[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10964-S10980]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Continued
Mr. ISAKSON. Madam President, I wish to take an additional minute, if
I might--the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is on the
floor--to say, in addition to my statement I made 2 days ago in a
speech on the floor with regard to the START treaty, that I wish to
thank the chairman and the ranking member of the Foreign Relations
Committee for the accommodating process from day one in April until
today, where the treaty will ultimately pass on the floor of the
Senate.
Legislation is about improving ideas and making sure the interest of
the
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American people and the United States of America is protected. Through
the work of Senators Lugar and Kerry, we have been able to craft
amendments to the resolution of ratification on the START treaty that
ensure missile defense and modernization--the two contentious points on
this legislation which came from the committee--are not only taken care
of, but they are buttoned down and they are clear. And I thank the
chairman and the ranking member for their willingness to do so.
I want to let everyone who is listening and those who will read the
reports of this debate know that this has been a 7-month process, not a
9-day process, and it has been a detailed process. It has been the work
of the will of the people of the United States of America, and the U.S.
Senate has worked its will. When it is ratified today, it will be a
step forward in the future for my children and grandchildren.
During my campaign when I ran for reelection this year, I made the
following statement: The rest of my life is about doing everything I
can do to see to it that the lives of my children and grandchildren are
safer, more secure, and as affluent as my life has been because of my
parents and grandparents. Today, in this ratification, we are ensuring
that we will be strong in our strength, we will trust but we will
verify. We will make sure we can fight, if necessary, but we will also
make sure we are accountable. And most important of all, with regard to
the biggest threats we face--terrorism and loose nuclear materials
falling into the hands of a rogue nation--we will be a safer country
because of this, and I thank the chairman and ranking member because of
it.
I thank the chairman for his time, and I yield back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. KIRK. Madam President, I rise to oppose the START treaty because
it recognizes limits on U.S. missile defenses in return for marginal
reductions in the Russian arsenal. At the moment when the U.S. and
allies must build missile defenses to protect against Iran, this treaty
generates Russian pressure for America to go slow or risk Russia's
departure from the agreement.
If you take the President's Senate missile defense letter at face
value, then America would deploy defenses that will trigger a Russian
treaty exit. I am concerned that to prevent a Russian treaty
withdrawal, the United States will move slower on building defenses
against Iran just when we need to move faster.
The most important duty of the Federal Government is to defend
Americans against foreign attack, and the most important mission under
that duty is to protect American families from the most dangerous
nations that could carry out such an attack.
In the mid-20th century, we agreed that the Soviet Union represented
a clear and present danger to America. Our Cold War Presidents--Truman
through Clinton, Republicans and Democrats--backed policies of a strong
defense, with alliances with our friends and diplomacy with the
Soviets. But much has changed since the 20th century ended over a
decade ago. While the Russians still have an impressive arsenal, they
are shadows of their former shadow, dropping from 290 million people to
140 million people and from a gross domestic product of $2.6 trillion
in 1990 to $2.1 trillion in 2010. The nuclear national security threat
for the new 21st century moved beyond Russia to include Iran and North
Korea, soon to be armed with nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver
them.
While the Russians are heavily armed, they present a relatively
stable face to the outside world. They have the capability to attack,
but they currently lack the intent. On any given year, their leaders
appear adverse to risk and unready to commit national suicide. The same
cannot be said for Iran, North Korea, and other nations that present a
far less rational face to the international community. Looking at such
potentially irresponsible leaders, it is incumbent on us to go beyond
idealistic diplomacy and mount a defense against an attack which may be
leveled against our people or our allies. The lives of millions and the
cause of freedom depend on our assessment of this threat and how we
respond.
Recall that nuclear technology represents the science of the 1930s,
missile technology from the 1960s. Since the laws of physics cannot be
classified, countries bad and good will all one day have the means to
develop powerful arsenals based on the last century's science. It is
the sacred mission of the democracies to understand this change, to
measure its danger, and to eliminate an attack should one of these
smaller, less rational countries attack.
In such an environment, an agreement to limit the nuclear arms of the
United States and Russia is helpful but does not concern the new danger
emerging against the people of the West. If we can lower nuclear arms
to levels where we still maintain a devastating counterpunch against a
rational opponent who is uninterested in national suicide, then a
nuclear war with that country remains unlikely and the cost of our
armaments is reduced. If that agreement also causes us not to build
defenses against an irrational opponent who may attack anyway, then we
have committed a grievous national error.
I initially favored the goals of the START treaty. The treaty is an
echo from the 20th century and had a marginal utility in improving the
defense of the United States. Unfortunately, the negotiations to
produce this treaty took a turn that was not well perceived by the
press or public. The Russians used these negotiations intended to
improve the defense of the United States as a means to preserve their
ability to attack.
Surprisingly, American negotiators formalized a link in the protocol
between limiting defenses against missile attack and maintaining forces
to carry out such a strike. Perversely, this agreement now stands for
two principles: No. 1, the United States and Russia should reduce their
nuclear arms, on which we all agree, and No. 2, the United States
should recognize policies to maintain the viability of a Russian
attack. This second principle turns the purpose of the treaty on its
head. It weakens the future defense of our Nation. The treaty would
support a policy that we must not improve our defenses to such a degree
as to defeat a Russian attack.
Much of this has had little impact on actual defense plans regarding
Russia. Russia presents a relatively stable, status quo face to the
international community. It also maintains a nuclear force which would
quickly overwhelm any planned system of defense. But a policy of
limiting missile defense has a tremendous impact on our ability to
thwart an attack from less responsible powers, such as Iran or North
Korea. Given the actions of Iranian and North Korean leaders, I would
argue these countries represent the more important danger to the future
of the United States and our allies in this new century.
In the 20th century, the argument about the defense of the Nation
against an attack by missiles took on a divided and partisan tone.
President Reagan proposed ``missile defense,'' while congressional
Democrats opposed ``Star Wars.''
Much of the disagreement ended in the late 1980s and 1990s when Iraq
attacked Iran and then Israel with missiles.
Over time, careful observers noted that missile defense was important
not just to the health of Israel but to its survival.
When Russia attacked Georgia, it used a great number of missiles to
deliver blows against that little country. As this century winds on,
more countries will see these realities of the 21st century, eventually
including the United States.
The administration's unsteady missile defense plans also concern me.
I am concerned about the missile defense actions taken by the current
administration. When it took office, it cancelled plans to enhance the
missile defenses of the United States itself that were based in Alaska
and California. To the great embarrassment of our allies in the Czech
Republic and Poland, it cancelled plans to deploy radars and two-stage
ground-based interceptors (GBIs). I would note that history has been
unkind to Western leaders that abandon Poland.
The administration also began an effort to cancel funding for the
``Arrow III'' interceptor being jointly developed with Israel. Thanks
to the late Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Committee,
Jack Murtha, the effort to kill Arrow III was reversed and
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full-funding came to the Arrow III program despite the President's
early wishes.
Once the negative reaction of our hurt Polish allies was known, the
administration responded with a four-part plan to calm Europe using
systems inferior to the GBI anti-missiles originally proposed by the
last administration and current Secretary of defense. The inartfully
coined European ``Phased-Adaptive'' approach involved anti-aircraft
systems patched together in a rather ad hoc fashion. We now plan to
begin by sailing U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers near European coasts followed
by a decade and the possible deployment of a to-be-built Navy missile
interceptor that does not yet exist, called the ``Standard Missile 3,
block IIA''.
I contacted our Missile Defense Agency and asked if the originally
planned GBIs for Poland could have stopped an attack by Iran against
the United States. They answered yes.
We checked if any one of the new ``Phased-Adaptive'' stages could
stop a similar intercontinental attack by Iran against the U.S. They
answered Phase I could not, Phase II could not, and Phase III could
not.
In fact the only phase that could engage a missile launched by Iran
against the U.S. was not until Phase IV by the IIB missile that did not
yet exist that would be deployed far later than the original GBIs
proposed.
The problem goes deeper. I asked the MDA to compare the capabilities
of the originally proposed two-stage GBIs to hit an Iranian missile
against the future final Phase IV SM-3 JIB. The MDA replied with this
graph. It shows that the original, longer range GBIs would have a full
4-minute window to hit and destroy an incoming Iranian missile bound
for New York City. The SM-3 IIB, which has a shorter range, would have
only 3 minutes. In short, the administration's new proposed missile has
25 percent less time to defeat an incoming Iranian attack than the
originally proposed missile. No wonder our Polish allies supported the
original plan.
I worry that some of these changes were made to curry favor with the
Russians. I am concerned that the preamble to the START treaty would be
used to reduce or block the efforts of the Congress to upgrade the
defenses of the United States. In short, I am worried that while this
treaty reduces the smaller threat of attack by Russia, it creates a
Russian block for plans to eliminate the larger threat from Iran. The
Russians clearly stated that if we mount defenses that could defeat
their attack, they would pull out of the treaty. The problem is that to
eliminate the threat from Iran and North Korea, we will have to do so.
In this case, what is the value of the treaty? It clearly helps the
Russians but if it blocks or delays our effort to protect against Iran,
does it help us? I am also concerned with other aspects of this treaty,
like an end to full-time compliance monitoring inside Russia.
There are also details of the treaty itself that concern me. Under
previous treaties, the United States had a full-time monitoring
presence in Votkinsk. This was eliminated. We will no longer have full-
time monitors in Russia.
Also, an end to telemetry from new Russian missiles. Under previous
treaties, the United States and Russia shared all the information
transmitted by their test missiles in flight, called telemetry. While
our spy satellites, planes and ships can gather some of this
information, there is nothing like getting it straight from the
missile's mouth. Telemetry is key to understanding the capability of a
new missile, especially its maneuvers to drop off one or more nuclear
warheads.
Under this new treaty, this data was lost. The Russians will not
provide telemetry from their new missiles under this treaty. Their only
obligation is to share telemetry from five missile flights a year and
they will likely pick old missiles to do this.
We are told we lost the capability to collect the telemetry of new
Russian missiles because while the Russians are developing many new
models, we are not. Given that telemetry would report mainly on new
Russian developments and not American, our negotiators gave up.
They should not have given up. The collection of telemetry from new
Russian missiles had long been enshrined in arms control treaties. This
precedent was well established and should have been continued.
There are inspections, but only 18 per year. We are told that the new
treaty will offer the unprecedented inspection of actual missile
warheads. This is true. Under the old treaties, we simply counted the
number of missiles the Russians had using our spy satellites and
assumed each missile was packed with as many warheads as the missile's
flight tests and telemetry showed.
Now we will get to inspect actual missiles--but only 18 per year. The
Russians have hundreds. At the rate the treaty allows, the full
inspection of the Russian arsenal of 800 launchers would take over 40
years.
I asked administration officials how many hours notice the Russians
would have before Americans conducted an actual warhead inspection. In
all cases, they would have 24 hours or more notice that the Americans
were coming. After extensive briefings on Russian cheating against
previous arms control treaties--most flagrantly the treaty banning
biological weapons--it should give you pause that the United States
gave up collecting telemetry on the flight of every Russian missile in
return for the inspection of 10 missiles per year and that only after a
full day's notice.
We are also told that this treaty is needed to improve Russian
international behavior. In my view, a treaty should only be signed to
reward good behavior, not to encourage it later.
I was most inclined to support the intent of this treaty to improve
relations between the United States and Russia on the subject of
collapsing the Iranian regime and its nuclear weapons program.
Undoubtedly, the administration earned good marks in getting the
Russians to cancel the delivery of one key piece of air defense
equipment--an anti-aircraft missile battery called the S-300--to Iran.
This was an unqualified success.
Unfortunately, there are many more failures where the press paid
little note. We believe the Russians are still delivering other pieces
of air defense equipment to the Iranians. That is why the Russians
insisted on exempting such deliveries from the new U.N. sanctions
against Iran. Russian equipment will likely be used to defend Iran's
nuclear sites, the very programs we are most worried about that violate
Iran's commitment to the U.N. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
What is most surprising is the actions of the Russians since the
negotiation of this treaty. They know we, the Europeans and Israelis
are most worried about the nuclear program of Iran. Despite these well-
publicized concerns and numerous U.N. resolutions against the Iranian
nuclear program, the Russians chose this year and this country to
provide nuclear fuel to the Iranian reactor at Bushehr. As that Russian
reactor begins operation, plutonium production will begin inside Iran.
