[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10955-S10960]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 4922 to Amendment No. 4904
Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I have a second-degree amendment at the
desk, No. 4922.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Kirk] proposes an amendment
numbered 4922 to Amendment No. 4904.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide an additional understanding regarding the December
18, 2010, letter from President Obama to the Senate regarding missile
defense)
On page 2, after line 19, add the following:
(2) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the United
States that the advice and consent of the Senate to the New
START Treaty is subject to the understanding, which shall be
transmitted to the Russian Federation at the time of the
exchange of instruments of ratification, stated in the letter
transmitted by President Barack Obama to the Majority Leader
of the United States Senate on December 18, 2010, the text of
which is as follows:
The White House,
Washington, December 18, 2010.
Hon. Harry M. Reid,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Reid: As the Senate considers the New START
Treaty, I want to
[[Page S10956]]
share with you my views on the issue of missile defense,
which has been the subject of much debate in the Senate's
review of the Treaty.
Pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999
(Public Law 106-38), it has long been the policy of the
United States to deploy as soon as is technologically
possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable
of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack, whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate. Thirty ground-based interceptors
based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, are now defending the nation. All United States
missile defense programs--including all phases of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (EPAA)
and programs to defend United States deployed forces, allies,
and partners against regional threats--are consistent with
this policy.
The New START Treaty places no limitations on the
development or deployment of our missile defense programs. As
the NATO Summit meeting in Lisbon last month underscored, we
are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe
designed to provide full coverage for NATO members on the
continent, as well as deployed U.S. forces, against the
growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic
missiles. The final phase of the system will also augment our
current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles
from Iran targeted against the United States.
All NATO allies agreed in Lisbon that the growing threat of
missile proliferation, and our Article 5 commitment of
collective defense, requires that the Alliance develop a
territorial missile defense capability. The Alliance further
agreed that the EPAA, which I announced in September 2009,
will be a crucial contribution to this capability. Starting
in 2011, we will begin deploying the first phase of the EPAA,
to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and
medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases,
we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-based
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in Romania and Poland
to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planned for the end
of the decade, further upgrades of the SM-3 interceptor will
provide an ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our
defense of NATO European territory, as well as that of the
United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from
Iran.
The Lisbon decisions represent an historic achievement,
making clear that all NATO allies believe we need an
effective territorial missile defense to defend against the
threats we face now and in the future. The EPAA represents
the right response. At Lisbon, the Alliance also invited the
Russian Federation to cooperate on missile defense, which
could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed
by NATO to enhance our common security against common
threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the
Alliance's missile defenses can be strengthened by improving
NATO-Russian relations.
This comes even as we have made clear that the system we
intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and
it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile
defense capabilities. Effective cooperation with Russia could
enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our
combined territorial missile defenses, and at the same time
provide Russia with greater security. Irrespective of how
cooperation with Russia develops, the Alliance alone bears
responsibility for defending NATO's members, consistent with
our Treaty obligations for collective defense. The EPAA and
NATO's territorial missile defense capability will allow us
to do that.
In signing the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation
issued a statement that expressed its view that the
extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty
include a ``build-up in the missile defense capabilities of
the United States of America such that it would give rise to
a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian
Federation.'' Article XIV(3), as you know, gives each Party
the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it believes its
supreme interests are jeopardized.
The United States did not and does not agree with the
Russian statement. We believe that the continued development
and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including
qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do
not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the
Russian Federation, and have provided policy and technical
explanations to Russia on why we believe that to be the case.
Although the United States cannot circumscribe Russia's
sovereign rights under Article XIV(3), we believe that the
continued improvement and deployment of U.S. missile defense
systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the
effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty, and
therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying
Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty.
Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I
am President, and as long as the Congress provides the
necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop
and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United
States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. My
Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA.
While advances of technology or future changes in the threat
could modify the details or timing of the later phases of the
EPAA--one reason this approach is called ``adaptive''--I will
take every action available to me to support the deployment
of all four phases.
