 
     current U.S. strategy has lost sight of these considerations, 
     which is why our war effort there is faltering.

  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record an article by Amanda Terkel of 
the Huffington Post that says that military commanders expect the 
United States to have a significant presence in Afghanistan for another 
8 to 10 years, this according to a Member of Congress who was there.

                [From huffingtonpost.com, Mar. 10, 2011]

Commanders Expect a `Significant' U.S. Presence in Afghanistan for 8 to 
                         10 More Years: Dem Rep

                           (By Amanda Terkel)

       Washington.--Military commanders expect the United States 
     to have a ``significant presence'' in Afghanistan for another 
     eight to 10 years, according to a member of Congress who just 
     returned from a trip to the region and has introduced 
     legislation calling for a full accounting of the costs of the 
     war.
       Rep. Bruce Braley (D-Iowa) spent his congressional four-day 
     weekend on a fact-finding trip to Afghanistan, meeting with 
     Gen. David Petraeus, Amb. Karl Eikenberry and members of the 
     Iowa National Guard. In an interview with The Huffington Post 
     on Wednesday, Braley said that while there has clearly been 
     some significant progress, challenges will remain even after 
     2014, when combat operations are supposed to end.
       ``It was very clear that under the best-case scenario, 
     there will be some significant U.S. presence, according to 
     them, for the next eight to 10 years,'' Braley said, adding 
     that he expected that presence to include both military and 
     civilian personnel. ``That includes a very clear commitment 
     that the drawdown will begin on schedule in July, and that 
     the targeted date of being out with most combat forces by 
     2014 will be met. They continue to maintain that they are on 
     pace to maintain those objectives.''
       The key transition benchmark, Braley said, will be the 
     readiness of local law enforcement to assume principal 
     responsibility of what are now largely U.S. security 
     operations. ``I think that the whole point is to transition 
     the burden of maintaining security to the Afghan army and 
     Afghan police, but there would be an obviously advisory role, 
     they anticipate, for the U.S. military for the foreseeable 
     future,'' he said. ``The big question right now is when they 
     start drawing down in July, where they're going to do that 
     and the size of the redeployment.''
       Pentagon spokespersons told The Huffington Post that the 
     Defense Department is not ready to discuss specific timelines 
     at this point, and so far, no U.S. military or NATO official 
     has publicly cited the time frame mentioned by Braley.
       On Monday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who was also in 
     Afghanistan to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, said 
     that both countries agree U.S. involvement should continue 
     beyond 2014, although he didn't specify at what levels or for 
     how long.
       ``I would say that if the Afghan people and the Afghan 
     government are interested in an ongoing security relationship 
     and some sort of an ongoing security presence--with the 
     permission of the Afghan government--the United States, I 
     think, is open to the possibility of having some presence 
     here in terms of training and assistance, perhaps making use 
     of facilities made available to us by the Afghan government 
     for those purposes,'' said Gates. ``We have no interest in 
     permanent bases, but if the Afghans want us here, we are 
     certainly prepared to contemplate that,''
       While in Afghanistan, Gates also said that there were 
     unlikely to be U.S. withdrawals in July from the hard-fought 
     areas of the south--Helmand and Kandahar provinces. But he 
     added, ``While no decisions on numbers have been made, in my 
     view, we will be well-positioned to begin drawing down some 
     U.S. and coalition forces this July, even as we redeploy 
     others to different areas of the country.''
       Braley said that one of the most profound comments made by 
     Petraeus during their meeting was that there wasn't the 
     ``right combination at play'' in Afghanistan until the fall 
     of last year, which accounts for the slow pace of progress. 
     Incidentally, Petraeus took command in Afghanistan from 
     ousted Gen. Stanley McChrystal in June.
       ``One of the significant challenges that you face is 
     dealing with a sovereign state that was sovereign in name 
     only, which was a comment that Ambassador Eikenberry made,'' 
     said Braley. ``You've got a country with a high illiteracy 
     rate, so that when Afghan army and police are trained, they 
     are also being taught to read and basic math skills. It's a 
     very long-term project to get Afghanistan to the point where 
     it can sustain itself economically. That doesn't even take 
     into account the activities that are going on in Pakistan, 
     which have enormous implications in Afghanistan.''
       On Wednesday, Braley, a member of the House Committee on 
     Veterans. Affairs, introduced the True Cost of War Act, which 
     would require the president and pertinent cabinet members to 
     submit a written report to Congress on the long-term human 
     and financial costs of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan 
     through 2020.
       Braley said this legislation has been a priority of his 
     since he came to Congress in 2006, in large part because of 
     the toll the Iraq war was taking on the country.
       ``The whole point of my legislation is that the American 
     people--especially at a time when Republicans have been 
     pushing all these budget cuts--are entitled to know what the 
     true costs are, because the young men and women coming back 
     with these injuries certainly have a clear understanding of 
     what they are,'' he said.
       Braley added that on his trip, he brought up this issue at 
     nearly every single briefing he attended, recounting the 
     experiences he had just before his trip visiting wounded 
     soldiers and their families who had been treated at the 
     National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md. and the Walter 
     Reed Army Medical Center in D.C.
       ``I wanted them to realize that in a single congressional 
     district in Iowa, the implications of this war were 
     enormous,'' said Braley. ``I have to tell you that I was very 
     impressed by how moved the people I shared those experiences 
     with were. They tend to get caught up in talking policies, 
     numbers and long-term objectives, and I think they 
     appreciated the fact that I brought it down to a very real, 
     human level.''
       On Monday, Rasmussen released a poll finding that for the 
     first time, a majority of Americans want U.S. troops 
     withdrawn from Afghanistan within one year.

  I include for the Record a statement relating to a challenging of the 
claims of progress in Afghanistan that I issued 2 days ago.

       Dear Colleague: Today, many of us are hearing from General 
     Petraeus that ``significant'' progress is being made in 
     Afghanistan. We have heard it before. Military and civilian 
     leaders have, for years, told lawmakers and the public that 
     they were making ``progress'' in Afghanistan. For instance:

[[Page H1931]]

       In a speech to a joint session of Congress in 2004, 
     President Karzai said, ``You [Americans] came to Afghanistan 
     to defeat terrorism, and we Afghans welcomed and embraced you 
     for the liberation of our country. . . . This road, this 
     journey is one of success and victory.''
       In a joint press conference with President Karzai after 
     that speech, President Bush said, ``Today we witness the 
     rebirth of a vibrant Afghan culture. Music fills the 
     marketplaces and people are free to come together to 
     celebrate in open. . . . Years of war and tyranny have eroded 
     Afghanistan's economy and infrastructure, yet a revival is 
     under way.''
       At another joint press conference with President Karzai in 
     March of 2006, President Bush said, ``We are impressed by the 
     progress that your country is making, Mr. President [Karzai], 
     a lot of it has to do with your leadership.''
       In February of 2007, Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry told National 
     Public Radio that Afghanistan was ``on the steady path, right 
     now . . . to, I believe, success.''
       In April 2008, President Bush told news reporters, ``I 
     think we're making good progress in Afghanistan.''
       October 2008, General McKiernan, Commander of NATO forces 
     in Afghanistan, told the press ``We are not losing in 
     Afghanistan.'' In May 2009, he was replaced by General 
     McChrystal.
       October 2008, President Bush said Afghanistan is ``a 
     situation where there's been progress and there are 
     difficulties.''
       November 2009, President Obama, visiting troops in 
     Afghanistan, reportedly said, ``Because of the progress we're 
     making, we look forward to a new phase next year, the 
     beginning of the transition to Afghan responsibility.''
       December 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, the top 
     commander, predicted that the U.S. troop buildup in 
     Afghanistan will make ``significant progress'' in turning 
     back the Taliban and securing the country by the coming 
     summer. ``By next summer I expect there to be significant 
     progress that is evident to us,'' McChrystal said in 
     congressional testimony.
       In January 2010, General McChrystal was asked by Diane 
     Sawyer, ``Have you turned the tide?'' McChrystal answered, 
     ``I believe we are doing that now.''
       In May 2010, General McChrystal told Congress that he saw 
     ``progress'' in Afghanistan.
       In May 2010, President Obama told the press that ``we've 
     begun to reverse the momentum'' in Afghanistan.
       In June 2010, Secretary Gates told a Congressional 
     committee that we are ``making headway'' in Afghanistan. In 
     June 2010, General McChrystal was replaced by General 
     Petraeus.
       In August 2010, General Petraeus said, ``there's progress 
     being made'' in Afghanistan.
       In February 2011, General Petraeus said, ``We have achieved 
     what we set out to achieve in 2010'' which was to reverse the 
     insurgency momentum, solidify our accomplishments, and build 
     on successes. ``We took away safe havens and the 
     infrastructure that goes with it.''
       The President has requested another $113.4 billion to 
     continue the war in Afghanistan in FY12. That sum will be on 
     top of $454.7 billion already spent (and borrowed) on the war 
     to date. On Thursday, March 17, 2011, Congress will have the 
     opportunity to consider whether all of this ``progress'' has 
     been worth the money. It is time for Congress to exercise 
     fiscal responsibility and to assume its Constitutional 
     responsibilities and end the war in Afghanistan. Vote YES on 
     H. Con. Res. 28 and direct the President to end this war by 
     the end of the year.
           Sincerely,
                                               Dennis J. Kucinich,
                                               Member of Congress.

  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Conyers).
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have a senior member of the Judiciary 
Committee on the floor with me, the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Berman). I don't see any other members here. But this is an important 
matter for the Judiciary Committee in that article I, section 8, says 
only Congress has the right to declare war.
  Obviously, we haven't declared war in a very, very long time, so I 
think that we have to find out what is the constitutional basis that we 
are operating under in--well, I will skip Iraq. We all know that was 
based on false information promulgated from the President of the United 
States.

                              {time}  1150

  But, now, getting to Afghanistan, we find that we have a resolution 
dating back to September 14, 2011, a use of force resolution. But that 
has expired, by any rational investigation of it. It was designed to 
respond to the 9/11 terrorist attack and to fight al Qaeda. But today 
we're in Afghanistan on a long-term effort at rebuilding the nation. 
Nation building is unrelated to that original resolution. And now we're 
in Afghanistan and an unlawful incursion into Pakistan.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. CONYERS. So now we're in Pakistan and the CIA is operating covert 
combat activities there, and those are unlawful. We're violating the UN 
Charter, which we are supposed to be a leader in. And so the Obama 
administration is carrying on the same military operations of its 
predecessor.
  Mr. BERMAN. May I inquire how much time is remaining on the time 
allotted to me?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California has 22 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask unanimous consent that 8 
of those 22 minutes be yielded to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Burton), who is now controlling the time for the majority on the 
committee.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) will 
control 8 minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I just want to take a couple of minutes to talk about one point. That 
part of the majority party that is urging the same position I am on 
this resolution, which is a ``no'' vote, has made the argument a number 
of times that when you're dealing with fundamental issues of national 
security, you spend money, even under difficult times, a point that I 
have no disagreement with. And they argue the issue of what the 
alternatives will be and the potential for providing new safe havens 
for terrorists or more safe havens for terrorists or a return of 
Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists if we pass this resolution, 
and I don't disagree with that point.
  What I find upsetting about the majority's position is their denial 
of the fundamental point. They quote General Petraeus for every 
position that they find philosophically and factually satisfying and 
ignore General Petraeus and Secretary Gates on the fundamental concept 
of how we hope to change the course of what is happening in 
Afghanistan. Because if we don't change it, then we have to come and 
address the fundamental question of what we're doing there through a 
counterinsurgency strategy.
  So we talk about clear and hold and build. And it is the military's 
job to clear and, for a time, to hold, but build is fundamentally a 
civilian program. General Petraeus over and over again has said this 
conflict in Afghanistan cannot be won unless we strengthen the 
governance of a very flawed government in Afghanistan, unless we 
provide economic opportunities for that society to progress and win the 
hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan to the cause for which we 
are fighting.
  It's also a view of Afghanistan as if it's isolated from the rest of 
the world. I can go through countries around the world--failed states, 
nearly failing states, terrible problems--which are certainly becoming 
safe harbors for terrorism.
  So when the same party that makes a strong case for our national 
security interests here at the same time passes legislation which 
slashes every aspect of efforts to strengthen governance and 
development assistance and to provide the kinds of opportunities that 
serve our national security interests, I find it a strange kind of 
logic and a flaw in their approach to this.
  I understand the economic hardships we have. If one wanted to look at 
the foreign assistance budget and take specific things that aren't 
working and get rid of them, I understand that, and if one wanted to 
make proportional cuts in the foreign assistance budget. But to come 
with the argument of, ``We're broke; we've got to cut spending,'' and 
then disproportionately focus on that aspect of our national security 
strategy which will do a tremendous amount and will be fundamental to 
any effort to stop them from being safe harbors for terrorism, and that 
is to massively slash disproportionately foreign assistance, it's a 
terrible mistake. It terribly undermines the national security strategy 
that we're trying to achieve through our operations and our presence 
and the money we're spending

[[Page H1932]]

in Afghanistan. It's not thinking, I think, as clearly as needs to be 
thought. And I urge those in the majority to think again about how much 
the cuts that we need to make should be coming from that part of the 
budget that constitutes 1 percent of the Federal budget.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from California, I have great 
respect for him in many, many ways. We talk about we've got to enhance 
the governance of Afghanistan. Well, this is President Karzai's quote 
from March 12, 2001. I have read it before, but I want to submit it for 
the Record:
  ``I request that NATO and America should stop these operations on our 
soil,'' Karzai said. ``This war is not on our soil. If this war is 
against terror, then this war is not here. Terror is not here.''
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Griffin), the vice chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, and an Iraq war veteran who 
continues to serve as a major in the U.S. Army Reserves.
  Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas. I rise today in opposition to H. Con. Res. 
28 because it would undermine our national security and our ability to 
keep us safe right here at home. I understand that many Americans are 
frustrated with the length of this war. I also understand the American 
people have demanded the U.S. Government get its fiscal house in order. 
I know we cannot afford to fund this war indefinitely. But some think 
that cutting and running immediately from Afghanistan is the solution. 
That's simply not an option.
  This is a reckless resolution. We've made progress in Afghanistan, 
and we cannot afford to abandon that progress by immediately 
withdrawing our troops. What we must do, however, is demand that our 
military and civilian leaders set clear and definable goals for our 
military efforts in Afghanistan. We also must listen to our military 
commanders who are there on the ground day in and day out.
  General Petraeus has testified to our military's substantial progress 
in impeding the Taliban's influence and increasing the number of Afghan 
security forces. He cautioned, however, that this recent success is 
fragile and reversible.
  We must allow our troops to remain in Afghanistan to defeat the 
Taliban and al Qaeda so that we can keep Americans safe here. We must 
continue to train and support local security forces because this will 
bring about the safe and successful full transition of the country's 
security to the Afghan people.

                              {time}  1200

  To withdraw now, to withdraw immediately, would be to forfeit that 
progress and allow the Taliban and other extremists to regain their 
footing in Afghanistan.
  We must honor the men and women of our Armed Forces, who have fought 
so hard. We must honor the men and women of the international armed 
forces, who have fought so hard. We must honor the men and women of the 
Afghan forces, who have fought hard to defend their own country. They 
have sacrificed so much, and we cannot abandon them now. Most 
importantly, it is not in our national interest to do so.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank Mr. Berman for 
giving us 8 minutes of his time, and I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. KUCINICH. May I ask, Mr. Speaker, how much time each group has 
remaining.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida controls 22 
minutes; the gentleman from Ohio controls 22 minutes; the gentleman 
from California controls 9\1/2\ minutes; and the gentleman from North 
Carolina controls 16 minutes.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. Speaker, Members of this House are talking about cutting $100 
billion from the budget. Well, we can trim the Federal budget of more 
than $100 billion in out-of-control spending.
  Members have been very concerned about out-of-control spending. They 
are calling for a reduction in the Federal budget. Cutting spending on 
the war in Afghanistan would solve their concerns. Spending on the war 
is greater than the minimum amount of Federal spending certain Members 
believe must be cut from the budget for fiscal responsibility.
  In the fiscal year 2012 budget request, the President has requested 
$113.4 billion to continue the war. In fact, congressional 
appropriations of over $100 billion for the Afghanistan war has been 
the rule in recent years; and as we've seen, there is talk of extending 
this war for another 10 years. $1 trillion, perhaps?
  Spending on the Afghanistan war has increased much faster than 
overall government spending in recent years. Consider a comparison of 
the average annual rates of growth of government spending versus the 
Afghanistan war spending from 2008 through 2011.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself 10 more seconds.
  Overall government spending has increased 9 percent from 2008 through 
2011, but Afghanistan war spending has increased 25 percent. If you 
want to save $100 billion, then vote for this resolution.
  I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Filner).
  (Mr. FILNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FILNER. Mr. Kucinich, I thank you for your courage in bringing 
this debate to the floor. It's like the 600-pound elephant in the 
Nation. This war has gone on and on--and we never discuss it.
  I want to applaud the courage of Mr. Jones from North Carolina. He 
has taken more than a lot of grief from his own party, and he has stood 
up to that with courage that is admirable.
  I want to look at this debate, my colleagues, from the point of view 
of former chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, a position in 
which I was honored to serve.
  Mr. Kucinich, I think you underestimate the cost of this war. I've 
never seen you so conservative.
  I had a hearing last year before the Veterans' Affairs Committee in 
which Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stigleitz testified. He said 
these wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will be $5 trillion to $7 trillion 
wars over their whole course. Let us not forget--and that's not 
calculated in your costs. Mr. Kucinich--the veterans, those who have 
served in this war with great courage, with great professionalism. 
Treating these veterans costs hundreds of billions of dollars more, and 
we're not considering that when we talk about ending this war.
  We've been told that there have been about 45,000 casualties in these 
two wars in the last 10 years. Then why have almost 1 million people 
shown up at the Veterans Administration hospitals for war-related 
injuries? One million. This is not a rounding error. This is a 
deliberate attempt to misguide us on the cost of this war. This war is 
costing, in addition to what the budget says, hundreds of billions more 
for treating our veterans. We must calculate that into the cost of this 
war.
  When you guys say, ``deficit and debt,'' we are going to say, 
``Afghanistan.''
  In recent weeks, we have heard much from our Republican colleagues 
about out-of-control Federal spending. They want to cut $100 billion 
from our budget.
  If my friends are serious about cutting the budget, they should vote 
for H. Con. Res. 28.
  Since 2001, our Nation has wasted $1.121 trillion on the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. We are spending $5.4 billion a month in Iraq and $5.7 
billion a month in Afghanistan. This is a waste of our national 
resources and taxpayer funding!
  For FY2012, the President has requested $113.4 billion to continue 
the war in Afghanistan.
  Between 2008 through 2011, overall government spending went up 9 
percent annually. But this is nothing compared to the 25 percent annual 
increase in spending in Afghanistan.
  Furthermore, spending on the Afghanistan war is rising at an 
accelerating rate. Over just three years (2010, 2011, and 2012), we 
will spend 45 percent more on the war in Afghanistan than we did in the 
preceding 8 years!
  There is no better example of out-of-control Federal spending.
  If Congress is really serious about being fiscally responsible and 
about cutting the Federal budget by three figures, then cutting 
spending on the out-of-control, hundred billion dollar a

[[Page H1933]]

year war in Afghanistan must be a serious consideration.
  Today, we have an opportunity to do just that! A Yes vote will cut 
the 2012 budget by at least $113.4 billion.
  If you are serious about reducing the deficit, then vote ``yes'' on 
H. Con. Res. 28!
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. You're someone who says ``billions of dollars'' and 
``Afghanistan'' both.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution and in support of 
our military personnel who are putting their lives in jeopardy in 
Afghanistan. They are doing their duty for us, for which every American 
should be eternally grateful. Now we must do our duty to them. If our 
military is engaged in a dangerous mission that we believe cannot be 
successful and but for face-saving we are keeping them there, we are 
doing a disservice to our defenders and to our Nation.
  The people of Afghanistan are as courageous and independent as any on 
Earth. They are indomitable and unconquerable--a lesson invaders have 
learned the hard way for centuries. The liberation of Afghanistan from 
the Taliban was accomplished, not by a massive influx of American 
troops, but instead by fighters of the Northern Alliance militia and 
the air support that we provided them. It was a tremendous success.
  When they were doing the fighting, it was a success. When we try to 
do the fighting all over the world, we lose. We cannot be a Nation that 
occupies the rest of the world. We cannot be a country that sends its 
troops all over the world to handle every problem.
  After the great success of eliminating the Taliban from Afghanistan, 
our foreign policy bureaucracy, not our troops, set in place a 
government structure totally inconsistent with the village and tribal 
culture of the Afghan people. That information is no surprise to 
anybody. Most of us understand that.
  They have a tribal culture there in Afghanistan and a village system. 
That is what works for them. Our State Department has tried to foist 
upon them a centralized system in which they don't even elect their 
provincial governors. After being liberated from the Taliban by 
Afghans, our troops are now there to force the Afghan people to accept 
an overly centralized and corrupt system which was put in place by our 
State Department bureaucracy.
  I'm sorry, it won't work. It will not work. Any attempt to subjugate 
these people and to force them to acquiesce to our vision of 
Afghanistan will fail. We all understand that. If we are honest with 
ourselves, we know that that tactic won't succeed. To keep our troops 
over there any longer is sinful. It is a disservice to our country, and 
it is also sinful to those young men who are willing to give their legs 
and their lives for us.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. JONES. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is now up to us in Congress to stand up for those 
Americans in uniform who will be needlessly giving their lives to 
accomplish a mission that cannot be accomplished. If it can't be done, 
we should not be sending them over there.
  The most responsible course of action is to, as quickly as possible, 
get our people out of this predicament, not to dig us in deeper and not 
to wait until this bloody quagmire kills even more Americans and we 
have to leave without success. If we can't win, we should pull out now.
  Mr. JONES. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to a 
gentleman who knows a lot about the threats that are facing our Nation, 
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers), the chairman of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

                              {time}  1210

  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, there is a lot of power and 
emotion in this debate today, and I'm glad for that. There should be.
  I recall the first time I had the chance to get to Afghanistan in 
late 2003. I met a woman there who had been trained as a doctor in the 
United States. She went to practice medicine in her home country of 
Afghanistan. When the Taliban took over, they stripped her of her 
medical duties. They sent her home. She was imprisoned in her own home 
for 6 years. I met her at a children's hospital, and in the days of the 
first conflict, she stripped off her burka, she walked 10 miles to the 
town to show up to provide medical care for the first time to these 
children as a woman in Afghanistan. With tears in her eyes she said, 
Thank you. These children have no chance. Afghanistan has no future.
  And we saw the soccer field where they took people down and summarily 
executed them for violations that they deemed to be executable offenses 
under no law of their own, the burned buses where the modern 
conveniences were burned to get them out of the system when the Taliban 
took over to apply sharia law. And none of that would matter from the 
pain and the loss if you've attended one of these fine soldier's 
funerals; it is an emotional thing, and there is pain, and hurt, and 
sorrow, and something lost in all of us.
  So none of those other things would be alone a reason to send our 
soldiers to risk their lives in defense of this country, but because of 
the things I talked about, because they have imprisoned women in 
Afghanistan, because of the things that they've done to the people 
there, it created hate and ignorance and brutality, and al Qaeda saw an 
advantage, and they took it. They established there a safe haven where 
they recruited, where they financed, where they planned, where they 
armed themselves, where they recruited people around the world from 
other countries to come to train, and they sent some of them to the 
United States of America to slaughter 3,000 people.
  And if you want to talk about money, the trillion-plus dollars that 
9/11 has cost us just in economic loss, that's why we're there. We 
should not forget the mission today and why they risk their lives. If 
you want to talk about the State Department policies, I'm all in. I'd 
love to have that debate. If you want to talk about rules of 
engagement, I'm in, that's a place, let's do it, let's have that 
debate.
  But if you want to tell the enemy today--and by the way, for the 
first time, we've got information that their commanders are saying we 
don't want to go fight. The spring offensive is being planned now, 
right now. Our soldiers are preparing for battle right now. This may be 
that last great battle in Afghanistan on behalf of our soldiers to 
eliminate the major components of the Taliban taking over their 
country.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. So if that woman doctor who trained here, 
taking care of kids, who cried for help and support doesn't move you, 
and maybe it shouldn't; for the pain of that funeral, that loss, that 
soldier who gave it all for this country doesn't move; then what ought 
to move you is the fact that these folks are gearing up and hoping and 
praying that we give up and we pull these troops out before the mission 
is done.
  We all want them home. We want them home with no safe haven and a way 
that we can continue to put pressure on al Qaeda and its supporting 
affiliates.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to include in the Record an article on 
AlterNet by Tom Engelhardt which discusses the open-ended nature of the 
Afghanistan war.