While the Russians promise that the Iranians will not be able to use
this plutonium in Iranian bombs, can we be assured that these promises
will be honored? Would not it have been better to never begin plutonium
production in Iran at all?
I am also concerned about new ideas coming from the administration on
missile defense and the Russians. Long ago, President Clinton proposed
U.S-Russian cooperation in space. That cooperation led to a dependence
so that soon, the U.S. will lack any way to launch astronauts. We
cannot send our own astronauts to our own space station without the
permission of the Russians.
In discussions regarding this treaty, I learned that the
administration is now planning to bring the Russians inside the missile
defenses of NATO. Russia is the very nation that used missiles to
attack Georgia--a country applying for membership in NATO. I am sure
the Georgians would be uncomfortable at best seeing Russians manage the
missile defense of their little nation.
The U.S. offer to bring the Russians into NATO's missile defenses was
embodied in an offer at the recent NATO conference in Lisbon. Nearly
all Americans are fully aware of Russian spying against the United
States military for the last 70 years. We know that Russia has one of
the most active cyber-attack networks on the planet operating against
U.S. networks. It would seem that a proposal to bring the Russians into
the missile defense system of
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NATO would introduce powerful new opportunities for espionage against
us, as well as a greater understanding of our defense capabilities and
weaknesses.
Imagine a Russian officer in a NATO missile defense center. He will
soon learn when our system is alerted, how it processes information,
what our response times are and the estimated accuracy of our
interceptors. These are the things he would learn during his first week
inside our operations center. We can only imagine what else he would
learn over the coming years.
Remember that the warning information from NATO is critical to the
defense of the United States. If the Russians managed to spoof or block
critical NATO missile warning data, then U.S. commanders defending our
homeland would become weaker, not stronger due to Russian presence in
NATO missile defense centers.
Recall that missile combat is the ultimate ``come as you are''
affair. In a struggle between continents, the battle will be joined
within 30 minutes. When submarine or medium-range missiles are
employed, battle can start in as little as 10 minutes. If we have
Russians in the system who found American weaknesses or deployed
problems, U.S. commanders will have only minutes to diagnose and fix
those problems before the gravest consequences befall our people and
allies.
The next Congress will favor missile defense programs to a far
greater degree than this one. I plan to encourage this body and
especially the House with legislation to deny funding for any effort to
bring Russians into the missile defenses of NATO or the United States.
I respect the opinions of Senators on both sides of this question. It
is my judgment that safety of the American people is better off if we
work to eliminate the new dangers of the 21st century rather than focus
on the old agreements of the 20th century. In my view, the growing
dangers of Iran and North Korea threaten the American people most.
Therefore, the missile defense programs of the United States and our
allies take precedence over an agreement whose protocol limits our
defenses by acknowledging the need to preserve the ability of Russia to
attack the United States.
While most of us were born in the 20th century and we loved black and
white TV, the ``Ed Sullivan Show'' and the ``Honeymooners,'' we
recognize that time has passed and we must adapt to the new world of
the Internet, Ipad and Ichat. The 20th century doctrine of nuclear
Mutually Assured Destruction against the Soviet Union is part of our
past and not part of a future involving Taepo Dong II missiles from
North Korea and Shahab III missiles from Iran.
I would urge the administration to devote the time and attention of
our able diplomats to ending the Iranian nuclear program rather than
this agreement that, while laudable in its very modest goals, went awry
at the negotiating table.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, on April 8, 2009, President Obama and
President Medvedev concluded negotiations, which had begun under
President Bush, and signed the New START treaty. This new treaty is a
key part of the reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Even though the
Cold War ended 20 years ago, this relationship has been unclear; Russia
is not an adversary but neither is it an ally. There have been divides
and disagreements even though we share many common goals and interests.
President Obama is rightly intent on moving the relationship in a more
positive direction. Ratification of the New START treaty is an
important part of this process.
On May 13 of this year, President Obama submitted the New START
treaty to the Senate. In carrying out its responsibility the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Service Committee and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held a total of 20 hearings and
4 briefings. Seven hearings and three briefings were held by the Armed
Services Committee. Even before the new treaty was submitted to the
Senate, the Department of State provided the Senate National Security
Working Group multiple briefings on the status of and issues discussed
during negotiations.
It is now time for the Senate to provide its consent to ratification.
As Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said
about the START treaty on December 12, ``this is a national security
issue of great significance and the sooner we get it done the better.''
The Director of National Intelligence is also eager to get this treaty
finished and restore the insight into Russian nuclear forces that this
treaty will provide and that is so important for the intelligence
community. Director Clapper said, ``the sooner, the better. From an
intelligence perspective, we are better off with the Treaty than
without it.'' Retired General Brent Scowcroft, the National Security
Adviser for both Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, and a
supporter of the Treaty, said, ``to play politics with what is the
fundamental national interest is pretty scary stuff.''
Some have suggested that this new treaty should not be taken up in
this lameduck session of the 111th Congress. I couldn't disagree more.
Almost as soon as this session of Congress began, the President
announced his intent to complete negotiations on the new strategic arms
agreement to replace the START I treaty. Various Senate committees of
this Congress and the Senate National Security Working Group of this
Congress were briefed on numerous occasions by the negotiating team on
the new treaty. This Congress got the updates on the progress and the
issues and this Congress provided guidance along the way. The
committees of this Congress held 20 hearings and briefings on this new
treaty. This Congress hosted several all-Member briefings including one
such session with the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper,
to get his views on the importance of the treaty. The next Congress
will not have the benefit of all that work and insight. It is in fact
the obligation and the duty of this Congress to take up this treaty.
When President Obama submitted the START treaty to the Senate for
consideration he made six key points.
The treaty will enhance the national security of the United States.
The treaty mandates mutual reductions and limitations on the world's
two largest nuclear arsenals.
The treaty will promote transparency and predictability in the future
strategic relationships of Russia and the United States.
The treaty will enable each party to the treaty to verify that the
other party is complying with its obligations through a regime of
onsite inspections, notifications, comprehensive and continuing data
exchanges, and provisions for unimpeded use of national technical
means.
The treaty includes detailed procedures for elimination or conversion
of treaty accountable items, and
The treaty provides for the exchange of certain telemetric
information on ballistic missile launches.
Equally important to this discussion is what the START treaty does
not cover.
It does not limit U.S. missile defense plans and programs.
It does not limit U.S. conventional prompt global strike programs.
It does not provide authority within the treaty to modify the terms
and conditions of the treaty without the advice and consent of the
Senate.
It does not constrain in any way the ability of the United States to
modernize the nuclear weapons complex, modernize, maintain, or replace
strategic delivery systems, or the ability to ensure that the stockpile
of U.S. nuclear weapons remains safe, secure, and reliable.
It also does not cover nonstrategic nuclear weapons--often referred
to as tactical nuclear weapons. The START treaty covers, as have all
previous nuclear arms reduction treaties, strategic offensive nuclear
arms. Dealing with tactical nuclear weapons is certainly an area of
arms control that needs to be addressed but has proved elusive to
previous administrations, Democratic and Republican. It remains to be
addressed.
The START III treaty was to have covered these weapons but when the
START II treaty, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1993, was not ratified, any hope of
addressing tactical nuclear weapons in a START III treaty died along
with the START II treaty. 17 years later President Obama is trying to
get nuclear
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arms reductions back on track, by resuming discussions with Russia and
signing the START treaty. Hopefully, entry into force of this START
treaty will allow the United States and Russia to discuss an agreement
on tactical nuclear weapons. While getting an agreement to limit
tactical nuclear weapons will be very difficult, without ratification
of the New START treaty, it will be impossible.
Because this treaty does not require any significant reductions in
either U.S. nuclear weapons or delivery systems, it is a fairly modest
treaty.
The so-called Moscow Treaty, which was signed in 2002 by President
George W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, limited both Russia
and the United States to a range of operationally deployed nuclear
warheads by the year 2012. Under the Moscow Treaty, each side could
have between 1700 and 2200 total operationally deployed nuclear
weapons. Russia has already met this goal and the United States is very
close. Under the START treaty, each side will have no more than 1550
deployed nuclear weapons, a reduction of just 150 weapons below the
Moscow Treaty. The START treaty does not limit the number of
nondeployed nuclear weapons, an issue of importance to the Commander of
the U.S. Strategic Command, GEN. Kevin Chilton.
The limits in this treaty were agreed to after careful analysis by
U.S. military leadership, particularly GEN Kevin Chilton, the Commander
of the U.S. Strategic Command and the man responsible for these
strategic systems.
At a hearing before the Armed Services Committee on July 20, 2010,
GEN Chilton stated that the force levels in the treaty meet the current
guidance for deterrence for the United States. That guidance was laid
out by President George W. Bush
The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring
America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries,
assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as
long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted
in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary
capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon limits in New
START and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR).
The strategic deployed forces allowed under the treaty will ensure
the retention of the nuclear triad--all three delivery legs of the
triad, bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. On that point GEN Chilton was very
clear, saying ``We will retain a triad of strategic nuclear delivery
systems.''
Secretary of Defense Gates has also been very clear that the nuclear
triad will be maintained. In an op-ed in May in the Wall Street
Journal, Secretary Gates said the New START treaty ``preserves the U.S.
nuclear arsenal as a vital pillar of our nation's and our allies'
security posture. Under this treaty the U.S. will maintain our powerful
nuclear triad . . . and we retain the ability to change our force mix
as we see fit.''
Some have said that the United States will have to make significant
reductions to reach the force levels under the treaty and that the
Russians will have to make no reductions. According to GEN Chilton this
argument is a distraction. At an Armed Services Committee hearing GEN
Chilton commented on the lower level of Russian forces and said:
New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile
warheads that can target the United States, missiles that
pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation.
Regardless of whether Russia would have kept its missile
force levels within those limits without a New START Treaty,
upon ratification they would now be required to do so.
While the START treaty will also not require significant reductions
in the number of U.S. strategic delivery systems, there will be
some reductions but not for 7 years. More importantly the START treaty
will provide certainty for both Russia and the United States as to the
size of the deployed nuclear force of the other. This is particularly
important to the United States because Russia is now below the proposed
delivery system limits of the START treaty, but has plans to build the
number of strategic delivery systems. It is very much in the interest
of the United States to have a cap on that build-up. An unrestrained
build up would quickly bring back the ghosts and burdensome costs of
the Cold War.
Under this new treaty, Russia and the United States will each have a
total of 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and 700 deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments. The treaty does not limit nondeployed nuclear warheads,
nondeployed ICBMs, nondeployed SLBMs, or heavy bombers that are not
equipped for nuclear armaments. This is particularly important for the
B-1B bomber fleet, as those airframes have not been in nuclear service
for many years and will not be counted under the START treaty when
simple modifications are completed.
This START treaty brings a practical approach to strategic systems
and counts real delivery systems and real warheads. Over the years, the
old START I treaty had resulted in exaggerated nuclear force numbers.
For instance, under the old START I treaty, the four Ohio class
submarines that have been converted to conventional use, were still
counted as 96 deployed SLBMs and 768 deployed nuclear warheads. These
exaggerated force structure levels have led to uncertainties for
military planners and increased costs for the United States. Under this
treaty they will not be counted.
One of the additional benefits of this START treaty is that the
treaty provides a clear mechanism to remove systems from being counted
under the treaty. The ability to clearly and easily remove systems,
such as heavy bombers from under the treaty, is also of great
importance to General Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command.