Sincerely,
Barack Obama.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, on the basis of rule XXII and the question
of timely filing, I would object to this amendment being considered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is well taken. The
amendment falls.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, am I allowed to be heard on the point of
order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no debate on a point of order.
Mr. KIRK. Roger that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do not want the Senator to not have an
opportunity to be able to speak to this. I think he should be able to.
He certainly has that right in the context of his time. I will not
speak very long at all.
I want to thank the Senator from Arizona, my long-time friend, for
his very generous comments. I appreciate them personally. But also I
thank him for his willingness, under some circumstances that I know
were tough for him, in terms of how a lot of this played out. He
nevertheless sat with me, worked through these issues, and obviously I
wish we had been able to reach an agreement sometime earlier, but I am
glad he is there now on this amendment. I am glad we are able to accept
it.
I thank Senator Corker who has been a straight dealer throughout all
of this--no histrionics, no politics. I think he has really seen his
responsibilities on the Foreign Relations Committee in the best way and
has studied and thought and worked at and tried to find a way to solve
a problem, not create a problem. So I thank him for that approach to
this treaty.
I think this amendment, if I can say--I mean, I was here in the
Senate. I remember debating the first proposal of President Reagan with
respect to missile defense, which then was called the SDI, the
Strategic Defense Initiative, and became what we called Star Wars back
then. We have traveled a long distance since then. The world also has
changed significantly since then.
We no longer live in that sort of bipolar East-West, Soviet-U.S.-
dominated world. We are living in a multipolar, extraordinarily
complicated and significantly changed world in the context of the
threats we face. The threats we now face, particularly of a rogue
state, or of the possibility of a terrorist group stealing or putting
their hands on some loosely guarded materials and/or weapons, those are
possibilities that are real. We need to deal with this different kind
of threat.
I believe the President of the United States has been pursuing a
plan, building on what previous administrations have done; that is,
pursuing the right kind of approach to try to figure out: How do we
make all of us safer? Our hope is that the Russians will understand
this is not directed at them. This is directed at how we together can
build a structure in which all of us can share in a way that forces the
Irans and North Koreas and others to understand the futility, indeed
the counterproductivity of the direction in which they are moving.
So I think this is a good amendment to embrace within the instrument
of ratification what the President is doing anyway, what the
administration has been committed to doing anyway. I personally do not
think it was necessary--in order to achieve an appropriate
understanding of where the administration is going--but to whatever
degree it gives Senators the ability in the advice and consent process
to believe that we are appropriately putting Russians on notice as to
this course we are on, I think it reinforces what the President has
already done and said. I do not think they should view it as something
new or as an aberration from any course that we have been on. I
certainly do not view it that way.
I am confident they will see that we can build on this treaty in a
way that we share in the future strategies, analyses, perhaps even
technologies in the long run that will make all of us safer
[[Page S10957]]
and ultimately provide all of us with the ability to deal with the
realities of a nuclear world. Our goal is to make us safer, and we
believe this helps us do that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I join with the sentiments just expressed
by the chairman. I very much appreciate the statements made by Senator
McCain, Senator Lieberman, and my colleague on the Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Corker, who has worked diligently throughout the
hearings, the markup, and this debate.
I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to the amendment
that they have offered, 4904, as modified.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Just briefly on the remarks about the missile defense,
I have served as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and
ranking member and have been involved in it for quite a few years. I
think the language affirms the continued development of the two-stage,
ground-based interceptor. Then, I guess, I accept the language that
says ``as a technological and strategic hedge.''
But I would just say to my colleagues, the reason we are at this
point is because, during the negotiations with the Russians concerning
the New START treaty, the administration, responding to Russian
objections about missile defense--which were so unfounded and I could
never fathom--the administration agreed, in September of last year,
unilaterally, and to the utter surprise of Poland and the Czech
Republic, to cancel the planned two-stage GBI that was to be deployed
in 2016 in Poland.
It was a great embarrassment to our allies. They had been negotiating
with us for many years on this project. They had stood firm for it, and
the administration then promised this phase four SM-3 Block 2B. But it
was not on the drawing board, not under development, and cannot be
completed until 2020 if we as a Congress fund it over that decade. The
President certainly will not be in office at that time. So I am uneasy
about this whole matter of missile defense.
