[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10953-S10960]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                Amendment No. 4892, as Further Modified

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe at the desk now is the Kyl 
amendment, as modified.
  I am sorry about the confusion. Mr. President, I ask unanimous 
consent that we be able to immediately proceed to the Kyl amendment. We 
will come right back to the Corker amendment, but I ask unanimous 
consent to proceed to the Kyl amendment, as modified, with the 
modification that has been submitted at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4892), as further modified, is as follows:

       At the end of subsection (a), add the following:
       (11) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to 
     the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) accelerate to the extent possible the design and 
     engineering phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
     Replacement (CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing 
     Facility (UPF); and
       (B) request full funding, including on a multi-year basis 
     as appropriate, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
     Replacement building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon 
     completion of the design and engineering phase for such 
     facilities.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe Senator Kyl wishes to say 
something.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will comment more when I make my concluding 
comments, but what we have just done is to agree to provide a mechanism 
for the President to certify a way forward to fund the two large 
facilities that are part of the nuclear weapons complex in a way that 
we hope will provide for the most efficient way to build these 
facilities and to get them constructed as rapidly as possible.
  The result of this is that, potentially, we could save hundreds of 
millions of dollars and construct the facilities at an earlier date 
than was originally intended. But to be clear, nothing in this 
amendment reduces the President's decisionmaking or flexibility. It 
remains his decision as to how the funding is requested and when it is 
requested.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I agree with the comments of the Senator. 
It does leave the President that important ability, but it also puts 
the question of whether this is a way that is more efficient. It is 
something we should be looking at, and the President intends to look at 
it. We will accept this amendment.
  Mr. President, I don't think there is further debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4892), as further modified, was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 4904

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank Senator Kyl and the Chair, and now, 
Mr. President, I believe the Corker amendment is the pending business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to again say that we have asked by 
unanimous consent to change this to be the McCain-Lieberman-Corker 
amendment, and we have also added Senators Alexander, Brown of 
Massachusetts,  Murkowski, Johanns, Levin, and Bayh as cosponsors.
  As a matter of tremendous respect and courtesy, I think it would be 
best for Senator McCain to be the first speaker on this amendment that 
he was very involved in developing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senators Lieberman, 
and Senator Corker, I have an amendment at the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving--I believe the Senator is 
referring to the amendment that is pending?
  Mr. CORKER. That is correct.
  Mr. KERRY. It is the pending amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. First of all, it is probably not too relevant, but I 
would like to say that this should have been the Lieberman-Corker-
McCain or Corker-Lieberman-McCain amendment because of the distribution 
of effort that has been made on this amendment. Be that as it may, I 
think this amendment makes some improvement that will be very helpful.
  It has two parts. The first requires the President to certify that we 
do not recognize Russia's argument that the treaty can only be 
effective and viable only in conditions where the United States is not 
building up its missile defenses. The statement would also be 
transmitted to the Russians when the instruments of ratification are 
exchanged. Second, the amendment would include in the instrument an 
understanding that the preamble is not legally binding.

[[Page S10954]]