For example the United States currently has 76 B-52 bombers and 18 B-
2 bombers, a total of 94 nuclear capable bombers. Under the current
plan for implementing the treaty there will be up to 60 nuclear capable
bombers. The remaining 34 can be converted to conventional only
capability and will no longer count under the treaty. They do not have
to be destroyed. I think this fact is often misunderstood and there may
be an impression that the 34 bombers will have to be destroyed under
the treaty. That is not the case.
This past May, Secretary of Defense Gates wrote an op-ed in the Wall
Street Journal. Drawing on his long history and involvement with
strategic arms control agreements, which dates back to 1970, Secretary
Gates said that the question is always the same for each treaty: ``Is
the United States better off with an agreement or without it?'' With
respect to the START Treaty Secretary Gates' answer to the question is
unequivocal: ``The United States is far better off with this Treaty
than without it.''
That is also the issue now before the Senate. Is the United States
better off with this START treaty? The 20 hearings and 4 briefings have
clearly demonstrated that it is.
In that same op-ed, Secretary Gates emphasized the current state of
affairs that has existed since the end of December 2009 when the START
I treaty expired. Since that time, there has been no verification and
inspection regime, no visibility into the Russian strategic programs,
and no limits on delivery vehicles. As the Secretary said:
Since the expiration of the old START Treaty in December
2009, the U.S. has had none of these safeguards. The new
treaty will put them back in place, strengthen many of them,
and create a verification regime that will provide for
greater transparency and predictability between our two
countries, to include substantial visibility into the
development of Russian nuclear forces.
This rigorous inspection and verification regime, which when coupled
with our national technical means, will allow this treaty to be
monitored and verified. Nevertheless there has been an argument made
that Russia cheated on the START I treaty and therefore we shouldn't
ratify the new treaty. According to the State Department that is simply
not the case.
In testimony before the Armed Services Committee in July, Assistant
Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller said, regarding the State
Department's 2010 Treaty Compliance Report:
I want to point out that Russia was in compliance with
START's central limits during the Treaty's life span.
Moreover, the majority of compliance issues raised under
START were satisfactorily resolved. Most reflected differing
interpretations on how to implement START's complex
inspection and verification regime.
The old START I treaty was a complicated and complex treaty, many of
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the lessons learned from the inspections during the course of that
treaty have been incorporated into the new treaty. There were issues on
both sides. According to the 2010 Treaty Compliance Report:
The United States stated on several occasions to our Treaty
partners that the United States was compliant with the
Treaty; however as might be expected under a verification
regime as complex as START, the United States and Russia
developed a difference of views with regard to how the sides
implemented certain Treaty requirements.
This is not the same as cheating.
Our senior military leaders believe the new treaty can be monitored
and verified and that if Russia did cheat there is high confidence that
any cheating could be detected before such cheating rose to a level of
military significance. General Chilton said during testimony before the
Armed Services Committee, ``New START will reestablish a strategic
nuclear arms control verification regime that provides access to
Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force
deployments over the life of the treaty.''
In a discussion on the ability to detect cheating I asked General
Chilton, ``In other words, the verification provisions give you
confidence that Russia cannot achieve a militarily significant
advantage undetected?'' General Chilton said: ``Yes, that's correct.''
Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, in her July testimony
before the Armed Services Committee, made it clear that any cheating
could be detected before it became militarily significant. She also
believes that the United States is well positioned to deter cheating as
well. In that regard she said:
Deterrence of cheating is a key part of the assessment of
verifiability, and is strongest when the probability of
detecting significant violations is high, the benefits to
cheating are low, and the potential costs are high. We assess
that this is the case for Russia cheating under the New START
Treaty.
One of the areas on which we have had substantial discussion is
missile defense. The U.S. missile defense program isn't covered or
limited by the New START treaty. It--the missile defense program--has
nevertheless become a major focus of the debate on the treaty. Our
missile defense programs and policies are based on developing and
fielding the missile defense capabilities we need to meet the missile
threats we face, not on any of these treaty matters. The New START
treaty does not limit the missile defense capabilities we need.
Secretary of Defense Gates, in testimony before the Armed Services
Committee on June 17, said:
The Treaty will not constrain the United States from
deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor
impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. I
remain confident in the U.S. missile defense program, which
has made considerable advancements, including the testing and
development of the SM-3 missile, which we will deploy in
Europe.
Secretary of State Clinton, in testimony before the Armed Services
Committee on June 17 said:
This Treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts.
I want to underscore this because I know there have been a
lot of concerns about it and I anticipate a lot of questions.
During that same hearing Secretary Clinton went on to say:
The Treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging
the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
forces, but that's simply a statement of fact. It too does
not in any way constrain our missile defense programs.
In a July 20 hearing before the Armed Services Committee, GEN Kevin
Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command said:
As the combatant command(er) also responsible for
synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations, and
advocacy, I can say with confidence that this treaty does not
constrain any current or future missile defense plans.
Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, the lead negotiator
of the Treaty, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations hearing
on June 10, said:
The Treaty does not constrain our current or planned
missile defense and, in fact, contains no meaningful
restrictions on missile defenses of any kind.
Later, on July 29, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee,
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said:
There were no--and I repeat--no secret deals made in
connection with the New START Treaty, not on missile defense
nor on any other issue.
As the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report made clear, the
administration is pursuing a variety of systems and capabilities to
defend the homeland and different regions of the world against missile
threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran. A good example of
that is the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe. The
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended it
unanimously. It is strongly supported by our NATO allies. The November
20, NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration says that ``the United States
European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national
contribution to the NATO missile defense architecture.''
During the NATO Lisbon Summit NATO announced its own decision to
build a missile defense system to protect European populations and
territory against missile attack, consistent with the phased adaptive
approach. The phased adaptive approach is designed to provide effective
missile defense capabilities in a timely manner against existing or
emerging Iranian missile threats. Those are the missile threats faced
by our military personnel, allies, and partners in Europe.
As the Secretary of Defense and numerous other officials have made
clear, the treaty does not limit our missile defense plans or programs.
The Armed Services Committee also knows that, and our authorization
bill stated that fact. Section 221(b)(8) of the Ike Skelton national
Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2011 that we passed this
morning in the Senate states, ``there are no constraints contained in
the New START Treaty on the development or deployment of effective
missile defenses, including all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach
to missile defense in Europe and further enhancements to the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense system, as well as future missile defenses.''
To be very clear there is one provision in the treaty that prohibits
each side from using ICBM silos or SLBM launchers for missile defense
interceptors, and vice versa. But using these silos and launchers are
not in our missile defense plan and should not be in our plan because
it would be very much against our interest to use strategic missile
interceptor silos for ballistic defense purposes. It would be more
expensive than building new silos, the strategic missile silos aren't
in the right locations to defend against missiles from North Korea, and
most importantly, it would be destabilizing to launch ballistic missile
interceptors from ICBM silos or SLBM launchers.
Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency, has made clear, we don't want, need, or plan to use such silos
for missile defense purposes. In a June 16 hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Lieutenant General O'Reilly made it very
clear saying ``replacing ICBMs with ground-based interceptors or
adapting the submarine-launched ballistic missiles to be an interceptor
would actually be a setback--a major setback--to the development of our
missile defenses.''
That one limitation has no impact on our plans for missile defense,
plans that are more effective and less expensive than converting ICBM
or SLBM silos to missile defense use.
There is one other area of the many that have been discussed in
connection with the START treaty that I would like to raise, and that
is modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and maintaining the
ability to certify annually that our stockpile remains safe, secure and
reliable.
Shortly before Congress instituted a moratorium on nuclear weapons
testing in the early 1990s, the United States established a stockpile
stewardship program to design and build advanced scientific,
experimental, and computational capabilities to enable the annual
certification process for the nuclear weapons. This program has been
very successful. Beginning in 2005, however, support for the program
started to wane and the budgets for nuclear activities started to go
down. Without enough money the weapons complex was forced to have
layoffs at the nuclear weapons laboratories and the production
facilities, to defer
[[Page S10970]]
maintenance on many important buildings and facilities, to delay key
acquisitions, and to delay design and construction of the last two
major new production facilities. President Obama, in his fiscal year
2011 budget request and in the plans for the future years, has turned
this situation around by providing $4.1 billion more over the next five
years than previously planned. This level of funding is unprecedented
since the end of the Cold War.
President Obama laid out his funding plan for the nuclear enterprise
in the November Section 1251 report, a report that would provide an
additional $1.2 billion over 2 years, a 15 percent increase and a total
of $41.6 billion for fiscal years 2012-2016 for the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
With these amounts has the administration committed enough to
modernization and sustainment of the complex and the life extension
programs for the nuclear stockpile? The directors of three nuclear
weapons laboratories all say yes. In a joint December 1, 2010, letter
to Senators Kerry and Lugar, the three Directors of the nuclear weapons
laboratories said that the finding level proposed in the section 1251
report `` would enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for
ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective stockpile under the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.''
The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
under both President George W. Bush and President Obama, Tom
D'Agostino, said, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee in
July:
Our plans for investment in and modernization of the
Nuclear Security Enterprise--the collection of NNSA
laboratories, production sites, and experimental facilities
that support our stockpile stewardship program, our nuclear
nonproliferation agenda, our Naval nuclear propulsion
programs, and a host of other nuclear security missions--are
essential irrespective of whether or not New START is
ratified.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took the right approach on
this issue in its resolution of ratification by not making entry into
force contingent on a certain funding level, but by including a sense
of the Senate that the United States is committed to a robust stockpile
stewardship program.
The list of both Republican and Democratic supporters of this Treaty
is broad and strongly bipartisan, including eight former Secretaries of
State--Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher, Colin Powell,
Condoleezza Rice, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, George Schultz,
Henry Kissinger--four former Secretaries of Defense--Harold Brown,
Frank Carlucci, Bill Cohen, Bill Perry, and Jim Schlesinger--seven
former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command, President George H.W.
Bush, President Clinton and a long list of national security experts.
Our NATO allies support this treaty and have urged us to ratify it
without delay. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rassmussen said at
the NATO summit in Lisbon in November:
A ratification of the START Treaty will contribute strongly
to an improvement of the overall security environment in the
Euro-Atlantic area, and all members of the NATO-Russia
Council share the view that an early ratification of the
START Treaty would be to the benefit of security in the Euro-
Atlantic area. I'd also have to say that it is a matter of
concern that a delayed ratification of the START Treaty will
be damaging to the overall security environment in Europe. So
we strongly urge both parties to ratify the START Treaty as
early as possible.
I believe that the Senate should consent to ratification of the New
START treaty and that ratification of this treaty is in the national
security interest of the United States. Ratification of the New START
treaty will provide predictability, confidence, transparency and
stability in the United States-Russian relationship. The New START
treaty will make us safer today, and leave a safer world for our
children and grandchildren. The Senate should ratify the New START
treaty now.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I am very pleased that the Senate is
about to ratify the New START treaty--I hope and believe with a very
solid bipartisan vote.
This really is a historic moment. This is the biggest arms control
treaty in 20 years, and the most important foreign policy action the
Senate will take this Congress.
This is absolutely the right thing to do. It is important to our
national security and it is critical to uphold America's place in the
world community.
As I have said many times, the arms reductions in this treaty are
modest. New START requires a 30 percent reduction in warheads from the
limits set out in the Moscow Treaty in 2002 to 1,550 on each side, but
both the United States and Russia have been reducing their strategic
stockpiles since then.
The real importance of this treaty comes from the monitoring
provisions, confidence-building measures, and the strengthened
relationship between two of the world's major powers.
We have not had inspectors at Russian nuclear facilities for 13
months. We have not had data exchanges on the size and deployment of
Russian forces. Russia has had the freedom to block our national
technical means to monitor their forces. Apart from our national
technical means, we are now blind.
With this treaty, we will benefit from these measures and others. The
Senate has discussed the monitoring and verification provisions at
length during this debate--in open and closed session--and it has been
made very clear that this treaty greatly strengthens our intelligence
community's ability to monitor and assess Russian strategic forces.
As Director of National Intelligence Clapper has said, the sooner we
ratify this treaty, the better. I am very pleased that the Senate is
acting now, before the end of the year and the congressional session,
to give the executive branch these tools.