    How To Schedule a War: The Incredible Shrinking Withdrawal Date

                          (By Tom Engelhardt)

       Going, going, gone! You can almost hear the announcer's 
     voice throbbing with excitement, only we're not talking about 
     home runs here, but about the disappearing date on which, for 
     the United States and its military, the Afghan War will 
     officially end.
       Practically speaking, the answer to when it will be over 
     is: just this side of never. If you take the word of our 
     Afghan War commander, the secretary of defense, and top 
     officials of the Obama administration and NATO, we're not 
     leaving any time soon. As with any clever time traveler, 
     every date that's set always contains a verbal escape hatch 
     into the future.
       In my 1950s childhood, there was a cheesy (if thrilling) 
     sci-fi flick, The Incredible Shrinking Man, about a fellow 
     who passed

[[Page H1934]]

     through a radioactive cloud in the Pacific Ocean and soon 
     noticed that his suits were too big for him. Next thing you 
     knew, he was living in a doll house, holding off his pet cat, 
     and fighting an ordinary spider transformed into a monster. 
     Finally, he disappeared entirely leaving behind only a 
     sonorous voice to tell us that he had entered a universe 
     where ``the unbelievably small and the unbelievably vast 
     eventually meet, like the closing of a gigantic circle.''
       In recent weeks, without a radioactive cloud in sight, the 
     date for serious drawdowns of American troops in Afghanistan 
     has followed a similar path toward the vanishing point and is 
     now threatening to disappear ``over the horizon'' (a place 
     where, we are regularly told, American troops will lurk once 
     they have finally handed their duties over to the Afghan 
     forces they are training).
       If you remember, back in December 2009 President Obama 
     spoke of July 2011 as a firm date to ``begin the transfer of 
     our forces out of Afghanistan,'' the moment assumedly when 
     the beginning of the end of the war would come into sight. In 
     July of this year, Afghan President Hamid Karzai spoke of 
     2014 as the date when Afghan security forces ``will be 
     responsible for all military and law enforcement operations 
     throughout our country.''
       Administration officials, anxious about the effect that 
     2011 date was having on an American public grown weary of an 
     unpopular war and on an enemy waiting for us to depart, 
     grabbed Karzai's date and ran with it (leaving many of his 
     caveats about the war the Americans were fighting, 
     particularly his desire to reduce the American presence, in 
     the dust). Now, 2014 is hyped as the new 2011.
       It has, in fact, been widely reported that Obama officials 
     have been working in concert to ``play down'' the president's 
     2011 date, while refocusing attention on 2014. In recent 
     weeks, top administration officials have been little short of 
     voluble on the subject. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
     (``We're not getting out. We're talking about probably a 
     years-long process.''), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
     and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen, 
     attending a security conference in Australia, all ``cited 
     2014 . . . as the key date for handing over the defense of 
     Afghanistan to the Afghans themselves.'' The New York Times 
     headlined its report on the suddenly prominent change in 
     timing this way: ``U.S. Tweaks Message on Troops in 
     Afghanistan.''
       Quite a tweak. Added Times reporter Elisabeth Bumiller: 
     ``The message shift is effectively a victory for the 
     military, which has long said the July 2011 deadline 
     undermined its mission by making Afghans reluctant to work 
     with troops perceived to be leaving shortly.''


                Inflection Points and Aspirational Goals

       Barely had 2014 risen into the headlines, however, before 
     that date, too, began to be chipped away. As a start, it 
     turned out that American planners weren't talking about just 
     any old day in 2014, but its last one. As Lieutenant General 
     William Caldwell, head of the NATO training program for 
     Afghan security forces, put it while holding a Q&A with a 
     group of bloggers, ``They're talking about December 31st, 
     2014. It's the end of December in 2014 . . . that [Afghan] 
     President Karzai has said they want Afghan security forces in 
     the lead.''
       Nor, officials rushed to say, was anyone talking about 2014 
     as a date for all American troops to head for the exits, just 
     ``combat troops''--and maybe not even all of them. Possibly 
     tens of thousands of trainers and other so-called non-combat 
     forces would stay on to help with the ``transition process.'' 
     This follows the Iraq pattern where 50,000 American troops 
     remain after the departure of U.S. ``combat'' forces to great 
     media fanfare. Richard Holbrooke, Obama's Special 
     Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, was typical in 
     calling for ``the substantial combat forces [to] be phased 
     out at the end of 2014, four years from now.'' (Note the 
     usual verbal escape hatch, in this case ``substantial,'' 
     lurking in his statement.)
       Last Saturday, behind ``closed doors'' at a NATO summit in 
     Lisbon, Portugal, Afghan War commander General David Petraeus 
     presented European leaders with a ``phased four-year plan'' 
     to ``wind down American and allied fighting in Afghanistan.'' 
     Not surprisingly, it had the end of 2014 in its sights and 
     the president quickly confirmed that ``transition'' date, 
     even while opening plenty of post-2014 wiggle room. By then, 
     as he described it, ``our footprint'' would only be 
     ``significantly reduced.'' (He also claimed that, post-2014, 
     the U.S. would be maintaining a ``counterterrorism 
     capability'' in Afghanistan--and Iraq--for which ``platforms 
     to . . . execute . . . counterterrorism operations,'' 
     assumedly bases, would be needed.)
       Meanwhile, unnamed ``senior U.S. officials'' in Lisbon were 
     clearly buttonholing reporters to ``cast doubt on whether the 
     United States, the dominant power in the 28-nation alliance, 
     would end its own combat mission before 2015.'' As always, 
     the usual qualifying phrases were profusely in evidence.
       Throughout these weeks, the ``tweaking''--that is, the 
     further chipping away at 2014 as a hard and fast date for 
     anything--only continued. Mark Sedwill, NATO's civilian 
     counterpart to U.S. commander General David Petraeus, 
     insisted that 2014 was nothing more than ``an inflection 
     point'' in an ever more drawn-out drawdown process. That 
     process, he insisted, would likely extend to ``2015 and 
     beyond,'' which, of course, put 2016 officially into play. 
     And keep in mind that this is only for combat troops, not 
     those assigned to ``train and support'' or keep ``a strategic 
     over watch'' on Afghan forces.
       On the eve of NATO's Lisbon meeting, Pentagon spokesman 
     Geoff Morrell, waxing near poetic, declared 2014 nothing more 
     than an ``aspirational goal,'' rather than an actual 
     deadline. As the conference began, NATO's Secretary General 
     Anders Fogh Rasmussen insisted that the alliance would be 
     committed in Afghanistan ``as long as it takes.'' And new 
     British Chief of the Defense Staff General Sir David Richards 
     suggested that, given the difficulty of ever defeating the 
     Taliban (or al-Qaeda) militarily, NATO should be preparing 
     plans to maintain a role for its troops for the next 30 to 40 
     years.


                              war extender

       Here, then, is a brief history of American time in 
     Afghanistan. After all, this isn't our first Afghan War, but 
     our second. The first, the CIA's anti-Soviet jihad (in which 
     the Agency funded a number of the fundamentalist extremists 
     we're now fighting in the second), lasted a decade, from 1980 
     until 1989 when the Soviets withdrew in defeat.
       In October 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush 
     administration launched America's second Afghan War, taking 
     Kabul that November as the Taliban dissolved. The power of 
     the American military to achieve quick and total victory 
     seemed undeniable, even after Osama bin Laden slipped out of 
     Tora Bora that December and escaped into Pakistan's tribal 
     borderlands.
       However, it evidently never crossed the minds of President 
     Bush's top officials to simply declare victory and get out. 
     Instead, as the U.S. would do in Iraq after the invasion of 
     2003, the Pentagon started building a new infrastructure of 
     military bases (in this case, on the ruins of the old Soviet 
     base infrastructure). At the same time, the former Cold 
     Warriors in Washington let their dreams about pushing the 
     former commies of the former Soviet Union out of the former 
     soviet socialist republics of Central Asia, places where, 
     everyone knew, you could just about swim in black gold and 
     run geopolitically wild.
       Then, when the invasion of Iraq was launched in March 2003, 
     Afghanistan, still a ``war'' (if barely) was forgotten, while 
     the Taliban returned to the field, built up their strength, 
     and launched an insurgency that has only gained momentum to 
     this moment. In 2008, before leaving office, George W. Bush 
     bumped his favorite general, Iraq surge commander Petraeus, 
     upstairs to become the head of the Central Command which 
     oversees America's war zones in the Greater Middle East, 
     including Afghanistan.
       Already the guru of counterinsurgency (known familiarly as 
     COIN), Petraeus had, in 2006, overseen the production of the 
     military's new war-fighting bible, a how-to manual dusted off 
     from the Vietnam era's failed version of COIN and made new 
     and magical again. In June 2010, eight and a half years into 
     our Second Afghan War, at President Obama's request, Petraeus 
     took over as Afghan War commander. It was clear then that 
     time was short--with an administration review of Afghan war 
     strategy coming up at year's end and results needed quickly. 
     The American war was also in terrible shape.
       In the new COIN-ish U.S. Army, however, it is a dogma of 
     almost biblical faith that counterinsurgencies don't produce 
     quick results; that, to be successful, they must be pursued 
     for years on end. As Petraeus put it back in 2007 when 
     talking about Iraq, ``[T]ypically, I think historically, 
     counterinsurgency operations have gone at least nine or 10 
     years.'' Recently, in an interview with Martha Raddatz of ABC 
     News, he made a nod toward exactly the same timeframe for 
     Afghanistan, one accepted as bedrock knowledge in the world 
     of the COINistas.
       What this meant was that, whether as CENTCOM commander or 
     Afghan War commander, Petraeus was looking for two 
     potentially contradictory results at the same time. Somehow, 
     he needed to wrest those nine to 10 years of war-fighting 
     from a president looking for a tighter schedule and, in a war 
     going terribly sour, he needed almost instant evidence of 
     ``progress'' that would fit the president's coming December 
     ``review'' of the war and might pacify unhappy publics in the 
     U.S. and Europe.
       Now let's do the math. At the moment, depending on how you 
     care to count, we are in the 10th year of our second Afghan 
     War or the 20th year of war interruptus. Since June 2009, 
     Petraeus and various helpers have stretched the schedule to 
     2014 for (most) American combat troops and at least 2015 or 
     2016 for the rest. If you were to start counting from the 
     president's December surge address, that's potentially seven 
     more years. In other words, we're now talking about either a 
     15-year war or an on-and-off again quarter-century one. All 
     evidence shows that the Pentagon's war planners would like to 
     extend those already vague dates even further into the 
     future.


               On Ticking Clocks in Washington and Kabul

       Up to now, only one of General Petraeus's two campaigns has 
     been under discussion here: the other one, fought out these 
     last years not in Afghanistan, but in Washington and NATO 
     capitals, over how to schedule a war. Think of it as the war 
     for a free hand in determining how long the Afghan War is to 
     be fought.
       It has been run from General Petraeus's headquarters in 
     Kabul, the giant five-sided

[[Page H1935]]

     military headquarters on the Potomac presided over by 
     Secretary of Defense Gates, and various think-tanks filled 
     with America's militarized intelligentsia scattered around 
     Washington--and it has proven a classically successful 
     ``clear, hold, build'' counterinsurgency operation. 
     Pacification in Washington and a number of European capitals 
     has occurred with remarkably few casualties. (Former Afghan 
     war commander General Stanley McChrystal, axed by the 
     president for insubordination, has been the exception, not 
     the rule.)
       Slowly but decisively, Petraeus and company constricted 
     President Obama's war-planning choices to two options: more 
     and yet more. In late 2009, the president agreed to that 
     second surge of troops (the first had been announced that 
     March), not to speak of CIA agents, drones, private 
     contractors, and State Department and other civilian 
     government employees. In his December ``surge'' address at 
     West Point (for the nation but visibly to the military), 
     Obama had the temerity as commander-in-chief to name a 
     specific, soon-to-arrive date--July 2011--for beginning a 
     serious troop drawdown. It was then that the COIN campaign in 
     Washington ramped up into high gear with the goal of driving 
     the prospective end of the war back by years.
       It took bare hours after the president's address for 
     administration officials to begin leaking to media sources 
     that his drawdown would be ``conditions based''--a phrase 
     guaranteed to suck the meaning out of any deadline. (The 
     president had indeed acknowledged in his address that his 
     administration would take into account ``conditions on the 
     ground.'') Soon, the Secretary of Defense and others took to 
     the airwaves in a months-long campaign emphasizing that 
     drawdown in Afghanistan didn't really mean drawdown, that 
     leaving by no means meant leaving, and that the future was 
     endlessly open to interpretation.
       With the ratification in Lisbon of that 2014 date ``and 
     beyond,'' the political clocks--an image General Petraeus 
     loves--in Washington, European capitals, and American Kabul 
     are now ticking more or less in unison.
       Two other ``clocks'' are, however, ticking more like bombs. 
     If counterinsurgency is a hearts and minds campaign, then the 
     other target of General Petraeus's first COIN campaign has 
     been the restive hearts and minds of the American and 
     European publics. Last year a Dutch government fell over 
     popular opposition to Afghanistan and, even as NATO met last 
     weekend, thousands of antiwar protestors marched in London 
     and Lisbon. Europeans generally want out and their 
     governments know it, but (as has been true since 1945) the 
     continent's leaders have no idea how to say ``no'' to 
     Washington. In the U.S., too, the Afghan war grows ever more 
     unpopular, and while it was forgotten during the election 
     season, no politician should count on that phenomenon lasting 
     forever.
       And then, of course, there's the literal ticking bomb, the 
     actual war in Afghanistan. In that campaign, despite a 
     drumbeat of American/NATO publicity about ``progress,'' the 
     news has been grim indeed. American and NATO casualties have 
     been higher this year than at any other moment in the war; 
     the Taliban seems if anything more entrenched in more parts 
     of the country; the Afghan public, ever more puzzled and less 
     happy with foreign troops and contractors traipsing across 
     the land; and Hamid Karzai, the president of the country, 
     sensing a situation gone truly sour, has been regularly 
     challenging the way General Petraeus is fighting the war in 
     his country. (The nerve!)
       No less unsettling, General Petraeus himself has seemed 
     unnerved. He was declared ``irked'' by Karzai's comments and 
     was said to have warned Afghan officials that their 
     president's criticism might be making his ``own position 
     `untenable,' '' which was taken as a resignation threat. 
     Meanwhile, the COIN-meister was in the process of imposing a 
     new battle plan on Afghanistan that leaves counterinsurgency 
     (at least as usually described) in a roadside ditch. No more 
     is the byword ``protect the people,'' or ``clear, hold, 
     build''; now, it's smash, kill, destroy. The war commander 
     has loosed American firepower in a major way in the Taliban 
     strongholds of southern Afghanistan.
       Early this year, then-commander McChrystal had 
     significantly cut back on U.S. air strikes as a COIN-ish 
     measure meant to lessen civilian casualties. No longer. In a 
     striking reversal, air power has been called in--and in a big 
     way. In October, U.S. planes launched missiles or bombs on 
     1,000 separate Afghan missions, numbers seldom seen since the 
     2001 invasion. The Army has similarly loosed its massively 
     powerful High Mobility Artillery Rocket System in the area 
     around the southern city of Kandahar. Civilian deaths are 
     rising rapidly.

  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  We keep coming back to 9/11. We're near the eighth anniversary of the 
invasion of Iraq, which had nothing to do with 9/11, and which was 
predicated on a lie, no weapons of mass destruction. The war in 
Afghanistan is based on a misreading of history. The Soviet Union 
understood that at hard cost. The occupation is fueling an insurgency.
  Now, Jeremy Scahill in the Nation points out that Taliban leaders 
have said they've seen a swelling in Taliban ranks since 9/11 in part 
attributed to the widely held perception that the Karzai government is 
corrupt and illegitimate, and that Afghans, primarily ethnic Pashtuns, 
want foreign occupation forces out. They're only fighting to make 
foreigners leave Afghanistan. Occupation fuels insurgency. That is an 
ironclad fact.
  I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
  Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of this resolution, of 
which I'm proud to be an original cosponsor, and I'd like to thank 
Representative Kucinich for his work on this resolution and also mainly 
for his continued and passioned defense of congressional war powers 
authority. Also, I, too, want to commend Congressman Jones for his 
leadership on this issue and so many other issues.
  This resolution is simple and straightforward. It directs the 
President to end the near decade-long war in Afghanistan and to 
redeploy United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan by the end of this 
year. Al Qaeda is not in Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden still has not 
been found. This resolution comes at a time when a growing number of 
Members of Congress, military and foreign policy experts, and, in 
particular, the American people, are calling for an immediate end to 
this war. Enough is enough.
  Let me just say something. First of all, we've heard that polls are 
showing that nearly three-quarters of the American public favors action 
to speed up U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yes, the Congress 
authorized the use of force in 2001, which I voted against because it 
gave the President, any President, a blank check to use force, anytime, 
anyplace, anywhere in the world for any period of time. It was not a 
declaration of war, yet this has been the longest war in American 
history, the longest war in American history.
  As the daughter of a 25-year Army officer who served in two wars, let 
me salute our troops, let me honor our troops and just say our 
servicemen and -women have performed with incredible courage and 
commitment in Afghanistan. But they have been put in an impossible 
situation. It's time to bring them home. There is no military solution 
in Afghanistan.
  As we fight here in Congress to protect investments in education, 
health care, public health and safety, the war in Afghanistan will cost 
more than $100 billion in 2011 alone.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield the gentlewoman an additional 30 seconds.
  Ms. LEE. No one can deny that the increasing costs of the war in 
Afghanistan are constraining our efforts to invest in job creation and 
jump-start the economy.
  Yesterday, I joined a bipartisan group of 80 Members of Congress in 
sending a letter to President Obama calling for a significant and 
sizeable reduction in United States troop levels in Afghanistan no 
later than July of this year.
  This debate that we're having today here should have occurred in 2001 
when Congress authorized this blank check. It was barely debated. It 
was barely debated, and the rush to war has created not less anger 
towards the United States but more hostilities, and it's not in our 
national security nor economic interests to continue.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I want to point out that for those Members who are 
concerned about the finances of this government, U.S. debt soared from 
$6.4 trillion in March 2003 to $10 trillion.
  Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winner economist, and his associate, 
Linda Bilmes, pointed out that at least a quarter of that increase is 
directly attributable to the war in Iraq. As a result of two costly 
wars, funded by debt, our fiscal house was in abysmal shape even before 
the financial crisis, and those fiscal woes compounded the downturn. 
The global financial crisis was due at least in part--this is a quote--
to the war.

                              {time}  1220

  Now they continue. The Iraq war didn't just contribute to the 
severity of the fiscal crisis, though it kept us from responding to it 
effectively. So, my friends, finance is a national security issue. If 
we are broke, we can't defend ourselves.

