[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 13 (Monday, January 31, 2011)]
[Senate]
[Pages S349-S353]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEW START TREATY
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as some of us predicted, problems are already
arising from the Senate's ratification of the New START treaty last
December.
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The Russians just ratified it, and their interpretation of its meaning
and obligation is different from ours. That is going to cause problems.
I will also discuss this afternoon the President's fiscal year 2012
budget in the areas of nuclear modernization and missile defense, both
of which were closely tied to the Senate's support of the New START
treaty.
First, what the Russians are saying about the treaty. The Russian
State Duma and the Federation Council, which is their counterpart to
the Senate, last week passed its Federal law on the New START treaty,
and that is the Russian equivalent to our resolution of ratification.
That document demonstrates there is a significant divergence of views
between the two countries on several key provisions and core principles
of the New START treaty.
For example, Russian officials continue to assert, despite statements
from the Obama administration and despite the Senate's legally binding
positions to the contrary, that various treaty provisions, including in
the preamble, constrain U.S. military options regarding missile defense
and conventional prompt global strike. Far from supporting the touted
``reset'' in its relations, this lack of meeting of the minds is a
ticking time bomb for disruption of our relations.
First, regarding missile defense. The Senate unanimously adopted an
amendment to the resolution of ratification providing that the New
Start preamble does not impose a legal obligation on the parties. The
Senate's principal concern and rationale for this provision was the
language in the preamble linking offensive forces to missile defenses,
a clear attempt by the Russians to foreclose future qualitative and
quantitative improvements to U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Contrary to the U.S. position, Russian officials have recently declared
that the preamble is an integral part of the treaty and is thus binding
on the parties. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated:
There are a few problems, one of the main ones being the
assertion contained in this [Senate floor] statement that the
correlation between strategic offensive and defensive
weapons, reflected in the treaty, is not legally binding for
the U.S. and Russia because it is stipulated in the preamble.
This thesis cannot be defended by lawyers.
Contradicting President Obama's December 18 letter on missile defense
to Senators Reid and McConnell and the Senate's resolution of
ratification, Foreign Minister Lavrov further contends:
The content of the treaty unequivocally points to the
correlation between strategic offensive weapons and missile
defense, it is set out in the preamble, whereas the text of
the treaty contains an article that allows either party to
withdraw in the event of an emergency. We are convinced that
the implementation of the full-scale global missile defense
by the U.S. will be precisely such an emergency.
These statements stand in apparent contradiction to the resolution of
ratification adopted by the Senate.
On the point concerning the legality of the preamble, which includes
the unfortunate linkage between offensive arms and missile defense, the
Russian Federal law on the New START ratification highlights the
importance that Russia attaches to the preamble and this linkage
between missile defense and strategic offensive arms, and it introduces
a new issue: The possibility of ``understandings'' between the parties
not revealed to the Senate.
Here is what article 4, paragraph 1 of the Russian law says:
The provisions of the preamble of the New START treaty
shall have indisputable significance for the understanding of
the Parties intentions upon its signature, including the
content of the terms agreed between them and the
understandings without which the New START treaty would not
have been concluded. In this connection, they must be
considered in toto by the parties in the course of
implementing the New START treaty.
Because of these ``terms'' and ``understandings,'' article 4 goes on
to state that the Russian Federation shall exercise its right to
withdraw from the treaty in the case of extraordinary events, including
the ``deployment by the United States of America, another state, or a
group of states of a missile defense system capable of significantly
reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's strategic
nuclear forces.''
So now the Russian Parliament is clearly on record that the
deployment of the U.S. national missile defenses or missile defense
deployments in conjunction with our NATO allies could be cause for
Russian withdrawal from the treaty. Since Russia opposed the deployment
of 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland, it is likely to oppose as
well the planned deployment of land-based SM-3 missiles in Romania and
Poland capable of intercepting Iranian ICBMs.
This provision of the Russian law is fundamentally incompatible with
the U.S. understanding of the treaty and with current U.S. plans to
deploy these U.S. defenses in Europe and to deny U.S. national missile
defenses as the President affirmed to us in his December 18 letter. The
administration should immediately work to resolve this dispute with the
Russians. Otherwise, the United States would be willfully perpetrating
a future collision course between Russia and the United States.