With the ratification of this treaty, the Senate also makes clear
that the United States is willing and able to make good on its foreign
policy promises and to act in the best interests of our country and of
the world.
Following ratification in the Russian Duma, the United States and
Russia will begin the next round of arms control and transparency.
I hope and I believe many Senators have expressed their desire, that
this will lead to further arms control negotiations to reduce further
the level of strategic arms and to address tactical nuclear weapons and
other delivery mechanisms.
The ratification also maintains, and hopefully will build on, the
improving relationship between our two countries and our two young
Presidents.
We have enjoyed strong cooperation this year, over Afghanistan, over
Iran, and--according to a letter I received from President Obama on
Monday--over the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula.
In a world of asymmetric threats, we need friends and allies more
than ever. This treaty moves us in this direction--with Russia and with
the Eastern European nations that are strongly in support of the
treaty.
Before closing, I want to congratulate and thank my good friend from
Massachusetts. He has spent an incredible amount of time considering
this treaty in the Foreign Relations Committee, preparing the
resolution of ratification and in managing this floor debate.
He has done a fabulous job, and I really want to thank him for all
his effort and his cooperation with me through this entire process.
I would also like to thank the many administration officials for
their assistance in my consideration of this treaty, all of whom have
spent time in my office over the past year. They include:
Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, our lead negotiator;
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs;
Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration; and Director of National
Intelligence Jim Clapper.
Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, today, the Senate has a historic
opportunity to follow in a long history of strong, bipartisan support
for reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons around the globe. We
have a chance to strengthen American national security and restore
American leadership on the nuclear agenda. I am hopeful that the Senate
will choose the right path and vote in favor of ratification of the New
START treaty.
I want to thank Senators Kerry and Lugar for their tireless,
impressive work on the New START treaty.
[[Page S10971]]
Former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, in explaining his
support for the New START Treaty, told our committee earlier this year
that the Senate's decision on New START ``will affect the prospects for
peace for a decade or more. It is, by definition, not a bipartisan, but
a nonpartisan, challenge.'' Senators Kerry and Lugar have done
everything in their power to make this a nonpartisan effort, and I
commend them and their staff for their excellent work.
I want to also take a moment to thank the negotiators, Rose
Gottemoeller, Ted Warner, their colleagues at the White House, and all
the civil servants responsible for negotiating this agreement. Each of
them has a lifetime of experience and impressive expertise on nuclear
issues, and they all worked hard to navigate this difficult treaty
process. America was well-served by your efforts, and we thank you for
your leadership.
At the very beginning of this long process, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates asked the Senate a very important question: Is the United
States better off with an agreement or without it? Today, the Senate
has to answer this specific question.
We have had a very long, thorough, and vigorous debate, and some
Senators may not agree with everything in the treaty text before us,
and some may have problems with the process by which we are here today,
but let's be clear. The vote today is not about what each of us might
have done differently. The vote today is not about abstract numbers or
theoretical point scoring. The historic vote today is simple: Do you
believe the United States and the world are better off with an
agreement or without one?
The Senate--led in a bipartisan fashion by Senators Kerry and Lugar
has done an impressive job of meeting its constitutional
responsibilities, and I am proud of the work we have done in giving our
advice and consent to the New START treaty. The involvement of the
Senate over the last year and a half and the debate we have undertaken
have been worthy of the world's greatest deliberative body.
I have heard from many of my colleagues that the Senate should not be
a rubber stamp in ratifying the New START Treaty--as if to suggest we
have not taken our constitutional responsibilities seriously during
this process. This could not be further from the truth.
First, the Senate's influence can be seen throughout the treaty
document. A number of Senators met with negotiators numerous times
prior to the treaty's completion, and some even traveled to Geneva
during the negotiations. In many respects, from the very beginning, our
negotiators were operating within a framework and boundaries as set by
Senators involved in the process. The treaty itself is really a product
of collective input from both the executive and congressional branches.
The unique insight and input this Congress has provided throughout the
negotiation process could not be replicated in any future
consideration.
In addition, since we received the treaty, the Senate has done its
job and has thoroughly considered this agreement. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held 12 hearings and heard testimony from 21 expert
witnesses. The administration has answered over 900 questions for the
record. We have also had more floor time for amendments and
consideration than any other treaty of its kind. Our vigorous debate on
the floor has added nuance and depth to this already thorough body of
work.
It is also important to note that the Senate, in providing its advice
and consent, actually writes and approves the resolution of
ratification to go along with the treaty. This is not an insignificant
document. This is the Senate's opportunity to influence the treaty's
future interpretation and implementation and our chance to provide the
declarations, understandings, and conditions to the treaty. The
resolution succinctly and explicitly expresses the Senate's views on
New START, and our resolution actually provides some strong statements
with respect to many of the concerns raised by critics of the treaty.
For example, on missile defense, the resolution reads very clearly
that the United States remains committed to missile defense, and the
New START treaty does not constrain that commitment:
The New START Treaty and the . . . unilateral statement of
the Russian Federation on missile defense do not limit in any
way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting, activities
that the U.S. currently plans or that might be required . . .
to protect U.S. Armed Forces and U.S. allies from limited
ballistic missile attack.
In addition, the DeMint amendment on missile defense in the
resolution reads:
The United States is and will remain free to reduce the
vulnerability to attack by constructing a layered missile
defense capable of countering missiles of all ranges The
United States is committed to improving U.S. strategic
defensive capabilities both quantitatively . . . and
qualitatively and such improvements are consistent with the
Treaty.
On tactical nuclear weapons, the resolution reads:
The Senate calls upon the President to pursue . . . an
agreement with Russia that would address the disparity
between tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles . . . and would
secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable
manner.
Finally, on strategic-range, nonnuclear weapon systems:
Nothing in the New START Treaty restricts U.S. research,
development, testing, and evaluation of strategic-range, non-
nuclear weapons . . . [or] prohibits deployments of
strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon systems.
The fact is that the Senate has done its constitutional duty and has
thoroughly debated and considered this important agreement.
Adding to our extensive internal debate, countless outside experts
and former officials have also weighed in on this treaty. New START has
the unanimous backing of our Nation's military and its leadership,
including Secretary Gates, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the
commander of America's Strategic Command, and the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency. America's military establishment is joined by
the support of every living Secretary of State--from Secretary Jim
Baker to Secretary Condoleezza Rice--as well as five former Secretaries
of Defense, nine former national security advisors, and former
Presidents Clinton and George H.W. Bush. The overwhelming consensus
from these foreign policy and national security heavyweights has been
clear: New START is in America's national security interests.
I think it is important to take a step back and remember the broader
picture of the decision before us today. We are no longer talking about
abstract numbers, intangible ideas or questions of process. We are
talking about real nuclear weapons. We are talking about thousands of
the most dangerous weapons in the history of mankind--weapons actually
aimed directly at American cities.
Our arsenals are composed primarily of nuclear weapons each yielding
between 100 and 1,200 kilotons of power. To give you a sense of the
power of these weapons, the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima yielded
around 13 kilotons of power. After New START, the United States and
Russia will still be allowed an arsenal of 1,550 warheads capable of
leveling cities more than five times the size of New Hampshire's
largest city of Manchester.
Now, I am under no illusions that the ratification of the New START
treaty will somehow by itself meet the threats posed by nuclear weapons
around the globe. President Kennedy told us that attainable peace will
be ``based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual
evolution in human institutions'' and ``peace must be the product of
many nations, the sum of many acts.'' He said:
No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of . . .
all can provide absolute security . . . But it can . . .
offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated,
uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.
New START is a step away from this ``unabated, uncontrolled,
unpredictable'' environment.
As the first Nation to invent and then use nuclear weapons, the
United States has spent the majority of the last half century trying to
reduce the risk they pose. Over five decades ago, President Eisenhower
committed the United States to meeting its special responsibilities on
the nuclear threat. He said:
[[Page S10972]]
The United States pledges before you--and therefore before
the world--its determination to help solve the fearful atomic
dilemma--to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way
by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be
dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.
Eisenhower's early commitment and America's special responsibility
have led to unbroken U.S. leadership in the world on the nuclear
agenda. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty--the cornerstone of global
nonproliferation efforts--was born out of President Eisenhower's
``Atoms for Peace'' vision. The original START treaty was a culmination
of President Reagan's entreaty to ``trust, but verify'' Russia and its
actions. The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which has led
to the deactivation of over 7,500 Russian nuclear warheads, was the
result of two visionary and farsighted Senators named Nunn and Lugar.
American leadership on the nuclear agenda makes the world safer.
Period.
As Secretaries Kissinger, Schultz, Perry, and Senator Nunn told us in
their seminal 2007 opinion piece:
The world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous
nuclear era . . . Nuclear weapons today present tremendous
dangers but also a historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will
be required to take the world to the next stage--to a solid
consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally
as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation
into potentially dangerous hands.
The New START treaty should be the next step on the path of American
leadership on the nuclear agenda. If we turn our back on this treaty at
this time, we are turning our back on a generation of bipartisan,
American leadership in this field, and we cede the field to a more
dangerous and more uncertain world.
The debate over New START is now over, and the only choice left
before us is this treaty or nothing. Each of us today will decide--yes
or no--whether we think we are better off with a treaty or without one.
I hope we will vote on the side of the overwhelming majority of
foreign policy and national security experts who have called on us to
support this treaty. I hope we will vote on the side of our unanimous
military and intelligence communities. I hope we will vote on the side
of a legacy of American leadership on the nuclear agenda.
I am hopeful we will follow in the footsteps of the Senate's strong
bipartisan history and ratify the New START treaty today.
Mr. KOHL. Madam President, I rise today to support ratification of
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START. This treaty
continues the bipartisan arms control framework first proposed by
President Ronald Reagan and implemented by President George H.W. Bush
with the START I and START II treaties. President George W. Bush
continued this work with the Moscow Treaty. Now President Obama has
taken another important step to address the dangers of nuclear weapons
with the New START treaty.
Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and reducing existing nuclear
stockpiles is critical to our national security. New START helps
accomplish this goal by placing responsible limits on nuclear warheads
and delivery vehicles, while still enabling the United States to
maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.
New START also reestablishes regular onsite inspections of Russian
nuclear facilities, which ended more than a year ago when the previous
START treaty expired. The potential lack of safety, security, and
controls of Russian nuclear weapons is a grave security risk, and there
is no substitute for onsite inspections to address this threat.
I carefully considered the views of our military and diplomatic
leaders in evaluating New START, and I am impressed by the breadth of
bipartisan support for this treaty. The Secretaries of State, Defense,
and Energy support New START. Our senior uniformed military leaders
support New START, including the head of the Missile Defense Agency.
Every living former Secretary of State, Republican or Democrat,
supports New START.
I commend my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for
the extensive work they have done to consider the New START treaty.
They have produced a thorough record on the merits of this treaty,
which enables every Senator to cast an informed vote. After reviewing
this record, I am proud to cast my vote in favor of ratifying New
START.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, before I begin my remarks on the New
START treaty, I would like to point out to my colleagues that in 2002,
I voted in favor of the Moscow Treaty. I was also one of 93 Senators
who voted in favor of START I in 1992.
I recognize the importance of maintaining a positive and cooperative
relationship with Russia. The proponents of the New START treaty argue
that this treaty is necessary to continue the goodwill between our
countries and the much-touted ``reset'' in our relations. More
importantly to me, however, are the merits of the treaty itself. The
Senate should not simply ratify this treaty to appease Russia or as a
signal of cooperation with them. The treaty should be considered based
on its impact on our national security and the security of our allies.
A nuclear arms control treaty can be evaluated based on the level of
parity it brings to the two parties. In this regard, I believe this
treaty falls short. The fact is, while this treaty places new limits on
warheads, as well as deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles, Russia
is already below the limit on delivery vehicles. The treaty primarily
imposes new limits on the U.S., while requiring modest, if any,
reductions on the Russian side. Also alarming is that this treaty is
silent on the matter of tactical nuclear weapons. It is believed that
Russia has a 10-to-1 advantage over the U.S. in terms of tactical
nuclear weapons.