[[Page H1936]]

  I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Welch).
  Mr. WELCH. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, my colleagues on the other side, America does have a 
national security interest in protecting American citizens from 
terrorist attack. But the question before us is this: Is that national 
security interest being served by 10 years of nation building in the 
third most corrupt country in the entire world? Is our national 
security interest being served by sending 100,000 troops and $454 
billion in taxpayer money to a country where there are 50 members of al 
Qaeda? Is it a winning and likely successful strategy when al Qaeda 
simply moves where we aren't? They move out of Afghanistan into 
Pakistan, to Sudan, to wherever they can find a safe haven.
  Does it make sense to ask our soldiers and our taxpayers to sacrifice 
when our Afghan partner is so profoundly corrupt? And I mean world-
class corrupt: $3 billion in pallets of cash moved out of the Kabul 
airport to safe havens for warlords; an Afghan Vice President who flies 
to Dubai with $52 million in walking-around money; when the U.S.-backed 
Afghan major crimes unit tries to get Karzai to act on corruption and 
Karzai gets his buddy out of jail. Yes, we have a national security 
interest in protecting America from attack, but this is a losing 
strategy.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York 
(Ms. Velazquez).
  (Ms. VELAZQUEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this 
resolution.
  After 10 long years, $336 billion spent, 1,500 American lives lost, 
and thousands maimed, it is time to bring our troops home. Our 
servicemen and -women and their coalition allies have performed 
valiantly. The United States has done everything possible to provide 
opportunity for the Afghanistan people and the chance for a democratic 
government there to mature and take hold. Afghanistan must now take 
responsibility for its own destiny.
  The fact of the matter is this: If now is not the time to leave, then 
when? Afghanistan has become the longest war in U.S. history, with a 
price tag of $100 billion a year. At a time when we are contemplating 
cutting services for seniors, educational programs for children, and 
tuition assistance for working college students, that money could be 
spent more wisely elsewhere.
  Mr. Speaker, too much of our country's treasure has gone toward this 
war. But more importantly, the cost in human life, American and Afghan, 
has been enormous. As the world's greatest democracy, what kind of 
message does this war send to other nations? Do as we say, not as we 
do?
  It is time to make our actions reflect our words. Get out of 
Afghanistan now.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, at the present time, I would like to yield 5 
minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Paul).
  (Mr. PAUL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman.
  The question we are facing today is, should we leave Afghanistan? I 
think the answer is very clear, and it's not complicated. Of course we 
should, as soon as we can. This suggests that we can leave by the end 
of the year. If we don't, we'll be there for another decade, would be 
my prediction.
  The American people are now with us. A group of us here in the 
Congress, a bipartisan group, for nearly a decade have been talking 
about this, arguing not to expand the war, not to be over there, not to 
be in nation building. And the American people didn't pay much 
attention. Now they are. The large majority of the American people now 
say it's time to get out of Afghanistan. It's a fruitless venture. Too 
much has been lost. The chance of winning, since we don't even know 
what we are going to win, doesn't exist. So they are tired of it. 
Financially, there's a good reason to come home as well.
  Some argue we have to be there because if we leave under these 
circumstances we'll lose face; it will look embarrassing to leave. So 
how many more men and women have to die, how many more dollars have to 
be spent to save face? That is one of the worst arguments possible.
  We are not there under legal conditions. This is a war. Who says it 
isn't a war? Everybody talks about the Afghan war. Was the war 
declared? Of course not. It wasn't declared. There was a resolution 
passed that said that the President at that time, under the emergency 
of 9/11, could go and deal with al Qaeda, those who brought upon the 9/
11 bombings. But al Qaeda is not there anymore. So we are fighting the 
Taliban.
  The Taliban used to be our allies at one time when the Soviets were 
there. The Taliban's main goal is to keep the foreign occupation out. 
They want foreigners out of their country. They are not al Qaeda. Yet 
most Americans--maybe less so now. But the argument here on the floor 
is we have got to go after al Qaeda. This is not a war against al 
Qaeda. If anything, it gives the incentive for al Qaeda to grow in 
numbers rather than dealing with them.
  The money issue, we are talking about a lot of money. How much do we 
spend a year? Probably about $130 billion, up to $1 trillion now in 
this past decade.
  Later on in the day, we are going to have two votes. We are going to 
have a vote on doing something sensible, making sense out of our 
foreign policy, bringing our troops home and saving hundreds of 
billions of dollars. Then we also will have a vote against NPR, to cut 
the funding of NPR. There is a serious question about whether that will 
even cut one penny. But at least the fiscal conservatives are going to 
be overwhelmingly in support of slashing NPR, and then go home and brag 
about how they are such great fiscal conservatives. And the very most 
they might save is $10 million, and that's their claim to fame for 
slashing the budget. At the same time, they won't consider for a minute 
cutting a real significant amount of money.
  All empires end for fiscal reasons because they spread themselves too 
far around the world, and that's what we are facing. We are in the 
midst of a military conflict that is contributing to this inevitable 
crisis and it's financial. And you would think there would be a message 
there.
  How did the Soviets come down? By doing the very same thing that 
we're doing: perpetual occupation of a country.
  We don't need to be occupying Afghanistan or any other country. We 
don't even need to be considering going into Libya or anywhere else. 
Fortunately, I guess for those of us who would like to see less of this 
killing, we will have to quit because we won't be able to afford it.
  The process that we are going through is following the War Powers 
Resolution. This is a proper procedure. It calls attention to how we 
slip into these wars.
  I have always claimed that it's the way we get into the wars that is 
the problem. If we would be precise and only go to war with a 
declaration of war, with the people behind us, knowing who the enemy 
is, and fight, win, and get it over with, that would be more 
legitimate. They don't do it now because the American people wouldn't 
support it. Nobody is going to declare war against Afghanistan or Iraq 
or Libya.
  We now have been so careless for the past 50 or 60 years that, as a 
Congress and especially as a House, we have reneged on our 
responsibilities. We have avoided our prerogatives of saying that we 
have the control. We have control of the purse. We have control of when 
we are supposed to go to war. Yet the wars continue. They never stop. 
And we are going to be completely brought down to our knees.
  We can't change Afghanistan. The people who are bragging about these 
changes, even if you could, you are not supposed to. You don't have the 
moral authority. You don't have the constitutional authority.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. JONES. I yield the gentleman 30 additional seconds.
  Mr. PAUL. So I would say, the sooner, the better, we can come home. 
This process says come home. Under the law, it says you should start 
bringing troops home within 30 days. This allows up to the end of the 
year after

[[Page H1937]]

this would be passed. But this needs to be done. A message needs to be 
sent. And some day we have to wake up and say, if you are a fiscal 
conservative, you ought to look at the waste.

                              {time}  1230

  This is military Keynesianism to believe that we should do this 
forever. So I would say this is the day to be on record and vote for 
this resolution.
  Mr. JONES. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am so honored to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter), a member of the Armed 
Services Committee and a distinguished combat veteran who has served 
our country honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan with the United States 
Marine Corps.
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, first, I was in the Marine Corps. I did two 
tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan. I didn't do anything exceptional; 
but if anybody else has served in Afghanistan, I will yield to you 
right now. If anybody in this Congress who has served in a military 
capacity in these wars in Afghanistan, I'll be happy to yield to you.
  You might have taken a few trips over, and you can tell stories about 
the families that are impacted who you know. You can talk about people 
who you know that have been impacted. You can talk about those marines 
and soldiers and sailors and airmen that we see injured at Bethesda and 
Walter Reed; but if you want to quote somebody, you can quote me. I'm 
in 223 Cannon.
  If you want to talk to a family that's been impacted by three 
deployments, two of my kids, all of them 10 or under--I have three--two 
of them have been through three deployments. One child, my youngest 
daughter, has been through one deployment, the Afghan deployment in 
2007.
  If you want to talk to somebody, feel free to talk to my family 
because they understand what it's like. What they also understand is 
the reason that we're there.
  Less than 2 percent of America's population serves. The burden from 
Afghanistan is on their shoulders. It's on my family's shoulders. They 
know what's at stake. That's why they basically allowed me to do it. 
They allowed me to go to Iraq and Afghanistan because of the number one 
reason that we're there, the number one reason. And it's not to nation-
build. It's to make sure that radicalized Muslims stop killing 
Americans. It's to stop them from destroying this country.
  They want to murder us. Every single person in this room, every 
American, radicalized Muslims want to murder. That's why we have men 
and women over there right now fighting. That's it. There's no other 
reason for it.
  Nation building is a thing we have to do there on the side to get the 
people, the Afghan people, on our side. But what we're doing right now 
is we're taking out the enemy.
  And we have to trust General Petraeus. We have to trust President 
Obama, in this case, that they know what's going on. He's the Commander 
in Chief, not us. We are not the commanders in chief. There's one of 
them, and it's the other side's President.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. HUNTER. If you want to quote somebody who's been there, feel free 
to quote me. If you want to talk about it, feel free to come to my 
office. And if you want to hold up pictures of families, hold up 
pictures of mine because they've been impacted by it.
  But I thank the gentleman from Ohio for bringing up this debate 
because what has happened is our side has cut defense by $16 billion in 
H.R. 1. If we're not going to support our troops while we're fighting, 
this type of resolution might need a look at later. I don't think now 
is the right time.
  I oppose the resolution.


                Announcement By the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. McClintock). All Members are reminded 
that remarks in debate should be addressed to the Chair and through the 
Chair and not to each other.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to insert into the Record a recent report 
from The Washington Post that says that we've seen the steepest 
increase in lost limbs among soldiers and marines occurring in the last 
4 months.

                [From the Washington Post, Mar. 9, 2011]

       Report Reveals Steep Increase in War Amputations Last Fall

                            (By David Brown)

       The majority of American soldiers undergoing amputation for 
     war wounds last fall lost more than one limb, according to 
     data presented Tuesday to the Defense Health Board, a 
     committee of experts that advises the Defense Department on 
     medical matters.
       Military officials had previously released data showing 
     that amputations, and especially multiple-limb losses, 
     increased last year. The information presented to the 20-
     member board is the first evidence that the steepest increase 
     occurred over the last four months of the year.
       In September 2010, about two-thirds of all war-theater 
     amputation operations involved a single limb (usually a leg) 
     and one-third two or more limbs. The split was roughly 50-50 
     in October and November. In December, only one-quarter of 
     amputation surgery involved only one limb; three-quarters 
     involved the loss of two or more limbs.
       The Marines, who make up 20 percent of the forces in Iraq 
     and Afghanistan, were especially hard hit. Of the 66 wounded 
     severely enough to be evacuated overseas in October, one-
     third lost a limb.
       In the first seven years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 
     about 6 percent of seriously wounded soldiers underwent 
     amputation.
       Wounds to the genitals and lower urinary tract--known as 
     genitourinary injuries--accounted for 11 percent of wounds 
     over the last seven months of 2010, up from 4 percent in the 
     previous 17 months, according to data presented by John B. 
     Holcomb, a trauma surgeon and retired Army colonel.
       The constellation of leg-and-genital wounds are in large 
     part the consequence of stepping on improvised explosive 
     devices--homemade mines--and are known as ``dismounted IED 
     injuries.''
       The data were assembled by Holcomb and two physicians at 
     Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany, where all 
     seriously injured soldiers are taken on their way back to the 
     United States.
       The steep increase in both the rate and number of 
     amputations clearly disturbed both Holcomb and members of the 
     board, which met at a Hilton hotel near Dulles International 
     Airport.
       Holcomb, who spent two weeks at Landstuhl in December and 
     is a former head of the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical 
     Research, said he had heard of ``unwritten pacts among young 
     Marines that if they get their legs and genitals blown off 
     they won't put tourniquets on but will let each other die on 
     the battlefield.''
       Richard H. Carmona, who was U.S. surgeon general from 2002 
     to 2006 and is now on the board, said the information was 
     ``very disturbing.''
       He said it has made him ask: ``What is the endgame here? Is 
     the sacrifice we are asking of our young men and women worth 
     the potential return? I have questions about that now.''
       Carmona, 61, served as an Army medic in Vietnam before 
     going to college and medical school. He has a son who is an 
     Army sergeant and is serving in Iraq.
       Jay A. Johannigman, an Air Force colonel who has served 
     multiple deployments as a trauma surgeon, said his stint at 
     the military hospital at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan last 
     fall ``was different'' both personally and medically.
       ``We see the enormous price our young men and women are 
     paying. It should not be for naught,'' he said. He didn't 
     want to elaborate.
       Why amputation-requiring injuries increased so much in 
     recent months isn't entirely understood. It is partly a 
     function of tactics that emphasize more foot patrols in rural 
     areas. Some people have speculated the mines may be 
     constructed specifically to cause the devastating wounds.
       ``Do the Marines know? Probably,'' said Frank Butler, a 
     doctor and retired Navy captain who has spearheaded 
     improvements in battlefield first aid over the last decade. 
     ``But they're not releasing a thing. And they shouldn't.''

  I would also like to insert into the Record a report from the 
``American Conservative'' which says that late last year IED deaths 
among our own soldiers were up, not down.

            [From The American Conservative, Mar. 10, 2011]

               How's That Population-Centric COIN Going?

                       (Posted by Kelley Vlahos)

       If the success or failure of the Afghan military ``surge'' 
     rests on whether the U.S. can bring down the level of 
     violence and protect the civilian population from the 
     Taliban--a metric that the now fading COINdinistas had once 
     insisted could be achieved with the right strategy--then two 
     new statistics to emerge this week don't bode well for the 
     prospects of the nearly 2-year-old counterinsurgency 
     operation in Afghanistan.
       First, more of our soldiers today are coming home this year 
     with amputations than in the previous year, according reports 
     coming out of the Defense Health Board this week. According 
     to The Washington Post, which was apparently the only 
     mainstream news outlet to cover the board's meeting in 
     Northern Virginia on Tuesday, the steepest increase in lost 
     limbs among soldiers and Marines occurred in the last four 
     months.

[[Page H1938]]

       The Marines, who make up 20 percent of the forces in Iraq 
     and Afghanistan, were especially hard hit. Of the 66 wounded 
     severely enough to be evacuated overseas in October, one-
     third lost a limb.
       In the first seven years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 
     about 6 percent of seriously wounded soldiers underwent 
     amputation.
       Wounds to the genitals and lower urinary tract--known as 
     genitourinary injuries--accounted for 11 percent of wounds 
     over the last seven months of 2010, up from 4 percent in the 
     previous 17 months, according to data presented by John B. 
     Holcomb, a trauma surgeon and retired Army colonel.
       The constellation of leg-and-genital wounds are in large 
     part the consequence of stepping on improvised explosive 
     devices--homemade mines--and are known as ``dismounted IED 
     injuries.''
       The data regarding the increased amputations were already 
     reported in Friday's WaPo, but apparently the fact they 
     spiked in the last few months only came out in the meeting. 
     Who knows if that point would've ever seen the light of day 
     if a reporter hadn't been there. A source close to the board 
     told me that media rarely show up to cover the DHB, which is 
     a pity, because its members, which include both civilian and 
     retired military doctors and scientists, probably know more 
     about the ``big picture'' regarding the health and welfare of 
     our troops in the battlefield than anyone else and tend to 
     talk candidly among themselves about conditions there.
       The data was presented Tuesday by John B. Holcomb, a trauma 
     surgeon and retired Army colonel. As a former head of the 
     U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research, he said he had 
     heard of ``unwritten pacts among young Marines that if they 
     get their legs and genitals blown off they won't put 
     tourniquets on but will let each other die on the 
     battlefield.''
       New DHB member Richard Carmona, a former U.S. Surgeon 
     General under Bush, apparently didn't get the memo about 
     keeping his emotional responses in check. The Vietnam veteran 
     called the new statistics ``very disturbing,'' and then 
     asked, ``What is the endgame here? Is the sacrifice we are 
     asking of our young men and women worth the potential return? 
     I have questions about that now.''
       He should definitely have questions, considering that Gen. 
     David Petraeus, Lt. Gen. William ``svengali'' Caldwell and 
     others have been all over the press in recent weeks talking 
     about how promising it looks in Afghanistan the Taliban's 
     ``halted momentum,'' and all that.
       Meanwhile, the other big news today is that civilian deaths 
     in Afghanistan are up, too.
       According to a new U.N. report, civilian deaths as a result 
     of war violence rose 15 percent from the year before in 
     Afghanistan (some of the highest levels since the war began 
     in 2001). More than two-thirds of those deaths--2,777--were 
     caused by insurgents (up 28 percent) and 440 were caused by 
     Afghan Army/NATO forces (down 25 percent*). While the Taliban 
     is responsible for most civilian deaths, the U.S. has made 
     ``protecting the population'' a major strategic goal for 
     winning over the Afghan people, legitimizing the Karzai 
     government and draining the Taliban of its authority. 
     Instead, it's been publicly blamed and repudiated by Afghans 
     for a number of civilian bombing deaths, the most recent 
     being nine Afghan boys killed ``by accident'' in a U.S. air 
     strike in Kunar province.
       This week, President Karzai, rejected an apology from 
     Petraeus for the killings, and later accepted another attempt 
     at apology from Sec. Def. Bob Gates. It didn't help that 
     Petraeus' apology came a week after he suggested that the 
     young victims of another NATO attack in Kunar had gotten 
     their burn marks not from the strike, but from their parents, 
     who might have hurt the kids themselves in disciplinary 
     actions. It didn't go over so well, especially since Afghan 
     authorities say 65 people were killed, many of them women and 
     children. NATO has now admitted that some civilians may have 
     been hurt, but insists the operation had targeted insurgents.
       Again, my mind goes back to the COINdinistas, many of whom 
     remain delusional about the direction of the war, and others 
     who might be furiously back-peddling or remolding themselves 
     as we speak. In June 2009, Triage: The Next Twelve Months in 
     Afghanistan and Pakistan, was published by the pro-COIN 
     Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In it, fellow 
     Andrew Exum, CNAS CEO Nathaniel Fick, David Kilcullen and 
     Ahmed Humayun wrote this (emphasis mine):
       ``To be sure, violence will rise in Afghanistan over the 
     next year--no matter what the United States and its allies 
     do. What matters, though, is who is dying. And here a 
     particular lesson may be directly imported from the U.S. 
     experience in Iraq. In 2007, during the Baghdad security 
     operations commonly referred to as ``the surge,'' U.S. 
     casualties actually increased sharply. What U.S. planners 
     were looking for, however, was not a drop in U.S. 
     casualties--or even a drop in Iraqi security force casualties 
     but a drop in Iraqi civilian casualties. In the same way, 
     U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan must be focused on 
     protecting the population even at the expense of allied 
     casualties.''.
       Afghan civilian casualties, whether at the hands of the 
     coalition, the Taliban, or the Afghan government, will be the 
     most telling measure of progress.
       Well, violence is up, and deaths among NATO and its allies 
     are up. And so are civilian casualties.
       Meanwhile, while the CNAS team said in June 2009 that NATO/
     Afghan soldier deaths were expected to rise, they also 
     claimed that another metric of success would be an eventual 
     flattening of IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) incidents.
       Another indicator of cooperation (with local Afghans) is 
     the number of roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices, 
     or IEDs) that are found and cleared versus exploded. IED 
     numbers have risen sharply in Afghanistan since 2006 (though 
     numbers are still low, and IEDs still unsophisticated, 
     compared to Iraq). The coalition should expect an increase in 
     numbers again this year. However, a rise in the proportion of 
     IEDs being found and defused (especially when discovered 
     thanks to tips from the local population) indicates that 
     locals have a good working relationship with local military 
     units a sign of progress.
       Despite all his spin to the contrary, Petraeus cannot hide 
     the fact that late last year, IED deaths among our own 
     soldiers were up, not down. A chart issued within its own 
     November progress report to Congress last November shows 
     that, and it shows that the found and cleared IEDs had not 
     risen above the attacks in most areas of the country.
       Plus, metric or no metric, the recent data indicating 
     serious injuries of U.S. soldiers this late in the game--
     while every other assessment outside the military bubble says 
     the Taliban are making more gains not less--should leave any 
     thinking person at this point to question, ``is it really 
     worth it?''
       Not sure what it will take before the COINdinistas admit 
     events on the ground are falling short of their own metrics. 
     Sounds like a good follow-up to ``Triage,'' but will anyone 
     there have the guts to write it?

  I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Texas, Representative 
Jackson Lee.
  Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I respect my President, our President.
  I thank the previous speaker for his service. I thank all of the 
United States military, at home and abroad, for their brave and 
courageous service.
  I beg to differ. The Constitution indicates that the Congress can 
declare war, which has not been so declared. I would make the argument 
that we have shed our blood in Afghanistan, and my hat is off to those 
families who have lost their loved ones, and certainly those who fight 
on the front lines today.
  I believe it is important for Congress to be engaged in this effort 
because this is the people's House. A few months ago, a year ago, I may 
not have supported this move. But here we are again, facing the same 
obstacles.
  This amendment or resolution says within 30 days, but up to December 
31, if necessary.
  It is time now to push the Kabul government to be able to negotiate 
and engage. It is time to use smart power. It is time to let girls go 
to school, let leaders lead, and for our combat troops and others to 
come home.
  It is time to recognize that our resources are needed around the 
world. Libya is in need.
  But it is time for us to end with Afghanistan and to push them to be 
a sovereign nation, and to work with them on diplomacy and to be able 
to save lives.
  I support this resolution. I wish that it would pass now.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. 
Lewis).
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition 
to the longest running war in our Nation's history. I want to thank my 
friend and colleague from Ohio for introducing this resolution.
  War is not the answer. It is not the way to peace. We must root out 
the causes of hate and violence.
  Gandhi once said: ``Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the 
fear of punishment, and the other by acts of love. Power based on love 
is a thousand times more effective and permanent than the one derived 
from the fear of punishment.''
  Our path to peace in Afghanistan is not through war; it is not 
through violence. Enough is enough. The time is long overdue.
  We are spending billions of dollars a week. Not another nickel, not 
another dime, not another dollar, not another hour, not another day, 
not another week. We must end this war and end it now.
  I urge all of my colleagues to support the resolution.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Polis).

[[Page H1939]]

  Mr. POLIS. I thank the gentleman from Ohio for bringing forth this 
important resolution and finally bringing to the floor of the House the 
discussion about the war in Afghanistan.
  Wrong war, wrong time, wrong place. Intelligence estimates are that 
there are under 50 al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. With the current 
cost of the war effort, we're spending between $1.5 billion and $2 
billion per al Qaeda operative.
  There is a very real terrorist threat to our country that comes from 
the loosely knit al Qaeda terrorist network, but that threat does not 
emanate from Afghanistan. It does not emanate from any one particular 
nation-state. It is a stateless menace. They go wherever they're able 
to thrive on the lack of order.
  To effectively combat this menace, we need targeted special 
operations, we need aggressive intelligence gathering, and we need to 
make sure that we combat this menace wherever they are with the 
appropriate resources.
  Being bogged down, occupying one particular nation-state is a waste 
of resources and not the best way to keep the American people safe.
  I strongly support this resolution.

