[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10982-S10986]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Continued
The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be no
other amendments, motions, or points of order in order in relation to
the treaty or the resolution of ratification; that the Senate
immediately proceed with no intervening action or debate to a vote on
the Resolution of Advise and Consent to Ratification, as amended, to
the New START Treaty, Treaty Document No. 111-5; that if the resolution
is adopted, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table and the
President of the United States be immediately notified of the Senate's
action; that upon disposition of the New START treaty, the Senate
proceed to a vote on confirmation of the nomination of Calendar No.
1089, Mary Helen Murguia, of Arizona, to be a U.S. circuit judge for
the Ninth Circuit; that if the nomination is confirmed, the motion to
reconsider be laid upon the table and the President be immediately
notified of the Senate's action; that following the vote on the Murguia
nomination, the Senate immediately proceed to a vote on Calendar No.
934, Scott M. Matheson, Jr., of Utah, to be a U.S. circuit judge for
the Tenth Circuit; that if the nomination is confirmed, the motion to
reconsider be laid upon the table and the President be immediately
notified of the Senate's action; further, that upon disposition of the
Matheson nomination, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to
the consideration of the following judicial nominations en bloc:
Calendar Nos. 1119, 1120, and 1139, that is, Kathleen M. O'Malley,
Beryl Alaine Howell, and Robert Leon Wilkins; that the nominations be
confirmed en bloc, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid
upon the table en bloc, the President be immediately notified of the
Senate's action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on the adoption of the resolution of ratification, as
amended, to the treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, with
Protocol.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and
the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning).
Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
Bunning) would have voted ``nay.''
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 71, nays 26, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 298 Ex.]
YEAS--71
Akaka
Alexander
Baucus
Bayh
Begich
Bennet
Bennett
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown (MA)
Brown (OH)
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coons
Corker
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Franken
Gillibrand
Gregg
Hagan
Harkin
Inouye
Isakson
Johanns
Johnson
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
Manchin
McCaskill
Menendez
Merkley
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (NE)
Nelson (FL)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sanders
Schumer
Shaheen
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Tester
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Voinovich
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden
NAYS--26
Barrasso
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Cornyn
Crapo
DeMint
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kirk
Kyl
LeMieux
McCain
McConnell
Risch
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Thune
Vitter
Wicker
NOT VOTING--3
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
The VICE PRESIDENT. On this vote, the yeas are 71, the nays are 26.
Two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the
affirmative, the resolution of ratification, as amended, is agreed to.
The resolution of ratification agreed to is as follows:
Treaty Approved
Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Treaty Doc. 111-5).
Resolution of ratification as amended:
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
That the Senate advises and consents to the ratification of
the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on
April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annex on Inspection
Activities to the Protocol, Annex on Notifications to the
Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the
Protocol, all such documents being integral parts of and
collectively referred to in this resolution as the ``New
START Treaty'' (Treaty Document 111-5), subject to the
conditions of subsection (a), the understandings of
subsection (b), and the declarations of subsection (c).
(a) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to
the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the
following conditions, which shall be binding upon the
President:
(1) General compliance.--If the President determines that
the Russian Federation is acting or has acted in a manner
that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the New
START Treaty, or is in violation of the New START Treaty, so
as to threaten the national security interests of the United
States, then the President shall--
(A) consult with the Senate regarding the implications of
such actions for the viability of the New START Treaty and
for the national security interests of the United States;
(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting with the Russian
Federation at the highest diplomatic level with the objective
of bringing the Russian Federation into full compliance with
its obligations under the New START Treaty; and
(C) submit a report to the Senate promptly thereafter,
detailing--
(i) whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in
the national security interests of the United States; and
(ii) how the United States will redress the impact of
Russian actions on the national security interests of the
United States.
(2) Presidential certifications and reports on national
technical means.--(A) Prior to the entry into force of the
New START Treaty, and annually thereafter, the President
shall certify to the Senate that United States National
Technical Means, in conjunction with the verification
activities provided for in the New START Treaty, are
sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian
compliance with the provisions of the New START Treaty and
timely warning of any Russian preparation to break out of the
limits in Article II of the New START Treaty. Following
submission of the first such certification, each subsequent
certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate
indicating how United States National Technical Means,
including collection, processing, and analytic resources,
will be utilized to ensure effective monitoring. The first
such report shall include a long-term plan for the
maintenance of New START Treaty monitoring. Each subsequent
report shall include an update of the long-term plan. Each
such report may be submitted in either classified or
unclassified form.
