[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 27 (Friday, February 18, 2011)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E301-E302]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       BARLETTA AMENDMENTS AND WEINER-CHAFFETZ-CRAVAACK AMENDMENT

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. DONALD M. PAYNE

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, February 18, 2011

  Mr. PAYNE. I rise today to oppose the Barletta amendments and the 
Weiner-Chaffetz-Cravaack amendment to eliminate funding for the U.S. 
Institute of Peace (USIP), should they be offered during floor 
consideration of H.R. 1.
  The elimination of USIP would have strong, adverse impact on 
America's security interests. USIP is an important national security 
actor. The U.S. Government must have options for resolving 
international conflict other than military action. USIP--created by 
Congress and signed into law by President Ronald Reagan--is the only 
independent U.S. Government actor that is dedicated solely to conflict 
prevention and resolution.
  USIP is the critical bridge between governmental and non-governmental 
actors to promote peace in volatile conflicts. Their Center for 
Mediation and Conflict Resolution conducts work in a number of critical 
conflict zones in Africa, Middle East, and across the globe:
  USIP is addressing a series of challenges and opportunities facing 
the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, with a focus on institutional 
capacity to make compromises, the capacity of the Israeli and 
Palestinian publics to build consensus and support for a negotiated 
agreement, and the role of U.S. policymakers in encouraging and 
supporting these efforts toward a peaceful resolution.
  USIP is addressing several issues in Nigeria, a country rife with 
conflicts over petroleum resources and religion. Amidst this situation, 
the Center is working on peace efforts for the Niger Delta region, 
including working collaboratively with local governments, oil 
companies, and Nigerian NGOs.
  For nearly two decades, the United States Institute of Peace has been 
working in Sudan on peace processes. Its knowledge and expertise has 
helped shape the environment that has contributed, so far, to a 
relatively peaceful outcome of the referendum. USIP's work on 
prevention, power-sharing, constitutional reform and natural resources 
has made a critical difference in the country's local capacity.
  USIP produces timely expert analysis on issues critical to 
policymakers and conflict prevention practitioners. Just last week USIP 
published the attached PEACE Brief report on the political stalemate in 
Cote d'Ivoire following the November 28, 2010 election and the broader 
issue of preventing electoral violence in Africa.
  USIP is a small, agile center of innovation in support of America's 
national security interests in supporting peace and democracy in Africa 
and across the globe. USIP has been a very useful resource to 
policymakers for decades, we can not eliminate this critical 
institution.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in voting ``no'' on these amendments.

 [From the PeaceBrief--United States Institute of Peace, Feb. 7, 2011]

    Cote d'Ivoire's Political Stalemate: A Symptom of Africa's Weak 
                         Electoral Institutions

                           (By Dorina Bekoe)


                                Summary

       The political stalemate in Cote d'Ivoire following the 
     November 28, 2010, presidential election continues. The 
     majority of the international community recognizes Alassane 
     Ouattara as the winner, but Laurent Gbagbo, the sitting 
     president, insists he won. Financial and diplomatic sanctions 
     imposed on the Gbagbo administration have thus far not forced 
     Gbagbo from power.
       Maintaining international pressure and focus is critical to 
     resolving the Ivorian crisis, but African states are 
     increasingly divided on how to proceed.
       The power-sharing arrangement settled on by five African 
     nations in recent elections sets a dangerous precedent. 
     Losers with a strong militia may find it easier to use 
     threats of violence or actual violence to retain a critical 
     power role, thus subverting the intent of the election.
       African states will continue to experience violence during 
     elections until the security sector is reformed, states 
     refrain from holding elections while militias remain 
     mobilized and armed, elections can be clearly and 
     independently verified, institutions are politically 
     independent, and policies exist to discourage the violent 
     acquisition of power.
       Following the November 28, 2010, presidential runoff 
     election, the United Nations, charged with validating the 
     electoral process, along with the Independent Electoral 
     Commission, proclaimed Alassane Ouattara the winner, with 
     54.1 percent of the vote, over Laurent Gbagbo, the sitting 
     president, who had received 45.9 percent of the vote. 
     However, the Constitutional Council, headed by a Gbagbo 
     supporter, annulled results in 13 departments, alleging 
     fraud, and proclaimed Gbagbo the winner, with 51.4 percent of 
     the vote; Ouattara was given 48.5 percent.\1\ Both Ouattara 
     and Gbagbo were sworn in as president by their supporters.
       Most in the international and regional communities 
     recognized Ouattara as the winner, and the Economic Community 
     of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) 
     suspended Cote d'Ivoire from membership. Gbagbo's calls to 
     investigate election fraud, recount the ballots, and craft a 
     power-sharing arrangement have been rejected by the 
     international and regional institutions. Instead, ECOWAS and 
     AU envoys have urged Gbagbo to step down, financial and 
     travel sanctions have been placed on him and his associates, 
     and ECOWAS threatened military intervention.\2\ With the 
     military and the Young Patriots militia supporting Gbagbo and 
     the Forces Nouvelles rebels supporting Ouattara, many fear 
     that the failure of diplomacy and sanctions will reignite the 
     2002 civil war. While the central conundrum is how to 
     convince Gbagbo to leave office, larger questions loom about 
     the role of elections, the state of democratization, and the 
     strength of institutions in Africa.