                              {time}  1240

  Mr. KUCINICH. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BERMAN. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California (Mr. Rohrabacher).
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. I rise in support of the resolution, and again with 
great respect and concern for those great people who we are sending 
overseas to defend us. If we don't think they can succeed, it is 
incumbent upon us to bring them home as soon as possible.
  I was not in the United States military in Afghanistan, but I did 
participate in a battle in Afghanistan when the Russians were there. I 
went in with the Mujahideen unit and fought in the Battle of Jalalabad 
in 1988. I got to know these people of Afghanistan. Foreign troops will 
never conquer the people of Afghanistan.
  And, yes, radicalized Islams did murder Americans on 9/11. By the 
way, most of them were Saudis. Most all of them who hijacked the planes 
were Saudis. And Saudi Arabia still has the radical Islamic tenets that 
we are talking about that supposedly brought us into this battle.
  We will not succeed if we are planning to force the Afghan people to 
accept the centralized government that our State Department has foisted 
upon them. All we are going to do is lose more people. All we are going 
to do is have more wounded people and more of our military sent over 
there, because that is what they are telling us is the method of 
getting out. To get out, we have to have Karzai accepted.
  We have foisted on them the most centralized system of government 
that would never have even worked here, because we believe that local 
people should run the police and should elect their own local 
officials. If we don't believe that that system will work, and that is 
our plan, we should get our people out of there before more of them are 
killed and maimed.
  Yes, we do respect Duncan Hunter and all those people who have 
served. That is the reason, that is what motivates me.
  Here we have Walter Jones, who represents the Marine Corps down at 
Camp Lejeune. If they thought that they were defending our country and 
were going to save our lives, all of them would give their lives for 
us. But they are not on that mission. They are on that mission to get 
the Afghan people and coerce them into accepting a corrupt central 
government, and that won't work. It didn't work when I was there 
fighting the Russians. It won't work now.
  Mr. JONES. I continue to reserve my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, with all due respect to the gentleman 
from California, I would not compare a staff delegation trip to the 
valiant forces of our armed services who are fighting overseas.
  I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. 
Coffman), a member of the Armed Services Committee, a combat veteran of 
the first gulf war, who served again in Iraq 5 years ago with the 
United States Marine Corps.
  Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado. I thank the gentlewoman from Florida, and I 
thank the gentleman from Ohio for bringing this resolution forward, and 
I reluctantly rise in opposition to it.
  I volunteered to serve in Iraq not because I believed that invading, 
pacifying, and administering the country was the right course of 
action, but I believed that once we had made the commitment that we had 
to follow it through and bring it to a reasonable and just conclusion.
  In Afghanistan, I think that what this Nation first did was great: 
That we were attacked on 9/11. The Taliban controlled much of the 
country and gave safe harbor to al Qaeda, and we gave air, logistical, 
and advisory support to the anti-Taliban forces in the country and they 
pushed the Taliban out.
  We made a wrong turn after that, by forcing the victors on the ground 
aside instead of using our leverage to have them reach out to the 
Pashtun elements of the country, and we superimposed a political 
process on them that doesn't fit the political culture of the country, 
a government that is mired in corruption and has little capacity to 
govern outside of Kabul. I believe it is wrong to use conventional 
forces against an irregular force that make our military vulnerable to 
asymmetric capability. But we have security interests in Afghanistan 
that we must accept.
  We need to make sure that the Taliban doesn't take over the country 
where it becomes a permissive environment, where they can use that to 
destabilize Afghanistan, to assist the Taliban on the other side of the 
Durand Line. We need some base of operations in Afghanistan to be able 
to strike al Qaeda targets in the federally administered tribal areas 
of Afghanistan. I believe that we can do it with a lighter footprint. I 
think we ought to be focused on supporting factions within this region 
that share our strategic interests.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. COFFMAN of Colorado. I thank the gentlewoman from Florida.
  We have strategic interests in Afghanistan. It would be wrong, it 
would be irresponsible at this time to expeditiously withdraw all of 
our forces from Afghanistan, again, without recognizing our strategic 
interests there.
  Although I differ on the strategy that we are using right now, I 
recognize the security interests of the United States that are vital 
for us to maintain not only peace and stability in the region but also 
at home.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas (Mr. Conaway), a member of the Armed Services, Intelligence, 
Agriculture, and Ethics Committees.
  Mr. CONAWAY. I thank the gentlewoman.
  We have to get this right. I rise in opposition to this motion. I use 
that phrase, it comes from David Petraeus' testimony in the last 2 days 
in front of the House Armed Services Committee.
  He tells a poignant story about a black day in Iraq when he was 
commander of the 101st in which two helicopters collided midair and 17 
troops were killed. Really, one of his darkest days. And in the 
emotions of all of that and the trauma and the fight to move forward, a 
young PFC came up to this two-star general, which is pretty odd, and he 
said: General, I know of 17 reasons why we have to get this right.
  That analogy can be spread across all of the lives lost, all of the 
grievous injuries that we have suffered in this war over the last 10 
years in Afghanistan. We have to get this right. And this emotion that 
they have brought forward is not remotely going to get it right. 
Whatever your position is, this is not the right thing to do. We should 
not do this.
  These conversations have consequences. They are heard around the 
world. And while the other side, the folks who will vote for this, the 
folks who brought this forward have a right to do this and, in their 
mind, perhaps an obligation to do this, to have this conversation, 
these conversations affect the men and women in the fight. And for us 
to stand here over and over to tell them that they cannot win, that 
they cannot make this happen, is irresponsible on our part.
  David Petraeus is the man who knows more about what is going on on

[[Page H1940]]

the ground in Afghanistan today than anybody walking the face of the 
Earth. And, Mr. Speaker, in all deference to the fellows who served 20 
years ago there in whatever capacity, that was 20 years ago. Today, 
David Petraeus says the strategy is correct. We have got the inputs 
correct. We are moving forward, and we can make the circumstances to 
get the end results that we want in which the Afghan people are in 
charge of Afghanistan and responsible for Afghanistan security.
  This resolution is incorrect. It will not get it right, and I 
strongly urge a ``no'' vote on this resolution.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Texas, Judge Poe, vice chair of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigation.
  Mr. POE of Texas. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.
  War is expensive; and it should not be measured in the cost of money, 
which has been, really, the discussion today. I have the greatest 
respect for Mr. Jones and Mr. Rohrabacher and you, too, Mr. Kucinich, 
but this is an important issue before us.
  Today, as we are here in the House of Representatives, Mark Wells is 
being buried. He was killed on March 5, representing us in Afghanistan. 
He had been to Iraq. And, yes, he is of Irish heritage, so his family 
decided, ``We want to have his service on St. Patrick's Day.''
  I talked to his father, Burl, earlier this week. And Burl is proud of 
his son's service, and he is proud of America's service in Afghanistan. 
And Burl told me, he said: ``Congressman Poe, it is my fear that there 
are dark days ahead for America because we may not choose to 
persevere.''
  And what I believe he meant by that was that his son and others who 
have died for this country, died for that concept of freedom, people 
that live after them, our soldiers that are over there, and we who make 
decisions, may not persevere and finish this war.
  War is hard. It is expensive. And America never quits, and America 
should never quit in this war.
  Our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan have always had the policy and 
philosophy: America will get weary. Americans will quit. They don't 
have the stomach for it.

                              {time}  1250

  We need to send a message to them and the rest of the world and to 
our troops that are on the front lines in Afghanistan today that we 
support them and we will not get weary, we will not quit, we will not 
give in or give up just because this war has been long and hard.
  And that's just the way it is.
  Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to put into the Record an article from the 
National Interest which states that many U.S. and western troops cannot 
leave their bases without encountering IEDs or more coordinated attacks 
from insurgents.

               [From The National Interest, Mar. 9, 2011]

                   Pulling a Fast One in Afghanistan

                       (By Christopher A. Preble)

       I have just returned from a discussion of U.S. strategy in 
     Afghanistan and Pakistan hosted by the Foundation for the 
     Defense of Democracies. The meeting of 25 or so journalists, 
     think tankers, and current and former government officials 
     featured introductory remarks by Gilles Dorronsoro, visiting 
     scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, and FDD's Bill Roggio. FDD 
     President, Cliff May, moderated the session. The meeting was 
     officially on the record, but I'm relying solely on my hand-
     written notes, so I won't quote the other attendees directly.
       I would characterize the general mood as grim. A few 
     attendees pointed to the killing of a number of Taliban 
     figures in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and reports of 
     progress in Marja and the rest of Helmand province as 
     evidence of progress. These gains, one speaker maintained, 
     were sustainable and would not necessarily slip in the event 
     that U.S. forces are directed where elsewhere.
       Dorronsoro disputed these assertions. He judged that the 
     situation today is worse than it was a year ago, before the 
     surge of 30,000 additional troops. The killing of individual 
     Taliban leaders, or foot-soldiers, was also accompanied by 
     the inadvertent killing of innocent bystanders, including 
     most recent nine children. So there is always the danger that 
     even targeted strikes based on timely, credible intelligence, 
     will over the long term replace one dead Talib with two or 
     four or eight of his sons, brothers, cousins, and tribesman. 
     How many people have said ``We can't kill our way to 
     victory''?
       For Dorronsoro, the crucial metric is security, no number 
     of bad guys and suspected bad guys killed. And, given that he 
     can't drive to places that he freely visited two or three 
     years ago, he judges that security in the country has gotten 
     worse, not better. Many U.S. and Western troops cannot leave 
     their bases without encountering IEDs or more coordinated 
     attacks from insurgents. U.S. and NATO forces don't control 
     territory, and there is little reason to think that they can. 
     Effective counterinsurgencies (COIN) are waged by a credible 
     local partner, a government that commands the respect and 
     authority of its citizens. That obviously doesn't exist in 
     Afghanistan. The Afghan militia, supposedly the key to long-
     term success, is completely ineffective.
       Secretary Gates asserted on Monday that the draw down of 
     U.S. troops would begin as scheduled this July, although, as 
     the Washington Post's Greg Jaffe writes, ``he cautioned that 
     any reductions in U.S. forces would likely be small and that 
     a significant U.S. force will remain in combat for the rest 
     of 2011.'' NATO remains committed to 2014 as the date to hand 
     over security to the Afghan government. Whether the United 
     States retains a long-term presence in the country is the 
     subject of much speculation.
       For the people from FDD, it shouldn't be. Roggio stressed 
     that the problem with U.S. strategy is that Americans were 
     looking for an exit, when we should be making a long-term 
     commitment to Afghanistan. May concurred. When I asked them 
     to clarify how long term, both demurred (Roggio said ``a 
     decade or more'' but didn't elaborate). I also inquired about 
     the resources that would be required to constitute 
     ``commitment''. Given that we have over 100,000 troops on the 
     ground, and that we will spend over $100 billion in 
     Afghanistan in this year alone, how much more of a commitment 
     would they find acceptable? Again, no definitive answer.
       Roggio did claim, however, that a long-term commitment 
     would increase the prospect of turning the Pakistanis. This 
     is the crucial other piece in the puzzle. Nearly everyone in 
     the meeting agreed that the unwillingness of the Pakistanis 
     to cooperate with the United States had allowed a safe haven 
     to be created in North Waziristan and elsewhere along the 
     AfPak border. Most in the meeting admitted that Pakistan's 
     interests in Afghanistan did not always align with our own. 
     None had an answer for decisively changing this calculus, but 
     some agreed with Roggio that evidence of progress in 
     Afghanistan--combined with a credible commitment on the part 
     of the U.S. to remain for the long-haul--would convince the 
     Pakistanis to side with the Americans.
       If you're reading carefully, you can see a circular logic 
     here, brilliantly encapsulated by Dorronsoro. I paraphrase: 
     We cannot win Afghanistan without turning Pakistan, but we 
     cannot turn the Pakistanis without warning in Afghanistan. It 
     is no wonder that one attendee declared herself growing 
     increasingly depressed as the meeting wore on.

  I would like to insert into the Record an article from Cato-at-
Liberty's Web site entitled America's Aimless Absurdity in Afghanistan.

              America's `Aimless Absurdity' In Afghanistan

              (Posted By Malou Innocent On March 7, 2011)

       Rasmussen reports that 52% of Americans want U.S. troops 
     home from Afghanistan within a year, up from 43% last fall. 
     Of course, polls are ephemeral snapshots of public opinion 
     that can fluctuate with the prevailing political winds; 
     nonetheless, it does appear that more Americans are slowly 
     coming to realize the ``aimless absurdity'' of our nation-
     building project in Central Asia.
       Earlier today, former Republican senator Judd Gregg of New 
     Hampshire said on MSNBC's ``Morning Joe'': ``I don't think we 
     can afford Afghanistan much longer.'' He continued: ``The 
     simple fact is that it's costing us. Good people are losing 
     their lives there, and we're losing huge amounts of resources 
     there. . . . So I think we should have a timeframe for 
     getting out of Afghanistan, and it should be shorter rather 
     than longer.''
       Gregg is absolutely right. It is well past time to bring 
     this long war to a swift end. Yet Gregg's comments also 
     reflect a growing bipartisan realization that prolonging our 
     land war in Asia is weakening our country militarily and 
     economically.
       To politicians of any stripe, the costs on paper of staying 
     in Afghanistan are jarring. Pentagon officials told the House 
     Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that it costs an average 
     of $400 per gallon of fuel for the aircraft and combat 
     vehicles operating in land-locked Afghanistan. The U.S. 
     Agency for International Development has spent more than $7.8 
     billion on Afghanistan reconstruction since 2001, including 
     building and refurbishing 680 schools and training thousands 
     of civil servants. Walter Pincus, of The Washington Post, 
     reported that the Army Corps of Engineers spent $4 billion 
     last year on 720 miles of roads to transport troops in and 
     around the war-ravaged country. It will spend another $4 to 
     $6 billion this year, for 250 more miles.
       War should no longer be a left-right issue. It's a question 
     of scarce resources and limiting the power of government. 
     Opposition to the war in Afghanistan can no longer be swept 
     under the carpet or dismissed as an issue owned by peaceniks 
     and pacifists, especially when our men and women in uniform 
     are being deployed to prop up a regime Washington doesn't 
     trust, for goals our president can't define.

  I would like to put into the Record an article from Truthdig posted 
on

[[Page H1941]]

AlterNet entitled Afghanistan: Obscenely Well-Funded but Largely 
Unsuccessful War Rages on Out of Sight of the American Public.

                     [From AlterNet, Nov. 18, 2010]

Afghanistan: Obscenely Well-Funded, But Largely Unsuccessful War Rages 
                 on Out of Sight of the American Public

                             (By Juan Cole)

       Not only is it unclear that the U.S. and NATO are winning 
     their war in Afghanistan, the lack of support for their 
     effort by the Afghanistan president himself has driven the 
     American commander to the brink of resignation. In response 
     to complaints from his constituents, Afghanistan's mercurial 
     President Hamid Karzai called Sunday for American troops to 
     scale back their military operations. The supposed ally of 
     the U.S., who only last spring petulantly threatened to join 
     the Taliban, astonished Washington with this new outburst, 
     which prompted a warning from Gen. David Petraeus that the 
     president was making Petraeus' position ``untenable,'' which 
     some speculated might be a threat to resign.
       During the past two months, the U.S. military has fought a 
     major campaign in the environs of the southern Pashtun city 
     of Kandahar, launching night raids and attempting to push 
     insurgents out of the orchards and farms to the east of the 
     metropolis. Many local farmers were displaced, losing their 
     crops in the midst of the violence, and forced to become day 
     laborers in the slums of Kandahar. Presumably these Pashtun 
     clans who found themselves in the crossfire between the 
     Taliban and the U.S. put pressure on Karzai to call a halt to 
     the operation.
       That there has been heavy fighting in Afghanistan this fall 
     would come as a surprise to most Americans, who have seen 
     little news on their televisions about the war. Various 
     websites noted that 10 NATO troops were killed this past 
     Saturday and Sunday alone, five of them in a single battle, 
     but it was hardly front page news, and got little or no 
     television coverage.
       The midterm campaign circus took the focus off of foreign 
     affairs in favor of witches in Newark and eyes of Newt in 
     Georgia. Distant Kandahar was reduced to an invisible battle 
     in an unseen war, largely unreported in America's mass media, 
     as though it were irrelevant to the big campaign issues--of 
     deficits and spending, of taxes and public welfare. Since it 
     was President Obama's offensive, Democrats could not run 
     against it. Since it is billed as key to U.S. security, 
     Republicans were not interested in running against it. 
     Kandahar, city of pomegranates and car bombs, of poppies and 
     government cartels, lacked a partisan implication, and so no 
     one spoke of it.
       In fact, the war is costing on the order of $7 billion a 
     month, a sum that is still being borrowed and adding nearly 
     $100 billion a year to the already-burgeoning national debt. 
     Yet in all the talk in all the campaigns in the hustings 
     about the dangers of the federal budget deficit, hardly any 
     candidates fingered the war as economically unsustainable.
       The American public cannot have a debate on the war if it 
     is not even mentioned in public. The extreme invisibility of 
     the Afghanistan war is apparent from a Lexis Nexis search I 
     did for ``Kandahar'' (again, the site of a major military 
     campaign) for the period from Oct. 15 to Nov. 15. I got only 
     a few dozen hits, from all American news sources (National 
     Public Radio was among the few media outlets that devoted 
     substantial airtime to the campaign).
       The campaign in the outskirts of Kandahar had been modeled 
     on last winter's attack on the farming area of Marjah in 
     Helmand Province. Marjah was a demonstration project, 
     intended to show that the U.S., NATO and Afghanistan security 
     forces could ``take, clear, hold and build.''
       Petraeus' counterinsurgency doctrine depends on taking 
     territory away from the insurgents, clearing it of 
     guerrillas, holding it for the medium term to keep the 
     Taliban from returning and to reassure local leaders that 
     they need not fear reprisals for ``collaborating,'' and then 
     building up services and security for the long term to ensure 
     that the insurgents can never again return and dominate the 
     area. But all these months later, the insurgents still have 
     not been cleared from Marjah, which is a site of frequent gun 
     fights between over-stretched Marines and Taliban.
       There is no early prospect of Afghan army troops holding 
     the area, or of building effective institutions in the face 
     of constant sniping and bombing. Marjah is only 18 square 
     miles. Afghanistan is more than 251,000 square miles. If 
     Marjah is the model for the campaign in the outskirts of 
     Kandahar, then the latter will be a long, hard slog. Kandahar 
     is even more complicated, since the labyrinthine alleyways of 
     the city and its hundreds of thousands of inhabitants offer 
     insurgents new sorts of cover when they are displaced there 
     from the countryside.
       Counterinsurgency requires an Afghan partner, but all along 
     the spectrum of Afghan institutions, the U.S. and NATO are 
     seeking in vain for the ``government in a box'' once promised 
     by Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The people in the key provinces 
     of Helmand and Kandahar are largely hostile to U.S. and NATO 
     troops, seeing them as disrespecting their traditions and as 
     offering no protection from violence. They see cooperating 
     with the U.S. as collaboration and want Mullah Omar of the 
     Taliban to join the government.
       Although the U.S. and NATO have spent $27 billion on 
     training Afghan troops, only 12 percent of them can operate 
     independently. Karzai and his circle are extremely corrupt, 
     taking millions in cash payments from Iran and looting a 
     major bank for unsecured loans, allowing the purchase of 
     opulent villas in fashionable Dubai. It is no wonder that 
     Petraeus is at the end of his rope. The only question is why 
     the Obama administration is not, and how long it will hold to 
     the myth of counterinsurgency.

  I would like to put into the Record an article published on AlterNet 
titled Totally Occupied: 700 Military Bases Spread Across Afghanistan, 
by Nick Turse at TomDispatch.com.

[From AlterNet, Posted on February 10, 2010, Printed on March 17, 2011]

     Totally Occupied: 700 Military Bases Spread Across Afghanistan

                    (By Nick Turse, Tomdispatch.com)

       In the nineteenth century, it was a fort used by British 
     forces. In the twentieth century, Soviet troops moved into 
     the crumbling facilities. In December 2009, at this site in 
     the Shinwar district of Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province, 
     U.S. troops joined members of the Afghan National Army in 
     preparing the way for the next round of foreign occupation. 
     On its grounds, a new military base is expected to rise, one 
     of hundreds of camps and outposts scattered across the 
     country.
       Nearly a decade after the Bush administration launched its 
     invasion of Afghanistan, TomDispatch offers the first actual 
     count of American, NATO, and other coalition bases there, as 
     well as facilities used by the Afghan security forces. Such 
     bases range from relatively small sites like Shinwar to mega-
     bases that resemble small American towns. Today, according to 
     official sources, approximately 700 bases of every size dot 
     the Afghan countryside, and more, like the one in Shinwar, 
     are under construction or soon will be as part of a base-
     building boom that began last year.
       Existing in the shadows, rarely reported on and little 
     talked about, this base-building program is nonetheless 
     staggering in size and scope, and heavily dependent on 
     supplies imported from abroad, which means that it is also 
     extraordinarily expensive. It has added significantly to the 
     already long secret list of Pentagon property overseas and 
     raises questions about just how long, after the planned 
     beginning of a drawdown of American forces in 2011, the U.S. 
     will still be garrisoning Afghanistan.


                    400 Foreign Bases in Afghanistan

       Colonel Wayne Shanks, a spokesman for the U.S.-led 
     International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), tells 
     TomDispatch that there are, at present, nearly 400 U.S. and 
     coalition bases in Afghanistan, including camps, forward 
     operating bases, and combat outposts. In addition, there are 
     at least 300 Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National 
     Police (ANP) bases, most of them built, maintained, or 
     supported by the U.S. A small number of the coalition sites 
     are mega-bases like Kandahar Airfield, which boasts one of 
     the busiest runways in the world, and Bagram Air Base, a 
     former Soviet facility that received a makeover, complete 
     with Burger King and Popeyes outlets, and now serves more 
     than 20,000 U.S. troops, in addition to thousands of 
     coalition forces and civilian contractors.
       In fact, Kandahar, which housed 9,000 coalition troops as 
     recently as 2007, is expected to have a population of as many 
     as 35,000 troops by the time President Obama's surge is 
     complete, according to Colonel Kevin Wilson who oversees 
     building efforts in the southern half of Afghanistan for the 
     U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. On the other hand, the Shinwar 
     site, according to Sgt. Tracy J. Smith of the U.S. 48th 
     Infantry Brigade Combat Team, will be a small forward 
     operating base (FOB) that will host both Afghan troops and 
     foreign forces.
       Last fall, it was reported that more than $200 million in 
     construction projects--from barracks to cargo storage 
     facilities--were planned for or in-progress at Bagram. 
     Substantial construction funds have also been set aside by 
     the U.S. Air Force to upgrade its air power capacity at 
     Kandahar. For example, $65 million has been allocated to 
     build additional apron space (where aircraft can be parked, 
     serviced, and loaded or unloaded) to accommodate more close-
     air support for soldiers in the field and a greater 
     intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. 
     Another $61 million has also been earmarked for the 
     construction of a cargo helicopter apron and a tactical 
     airlift apron there.
       Kandahar is just one of many sites currently being 
     upgraded. Exact figures on the number of facilities being 
     enlarged, improved, or hardened are unavailable but, 
     according a spokesman for ISAF, the military plans to expand 
     several more bases to accommodate the increase of troops as 
     part of Afghan War commander Stanley McChrystal's surge 
     strategy. In addition, at least 12 more bases are slated to 
     be built to help handle

[[Page H1942]]

     the 30,000 extra American troops and thousands of NATO forces 
     beginning to arrive in the country.
       ``Currently we have over $3 billion worth of work going on 
     in Afghanistan,'' says Colonel Wilson, ``and probably by the 
     summer, when the dust settles from all the uplift, we'll have 
     about $1.3 billion to $1.4 billion worth of that [in the 
     South].'' By comparison, between 2002 and 2008, the Army 
     Corps of Engineers spent more than $4.5 billion on 
     construction projects, most of it base-building, in 
     Afghanistan.
       At the site of the future FOB in Shinwar, more than 135 
     private construction contractors attended what was termed an 
     ``Afghan-Coalition contractors rodeo.'' According to 
     Lieutenant Fernando Roach, a contracting officer with the 
     U.S. Army's Task Force Mountain Warrior, the event was 
     designed ``to give potential contractors a walkthrough of the 
     area so they'll have a solid overview of the scope of work.'' 
     The construction firms then bid on three separate projects: 
     the renovation of the more than 30-year old Soviet 
     facilities, the building of new living quarters for Afghan 
     and coalition forces, and the construction of a two-kilometer 
     wall for the base.
       In the weeks since the ``rodeo,'' the U.S. Army has 
     announced additional plans to upgrade facilities at other 
     forward operating bases. At FOB Airborne, located near Kane-
     Ezzat in Wardak Province, for instance, the Army intends to 
     put in reinforced concrete bunkers and blast protection 
     barriers as well as lay concrete foundations for Re-Locatable 
     Buildings (prefabricated, trailer-like structures used for 
     living and working quarters). Similar work is also scheduled 
     for FOB Altimur, an Army camp in Logar Province.


