[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10982-S10986]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                  STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Continued

  The VICE PRESIDENT. The majority leader.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be no 
other amendments, motions, or points of order in order in relation to 
the treaty or the resolution of ratification; that the Senate 
immediately proceed with no intervening action or debate to a vote on 
the Resolution of Advise and Consent to Ratification, as amended, to 
the New START Treaty, Treaty Document No. 111-5; that if the resolution 
is adopted, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table and the 
President of the United States be immediately notified of the Senate's 
action; that upon disposition of the New START treaty, the Senate 
proceed to a vote on confirmation of the nomination of Calendar No. 
1089, Mary Helen Murguia, of Arizona, to be a U.S. circuit judge for 
the Ninth Circuit; that if the nomination is confirmed, the motion to 
reconsider be laid upon the table and the President be immediately 
notified of the Senate's action; that following the vote on the Murguia 
nomination, the Senate immediately proceed to a vote on Calendar No. 
934, Scott M. Matheson, Jr., of Utah, to be a U.S. circuit judge for 
the Tenth Circuit; that if the nomination is confirmed, the motion to 
reconsider be laid upon the table and the President be immediately 
notified of the Senate's action; further, that upon disposition of the 
Matheson nomination, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to 
the consideration of the following judicial nominations en bloc: 
Calendar Nos. 1119, 1120, and 1139, that is, Kathleen M. O'Malley, 
Beryl Alaine Howell, and Robert Leon Wilkins; that the nominations be 
confirmed en bloc, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid 
upon the table en bloc, the President be immediately notified of the 
Senate's action, and the Senate then resume legislative session.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question is on the adoption of the resolution of ratification, as 
amended, to the treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, with 
Protocol.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and 
the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning).
  Further, if present and voting, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. 
Bunning) would have voted ``nay.''
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 71, nays 26, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 298 Ex.]

                                YEAS--71

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (MA)
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Gregg
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse
     Wyden

                                NAYS--26

     Barrasso
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bond
     Brownback
     Bunning
  The VICE PRESIDENT. On this vote, the yeas are 71, the nays are 26. 
Two-thirds of the Senators present and voting having voted in the 
affirmative, the resolution of ratification, as amended, is agreed to.
  The resolution of ratification agreed to is as follows:

                            Treaty Approved

       Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Treaty Doc. 111-5).
       Resolution of ratification as amended:
       Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein),
       That the Senate advises and consents to the ratification of 
     the Treaty between the United States of America and the 
     Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on 
     April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annex on Inspection 
     Activities to the Protocol, Annex on Notifications to the 
     Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the 
     Protocol, all such documents being integral parts of and 
     collectively referred to in this resolution as the ``New 
     START Treaty'' (Treaty Document 111-5), subject to the 
     conditions of subsection (a), the understandings of 
     subsection (b), and the declarations of subsection (c).
       (a) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
     following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) General compliance.--If the President determines that 
     the Russian Federation is acting or has acted in a manner 
     that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the New 
     START Treaty, or is in violation of the New START Treaty, so 
     as to threaten the national security interests of the United 
     States, then the President shall--
       (A) consult with the Senate regarding the implications of 
     such actions for the viability of the New START Treaty and 
     for the national security interests of the United States;
       (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting with the Russian 
     Federation at the highest diplomatic level with the objective 
     of bringing the Russian Federation into full compliance with 
     its obligations under the New START Treaty; and
       (C) submit a report to the Senate promptly thereafter, 
     detailing--
       (i) whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in 
     the national security interests of the United States; and
       (ii) how the United States will redress the impact of 
     Russian actions on the national security interests of the 
     United States.
       (2) Presidential certifications and reports on national 
     technical means.--(A) Prior to the entry into force of the 
     New START Treaty, and annually thereafter, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that United States National 
     Technical Means, in conjunction with the verification 
     activities provided for in the New START Treaty, are 
     sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian 
     compliance with the provisions of the New START Treaty and 
     timely warning of any Russian preparation to break out of the 
     limits in Article II of the New START Treaty. Following 
     submission of the first such certification, each subsequent 
     certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate 
     indicating how United States National Technical Means, 
     including collection, processing, and analytic resources, 
     will be utilized to ensure effective monitoring. The first 
     such report shall include a long-term plan for the 
     maintenance of New START Treaty monitoring. Each subsequent 
     report shall include an update of the long-term plan. Each 
     such report may be submitted in either classified or 
     unclassified form.
       (B) It is the sense of the Senate that monitoring Russian 
     Federation compliance with the New START Treaty is a high 
     priority and that the inability to do so would constitute a 
     threat to United States national security interests.
       (3) Reductions.--(A) The New START Treaty shall not enter 
     into force until instruments of ratification have been 
     exchanged in accordance with Article XIV of the New START 
     Treaty.
       (B) If, prior to the entry into force of the New START 
     Treaty, the President plans to implement reductions of United 
     States strategic nuclear forces below those currently planned 
     and consistent with the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive 
     Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (commonly 
     referred to as ``the Moscow Treaty''), then the President 
     shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such 
     reductions on the national security of the United States; and
       (ii) take no such reductions until the President submits to 
     the Senate the President's determination that such reductions 
     are in the national security interest of the United States.
       (4) Timely warning of breakout.--If the President 
     determines, after consultation with the Director of National 
     Intelligence, that the Russian Federation intends to break 
     out of the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty, the 
     President shall immediately inform the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Armed Services of the