I think the administration made a colossal error in giving up on the
planned two-stage strategic policy. But this language is better than no
language. I thank my colleagues for moving forward with it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from North Dakota wants
to speak on this a little bit. I thought we might, if he was willing--
we could accept the amendment and then the Senator would have an
opportunity to speak.
Mr. President, we are prepared to accept this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 4904), as further modified, was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have an understanding--while it is not a
unanimous consent request yet, we have an understanding with Senator
Kyl that is the last amendment. We are waiting for the agreed-upon
language from both leaderships in order to arrive at a time for the
vote. It is our understanding that other issues that were part of the
equation of when that vote might take place have been resolved. So, as
a result, I think Senators can anticipate that, hopefully, sometime
soon that unanimous consent request will be propounded.
Until then, Senators are free to talk on the treaty and I look
forward to their comments.
Can I say one word, Mr. President? I apologize.
Earlier when I was thanking folks, I meant to, and I neglected to
because I jumped over to thank Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher.
As we all know, she was a Member of the House, spent a lot of time on
separate issues. In fact, she chaired one of the subcommittees of the
Armed Services Committee. She logged a lot of miles and worked her
heart out to assist in the evolution of this treaty. She has, as we all
know, been fighting cancer. She just recently had cancer surgery. We
wish her well in her recovery and express our gratitude to her for her
work.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts and
Senators McCain and Lieberman.
There are probably still some folks making up their minds on this
treaty. I think most people have debated this at length and discussed
it at length off the floor.
Our side has raised a number of questions. We have tried to cross
every t and dot every i. This has been done in a very methodical way. I
thank the chairman for the way he has worked with us. I thank Senator
Lugar for his longstanding leadership in this regard. I thank the
administration officials who have absolutely bent over backward to try
to solve every problem that has come up. The administration has not
only solved problems for people who might vote for the treaty, they
have tried to solve problems for people who they know will not vote for
the treaty. We have some Members on our side who I know are still
making up their minds. I have been involved in this for a long time. I
enjoyed this. I think this is an incredibly serious matter.
I have two daughters and a wife I love. National security is
something that is important to all of us. None of us wants anything bad
to happen to this country. But to my friends on this side of the aisle
who still may have some questions, there is no way in the world we
would have the commitments we have on nuclear modernization if it were
not for the process of this treaty. Now with Senator Kyl's amendment
being accepted, we are even fast-tracking that. There is no way in the
world the unilateral statements that are going to be presented to
Russia are going to be made regarding missile defense would be
occurring without this treaty being in place. I don't think there is a
person in the world who has debated seriously whether 1,550 warheads
being deployed in any way affects this country's national security.
To those of you who may still be wavering, I believe every issue that
has been raised has been answered strongly and legitimately. We have
put forth what our posture is on nuclear armaments more clearly than we
have done in recent times. I hope people will come to the same
conclusion, that this is good for the country.
I thank all those who have allowed me to be involved the way that I
have. I urge support, whenever the vote occurs, for a treaty that I
believe absolutely makes our country safer. With all these
accommodations, at some point, it seems that the right thing to do is
to say yes to yes.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of discussion
about modernization this morning. I have listened to much of it and was
not going to come to the floor, but I do want the record to show
clearly what the numbers are on modernization. It is important to the
future for us to understand what has been done and what is being done
and what will be done.
I chair the Appropriations Subcommittee that funds nuclear weapons
activities. I have spoken about this previously. It is very important
going forward that we all understand what not only this administration
but the previous administration has proposed with respect to
modernization. I agree with my colleague from Kentucky. It is
encouraging, at the end of this debate, that two bipartisan amendments
represent the conclusion of this very important debate. We often debate
things that are of lesser importance or of greater importance and
sometimes don't always see the difference between the two. But this is
one of those cases where if we ratify the START agreement today, when
all is said and done, more will have been done than said. That is very
unusual in a political body.