  I think this is a helpful amendment, and I appreciate that it could 
be included by the Senator from Massachusetts, but ultimately it does 
not address my concerns that the Russians believe the treaty could be 
used to limit our missile defense. We should have removed this clause 
from the preamble.
  The message sent by the first part of this amendment is positive, but 
it is not conveyed to the Duma. When we look at the fact--I understand 
why the proponents of this treaty would not want to transmit this 
aspect of the treaty to the Duma for fear of some backlash and perhaps 
problems in the Russian Duma, although it is not a body that is 
renowned for its independence, to say the least. The fact is, it will 
not be transmitted to the Duma. The fact is, if the Russians and the 
United States agreed to a treaty and a part of that treaty was not 
transmitted to the Senate, I think that would be something to which 
most of us would take strong exception.
  I thank Senator Corker. He has worked extremely hard on this issue. 
Joe Lieberman has worked extremely hard, trying to reach a point, 
obviously, that they could agree to support this treaty. Whether they 
eventually do or not is something that I neither know nor would 
predict, but I do think it shows some improvement. I still have various 
concerns, as I have had from the beginning, on the issue of defensive 
missile systems, how it would play, whether it is actually part of the 
treaty and, if so, how enforceable.
  What complicates this more than anything else is the continued 
statements, public statements on American television a short time ago--
Vladimir Putin saying that if we move forward with improving our 
missile defenses, they would take ``appropriate actions.'' Their 
Foreign Minister has made repeated statements--not last year but last 
month--saying one thing and publicly declaring it while on the other 
hand we are assuming this will prevent them from doing what they say 
they will do. That is a contradiction.
  I understand how solemn treaties are, and I understand how binding 
treaties are. I also understand that when the leader of a nation says 
on ``Larry King Live''--God bless you, Larry, for everything you did 
for us--that they will have to take ``appropriate actions'' if we 
improve quantitatively or qualitatively our strategic missile defense 
systems, then obviously you have to give some credence to that, when 
public statements are made. Obviously, in the view of Senator Kerry, 
who has done a masterful job in shepherding this treaty through the 
Senate in the last several days, that is not that meaningful. So we 
just have a fundamental disagreement of opinion. But I can say this: If 
we negotiated a treaty and made certain agreements and the President of 
the United States made public statements on national or international 
television contradicting that, then I think it would give the party we 
are in negotiations with significant pause.
  Not one statement that I have been able to find has a Russian 
leader--either Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, or Prime Minister or 
President--saying they will adhere to the provisions that are in this 
amendment. That is a fundamental contradiction that I am sorry cannot 
be resolved.
  I know what the votes are going to be on this treaty. Again, I 
congratulate Senator Kerry for the incredible job he has done and, 
frankly, his great willingness to talk with me and negotiate with me 
and have dialog and work toward a common goal. He has done that in good 
faith, and I am grateful for the opportunity he has given me to play a 
role, including agreeing to this amendment which I think will improve 
the treaty.
  I wish to say that I know how difficult this has been for Senator 
Corker and other Members on this side.
  I thank Senator Lieberman for the continued hard work he does on this 
issue.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I think it is very 
helpful.
  With that, I yield to my colleagues, cosponsors of the amendment, if 
that is agreeable to Senator Kerry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Senator Corker and I had a vote--
actually, Senator Corker, Senator McCain, and I had a vote on whose 
name should be first on this, and Senator Corker and I won, 2 to 1. 
Senator McCain's name is first because this is an amendment that 
attempts to deal in a unifying way with our concern that the Russians 
misunderstand the impact of this treaty or the impact of our 
development of missile defenses on this treaty and that it is important 
for us to speak out in unity, in a unified and clear voice, to the 
Russians, and no one has made that point more clearly as the treaty has 
been considered than Senator McCain. In fact, he offered an amendment 
earlier in our deliberations on the treaty which I supported, which did 
not pass, which would have removed the section of the preamble that has 
obviously been put in by the Russians in the negotiations which is 
confusing at best and downright mischievous at worst.
  This is the section that says:

       Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between 
     strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that 
     this interrelationship will become more important as 
     strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current 
     strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and 
     effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

  That is the end of the quote from the preamble. It strikes me as I 
read it that it will be a topic of consideration in law schools and 
classes on international law. The first question is, What did it mean? 
But I think the Russians had a particular intent in putting it in 
there, and they know what they wanted it to mean.
  What is troubling is that when the treaty was signed earlier in the 
year in Prague, the Russian Federation issued a statement that 
basically made these same points--that the treaty will be effective and 
viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative 
buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States 
of America.
  But these are two separate categories. This treaty, the START treaty, 
is all about reducing the offensive capabilities, nuclear and delivery 
capabilities of both great powers. We are building a missile defense 
system. It started out as a very controversial matter. It started out a 
long time ago--President Reagan, really, initially, and then serious 
consideration in the 1990s when a lot of people argued against it and 
said it was a waste of money and it would never work technologically, 
that you couldn't create a bullet that would hit a bullet. Yet that is 
exactly what we have done. Thank God that we invested the money and 
that our scientists and military leaders have brought it as far it is 
because one of the great threats that will face the people of the 
United States, our national security, will come from missiles carrying 
weapons of mass destruction fired particularly by rogue nations such as 
Iran and North Korea. It would be irresponsible of us not to have 
developed a capacity to defend against those kinds of missile attacks. 
We have done that.
  The Russians keep wanting to link that to this treaty. It is not 
linked to the treaty. Therefore, I regretted that section was in the 
preamble I read. The United States responded through the State 
Department to that statement by the Russian Government when they signed 
the treaty. But it is really important for us, at the same time the 
instruments of ratification are conveyed to the Russian Government, to 
make a clear and direct statement of our understanding of the total 
nonrelationship between the development of our missile defense 
capability and the START treaty.