            Power sharing in response to electoral violence

       In 2010, opposition candidates claimed electoral fraud and 
     irregularities in every presidential election in Africa--in 
     Guinea, Togo, Sudan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Comoros, 
     Tanzania, and Rwanda. Historically, in many cases of 
     electoral fraud, the challenger urges demonstrations or 
     refuses to recognize the results. In prolonged and violent 
     standoffs mediators have been dispatched, as occurred in 
     Guinea 2010, or a power-sharing agreement has been 
     negotiated, as occurred in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008, in 
     Togo in 2005, in Madagascar in 2002, and in Zanzibar in 2001.
       While the power-sharing arrangements in those five cases 
     aimed to stop the violence and address some of its underlying 
     causes, such arrangements could have longlasting 
     implications, and shorter, transitional measures might be 
     considered instead. Granted, an electorate can vote for a 
     power-sharing or proportionally representative government. 
     The problems arise when power sharing is imposed as a 
     solution when there is a clear winner (it weakens the purpose 
     of an election), when the winner cannot be determined (it can 
     encourage fraud and other obfuscation), or when there is 
     postelection violence (it may demonstrate that violence 
     pays). In this sense, Gbagbo's power-sharing proposal is 
     troubling and presents a critical philosophical decision for 
     Africa's institutions: how to react to candidates who respond 
     violently to election results. More broadly, how can leaders 
     be encouraged to accept defeat? How should the international 
     community respond to leaders who use violence to hold on to 
     power? For the remainder of 2011, Africa faces nearly 40 
     elections and referenda in 23 countries, including some that 
     have a history of violence and weak democratic institutions, 
     such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of 
     Congo. A power-sharing norm, in the event of violently 
     contested election results, will be a dangerous precedent.


                    lessons from madagascar and togo

       In 2003, a disputed first-run election left Madagascar 
     divided between the supporters of incumbent president Didier 
     Ratsiraka and challenger Marc Ravalomanana. The Organization 
     of African Unity brokered the Dakar Agreement to pave the way 
     for a resolution .\3\ But when Ratsiraka refused to concede, 
     confrontations between the two escalated, and Ratsiraka fled 
     to France. \4\ Six years later the mayor of Antananarivo, 
     Andry Rajoelina, accused Ravalomanana's administration of 
     corruption and mismanagement and, with the military's 
     backing, assumed the presidency. Ravalomanana fled to South

[[Page E302]]