When I say ``more will have been done than said,'' it is so
unbelievably important to try to reduce the number of nuclear weapons
and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. But there is a subtext to
all the other things we have discussed, which is why I want to put in
the record the funding for the nuclear weapons issues. That subtext is
money, money related to national security. We are a country with a $13
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trillion debt. Modernization is expensive. Yet it relates to our
national security. National missile defense, which we have heard a lot
about, is very expensive. I understand that also relates to national
security. But this issue of getting our debt under control and our
fiscal policy under control is just as much a part of the national
security interests of this country.
The subtext to these discussions--modernization, missile defense--is
about funding as well and getting this country's economic house in
order.
Let me mention the issue of nuclear weapons modernization. In fiscal
year 2010, we were spending $6.3 billion on the modernization program
on nuclear weapons activities. In fiscal year 2011, it went to $7
billion, up 10 percent--so a 10-percent increase for the nuclear
weapons activities in President Obama's budget request. That 10-percent
increase was unusual because most accounts were flat or some had cuts.
But nuclear weapons got a 10-percent increase. The proposal for 2011, a
$600 million increase but $7 billion total, was actually short-
circuited and put in the continuing resolution. All the other funding
in the CR is flat funding from the previous year. But the funding for
the nuclear weapons programs at 10 percent higher was put into the CR.
Those programs and those programs alone get the higher funding. That $7
billion was not all that was to be spent. Another $4 billion emerged. I
heard about that on the radio while driving in North Dakota, that
another $4 billion had been put into this pot for modernization. The
additional funding from the 1251 report, which was produced in the
fall, means 2012 funding would go from $6.3 billion in 2010, $7 billion
in 2011, to $7.6 billion in 2012. That is a $1.2 billion increase in 2
years.
Linton Brooks, the fellow who ran the National Nuclear Security
Administration and who did a good job in that role, said:
I would've killed for this kind of budget.
He is referring to $1.12 billion increase and two 10 percent
increases, while much of the other budget was flat. We are talking
about $85 billion for the next decade on these weapons activities, an
increase of $8.5 billion in the next 5 years over what was portrayed in
the 2010 budget. We are talking about a lot of additional money that
has been committed. It shows a commitment to build two nuclear
facilities that were discussed earlier. I want to mention them because
it is important to understand what we are doing, the uranium processing
facility at the Y-12 production complex and the chemistry and
metallurgy research replacement facility at Los Alamos. There were
moneys in the 2012 budget in construction funds for these two
facilities, not as much as some would want in the Senate. But the fact
is, the design of these two facilities is only 45 percent complete. We
don't fund things that are 45 percent designed. To come out here and
say we ought to be providing robust funding for buildings that are not
even designed just makes no sense. Why, NNSA can't have confidence in
its funding needs until it reaches about a 90-percent design point and
that will be in 2013.
I listened this morning to this discussion and I think what the
chairman has done and what Senator Kyl has done in reaching an
agreement is fine. But I want the record to show that this
administration has proposed robust increases in 2010, 2011, 2012, and
for a 5-year period in these modernization accounts, life extension
programs--robust increases. Even that is not enough for some. They want
to put money into buildings that are not yet designed. That doesn't
make much sense to me.
My point is, when we add up all of this, the subtext is how are we
going to pay for it. Because it is easy to talk about authorizing, to
talk about appropriating. The question is, Where does the money come
from at a time when we are borrowing 40 cents of everything we spend in
this government? The subtext of money and debt is also a significant
part of this country's national security. If we don't get our fiscal
house in order, all these debates will pale by comparison. We can't
lose our economy and have a future collapse of the economy because the
rest of the world has very little confidence in our ability to make
smart decisions. We can't risk all that and believe we are going to be
a world economic power moving forward. If we are going to remain a
world economic power--and we can, and I believe we will--it will be
because we start making some smart, tough, courageous decisions. That
is more than just calling for more money, more spending, which was most
of this morning's discussion.