[[Page S10983]]

     Senate, with a view to determining whether circumstances 
     exist that jeopardize the supreme interests of the United 
     States, such that withdrawal from the New START Treaty may be 
     warranted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the New 
     START Treaty.
       (5) United states missile defense test telemetry.--Prior to 
     entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that the New START Treaty does not 
     require, at any point during which it will be in force, the 
     United States to provide to the Russian Federation telemetric 
     information under Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part 
     Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric 
     Information to the Protocol for the launch of--
       (A) any missile defense interceptor, as defined in 
     paragraph 44 of Part One of the Protocol to the New START 
     Treaty;
       (B) any satellite launches, missile defense sensor targets, 
     and missile defense intercept targets, the launch of which 
     uses the first stage of an existing type of United States 
     ICBM or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New 
     START Treaty; or
       (C) any missile described in clause (a) of paragraph 7 of 
     Article III of the New START Treaty.
       (6) Conventional prompt global strike.--(A) The Senate 
     calls on the executive branch to clarify its planning and 
     intent in developing future conventionally armed, strategic-
     range weapon systems. To this end, prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall provide a 
     report to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate containing the following:
       (i) A list of all conventionally armed, strategic-range 
     weapon systems that are currently under development.
       (ii) An analysis of the expected capabilities of each 
     system listed under clause (i).
       (iii) A statement with respect to each system listed under 
     clause (i) as to whether any of the limits in Article II of 
     the New START Treaty apply to such system.
       (iv) An assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of 
     each system.
       (v) A discussion of alternative deployment options and 
     scenarios for each system.
       (vi) A summary of the measures that could help to 
     distinguish each system listed under clause (i) from nuclear 
     systems and reduce the risks of misinterpretation and of a 
     resulting claim that such systems might alter strategic 
     stability.
       (B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be supplemented 
     by a classified annex.
       (C) If, at any time after the New START Treaty enters into 
     force, the President determines that deployment of 
     conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs is required at levels 
     that cannot be accommodated within the limits in Article II 
     of the New START Treaty while sustaining a robust United 
     States nuclear triad, then the President shall immediately 
     consult with the Senate regarding the reasons for such 
     determination.
       (7) United states telemetric information.--In implementing 
     Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part Seven of the 
     Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the 
     Protocol, prior to agreeing to provide to the Russian 
     Federation any amount of telemetric information on a United 
     States test launch of a conventionally armed prompt global 
     strike system, the President shall certify to the Committees 
     on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate that--
       (A) the provision of United States telemetric information--
       (i) consists of data that demonstrate that such system is 
     not subject to the limits in Article II of the New START 
     Treaty; or
       (ii) would be provided in exchange for significant 
     telemetric information regarding a weapon system not listed 
     in paragraph 8 of Article III of the New START Treaty, or a 
     system not deployed by the Russian Federation prior to 
     December 5, 2009;
       (B) it is in the national security interest of the United 
     States to provide such telemetric information; and
       (C) provision of such telemetric information will not 
     undermine the effectiveness of such system.
       (8) Bilateral consultative commission.--Not later than 15 
     days before any meeting of the Bilateral Consultative 
     Commission to consider a proposal for additional measures to 
     improve the viability or effectiveness of the New START 
     Treaty or to resolve a question related to the applicability 
     of provisions of the New START Treaty to a new kind of 
     strategic offensive arm, the President shall consult with the 
     Chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate with regard to whether the 
     proposal, if adopted, would constitute an amendment to the 
     New START Treaty requiring the advice and consent of the 
     Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of 
     the Constitution of the United States.
       (9) United states commitments ensuring the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.--(A) The 
     United States is committed to ensuring the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces. It is the 
     sense of the Senate that--
       (i) the United States is committed to proceeding with a 
     robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and 
     modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and 
     capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and 
     performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at the New 