I am sending a letter to Assistant Secretary of State Rose
Gottemoeller which raises this issue and asks for clarification of the
assertion that there were understandings between the negotiators not
reflected in the public record.
The President will have to decide whether to exchange the instruments
of ratification with the Russian Federation with this discrepancy
extant--and the others that I will briefly touch on. I am not aware of
a bilateral treaty that is entered into force where such a divergence
of views existed. Perhaps there is clarification on these matters in
some secret cable or in another part of the classified negotiating
record. The administration's stubborn refusal to share these materials
with the Senate has denied Senators the answer.
Part of the Corker-Lieberman amendment to the treaty also requires
the administration to communicate to Russia at the time of the exchange
of instruments of ratification that it is the policy of the United
States to continue development and deployment of U.S. missile defense
systems, including qualitative and quantitative improvements to such
systems. I urge the administration to consult with the Senate to ensure
that our intent is accurately conveyed before exchanging this policy
statement and the instruments of ratification.
The resolution of ratification also makes clear that missile defense
will not be on the table in any future treaty. Understanding No. 1
makes clear that no limits on U.S. missile defenses can be achieved
through the New START treaty, including the Bilateral Consultative
Commission it creates, without the advice and consent of the Senate
which, if I have anything today about it, will not be forthcoming.
There is also declaration No. 1 which states:
Further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of
the United States are not in the national security interests
of the United States, and the LeMieux amendment, which made
it the policy of the United States not to include defensive
missile systems in any negotiations with Russia on tactical
nuclear weapons.
The administration might have created the impression with Russia that
the United States would discuss missile defense, whether in the
Tauscher-Rybakov track of secretive side negotiations--the full extent
of which the administration is hiding from Congress--or by agreeing to
the preamble language, or article V, section III, in contravention of
section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 Defense authorization bill.
With regard to Under Secretary Tauscher's side negotiations, I note
that the Russians know more about the U.S. position and these
negotiations than the Senate does, which brings to mind again article 4
of the Russian Federal law on ratification which states that the
``provisions of the preamble of the New START treaty shall have
indisputable significance for the understanding of the Parties'
intentions . . . including the content of the terms agreed between them
and the understandings without which the New START treaty would not
have been concluded.''
What understandings are these? Is this referring to something beyond
the text of the treaty and the preamble? Unfortunately, the Senate is
unaware of such understandings because we have been denied access to
the negotiating record.
There is the potential here for a major confrontation between the
Senate and the administration if the administration does not
immediately
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make a full disclosure to the Senate on these matters. The Senate's
action in the resolution of ratification should also make clear that it
will not accept any further linkage between offensive nuclear
reductions. I am pleased to note a recent product of the Arms Control
Association, called ``Strategic Missile Defense: A Threat to Future
Nuclear Arms Reductions,'' that seems to agree with my point. In its
recent analysis, this group correctly observed that the United States
will continue to require exempting strategic missile defense from
treaties.
Now, while the Arms Control Association seems to believe this is a
mistake, I am pleased the Senate sent a message so unmistakable that
even the arms control community comprehended it. The administration
will have an opportunity to prove whether its statements of support for
missile defense, including the President's December 18 letter, were
mere rhetoric or actual policy, beginning when it submits the fiscal
year 2012 budget request. Initial press reports hint that the Defense
Department is anticipating yet another reduction in funding for missile
defense programs over the next 5 years, despite funding plans that are
already about $4 billion below what was envisioned by the last
administration for fiscal years 2010 through 2013. This is
inconceivable given the funding shortfalls increasingly apparent in the
President's own plans for improving U.S. missile defenses as well as
four phases of the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in
Europe. It appears that elements of the administration's phased
adaptive approach for missile defense are already falling behind, and
the President's budgets for missile defense have almost guaranteed the
atrophy and obsolescence of the only national missile defense system we
now have.
If these reports are accurate, it would belie the President's
commitment to missile defense, which was central to Senate support for
the New START treaty, and suggests the Senate was misled during its
consideration of the treaty.