I don't object to the amendment. My colleagues have raised important
issues. But it is important to understand we have made great progress
on the modernization funding programs in the past months, and this
administration has moved very aggressively to meet those needs and meet
those concerns. That is important with respect to the public record.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I have given a lot of thought to the
treaty, and having been involved in missile defense and nuclear issues
serving on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of Armed Services, as
ranking member and chairman, many of the provisions in the treaty are
acceptable and should pose no threat to our national security. But
considered as part of the administration's stated foreign policy and
strategic policy and in relation to the reality of the world situation
today, I do not believe the treaty will make us safer. I think that is
a good test.
I disagree with my colleagues who are overly confident that this is
going to make the world safer. I believe the treaty, for that reason,
should be rejected.
Some say a defeat for the treaty would harm the United States. I
think the entire world would see the Senate action as a resurgence of
America's historical policy of peace through strength and a rejection
of a leftist vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The negotiating
posture statements and actions of Russia indicate it is regressing
sadly into an old Soviet mindset as it views the outside world. This is
disappointing and indicative of anything but the positive reset we hope
to achieve with them. It is extremely important for Russian and U.S.
security and world security, that Russia sees its role as a positive
force for peace and security. These negotiations, however, show the
face of the old Soviet Union. They have been so relentless in the way
they have negotiated.
Negotiations with any mature power, especially Russia, are difficult
and serious. This administration began with a naive expectation that a
treaty could be quickly achieved that would show their leadership
towards peace and a nuclear-free world. The Obama administration wanted
to set an example for other nations to reduce their nuclear weapons
towards a world without any nuclear weapons. We have heard this
leadership and this setting of an example theme repeatedly from the
President and the administration. But Russia has not the slightest
interest in such vague concepts, nor in eliminating all nuclear
weapons. They have no idea or intention ever of relinquishing nuclear
weapons. They are focused on their own national interest, on coming out
ahead in the negotiations for military, political, psychological, and
hegemonic reasons.
It seems clear to me that Russia got what it wanted and President
Obama got a treaty paper which strategically means very little but can
be touted as a victory for peace.
So this is what I have concluded during this debate--and the debate
has been helpful--the debate has caused me to think through a good bit
of this. A longer debate at a different time of the year, I think,
could have helped all of our colleagues. I do not believe the success
in negotiation of the treaty will in any way make the Russians more
cooperative, as the administration has repeatedly suggested.
Russia has been inconsistent at best in helping the United States
with the danger of nuclear Iran and North Korea--the gravest threats to
peace in the world, with military action being undertaken against our
ally, South Korea, in recent weeks, and with the real possibility of an
attack on Iran's nuclear weapons that, hopefully, can be avoided.
Why has Russia not been more cooperative? They blocked a resolution
condemning North Korea Sunday in the U.N. Russia attacked Georgia, a
sovereign nation, and continues to occupy Georgian territory. This
shocking act
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of aggression condemned by independent bodies goes without any real
U.S. response. Georgia is a pro-American, free market, independent
nation whose attack was calculated and deliberate.
Russia continues to work to undermine the pro-Western democracy
movement in the Ukraine. They continue a host of actions that evidence
a long-term plan to effect a real or de facto reabsorption of these
three nations into what was the old Soviet Union.
So these ominous trends, it seems to me, have not been seriously
considered throughout this quest for the treaty. The events do not give
me confidence that the treaty, therefore, is a positive step for the
United States, the world, or for peace.
Secondly, as I noted, and I will not go into detail now, the
administration conceded the two-staged, ground-based interceptor site
that would have been established in Poland, that would provide
redundant protection to the United States from an Iranian missile and
protected virtually all of Europe from an Iranian missile. That was
given away unilaterally by the administration without prior warning to
our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic. They heard about it in the
paper. They realized the United States had gone behind them, our
allies, and made a deal with the Russians. It was a very unfortunate
event, indeed.
The plan that has been talked about--the fourth phase of the SM-3
Phased Adaptive Approach--is not even on the drawing board and is
unlikely to actually survive. It would be difficult to see it surviving
in five different budget cycles over the next 10 years it would take to
develop that system. We walked away from one that could be deployed
soon.
I offered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to make clear the Senate
does not concur in an ill-conceived vision of the administration that
would move us to a world without nuclear weapons. I thank Senators Kyl,
LeMieux, Cornyn, Chambliss, and Inhofe for cosponsoring the amendment.
