[Congressional Record Volume 157, Number 3 (Friday, January 7, 2011)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E42-E43]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                 ``EXPERTS LETTER ON DEFENSE SPENDING''

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BARNEY FRANK

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, January 7, 2011

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I have been encouraged to 
see some signs that the mind set that would not only exclude the 
military budget from deficit reduction efforts but would in fact 
inflate an already excessive allocation has been weakening. Secretary 
Gates' statement on Thursday, January 6, of a recognition of many to 
take the deficit into account in budgeting for the Pentagon is 
encouraging, although he does not go far enough. I think that there is 
no issue more important than to recognize that reducing the extent to 
which America engages in an extremely expensive worldwide subsidy for 
many of our wealthy allies in the area of defense has contributed 
significantly to our deficit, and it is clear that we can substantially 
reduce military spending without in any way reducing the security of 
the United States.
  In November of last year, a wide-ranging group of people very 
knowledgeable about national security needs met. I am encouraged that 
the Commission recognized the importance of including military spending 
restraints, although I did not agree with their proposal to increase 
healthcare costs for retirees. And I believe that the thoughtful letter 
that they received from this wide-ranging coalition of experts on 
national security and military spending should be shared with our 
colleagues so I ask that it be printed here.

Experts Letter on Defense Spending to the National Commission on Fiscal 
              Responsibility and Reform, November 18, 2010

       Dear Co-chairman Bowles and Co-chairman Simpson: We are 
     writing to you as experts in national security and defense 
     economics to convey our views on the national security 
     implications of the Commission's work and especially the need 
     for achieving responsible reductions in military spending. In 
     this regard, we appreciate the initiative you have taken in 
     your 10 November 2010 draft proposal to the Commission. It 
     begins a necessary process of serious reflection, debate, and 
     action.
       The vitality of our economy is the cornerstone of our 
     nation's strength. We share the Commission's desire to bring 
     our financial house into order. Doing so is not merely a 
     question of economics. Reducing the national debt is also a 
     national security imperative.
       To date, the Obama administration has exempted the Defense 
     Department from any budget reductions. This is short-sighted: 
     It makes it more difficult to accomplish the task of 
     restoring our economic strength, which is the underpinning of 
     our military power.
       As the rest of the nation labors to reduce its debt burden, 
     the current plan is to boost the base DOD budget by 10 
     percent in real terms over the next decade. This would come 
     on top of the nearly 52 percent real increase in base 
     military spending since 1998. (When war costs are included 
     the increase has been much greater: 95 percent.)
       We appreciate Secretary Gates' efforts to reform the 
     Pentagon's business and acquisition practices. However, even 
     if his reforms fulfill their promise, the current plan does 
     not translate them into budgetary savings that contribute to 
     solving our deficit problem. Their explicit aim is to free 
     funds for other uses inside the Pentagon. This is not good 
     enough.
       Granting defense a special dispensation puts at risk the 
     entire deficit reduction effort. Defense spending today 
     constitutes over 55 percent of discretionary spending and 23 
     percent of the federal budget. An exemption for defense not 
     only undermines the broader call for fiscal responsibility, 
     but also makes overall budget restraint much harder as a 
     practical economic and political matter.
       We need not put our economic power at risk in this way. 
     Today the United States possesses a wide margin of global 
     military superiority. The defense budget can bear significant 
     reduction without compromising our essential security.
       We recognize that larger military adversaries may rise to 
     face us in the future. But the best hedge against this 
     possibility is vigilance and a vibrant economy supporting a 
     military able to adapt to new challenges as they emerge.
       We can achieve greater defense economy today in several 
     ways, all of which we urge you to consider seriously. We need 
     to be more realistic in the goals we set for our armed forces 
     and more selective in our choices regarding their use abroad. 
     We should focus our military on core security goals and on 
     those current and emerging threats that most directly affect 
     us.
       We also need to be more judicious in our choice of security 
     instruments when dealing