With regard to Conventional Prompt Global Strike--remember, this is
the concept where U.S. intercontinental range missiles could substitute
a conventional warhead for a nuclear warhead for prompt delivery to a
place far away on the globe in a time of emergency--Senators' concerns
were not limited to missile defense, as I said. We also talked about
this Prompt Global Strike issue in connection with the START treaty.
Referencing this capability, Foreign Minister Lavrov told the Russian
Duma:
The [U.S.] Senate's resolution claims that the treaty does
not apply to new kinds of nonnuclear strategic weapons that
could be developed in the future. But this is not true.
Then he also stated:
We find unacceptable the unilateral American interpretation
of the treaty, according to which future strategic range
systems with non-nuclear warheads not meeting the parameters
stated in the treaty shall not be regarded as new types of
strategic offensive weapons covered by the treaty.
Likewise, Russian Federal law states in article 2, paragraph 7:
The question of the applicability of the provisions of the
New START treaty to any new kind of strategic-range offensive
arms should be resolved within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission . . . prior to the deployment of such
new kind of strategic-range offensive arms.
Hence, Russia is rejecting the U.S. understanding on strategic range
nonnuclear weapons systems contained in the Senate's resolution of
ratification, which states:
. . . nothing in the New START treaty prohibits deployments
of strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems.
In other words, conventional Prompt Global Strike.
The President must make this fact plain to both Russia and the Senate
when he provides the report on the conventional Prompt Global Strike
systems to the Senate prior to entry into force of the treaty. It mocks
the very idea of a U.S.-Russian arms control pact if such a
disagreement--Russia's rejection of a formally adopted U.S.
understanding--is allowed to stand.
Let me mention telemetry. In response to Senators who raised concerns
about the inadequacy of the verification and telemetry provisions in
New START, the administration essentially said: Not to worry; the
treaty permits each side to exchange telemetry on up to five tests per
year. As could have been expected when the administration capitulated
to Russian demands concerning telemetry, the Russian Federal law now
prohibits ``providing to the United States of America telemetric
information about the launches of new types of intercontinental
ballistic missiles and submarine ballistic missiles.'' That is exactly
what treaty opponents predicted. As a result, we will know less about
new Russian systems than under the previous START verification regime.
At the very least, Russia's action in its federal law to deny the
United States telemetry on this future missile development will place
greater burdens on our national technical means to monitor the
development of new Russian ballistic missiles. The denial of telemetry
from new delivery systems poses a material risk by aiding Russia's
potential for breakout from the treaty limits, which is, of course, a
central concern of the Senate in conditions Nos. 2 and 4 of the
resolution of ratification.
Finally, the Russian Foreign Minister seems to have taken aim at the
Senate's condition that negotiations begin within a year to address the
disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between Russia and the United
States. In noting the imbalance in conventional forces, plans to deploy
weapons in space, and U.S. global missile defense plans, Russian
Minister Lavrov stated:
It is possible to hold future negotiations only with due
account of all these factors and after the fulfillment of the
New START.
Clearly, Russia is not interested in beginning such negotiations
anytime soon.
The Foreign Minister has proven correct those Senators who cautioned
that after this treaty was ratified, the United States would lose
whatever leverage it had to address nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller appears to take seriously the Senate's
instruction in this regard, even referring to it as her ``marching
orders.'' I trust she views equally the Senate's ``marching orders''
that a subsequent treaty not deal with U.S. missile defenses.
I am not aware of an example where the United States has ratified a
bilateral treaty in the face of clear evidence that there is no meeting
of the minds on key treaty terms. While New START was under Senate
consideration, administration officials continually spoke about how
critical the treaty was to ``reset'' relations with Russia and how the
completed treaty manifestly improved relations between the two
countries. This can be the case, however, only if the parties actually
agree on the fundamentals of the treaty's meaning.
Now let me speak to the anticipated 2012 budget for nuclear
modernization.
The Senate, in condition 9 of the resolution, linked its support for
the New START treaty on a clear commitment to ``ensuring the safety,
reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.'' This commitment
requires full funding to ensure a robust Stockpile Stewardship Program,
a modernized nuclear weapons production capability, and the development
of new nuclear delivery systems to replace the aging nuclear triad of
bombers, submarines, and ICBMs.