While I will not insist on a vote at this hour, this matter will be a
significant subject for the future.
Thirdly, I would suggest the treaty is promoted as a step towards a
world free of nuclear weapons. This is a fantastical idea that goes
beyond insignificance, it is dangerous. Basing any policy, especially a
nuclear policy, on an idea as cockamamie as zero nuclear weapons in the
world can only lead to confusion and uncertainty. Confusion and
uncertainty are the polar opposites of the necessary attributes of
security and stability. These are the essentials of good strategic
policy: security and stability.
Thus, the Obama policy creates a more dangerous world. Some say the
President's zero nukes policy is just a distant vision, some vague
wish, so don't worry. The situation would be much better if that were
so, but it is not. President Obama has made zero nuclear weapons a
cornerstone of our defense policy. It has, amazingly, already been made
a centerpiece of our military policy, being advanced by concrete steps
today. Presidents, Commanders-in-Chief, have the power to make such
monumental changes in policy, and this President is certainly doing so.
The change is seen most seriously in the critically important Nuclear
Posture Review produced in April 2010 by the Defense Department. This
document is a formal document produced by the new administration's
Defense Department. The determination to pursue the zero nuclear
weapons vision is seen throughout this review. Amazingly, there are 30
references in that document to a world without nuclear weapons.
The NPR begins with an introductory letter from Secretary of Defense
Gates, the second sentence of which says this:
As the President said in Prague last year, a world without
nuclear weapons will not be achieved quickly, but we must
begin to take concrete steps today.
The Executive Summary further drives the issue home. The first
sentence in the Executive Summary recalls that President Obama, in
Prague, highlighted nuclear dangers and said:
The United States will seek the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons.
The first sentence in the second paragraph of the NPR is particularly
ominous and even chilling to me. Posture Reviews are defense reviews,
and by their nature are bottom-up reports, driven by threat assessments
and the requirements necessary to defend America. These reviews
historically are objective analyses from experts, not political
reports. The troubling line reads:
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the
Administration's approach to promoting the President's agenda
for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world
without nuclear weapons.
This statement reveals the whole truth. The NPR is the President's
policy, sent from the top down, not the bottom up. Stunningly, the
report lacks a clear focus on the only objective that counts: Securing
a nuclear arsenal second to none that can, under any circumstances,
deter attacks on and defend the United States and its allies.
Fourthly, the Obama vision of a world without nuclear weapons has not
been well received. Indeed, the breadth of the criticism from experts
and world leaders is noteworthy.
Two years ago, Congress adopted an amendment I proposed that called
for a commission to review the strategic posture of the United States.
It was bipartisan and chaired by former Secretaries of Defense Dr.
William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger. The commission powerfully
dismissed the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. In somewhat
diplomatic but clear and strong language, they said this:
The conditions that might make possible the global
elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and
their creation would require a fundamental transformation of
the world political order.
They went on to say this:
All of the commission members believe that reaching the
ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a
fundamental change in geopolitics.
Maybe the Second Coming.
Others have dismissed this concept as a wild chimera. French
President Sarkozy, from one of our European allies, France, said this:
It [our nuclear deterrent] is neither a matter of prestige
nor a question of rank, it is quite simply the Nation's life
insurance policy.
He made clear they had no intention of giving that up.
Secretary James Schlesinger, back when President Reagan was meeting
in Reykjavik over nuclear issues, made this wise comment:
Nuclear arsenals are going to be with us as long as there
are sovereign states with conflicting ideologies. Unlike
Aladdin with his lamp, we have no way to force the nuclear
genie back into the bottle. A world without nuclear weapons
is a utopian dream.
Keith Payne, who served on this nuclear commission, writing recently
in the National Review, said:
The presumption that United States movement toward nuclear
disarmament will deliver nonproliferation success is a
fantasy. On the contrary, the United States nuclear arsenal
has itself been the single most important tool for
nonproliferation in history, and dismantling it would be a
huge setback.
Remember the commission.