(B) It is the sense of the Senate that monitoring Russian
Federation compliance with the New START Treaty is a high
priority and that the inability to do so would constitute a
threat to United States national security interests.
(3) Reductions.--(A) The New START Treaty shall not enter
into force until instruments of ratification have been
exchanged in accordance with Article XIV of the New START
Treaty.
(B) If, prior to the entry into force of the New START
Treaty, the President plans to implement reductions of United
States strategic nuclear forces below those currently planned
and consistent with the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (commonly
referred to as ``the Moscow Treaty''), then the President
shall--
(i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such
reductions on the national security of the United States; and
(ii) take no such reductions until the President submits to
the Senate the President's determination that such reductions
are in the national security interest of the United States.
(4) Timely warning of breakout.--If the President
determines, after consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence, that the Russian Federation intends to break
out of the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty, the
President shall immediately inform the Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services of the
[[Page S10983]]
Senate, with a view to determining whether circumstances
exist that jeopardize the supreme interests of the United
States, such that withdrawal from the New START Treaty may be
warranted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the New
START Treaty.
(5) United states missile defense test telemetry.--Prior to
entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall
certify to the Senate that the New START Treaty does not
require, at any point during which it will be in force, the
United States to provide to the Russian Federation telemetric
information under Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part
Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric
Information to the Protocol for the launch of--
(A) any missile defense interceptor, as defined in
paragraph 44 of Part One of the Protocol to the New START
Treaty;
(B) any satellite launches, missile defense sensor targets,
and missile defense intercept targets, the launch of which
uses the first stage of an existing type of United States
ICBM or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New
START Treaty; or
(C) any missile described in clause (a) of paragraph 7 of
Article III of the New START Treaty.
(6) Conventional prompt global strike.--(A) The Senate
calls on the executive branch to clarify its planning and
intent in developing future conventionally armed, strategic-
range weapon systems. To this end, prior to the entry into
force of the New START Treaty, the President shall provide a
report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
Relations of the Senate containing the following:
(i) A list of all conventionally armed, strategic-range
weapon systems that are currently under development.
(ii) An analysis of the expected capabilities of each
system listed under clause (i).
(iii) A statement with respect to each system listed under
clause (i) as to whether any of the limits in Article II of
the New START Treaty apply to such system.
(iv) An assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of
each system.
(v) A discussion of alternative deployment options and
scenarios for each system.
(vi) A summary of the measures that could help to
distinguish each system listed under clause (i) from nuclear
systems and reduce the risks of misinterpretation and of a
resulting claim that such systems might alter strategic
stability.
(B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be supplemented
by a classified annex.
(C) If, at any time after the New START Treaty enters into
force, the President determines that deployment of
conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs is required at levels
that cannot be accommodated within the limits in Article II
of the New START Treaty while sustaining a robust United
States nuclear triad, then the President shall immediately
consult with the Senate regarding the reasons for such
determination.
(7) United states telemetric information.--In implementing
Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part Seven of the
Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the
Protocol, prior to agreeing to provide to the Russian
Federation any amount of telemetric information on a United
States test launch of a conventionally armed prompt global
strike system, the President shall certify to the Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate that--
(A) the provision of United States telemetric information--
(i) consists of data that demonstrate that such system is
not subject to the limits in Article II of the New START
Treaty; or
(ii) would be provided in exchange for significant
telemetric information regarding a weapon system not listed
in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New START Treaty, or a
system not deployed by the Russian Federation prior to
December 5, 2009;
(B) it is in the national security interest of the United
States to provide such telemetric information; and
(C) provision of such telemetric information will not
undermine the effectiveness of such system.
(8) Bilateral consultative commission.--Not later than 15
days before any meeting of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission to consider a proposal for additional measures to
improve the viability or effectiveness of the New START
Treaty or to resolve a question related to the applicability
of provisions of the New START Treaty to a new kind of
strategic offensive arm, the President shall consult with the
Chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate with regard to whether the
proposal, if adopted, would constitute an amendment to the
New START Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the
Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of
the Constitution of the United States.
(9) United states commitments ensuring the safety,
reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.--(A) The
United States is committed to ensuring the safety,
reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces. It is the
sense of the Senate that--
(i) the United States is committed to proceeding with a
robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and
modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and
capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and
performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at the New
START Treaty levels and meet requirements for hedging against
possible international developments or technical problems, in
conformance with United States policies and to underpin
deterrence;
(ii) to that end, the United States is committed to
maintaining United States nuclear weapons laboratories and
preserving the core nuclear weapons competencies therein; and
(iii) the United States is committed to providing the
resources needed to achieve these objectives, at a minimum at
the levels set forth in the President's 10-year plan provided
to the Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law
111-84).