If in a given year funding fails to meet the 10-year plan or required
levels of resources are greater than the 10-year plan, the President is
required by condition 9 to submit a report on how the administration
will remedy the shortfall, the project requiring funds and the level
that is required, the impact of the shortfall on nuclear readiness, and
whether it is in the national interest to remain a party to the treaty.
We must codify the requirement to provide an annual update to section
1251, requiring the administration to annually provide updated
assessment of the levels of funding required to maintain and modernize
the stockpile. And the administration has agreed this is necessary.
As it currently stands, the administration's proposed 10-year budget
for nuclear weapons activities, as promised in the update to the
section 1251 report, takes a critical first step toward nuclear weapon
sustainment and modernization. It proposes an $85 billion budget for
weapons activities over 10
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years, from 2011 through 2020, and describes the critical near-term
requirements of at least $7 billion in 2011 and $7.6 billion in 2012.
To be successful, the modernization program must have the complete
backing of the President, the Armed Services Committees and the
Appropriations Committees, as well as the full House and Senate. These
budget requests will allow the laboratories and plants responsible for
nuclear weapons to begin a slow recovery from the neglect that has been
crippling their ability to address real issues as our current stockpile
ages. The administration must, however, continue to review and revise
its estimates for the modernization program and follow through on its
commitments to obtain this funding from the Congress.
This modernization program must address the past, the present, and
the future of our nuclear weapons complex. For example, the Stockpile
Surveillance Program evaluates the current condition of our aging
stock. This program has been seriously underfunded in recent years,
resulting in a decreased confidence in our nuclear weapons. This is not
my assessment but, rather, the assessment of some of the premier
authorities on nuclear weapons--the Directors of the nuclear weapons
laboratories. It is likewise the conclusion of the bipartisan
Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture.
Likewise, budget requests must allow for the continuation of current
life extension programs, including the W-76, which is currently in
production, the B-61, which is rapidly nearing its end of life but
continues to be required for both strategic and tactical roles, and the
W-78, which will require a very extensive and challenging life
extension to correct aging issues and incorporate higher standards for
safety and security. These three planned programs will likely not be
completed until the end of the 2020 decade. As it stands, there does
not appear to be capacity in the complex to insert the long-range
strike option warhead production in the next decade, which will be
needed to replace our current W-80 warheads and air-launched cruise
missiles. As we are the only nuclear weapons state without a nuclear
weapons production capability, restoring the health of our current
weapons is critically important.
Finally, the balanced program must prepare us for the future by
improving the quality of our facilities, many of which are Cold War-
and even Manhattan Project-era facilities. Design and engineering
development of the chemistry and metallurgy replacement nuclear
facility and the uranium processing facility should be accelerated to
the extent possible, construction estimates should be properly
evaluated, and completion of these facilities should be aggressively
pursued for their completion by 2020. This is another so-called
marching order for the administration. It is difficult to overstate the
importance of these facilities to our future national security.
The opportunity exists to push these programs forward. For example,
the recent exchange of letters between the Senate appropriations
leaders and the President shows that the commitment must be bipartisan
and must include both Congress and the administration. Notably, the
Senate Appropriations Committee leaders, Senators Inouye and Cochran,
and the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee leaders, Senators
Feinstein and Alexander, stated on December 16, 2010, that ``funding
for nuclear modernization and the National Nuclear Security Agency's
proposed budgets should be considered defense spending, as it is
critical to national security.'' And they state that ``this represents
a long-term commitment by each of us, as modernization of our nuclear
arsenal will require a sustained effort.''
The President responded on December 20, 2010, with a commitment to
support the $85 billion budget, and he also committed to an annual
update to the section 1251 report. Here is what he said:
I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment
for the long term, in addition to this one-year budget
increase. That is my commitment to Congress.
It must be our commitment to hold the President to his word and to
likewise provide our full support for nuclear weapon modernization.
Finally, on nuclear delivery systems and the President's commitment
to missile defense, first, we expect to see significant funding for the
next-generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine and follow-on heavy
bomber, which the administration now seems to support, although it has
not yet confirmed that the United States intends the bomber to be
capable of a nuclear standoff mission, as well as a final decision that
the follow-on to the air-launched cruise missile will be nuclear
capable.