                          The Afghan Base Boom

       Recently, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Afghanistan 
     District-Kabul, announced that it would be seeking bids on 
     ``site assessments'' for Afghan National Security Forces 
     District Headquarters Facilities nationwide. The precise 
     number of Afghan bases scattered throughout the country is 
     unclear.
       When asked by TomDispatch, Colonel Radmanish of the Afghan 
     Ministry of Defense would state only that major bases were 
     located in Kabul, Pakteya, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-
     Sharif, and that ANA units operate all across Afghanistan. 
     Recent U.S. Army contracts for maintenance services provided 
     to Afghan army and police bases, however, suggest that there 
     are no fewer than 300 such facilities that are, according to 
     an ISAF spokesman, not counted among the coalition base 
     inventory.
       As opposed to America's fast-food-franchise-filled bases, 
     Afghan ones are often decidedly more rustic affairs. The 
     police headquarters in Khost Farang District, Baghlan 
     Province, is a good example. According to a detailed site 
     assessment conducted by a local contractor for the Army Corps 
     of Engineers and the Afghan government, the district 
     headquarters consists of mud and stone buildings surrounded 
     by a mud wall. The site even lacks a deep well for water. A 
     trench fed by a nearby spring is the only convenient water 
     source.
       The U.S. bases that most resemble austere Afghan facilities 
     are combat outposts, also known as COPs. Environmental 
     Specialist Michael Bell of the Army Corps of Engineers, 
     Afghanistan Engineer District-South's Real Estate Division, 
     recently described the facilities and life on such a base as 
     he and his co-worker, Realty Specialist Damian Salazar, saw 
     it in late 2009:
       ``COP Sangar . . . is a compound surrounded by mud and 
     straw walls. Tents with cots supplied the sleeping quarters . 
     . . A medical, pharmacy and command post tent occupied the 
     center of the COP, complete with a few computers with 
     internet access and three primitive operating tables. Showers 
     had just been installed with hot [water] . . . only available 
     from 8 a.m. to 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. . . .
       ``An MWR [Morale, Welfare and Recreation] tent was erected 
     on Thanksgiving Day with an operating television; however, 
     the tent was rarely used due to the cold. Most of the troops 
     used a tent with gym equipment for recreation . . . A cook 
     trailer provided a hot simple breakfast and supper. Lunch was 
     MREs [meals ready to eat]. Nights were pitch black with no 
     outside lighting from the base or the city.''


                           What Makes a Base?

       According to an official site assessment, future 
     construction at the Khost Farang District police headquarters 
     will make use of sand, gravel, and stone, all available on 
     the spot. Additionally, cement, steel, bricks, lime, and 
     gypsum have been located for purchase in Pol-e Khomri City, 
     about 85 miles away.
       Constructing a base for American troops, however, is 
     another matter. For the far less modest American needs of 
     American troops, builders rely heavily on goods imported over 
     extremely long, difficult to traverse, and sometimes 
     embattled supply lines, all of which adds up to an 
     extraordinarily costly affair. ``Our business runs on 
     materials,'' Lieutenant General Robert Van Antwerp, commander 
     of the Army Corps of Engineers, told an audience at a town 
     hall meeting in Afghanistan in December 2009. ``You have to 
     bring in the lumber, you have to bring in the steel, you have 
     to bring in the containers and all that. Transport isn't easy 
     in this country--number one, the roads themselves, number 
     two, coming through other countries to get here--there are 
     just huge challenges in getting the materials here.''
       To facilitate U.S. base construction projects, a new 
     ``virtual storefront''--an online shopping portal--has been 
     launched by the Pentagon's Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). 
     The Maintenance, Repair and Operations Uzbekistan Virtual 
     Storefront website and a defense contractor-owned and 
     operated brick-and-mortar warehouse facility that supports it 
     aim to provide regionally-produced construction materials to 
     speed surge-accelerated building efforts.
       From a facility located in Termez, Uzbekistan, cement, 
     concrete, fencing, roofing, rope, sand, steel, gutters, pipe, 
     and other construction material manufactured in countries 
     like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
     Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan can be rushed to nearby 
     Afghanistan to accelerate base-building efforts. ``Having the 
     products closer to the fight will make it easier for 
     warfighters by reducing logistics response and delivery 
     time,'' says Chet Evanitsky, the DLA's construction and 
     equipment supply chain division chief.


                      America's Shadowy Base World

       The Pentagon's most recent inventory of bases lists a total 
     of 716 overseas sites. These include facilities owned and 
     leased all across the Middle East as well as a significant 
     presence in Europe and Asia, especially Japan and South 
     Korea. Perhaps even more notable than the Pentagon's 
     impressive public foreign property portfolio are the many 
     sites left off the official inventory. While bases in the 
     Persian Gulf countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and the 
     United Arab Emirates are all listed, one conspicuously absent 
     site is Al-Udeid Air Base, a billion-dollar facility in 
     nearby Qatar, where the U.S. Air Force secretly oversees its 
     on-going unmanned drone wars.
       The count also does not include any sites in Iraq where, as 
     of August 2009, there were still nearly 300 American bases 
     and outposts. Similarly, U.S. bases in Afghanistan--a 
     significant percentage of the 400 foreign sites scattered 
     across the country--are noticeably absent from the Pentagon 
     inventory.
       Counting the remaining bases in Iraq--as many as 50 are 
     slated to be operating after President Barack Obama's August 
     31, 2010, deadline to remove all U.S. ``combat troops'' from 
     the country--and those in Afghanistan, as well as black sites 
     like Al-Udeid, the total number of U.S. bases overseas now 
     must significantly exceed 1,000. Just exactly how many U.S. 
     military bases (and allied facilities used by U.S. forces) 
     are scattered across the globe may never be publicly known. 
     What we do know--from the experience of bases in Germany, 
     Italy, Japan, and South Korea--is that, once built, they have 
     a tendency toward permanency that a cessation of hostilities, 
     or even outright peace, has a way of not altering.
       After nearly a decade of war, close to 700 U.S., allied, 
     and Afghan military bases dot Afghanistan. Until now, 
     however, they have existed as black sites known to few 
     Americans outside the Pentagon. It remains to be seen, a 
     decade into the future, how many of these sites will still be 
     occupied by U.S. and allied troops and whose flag will be 
     planted on the ever-shifting British-Soviet-U.S./Afghan site 
     at Shinwar.

  General Petraeus and others in the administration continue their PR 
campaign. Overwhelming evidence is proving their upbeat assessments of 
our strategy is false. A recent article by the Los Angeles Times cited 
a report released by the Foreign Affairs Committee and the British 
Parliament that concluded that ``despite the optimistic appraisals we 
heard from some military and official sources, the security situation 
across Afghanistan as a whole is deteriorating. Counterinsurgency 
efforts in the south and east have allowed the Taliban to expand its 
presence and control in other previously relatively stable areas in 
Afghanistan.''
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Charles Rangel.
  (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RANGEL. This afternoon sometime, I will reintroduce my bill 
calling for a mandatory draft, making certain that every young person 
has an opportunity one way or the other to serve this great nation of 
ours, whether we're talking about in our schools, our hospitals, or 
just to provide some public service.
  But the main part of this bill is that the President, when he asked 
us to declare war, or however we get involved in these things with loss 
of lives, we're going to have these people that come to the well and 
explain how we have to get involved, we have to fight, we can't give 
up, to see whether or not if their kids and grandchildren were mandated 
that they would have to go into these areas and put themselves in 
harm's way, how soon it will be before we take another look at this.
  Let me congratulate the gentleman from Ohio for allowing our priests, 
our rabbis, our ministers to recognize that

[[Page H1943]]

we're talking about human lives being lost because of our concern about 
oil in this part of the world. It hasn't got a darn thing to do with 
our national security. I just hope and pray that one day we would be 
able to say we know we made a mistake and withdraw from this type of 
thing now and for the future of this great country.
  Thank you for this opportunity.
  Mr. BERMAN. I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bartlett), the chairman of the Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.
  (Mr. BARTLETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for yielding.
  If our only reason for being in Afghanistan was to deny sanctuary to 
al Qaeda, I probably would have asked time from the gentleman from Ohio 
and be speaking from the other side, because when we are successful in 
Afghanistan, that will not have denied sanctuary to al Qaeda because 
they will simply go over into Pakistan. If not there, they'll go to 
Yemen and Somalia. If we leave Afghanistan now or if we leave 
Afghanistan before victory in Afghanistan, we will have sent a message 
to the world that their suspicions are really true, that all you have 
to do to the United States is make it tough for them and they will pull 
out. We did it in Beirut. We did it in Somalia. It is absolutely 
essential that we win here, or our credibility is gone forever as a 
major player in geopolitical things in the world.
  A second good reason for staying in Afghanistan is that if we can 
have a fledgling democracy there, that will send a very powerful 
message to the Middle East from which most of the world's oil comes. 
There is a lot of upheaval there, and a stable democracy in Afghanistan 
would be enormously important.
  Beyond denying sanctuary to al Qaeda, there are very good reasons for 
staying in Afghanistan until we have victory. Our young people there 
are doing an incredible job. I just came from there a bit over a week 
ago. We can succeed there, and I think we must succeed for the two 
reasons I mentioned.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Gibson), a member of the Armed Services 
Committee and a decorated combat veteran who ended his 24-year military 
career as a colonel in the United States Army.
  Mr. GIBSON. I thank the lady.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the resolution. I served 
in Iraq when it was hard and unpopular, and I thank God that I live in 
a country that had the intestinal fortitude to see it through.
  This year, we're going to complete our objectives in Iraq, and the 
remaining 48,000 troops that are there are going to come home. There's 
going to be a small contingent, about 150 or so, that are going to move 
underneath the Embassy, but we will have completed our objectives and 
Iraq will be stable and friendly.
  Now, Afghanistan is different from Iraq, but our approach should be 
similar. The surge has accomplished its primary aim, to seize the 
initiative from the Taliban. But now we need to finish the job of 
building out the institution, the security and the civil institutions.
  I'm recently back from Afghanistan, and I had an opportunity to meet 
the leadership there. I feel confident we've got the right plan going 
forward. And I support the President's plan, the President's plan to 
begin withdrawal this year and to complete combat operations by 2014, 
because I believe this plan will stabilize Afghanistan and help protect 
our cherished way of life, preventing al Qaeda from regaining 
sanctuary.
  Now going forward, I think we need to learn from these experiences. 
Some comments were made here earlier about us, whether or not we're a 
Republic or an empire. I share those concerns and those sentiments. 
We're a Republic, and we need to learn from these experiences. But we 
need to see this through. We need to stand with our Commander in Chief. 
We need to stand with our troops. Complete this task.
  And then finally let me say that I join all today on both sides of 
the aisle who honor our service men and women who have fell in the line 
of battle. We pray for their souls. We pray for their families. We 
remember those wounded in battle, those who bear physical scars. Those 
who bear no physical scars who are emotionally scarred, we pray for 
them. We honor them.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
  Mr. GIBSON. And let me say this: That going forward, that this body, 
whether it be this issue or any issue, that this body and that this 
country shall be worthy of the sacrifices of our service men and women.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Palazzo), a member of the Armed 
Services Committee and a Marine veteran of the first gulf war who 
continues to serve with the Army National Guard.
  Mr. PALAZZO. Mr. Speaker, the resolution proposed by my colleague 
from Ohio does a disservice to the men and women who have courageously 
defended our country from our enemies in Afghanistan. This past weekend 
I had the distinct pleasure and honor of welcoming home the 287th 
Engineering Company, commonly referred to as Sappers, based in 
Lucedale, Mississippi. They have the most dangerous mission in 
Afghanistan. They were the ones that cleared routes so that our men and 
women in uniform could have safe passage. They're the ones that rooted 
out the IEDs and the roadside bombs. And I'm happy to say they came 
back 100 percent, with one wounded warrior, but they did their mission.
  While they were obviously overjoyed to see their loved ones again, 
the soldiers I spoke with were good to go with that mission and what 
they had accomplished. They fully understand that there are those who 
want to indiscriminately kill and maim Americans and we would rather 
take the fight to them overseas and abroad instead of having them come 
to our backyard, to our schools and our playgrounds.

                              {time}  1300

  Just yesterday, I had the chance to speak personally with General 
Petraeus after his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. 
Again, as a Marine veteran of the Persian Gulf war and currently 
serving in the Mississippi National Guard, I know firsthand what good 
military commands look like, and General Petraeus is a great leader, a 
professional soldier, and someone whose opinion I respect very much.
  Based on this resolution, his quote was, ``The Taliban and al Qaeda 
obviously would trumpet this as a victory, as a success. Needless to 
say, it would completely undermine everything that our troopers have 
fought and sacrificed so much for.''
  Mr. Speaker, Congress' constitutional responsibility is to ensure 
that the courageous men and women in our armed services have the tools 
and equipment and training to do their job and come home safely to 
their family. Our warfighters don't need armchair generals in this 
Congress arbitrarily dictating terms that will cause irreparable harm 
to them and to the national security of this country.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire how much time is remaining 
for each individual.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) has 
5\3/4\ minutes remaining; the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen) has 3\1/2\ minutes remaining; the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Berman) has 9\1/2\ minutes remaining; and the gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr. Jones) has 5 minutes remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, spending on the Afghanistan war is rising at an 
accelerating rate. Over just 3 years, in a period of 3 years--2010, 
2011, and 2012--we will spend 45 percent more on the war in Afghanistan 
than we did in the preceding

[[Page H1944]]

8 years, $336.9 billion versus $231.2 billion. This is an example of 
out-of-control Federal spending.
  If Congress is serious about being fiscally responsible and about 
cutting the Federal budget by three figures, then cutting spending on 
the out-of-control $100 billion-a-year war in Afghanistan must be a 
serious consideration. This legislation, House Concurrent Resolution 
28, gives those who are concerned about the costs of this war an 
opportunity finally to have a choice.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Who seeks recognition?
  The Chair will recognize Members for closing speeches in the reverse 
order of opening. That is, the gentleman from North Carolina, the 
gentleman from California, the gentleman from Ohio, and finally the 
gentlewoman from Florida.


                        Parliamentary Inquiries

  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Is it the province of the Chair to determine that 
closing statements are in order?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Recognition is in the discretion of the 
Chair.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Further parliamentary inquiry. Does the Chair have the 
right to determine that closing statements are the order of business 
here?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. It is the custom of the House for the Chair 
to recognize Members in the reverse order of their opening statements 
to make their closing statements.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Further parliamentary inquiry. Does the Chair have the 
ability to direct individual Members that they are to give their 
closing statements?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. A Member may yield his last amount of time 
to another Member at his discretion.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. JONES. I yield myself 3 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, first I would like to say to every Member that has been 
on the floor that served in our military, thank you and God bless you, 
as I say all the time to those who are overseas for this country.
  Because I did not serve, I sought out a Marine general that every 
Marine that spoke on the floor today, if I said his name--but I don't 
have permission--they would salute him. They know him.
  Let me share with you what this Marine general said to me back in 
November when I told him I read an article in The New York Times that 
an Army colonel was saying, Oh, the training of Afghans is going so 
well. So I emailed him. This is a six-point response, and I am going to 
read three very quickly:
  ``Continued belief that we can train the Afghan army to be effective 
in the time we have is nonsense. The vast majority cannot even read. 
They are people from the villages hooked on drugs, illiterate, and 
undisciplined. The South Vietnamese soldiers were much better trained, 
and they could not stem the tide.''
  He further states, ``What is the end state we are looking to achieve? 
What are the measures of effectiveness? What is our exit strategy? Same 
old questions, no answers.''
  He closed by saying this: ``What do we say to the mother and father, 
the wife, of the last Marine killed to support a corrupt government and 
a corrupt leader in a war that cannot be won?''
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, if I could ask my good friend the 
gentleman from California if he would yield 2 minutes of his time to 
me.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask unanimous consent to 
yield 2 minutes of my remaining time to my chairman, the gentlewoman 
from Florida (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen).
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida may control 
that time.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, how much would I have, then, to close?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 5\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I reserve the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Who seeks recognition?
  Seeing none, we will proceed with the closing statements in the 
reverse order of the opening statements.
  First, the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from North Carolina has 3\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. JONES. I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Ohio 
(Mr. Kucinich).
  Mr. KUCINICH. The 2001 authorization of military force and the 
justification for our continued military presence in Afghanistan is 
that the Taliban in the past provided a safe haven for al Qaeda or 
could do so again in the future. General Petraeus has already admitted 
that al Qaeda has little or no presence in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is an 
international organization, and, yes, they are a threat to America. The 
Taliban is only a threat to us as long as we continue our military 
occupation in Afghanistan.
  After more than 9 years of military occupation of Afghanistan, can we 
really continue to claim to be acting in self-defense? The premise that 
the presence of our troops on the ground keeps us safer at home has 
been repudiated by recent terrorist attacks on the United States, all 
done by people other than Afghans outraged at continuing U.S. military 
occupation of predominantly Muslim countries. That is not to justify 
what they do, but it is to clarify the condition that we have in 
Afghanistan.
  For how long are we going to continue to dedicate hundreds of 
billions of dollars and thousands of lives before we realize we can't 
win Afghanistan militarily?
  At the end of the year, the administration and U.S. military leaders 
were touting peace talks to end the war with high-level Taliban 
leaders. These Taliban leaders turned out to be fake.
  A November 2010 article in The New York Times detailed joint U.S. and 
Afghan negotiations with Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, a man the U.S. 
claimed was one of the most senior commanders in the Taliban. According 
to the New York Times, ``the episode underscores the uncertain and even 
bizarre nature of the atmosphere in which Afghan and American leaders 
search for ways to bring the American-led war to an end. The leaders of 
the Taliban are believed to be hiding in Pakistan, possibly with 
assistance of the Pakistani government, which receives billions of 
dollars in U.S. aid.''
  How can we claim that a cornerstone of our counterinsurgency strategy 
is to take out Taliban strongholds across the country while at the same 
time conducting negotiations with the Taliban in an effort to end the 
war?
  This episode further underlies the significant weakness in our 
strategy. We think we can separate the Taliban from the rest the Afghan 
population. Our counterinsurgency strategy fails to recognize a basic 
principle: Occupations fuel insurgencies. Occupations fuel 
insurgencies. Occupations fuel insurgencies.
  The Taliban is a local resistance movement that is part and parcel of 
the indigenous population.

                              {time}  1310

  We lost the Vietnam war because we failed to win the hearts and minds 
of the local population. Without providing them with a competent 
government that provided them with basic security and a decent living, 
we're committing the same mistake in Afghanistan.
  News reports indicate the Taliban is regaining momentum. The increase 
in civilian casualties due to higher levels of violence by insurgents 
further undermines the assurances of progress. As we send more troops 
into the country and kill innocent civilians with errant air strikes, 
the Taliban gains more support as resistors of foreign occupation. If 
we accept the premise that we can never leave Afghanistan until the 
Taliban is eradicated, we'll be there forever.
  I would like to insert into the Record an article from The Nation, 
``America's Failed War in Afghanistan--No Policy Change Is Going to 
Affect the Outcome.'' That's by Jeremy Scahill.