     START Treaty levels and meet requirements for hedging against 
     possible international developments or technical problems, in 
     conformance with United States policies and to underpin 
     deterrence;
       (ii) to that end, the United States is committed to 
     maintaining United States nuclear weapons laboratories and 
     preserving the core nuclear weapons competencies therein; and
       (iii) the United States is committed to providing the 
     resources needed to achieve these objectives, at a minimum at 
     the levels set forth in the President's 10-year plan provided 
     to the Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
     111-84).
       (B) If appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the 
     resource requirements set forth in the President's 10-year 
     plan, or if at any time more resources are required than 
     estimated in the President's 10-year plan, the President 
     shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment or 
     the identification of the requirement for such additional 
     resources, as appropriate, a report detailing--
       (i) how the President proposes to remedy the resource 
     shortfall;
       (ii) if additional resources are required, the proposed 
     level of funding required and an identification of the 
     stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, 
     operation, activity, construction, or project for which 
     additional funds are required;
       (iii) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of United States nuclear forces; 
     and
       (iv) whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought 
     about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the national 
     interest of the United States to remain a Party to the New 
     START Treaty.
       (10) Annual report.--As full and faithful implementation is 
     key to realizing the benefits of the New START Treaty, the 
     President shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than 
     January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012, 
     which will provide--
       (A) details on each Party's reductions in strategic 
     offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered 
     into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, 
     during the previous year;
       (B) a certification that the Russian Federation is in 
     compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a 
     detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian 
     Federation;
       (C) a certification that any conversion and elimination 
     procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START 
     Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in 
     ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the 
     New START Treaty, or--
       (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or 
     elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia 
     within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission 
     remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in 
     paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; 
     and
       (ii) a comprehensive explanation of steps the United States 
     has taken with respect to each such case;
       (D) an assessment of the operation of the New START 
     Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including--
       (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise 
     impeded the collection of telemetric information; and
       (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric 
     information; and
       (E) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists 
     that endangers the national security interests of the United 
     States.
       (11) Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.--Prior to the 
     entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear 
     delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise 
     missile, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM; and
       (B) maintain the United States rocket motor industrial 
     base.
       (12) Tactical nuclear weapons.--(A) Prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate that--
       (i) the United States will seek to initiate, following 
     consultation with NATO allies but not later than one year 
     after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, 
     negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to 
     address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) 
     nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of 
     the United States and to secure and reduce tactical nuclear 
     weapons in a verifiable manner; and
       (ii) it is the policy of the United States that such 
     negotiations shall not include defensive missile systems.
       (B) Not later than one year after the entry into force of 
     the New START Treaty, and annually thereafter for the 
     duration of the New START Treaty or until the conclusion of 
     an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President 
     shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
     Services of the Senate a report--
       (i) detailing the steps taken to conclude the agreement 
     cited in subparagraph (A); and
       (ii) analyzing the reasons why such an agreement has not 
     yet been concluded.
       (C) Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced 
     in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical 
     nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the 
     security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to 
     engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of--
       (i) establishing cooperative measures to give each Party to 
     the New START Treaty