  That is what this amendment does. I am privileged to cosponsor it 
with Senator McCain, Senator Corker, and a number of other Members of 
both parties. Basically, it says that before the New START treaty could 
enter into force, the President shall certify to the Senate--basically, 
this is certifying what the President said in a letter sent to Senator 
Reid a few days ago--and at the time of the exchange of instruments of 
ratification shall communicate directly to the Russian Federation that, 
No. 1, we are going to continue development and deployment of a missile 
defense system to defend against missile threats from nations such as--
and I would add ``not limited to''--North Korea and Iran.
  No. 2, what do we mean by qualitative and quantitative improvement

[[Page S10955]]

of such systems that we are going to be continuing? This is very 
important. We define that here to include all phases of the phased 
adaptive approach to missile defenses in Europe embraced now by our 
NATO allies; second, the modernization of the ground-based midcourse 
defense system; and third, the continued development of the two-stage 
ground-based interceptor as a technological and strategic hedge.
  We are being as direct as we can be here to the Russians. Some of my 
colleagues have said--and the record, unfortunately, shows it--that 
their record for complying with treaties is not a good one. We don't 
want to enter into this one with any misunderstandings or covering up 
the truth. We are saying here loudly and clearly that the United States 
is going to continue to develop all of these different forms of missile 
defense to protect our security and that has nothing to do with this 
START treaty.
  I think the third section here is very important. We say:

       The U.S. believes that these systems [missile defense 
     systems] do not and will not threaten the strategic balance 
     with the Russian Federation. Consequently, while the U.S. 
     cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian 
     Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the [START] 
     Treaty--

  Which is the section that gives nations the right to withdraw under 
extraordinary circumstances--nonetheless, if we adopt this, when we 
adopt it, this amendment, we are saying here:

       The United States believes continued improvement and 
     deployment of United States missile defense systems do not 
     constitute a basis for questioning the effectiveness and 
     viability of the Treaty, and therefore would not give rise to 
     circumstances justifying the withdrawal of the Russian 
     Federation from the treaty.

  We are trying to manage our relationship with the Russian Federation 
in a way that is conducive to the security of our country and the 
security of the world.
  We disagree with the Russians on an awful lot of things, including 
human rights and values and freedom of the press--which the current 
government in Russia has so aggressively suppressed. So we want to be 
honest with them and direct with them and not enter into this important 
treaty with any illusions. I believe we have said that clearly. If it 
passes, it will be presented to the Russian Government directly.
  I am very pleased we have a broad, bipartisan group supporting this. 
It is a unified way to conclude our deliberations here before we go to 
vote on ratification, and I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor to the Senator from Tennessee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to add Senator 
Begich as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am thrilled to join with Senator McCain 
and Senator Lieberman in an amendment dealing with missile defense. 
This is a subject that has been discussed ever since this treaty was 
first presented.
  I cannot think of a better way to end this debate. I thank Senator 
Kerry for having the patience of Job, having worked through this. 
Somebody mentioned deals and where they have been taking place. They 
have been taking place on the Senate floor. We have been working on 
this for a long time. We have gone through intelligence briefings. We 
have gone through incredible numbers of hearings. I think this has been 
done exactly in the right way.
  I thank the Senator for his leadership. I thank Senator Lugar for his 
leadership on nuclear armaments in general. The Senator has been 
pursuing that for years.
  So we have before us an amendment on missile defense. Again, it has 
been discussed in great detail. This says three things. Senator 
Lieberman certainly talked about much of the detail, but the President 
the other day sent us a letter declaring, in very strident ways, his 
commitment to both the phased-adaptive approach to missile defense, 
which will take place in Europe, and our ground-based interceptors. He 
has said that absolutely in strident terms.
  What this amendment does is certifies to Congress--he certifies to 
Congress--that he is going to continue those efforts. He will continue 
those efforts on phased-adaptive approach and ground-based 
interceptors.
  Second, we have been concerned about what Russia thinks as it relates 
to this treaty. When we exchange the instruments of ratification, when 
we exchange the documents when ratifying this treaty, they are going to 
be told that we, in fact, are continuing to pursue our missile defenses 
in every way possible, and that in no way affects our relationship from 
that standpoint as it relates to this treaty. I think that is 
incredibly strong.
  Then, third, we have talked about this preamble, and every one of us 
knows the preamble is nonbinding. But as an understanding of this 
treaty going forward, we are telling the Russians that the preamble 
absolutely is not binding and that we are pursuing these missile 
defense applications that have been discussed. I am proud to join with 
Senator McCain, with Senator Lieberman, two people who care as deeply 
about our national security as anybody in the United States, certainly 
in this Senate. I am proud to have the other Members of the Senate who 
have joined in.
  Let me just say in closing, I think it is absolutely appropriate that 
the last two amendments we address are the Kyl amendment which deals 
with modernization--the President has made incredible investments in 
modernization that have come about through this entire process, a 
commitment to ensure that the nuclear arsenal we have is one that 
operates, that is reliable, that is safe.
  I think people know we have 1,550 deployed warheads--after this 
treaty goes into effect, over a long period of time, we reduce to that 
number, but that we have roughly 3,500 other warheads that, again, will 
continue to be modernized and made available, if necessary.
  So I want to say that in accepting the Kyl amendment and all of the 
things that have come with it--the letter from the appropriators and 
accepting this missile defense amendment--if that ends up being the 
case, and I hope it will be by unanimous consent shortly, I think what 
we have done throughout this entire process has strengthened our 
country's national security.
  I can say: Look, this is called the New START, but I could call this 
the Missile Defense and Nuclear Modernization Act of 2010 because all 
of these things have come into play to make our country safer. I want 
to thank the chairman. I want to thank the administration for walking 
through, over the last 6 months, and helping us cross t's and dot i's. 
I think this treaty is good for our country. I think this treaty 
enhances our national security. I thank the chairman for the way he has 
worked with us to get it into that position, certainly Senators McCain 
and Lieberman for helping take the lead on this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.