     Africa. Despite the absence of both Ratsiraka and 
     Ravalomanana, the political situation in Madagascar remains 
     unresolved. Efforts at resolution have floundered as the 
     international community, once united in bringing Rajoelina 
     and the former presidents together, has splintered, with 
     different countries considering their own national and 
     regional interests. Resolving the crisis is made more 
     difficult as the efforts of mediators are uncoordinated and 
     therefore weakened.\5\
       The response in Togo differed markedly. After long-serving 
     Gnassingbe Eyadema died in 2005, the parliament swore in his 
     son, Faure Gnassingbe, contravening the constitution. ECOWAS 
     and the International Organization of the Francophonie 
     suspended Togo. After an enormous amount of international 
     pressure and mediation, Gnassingbe stepped aside to allow 
     elections, as required by the constitution. In this case, the 
     concerted pressure of the international and regional 
     communities provided space for the resolution of the crisis.
       The Ivorian situation must not slip from international 
     attention. The financial and travel sanctions have begun to 
     constrain Gbagbo and his administration, but he remains in 
     place. Only resolute diplomatic pressure and adherence to 
     sanctions will eventually dislodge Gbagbo and avert conflict. 
     Yet the AU's reversal on military intervention, the refusal 
     by Ghana and South Africa to take a stance for one candidate 
     or the other, and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni's statement that 
     the votes should be investigated show a divided region. 
     Furthermore, other African countries are receiving Gbagbo's 
     representatives, in a break with the initial practice of 
     recognizing only Ouat-tara's representatives; they were 
     recently in Kenya to explain their reasons for rejecting 
     Ouattara's victory claims. These developments threaten a 
     swift resolution to this stalemate and portend a long period 
     of instability.


         the role of ivorian civil society in reducing tension

       Political and geographic divisions make it difficult for 
     Ivoirian civil society to act as a joint force for peace. 
     Moderate voices, willing to bridge regional and political 
     divides, are not being heard.\6\ It is important to note that 
     Ouattara did not obtain a landslide victory. A substantial 
     number of voters, nearly 46 percent, supported Gbagbo. Their 
     reasons for supporting Gbagbo reflect the existing regional, 
     ethnic, and religious divisions in Cote d'Ivoire. Whether 
     Gbagbo or Ouattara emerges as winner from the current 
     stalemate, the next president will face a sharply divided 
     electorate that challenges his rule. Thus, this election, 
     which was meant to repair the divisions between the north and 
     the south, will have failed to do so. At the very least, a 
     key ingredient for avoiding war in Cote d'Ivoire is to 
     reconcile these divided communities. Civil society's moderate 
     voices can play a critical role in starting the 
     reconciliation process.\7\ Moderates can also make joint 
     statements and appearances and participate in the current 
     mediation process between Gbagbo and Ouattara. The 
     international community should help by emphasizing the 
     importance of moderates and building their capacity and 
     infrastructure to succeed.


               preventing violence in electoral disputes

       Cote d'Ivoire's crisis, as well as others, could have been 
     avoided if the militias had demobilized and if clear rules 
     for the security services had existed, methods for verifying 
     elections were clear and disputes could have been credibly 
     resolved, and Africa's institutions had implementable tools 
     for discouraging electoral violence.


                    the role of the security forces

       In many countries, security services remain politicized and 
     are used to crush demonstrations and intimidate the 
     opposition. This was clearly seen in the postelection 
     demonstrations in Ethiopia in 2005, where approximately 
     30,000 opposition members were arrested.\8\ In Cote d'Ivoire 
     as many as 30 demonstrators died at the hands of state 
     security services during a public demonstration.\9\ Reform 
     and depoliticization of the security forces would reduce the 
     chances of violence.


               disarmament and demobilization of militias

       Repeated attempts to disarm the militia ahead of the 
     elections in Cote d'Ivoire failed. The program was poorly 
     funded, and there were identifiable security, financial, and 
     political benefits for the militia to remain intact. Removing 
     those incentives would have spurred demobilization. Now, with 
     Ouattara and Gbagbo in control of arms, the prospect of 
     violence increases dramatically should diplomacy fail. A 
     similar outcome occurred in the Republic of Congo after the 
     1993 parliamentary elections when the three political party 
     leaders each claimed victory while still in charge of their 
     respective militias. The clashes in the ensuing several 
     months left 2,000 dead.\10\ Elections should not proceed 
     while candidates remain in control of militias.