(B) If appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the
resource requirements set forth in the President's 10-year
plan, or if at any time more resources are required than
estimated in the President's 10-year plan, the President
shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment or
the identification of the requirement for such additional
resources, as appropriate, a report detailing--
(i) how the President proposes to remedy the resource
shortfall;
(ii) if additional resources are required, the proposed
level of funding required and an identification of the
stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program,
operation, activity, construction, or project for which
additional funds are required;
(iii) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety,
reliability, and performance of United States nuclear forces;
and
(iv) whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought
about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national
interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New
START Treaty.
(10) Annual report.--As full and faithful implementation is
key to realizing the benefits of the New START Treaty, the
President shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than
January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012,
which will provide--
(A) details on each Party's reductions in strategic
offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered
into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports,
during the previous year;
(B) a certification that the Russian Federation is in
compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a
detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian
Federation;
(C) a certification that any conversion and elimination
procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START
Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in
ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the
New START Treaty, or--
(i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or
elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia
within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission
remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in
paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol;
and
(ii) a comprehensive explanation of steps the United States
has taken with respect to each such case;
(D) an assessment of the operation of the New START
Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including--
(i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise
impeded the collection of telemetric information; and
(ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric
information; and
(E) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists
that endangers the national security interests of the United
States.
(11) Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.--Prior to the
entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall
certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
(A) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear
delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise
missile, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM; and
(B) maintain the United States rocket motor industrial
base.
(12) Tactical nuclear weapons.--(A) Prior to the entry into
force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to
the Senate that--
(i) the United States will seek to initiate, following
consultation with NATO allies but not later than one year
after the entry into force of the New START Treaty,
negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to
address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical)
nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of
the United States and to secure and reduce tactical nuclear
weapons in a verifiable manner; and
(ii) it is the policy of the United States that such
negotiations shall not include defensive missile systems.
(B) Not later than one year after the entry into force of
the New START Treaty, and annually thereafter for the
duration of the New START Treaty or until the conclusion of
an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President
shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed
Services of the Senate a report--
(i) detailing the steps taken to conclude the agreement
cited in subparagraph (A); and
(ii) analyzing the reasons why such an agreement has not
yet been concluded.
(C) Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced
in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical
nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the
security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to
engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of--
(i) establishing cooperative measures to give each Party to
the New START Treaty
[[Page S10984]]
improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and
security of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the other
Party; and
(ii) providing United States or other international
assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate
accounting and security of its tactical nuclear weapons.
(13) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to
the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President
shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
(A) accelerate to the extent possible the design and
engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF); and
(B) request full funding, including on a multi-year basis
as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon
completion of the design and engineering phase for such
facilities.
(14) Effectiveness and viability of new start treaty and
united states missile defenses.--Prior to the entry into
force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to
the Senate, and at the time of the exchange of instruments of
ratification shall communicate to the Russian Federation,
that it is the policy of the United States to continue
development and deployment of United States missile defense
systems to defend against missile threats from nations such
as North Korea and Iran, including qualitative and
quantitative improvements to such systems. Such systems
include all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defenses in Europe, the modernization of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system, and the continued development of
the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as a technological and
strategic hedge. The United States believes that these
systems do not and will not threaten the strategic balance
with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while the United
States cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the
Russian Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the
Treaty, the United States believes continued improvement and
deployment of United States missile defense systems do not
constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and
viability of the Treaty, and therefore would not give rise to
circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian
Federation from the Treaty.
(b) Understandings.--The advice and consent of the Senate
to the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the
following understandings, which shall be included in the
instrument of ratification:
(1) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the United
States that--
(A) the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on
the deployment of missile defenses other than the
requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START
Treaty, which states, ``Each Party shall not convert and
shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement
of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further
shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile
defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs
therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers
that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for
placement of missile defense interceptors therein.'';
(B) any additional New START Treaty limitations on the
deployment of missile defenses beyond those contained in
paragraph 3 of Article V, including any limitations agreed
under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
would require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may
enter into force for the United States only with the advice
and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States;
(C) the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement by the Russian
Federation on missile defense does not impose a legal
obligation on the United States; and
(D) the preamble of the New START Treaty does not impose a
legal obligation on the Parties.