The administration has argued that this treaty is necessary to
provide strategic stability. However, if we are reducing our strategic
weapons without regard to Russia's overwhelming advantage on tactical
nuclear weapons, I question whether this reduction isn't weakening
strategic stability. It should also be mentioned that some proponents
of the New START treaty were critical of the 2002 Moscow Treaty for
failing to reduce Russian tactical nuclear weapons. I believe our
leverage with the Russians to begin placing meaningful limits on
tactical nuclear weapons existed with this treaty. Now, I see no clear
path to negotiating reductions in tactical nuclear weapons.
Like many of my colleagues, I have serious concerns about the
inclusion of references to and limitations on U.S. plans for missile
defense. I don't believe there should be a connection between strategic
nuclear weapons reductions and our plans for missile defense. I am
equally troubled that Russia issued a unilateral statement at the
treaty's signing stating that the treaty ``may be effective and viable
only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build-
up in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of
America.''
It is positive that the Resolution of Ratification makes a strong
statement that the treaty does not limit the deployment of U.S. missile
defense systems, other than those contained in article V. It also says
that the Russian statement on missile defense does not impose a legal
obligation on the United States. While I would have preferred that this
treaty not contain any language on missile defense, I appreciate the
work of the Foreign Relations chairman and ranking member to include
this language in the ratification resolution. But the fact remains,
this language is simply our opinion and is nonbinding.
This treaty reverses the gains made in the Moscow Treaty which de-
linked offensive and defensive capabilities. Although a modified
amendment on missile defense to the resolution of ratification was
agreed to today, I am disappointed that the Senate could not agree to
the amendment offered by Senator McCain which would have stricken the
language in the treaty's preamble that arguably gives Russia a say on
our future missile defense plans.
Finally, I also share the serious concerns related to the issue of
verification. It has been the subject of much debate, and deservedly
so. I agree with the sentiment that as our deployed strategic nuclear
weapons are reduced, it becomes more and more critical that the
remaining weapons can be relied upon. As the number of weapons is
reduced, it becomes more important that we know that the Russians are
abiding by the limits of the treaty.
[[Page S10973]]
After reviewing the classified material presented by Senator Bond,
ranking member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have serious
reservations about the new verification regime contained in the treaty.
Although former Secretary of State James Baker supports ratification of
the treaty, he stated that the verification mechanism in the New START
treaty ``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that
verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions
under START I.''
I do regret that without a treaty in place that there is no
verification regime, and no U.S. inspectors monitoring Russia's nuclear
arms activities. It's important to point out, however, that the Obama
administration had the ability to extend the verification regime for 5
years, as provided for in START I. But the Obama administration failed
to act. The administration also insisted there would be a ``bridging
agreement'' to continue verification until the entry into force of a
successor agreement. This agreement was never completed either.
I am deeply disappointed that in these areas of concern, the Senate
is simply being asked to be a ``rubberstamp'' rather than fulfill our
constitutional obligation to provide our advice on these important
matters. Had the advice of the Senate on these important issues been
incorporated into the treaty, I believe it would have gained
overwhelming bipartisan support. Without addressing these areas in a
meaningful way, I am reluctantly unable to support it.
Mr. COONS. Madam President, I am pleased to join my colleagues in
voicing my strong and unequivocal support for New START. I want to
thank Senators Kerry and Lugar for their leadership on this issue, and
join them in urging the Senate to support ratification. New START will
make America stronger and more secure by building on 30 years of U.S.
global leadership on nuclear arms control and reduction. This is why it
has been endorsed by national security leaders on both sides of the
aisle, including every living Republican Secretary of State, 5 former
Secretaries of Defense, 7 former commanders of the U.S. Strategic
Command, the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 former Presidents, and all
27 of our NATO allies.
We simply cannot afford to postpone the vote until the 112th Congress
and delay ratification any further. Military planners have confirmed
that ratification is essential to U.S. security in an increasingly
dangerous environment, and 73 percent of Americans support ratification
according to one recent poll.
As the newest member of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services
Committees, I did not have the luxury of receiving the wealth of
information and perspective offered in the 18 public hearings and
Senate deliberations on this issue. I have, however, received enough
information from classified briefings to know this is a pressing
national security matter of the highest order. As we approach a vote, I
plan on following the strong advice of our military and national
security leadership, as well as the will of the American people, in
supporting New START.
New START will enhance U.S. intelligence gathering and restore
inspections needed to monitor the Russian nuclear force. For more than
a year, we have been deprived of such inspections due the expiration of
the original treaty. While opponents of New START have highlighted the
reduction in the total number of inspections, those which remain
comprise the most robust strategic arms inspections regime in history.
By increasing transparency between the United States and Russia, New
START will enhance our mutual nuclear deterrent. This is just one
example of why ratification is in America's best security interest.
In addition to reducing the total number of both American and Russian
deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1550, New START will limit the
number of deployed delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads to 700. As we
consider investing more than $85 billion over the next decade into
modernizing our current nuclear arsenal, we must also consider the
practical benefit of maintaining a smaller number of strategic nuclear
weapons. These limits have been endorsed by our military planners
because they are commensurate with our current and future defense
needs. Moreover, reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads and
delivery vehicles better positions us to invest the savings in nuclear
modernization.
The United States and Russia share common threats and common
interests, and, in the words of Vice President Biden, New START is a
``cornerstone of our efforts to reset relations with Russia.'' Over the
past 2 years, cooperation between the United States and Russia has
grown in areas such as supporting sanctions to thwart Iran's nuclear
development and transferring essential supplies into Afghanistan. At
this juncture, the Senate's failure to ratify New START could have far-
reaching implications on such progress, including jeopardizing future
cooperation in these critical areas.
As some of my colleagues propose altering the treaty, I want to voice
my strong opposition to all amendments, as they would effectively kill
the agreement by requiring renegotiation with Russia. In the future, we
can address some of the issues raised during the amendment process--
including Russia's extensive stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons--but
these matters exceed the breadth of the treaty before us today. I also
believe that we can achieve a missile defense cooperation agreement
with Russia, but reaching an understanding on missile defense will be
easier once we have established an agreed-upon limit to the number of
deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
America must maintain its global leadership on nuclear arms control
and nonproliferation, and it is our obligation as Senators to act now.
It is time to look beyond politics and vote on principle, and I urge
all Senators to join me in supporting ratification of New START because
it is a domestic and global security imperative.
Ms. SNOWE. Madam President, I rise today to express my support for
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START, which was
signed by the United States and Russia on April 8 and transmitted for
the advice and consent of the Senate on May 13. Since then, Chairman
Kerry, with the unwavering support of Ranking Member Lugar, has
navigated the treaty through 18 hearings before the Senate Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees--and I commend
the chairman for his determination to see this paramount accomplishment
through to the finish.
Without equivocation, since his election to the U.S. Senate in 1976,
Ranking Member Lugar has been an overriding force of nature in reducing
the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and his work
with then-Senate Armed Services Chairman Sam Nunn to lay the groundwork
for the deactivation of more than 7,500 of these dangerous weapons in
the former Soviet Union is legendary. Throughout the negotiations and
consideration of New START, Ranking Member Lugar has once again
demonstrated his incredible depth of knowledge and expertise on these
issues, which has been of the utmost benefit to the Senate.
President George H.W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed
the original START Treaty on July 31, 1991--5 months before the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The agreement represented the culmination
of more than 20 years of bilateral arms control agreements between our
two nations.
Much has changed over what is almost two decades since the original
START agreement was signed in Moscow. The world has witnessed the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the rise of terrorist organizations
with nuclear weapons ambitions, and growing threats from hostile
regimes in such locations as Tehran and Pyongyang. As a result, when
START expired 1 year ago this month, we found ourselves at a
crossroads--without the ability to inspect Russian missile silos,
which, frankly, is unfortunate given that last year Senator Lugar
suggested that the administration obtain a short-term ``bridging
agreement'' with the Russians to ensure there was not a verification
gap between the expiration of START and approval of New START.
Yet despite this missed opportunity to secure a short-term bridging
agreement, I believe the debate we have had in this body over the last
12 months has made clear that it is in our vital national interests to,
first and foremost, maintain strategic stability between the United
States and Russia--
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the two countries that hold more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear
weapons--and furthermore to upgrade the original START agreement to
reflect the new realities of the post-Cold War era.
On the first point, I have supported New START's goal of reinstating
a more stable, transparent, and legally binding mechanism based on
proven methods for monitoring compliance with treaty provisions and
deterring potential violations. For example, New START requires
essential data exchanges detailing the numbers, types, and locations of
affected weapons, mandates up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections
each year to try and confirm information shared during such exchanges,
and it calls for the parties to notify each other and to update the
database whenever they move such forces between facilities.
Since the early years of nuclear weapons agreements between the
United States and the Soviet Union, beginning with Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, known as SALT, in May 1972; to the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces, or INF Treaty, in December 1987 and the original START
agreement in July 1991; our nations have gained from the structure and
degree of transparency that these agreements provide. As former
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said
in May, New START is ``an evolution of treaties that have been
negotiated in previous administrations of both parties'' and ``its
principal provisions are an elaboration'' of existing agreements.
Secretary Kissinger went on to note that the continued absence of this
vital agreement would undoubtedly ``create an element of uncertainty in
the calculations of both adversaries and allies'' and have an
``unsettling impact on the international environment.''
In other words, without the comprehensive and overlapping system of
inspections, notifications, and data exchanges that both the original
START and New START provide, our strategic commanders and civilian
leaders may be forced to position their assets in a way that
anticipates the worst case scenario, which as we witnessed during many
overwrought days of the Cold War is an incredibly precarious--and often
more costly--approach in terms of the prioritization of our
intelligence and defense resources. Therefore, I believe firmly that,
when combined with our Nation's overhead intelligence assets, remote
sensing equipment, and other classified methods, the New START
agreement will provide our government better insight into the accuracy
of Russia's declarations on the numbers and types of deployed and
nondeployed strategic offensive arms subject to the treaty, thereby
engendering greater confidence in our comprehension of the state of
affairs, enhancing global stability and our security here at home.
Still, in addition to maintaining the framework of our nuclear arms
reduction program with Russia, it is crucial that this treaty be
thoroughly vetted to reflect the reality of the threats we face in the
21st century. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that the
President ``shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur''--and as such we must make absolutely certain that questions
regarding our ability to verify Russian compliance with New START's
limits, to develop and deploy effective missile defenses, and to
modernize our nuclear weapons complex, have been satisfactorily
resolved. Senator Kyl, in particular, has brought great value to this
process--and I extol all of my colleagues for their dedication to
meeting our constitutional responsibilities.
Among the most significant questions that have been raised are those
that deal with our ability to monitor Russian compliance with the
treaty's limits. As part of its overlapping monitoring and verification
regimes, New START permits up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections at
ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases each year. U.S. inspectors
will use these inspections to help verify data on the number of
warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed submarine launched
ballistic missiles and the number of armaments located on deployed
heavy bombers.
Over the course of this debate, some of my colleagues have questioned
the utility and effectiveness of New START's on-site inspections. As a
member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have worked
with my colleagues to scrutinize this proposed agreement and have
closely reviewed the National Intelligence Estimate pertaining to this
subject as well as a number of other classified reports. It is
important to understand that we do not depend only on the treaty's
monitoring and verification provisions to ensure the Russians are
complying with the warhead limit and other clauses. To the contrary,
the treaty is but one critical instrument which, as with the 1991 START
agreement, is intended to augment information collected through our
overhead assets, and via other technical tools that leverage the larger
U.S. Intelligence system--known as our National Technical Means.