[[Page S10984]]

     improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and 
     security of tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the other 
     Party; and
       (ii) providing United States or other international 
     assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate 
     accounting and security of its tactical nuclear weapons.
       (13) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to 
     the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) accelerate to the extent possible the design and 
     engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
     Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing 
     Facility (UPF); and
       (B) request full funding, including on a multi-year basis 
     as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
     Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon 
     completion of the design and engineering phase for such 
     facilities.
       (14) Effectiveness and viability of new start treaty and 
     united states missile defenses.--Prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate, and at the time of the exchange of instruments of 
     ratification shall communicate to the Russian Federation, 
     that it is the policy of the United States to continue 
     development and deployment of United States missile defense 
     systems to defend against missile threats from nations such 
     as North Korea and Iran, including qualitative and 
     quantitative improvements to such systems. Such systems 
     include all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 
     defenses in Europe, the modernization of the Ground-based 
     Midcourse Defense system, and the continued development of 
     the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as a technological and 
     strategic hedge. The United States believes that these 
     systems do not and will not threaten the strategic balance 
     with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while the United 
     States cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the 
     Russian Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the 
     Treaty, the United States believes continued improvement and 
     deployment of United States missile defense systems do not 
     constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and 
     viability of the Treaty, and therefore would not give rise to 
     circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian 
     Federation from the Treaty.
       (b) Understandings.--The advice and consent of the Senate 
     to the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
     following understandings, which shall be included in the 
     instrument of ratification:
       (1) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the United 
     States that--
       (A) the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on 
     the deployment of missile defenses other than the 
     requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START 
     Treaty, which states, ``Each Party shall not convert and 
     shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement 
     of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further 
     shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile 
     defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs 
     therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers 
     that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for 
     placement of missile defense interceptors therein.'';
       (B) any additional New START Treaty limitations on the 
     deployment of missile defenses beyond those contained in 
     paragraph 3 of Article V, including any limitations agreed 
     under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, 
     would require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may 
     enter into force for the United States only with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, 
     section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States;
       (C) the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement by the Russian 
     Federation on missile defense does not impose a legal 
     obligation on the United States; and
       (D) the preamble of the New START Treaty does not impose a 
     legal obligation on the Parties.
       (2) Rail-mobile icbms.--It is the understanding of the 
     United States that--
       (A) any rail-mobile-launched ballistic missile with a range 
     in excess of 5,500 kilometers would be an ICBM, as the term 
     is defined in paragraph 37 of Part One of the Protocol (in 
     the English-language numbering), for the purposes of the New 
     START Treaty, specifically including the limits in Article II 
     of the New START Treaty;
       (B) an erector-launcher mechanism for launching an ICBM and 
     the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted would be an 
     ICBM launcher, as the term is defined in paragraph 28 of Part 
     One of the Protocol (in the English-language numbering), for 
     the purposes of the New START Treaty, specifically including 
     the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty;
       (C) if either Party should produce a rail-mobile ICBM 
     system, the Bilateral Consultative Commission would address 
     the application of other parts of the New START Treaty to 
     that system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and XI of 
     the New START Treaty and relevant portions of the Protocol 
     and the Annexes to the Protocol; and
       (D) an agreement reached pursuant to subparagraph (C) is 
     subject to the requirements of Article XV of the New START 
     Treaty and, specifically, if an agreement pursuant to 
     subparagraph (C) creates substantive rights or obligations 
     that differ significantly from those in the New START Treaty 