(2) Rail-mobile icbms.--It is the understanding of the
United States that--
(A) any rail-mobile-launched ballistic missile with a range
in excess of 5,500 kilometers would be an ICBM, as the term
is defined in paragraph 37 of Part One of the Protocol (in
the English-language numbering), for the purposes of the New
START Treaty, specifically including the limits in Article II
of the New START Treaty;
(B) an erector-launcher mechanism for launching an ICBM and
the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted would be an
ICBM launcher, as the term is defined in paragraph 28 of Part
One of the Protocol (in the English-language numbering), for
the purposes of the New START Treaty, specifically including
the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty;
(C) if either Party should produce a rail-mobile ICBM
system, the Bilateral Consultative Commission would address
the application of other parts of the New START Treaty to
that system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and XI of
the New START Treaty and relevant portions of the Protocol
and the Annexes to the Protocol; and
(D) an agreement reached pursuant to subparagraph (C) is
subject to the requirements of Article XV of the New START
Treaty and, specifically, if an agreement pursuant to
subparagraph (C) creates substantive rights or obligations
that differ significantly from those in the New START Treaty
regarding a ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' as defined in Part
One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty, such agreement
will be considered an amendment to the New START Treaty
pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article XV of the New START Treaty
and will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification.
(3) Strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon systems.--It is the
understanding of the United States that--
(A) future, strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems that
do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New START Treaty
will not be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' subject
to the New START Treaty;
(B) nothing in the New START Treaty restricts United States
research, development, testing, and evaluation of strategic-
range, non-nuclear weapons, including any weapon that is
capable of boosted aerodynamic flight;
(C) nothing in the New START Treaty prohibits deployments
of strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems; and
(D) the addition to the New START Treaty of--
(i) any limitations on United States research, development,
testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-nuclear
weapon systems, including any weapon that is capable of
boosted aerodynamic flight; or
(ii) any prohibition on the deployment of such systems,
including any such limitations or prohibitions agreed under
the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, would
require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may enter
into force for the United States only with the advice and
consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 2,
clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
(c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to
the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the
following declarations, which express the intent of the
Senate:
(1) Missile defense.--(A) It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(i) pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999
(Public Law 106-38), it is the policy of the United States
``to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an
effective National Missile Defense system capable of
defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized,
or deliberate)'';
(ii) defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for
new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should
deterrence fail; and
(iii) further limitations on the missile defense
capabilities of the United States are not in the national
security interest of the United States.
(B) The New START Treaty and the April 7, 2010, unilateral
statement of the Russian Federation on missile defense do not
limit in any way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting,
activities that the United States Government currently plans
or that might be required over the duration of the New START
Treaty to protect the United States pursuant to the National
Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to protect United States
Armed Forces and United States allies from limited
ballistic missile attack, including further planned
enhancements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system
and all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile
defense in Europe.
(C) Given its concern about missile defense issues, the
Senate expects the executive branch to offer regular
briefings, not less than twice each year, to the Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on all
missile defense issues related to the New START Treaty and on
the progress of United States-Russia dialogue and cooperation
regarding missile defense.
(2) Defending the united states and allies against
strategic attack.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(A) a paramount obligation of the United States Government
is to provide for the defense of the American people,
deployed members of the United States Armed Forces, and
United States allies against nuclear attacks to the best of
its ability;
(B) policies based on ``mutual assured destruction'' or
intentional vulnerability can be contrary to the safety and
security of both countries, and the United States and the
Russian Federation share a common interest in moving
cooperatively as soon as possible away from a strategic
relationship based on mutual assured destruction;
(C) in a world where biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them are proliferating,
strategic stability can be enhanced by strategic defensive
measures;
(D) accordingly, the United States is and will remain free
to reduce the vulnerability to attack by constructing a
layered missile defense system capable of countering missiles
of all ranges;
(E) the United States will welcome steps by the Russian
Federation also to adopt a fundamentally defensive strategic
posture that no longer views robust strategic defensive
capabilities as undermining the overall strategic balance,
and stands ready to cooperate with the Russian Federation on
strategic defensive capabilities, as long as such cooperation
is aimed at fostering and in no way constrains the defensive
capabilities of both sides; and
(F) the United States is committed to improving United
States strategic defensive capabilities both quantitatively
and qualitatively during the period that the New
[[Page S10985]]
START Treaty is in effect, and such improvements are
consistent with the Treaty.
(3) Conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems.--
Consistent with statements made by the United States that
such systems are not intended to affect strategic stability
with respect to the Russian Federation, the Senate finds that
conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems not co-
located with nuclear-armed systems do not affect strategic
stability between the United States and the Russian
Federation.