[[Page H1945]]

                    [From The Nation, Mar. 17, 2011]

   America's Failed War in Afghanistan--No Policy Change Is Going To 
                           Affect the Outcome

                          (By Jeremy Scahill)

       At the end of the NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal this 
     weekend, the leadership of the Afghan Taliban issued a 
     statement characterizing the alliance's adoption of a loose 
     timeline for a 2014 end to combat operations as ``good news'' 
     for Afghans and ``a sign of failure for the American 
     government.'' At the summit, President Barack Obama said that 
     2011 will begin ``a transition to full Afghan lead'' in 
     security operations, while the Taliban declared: ``In the 
     past nine years, the invaders could not establish any system 
     of governance in Kabul and they will never be able to do so 
     in future.''
       While Obama claimed that the U.S. and its allies are 
     ``breaking the Taliban's momentum,'' the reality on the 
     ground tells a different story. Despite increased Special 
     Operations Forces raids and, under Gen. David Petraeus, a 
     return to regular U.S.-led airstrikes, the insurgency in 
     Afghanistan is spreading and growing stronger. ``By killing 
     Taliban leaders the war will not come to an end,'' said the 
     Taliban's former foreign minister, Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, in 
     an interview at his home in Kabul. ``On the contrary, things 
     get worse which will give birth to more leaders.''
       Former and current Taliban leaders say that they have seen 
     a swelling in the Taliban ranks since 9-11. In part, they 
     say, this can be attributed to a widely held perception that 
     the Karzai government is corrupt and illegitimate and that 
     Afghans--primarily ethnic Pashtuns--want foreign occupation 
     forces out. ``We are only fighting to make foreigners leave 
     Afghanistan,'' a new Taliban commander in Kunduz told me 
     during my recent trip to the country. ``We don't want to 
     fight after the withdrawal of foreigners, but as long as 
     there are foreigners, we won't talk to Karzai.''
       ``The Americans have very sophisticated technology, but the 
     problem here in Afghanistan is they are confronting ideology. 
     I think ideology is stronger than technology,'' says Abdul 
     Salam Zaeef, a former senior member of Mullah Mohammed Omar's 
     government. ``If I am a Taliban and I'm killed, I'm martyred, 
     then I'm successful. There are no regrets for the Taliban. 
     It's very difficult to defeat this kind of idea.''
       But it is not simply a matter of ideology versus 
     technology. The Taliban is not one unified body. The Afghan 
     insurgency is fueled by fighters with a wide variety of 
     motivations. Some are the dedicated jihadists of which Zaeef 
     speaks, but others are fighting to defend their land or are 
     seeking revenge for the killing of family members by NATO or 
     Afghan forces. While al Qaeda has been almost entirely 
     expelled from Afghanistan, the insurgency still counts a 
     small number of non-Afghans among its ranks. Bolstering the 
     Taliban's recruitment efforts is the perception in 
     Afghanistan that the Taliban pays better than NATO or the 
     Afghan army or police.
       The hard reality U.S. officials don't want to discuss is 
     this: the cultural and religious values of much of the 
     Pashtun population--which comprises 25-40 percent of the 
     country--more closely align with those of the Taliban than 
     they do with Afghan government or U.S./NATO forces. The 
     Taliban operate a shadow government in large swaths of the 
     Pashtun areas of the country, complete with governors and a 
     court system. In rural areas, land and property disputes are 
     resolved through the Taliban system rather than the Afghan 
     government, which is widely distrusted. ``The objectives and 
     goal of the American troops in Afghanistan are not clear to 
     the people and therefore Afghans call the Americans 
     `invaders,' '' says Muttawakil. ``Democracy is a very new 
     phenomenon in Afghanistan and most people don't know the 
     meaning of democracy. And now corruption, thieves and fakes 
     have defamed democracy. Democracy can't be imposed because 
     people will never adopt any value by force.''
       The U.S. strategy of attempting to force the Taliban to 
     surrender or engage in negotiations rests almost exclusively 
     on attempts to decapitate the Taliban leadership. While 
     Taliban leaders acknowledge that commanders are regularly 
     killed, they say the targeted killings are producing more 
     radical leaders who are far less likely to negotiate than the 
     older school Taliban leaders who served in the government of 
     Mullah Mohammed Omar. ``If today Mullah Omar was captured or 
     killed, the fighting will go on,'' says Zaeef, adding: ``It 
     will be worse for everyone if the [current] Taliban 
     leadership disappears.''
       In October, there were a flurry of media reports that 
     senior Taliban leaders were negotiating with the Karzai 
     government and that U.S. forces were helping to insure safe 
     passage for the Taliban leaders to come to Kabul. The Taliban 
     passionately refuted those reports, saying they were 
     propaganda aimed at dividing the insurgency. Last week the 
     Taliban appeared vindicated on this point as Karzai spoke in 
     markedly modest terms on the issue. He told The Washington 
     Post that three months ago he had met with one or two ``very 
     high'' level Taliban leaders. He characterized the meeting as 
     ``the exchange of desires for peace,'' saying the Taliban 
     ``feel the same as we do here--that too many people are 
     suffering for no reason.''
       Update: [On Tuesday, The New York Times reported that NATO 
     and the Afghan government have held a series of ``secret'' 
     peace negotiations with a man who posed as a senior Taliban 
     leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour. A Western diplomat 
     involved in the discussions told the Times, ``[W]e gave him a 
     lot of money.'' It is unclear who, if anyone, the impostor 
     was working for, though the Times speculated that he could 
     have been deployed by Pakistan's ISI spy agency or by the 
     Taliban itself. ``The Taliban are cleverer than the Americans 
     and our own intelligence service,'' said a senior Afghan 
     official who is familiar with the case. ``They are playing 
     games.'' Last month, the White House asked the Times to 
     withhold Mansour's name ``from an article about the peace 
     talks, expressing concern that the talks would be 
     jeopardized--and Mr. Mansour's life put at risk--if his 
     involvement were publicized. The Times agreed to withhold Mr. 
     Mansour's name,'' according to the paper.
       This incident is significant on a number of levels. If 
     true, it underscores the ineffective and inaccurate nature of 
     U.S., NATO and Afghan government intelligence. It also 
     confirms what Taliban leaders have stated publicly and to 
     The Nation, namely that it has not negotiated with the 
     Afghan government or NATO and that it will not negotiate 
     unless foreign troops leave Afghanistan. The fake Mullah 
     Mansour, according to the Times, ``did not demand, as the 
     Taliban have in the past, a withdrawal of foreign forces 
     or a Taliban share of the government.''
       In October, a U.S. official said that reports in U.S. media 
     outlets of senior Taliban negotiating are propaganda aimed at 
     sowing dissent among the Taliban leadership. ``This is a 
     psychological operation, plain and simple,'' the official 
     with firsthand knowledge of the Afghan government's 
     strategies told the McClatchy news service. ``Exaggerating 
     the significance of it is an effort to sow distrust within 
     the insurgency.''
       Today on MSNBC, Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell 
     continued to insist that U.S. and NATO forces have 
     facilitated safe passage for Taliban leaders for 
     reconciliation meetings in Kabul. The Taliban maintain there 
     have been no meetings.
       The Taliban impostor incident also calls into question 
     scores of deadly night raids that have resulted in the deaths 
     of innocent Afghans. Several survivors of night raids 
     recently told The Nation that they believed they were victims 
     of bad intelligence provided by other Afghans for money or to 
     settle personal grudges.
       Contrary to the rhetoric emanating from NATO and 
     Washington, the Taliban are not on the ropes and, from their 
     perspective, would gain nothing from negotiating with the 
     U.S. or NATO. As far as they are concerned, time is on their 
     side. ``The bottom line for [NATO and the U.S.] is to 
     immediately implement what they would ultimately have to 
     implement . . . after colossal casualties,'' stated the 
     Taliban declaration after the recent NATO summit. ``They 
     should not postpone withdrawal of their forces.''
       Depending on who you ask, the fact that Gen. Petraeus has 
     brought back the use of heavy U.S. airstrikes and is 
     increasing night raids and other direct actions by Special 
     Operations Forces could be seen as a sign of either fierce 
     determination to wipe out ``the enemy'' or of desperation to 
     prove the U.S. and its allies are ``winning.'' Over the past 
     three months, NATO claims that Special Operations Forces' 
     night raids have resulted in more than 360 ``insurgent 
     leaders'' being killed or captured along with 960 ``lower-
     level'' leaders and the capture of more than 2400 ``lower-
     level'' fighters. In July, Special Operations Forces averaged 
     5 raids a night. Now, according to NATO, they are conducting 
     an average of 17. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called 
     the raids ``intelligence-driven precision operations against 
     high value insurgents and their networks,'' adding, ``There 
     is no question that they are having a significant impact on 
     the insurgent leadership.''
       The raids undoubtedly have produced scores of successful 
     kill or capture operations, but serious questions abound over 
     the NATO definitions of Taliban commanders, sub-commanders 
     and foot soldiers. Most significantly, the raids consistently 
     result in the killing of innocent civilians, a fact that is 
     problematic for NATO and the Karzai government. ``A lot of 
     times, yeah, the right guys would get targeted and the 
     right guys would get killed,'' says Matthew Hoh a former 
     senior State Department official in Afghanistan who 
     resigned in 2009 in protest of U.S. war strategy. ``Plenty 
     of other times, the wrong people would get killed.
       Sometimes it would be innocent families.'' Hoh, who was the 
     senior U.S. civilian in Zabul province, a Taliban stronghold, 
     describes night raids as ``a really risky, really violent 
     operation,'' saying that when Special Operations Forces 
     conduct them, ``We might get that one guy we're looking for 
     or we might kill a bunch of innocent people and now make ten 
     more Taliban out of them.''
       Hoh describes the current use of U.S. Special Operations 
     Forces in Afghanistan as a ``tremendous waste of resources,'' 
     saying, ``They are the best strike forces the world's ever 
     known. They're very well trained, very well equipped, have a 
     tremendous amount of support, and we've got them in 
     Afghanistan chasing after mid-level Taliban leaders who are 
     not threatening the United States, who are only fighting us 
     really because we're in their valley.''
       In an interview with The Washington Post in mid-November, 
     President Karzai called for an end to the night raids. ``I 
     don't like it in

[[Page H1946]]

     any manner and the Afghan people don't like these raids in 
     any manner,'' Karzai said. ``We don't like raids in our 
     homes. This is a problem between us and I hope this ends as 
     soon as possible. . . . Terrorism is not invading Afghan 
     homes and fighting terrorism is not being intrusive in the 
     daily Afghan life.''
       Karzai's comments angered the Obama administration. At the 
     NATO summit, President Obama acknowledged that civilian 
     deaths have sparked ``real tensions'' with the Karzai 
     government, but reserved the right to continue US raids. 
     ``[Karzai's] got to understand that I've got a bunch of young 
     men and women . . . who are in a foreign country being shot 
     at and having to traverse terrain filled with IEDs, and they 
     need to protect themselves,'' Obama said. ``So if we're 
     setting things up where they're just sitting ducks for the 
     Taliban, that's not an acceptable answer either.'' Republican 
     Senator Lindsey Graham blasted Karzai's statement calling for 
     an end to night raids, saying, ``it would be a disaster for 
     the Petraeus strategy.''
       Along with Afghan government corruption, including a cabal 
     of war lords, drug dealers and war criminals in key 
     positions, the so-called Petraeus strategy of ratcheting up 
     air strikes and expanding night raids is itself delivering 
     substantial blows to the stated U.S. counterinsurgency 
     strategy and the much-discussed battle for hearts and minds. 
     The raids and airstrikes are premiere recruiting points for 
     the Taliban and, unlike Sen. Graham and the Obama 
     administration, Karzai seems to get that. In the bigger 
     picture, the U.S. appears to be trying to kill its way to a 
     passable definition of a success or even victory. This 
     strategy puts a premium on the number of kills and captures 
     of anyone who can loosely be defined as an insurgent and 
     completely sidelines the blowback these operations cause. 
     ``We found ourselves in this Special Operations form of 
     attrition warfare,'' says Hoh, ``which is kind of like an 
     oxymoron, because Special Operations are not supposed to be 
     in attrition warfare. But we've found ourselves in that in 
     Afghanistan''

  I would like to put into the Record an article from Aljazeera.net, 
which points out that for all practical purposes, Washington has given 
up on its counterinsurgency strategy.

                   [From Aljazeera.net, Mar. 7, 2011]

 Failing in Afghanistan Successfully--Despite Hundreds of Billions of 
  Dollars and Thousands of Troops, the U.S. Is Unable To Conclude Its 
                              Longest War

                          (By Marwan Bishara)

       While we have been fixated on successive Arab breakthroughs 
     and victories against tyranny and extremism, Washington is 
     failing miserably but discreetly in Afghanistan.
       The American media's one-obsession-at-a-time coverage of 
     global affairs might have put the spotlight on President 
     Obama's slow and poor reaction to the breathtaking 
     developments starting in Tunisia and Egypt. But they spared 
     him embarrassing questions about continued escalation and 
     deaths in Afghanistan.
       In spite of its international coalition, multiple 
     strategies, hundreds of billions of dollars, and a surge of 
     tens of thousands of troops, the U.S. is unable to conclude 
     its longest war yet or at least reverse its trend.
       Recent ``reports'' from the war front have been of two 
     kinds. Some official or analytical in nature and heavily 
     circulated in Washington portray a war going terribly well. 
     On the other hand, hard news from the ground tell a story of 
     U.S. fatigue, backtracking and tactical withdrawals or 
     redeployments which do not bode well for defeating the 
     Taliban or forcing them to the negotiations' table.
       For example, while the U.S. military's decision to withdraw 
     from the Pech valley was justified on tactical need to 
     redeploy troops for the task of ``protecting the 
     population'', keen observers saw it as a humiliating retreat 
     from what the Pentagon previously called a very strategic 
     position and sacrificed some hundred soldiers defending it.
       Likewise, strategic analysts close to the administration 
     speak triumphantly of U.S. surge and hi-tech firepower 
     inflicting terrible cost on the Taliban, killing many 
     insurgents and driving many more from their sanctuaries.
       But news from the war front show the Taliban unrelenting, 
     mounting counterattacks and escalating the war especially in 
     areas where the U.S. has ``surged'' its troops. And while the 
     majority of the 400 Afghan districts are ``calmer'', they 
     remain mostly out of Kabul's control.
     What success?
       Those with relatively long memories recall the then defence 
     secretary Donald Rumsfeld's claims that most of Afghanistan 
     was secure in early 2003 and that American forces had changed 
     their strategy from major combat operations to stabilisation 
     and reconstruction project.
       But the Taliban continued to carry daily attacks on 
     government buildings, U.S. positions and international 
     organisations. Two years later, the U.S. was to suffer the 
     worst and deadliest year since the war began.
       Today's war pundits are in the same state of denial. For 
     all practical purpose, Washington has given up on its 
     counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy devised under McChrystal 
     and Petreaus.
       Instead, it is pursuing a heavy handed and terribly 
     destructive crackdown that includes special operations, 
     assassinations, mass demolitions, air and night raids etc. 
     that have led to anything but winning the country, let alone 
     its hearts and minds.
       The killing of nine Afghan children last week--all under 
     the age of 12--by U.S. attack helicopters has once again put 
     the spotlight on the U.S. military's new aggressive methods.
       The results are so devastating for the conduct of the war 
     and to Washington's clients, that President Karzai not only 
     distanced himself from the U.S. methods, but also publicly 
     rejected Washington's apology for the killings.
       Nor is the recruitment and training of the Afghan forces 
     going well. Indeed, many seem to give up on the idea that 
     Afghan security forces could take matters into their hands if 
     the U.S. withdraws in the foreseeable future.
       Worse, U.S. strategic co-operation with Pakistan--the 
     central pillar of Obama's PakAf strategy--has cooled after 
     the arrest of a CIA contractor for the killing of two 
     Pakistanis even though he presumably enjoys diplomatic 
     immunity.
       Reportedly, it has also led to a ``breakdown'' in co-
     ordination between the two countries intelligence agencies, 
     the CIA and the ISI.
       But the incident is merely a symptom of a bigger problem 
     between the two countries. A reluctant partner, the Pakistani 
     establishment and its military are unhappy with U.S. strategy 
     which they reckon could destabilise their country and 
     strengthen Afghanistan and India at their expense.
       That has not deterred Washington from offering ideas and 
     money to repair the damage. However, it has become clear that 
     unlike in recent years, future improvement in their bilateral 
     relations will most probably come as a result of the U.S. 
     edging closer to Pakistan's position, not the opposite.
       All of which makes one wonder why certain Washington 
     circles are rushing to advance the ``success story''.
     Running out of options
       The Afghan government's incapability to take on the tasks 
     of governing or securing the country beyond the capital, and 
     the incapacity of the Obama administration to break the 
     Taliban's momentum does not bode well for an early conclusion 
     of the war.
       To their credit some of Obama's war and surge supporters 
     realise that there is no military solution for Afghanistan. 
     Clearly, their claims of battlefield successes help justify 
     the rush to talk to the Taliban.
       But it is not yet clear whether the presumably ongoing 
     exploratory secret negotiations with the Taliban are serious 
     at all, or will lead to comprehensive negotiations and 
     eventually a lasting deal. The last ``Taliban commander'' 
     Washington dialogued with in the fall turned out to be an 
     impostor--a shopkeeper from Quetta!
       If the Taliban does eventually accept to sit down with 
     Obama or Karzai envoys, the U.S. needs to explain why it 
     fought for 10 years only to help the group back to power.
       Secretary of state Hillary Clinton has begun the 
     humiliating backtracking last month: ``Now, I know that 
     reconciling with an adversary that can be as brutal as the 
     Taliban sounds distasteful, even unimaginable. And diplomacy 
     would be easy if we only had to talk to our friends. But that 
     is not how one makes peace.''
     Facing up to the reality
       The mere fact that the world's mightiest superpower cannot 
     win over the poorly armed Taliban after a long decade of 
     fighting, means it has already failed strategically, 
     regardless of the final outcome.
       The escalation of violence and wasting billions more cannot 
     change that. It is history. The quicker the Obama 
     administration recognises its misfortunes, minimises its 
     losses and convenes a regional conference over the future of 
     Afghanistan under UN auspices, the easier it will be to 
     evacuate without humiliation.
       Whether the U.S. eventually loses the war and declares 
     victory; negotiates a settlement and withdraw its troops, 
     remains to be seen. What is incontestable is that when you 
     fight the week for too long, you also become weak.
       All of which explains the rather blunt comments made in a 
     speech at the end of February, by U.S. Defence Secretary 
     Robert Gates when he said ``. . . any future defense 
     secretary who advises the president to again send a big 
     American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or 
     Africa should `have his head examined,' as General MacArthur 
     so delicately put it.''
       Amen.

  I would like to insert into the Record, from AlterNet, an article by 
Derrick Crowe and Robert Greenwald posted on February 6, 2011, titled 
Damning New Report Shows U.S. Strategy is Blocking Chance for Peace in 
Afghanistan.

                     [From AlterNet, Feb. 6, 2011]

Damning New Report Shows U.S. Strategy Is Blocking Chance for Peace in 
                              Afghanistan

                (By Derrick Crowe and Robert Greenwald)

     See: http://www.alternet.org/story/149815/
 The new report from NYU's Center for International 
     Cooperation is a damning description of the U.S. policies in 
     Afghanistan since 2001, and a warning that the escalated 
     military strategy blocks the road to peace while making the 
     Taliban more dangerous.
       Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success 
     in Afghanistan is the latest

[[Page H1947]]

     in a continuous string of statements from Afghanistan experts 
     that the U.S. war policies that were launched a year ago 
     aren't making us safer and aren't worth the substantial 
     costs: $1 million per U.S. troop in Afghanistan per year, for 
     a total of more than $375.5 billion wasted so far. The report 
     is written by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, 
     Kandahar-based researchers who've spent more than four years 
     researching the Taliban and the recent history of southern 
     Afghanistan.

  I would like to place into the Record an article from ABC News titled 
Afghan Security the Worst in a Decade, according to the U.N.

          ABC News--Afghan Security the Worst in a Decade: UN

       The security situation in Afghanistan has worsened to its 
     lowest point since the toppling of the Taliban a decade ago 
     and attacks on aid workers are at unprecedented levels, a 
     United Nations envoy said.
       Robert Watkins, the outgoing UN deputy special 
     representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, says 
     from a humanitarian perspective, security ``is on everyone's 
     minds''.
       ``It is fair to say that security in the country is at its 
     lowest point since the departure of the Talibans,'' he said.
       Mr Watkins says before last year's surge in NATO military 
     forces, the insurgency was centred in the south and south-
     east of the country.
       ``Since the surge of NATO forces last year, we have seen 
     the insurgency move to parts of the country where we've never 
     seen before,'' he said.
       ``We've now confronted with security problems that we'd 
     never dream that we'd have.
       ``While NATO is claiming that it has turned the corner . . 
     . we still see these very difficult security problems.''
       UN relief agencies now have regular access to just 30 per 
     cent of the country. Access is mixed for another 30 per cent 
     while there is hardly any access to the remaining 40 per 
     cent.
       Mr Watkins says a key issue is the ``conflation of 
     political, military, developmental and humanitarian aid''.
       ``Because of the way aid is dispersed in Afghanistan . . . 
     it has contributed to perception in parts of the Afghan 
     population that somehow humanitarian work is lumped into this 
     political and military effort,'' he said.
       ``We have to emphasise that we recognise that there has to 
     be separation and we have to be very careful to try to 
     address this perception.''
       But he pointed out that a positive development was that the 
     international and Afghan military have publicly acknowledged 
     that some kind of negotiated settlement was necessary to end 
     the instability.
       ``[This year] can be a crucial year if there is a 
     breakthrough in finding some kind of reconciliation 
     efforts,'' he said.
       The Taliban, a hardline Islamist movement, was forced from 
     power in late 2001 after a US invasion launched in the wake 
     of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.

  I would like to place into the Record an article from The New York 
Times discussing the counterintelligence strategy titled U.S. Pulling 
Back in Afghan Valley it Called Vital to War.