     regarding a ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' as defined in Part 
     One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty, such agreement 
     will be considered an amendment to the New START Treaty 
     pursuant to Paragraph 1 of Article XV of the New START Treaty 
     and will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification.
       (3) Strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon systems.--It is the 
     understanding of the United States that--
       (A) future, strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems that 
     do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New START Treaty 
     will not be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' subject 
     to the New START Treaty;
       (B) nothing in the New START Treaty restricts United States 
     research, development, testing, and evaluation of strategic-
     range, non-nuclear weapons, including any weapon that is 
     capable of boosted aerodynamic flight;
       (C) nothing in the New START Treaty prohibits deployments 
     of strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems; and
       (D) the addition to the New START Treaty of--
       (i) any limitations on United States research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-nuclear 
     weapon systems, including any weapon that is capable of 
     boosted aerodynamic flight; or
       (ii) any prohibition on the deployment of such systems, 
     including any such limitations or prohibitions agreed under 
     the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, would 
     require an amendment to the New START Treaty which may enter 
     into force for the United States only with the advice and 
     consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, section 2, 
     clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States.
       (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
     following declarations, which express the intent of the 
     Senate:
       (1) Missile defense.--(A) It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (i) pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
     (Public Law 106-38), it is the policy of the United States 
     ``to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an 
     effective National Missile Defense system capable of 
     defending the territory of the United States against limited 
     ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, 
     or deliberate)'';
       (ii) defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for 
     new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should 
     deterrence fail; and
       (iii) further limitations on the missile defense 
     capabilities of the United States are not in the national 
     security interest of the United States.
       (B) The New START Treaty and the April 7, 2010, unilateral 
     statement of the Russian Federation on missile defense do not 
     limit in any way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting, 
     activities that the United States Government currently plans 
     or that might be required over the duration of the New START 
     Treaty to protect the United States pursuant to the National 
     Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to protect United States 
     Armed Forces and United States allies from limited 
     ballistic missile attack, including further planned 
     enhancements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system 
     and all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 
     defense in Europe.
       (C) Given its concern about missile defense issues, the 
     Senate expects the executive branch to offer regular 
     briefings, not less than twice each year, to the Committees 
     on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on all 
     missile defense issues related to the New START Treaty and on 
     the progress of United States-Russia dialogue and cooperation 
     regarding missile defense.
       (2) Defending the united states and allies against 
     strategic attack.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (A) a paramount obligation of the United States Government 
     is to provide for the defense of the American people, 
     deployed members of the United States Armed Forces, and 
     United States allies against nuclear attacks to the best of 
     its ability;
       (B) policies based on ``mutual assured destruction'' or 
     intentional vulnerability can be contrary to the safety and 
     security of both countries, and the United States and the 
     Russian Federation share a common interest in moving 
     cooperatively as soon as possible away from a strategic 
     relationship based on mutual assured destruction;
       (C) in a world where biological, chemical, and nuclear 
     weapons and the means to deliver them are proliferating, 
     strategic stability can be enhanced by strategic defensive 
     measures;
       (D) accordingly, the United States is and will remain free 
     to reduce the vulnerability to attack by constructing a 
     layered missile defense system capable of countering missiles 
     of all ranges;
       (E) the United States will welcome steps by the Russian 
     Federation also to adopt a fundamentally defensive strategic 
     posture that no longer views robust strategic defensive 
     capabilities as undermining the overall strategic balance, 
     and stands ready to cooperate with the Russian Federation on 
     strategic defensive capabilities, as long as such cooperation 
     is aimed at fostering and in no way constrains the defensive 
     capabilities of both sides; and
       (F) the United States is committed to improving United 
     States strategic defensive capabilities both quantitatively 
     and qualitatively during the period that the New