Jonathan Tepperman, in Newsweek, said:
And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel,
India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their
weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could
quickly and secretly rearm.
Gideon Rachman, in Financial Times, said:
The idea of a world free of nuclear weapons is not so much
an impossible dream as an impossible nightmare.
William Kristol, writing in the Washington Post, in October, said:
Yet to justify a world without nuclear weapons, what Obama
would really have to envision is a world without war, or
without threats of war. . . .The danger is that the allure of
a world without nuclear weapons can be a distraction--even an
excuse for not acting against real nuclear threats. . . .So
while Obama talks of a future without nuclear weapons, the
trajectory we are on today is toward a nuclear--and missile-
capable North Korea and Iran--and a far more dangerous world.
Others have also written about this.
David Von Drehle, writing in Time Magazine, said:
A world with nuclear weapons in it is a scary, scary place
to think about. The industrialized world without nuclear
weapons was a scary, scary place for real. But there is no
way to un-ring the nuclear bell. The science and technology
of nuclear weapons is widespread, and if nukes are outlawed
someday, only outlaws will have nukes.
Kenneth Waltz, leading arms controller and professor emeritus of
political science at UC Berkeley, said:
[[Page S10960]]
We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's
striking and against all historical precedent that for that
substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear
states.
Importantly, the administration's planned further diminishment of our
nuclear stockpile--further diminishing it from these numbers--and
President Obama's hostility to the utility of nuclear weapons generally
has caused a great deal of unease among our non-nuclear allies. These
nations are not so open about their concerns, but the problem is a very
real one.
The American nuclear umbrella, our extended deterrence, has allowed
our allies, free democratic nations, to remain nuclear free, without
having nuclear weapons. But if the Obama policy continues, the Perry-
Schlesinger report concludes real dangers may await:
If we are unsuccessful in dealing with current challenges,
we may find ourselves at a tipping point, where many
additional states conclude that they require nuclear
deterrents of their own. If this tipping point is itself
mishandled, we may well find ourselves faced with a cascade
of proliferation.
The nuclear commission--President Obama appointed a number of the
Members on the Democratic side--said that if our allies who feel they
have been protected by our nuclear umbrella become uncertain, we could
be faced with a cascade of proliferation. Is that what we want? I know
the President wants nonproliferation. I know that is what he wants. I
am not attacking his goal. Throughout my remarks, I am raising the
question of whether these goals will be furthered by the actions of
this treaty and these policies or whether they will not.
One final concern. The administration has made it clear that this
treaty's nuclear reductions are just the first step in a long march to
a nuclear-free world. Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, who
negotiated the treaty, said in April:
We will also seek to include non-strategic, non-deployed
weapons in future reductions.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and
former Ambassador Alexander Vershbow a few weeks ago said that the
administration, in follow-on talks, will seek further reductions in
strategic, nondeployed, and nonstrategic weapons. And the President has
said that repeatedly.
We Senators, in the end, only have our judgment. My best judgment
tells me that if our weapons fall too low in numbers, such an event
could inspire rogue and dangerous lesser nuclear powers to seek to
become peer nuclear competitors to the United States--a dangerous event
for the entire world. Thus, I must conclude that the Obama plan is to
diminish the power and leadership of the United States. Carefully read,
this is what the goal does. I think this conclusion cannot be disputed.
The leader of the one nation that has been the greatest force for
freedom and stability in the world, with our large nuclear arsenal, is
displaying a naivete beyond imagining.
Since this treaty is a calculated step in the President's plan to
achieve dangerous and unacceptable policies, this treaty must not be
ratified. The treaty and the policy behind it must be rejected.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. We are shortly going to propound a unanimous consent
request. I have been saying that a couple of times now, but we really
are shortly going to do it. There are several Senators who wish to
speak. I would like to see if we could set up an order for them.
I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Washington proceed for
10 minutes, then the Senator from Texas for up to 10 minutes, then the
Senator from North Dakota for 5 minutes. I ask unanimous consent also
that each of those Senators would allow the interruption for the
propounding of the unanimous consent request if it comes during the
time they are speaking.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.