Since the treaty was transmitted to the Senate in May, the
Intelligence Committee has conducted a comprehensive review, and my
staff and I have questioned key officials, including the Director of
National Intelligence Jim Clapper, former Secretary of Defense Bill
Cohen, and Secretary Gates' Representative to Post-START Negotiations
Dr. Ted Warner. Additionally, my staff has held classified discussions
with former START inspection team members and delegates to the START
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Consequently, I would underscore two significant areas of advancement
where New START's verification and monitoring provisions will be
distinctly different from its predecessor. First, under the original
START agreement, the treaty database listed the number of warheads
attributed to a type of ballistic missile, and each missile of that
type counted as the same number of warheads. Notably, New START
advances this standard by enabling our inspectors to in fact count the
actual number of reentry vehicles deployed on the missile to confirm
that it equals the number designated by the Russians for that
particular weapon.
Secondly, New START includes the innovation that unique identifiers--
which mean numeric codes--be affixed to all Russian missiles and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Under the original START agreement,
unique identifiers were applied only to Russian road-mobile missiles.
As Ranking Member Lugar has noted, while this does not insure a
``foolproof'' verification system, it will provide enhanced confidence
and transparency under the Treaty structure.
Taken as a whole, I believe the treaty's notification requirements,
the use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, submarine launched
ballistic missile, and heavy bomber, and the 18 annual short-notice on-
site inspections, combined with our National Technical Means, will
further our critical national security objectives by helping us observe
and evaluate Russian activities--an objective that is fundamental to
our strategic stability.
Additionally, when it comes to our ballistic missile defense
capabilities, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote on
December 7 that ``The Russians need to understand that the U.S. will
use the full-range of American technology and talent to improve our
ability to intercept and destroy the ballistic missiles of hostile
countries.'' In an effort to make certain that our intentions are
unambiguous, the U.S. issued a unilateral statement at the signing of
New START, which affirms that our government ``intends to continue
improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend
itself against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach
to strengthening stability in key regions.''
Furthermore, Ranking Member Lugar also worked to ensure that the
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification that was approved by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 16 addresses this
question by declaring that ``it is the policy of the United States to
deploy as soon as technically possible an effective National Missile
Defense system'' and that nothing in the Treaty limits ``further
planned enhancements'' to missile defense programs. President Obama,
Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Gates have reaffirmed this commitment
and the Administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review, released in
February, outlines a detailed plan to continue to
[[Page S10975]]
expand international missile defense efforts to defend the United
States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners around the
world.
It is also important for the record to reflect that Russia issued a
similar statement when the original START was signed in 1991, saying
that the treaty would be viable only under conditions of compliance
with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which at the time restricted
ballistic missile defenses. History clearly shows that following
ratification of START the United States did not restrain its missile
defense programs or reduce its expenditures on ballistic missile
defenses in an effort to ensure that Russia remained committed to the
original START Treaty. To the contrary, U.S. spending on ballistic
missile defense programs increased dramatically following the signing
of the original START agreement--from less than $4 billion for
Department of Defense-wide ballistic missile defense funding support in
1991 to nearly $10 billion this year. Moreover, in spite of this threat
in 1991, Russia remained a party to START and continued to negotiate
further reductions on strategic offensive weapons after the U.S.
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
Still, despite this precedent and Ranking Member Lugar's considerable
efforts to make certain that the resolution addresses the issue of
missile defense, questions have been raised about potential
restrictions on our ability to deploy effective missile defenses, and
some of my colleagues have rightly criticized the preamble's
recognition of an ``interrelationship between strategic offensive arms
and strategic defensive arms.'' It has been argued--and I agree--that
this language, when combined with Russia's unilateral statement
asserting its concern about a United States ``build-up'' in missile
defense system capabilities, needlessly gives Russia a leverage point
with which to attempt to compel our government to pull back from our
missile defense objectives by threatening to withdraw from the Treaty
if we seek to increase our capabilities. As a result, I supported
Senator McCain's effort to amend the Treaty to strike any reference to
the ``interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic
defensive arms.''
Finally, when it comes to the modernization of our nuclear forces,
meaningful concerns have been raised about the deplorable state of our
deteriorating Manhattan Project-era nuclear laboratories and weapons
stockpiles. Senators Kyl and Corker should be commended for their
diligence in shedding light on the undeniable truth that these
facilities are sorely out-dated, and continue to erode as safety and
security costs have grown exponentially, maintenance is deferred, and
layoffs and hiring freezes deprive our government of highly skilled
scientists and technicians needed to maintain our nuclear deterrent.
Credible modernization plans and long-term funding for the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile and the infrastructure that supports it are
central to the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent, and we have
posed serious questions about the veracity of the administration's
modernization report that was submitted to Congress with the New START
agreement on May 13th, pursuant to section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010
Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, we have sought greater detail
and assurances regarding the administration's plans to retool and
sustain our national weapons labs--including construction of the
vitally important plutonium processing facility, known as the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility, in Los Alamos,
NM, and the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge, TN. These two
projects are essential for meeting our life extension program
requirements for existing warheads and certifying the safety and
readiness of the current stockpile.
On November 17, due in large part to the unyielding persistence of
Senators Kyl and Corker, the administration released an updated 1251
modernization report that directly answered many of our concerns and
elaborated on our modernization objectives by providing more detailed
10-year timelines and specific budget projections to sustain funding
for stockpile surveillance at over $200 million over the next 10 years,
and cost estimates for the plutonium and uranium processing facilities
at upwards of $5.8 billion and $6.5 billion respectively. In total, the
administration has now committed more than $85 billion to modernize our
nuclear weapons complex over the next 10 years--$15 billion more than
initially proposed by the administration--and I am confident this
undertaking will ensure continued support for these indispensable
activities.
It is now the responsibility of President Obama and his
administration to, in the months ahead, communicate even more specific
details regarding any lingering concerns about our Nation's long-term
modernization programs. The Resolution of Advice and Consent, which is
currently before the Senate, includes strong language requiring direct
notification to Congress if at any moment more resources are required--
or if appropriations are enacted that fail to meet our modernization
needs--and we as a body must hold this government true to these
commitments.
In summary, the original START agreement was signed over 19 years
ago, at a time when we still lived in a decidedly bipolar, and some
might argue less complicated world. But with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War, we are now facing new threats from
volatile governments intent on the proliferation of dangerous weapons,
and decentralized terrorist groups focused on launching attacks more
devastating even than 9/11.
Confronted with these daunting challenges, America must be prepared
to defend our homeland, our forces in theatre, and our allies--and I
believe this treaty allows future administrations to meet this
responsibility, to maintain a safe and effective deterrent, and at the
same time to continue to reduce the number of deployed and ready to
launch long-range nuclear weapons. And as former Secretary of State
James Baker noted in May, a more stable and cooperative relationship
between Washington and Moscow ``will be vital if the two countries are
to cooperate in order to stem nuclear proliferation in countries like
Iran and North Korea.'' Simply put, the ratification of New START, and
the cooperation and transparency it requires, has the potential to set
the stage for expanded NATO and Russian collaboration when it comes to
confronting terrorists and other dangerous proliferators--so together
we may face those who threaten stability in the post-Cold War world.
Mr. President, the New START treaty has the unanimous support of our
Nation's military and diplomatic leadership, Director of National
Intelligence Jim Clapper, and the endorsement of President George H.W.
Bush and prominent former national security officials such as Secretary
of Defense Bill Cohen, and every living Secretary of State--including
Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. As a member of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, I am convinced that this agreement, when
combined with our intelligence assets, will enhance global stability,
and most importantly, our national security. I urge my colleagues to
join me in supporting the Resolution of Advice and Consent to
Ratification.
Mr. REID. Madam President, we cannot end this historic session of
Congress without taking one more important step to protect the national
security of the United States. It is time for the Senate to ratify the
New START treaty.
This treaty will secure nuclear stockpiles. It will take nearly 1,500
American and Russian nuclear weapons out of commission. These are
weapons that, as we speak, are trained on cities like Washington and
Moscow, St. Louis and St. Petersburg.
More than a year has passed since American inspectors were on the
ground monitoring the Russian nuclear weapons arsenal. The sooner we
ratify this treaty, the sooner we can re-open the window into exactly
what the Russians are, or are not, doing.
START will also preserve a strong American nuclear arsenal. Our
military leaders have analyzed the treaty and determined the number of
nuclear weapons we need to retain in order to keep us safe here at
home. The director of the Missile Defense Agency has said the treaty
will not restrain or limit our missile-defense capacity.
America and Russia control more than 90 percent of the world's
nuclear weapons. The transparency this treaty
[[Page S10976]]
will provide is critical not just to our two countries but the entire
planet.
By ratifying the START treaty, we will also increase our ability to
work with other countries to reduce nuclear weapons around the world,
and to make sure that those weapons are kept safe and secure. We need
to work together with Russia to stop the most dangerous nuclear
threats, including those from Iran and North Korea.
One of the greatest and gravest threats we face is the specter of a
terrorist getting his hands on a nuclear weapon. We have faced nuclear
threats before--but such a threat from a superpower is much different
than one from a terrorist.
A nuclear-armed terrorist would not be constrained by doctrines of
deterrence or mutually assured destruction. Instead, rogue groups could
attack and destroy one of our cities--and millions of our people--
without warning. By ratifying the New START treaty, we can help make
sure this kind of unprecedented tragedy never happens
We have had a positive, bipartisan process up to this point. That
should continue today.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee overwhelmingly approved the
treaty with a bipartisan vote of 14-4.
Our Nation's military leadership unanimously supports it. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM
Michael Mullen testified before the Senate and urged us to ratify it.
Secretaries of State from the last five Republican Presidents support
the treaty because they know--in their words--``The world is safer
today because of the decades-long effort to reduce its supply of
nuclear weapons.''
And an all-star team of Republican and Democratic national security
leaders support the treaty, including former President George H.W.
Bush, Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, Brent Scowcroft, James
Schlesinger, Stephen Hadley, Senator Sam Nunn, and Senator John Warner.
Republicans have been included and instrumental from the beginning.
At Senator Kerry's urging, the resolution was crafted by Senator Lugar
to reflect the views of our Republican colleagues. The Foreign
Relations Committee then adopted additional Republican amendments in
its mark-up. And we have adopted four additional amendments on the
floor.
Senator Kyl raised legitimate concerns about the state of our nuclear
weapons complex, and the White House responded with an $85 billion
commitment to upgrade it over the next 10 years.
We have spent 8 days debating this treaty on the floor--that is
longer than we spent on the original START--in a bipartisan and
productive debate. I want to thank Chairman Kerry and Senator Lugar for
their tireless leadership on this treaty and thank Senators on both
side of the aisle who have worked hard to get this treaty completed.
For many Nevadans, the sights and sounds of a nuclear attack are
familiar. Deep in our desert sits the Nevada National Security Site,
which until this summer was called the Nevada Test Site.
Today the site is the center of our fight against terrorism and
nuclear smuggling. It is on the front lines of our intelligence, arms
control and nonproliferation efforts.
But the site was once a critical battlefield of the Cold War, and for
decades it served as our Nation's nuclear proving ground. A lot of
Nevadans grew up with mushroom clouds in our backyard. We want to make
sure the tests that took place in the Nevada desert are the closest we
come to a nuclear explosion.
Today we can do that. We can continue our institution's long history
of bipartisan support for arms control. We can take 1,500 nuclear
weapons off their launch pads. And we can make the future far safer for
America and the world.
This is not just a narrow Senate debate. It isn't just a local issue.
And it isn't something that can wait another day. The whole world is
watching and waiting for us to act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, let me thank my colleagues for working hard
to get this treaty passed and for being able to achieve that as well,
people within the administration. I appreciate the cooperation some of
us have had with the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the
ranking member and others who have worked hard to try to complete, in a
very short period of time, what probably should have taken a lot longer
period of time. But I appreciate their efforts to work with us in that
regard.
I would like to, briefly, speak to three things: the process, the
problems, and some positive results of the consideration of this
treaty.
For those who are watching, I can tell you right now there is only
one thing on the mind of everybody in this Chamber: How quickly are we
going to get out of here. One colleague said: I have a plane to catch.