Finally, we expect to see greater clarity with respect to the
administration's intention to maintain the ICBM leg of the triad after
the Minuteman III reaches the end of its life.
I expect the administration's commitment to these delivered platforms
to become increasingly evident in the Defense Department's 2012 budget
request as promised in the update to the section 1251 report.
Modernization of the delivery platforms must parallel the commitment to
the nuclear weapons. To continue to use Ms. Gottemoeller's formulation,
this is another ``marching order'' from the Senate for the
administration.
The President made clear his commitment to missile defense during the
course of the Senate's consideration of the New START treaty, as I
mentioned before. In his December 18 letter to Senators Reid and
McConnell, he wrote:
As long as I am President, and as long as Congress provides
the necessary funding, the United States will continue to
develop and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the
United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners.
The President reiterated what the Senate made clear in the resolution
of ratification--that the New START treaty places no limitations on the
development and deployment of our missile defense programs--and he
stated that he ``will take every action available to me to support the
deployment of all four phases'' of the planned missile defense
deployments in Europe. The Secretary of Defense also indicated during a
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on December 17 that the
Department was looking at an increase in missile defense funding for
fiscal year 2012.
As I said before, however, initial press reports hint that the
Department of Defense is anticipating a reduction for missile defense
programs over the next 5 years. Any cut to the missile defense budget
would be especially shocking in light of President Obama's commitments
to the Senate. Likewise, it would be absolutely indefensible in view of
Secretary Gates's recent comment that North Korea was within 5 years of
being able to strike the United States with an intercontinental
ballistic missile and that ``with North Korea's continuing development
of nuclear weapons . . . North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the
United States.''
Indeed, the recent discovery of a clandestine enrichment site in
North Korea raises significant concern about our ability to estimate
the pace at which that country is developing nuclear and ballistic
missile capabilities--and should make us think twice as well about our
estimate of Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.
Also troubling are recent statements by senior military officials,
including the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific and the Director
for Naval Intelligence, suggesting China's anti-ship ballistic
missiles, designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers, are now nearly
operational. This new anti-ship ballistic missile, combined with
Beijing's current and growing arsenal of short and medium-range
ballistic missiles, threatens to alter the strategic balance in Asia by
potentially grounding Pacific-based U.S. air forces and sinking U.S.
ships out to a range of 1,000 nautical miles--not to mention the
ability to strike U.S. allies and friends in the region.
The Russian Parliament provided its interpretation of the treaty and
preamble in its Federal Law on Ratification, and it is clearly at odds
with the Senate's resolution of ratification in several key respects,
including missile defense and conventional prompt global strike. To say
that their interpretation is not legally binding on the United States
is to miss the point, which is, as many of us said during debate over
New START, that because
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there is no meeting of the minds on these matters, the potential for
disputes and increasing tension between the two sides is likely. What
was to serve as a vehicle for ``reset'' may, in fact, serve to promote
increasing discord.
In fact, the first indication of this may have occurred last week,
when the U.S. and its NATO partners met with Russia to find common
ground on missile defense cooperation. In advance of that meeting, the
Russian President threatened ``either we agree to certain principles
with NATO, or we fail to agree, and then in the future we are forced to
adopt an entire series of unpleasant decisions concerning the
deployment of an offensive nuclear missile group.'' If this is the
language of reset, I wonder what the tone might have been had we not
agreed to New START? As it turns out, Russia appears to have rejected
the NATO approach.
Mr. President, we will watch carefully to ensure the administration
fulfills its 10-year commitment to nuclear modernization, starting with
the fiscal year 2012 budget request, and that nuclear reductions called
for under the New START treaty do not outpace the commitment to
modernization.
We must make certain, too, the administration modernizes our national
missile defense system to stay ahead of increasing threats; provides
the necessary direction and funding to ensure full, timely deployment
of missile defense assets in Europe to address the growing Iranian
threat; and directs the Missile Defense Agency to develop defensive
countermeasures to the anti-ship ballistic missile capability of China.
Finally, we must resurrect the Reagan vision of defensive missile
defense capabilities based in space, which is the only truly effective
means for protecting the Nation and its deployed forces.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up
to 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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