[[Page S10985]]

     START Treaty is in effect, and such improvements are 
     consistent with the Treaty.
       (3) Conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems.--
     Consistent with statements made by the United States that 
     such systems are not intended to affect strategic stability 
     with respect to the Russian Federation, the Senate finds that 
     conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon systems not co-
     located with nuclear-armed systems do not affect strategic 
     stability between the United States and the Russian 
     Federation.
       (4) Nunn-lugar cooperative threat reduction.--It is the 
     sense of the Senate that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
     Reduction (CTR) Program has made an invaluable contribution 
     to the security and elimination of weapons of mass 
     destruction, including nuclear weapons and materials in 
     Russia and elsewhere, and that the President should continue 
     the global CTR Program and CTR assistance to Russia, 
     including for the purpose of facilitating implementation of 
     the New START Treaty.
       (5) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the New START 
     Treaty, the President should regulate reductions in United 
     States strategic offensive arms so that the number of 
     accountable strategic offensive arms under the New START 
     Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds 
     the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms 
     possessed by the United States to such an extent that a 
     strategic imbalance endangers the national security interests 
     of the United States.
       (6) Compliance.--(A) The New START Treaty will remain in 
     the interests of the United States only to the extent that 
     the Russian Federation is in strict compliance with its 
     obligations under the New START Treaty.
       (B) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate 
     expects the executive branch to offer regular briefings, not 
     less than four times each year, to the Committees on Foreign 
     Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on compliance 
     issues related to the New START Treaty. Such briefings shall 
     include a description of all United States efforts in United 
     States-Russian diplomatic channels and bilateral fora to 
     resolve any compliance issues and shall include, but would 
     not necessarily be limited to, a description of--
       (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Consultative 
     Commission, in advance of such meetings; and
       (ii) any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral 
     Consultative Commission, within thirty days of such meetings.
       (7) Expansion of strategic arsenals in countries other than 
     russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that if, during the 
     time the New START Treaty remains in force, the President 
     determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic 
     arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty so 
     as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, 
     then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the 
     Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START Treaty 
     remains in the national interest of the United States.
       (8) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition 
     (1) of the resolution of advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols (commonly referred to as the 
     ``INF Treaty''), approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, and 
     condition (8) of the resolution of advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties 
     to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
     November 19, 1990 (commonly referred to as the ``CFE Flank 
     Document''), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997.
       (9) Treaty modification or reinterpretation.--The Senate 
     declares that any agreement or understanding which in any 
     material way modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States 
     or Russian obligations under the New START Treaty, including 
     the time frame for implementation of the New START Treaty, 
     should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent 
     to ratification.
       (10) Consultations.--Given the continuing interest of the 
     Senate in the New START Treaty and in strategic offensive 
     reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with 
     national security requirements and alliance obligations of 
     the United States, the Senate expects the President to 
     consult with the Senate prior to taking actions relevant to 
     paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.
       (11) Further strategic arms reductions.--
       (A) Recognizing the obligation under Article VI of the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
     Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, ``to pursue 
     negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
     cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
     nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete 
     disarmament under strict and effective international 
     control,'' and in anticipation of the ratification and entry 
     into force of the New START Treaty, the Senate calls upon the 
     other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early 
     consideration to corresponding reductions of their own 
     nuclear arsenals.
       (B) The Senate declares that further arms reduction 
     agreements obligating the United States to reduce or limit 
     the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in any 
     militarily significant manner may be made only pursuant to 
     the treaty-making power of the President as set forth in 
     Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
     United States.
       (12) Modernization and replacement of united states 
     strategic delivery vehicles.--In accordance with paragraph 1 
     of Article V of the New START Treaty, which states that, 
     ``Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and 
     replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out,'' 
     it is the sense of the Senate that United States deterrence 
     and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic 
     delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States is 
     committed to accomplishing the modernization and replacement 
     of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and to ensuring 
     the continued flexibility of United States conventional and 
     nuclear delivery systems.

  The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the previous order, the President will be 
immediately notified of the Senate's consent to the resolution of 
ratification.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I rise today to explain why I voted against 
the New START treaty. The U.S. Senate is the deliberative body of 
Congress. Our forefathers created the Senate so issues of this 
magnitude are thoroughly considered with all of the facts and with a 
careful eye on all possible future consequences. With previous treaties 
of this magnitude, the full Senate has been allowed over a full year to 
consider what the treaty would require of not only Russia but also the 
United States. That hasn't happened here, and it is a disconcerting 
trend.
  The executive branches of both the Russian and the U.S. governments 
stated they will not take actions during the negotiations of this 
treaty that would be contrary to the spirit of the treaty. Both the 
Russian and U.S. governments recognize the treaty's implementation will 
take time. The need to get this treaty right is paramount.
  I am concerned that I haven't had all of my specific questions 
answered about the treaty. Although members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee have had the opportunity to consider this treaty and ask many 
questions, the full Senate has not had the chance to have all of their 
questions answered. Forcing through a treaty without detailed scrutiny 
by the full Senate is not how our government should work.
  Even with post-Cold War threats and adversaries, the nuclear balance 
between the United States and Russia remains a cornerstone to global 
non-proliferation. That's why each member of the Senate must determine 
if he or she believes this treaty will make our Nation safer. We can 
only do so if we have all the information about the treaty, and we can 
only make it better if we have the opportunity to fully amend the 
treaty.
  During debate, we were repeatedly told that amending the treaty would 
kill it. That's just not true. Going back and forth on treaties is not 
new. As with the original START, which was signed in 1991, the U.S. 
Senate did not accept the first version and required that a better 
treaty be created.
  We offered amendments that would have simply required that Russia be 
more involved in the changes this treaty will require, stressing the 
importance to the Russian government to create a safe global atmosphere 
similar to the United States. Those amendments were rejected. Only two 
amendments, one about modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and 
one stating that missile defense will proceed, were accepted by 
unanimous consent. The other amendments were either not considered or 
failed. It is now up to the Russian Duma to consider the suggested 
changes by the Senate's amendments and approve them or not. Both 
countries should be willing to work hard on this front and the best 
treaties, just like legislative bills, are those that are thoroughly 
considered by all involved with a willingness to comprehensively 
address all concerns and needs.
  Beyond the issues of Senate processes, I have concerns about certain 
provisions in this treaty. It is impossible to fully consider this 
treaty without being able to review the full negotiating record, which 
has not been provided to all senators. Summaries have