How long are you going to talk? Will I be able to catch it?
That is understandable because every one of us wants to get home to
our families. I know there were some snide comments expressed about my
concern a week or so ago about the fact we were going to be into
Christmas week. But now the reality is everybody wants to get out of
here immediately so cut short your comments, put them in the Record,
and so on.
When I predicted a couple weeks ago that I didn't think we had time
to do everything the majority leader wanted to do and do it well, I had
no idea how many things would be added to the agenda and how difficult
that would be. Unfortunately, I think my prediction turned out to be
correct.
I remember just 1 year ago when we were on the Senate floor doing the
health care bill, one of the primary criticisms of it was the way it
was done. I must tell you, with regard to the process of this bill, I
am concerned about the precedent we are setting in the Senate, taking a
lameduck session to jam so many things through, frequently without an
opportunity to provide amendments or, when there are amendments, to
simply have them all shot down without, I believe, adequate
consideration.
We have done the tax legislation, the continuing resolution to fund
the Government, the DOD authorization bill, the DREAM Act, don't ask,
don't tell, the 9/11 bill is on the way, some judges, we passed a food
safety bill almost in the middle of the night by unanimous consent
without Members being adequately notified, and now the START treaty. In
many of those situations, there was not adequate time--as I said, no
amendments even allowed.
When cloture was filed, I expressed concern we had only dealt with, I
believe at that time, four amendments to the treaty itself. But we were
told: Don't worry. We will still give you consent to do resolution-of-
ratification amendments.
Unfortunately, not all of them were permitted by the majority and, in
order to get as many as possible together, we had to consolidate 70 or
so amendments down to a very few.
The other side announced at the beginning of the debate there would
be no amendments on the treaty itself or the preamble. It turned out
the amendments that were offered were all defeated, but we did have
some amendments on the resolution of ratification. They, too, would
have all been defeated or were defeated, except for the fact that we
were willing to water them down and, therefore, had them accepted by
the majority.
Now we have very little time to make closing statements because we
are going to adjourn sine die, meaning this is the end of the Congress.
We will not have time to actually prepare written statements for the
Record. This is a very brief statement to discuss primarily some
positive things because there is not time to lay out all the problems
that I think those of us who oppose the treaty still believe are
present in the treaty.
I agree with the comments the newest Member of the Senate, Mark Kirk,
made just a moment ago. He is very well schooled in these issues,
though a new Member of the Senate. I associate myself with a lot of the
remarks he made. I think later, when we come back next year, we can
chronicle the things that were said in the debates and have a pretty
good record of how it all ended. But I fear more for the process
because of the precedent set that serious matters, such as the ones we
have debated and dealt with, including the treaty, were done in, to
some extent, a slipshod way, to some extent in
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which there was not adequate time to do what the Senate should have
done.
I also fear for the precedent set with respect to treaty
ratification. Essentially, on many of the issues that were raised--and
I appreciate, I must say, colleagues have been kind to me in their
compliments. I appreciate that very much. They were complimentary to me
and my colleagues in saying we were raising important issues that
needed to be vetted, but in each case this was not the time to do it,
this was not the place to do it because if we dare change one comma in
this treaty, it would require that it be renegotiated. There were some
unspecified horrible results of the fact that we would have to
renegotiate the treaty because the Russians wouldn't like what we did.
The precedent we are establishing is that the Senate is a
rubberstamp. Whatever a President negotiates with the Russians or
somebody else, we dare not change because otherwise it will have to be
renegotiated, to some great detriment to humanity, and I don't think
that is appropriate. I think our Founders, when they wrote into the
Constitution an equal role for the Senate and the President, they meant
it. That role is advice and consent. We gave some advice in the last
Defense authorization bill. We said, for example, don't negotiate
conventional Prompt Global Strike limitations and don't allow
limitations on missile defense. Both those things were done against our
advice. But we are being asked to consent notwithstanding.
It seems to me, if the Senate is to have a role in the future on
these kinds of treaties, we better come to an understanding if we are
going to be able to make some changes. I don't think anybody ever said
the administration ever got anything 100 percent right. We ought to be
able to make some changes or else we might as well avoid the process
altogether because it is just a big waste of time. Eleven years ago
when we considered the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and rejected that
treaty, a lot of commentators said the Senate had finally put its mark
on the process by conclusively demonstrating it would not be a
rubberstamp and that would be a new era for the administration in the
future, having to pay some attention to what the Senate said. I hope
this new START treaty is an aberration, rather than the beginning of a
new precedent.
I will just tell you this. If the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
brought forward again, there will be a different process. Rather than
the situation which obtained here, in which I did not urge a single
colleague to oppose this treaty until the time that cloture was filed
on it, I will urge every one of my colleagues to oppose reconsideration
of the CTB.
So the process is not good. I have to hope that the result of the way
we handled it this year will not establish a new precedent. The
problems of the treaty I wish to discuss in detail, but because my
colleagues want to catch airplanes, I will not.
Let me focus then on the third and last element here, which is, some
new things we learned from this treaty, and, frankly, some achievements
that were obtained as a result of a lot of attention to it--being paid
to it by our colleagues, a lot of great debate, particularly with
respect to missile defense, modernization, and future arms control
agenda.
One of the things I think we have made some progress on is that this
may be the last arms control agreement for a while. Maybe we can get
back to focusing on the real issues, issues of proliferation, of
terrorism dealing with threats from countries such as North Korea and
Iran.
It is fine to have yet another Cold War era type agreement with
Russia. But the real issue is not between Russia and the United States,
it is dealing with these other threats. So I suggest we move away from
the distraction of agreements such as this, and on to what is a more
contemporary challenge. I think as a result of the debate, that will be
possible to do.
I would quote one of our colleagues, Condoleezza Rice, who served
with great distinction as Secretary of State, and before that as
National Security Adviser, wrote recently in the Wall Street Journal
and she said:
After this treaty, our focus must be on stopping dangerous
proliferators, not on further reductions of the U.S. and
Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threats to
each other or to international stability.
Presidential Adviser Gary Samore agreed, saying:
If Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear capability, that
would do more damage to the effort of the President to
achieve a nuclear free world than anything.
That is the real test of where we are headed. So I would hope the
focus in the future will be on the illicit programs of Iran, of Korea,
countries such as Syria, and potentially focusing on some of the
supporters of these countries such as the country of China. These are
the real challenges. I believe there would be bipartisan support in
this body to address those challenges next.
But, secondly, I think as a result of focusing on our nuclear
arsenal, which we had to do by looking at this treaty, we have also
learned that we have a very big challenge in this country. And,
fortunately and parallel with the treaty, we worked on this challenge,
the issue of how we can modernize our nuclear facilities and nuclear
force and the delivery vehicles of the triad that would deliver those
vehicles.
I think we have all agreed we made significant improvement in that
regard. The administration, I believe, has made a significant
commitment to the modernization of our nuclear facilities. And the
Senate, in various ways in dealing with this treaty, has done likewise,
as well as through an exchange of letters that have been entered into
by members of the Appropriations Committee, and we hope to work with
our colleagues in the House of Representatives with whom we have not
had enough contact on this issue. But hopefully, as a result of
everything we have done, we will have an opportunity to fund the
modernization, as it becomes clear more precisely what has to be done,
to ensure that all of that is accomplished within the appropriate
timeframe.
When we started out, we had a pretty woeful amount of money dedicated
to the modernization of our nuclear facilities. Now we have a request
from the administration of a total of about $85 billion over a decade
to operate our facilities. That includes about $15 billion in new
modernization spending.
With the 1251 report coming from the administration each year, we
anticipate there will be further updates which will demonstrate
additional progress we can make in the modernization. In addition, I
mentioned the letter from the four key members of the Appropriations
Committee in this body. We hope to work with Members in the House of
Representatives likewise.
Finally on this matter, one of the last amendments that was adopted
is a certification requirement, which is a change to the resolution of
ratification that, to the extent possible, the administration will
accelerate the planning and design of the two major facilities here
and, where appropriate, request multiyear funding, of which my two
colleagues from Tennessee who are, as usual, seated right here
together, made a very strong point--that we could not only save a lot
of money every year but also accelerate the construction of these
facilities so we could complete the life extension programs for our
nuclear weapons that are so critical.
A third thing I think we did, which is a very positive result, is to
focus a little bit also on the other aspect of modernization; that is
to say, the triad, our nuclear triad of bombers, submarines, and ICBMs.
The Secretary of Defense had made a decision at the outset of the
Obama administration that we would cancel the decision on the next
generation of bomber. It was very unclear whether it was the intention
of our government to have a nuclear-capable bomber part of the nuclear
triad.
Quoting General Chilton, who is the general responsible at Strategic
Command on this, ``We need service programs that sustain the long-term
viability of our land-based, airborne, and sea-based delivery
platforms.''
One of the amendments that was adopted, amendment No. 4864, does
require the President to certify that he intends to modernize or
replace the triad, a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise missile,
nuclear capable, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM--in other words, the
submarine leg, which I believe the administration has already begun to
move forward on.
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Also it would maintain the rocket motor industrial base necessary to
support continued production of ballistic missiles. This is very
important, because even if you modernize the warheads, if you do not
have modern delivery vehicles to deliver them, obviously you do not
have a capable deterrent. And, of course, the Russians, who have the
most capable system other than ours, are modernizing their delivery
vehicles, especially their ICBMs and, as a result, I think we need to
do that as well.
I am very pleased we have been able to resolve this question about a
nuclear-capable triad. I look forward to clear and unambiguous
statements from the administration in the future about this, and
eventually getting a replacement for all three legs of the triad that
need to be modernized.
Fourth, there was a lot of discussion here about missile defense. I
think without the treaty having come up, we probably would not have
spent the time and raised the issues with regard to missile defense
that were raised. We had a disagreement here about whether--or the
extent to which the preamble to the treaty and article V of the treaty
and the signing statements created a problem with respect to further
development of our missile defenses.
But through this debate, I believe, through commitments of the
President in a letter that he wrote, through an amendment to the
resolution of ratification and a lot of statements for the record
during this debate, we are much further down the road in predicting
that we will be able to deploy the kind of missile defense that is
necessary to protect not just our allies in Europe, for example, but
also the continental United States and the American people.
To conclude this point, any attempt by the Russian Federation now to
reestablish a link between missile defense and strategic arms control
will not succeed; that any argument that there is a legal right to
withdraw from the treaty if we proceed with our deployment plans, as
they will be communicated to the Russians, will not stand. So our
friends in Russia do need to understand what we have done here. And we
are making clear, as President Reagan once did, that U.S. missile
defenses are simply not open to a discussion. They will not be part of
future negotiations as well.
Finally, with regard to the Conventional Prompt Global Strike, I
think we made some progress there. Very few people had ever heard the
phrase, knew what it was. The Senate did give its advice in last year's
Defense bill not to limit it. But, nevertheless, it was limited in the
treaty. I think our debate about it here has helped to educate Members
as to the need for this, something both the administration and many of
us here in the Senate support. It is simply the capability to deliver
not a nuclear warhead but a conventional warhead by an ICBM at a very
long distance in a very relatively short period of time, to meet some
of the new threats we are going to be facing in the future.
Unfortunately, Prompt Global Strike is limited in the treaty.
Notwithstanding that unfortunate linkage, as I said, I think we have
had an opportunity to obtain a more secure commitment from the
administration on the deployment of the Global Strike capability,
because the resolution of ratification now calls for a detailed report
on our CPGS objectives prior to entry into the force of the treaty.
It will require the administration to consider treaty limitations,
methods of distinguishing nuclear, nonnuclear systems, which are
possible and should relieve any concern that the Russians have about
the potential for a Prompt Global Strike weapon being confused with a
nuclear weapon.
Apart from all of the things I just talked about there are other
things in the resolution of ratification that will add some strength to
the position that those of us who oppose the treaty have taken,
including working through the Bilateral Consultative Commission, not
being undercut by that commission, requiring an annual report
certifying Russian compliance with the terms of the New START treaty,
things of that sort.