[[Page E43]]

     with international challenges. Our armed forces are a 
     uniquely expensive asset and for some tasks no other 
     instrument will do. For many challenges, however, the 
     military is not the most cost-effective choice. We can 
     achieve greater efficiency today without diminishing our 
     security by better discriminating between vital, desirable, 
     and unnecessary military missions and capabilities.
       There is a variety of specific options that would produce 
     savings, some of which we describe below. The important 
     point, however, is a firm commitment to seek savings through 
     a reassessment of our defense strategy, our global posture, 
     and our means of producing and managing military power.
       Since the end of the Cold War, we have required our 
     military to prepare for and conduct more types of missions in 
     more places around the world. The Pentagon's task list now 
     includes not only preventive war, regime change, and nation 
     building, but also vague efforts to ``shape the strategic 
     environment'' and stem the emergence of threats. It is time 
     to prune some of these missions and restore an emphasis on 
     defense and deterrence.
       U.S. combat power dramatically exceeds that of any 
     plausible combination of conventional adversaries. To cite 
     just one example, Secretary Gates has observed that the U.S. 
     Navy is today as capable as the next 13 navies combined, most 
     of which are operated by our allies. We can safely save by 
     trimming our current margin of superiority.
       America's permanent peacetime military presence abroad is 
     largely a legacy of the Cold War. It can be reduced without 
     undermining the essential security of the United States or 
     its allies.
       The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limits 
     of military power. Avoiding these types of operation globally 
     would allow us to roll back the recent increase in the size 
     of our Army and Marine Corps.
       The Pentagon's acquisition process has repeatedly failed, 
     routinely delivering weapons and equipment late, over cost, 
     and less capable than promised. Some of the most expensive 
     systems correspond to threats that are least prominent today 
     and unlikely to regain prominence soon. In these cases, 
     savings can be safely realized by cancelling, delaying, or 
     reducing procurement or by seeking less costly alternatives.
       Recent efforts to reform Defense Department financial 
     management and acquisition practices must be strengthened. 
     And we must impose budget discipline to trim service 
     redundancies and streamline command, support systems, and 
     infrastructure.
       Change along these lines is bound to be controversial. 
     Budget reductions are never easy--no less for defense than in 
     any area of government. However, fiscal realities call on us 
     to strike a new balance between investing in military power 
     and attending to the fundamentals of national strength on 
     which our true power rests. We can achieve safe savings in 
     defense if we are willing to rethink how we produce military 
     power and how, why, and where we put it to use.
           Sincerely,
       Gordon Adams, American University; Robert Art, Brandeis 
     University; Deborah Avant, University of California, Irvine; 
     Andrew Bacevich, Boston University; Richard Betts, Columbia 
     University; Linda Bilmes, Kennedy School, Harvard University; 
     Steven Clemons, New America Foundation; Joshua Cohen, 
     Stanford University and Boston Review; Carl Conetta, Project 
     on Defense Alternatives; Owen R. Cote Jr., Security Studies 
     Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Michael 
     Desch, University of Notre Dame; Matthew Evangelista, Cornell 
     University; Benjamin H. Friedman, Cato Institute; Lt. Gen. 
     (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Center for Arms Control 
     and Non-Proliferation; David Gold, Graduate Program in 
     International Affairs, The New School; William Hartung, 
     Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation.
       David Hendrickson, Colorado College; Michael Intriligator, 
     UCLA and Milken Institute; Robert Jervis, Columbia 
     University; Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University; Elizabeth 
     Kier, University of Washington; Charles Knight, Project on 
     Defense Alternatives; Lawrence Korb, Center for American 
     Progress; Peter Krogh, Georgetown University; Richard Ned 
     Lebow, Dartmouth College; Walter LaFeber, Cornell University; 
     Col. (USA, Ret.) Douglas Macgregor; Scott McConnell, The 
     American Conservative; John Mearsheimer, University of 
     Chicago; Steven Metz, national security analyst and writer; 
     Steven Miller, Kennedy School, Harvard University and 
     International Security; Janne Nolan, American Security 
     Project.
       Robert Paarlberg, Wellesley College and Harvard University; 
     Paul Pillar, Georgetown University; Barry Posen, Security 
     Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
     Christopher Preble, Cato Institute; Daryl Press, Dartmouth 
     College; Jeffrey Record, defense policy analyst and author; 
     David Rieff, author; Thomas Schelling, University of 
     Maryland; Jack Snyder, Columbia University; J. Ann Tickner, 
     University of Southern California; Robert Tucker, Johns 
     Hopkins University; Stephen Van Evera, Security Studies 
     Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Stephen Walt, 
     Harvard University; Kenneth Waltz, Columbia University; Cindy 
     Williams, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute 
     of Technology; Daniel Wirls, University of California, Santa 
     Cruz.

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