                Amendment No. 4922 to Amendment No. 4904

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I have a second-degree amendment at the 
desk, No. 4922.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Kirk] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4922 to Amendment No. 4904.

  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To provide an additional understanding regarding the December 
 18, 2010, letter from President Obama to the Senate regarding missile 
                                defense)

       On page 2, after line 19, add the following:
       (2) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the United 
     States that the advice and consent of the Senate to the New 
     START Treaty is subject to the understanding, which shall be 
     transmitted to the Russian Federation at the time of the 
     exchange of instruments of ratification, stated in the letter 
     transmitted by President Barack Obama to the Majority Leader 
     of the United States Senate on December 18, 2010, the text of 
     which is as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                    Washington, December 18, 2010.
     Hon. Harry M. Reid,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Reid: As the Senate considers the New START 
     Treaty, I want to

[[Page S10956]]

     share with you my views on the issue of missile defense, 
     which has been the subject of much debate in the Senate's 
     review of the Treaty.
       Pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
     (Public Law 106-38), it has long been the policy of the 
     United States to deploy as soon as is technologically 
     possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable 
     of defending the territory of the United States against 
     limited ballistic missile attack, whether accidental, 
     unauthorized, or deliberate. Thirty ground-based interceptors 
     based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
     California, are now defending the nation. All United States 
     missile defense programs--including all phases of the 
     European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (EPAA) 
     and programs to defend United States deployed forces, allies, 
     and partners against regional threats--are consistent with 
     this policy.
       The New START Treaty places no limitations on the 
     development or deployment of our missile defense programs. As 
     the NATO Summit meeting in Lisbon last month underscored, we 
     are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe 
     designed to provide full coverage for NATO members on the 
     continent, as well as deployed U.S. forces, against the 
     growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic 
     missiles. The final phase of the system will also augment our 
     current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles 
     from Iran targeted against the United States.
       All NATO allies agreed in Lisbon that the growing threat of 
     missile proliferation, and our Article 5 commitment of 
     collective defense, requires that the Alliance develop a 
     territorial missile defense capability. The Alliance further 
     agreed that the EPAA, which I announced in September 2009, 
     will be a crucial contribution to this capability. Starting 
     in 2011, we will begin deploying the first phase of the EPAA, 
     to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and 
     medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases, 
     we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-based 
     Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in Romania and Poland 
     to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range 
     ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planned for the end 
     of the decade, further upgrades of the SM-3 interceptor will 
     provide an ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our 
     defense of NATO European territory, as well as that of the 
     United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from 
     Iran.
       The Lisbon decisions represent an historic achievement, 
     making clear that all NATO allies believe we need an 
     effective territorial missile defense to defend against the 
     threats we face now and in the future. The EPAA represents 
     the right response. At Lisbon, the Alliance also invited the 
     Russian Federation to cooperate on missile defense, which 
     could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed 
     by NATO to enhance our common security against common 
     threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the 
     Alliance's missile defenses can be strengthened by improving 
     NATO-Russian relations.
       This comes even as we have made clear that the system we 
     intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and 
     it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile 
     defense capabilities. Effective cooperation with Russia could 
     enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our 
     combined territorial missile defenses, and at the same time 
     provide Russia with greater security. Irrespective of how 
     cooperation with Russia develops, the Alliance alone bears 
     responsibility for defending NATO's members, consistent with 
     our Treaty obligations for collective defense. The EPAA and 
     NATO's territorial missile defense capability will allow us 
     to do that.
       In signing the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation 
     issued a statement that expressed its view that the 
     extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty 
     include a ``build-up in the missile defense capabilities of 
     the United States of America such that it would give rise to 