               clear, independent verification of results

       The UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI) was charged with 
     certifying the electoral process. It was to ``ensure that all 
     stages of the electoral process are carried out in accordance 
     with recognized standards . . . [and] not allow the results 
     to be contested in a non-democratic way or to be 
     compromised.''\11\ This language left room for contestation, 
     which is exactly what happened, when the electoral 
     commission, which is charged with announcing the provisional 
     results, and the Constitutional Council, which is charged 
     with verifying the electoral commission's results, disagreed. 
     ONUCI's role as certifier does not explicitly state that its 
     judgment is final. This ambiguity has been exploited in the 
     Ivorian crisis. Similarly, in Kenya the procedures in place 
     could not determine which candidate had won or whether the 
     electoral process had been fair, fueling the tension. 
     Strengthening and clarifying the processes and institutions 
     that verify an election will greatly reduce the chances and 
     claims of fraud.


                      fair hearings for grievances

       Credible means of assessing an election should be 
     buttressed by independent institutions for addressing 
     grievances. Cote d'Ivoire's politically biased institutions 
     do not foster this confidence. In Kenya's 2007 elections and 
     Togo's 2010 elections, opposition leaders refused to use 
     existing institutions, which they deemed biased, to resolve 
     their grievances, opting instead for street protests. Without 
     independent institutions, public protests will increase the 
     chances of violence, especially when security forces are 
     politicized.


              sanctions for violence in electoral disputes

       There is currently no continental stance or policy on 
     discouraging electoral violence. Politicians in Kenya, 
     Zimbabwe, Togo, and Zanzibar were all rewarded with power-
     sharing agreements when they contested elections violently. 
     Elsewhere, violent perpetrators were not prosecuted when the 
     country returned to political normalcy. This sends a message 
     that violence is costless and sometimes pays. Africa's 
     institutions must develop clear and implementable sanctions 
     against politicians who use violence to secure elections.


                               conclusion

       Other, country-specific ways to increase an election's 
     credibility and transparency certainly exist. However, basic 
     measures such as depoliticizing the security services, 
     disarming militias, clearly and independently verifying 
     elections, establishing independent institutions for 
     redressing grievances, and discouraging the use of violence 
     in elections can help prevent violent responses to electoral 
     results. Cote d'Ivoire had none of these measures in place. 
     Now, with the threat of violence looming, the international 
     and regional communities must remain unified in their 
     approach and push for the inclusion of moderate civil society 
     voices to ensure the resolution of the crisis.


                                endnotes

       \1\ West Africa Network for Peacebuilding--Cote d'Ivoire, 
     ``Troisieme Rapport de l'Observatoire de la Vie Politique et 
     des Medias en Periode Electorale'' (Abidjan: WANEP--Cote 
     d'Ivoire, January 8, 2011).
       \2\ This threat was reversed at the African Union's summit 
     on January 28-31, 2011.
       \3\ Dakar Agreement, http://www.afrol.com/Countries/
Madagascar/documents/accord_
     dakar.htm.
       \4\ Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, ``Africa: OAU Stands Aloof on 
     Madagascar, Despite Departure of Ratsiraka,'' Allafrica.com, 
     July 5, 2002, http://allafrica.com/stories/200207050825.html.
       \5\ International Crisis Group, ``Madagascar: Le Crise a un 
     Tournant Critique?,'' Africa Report 166, November 18, 2010, 
     4-6.
       \6\ ``Cote d'Ivoire: Voices of Reason Sidelined in the 
     Crisis,'' IRINNews.org, January 26, 2011, http://
www.irinnews.org/report.spx?ReportID=91733.
       \7\ Ibid.
       \8\ Lahra Smith, ``Political Violence and Uncertainty In 
     Ethiopia,'' U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report no. 192 
     (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, August 2007), 7.
       \9\ Amnesty International, ``Cote d'Ivoire: Injured 
     Protestors Denied Medical Care,'' Allafrica.com, December 20, 
     2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201012200899.html.
       \10\ U.S. Department of State, ``Congo Human Rights 
     Practices, 1994'' (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 
     February 1995), sect. 1(a), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/
democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_africa/Congo.html.
       \11\ UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI), ``The 
     Certification of Elections in Cote d'Ivoire,'' Resolution 
     1765, adopted by the UN Security Council on July 16, 2007, 
     http://www.onuci.org/pdf/faqcertificationen.pdf.

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