(4) Nunn-lugar cooperative threat reduction.--It is the
sense of the Senate that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program has made an invaluable contribution
to the security and elimination of weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons and materials in
Russia and elsewhere, and that the President should continue
the global CTR Program and CTR assistance to Russia,
including for the purpose of facilitating implementation of
the New START Treaty.
(5) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the Senate
that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the New START
Treaty, the President should regulate reductions in United
States strategic offensive arms so that the number of
accountable strategic offensive arms under the New START
Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds
the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms
possessed by the United States to such an extent that a
strategic imbalance endangers the national security interests
of the United States.
(6) Compliance.--(A) The New START Treaty will remain in
the interests of the United States only to the extent that
the Russian Federation is in strict compliance with its
obligations under the New START Treaty.
(B) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate
expects the executive branch to offer regular briefings, not
less than four times each year, to the Committees on Foreign
Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on compliance
issues related to the New START Treaty. Such briefings shall
include a description of all United States efforts in United
States-Russian diplomatic channels and bilateral fora to
resolve any compliance issues and shall include, but would
not necessarily be limited to, a description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise
with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Consultative
Commission, in advance of such meetings; and
(ii) any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral
Consultative Commission, within thirty days of such meetings.
(7) Expansion of strategic arsenals in countries other than
russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that if, during the
time the New START Treaty remains in force, the President
determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic
arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty so
as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States,
then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the
Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START Treaty
remains in the national interest of the United States.
(8) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition
(1) of the resolution of advice and consent to the
ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of
understanding and protocols (commonly referred to as the
``INF Treaty''), approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, and
condition (8) of the resolution of advice and consent to the
ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties
to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of
November 19, 1990 (commonly referred to as the ``CFE Flank
Document''), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997.
(9) Treaty modification or reinterpretation.--The Senate
declares that any agreement or understanding which in any
material way modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States
or Russian obligations under the New START Treaty, including
the time frame for implementation of the New START Treaty,
should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent
to ratification.
(10) Consultations.--Given the continuing interest of the
Senate in the New START Treaty and in strategic offensive
reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with
national security requirements and alliance obligations of
the United States, the Senate expects the President to
consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to
paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.
(11) Further strategic arms reductions.--
(A) Recognizing the obligation under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, ``to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international
control,'' and in anticipation of the ratification and entry
into force of the New START Treaty, the Senate calls upon the
other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early
consideration to corresponding reductions of their own
nuclear arsenals.
(B) The Senate declares that further arms reduction
agreements obligating the United States to reduce or limit
the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in any
militarily significant manner may be made only pursuant to
the treaty-making power of the President as set forth in
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the
United States.
(12) Modernization and replacement of united states
strategic delivery vehicles.--In accordance with paragraph 1
of Article V of the New START Treaty, which states that,
``Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and
replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out,''
it is the sense of the Senate that United States deterrence
and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic
delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States is
committed to accomplishing the modernization and replacement
of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and to ensuring
the continued flexibility of United States conventional and
nuclear delivery systems.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the previous order, the President will be
immediately notified of the Senate's consent to the resolution of
ratification.
Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I rise today to explain why I voted against
the New START treaty. The U.S. Senate is the deliberative body of
Congress. Our forefathers created the Senate so issues of this
magnitude are thoroughly considered with all of the facts and with a
careful eye on all possible future consequences. With previous treaties
of this magnitude, the full Senate has been allowed over a full year to
consider what the treaty would require of not only Russia but also the
United States. That hasn't happened here, and it is a disconcerting
trend.
The executive branches of both the Russian and the U.S. governments
stated they will not take actions during the negotiations of this
treaty that would be contrary to the spirit of the treaty. Both the
Russian and U.S. governments recognize the treaty's implementation will
take time. The need to get this treaty right is paramount.
I am concerned that I haven't had all of my specific questions
answered about the treaty. Although members of the Foreign Relations
Committee have had the opportunity to consider this treaty and ask many
questions, the full Senate has not had the chance to have all of their
questions answered. Forcing through a treaty without detailed scrutiny
by the full Senate is not how our government should work.
Even with post-Cold War threats and adversaries, the nuclear balance
between the United States and Russia remains a cornerstone to global
non-proliferation. That's why each member of the Senate must determine
if he or she believes this treaty will make our Nation safer. We can
only do so if we have all the information about the treaty, and we can
only make it better if we have the opportunity to fully amend the
treaty.
