[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 15 (Wednesday, February 2, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Page S480]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  REPORT CONCERNING THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED 
   STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE 
FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SIGNED IN 
        PRAGUE ON APRIL 8, 2010 (THE ``NEW START TREATY'')--PM 4

  The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message 
from the President of the United States which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations:

To the Senate of the United States:
  I have considered the United States Senate's December 22, 2010, 
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between 
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for 
the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annexes 
(the ``New START Treaty''; Treaty Document 111-5), and I hereby certify 
that:
  1. United States National Technical Means, in conjunction with the 
verification activities provided for in the New START Treaty, are 
sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian compliance with 
the provisions of the New START Treaty and timely warning of any 
Russian preparation to break out of the limits in Article II of the New 
START Treaty.
  2. The New START Treaty does not require, at any point during which 
it will be in force, the United States to provide to the Russian 
Federation telemetric information under Article IX of the New START 
Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric 
Information to the Protocol for the launch of (a) any missile defense 
interceptor, as defined in paragraph 44 of Part One of the Protocol to 
the New START Treaty; (b) any satellite launches, missile defense 
sensor targets, and missile defense intercept targets, the launch of 
which uses the first stage of an existing type of United States 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine-launched 
ballistic missile (SLBM) listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of the 
New START Treaty; or (c) any missile described in clause (a) of 
paragraph 7 of Article III of the New START Treaty.
  3. I intend to (a) modernize or replace the triad of strategic 
nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise 
missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine 
(SSBN) and SLBM; and (b) maintain the United States rocket motor 
industrial base.

  4. (a) The United States will seek to initiate, following 
consultation with NATO Allies but not later than 1 year after the entry 
into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations with the Russian 
Federation on an agreement to address the disparity between the non-
strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 
Federation and of the United States and to secure and reduce tactical 
nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner; and (b) it is the policy of the 
United States that such negotiations shall not include defensive 
missile systems.
  5. I intend to (a) accelerate, to the extent possible, the design and 
engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research. Replacement 
(CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF); and (b) 
request full funding, including on a multi-year basis as appropriate, 
for the CMRR building and the UPF upon completion of the design and 
engineering phase for such facilities.
  6. It is the policy of the United States to continue development and 
deployment of United States missile defense systems to defend against 
missile threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran, including 
qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems. As stated in 
the resolution, such systems include all phases of the Phased Adaptive 
Approach to missile defenses in Europe, the modernization of the 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, and the continued development of 
the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as a technological and strategic 
hedge. As I stated in my letter to the Senate of December 18, 2010, the 
United States believes that these systems do not and will not threaten 
the strategic balance with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while 
the United States cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the 
Russian Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty, the 
United States believes continued improvement and deployment of United 
States missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for 
questioning the effectiveness and viability of the Treaty, and 
therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying the 
withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty.
  The report called for in the sixth Condition of the Resolution will 
be provided under separate cover to the Committees on Armed Services 
and Foreign Relations.
                                                        Barack Obama.  
The White House, February 2, 2011.

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