     a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian 
     Federation.'' Article XIV(3), as you know, gives each Party 
     the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it believes its 
     supreme interests are jeopardized.
       The United States did not and does not agree with the 
     Russian statement. We believe that the continued development 
     and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including 
     qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do 
     not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the 
     Russian Federation, and have provided policy and technical 
     explanations to Russia on why we believe that to be the case. 
     Although the United States cannot circumscribe Russia's 
     sovereign rights under Article XIV(3), we believe that the 
     continued improvement and deployment of U.S. missile defense 
     systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the 
     effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty, and 
     therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying 
     Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty.
       Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I 
     am President, and as long as the Congress provides the 
     necessary funding, the United States will continue to develop 
     and deploy effective missile defenses to protect the United 
     States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. My 
     Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the EPAA. 
     While advances of technology or future changes in the threat 
     could modify the details or timing of the later phases of the 
     EPAA--one reason this approach is called ``adaptive''--I will 
     take every action available to me to support the deployment 
     of all four phases.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Barack Obama.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, on the basis of rule XXII and the question 
of timely filing, I would object to this amendment being considered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of order is well taken. The 
amendment falls.
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. President, am I allowed to be heard on the point of 
order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no debate on a point of order.
  Mr. KIRK. Roger that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do not want the Senator to not have an 
opportunity to be able to speak to this. I think he should be able to. 
He certainly has that right in the context of his time. I will not 
speak very long at all.
  I want to thank the Senator from Arizona, my long-time friend, for 
his very generous comments. I appreciate them personally. But also I 
thank him for his willingness, under some circumstances that I know 
were tough for him, in terms of how a lot of this played out. He 
nevertheless sat with me, worked through these issues, and obviously I 
wish we had been able to reach an agreement sometime earlier, but I am 
glad he is there now on this amendment. I am glad we are able to accept 
it.
  I thank Senator Corker who has been a straight dealer throughout all 
of this--no histrionics, no politics. I think he has really seen his 
responsibilities on the Foreign Relations Committee in the best way and 
has studied and thought and worked at and tried to find a way to solve 
a problem, not create a problem. So I thank him for that approach to 
this treaty.
  I think this amendment, if I can say--I mean, I was here in the 
Senate. I remember debating the first proposal of President Reagan with 
respect to missile defense, which then was called the SDI, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, and became what we called Star Wars back 
then. We have traveled a long distance since then. The world also has 
changed significantly since then.
  We no longer live in that sort of bipolar East-West, Soviet-U.S.-
dominated world. We are living in a multipolar, extraordinarily 
complicated and significantly changed world in the context of the 
threats we face. The threats we now face, particularly of a rogue 
state, or of the possibility of a terrorist group stealing or putting 
their hands on some loosely guarded materials and/or weapons, those are 
possibilities that are real. We need to deal with this different kind 
of threat.
  I believe the President of the United States has been pursuing a 
plan, building on what previous administrations have done; that is, 
pursuing the right kind of approach to try to figure out: How do we 
make all of us safer? Our hope is that the Russians will understand 
this is not directed at them. This is directed at how we together can 
build a structure in which all of us can share in a way that forces the 
Irans and North Koreas and others to understand the futility, indeed 
the counterproductivity of the direction in which they are moving.
  So I think this is a good amendment to embrace within the instrument 
of ratification what the President is doing anyway, what the 
administration has been committed to doing anyway. I personally do not 
think it was necessary--in order to achieve an appropriate 
understanding of where the administration is going--but to whatever 
degree it gives Senators the ability in the advice and consent process 
to believe that we are appropriately putting Russians on notice as to 
this course we are on, I think it reinforces what the President has 
already done and said. I do not think they should view it as something 
new or as an aberration from any course that we have been on. I 
certainly do not view it that way.
  I am confident they will see that we can build on this treaty in a 
way that we share in the future strategies, analyses, perhaps even 
technologies in the long run that will make all of us safer