                [From The New York Times, Feb. 24, 2011]

       U.S. Pulling Back in Afghan Valley It Called Vital to War

         (By C. J. Chivers, Alissa J. Rubin and Wesley Morgan)

       Kabul, Afghanistan.--After years of fighting for control of 
     a prominent valley in the rugged mountains of eastern 
     Afghanistan, the United States military has begun to pull 
     back most of its forces from ground it once insisted was 
     central to the campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
       The withdrawal from the Pech Valley, a remote region in 
     Kunar Province, formally began on Feb. 15. The military 
     projects that it will last about two months, part of a shift 
     of Western forces to the province's more populated areas. 
     Afghan units will remain in the valley, a test of their 
     military readiness.
       While American officials say the withdrawal matches the 
     latest counterinsurgency doctrine's emphasis on protecting 
     Afghan civilians, Afghan officials worry that the shift of 
     troops amounts to an abandonment of territory where multiple 
     insurgent groups are well established, an area that Afghans 
     fear they may not be ready to defend on their own.
       And it is an emotional issue for American troops, who fear 
     that their service and sacrifices could be squandered. At 
     least 103 American soldiers have died in or near the valley's 
     maze of steep gullies and soaring peaks, according to a count 
     by The New York Times, and many times more have been wounded, 
     often severely.
       Military officials say they are sensitive to those 
     perceptions. ``People say, `You are coming out of the Pech'; 
     I prefer to look at it as realigning to provide better 
     security for the Afghan people,'' said Maj. Gen. John F. 
     Campbell, the commander for eastern Afghanistan. ``I don't 
     want the impression we're abandoning the Pech.''
       The reorganization, which follows the complete Afghan and 
     American withdrawals from isolated outposts in nearby 
     Nuristan Province and the Korangal Valley, runs the risk of 
     providing the Taliban with an opportunity to claim success 
     and raises questions about the latest strategy guiding the 
     war.
       American officials say their logic is simple and 
     compelling: the valley consumed resources disproportionate 
     with its importance; those forces could be deployed in other 
     areas; and there are not enough troops to win decisively in 
     the Pech Valley in any case.
       ``If you continue to stay with the status quo, where will 
     you be a year from now?'' General Campbell said. ``I would 
     tell you that there are places where we'll continue to build 
     up security and it leads to development and better 
     governance, but there are some areas that are not ready for 
     that, and I've got to use the forces where they can do the 
     most good.''
       President Obama's Afghan troop buildup is now fully in 
     place, and the United States military has its largest-ever 
     contingent in Afghanistan. Mr. Obama's reinforced campaign 
     has switched focus to operations in Afghanistan's south, and 
     to building up Afghan security forces.
       The previous strategy emphasized denying sanctuaries to 
     insurgents, blocking infiltration routes from Pakistan and 
     trying to fight away from populated areas, where NATO's 
     superior firepower could be massed, in theory, with less risk 
     to civilians. The Pech Valley effort was once a cornerstone 
     of this thinking.
       The new plan stands as a clear, if unstated, repudiation of 
     earlier decisions. When Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the 
     former NATO commander, overhauled the Afghan strategy two 
     years ago, his staff designated 80 ``key terrain districts'' 
     to concentrate on. The Pech Valley was not one of them.
       Ultimately, the decision to withdraw reflected a stark--and 
     controversial--internal assessment by the military that it 
     would have been better served by not having entered the high 
     valley in the first place.
       ``What we figured out is that people in the Pech really 
     aren't anti-U.S. or anti-anything; they just want to be left 
     alone,'' said one American military official familiar with 
     the decision. ``Our presence is what's destabilizing this 
     area.''
       Gen. Mohammed Zaman Mamozai, a former commander of the 
     region's Afghan Border Police, agreed with some of this 
     assessment. He said that residents of the Pech Valley 
     bristled at the American presence but might tolerate Afghan 
     units. ``Many times they promised us that if we could tell 
     the Americans to pull out of the area, they wouldn't fight 
     the Afghan forces,'' he said.
       It is impossible to know whether such pledges will hold. 
     Some veterans worry that the withdrawal will create an ideal 
     sanctuary for insurgent activity--an area under titular 
     government influence where fighters or terrorists will 
     shelter or prepare attacks elsewhere.
       While it is possible that the insurgents will concentrate 
     in the mountain valleys, General Campbell said his goal was 
     to arrange forces to keep insurgents from Kabul, the 
     country's capital.
       ``There are thousands of isolated mountainous valleys 
     throughout Afghanistan, and we cannot be in all of them,'' he 
     said.
       The American military plans to withdraw from most of the 
     four principal American positions in the valley. For security 
     reasons, General Campbell declined to discuss which might 
     retain an American presence, and exactly how the Americans 
     would operate with Afghans in the area in the future.
       As the pullback begins, the switch in thinking has fueled 
     worries among those who say the United States is ceding some 
     of Afghanistan's most difficult terrain to the insurgency and 
     putting residents who have supported the government at risk 
     of retaliation.
       ``There is no house in the area that does not have a 
     government employee in it,'' said Col. Gul Rahman, the Afghan 
     police chief in the Manogai District, where the Americans' 
     largest base in the valley, Forward Operating Base Blessing, 
     is located. ``Some work with the Afghan National Army, some 
     work with the Afghan National Police, or they are a teacher 
     or governmental employee. I think it is not wise to ignore 
     and leave behind all these people, with the danger posed to 
     their lives.''
       Some Afghan military officials have also expressed pointed 
     misgivings about the prospects for Afghan units left behind.
       ``According to my experience in the military and knowledge 
     of the area, it's absolutely impractical for the Afghan 
     National Army to protect the area without the Americans,'' 
     said Major Turab, the former second-in-command of an Afghan 
     battalion in the valley, who like many Afghans uses only one 
     name. ``It will be a suicidal mission.''
       The pullback has international implications as well. Senior 
     Pakistani commanders have complained since last summer that 
     as American troops withdraw from Kunar Province, fighters and 
     some commanders from the Haqqani network and other militant 
     groups have crossed into Afghanistan from Pakistan to create 
     a ``reverse safe haven'' from which to carry out attacks 
     against Pakistani troops in the tribal areas.
       The Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups are all but 
     certain to label the withdrawal a victory in the Pech 
     Valley, where they could point to the Soviet Army's 
     withdrawal from the same area in 1988. Many Afghans 
     remember that withdrawal as a symbolic moment when the 
     Kremlin's military campaign began to visibly fall apart.
       Within six months, the Soviet-backed Afghan Army of the 
     time ceded the territory to mujahedeen groups, according to 
     Afghan military officials.
       The unease, both with the historical precedent and with the 
     price paid in American

[[Page H1948]]

     blood in the valley, has ignited a sometimes painful debate 
     among Americans veterans and active-duty troops. The Pech 
     Valley had long been a hub of American military operations in 
     Kunar and Nuristan Provinces.
       American forces first came to the valley in force in 2003, 
     following the trail of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the 
     Hezb-i-Islami group, who, like other prominent insurgent 
     leaders, has been said at different times to hide in Kunar. 
     They did not find him, though Hezb-i-Islami is active in the 
     valley.
       Since then, one American infantry battalion after another 
     has fought there, trying to establish security in villages 
     while weathering roadside bombs and often vicious fights.
       Along with other slotlike canyons that the United States 
     has already largely abandoned--including the Korangal Valley, 
     the Waygal Valley (where the battle of Wanat was fought in 
     2008), the Shuryak Valley and the Nuristan River corridor 
     (where Combat Outpost Keating was nearly overrun in 2009)--
     the Pech Valley was a region rivaled only by Helmand Province 
     as the deadliest Afghan acreage for American troops.
       On one operation alone in 2005, 19 service members, 
     including 11 members of the Navy Seals, died.
       As the years passed and the toll rose, the area assumed for 
     many soldiers a status as hallowed ground. ``I can think of 
     very few places over the past 10 years with as high and as 
     sustained a level of violence,'' said Col. James W. Bierman, 
     who commanded a Marine battalion in the area in 2006 and 
     helped establish the American presence in the Korangal 
     Valley.
       In the months after American units left the Korangal last 
     year, insurgent attacks from that valley into the Pech Valley 
     increased sharply, prompting the current American battalion 
     in the area, First Battalion, 327th Infantry, and Special 
     Operations units to carry out raids into places that American 
     troops once patrolled regularly.
       Last August, an infantry company raided the village of 
     Omar, which the American military said had become a base for 
     attacks into the Pech Valley, but which earlier units had 
     viewed as mostly calm. Another American operation last 
     November, in the nearby Watapor Valley, led to fighting that 
     left seven American soldiers dead.
       This article has been revised to reflect the following 
     correction:
       Correction: February 24, 2011
       An earlier version of this article referred incorrectly to 
     a pullback of American forces in eastern Afghanistan. It is a 
     pullback from remote territory within Kunar Province, not 
     from the province as a whole.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California (Mr. Berman) 
has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. BERMAN. I simply would very quickly make the case that the 
resolution should be voted against for several reasons. Initially, 
because it improperly invokes a provision of the War Powers Act that's 
inapplicable. This war was authorized by the U.S. Congress. Secondly, 
the manner in which it would force withdrawal is irresponsible and I 
don't think is the right way to do it. And, thirdly, that I am not 
prepared, from this point of view, to say that failure is in any way 
inevitable, and that we should not at this time make the judgment to 
pull the plug out from what we are doing in Afghanistan.
  I would urge a ``no'' vote on the resolution.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich) has 
5\1/4\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
  We've stated over and over in this debate the cost of this war in 
this budget alone will be over $113 billion--$113 billion. There are 
Members who have come to this floor trying to whack a billion dollars 
in spending here and there. This is $113 billion. You want to cut out 
waste, let's get out of Afghanistan.
  Keep in mind that when you go to the Pentagon, and some of our 
Members have, and have gone to Afghanistan, there's an open-ended war 
going on here. There's no end in sight. I've submitted for the Record 
articles with respect to that. Hear this: We're going to be there 
through at least 2020. And that's going to cost us an extra, at least 
an extra trillion dollars.
  Where are we going to get that money? Are we going to cut Social 
Security for that? Are we going to cut health care and cut funds for 
education? Are we going to cut more funds for home heating aid?
  Where are we going to get this money? Are we ready to give up our 
entire domestic agenda so that we can continue on the path of a war to 
prop up a corrupt regime whose friends are building villas in Dubai, 
presumably with money that comes through the United States that's 
shipped out in planes out of the Kabul airport?
  We have to start standing up for America here.
  I appreciate and respect every Member of this Congress who served in 
the military. We honor them, just as I honor the members of my own 
family; my father, Frank, who was a World War II veteran; my brother 
Frank, who was a Vietnam veteran; my brother Gary, a Vietnam-era 
veteran; my sister Beth Ann, an Army veteran. I come from a family that 
appreciates service to our country.
  But how are we serving our troops by letting them in a situation that 
is absolutely impossible, whether it's greater numbers of them 
returning home with injuries from IEDs. How are we serving our troops 
by telling them we're going to keep extending the period of the war? 
Who's speaking up truly for our troops here? Is it General Petraeus, 
who says, Well, we'll just keep the war going and maybe--maybe--we'll 
send 2,000 troops out of Afghanistan or redirect them by 2014. He 
doesn't get to make the choice. That choice must be made by the 
Congress of the United States.
  It's time that we started to stand up for the Constitution of the 
United States, which, last I checked, in Article I, section 8 provides 
that Congress has to make the decision whether or not to send our 
troops into war. We have not the right to give that over to a 
President, over to a general, or anybody else. It's our prerogative 
inside this Congress.
  In 2001, Mr. Speaker, I joined with Members of this House in voting 
for the authorization of military force following the terrorist attacks 
on 9/11. I don't take a backseat to anyone in standing up to defend 
this country. But as the United States continues in what is now the 
longest war in our history, it has become clear that the authorization 
for military force is being used as a carte blanche for circumventing 
Congress' role as a coequal branch of government.
  I want you to hear this. We're a coequal branch of government. We're 
not lap dogs for the President. We're not servants of generals. We are 
a coequal branch of government expressing the sovereign will of the 
American people.
  It has become clear this administration, just as the last 
administration, is willing to commit us to an endless war and an 
endless stream of money, just a year after a commitment of an 
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan and continued assurances of 
``progress.'' They have been walking that dog down the road for the 
last 7 years. Progress.
  My legislation invokes the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and if 
enacted, would require this President to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces out 
of Afghanistan by December 31, 2011.
  Regardless of your support or opposition to the war in Afghanistan, 
this debate has been a critical opportunity to evaluate the human and 
the economic cost as this Congress works to address our country's dire 
financial straits. Those of us that supported the withdrawal may not 
agree on a timeline, but an increasing number of us agree it's time to 
think and rethink our current national security strategy. And we have 
to know the costs are great. We can't get away from the costs of this 
war.
  Nobel Prize-winning economist Joe Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, his 
associate, wrote a book about the Iraq war. They projected then a 
minimum of $3 trillion in costs.
  I would like to include in the Record, Mr. Speaker, a statement that 
I made over 8 years ago at the beginning of the Iraq war, where I 
pointed out there was nothing--no reason why we should be going to war 
in Iraq because there was no proof that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction.
  I mention that in terms of this debate because we're at the 
confluence of the events--the anniversary of the Iraq war; the 
confluence of the funding of the war in Afghanistan. We've got to get 
out of Afghanistan. We've got to get out of Iraq. We've got to start 
taking care of things here at home.


       Analysis of Joint Resolution on Iraq by Dennis J. Kucinich

       Washington, Oct 2, 2002.--Whereas in 1990 in response to 
     Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of 
     Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to 
     liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the 
     national security of the United States and enforce United 
     Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;

[[Page H1949]]

       KEY ISSUE: In the Persian Gulf war there was an 
     international coalition. World support was for protecting 
     Kuwait. There is no world support for invading Iraq.
       Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq 
     entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement 
     pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other 
     things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical 
     weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, 
     and to end its support for international terrorism;
       Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, 
     United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led 
     to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical 
     weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and 
     that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program 
     that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than 
     intelligence reporting had previously indicated;
       KEY ISSUE: UN inspection teams identified and destroyed 
     nearly all such weapons. A lead inspector, Scott Ritter, said 
     that he believes that nearly all other weapons not found were 
     destroyed in the Gulf War. Furthermore, according to a 
     published report in the Washington Post, the Central 
     Intelligence Agency has no up to date accurate report on 
     Iraq's WMD capabilities.
       Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the 
     cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons 
     inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass 
     destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which 
     finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on 
     October 31, 1998;
       KEY ISSUES: Iraqi deceptions always failed. The inspectors 
     always figured out what Iraq was doing. It was the United 
     States that withdrew from the inspections in 1998. And the 
     United States then launched a cruise missile attack against 
     Iraq 48 hours after the inspectors left. In advanced of a 
     military strike, the US continues to thward (the 
     Administration's word) weapons inspections.
       Whereas in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing 
     weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United 
     States interests and international peace and security, 
     declared Iraq to be in ``material and unacceptable breach of 
     its international obligations'' and urged the President ``to 
     take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution 
     and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into 
     compliance with its international obligations'' (Public Law 
     105-235);
       Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national 
     security of the United States and international peace and 
     security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material 
     and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, 
     among other things, continuing to possess and develop a 
     significant chemical and biological weapons capability, 
     actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting 
     and harboring terrorist organizations;
       KEY ISSUES: There is no proof that Iraq represents an 
     imminent or immediate threat to the United States. A 
     ``continuing'' threat does not constitute a sufficient cause 
     for war. The Administration has refused to provide the 
     Congress with credible intelligence that proves that Iraq is 
     a serious threat to the United States and is continuing to 
     possess and develop chemical and biological and nuclear 
     weapons. Furthermore there is no credible intelligence 
     connecting Iraq to Al Qaida and 9/11.
       Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the 
     United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in 
     brutal repression of its civilian population thereby 
     threatening international peace and security in the region, 
     by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi 
     citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American 
     serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully 
     seized by Iraq from Kuwait;
       KEY ISSUE: This language is so broad that it would allow 
     the President to order an attack against Iraq even when there 
     is no material threat to the United States. Since this 
     resolution authorizes the use of force for all Iraq related 
     violations of the UN Security Council directives, and since 
     the resolution cites Iraq's imprisonment of non-Iraqi 
     prisoners, this resolution would authorize the President to 
     attack Iraq in order to liberate Kuwaiti citizens who may or 
     may not be in Iraqi prisons, even if Iraq met compliance with 
     all requests to destroy any weapons of mass destruction. 
     Though in 2002 at the Arab Summit, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to 
     bilateral negotiations to work out all claims relating to 
     stolen property and prisoners of war. This use-of-force 
     resolution enables the President to commit U.S.046 troops to 
     recover Kuwaiti property.
       Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its 
     capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction 
     against other nations and its own people;
       Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its 
     continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the 
     United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate 
     former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of 
     occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged 
     in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security 
     Council;
       KEY ISSUE: The Iraqi regime has never attacked nor does it 
     have the capability to attack the United States. The ``no 
     fly'' zone was not the result of a UN Security Council 
     directive. It was illegally imposed by the United States, 
     Great Britain and France and is not specifically sanctioned 
     by any Security Council resolution.
       Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing 
     responsibility for attacks on the United States, its 
     citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred 
     on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;
       KEY ISSUE: There is no credible intelligence that connects 
     Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to participation in those 
     events by assisting Al Qaida.
       Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other 
     international terrorist organizations, including 
     organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American 
     citizens;
       KEY ISSUE: Any connection between Iraq support of terrorist 
     groups in Middle East, is an argument for focusing great 
     resources on resolving the conflict between Israel and the 
     Palestinians. It is not sufficient reason for the U.S. to 
     launch a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq.
       Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 
     2001 underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the 
     acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international 
     terrorist organizations;
       KEY ISSUE: There is no connection between Iraq and the 
     events of 9/11.
       Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to 
     use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current 
     Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a 
     surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces 
     or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, 
     and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the 
     United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine 
     to justify action by the United States to defend itself;
       KEY ISSUE: There is no credible evidence that Iraq 
     possesses weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq has 
     successfully concealed the production of such weapons since 
     1998, there is no credible evidence that Iraq has the 
     capability to reach the United States with such weapons. In 
     the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had a demonstrated capability of 
     biological and chemical weapons, but did not have the 
     willingness to use them against the United States Armed 
     Forces. Congress has not been provided with any credible 
     information, which proves that Iraq has provided 
     international terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.
       Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 
     authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent 
     relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain 
     activities that threaten international peace and security, 
     including the development of weapons of mass destruction and 
     refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections 
     in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
     687, repression of its civilian population in violation of 
     United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and 
     threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in 
     Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 949;
       KEY ISSUE: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, 
     including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN 
     resolutions.
       Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military 
     Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has 
     authorized the President ``to use United States Armed Forces 
     pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 
     (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council 
     Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 
     and 677'';
       KEY ISSUE: The UN Charter forbids all member nations, 
     including the United States, from unilaterally enforcing UN 
     resolutions with military force.
       Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that 
     it ``supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the 
     goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as 
     being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military 
     Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),'' that 
     Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and ``constitutes a 
     continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of 
     the Persian Gulf region,'' and that Congress, ``supports the 
     use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 688'';
       KEY ISSUE: This clause demonstrates the proper chronology 
     of the international process, and contrasts the current march 
     to war. In 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution 
     asking for enforcement of its resolution. Member countries 
     authorized their troops to participate in a UN-led coalition 
     to enforce the UN resolutions. Now the President is asking 
     Congress to authorize a unilateral first strike before the UN 
     Security Council had asked its member states to enforce UN 
     resolutions.
       Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) 
     expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy 
     of the United States to support efforts to remove from power 
     the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a 
     democratic government to replace that regime;
       KEY ISSUE: This ``Sense of Congress'' resolution was not 
     binding. Furthermore, while Congress supported democratic 
     means of removing Saddam Hussein it clearly did not endorse 
     the use of force contemplated in this resolution, nor did it 
     endorse assassination as a policy.

[[Page H1950]]

       Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the 
     United States to ``work with the United Nations Security 
     Council to meet our common challenge'' posed by Iraq and to 
     ``work for the necessary resolutions,'' while also making 
     clear that ``the Security Council resolutions will be 
     enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be 
     met, or action will be unavoidable'';
       Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the 
     war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international 
     terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of 
     mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under 
     the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council 
     resolutions make clear that it is in the national security 
     interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war 
     on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security 
     Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of 
     force if necessary;
       KEY ISSUE: Unilateral action against Iraq will cost the 
     United States the support of the world community, adversely 
     affecting the war on terrorism. No credible intelligence 
     exists which connects Iraq to the events of 9/11 or to those 
     terrorists who perpetrated 9/11. Under international law, the 
     United States does not have the authority to unilaterally 
     order military action to enforce UN Security Council 
     resolutions.
       Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the 
     war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and 
     funding requested by the President to take the necessary 
     actions against international terrorists and terrorist 
     organizations, including those nations, organizations or 
     persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the 
     terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or 
     harbored such persons or organizations;
       KEY ISSUE: The Administration has not provided Congress 
     with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the 
     events of 9/11.
       Whereas the President and Congress are determined to 
     continue to take all appropriate actions against 
     international terrorists and terrorist organizations, 
     including those nations, organizations or persons who 
     planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks 
     that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons 
     or organizations;
       KEY ISSUE: The Administration has not provided Congress 
     with any proof that Iraq is in any way connected to the 
     events of 9/11. Furthermore, there is no credible evidence 
     that Iraq has harbored those who were responsible for 
     planning, authorizing or committing the attacks of 9/11.
       Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution 
     to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of 
     international terrorism against the United States, as 
     Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization 
     for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and
       KEY ISSUE: This resolution was specific to 9/11. It was 
     limited to a response to 9/11.
       Whereas it is in the national security of the United States 
     to restore international peace and security to the Persian 
     Gulf region;
       KEY ISSUE: If by the ``national security interests'' of the 
     United States, the Administration means oil, it ought to 
     communicate such to the Congress. A unilateral attack on Iraq 
     by the United States will cause instability and chaos in the 
     region and sow the seeds of future conflicts all over the 
     world.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from Florida has 5\1/2\ 
minutes remaining.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
  I am pleased and honored to yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. McCotter), a member of the Financial 
Services Committee, a former member of our Foreign Affairs Committee. I 
would like to remind my good friend that we still have a GOP vacancy in 
our committee and we need freedom and democracy believers like the 
gentleman from Michigan; seniority retained.
  Mr. McCOTTER. I thank the gentlelady. I thank her for her kind words 
and her attempt to draft me.
  In this age of hope and peril, today we all assemble with earnestness 
and sincerity to discuss matters of liberty and tyranny, matters of 
life and death.