I conclude that one of the things we will have to do proactively from
here on out, in order to achieve some of the objectives that we have
talked about here, is to work with our House colleagues who have not
been a part of this process, to share with them the reasons we have
concluded these things are important, to work together, the
administration, my colleagues on the Democratic side and our side, to
convince them each year of the necessary appropriations that will be
required, among other things, for modernization of both the triad and--
I know my colleagues are anxious to leave. As a result, I will cut my
comments short to make this point.
I again close, as I opened, by thanking colleagues for working under
what are, frankly, very difficult circumstances, to try to compress
everything into a very short period of time, to be on a START treaty at
the same time we are parachuting in all manner of other issues and
trying to get those resolved. This has not been easy.
For those colleagues who were patient and expressed desire to do
things on the floor that we did not have time for, I appreciate their
indulgences and appreciate the courtesies that everyone has extended.
This has been very contentious, and yet the disagreements between us
have never risen to any level beyond that which is totally appropriate
for a serious debate in the Senate, proving again that while we can
disagree or will disagree, we can certainly do so agreeably. I thank my
colleagues for their willingness to do that.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I thank the Senator. I know he has
curtailed his remarks. I have cut mine. But I do want to say a couple
of things as we try to wind down here. I want to thank the Senator from
Arizona for helping to get us to a point where we can vote now. I want
to thank Senator Wyden who, 48 hours after surgery, has made himself
available to come here and to be able to vote. We are appreciative of
that.
As we end our debate on the New START treaty, I believe we can say
the Senate has done its duty, and done it with diligence, serious
purpose, and honor. And I am confident that our Nation's security--and
that of the world--will be enhanced by ratifying this treaty.
When we began this debate 8 days ago, I quoted Chris Dodd's farewell
address, in which he reminded us that the Founding Fathers had designed
the Senate with these moments in mind. I think over the past week we
have lived up to our moment. Senators have had opportunity to speak and
debate. The fact is, we have considered this treaty--a less complicated
or far-reaching treaty than START I--for longer than we considered
START I and START II combined.
Admiral Mullen summed up our interests in this treaty in a compelling
way. He said:
I continue to believe that ratification of the New START
Treaty is vital to U.S. national security. Through the trust
it engenders, the cuts it requires, and the flexibility it
preserves, this treaty enhances our ability to do that which
we in the military have been charged to do: protect and
defend the citizens of the United States. I am as confident
in its success as I am in its safeguards. The sooner it is
ratified, the better.
I think that is exactly right, and it is important to keep our
fundamental charge to protect America foremost in our minds.
But I think there is something more to think about now. In the back
and forth of debates like this, as we dispute details and draw dividing
lines, it is easy to lose sight of the magnitude of the decision we are
making.
Because sometimes, when we repeat and repeat and repeat certain words
and phrases they become routine and ritual, and their true meaning
fades away. When we argue about the difference between 700 delivery
vehicles and 720, we may forget that in the final analysis, regardless
of where we stand on the START treaty, this is one of
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those rare times in the U.S. Senate, one of the only times in all our
service here, when we have it in our power to safeguard or endanger
human life on this planet. More than any other, this issue should
transcend politics. More than any other, this issue should summon our
best instincts and our highest sense of responsibility. More than at
almost any other time, the people of the world are watching us because
they rely on our leadership and because this issue involves not simply
our lives and the lives of our children but their lives and the lives
of their children as well.
So it is altogether fitting that we have debated and now we decide
not in a campaign season, but in a season that celebrates and summons
us to the ideal of peace on Earth. Yes, we have contended about
schedules. Yes, the constant chatter on cable speculates about whether
we would approve the treaty in time to get out of here for Christmas.
But the question is not whether we get out of here for a holiday; the
question is whether we move the world a little more out of the dark
shadow of nuclear nightmare. For whatever our faith, the right place
for us at this time of year, no matter how long it may take, is here in
the Senate where we now have a unique capacity to give a priceless gift
not just to our friends and family, but to our fellow men and women
everywhere. When Robert Oppenheimer left Los Alamos after the atomic
bomb was dropped, he said, ``The peoples of this world must unite or
they will perish. This war, that has ravaged so much of the earth, has
written these words. The atomic bomb has spelled them out for all men
to understand. . . . By our works we are committed, committed to a
world united, before this common peril, in law and in humanity.'' That
is what brings us to this moment.
Last night, a friend called my attention to the meditation of Pope
John Paul II when he visited Hiroshima. He said that from the memory of
those awesome mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki we must draw
the ``conviction that man who wages war can also successfully make
peace.'' This month in homes across this land, Americans are honoring
moments in the history of faith that enshrine the values that guide us
all regardless of faith. We in the Senate, only 100 of us in a world of
billions, should be humbled and proud that in this month we have the
privilege of reducing the risks of war and advancing the cause of
peace.
So think of what is at stake here and of the role we now have to
play, not only in the governing of our country but literally in the
life of the world. Here more than ever our power to advise and consent
is more than some arcane procedural matter. The Framers of the
Constitution created the Senate with a vision of statesmanship, that
here narrow interests would yield to the national interest, that petty
quarrels would be set aside in pursuit of great and common endeavor.
The best of our history has proven the wisdom of that vision. There was
that defining moment when Senator Daniel Webster stood at his desk in
this Chamber to address the fundamental moral issue of slavery. The
words with which he started were stark and simple, and they should
guide us today and every day. He said: ``I speak not as a Massachusetts
man, nor a northern man, but as an American.'' This is the very
definition of what it means to be a Senator. To speak not for one State
but for one America. To remember that the whole world is watching. So
it is now, and so it has been across the decades during which so many
Presidents and Senators of both parties, citizens in every part of the
country, have struggled and at critical turning points succeeded in
pushing back the dark frontier of nuclear conflict. The efforts have
not always been perfect; nothing in life or policy ever is. But as we
end this debate now, let us take our own step forward for America and
for the world. As stewards of enormous destructive power, we too can
become the stewards of peace.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as the Senate approaches a point of
decision on the New START treaty, I would like to offer a few
concluding thoughts.
My attitudes towards the enterprise of arms control have been
affected by the time I have spent during the last two decades visiting
remote areas of Russia in an effort to bolster Nunn-Lugar dismantlement
operations. When one sees Russian SS-18 ballistic missiles being cut up
at Surovatikha, or when one witnesses the dismantlement of a Typhoon
ballistic missile submarine at the SevMash facility on the approaches
to the Barents Sea, one gets a clear picture of the enormity of the
problem that confronted us during the Cold War.
With all the destructive power that was created during that era
amidst intense suspicion and enmity between the United States and the
former Soviet Union, we were extraordinarily fortunate to have avoided
a mishap that could have destroyed American civilization. During the
last two decades, we have circumscribed the nuclear problem, but we
have not eliminated it. Our cities remain vulnerable to accident,
miscalculation, and proliferation stemming from the Russian nuclear
arsenal. And we still must pay very close attention to the disposition
of Russian nuclear forces.
Visiting dismantlement operations in Russia also underscores that
arms control is a technically challenging endeavor. In these debates we
generally focus on the balance of nuclear forces, deterrence theories,
diplomatic maneuvers, and other aspects of high statecraft. But arms
control is also a ``nuts and bolts'' enterprise involving thousands of
American and Russian technicians, officials, and military personnel.
Verification and dismantlement activities require tremendous
cooperation on mundane engineering challenges, equipment and supply
logistics, and legal frameworks that allow these activities to proceed.
Ironically the exacting nature of arms verification and elimination
may be a blessing. The challenges of this work and the amount of
information that both sides are required to exchange have improved
transparency and forced our countries to build productive partnerships
over time.
The Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on June 24 in which
Defense Department officials in charge of verification and
dismantlement activities in the former Soviet Union testified. These
officials oversee dismantlement work in Russia that occurs every day.
Their agencies oversaw verification under START I before the treaty
expired on December 5, 2009. They would oversee the verification work
required under the New START treaty.
They described in detail how verification operations are conducted
and gave Senators a picture of how the United States and Russia
cooperate on technically challenging nonproliferation goals. Only five
members of the committee attended that hearing. I wish that every
Senator could have attended, because the presentation underscored how
much the START process links our two defense establishments and how
critical the START framework is to nonproliferation activities.
Mr. President, there is a maxim that has been popularized in American
cinema, variants of which have sometimes been attributed to early
political philosophers such as Sun Tsu or Machiavelli. It is ``Keep
your friends close, but your enemies closer.'' I am not suggesting that
Russia is an enemy. Our relationship with that country is far more
complex. It is a relationship that is both wary and hopeful. We admire
the Russian people and their cultural and scientific achievements,
while lamenting continuing restrictions on their civil and political
liberties. We recognize the potential for U.S.-Russian cooperation
based on deep commonalities in our history and geography, even as we
are frustrated that Cold War sensibilities are difficult to dislodge.
Although we can and must make situational judgments to engage Russia,
such engagement is no guarantee that we will experience a convergence
of perceived interests or the elimination of friction.
But one does not have to abandon one's skepticism of the Russian
Government or dismiss contentious foreign policy disagreements with
Moscow to invest in the practical enterprise of nuclear verification
and transparency. In fact, it is precisely the friction in our broader
relationship that makes this treaty so important.
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It would be an incredible strategic blunder to sever our START
relationship with Russia when that country still possesses thousands of
nuclear weapons. We would be distancing ourselves from a historic rival
in the area where our national security is most affected and where
cooperation already has delivered successes. When it comes to our
nuclear arsenals we want to keep Russia close. There are enough
centripetal forces at work without abandoning a START process that has
prevented surprises and miscalculations for 15 years.
The New START agreement came about because the United States and
Russia, despite differences on many geopolitical issues, do have
coincident interests on specific matters of nuclear security. We share
an interest in limiting competition on expensive weapons systems that
do little to enhance the productivity of our respective societies. We
share an interest in achieving predictability with regard to each
other's nuclear forces so we are not left guessing about equal
potential vulnerabilities. We share an interest in cooperating broadly
on keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.
And we share an interest in maintaining lines of communication between
our political and military establishments that are based on the
original START agreement.
Over the last 7 months the Senate has performed due diligence on the
New START treaty. Most importantly, we have gathered and probed
military opinion about what the treaty would mean for our national
defense. We have heard from the top military leadership, as well as the
commanders who oversee our nuclear weapons and our missile defense. We
have heard from former Secretaries of Defense and STRATCOM commanders
who have confirmed the judgment of current military leaders. Their
answers have demonstrated a carefully-reasoned military consensus in
favor of ratifying the treaty. Rejection of such a consensus on a
treaty that affects fundamental questions of nuclear deterrence would
be an extraordinary action for the Senate to take.
Moreover, the treaty review process has produced a much stronger
American political consensus in favor of modernization of our nuclear
forces and implementation of our miile defense plans. This includes
explicit commitments by the President and congressional appropriators.
In the absence of the New START treaty, I believe this consensus would
be more difficult to maintain. We have the chance today not only to
approve the New START treaty, but also to solidify our domestic
determination to achieve these national security goals.
I began the Senate debate on this treaty last week by citing a long
list of the national security threats that currently occupy our nation
and our military. Our troops are heavily engaged in Afghanistan and
Iraq. We are fighting a global terrorist threat. And we are seeking to
resolve the dangerous circumstances surrounding nuclear weapons
programs in Iran and North Korea. We are attempting to address these
and many other national security questions at a time of growing
resource constraints reflected in a $14 trillion debt.
In this context the U.S. Senate has a chance today to constrain
expensive arms competition with Russia. We have chance to guarantee
transparency and confidence-building procedures that contribute to our
fundamental national security. We have a chance to frustrate rogue
nations who would prefer as much distance as possible between the
United States and Russia on nuclear questions. And we have a chance to
strike a blow against nuclear proliferation that deeply threatens
American citizens and our interests in the world.
I am hopeful that the Senate will embrace this opportunity to bolster
U.S. national security by voting to approve the New START treaty.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The majority leader is recognized.
____________________