[[Page S10986]]

been provided, but summaries do not include the specific information on 
how the full implementation of this treaty will be done.
  As a founding member of the Senate ICBM Coalition, I strongly believe 
that all three legs of the nuclear triad--missiles, submarines, and 
bombers--must be maintained in order to retain a highly reliable and 
credible deterrent nuclear force. This need is even greater as we 
potentially draw down some of our nuclear forces through the New START 
treaty. I have worked with other members in the ICBM Coalition and with 
the administration to encourage them to ensure the treaty does not harm 
the triad. I appreciated the information provided by the administration 
on the treaty and the opportunity to meet on this issue during the 
floor debate. However, I remain deeply concerned about the implications 
the treaty will have on our country's national security, particularly 
its potential effects on the current missile force structure. Without 
the specific information on how the administration is going to 
implement the treaty and concrete assurances that the current missile 
force structure of 450 deployed and nondeployed silos be maintained, I 
remain skeptical of this agreement.
  F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, WY, helps the United States 
maintain one leg of the triad by operating part of the ICBM force. It 
is my obligation as a Senator from Wyoming to know what effects this 
treaty will have on the missile defense missions in my home state. I 
also respect and watch out for the servicemembers in the 90th Space 
Command and 20th Missile Command who work hard to ensure our country 
has a strong missile defense. I have not yet been able to get a firm 
commitment from my Senate colleagues and the administration on a 
concrete number of missiles that will be maintained under this treaty.
  Furthermore, the treaty will require unilateral reductions from the 
United States with no similar requirements for Russia. Instead, the 
Russian government is actually given room to build up its nuclear 
forces with more modern capabilities.
  Regardless of this agreement, the United States has not thoroughly 
addressed the modernization of our country's nuclear capabilities. I 
have spoken with those involved in the treaty negotiations regarding 
U.S. modernization. I was told that the modernization efforts are in 
the works and the funding for these activities is planned. I support 
this more focused modernization approach. Part of the need for U.S. 
modernization is to address our Nation's tactical weapons capabilities. 
As currently written, the treaty will leave Russia in a 10-1 advantage 
in tactical nuclear weapons. This is disconcerting and modernization 
must be a priority.
  I have concerns about verifiability as well. Former Secretary of 
State James Baker has described the treaty's verification regime as 
weaker than its predecessor. If the United States is going to make 
reductions to our capabilities under this treaty, we should ensure that 
Russia is doing the same and following the treaty as closely as our 
country will. We should not settle for some verification--we must 
require full verification. Second best will do the United States no 
good in terms of intelligence and response capabilities.
  Back in 2002, I traveled to Russia with the University of Georgia to 
talk about nonproliferation. At that time, I expressed serious concerns 
not only about Russia's capabilities to secure their nuclear complex, 
but also to ensure that their nuclear scientists and their knowledge 
did not become available to bad actors like al-Qaida. Ensuring that 
Russia continues to keep their capabilities and know-how secure is 
imperative and cannot be left to second best.
  Our two nations may approach nuclear agreements with different goals, 
but the fact that the United States and Russian governments maintain a 
dialogue is a highly positive fact. We need and want the cooperation of 
our counterparts in Russia in both bilateral and multilateral efforts. 
This is highlighted in the United Nations Security Council discussions 
on nuclear weapons development in Iran, North Korea, and other actors.
  We want and need to create a safer world while maintaining our 
defensive capabilities for ourselves and our allies. By forcing debate 
on this treaty during the lame duck session, I do not believe we were 
able to fully address all concerns in the detail that was warranted. We 
needed to be sure the treaty does what we expect it to do without any 
surprises. I am not convinced we will not see any surprises in the 
future. Thus, I voted against the New START treaty.

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