[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 31 (Thursday, March 3, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1223-S1224]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Portman, and Ms. 
        Landrieu):
  S. 473. A bill to extend the chemical facility security program of 
the Department of Homeland Security, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the law granting the Federal Government, 
for the first time, the authority to regulate the security of the 
Nation's highest risk chemical facilities is due to expire on March 18. 
We cannot allow this to occur. Given the success of this law and its 
vital importance to all Americans, I am introducing legislation today 
with Senators Pryor, Portman, and Landrieu to extend and improve the 
law.
  More than 70,000 products are created through the use of chemicals, 
helping to supply the consumer, industrial, construction, and 
agricultural sectors of our economy. The United States is home to 
thousands of facilities that manufacture, use, or store chemicals.
  This industry is vital to our economy, with annual sales of $725 
billion, exports of $171 billion, and more than 780,000 employees.
  After September 11, 2001, we realized that chemical facilities were 
vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given the hazardous chemicals present 
at many locations, terrorists could view them as attractive targets, 
yielding loss of life, significant injuries, and major destruction if 
successfully attacked.
  In 2005, as Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, I held a series of hearings on chemical security. 
Following these hearings, Senators Lieberman, Carper, Levin, and I 
introduced bipartisan legislation authorizing the Department of 
Homeland Security to set and enforce security standards at high-risk 
chemical facilities. That bill was incorporated into the homeland 
security appropriations act that was signed into law in 2006.
  To implement this new authority, DHS established the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, or CFATS. The program sets 
18 risk-based performance standards that high-risk chemical facilities 
must meet. These security standards cover a range of threats, such as 
perimeter security, access control, theft, internal sabotage, and cyber 
security.
  High-risk chemical facilities covered by the program must conduct 
mandatory vulnerability assessments, develop site security plans, and 
invest in protective measures.
  The Department must approve these assessments and site security 
plans, using audits and inspections to ensure compliance with the 
performance standards. The Secretary has strong authority to shut down 
facilities that are non-compliant.
  This risk-based approach has made the owners and operators of 
chemical plants partners with the Federal Government in implementing a 
successful, collaborative security program.
  This landmark law has been in place slightly more than four years. 
Taxpayers have invested nearly $300 million in the program, and 
chemical plants have invested hundreds of millions more to comply with 
the law. As a direct result, security at our Nation's chemical 
facilities is much stronger today.
  Now we must reauthorize the program. Simply put, the program works 
and should be extended.
  Changing this successful law, as was proposed last year by the House 
of Representatives in partisan legislation, would discard what is 
working for an unproven and burdensome plan.
  We must not undermine the substantial investments of time and 
resources already made in CFATS implementation by both DHS and the 
private sector. Worse would be requiring additional expenditures with 
no demonstrable increase to the overall security of our Nation.
  In the 111th Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives 
debated a provision that would alter the fundamental nature of CFATS. 
The provision would have required the Department to completely rework 
the program. It would have mandated the use of so-called ``inherently 
safer technology,'' or IST.
  What is IST? It is an approach to process engineering. It is not, 
however, a security measure.
  An IST mandate may actually increase or unacceptably transfer risk to 
other points in the chemical process or elsewhere in the supply chain.
  For example, many drinking water utilities have determined that 
chlorine remains their best and most effective drinking water treatment 
option. Their decisions were not based solely on financial 
considerations, but also on many other factors, such as the 
characteristics of the region's climate, geography, and source water 
supplies, the size and location of the utility's facilities, and the 
risks and benefits of chlorine use compared to the use of alternative 
treatment processes.
  According to one water utility located in an isolated area of the 
northwest United States, if Congress were to force it to replace its 
use of gaseous

[[Page S1224]]

chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, then the utility would have to use 
as much as seven times the current quantity of treatment chemicals to 
achieve comparable water quality results. In turn, the utility would 
have to arrange for many more bulk chemical deliveries, by trucks, into 
a watershed area. The greater quantities of chemicals and increased 
frequency of truck deliveries would heighten the risk of an accident 
resulting in a chemical spill into the watershed. In fact, the 
accidental release of sodium hypochlorite into the watershed would 
likely cause greater harm to soils, vegetation, and streams than a 
gaseous chlorine release in this remote area.
  Currently, DHS cannot dictate specific security measures, like IST. 
Nor should it. The Federal Government should set performance standards, 
but leave it up to the private sector to decide precisely how to 
achieve those standards.
  Forcing chemical facilities to implement IST could cost jobs at some 
facilities and affect the availability of many vital products.
  Last year, the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates 
testified that mandatory IST would restrict the production of 
pharmaceuticals and microelectronics, hobbling these industries. The 
increased cost of a mandatory IST program may force chemical companies 
to simply transfer their operations overseas, costing American workers 
thousands of jobs.
  To be clear, some owners and operators of chemical facilities may 
choose to use IST. But that decision should be theirs--not 
Washington's. Congress should not dictate specific industrial processes 
under the guise of security when a facility could choose other 
alternatives that meet the Nation's security needs.
  Last July, the Homeland Security Committee unanimously approved 
bipartisan legislation I authored with Senators Pryor, Voinovich, and 
Landrieu to extend CFATS for three more years.
  Additionally, the bill would have established voluntary exercise and 
training programs to improve collaboration with the private sector and 
state and local communities under the CFATS program; created a 
voluntary technical assistance program; and created a chemical facility 
security best practices clearinghouse and private sector advisory board 
at DHS to assist in the implementation of CFATS.
  Today, along with Senators Pryor, Portman, and Landrieu, I am 
reintroducing this bill. The Continuing Chemical Facilities 
Antiterrorism Security Act of 2011 is a straight-forward, common-sense 
reauthorization of the CFATS program.
  I am conscious of the risks our Nation faces through an attack on a 
chemical facility. That is why I authored this law in the first place 
and battled considerable opposition to get it enacted. We should 
support the continuation of this successful security program without 
the addition of costly, unproven Federal mandates. I urge my colleagues 
to support this important bill.
                                 ______