                              {time}  1320

  What we see in Afghanistan is a counterinsurgency operation being led 
by the United States. It is the most difficult and painful type of 
military operation to witness because it does involve working with the 
population, winning hearts and minds, and helping to build the 
institutions of democracy and liberty at the community and national 
levels, which have been nonexistent for decades.
  Yet because the cause is difficult, it does not mean we can turn away 
from it, because the Afghan people cannot turn away from it.
  In 2006, I was fortunate to be on a CODEL with many of my colleagues, 
and we had the opportunity to meet women who were serving in the Afghan 
National Assembly. Despite the difficulties in translation, it was very 
clear that they wanted to accomplish two things: they wanted to serve 
the Afghan people, who had entrusted them with their positions; and 
they wanted to honor the men and women of the United States military, 
who had risked and given so much for them to have that opportunity.
  As I said, I deeply appreciate the sincerity and earnestness of this 
debate today because, in this instance, clearly, it is not one based 
upon partisan division, but one based upon the dictates of conscience. 
I think it is very important that we look into this situation and see 
that it is not simply the United States that is involved here and that 
it is not simply a question of leaving without consequence. If we leave 
now, if we back this resolution, there will be consequences to the 
female Afghan National Assembly parliamentarians, who are trying to 
build freedom within that country.
  In my discussion with those brave women, they brought up how 
difficult it was for them: how hard it would be to build a sustainable 
democracy; to build an economy; to build, in many ways, what we here 
take for granted.
  I said to them that it was very important to remember that the United 
States, itself, was not always a great national power and a beacon of 
hope and freedom and that in our darkest days after the Revolution 
there were many who thought this free Republic would fail, and there 
were enemies who sought its destruction. Yet, at the founding time, the 
people of the United States and their leaders were able to take this 
Nation's democracy and turn it into one that not only secured freedom 
for itself but one that expanded it to others.
  I said that it was within the Halls of the United States Congress, 
within the Halls of our institution, that you could see the pictures of 
the Founders, like Jefferson and Madison, hanging from the walls, which 
remind us of what we have endured, what we enjoy, and what we must 
return.
  I told the Afghan National Assembly women that one day their 
daughters and granddaughters would look up and see on the walls their 
portraits hanging in a free Afghanistan that was allied with the Free 
World against terrorism and that was a beacon, itself, to those who 
were oppressed--because they will be free, because we will honor our 
duty not to seek miserly to hold our own freedom for ourselves, and 
because we will follow what Lincoln said:
  In seeking to extend freedom to the enslaved, we ensure freedom for 
ourselves.
  We will continue to stand with the Afghan people. We will continue to 
honor the commitment to the solemn word of the United States as she 
gave to that country; and one day, we will look back, and we will be 
proud of the votes we cast today.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, we have now been in Afghanistan for 113 
months, ten months longer than the war in Vietnam. The war in 
Afghanistan is now the longest conflict in United States history.
  Here at home, Americans are out of work, teachers are facing budget 
cuts, police departments are overstretched, and yet the President and 
much of Congress continue to cling to the notion that if given more 
time and more precious taxpayer dollars borrowed from China we will 
finally--after a decade of war--gain the edge to ``finish the job'' in 
Afghanistan.
  Mr. Speaker, I don't buy it. There is no comprehensive political 
outcome in sight. There is no decisive military outcome that will allow 
us to declare ``victory.'' There is no meaningful government outside of 
Kabul, the Afghani security forces are in disarray, and there is 
unbelievable corruption throughout the Karzai government, police, and 
security forces.
  Despite these realities, the U.S. taxpayer is being asked to foot a 
$100 billion bill per year--again, all borrowed money that future 
generations will have to pay back with interest--to continue a failed 
strategy in Afghanistan. I continue to be extremely concerned that the 
Afghanistan war has drawn the U.S. into a black hole not completely 
unlike Vietnam, where we propped up a corrupt government that had no 
relationship to the rest of the country. Recent events in North Africa 
and throughout the Middle East have shown us the consequences of 
similar policies.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly support our troops. They have fought 
heroically and done everything we have asked of them. We should honor 
those who have served and sacrificed for their country. But we are not 
honoring those who have served and those who continue to serve by 
supporting a war without

[[Page H1951]]

clear objectives, a clear exit strategy, and without any substantial 
hope for a ``military victory.''
  Clearly an orderly withdrawal can not be accomplished in 9 months. 
But supporting H. Con. Res. 28 provides an opportunity to send a 
message to the President that the current strategy and cost of the war 
in Afghanistan are unsustainable. We need a clear exit strategy. We 
need a less expensive, less troop intensive policy that could bring 
about a much better result in Afghanistan. We need to prioritize the 
needs here at home instead of spending treasure and blood on a 
seemingly open-ended war in Afghanistan. I urge my colleagues to join 
me in supporting H. Con. Res. 28.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, today the House has a chance to make a 
judgment about the wisdom of continuing our combat role in Afghanistan. 
In 2009, I came to the floor of the House and declared that I would 
give the President at least a year to show that his approach could 
work. For those who choose to actually look at the facts and the 
results to date, the conclusion is clear: it is time--past time--for us 
to leave Afghanistan.
  Time and again, our military forces would take out one of their field 
commanders, and every time several more rise to take their place. This 
is the nature of insurgency, it is the nature of the problem that 
confronts us, and it is not a problem that will be resolved by the 
continuous, endless use of military force. The number of insurgent 
attacks is at an all-time high. The corruption and dysfunctionality of 
the Afghan government has become legendary. And the cost of this 
conflict--both in killed and wounded, including the long-term care 
costs for the hundreds of thousands of veterans of this war--continue 
to rise. I voted for this resolution today in order to show that I am 
no longer willing to allow our military and our nation to bear the 
endless, deadly burden of a war without end that is moving neither our 
country nor theirs closer to safety and security. I hope the President 
takes note and works with us to bring our troops home.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, Secretary Gates recently stated that we could 
be in Afghanistan past the 2014 deadline for complete troop withdrawal. 
Meanwhile, more than 60 percent of Americans oppose this war, with more 
than 70 percent of people believing that we should withdraw a 
substantial number of U.S. troops from Afghanistan this summer.
  This is the longest war in U.S. history and all we have to show for 
it is a higher deficit and more debt.
  We already spend the most of any country in the world on defense. The 
next closest defense-spending country is China--and we spend seven 
times what they do.
  Defense spending currently constitutes about 60 percent of our 
discretionary spending. And it has increased 86 percent since 1998, 
becoming more entrenched than any entitlement program. As we're talking 
about cutting important programs that working families depend on, we 
should not continue to throw money down an endless hole in Afghanistan.
  I recently conducted a survey in my district inquiring about 
constituents' priorities and discovered that getting out of Afghanistan 
was second only to job creation. They also agree that one of the best 
ways to reduce the deficit is through extensive defense spending cuts.
  Republicans keep expressing the absolute necessity in cutting $100 
billion from the budget over the next five years. Pulling out of 
Afghanistan would, all by itself, save us over $100 billion in the 
upcoming budget.
  It is time for Congress to reassert its Constitutional war powers 
authority and set a time line for complete withdrawal of our troops 
from Afghanistan.
  I am proud to support this resolution by Representatives Kucinich and 
Jones that gives Congress, and therefore the American people, the power 
to decide whether America enters into or continues a war.
  I urge my colleagues to follow the will of the American people and 
support this resolution.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H. Con. Res. 28, a resolution 
that directs the President, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, to 
remove our troops from Afghanistan no later than December 31st, 2011.
  Secretary Gates recently stated that we could be in Afghanistan past 
the 2014 deadline for complete troop withdrawal. Meanwhile, more than 
60 percent of Americans oppose the war, with more than 70 percent of 
people believing that we should withdraw most troops from Afghanistan 
this summer. I recently conducted a survey in my district inquiring 
about constituents' priorities and discovered that getting out of 
Afghanistan was second only to job creation. They also agree that one 
of the best ways to reduce the deficit is through extensive defense 
spending cuts.
  This is the longest war in U.S. history and all we have to show for 
it is a higher deficit and more debt. Yet Republicans, who continue to 
tout the merits of a balanced budget, refuse to consider ending this 
expensive war, let alone consider modest defense-spending cuts.
  Defense spending currently constitutes almost 60 percent of our 
discretionary spending. As we are forced to consider cutting important 
programs that working families depend on, we should not continue to 
throw money down an endless hole in Afghanistan. Republicans continue 
to express the absolute necessity in cutting $100 billion from the 
budget over the next five years. Pulling out of Afghanistan would, all 
by itself, save us over $100 billion in the upcoming budget.
  The Majority is not listening to the American people. The American 
people want us out of Afghanistan and they want a solid plan to improve 
the economy and create jobs, neither of which the Republicans deem 
worthy enough to address.
  I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this resolution proposed by 
Representatives Kucinich and Jones that gives Congress, and therefore 
the American people, the Power to decide whether America enters into or 
continues a war. I urge my colleagues to follow the will of the people 
and support this resolution.
  Ms. CLARKE of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am writing to urge my support 
to bring our troops our home. The recent debate on removing the United 
States Armed Forces from Afghanistan has been the topic of many 
discussions and now is the time to take action. This devastating war 
has continued on for nearly a decade and it has taken the lives of more 
than 1,400 Americans and cost taxpayers over $366 billion.
  The war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting. We need to end this 
national humiliation and redirect war funding. The scope of our 
interest in Afghanistan has been exceeded and it is time to bring this 
war to a successful conclusion. While we have achieved hard-earned 
milestones, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and the 
threat to our national security remains unaffected.
  We can no longer fight this war. We have to leave it up to the Afghan 
people to determine their own fate and future. I ask my colleagues to 
join me in taking a stand to bring our troops home. Our economy is at 
stake, the precious lives of our troops and their families hang in the 
balance and the integrity of the United States has been severely 
jeopardized.
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, my colleagues, we're debating the 
wrong resolution here today.
  We should be debating a resolution that honors the continuing 
sacrifice, service, the courage and the steadfastness of our men and 
women in uniform--all volunteers--as they work to carry out their 
missions in the global war on terror. And their families back at home.
  These warriors serve today in Afghanistan, and yes, in Iraq.
  Both are active war zones where there are no ``front lines'' and 
every deployed servicemember lays his or her life on the line every 
day.
  And they have made significant progress. General Petreaus told our 
Defense Subcommittee this morning that ``The momentum of the Taliban 
has been halted in much of the country and reversed in some important 
areas.''
  The Afghan Security Forces are growing in number and capability.
  And the day when we turn all operations over to the Afghans gets 
closer and closer.
  None of this has been easy.
  Progress has been made through hard fighting and considerable 
sacrifice of so many Americans and our allies.
  There have been tough losses along the way. And there have been 
setbacks as well as successes.
  But instead of debating a resolution that honors the sacrifice of our 
brave warfighters, we are considering a measure that seeks to ``turn 
off the lights and slam the door as we withdraw.''
  Well, we've been down this road before.
  Two decades ago we celebrated alongside our Afghan allies as the 
invading Russian military rolled back into the USSR in defeat.
  And when the celebration ended, we walked away--we did not follow-up 
with the necessary investments in diplomacy and development assistance, 
turning our back on Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  Had we not done that in the early 1990s, we would have better secured 
our own country's future, as well as peace and stability in the region.
  Instead of intensifying our humanitarian efforts to help the Afghans 
meet their postwar challenges, we simply walked away--leaving a 
destroyed country that lacked roads, schools, and any plan or hope for 
rebuilding.
  Into this void marched the Taliban and al-Qaeda. My Colleagues, as 
they say, ``the rest is history'' for the Afghans and for all 
Americans:
  Horrors perpetrated on Afghan men, women and children;
  A curtain of oppression which denied half the population--women--any 
rights and dignity;

[[Page H1952]]

  Closed schools. Destroyed cultural institutions and national 
treasures;
  A modern-day Dark Ages;
  Mr. Speaker, the resolution we debate today would have us repeat that 
sad and dangerous saga.
  I urge defeat of the resolution.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Kucinich resolution 
directing the President to remove United States Armed Forces from 
Afghanistan.
  It is time to bring U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan to an 
end and to bring our troops home. The war effort in Afghanistan is no 
longer serving its purpose of enhancing the security of the United 
States, which should be our goal.
  We were attacked on 9/11 by al Qaeda. Al Qaeda had bases in 
Afghanistan. It made sense to go in and destroy those bases. And we 
did. We have every right, we have every duty to destroy bases which are 
being used to plot against the United States. But the CIA tells us that 
there are now fewer than 100 al Qaeda personnel in all of the country 
of Afghanistan.
  It is past time to admit that our legitimate purpose in Afghanistan--
to destroy al Qaeda bases--has long since been accomplished. But it is 
a fool's errand to try to remake a country that nobody since Genghis 
Khan has managed to conquer. What makes us think, what arrogance gives 
us the right to assume that we can succeed where the Mongols, the 
British, the Soviets failed? No government in Afghanistan, no 
government in Kabul, has ever been able to make its writ run in the 
entire country.
  Why have we undertaken to invent a government that is not supported 
by the majority of the people, a government that is corrupt, and try to 
impose it on this country? Afghanistan is in the middle of what is at 
this point a 35-year civil war. We have no business intervening in that 
civil war, we have no ability to win it for one side or the other, and 
we have no necessity to win it for one side or the other. This whole 
idea of counterinsurgency, that we are going to persuade the people who 
are left alive after our firepower is applied to love the government 
that we like is absurd.
  It will take tens of years, hundreds and hundreds of billions of 
dollars, tens of thousands of American lives, if it can be done at all, 
and we don't need to do it. It's their country. If they want to have a 
civil war, we can't stop them. We can't choose the rulers that they 
have, we don't have to like the rulers that they have, and we don't 
have to like their choices. It's not up to us.
  At this point we must recognize that rebuilding Afghanistan is both 
beyond our ability and beyond our mandate to prevent terrorists from 
attacking the United States. And if it be said that there are 
terrorists operating in Afghanistan, that may be, but it is also true 
of Yemen, Somalia and many other countries. We do not need to invade 
and conquer and occupy all those countries, and Afghanistan provides no 
greater necessity or justification for military operations.
  We are throwing $100 billion a year--plus countless lives--down a 
drainpipe, for no useful purpose at all--and with very little 
discussion of our purposes and of whether our policy matches our 
purposes.
  To continue so bad a policy at so high a cost is simply 
unconscionable. It is unjustifiable to sacrifice more money and more 
lives this way. I urge my colleagues to join me in voting to bring the 
U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan to a close.
  Now, I want to say a word about supporting the troops. I believe it 
is more supportive of the troops to bring them home from a war that 
they should not be fighting than it is to give them weapons to fight an 
unnecessary war in which some of them, unfortunately, will lose their 
lives.
  So I say support our troops. Bring them home. Support the country. 
Stop fighting where it no longer makes sense.
  Vote for this resolution. Let's bring our troops home.
  Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support H. 
Con. Res. 28, a resolution requiring the removal of all United States 
Armed Forces from Afghanistan. I believe it is time to bring the United 
States Military's involvement in Afghanistan to a close.
  Since the beginning of the Afghanistan War, the United States and 
Coalition Forces have lost 2,347 service men and women. Tens of 
thousands have suffered from other disabilities or psychological harm. 
With thousands of Texas Guardsmen currently serving in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, I will never forget their bravery in fighting for the 
freedoms, liberties, aid human dignity of the Afghanistan people.
  Our nation's economic and national security interests are not served 
by a policy of an open-ended war in Afghanistan.
  Mr. Speaker, our soldiers have fought for us, now it's time for us to 
fight for them. I encourage my colleagues to support this resolution 
and help bring our soldiers home.
  Ms. HIRONO. Mr. Speaker, while I support the intent of this bill, I 
rise in reluctant opposition to H. Con. Res. 28, legislation introduced 
by Congressman Kucinich directing the President to remove U.S. Armed 
Forces from Afghanistan within 30 days.
  I agree with Congressman Kucinich that we must have an exit strategy 
and a concrete plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. However, I 
voted against this resolution when it came up for a vote last year 
because I believed that withdrawing all troops 30 days after enactment 
of the bill was unrealistic.
  Yesterday, along with a large number of my like-minded colleagues in 
the House, I sent a letter to President Obama urging him to prepare for 
a significant and sizeable drawdown of troops from Afghanistan that 
begins this July. I ask for permission to include this letter for the 
record.
  Last December, the Obama Administration concluded in its review of 
the war in Afghanistan that we will be ready to begin a responsible 
drawdown in July 2011. This week, General Petraeus testified before 
Congress that he would keep our military and counterinsurgency gains in 
mind as he begins to provide recommendations to the President on 
commencing our military drawdown in July.
  We have now entered the tenth year that American troops have been in 
Afghanistan, the longest war in U.S. history. An overwhelming majority 
of the American people--including an increasing number of Members of 
Congress--supports a safe and significant redeployment of U.S troops 
from Afghanistan soon.
  There is no question that we need to end our mission in Afghanistan. 
I will carefully review the Obama Administration's assessment of the 
war effort, including plans for a drawdown, in the coming months. 
Insufficient progress in withdrawing U.S. troops by July 2011 will 
compel me to support a resolution like this in the future.

                                Congress of the United States,

                                   Washington, DC, March 16, 2011.
     Hon. Barack Obama,
     President of the United States,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President, We write to you to: express our utmost 
     support for your planned drawdown of the U.S. military 
     presence in Afghanistan beginning no later than July of this 
     year. We, the undersigned members of Congress, believe the 
     forthcoming reduction in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan 
     must be significant and sizeable, and executed in an orderly 
     fashion.
       Our nation's economic and national security interests are 
     not served by a policy of open-ended war in Afghanistan. At a 
     time of severe economic distress, the war in Afghanistan is 
     costing the United States more than $100 billion per year, 
     excluding the long-term costs of care for returning military 
     servicemembers. At the same time, military and intelligence 
     officials agree that Al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan is 
     diminished and that there will not be a military solution to 
     resolve the current situation. It is simply unsustainable for 
     our nation to maintain a costly, military-first strategy in 
     Afghanistan.
       A significant redeployment of U.S. troops from Afghanistan 
     beginning in July 2011 will send a clear signal that the 
     United States does not seek a permanent presence in 
     Afghanistan. This transition will provide incentive for 
     internal stakeholders to improve upon the political status 
     quo, reduce corruption, and take meaningful steps toward the 
     establishment of an effective, trustworthy, and inclusive 
     governance structure. A meaningful start to withdrawal will 
     also empower U.S. diplomatic engagement with regional and 
     global stakeholders who share a common interest in the long-
     term stability of Afghanistan.
       The majority of the American people overwhelmingly support 
     a rapid shift toward withdrawal in Afghanistan. In fact, a 
     Gallup Poll released on February 2, 2011 indicated that 72% 
     of Americans favor action this year to ``speed up the 
     withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.'' Let us be clear. The 
     redeployment of a minimal number of U.S. troops from 
     Afghanistan in July will not meet the expectations of 
     Congress or the American people.
       Mr. President, as you work to finally bring an end to the 
     war in Iraq by the end of this year, we must commit ourselves 
     to ensuring that our nation's military engagement in 
     Afghanistan does not become the status quo. It is time to 
     focus on securing a future of economic opportunity and 
     prosperity for the American people and move swiftly to end 
     America's longest war in Afghanistan.
       Mr. President, we look forward to working with you to make 
     that goal a reality.
           Sincerely,
         Joe Baca; Tammy Baldwin; Karen Bass; Lois Capps; Michael 
           E. Capuano; Andre Carson; Yvette D. Clarke; Steve 
           Cohen; John Conyers, Jr.; Jerry F. Costello; Elijah E. 
           Cummings; Danny K. Davis (IL); Peter A. DeFazio; Rosa 
           L. DeLauro; Theodore E. Deutch; John J. Duncan, Jr. 
           (TN); Donna F. Edwards; Keith Ellison; Sam Farr; Bob 
           Filner; Barney Frank; Marcia L. Fudge; John Garamendi; 
           Raul M. Grijalva; Luis V. Gutierrez; Alcee L. Hastings; 
           Maurice D. Hinchey; Mazie K. Hirono; Rush D. Holt; 
           Michael M. Honda; Jesse L. Jackson, Jr.; Sheila Jackson 
           Lee; Eddie

[[Page H1953]]

           Bernice Johnson; Hank Johnson, Jr.; Timothy V. Johnson; 
           Walter B. Jones; Barbara Lee; John B. Larson; John 
           Lewis; Zoe Lofgren; Ben Ray Lujan; Carolyn B. Maloney; 
           Edward J. Markey; Doris O. Matsui; Jim McDermott; James 
           P. McGovern; Michael H. Michaud; George Miller; Gwen 
           Moore; James P. Moran; Christopher S. Murphy; Grace 
           Napolitano; Eleanor Holmes Norton; John W. Olver; Bill 
           Pascrell, Jr.; Ron Paul; Donald M. Payne; Chellie 
           Pingree; Jared Polis; David E. Price; Mike Quigley; 
           Rep, Charles B. Rangel; Laura Richardson; Lucille 
           Roybal-Allard; Linda T. Sanchez; Loretta Sanchez; 
           Janice D. Schakowsky; Bobby Scott; Jose E. Serrano; 
           Albio Sires; Louise McIntosh Slaughter; Jackie Speier; 
           Pete Stark; Mike Thompson (CA); John F. Tierney; 
           Edolphus Towns; Niki Tsongas; Maxine Waters; Anthony D. 
           Weiner; Peter Welch; Lynn C. Woolsey, Members of 
           Congress.

  Ms. MOORE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to support this resolution with great 
reluctance.
  I have had many great conversations and discussions with the sponsor 
of this resolution since coming to Congress about the issues of war and 
peace and justice. He even came to my district last year to join me in 
a town hall on the war in Afghanistan. He's been a great leader on this 
issue and a great friend.
  I agree with the gentleman about the need to bring our troops home 
from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Recently, I joined a number of my 
colleagues in writing to the President to make clear our belief that 
the troop withdrawals from Afghanistan should be ``substantial, 
significant, and orderly.'' The gentleman from Ohio did not join that 
letter although as I said, I know he shares the same goals of all those 
who signed it.
  A few weeks ago, I voted for an amendment to H.R. 1 that would limit 
funding for the war in Afghanistan to $10 billion, with the hope that 
those funds would be used by the Defense Department to plan and 
implement a timetable for the safe and expeditious withdrawal of our 
troops.
  I want an end to these wars. One of the criteria that I have used for 
supporting those efforts and similar efforts in the past by a number of 
my colleagues is that we have to allow our military planners to 
implement that withdrawal in a way that is safe, orderly and 
responsible.
  I doubt that the 30 day-withdrawal deadline in this bill meets that 
criteria. The bill itself recognizes that by giving the President the 
option to delay that withdrawal through the end of the year.
  Although I am eager to withdraw, I am beset with a nagging question: 
how practical is it to move 100,000 troops and the associated equipment 
out of a country half way around the world in 30 days in an orderly, 
safe, and responsible fashion?
  I support getting our troops out of Afghanistan. But we have to do so 
wisely. We can't waive a magic wand today and they are gone tomorrow or 
dismiss concerns about their safety. That is why on the issue of how 
that withdrawal is conducted, I have always supported legislation that 
defers that question to our military planners.
  Again, even the letter that was sent to the President recently by a 
number of my colleagues, such as Barbara Lee and Jim McGovern, who like 
myself opposed the escalation of this war and want all of our troops 
home soon, does not dictate size or set a timetable for those 
withdrawals after July 2011.
  That letter however did make clear that ``a significant redeployment 
from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011 will send a clear signal that 
the United States does not seek a permanent presence in Afghanistan.''
  Even though July does not begin for over 100 days from now, sending 
that letter in March allows the military to have plenty of time to plan 
for a sizeable withdrawal.
  This was the same gist of several bills by Mr. McGovern last year 
that asked the military to give us their withdrawal plan by a certain 
date, including any reasons for why a redeployment might be delayed, 
rather than having Congress mandate that date.
  Again, I support this resolution reluctantly because it sends an 
important signal to the Afghanistan government and its people that the 
U.S. is not intent on an endless occupation and that after ten years in 
America's longest war in history, we cannot morally or financially 
continue to afford this war. To the extent this resolution does that, I 
am in full support. However, again, my concerns remain about its 
method.
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, once again we are debating this issue. And 
once again I will vote in support of ending our involvement in 
Afghanistan.
   Our ongoing commitment in Afghanistan has proved exceedingly 
difficult and costly--and at a time when we can ill-afford the $100 
billion a year to sustain it. After years of war, the economic and 
military costs are straining our servicemembers, their families, and 
the country--they are simply too high.
  President Obama increased our commitment there while also defining a 
goal of withdrawal. But our increased efforts have not yielded enough 
progress.
  I have joined with my colleagues in sending a letter, led by Rep. 
Barbara Lee, to the President supporting his planned drawdown of the 
U.S. military presence in Afghanistan beginning no later than July of 
this year.
  It is time to bring this war to a responsible end.
  Our brave men and women in uniform have fought well and continue to 
deserve our full support and commitment to return them home safely to 
their families and loved ones. They have fought with honor, at great 
cost, in the face of great challenges. I am humbled by their sacrifice.
  While I support the President and our military leadership, I believe 
we must send a message that the U.S. cannot sustain further commitments 
in Afghanistan.
  I believe the resolution before us today sends that message, and that 
is why I support it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the order of the House of Wednesday, March 16, 2011, the 
previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the concurrent resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further 
proceedings on this question will be postponed.

                          ____________________