[[Page S10957]]

and ultimately provide all of us with the ability to deal with the 
realities of a nuclear world. Our goal is to make us safer, and we 
believe this helps us do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I join with the sentiments just expressed 
by the chairman. I very much appreciate the statements made by Senator 
McCain, Senator Lieberman, and my colleague on the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Corker, who has worked diligently throughout the 
hearings, the markup, and this debate.
  I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to the amendment 
that they have offered, 4904, as modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Just briefly on the remarks about the missile defense, 
I have served as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and 
ranking member and have been involved in it for quite a few years. I 
think the language affirms the continued development of the two-stage, 
ground-based interceptor. Then, I guess, I accept the language that 
says ``as a technological and strategic hedge.''
  But I would just say to my colleagues, the reason we are at this 
point is because, during the negotiations with the Russians concerning 
the New START treaty, the administration, responding to Russian 
objections about missile defense--which were so unfounded and I could 
never fathom--the administration agreed, in September of last year, 
unilaterally, and to the utter surprise of Poland and the Czech 
Republic, to cancel the planned two-stage GBI that was to be deployed 
in 2016 in Poland.
  It was a great embarrassment to our allies. They had been negotiating 
with us for many years on this project. They had stood firm for it, and 
the administration then promised this phase four SM-3 Block 2B. But it 
was not on the drawing board, not under development, and cannot be 
completed until 2020 if we as a Congress fund it over that decade. The 
President certainly will not be in office at that time. So I am uneasy 
about this whole matter of missile defense.
  I think the administration made a colossal error in giving up on the 
planned two-stage strategic policy. But this language is better than no 
language. I thank my colleagues for moving forward with it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from North Dakota wants 
to speak on this a little bit. I thought we might, if he was willing--
we could accept the amendment and then the Senator would have an 
opportunity to speak.
  Mr. President, we are prepared to accept this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4904), as further modified, was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have an understanding--while it is not a 
unanimous consent request yet, we have an understanding with Senator 
Kyl that is the last amendment. We are waiting for the agreed-upon 
language from both leaderships in order to arrive at a time for the 
vote. It is our understanding that other issues that were part of the 
equation of when that vote might take place have been resolved. So, as 
a result, I think Senators can anticipate that, hopefully, sometime 
soon that unanimous consent request will be propounded.
  Until then, Senators are free to talk on the treaty and I look 
forward to their comments.
  Can I say one word, Mr. President? I apologize.
  Earlier when I was thanking folks, I meant to, and I neglected to 
because I jumped over to thank Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher.
  As we all know, she was a Member of the House, spent a lot of time on 
separate issues. In fact, she chaired one of the subcommittees of the 
Armed Services Committee. She logged a lot of miles and worked her 
heart out to assist in the evolution of this treaty. She has, as we all 
know, been fighting cancer. She just recently had cancer surgery. We 
wish her well in her recovery and express our gratitude to her for her 
work.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts and 
Senators McCain and Lieberman.
  There are probably still some folks making up their minds on this 
treaty. I think most people have debated this at length and discussed 
it at length off the floor.
  Our side has raised a number of questions. We have tried to cross 
every t and dot every i. This has been done in a very methodical way. I 
thank the chairman for the way he has worked with us. I thank Senator 
Lugar for his longstanding leadership in this regard. I thank the 
administration officials who have absolutely bent over backward to try 
to solve every problem that has come up. The administration has not 
only solved problems for people who might vote for the treaty, they 
have tried to solve problems for people who they know will not vote for 
the treaty. We have some Members on our side who I know are still 
making up their minds. I have been involved in this for a long time. I 
enjoyed this. I think this is an incredibly serious matter.
  I have two daughters and a wife I love. National security is 
something that is important to all of us. None of us wants anything bad 
to happen to this country. But to my friends on this side of the aisle 
who still may have some questions, there is no way in the world we 
would have the commitments we have on nuclear modernization if it were 
not for the process of this treaty. Now with Senator Kyl's amendment 
being accepted, we are even fast-tracking that. There is no way in the 
world the unilateral statements that are going to be presented to 
Russia are going to be made regarding missile defense would be 
occurring without this treaty being in place. I don't think there is a 
person in the world who has debated seriously whether 1,550 warheads 
being deployed in any way affects this country's national security.
  To those of you who may still be wavering, I believe every issue that 
has been raised has been answered strongly and legitimately. We have 
put forth what our posture is on nuclear armaments more clearly than we 
have done in recent times. I hope people will come to the same 
conclusion, that this is good for the country.
  I thank all those who have allowed me to be involved the way that I 
have. I urge support, whenever the vote occurs, for a treaty that I 
believe absolutely makes our country safer. With all these 
accommodations, at some point, it seems that the right thing to do is 
to say yes to yes.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, there has been a great deal of discussion 
about modernization this morning. I have listened to much of it and was 
not going to come to the floor, but I do want the record to show 
clearly what the numbers are on modernization. It is important to the 
future for us to understand what has been done and what is being done 
and what will be done.
  I chair the Appropriations Subcommittee that funds nuclear weapons 
activities. I have spoken about this previously. It is very important 
going forward that we all understand what not only this administration 
but the previous administration has proposed with respect to 
modernization. I agree with my colleague from Kentucky. It is 
encouraging, at the end of this debate, that two bipartisan amendments 
represent the conclusion of this very important debate. We often debate 
things that are of lesser importance or of greater importance and 
sometimes don't always see the difference between the two. But this is 
one of those cases where if we ratify the START agreement today, when 
all is said and done, more will have been done than said. That is very 
unusual in a political body.
  When I say ``more will have been done than said,'' it is so 
unbelievably important to try to reduce the number of nuclear weapons 
and to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. But there is a subtext to 
all the other things we have discussed, which is why I want to put in 
the record the funding for the nuclear weapons issues. That subtext is 
money, money related to national security. We are a country with a $13