During debate, we were repeatedly told that amending the treaty would
kill it. That's just not true. Going back and forth on treaties is not
new. As with the original START, which was signed in 1991, the U.S.
Senate did not accept the first version and required that a better
treaty be created.
We offered amendments that would have simply required that Russia be
more involved in the changes this treaty will require, stressing the
importance to the Russian government to create a safe global atmosphere
similar to the United States. Those amendments were rejected. Only two
amendments, one about modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and
one stating that missile defense will proceed, were accepted by
unanimous consent. The other amendments were either not considered or
failed. It is now up to the Russian Duma to consider the suggested
changes by the Senate's amendments and approve them or not. Both
countries should be willing to work hard on this front and the best
treaties, just like legislative bills, are those that are thoroughly
considered by all involved with a willingness to comprehensively
address all concerns and needs.
Beyond the issues of Senate processes, I have concerns about certain
provisions in this treaty. It is impossible to fully consider this
treaty without being able to review the full negotiating record, which
has not been provided to all senators. Summaries have
[[Page S10986]]
been provided, but summaries do not include the specific information on
how the full implementation of this treaty will be done.
As a founding member of the Senate ICBM Coalition, I strongly believe
that all three legs of the nuclear triad--missiles, submarines, and
bombers--must be maintained in order to retain a highly reliable and
credible deterrent nuclear force. This need is even greater as we
potentially draw down some of our nuclear forces through the New START
treaty. I have worked with other members in the ICBM Coalition and with
the administration to encourage them to ensure the treaty does not harm
the triad. I appreciated the information provided by the administration
on the treaty and the opportunity to meet on this issue during the
floor debate. However, I remain deeply concerned about the implications
the treaty will have on our country's national security, particularly
its potential effects on the current missile force structure. Without
the specific information on how the administration is going to
implement the treaty and concrete assurances that the current missile
force structure of 450 deployed and nondeployed silos be maintained, I
remain skeptical of this agreement.
F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, WY, helps the United States
maintain one leg of the triad by operating part of the ICBM force. It
is my obligation as a Senator from Wyoming to know what effects this
treaty will have on the missile defense missions in my home state. I
also respect and watch out for the servicemembers in the 90th Space
Command and 20th Missile Command who work hard to ensure our country
has a strong missile defense. I have not yet been able to get a firm
commitment from my Senate colleagues and the administration on a
concrete number of missiles that will be maintained under this treaty.
Furthermore, the treaty will require unilateral reductions from the
United States with no similar requirements for Russia. Instead, the
Russian government is actually given room to build up its nuclear
forces with more modern capabilities.
Regardless of this agreement, the United States has not thoroughly
addressed the modernization of our country's nuclear capabilities. I
have spoken with those involved in the treaty negotiations regarding
U.S. modernization. I was told that the modernization efforts are in
the works and the funding for these activities is planned. I support
this more focused modernization approach. Part of the need for U.S.
modernization is to address our Nation's tactical weapons capabilities.
As currently written, the treaty will leave Russia in a 10-1 advantage
in tactical nuclear weapons. This is disconcerting and modernization
must be a priority.
I have concerns about verifiability as well. Former Secretary of
State James Baker has described the treaty's verification regime as
weaker than its predecessor. If the United States is going to make
reductions to our capabilities under this treaty, we should ensure that
Russia is doing the same and following the treaty as closely as our
country will. We should not settle for some verification--we must
require full verification. Second best will do the United States no
good in terms of intelligence and response capabilities.
Back in 2002, I traveled to Russia with the University of Georgia to
talk about nonproliferation. At that time, I expressed serious concerns
not only about Russia's capabilities to secure their nuclear complex,
but also to ensure that their nuclear scientists and their knowledge
did not become available to bad actors like al-Qaida. Ensuring that
Russia continues to keep their capabilities and know-how secure is
imperative and cannot be left to second best.
Our two nations may approach nuclear agreements with different goals,
but the fact that the United States and Russian governments maintain a
dialogue is a highly positive fact. We need and want the cooperation of
our counterparts in Russia in both bilateral and multilateral efforts.
This is highlighted in the United Nations Security Council discussions
on nuclear weapons development in Iran, North Korea, and other actors.
We want and need to create a safer world while maintaining our
defensive capabilities for ourselves and our allies. By forcing debate
on this treaty during the lame duck session, I do not believe we were
able to fully address all concerns in the detail that was warranted. We
needed to be sure the treaty does what we expect it to do without any
surprises. I am not convinced we will not see any surprises in the
future. Thus, I voted against the New START treaty.
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