[[Page S10958]]

trillion debt. Modernization is expensive. Yet it relates to our 
national security. National missile defense, which we have heard a lot 
about, is very expensive. I understand that also relates to national 
security. But this issue of getting our debt under control and our 
fiscal policy under control is just as much a part of the national 
security interests of this country.
  The subtext to these discussions--modernization, missile defense--is 
about funding as well and getting this country's economic house in 
order.
  Let me mention the issue of nuclear weapons modernization. In fiscal 
year 2010, we were spending $6.3 billion on the modernization program 
on nuclear weapons activities. In fiscal year 2011, it went to $7 
billion, up 10 percent--so a 10-percent increase for the nuclear 
weapons activities in President Obama's budget request. That 10-percent 
increase was unusual because most accounts were flat or some had cuts. 
But nuclear weapons got a 10-percent increase. The proposal for 2011, a 
$600 million increase but $7 billion total, was actually short-
circuited and put in the continuing resolution. All the other funding 
in the CR is flat funding from the previous year. But the funding for 
the nuclear weapons programs at 10 percent higher was put into the CR. 
Those programs and those programs alone get the higher funding. That $7 
billion was not all that was to be spent. Another $4 billion emerged. I 
heard about that on the radio while driving in North Dakota, that 
another $4 billion had been put into this pot for modernization. The 
additional funding from the 1251 report, which was produced in the 
fall, means 2012 funding would go from $6.3 billion in 2010, $7 billion 
in 2011, to $7.6 billion in 2012. That is a $1.2 billion increase in 2 
years.
  Linton Brooks, the fellow who ran the National Nuclear Security 
Administration and who did a good job in that role, said:

       I would've killed for this kind of budget.

  He is referring to $1.12 billion increase and two 10 percent 
increases, while much of the other budget was flat. We are talking 
about $85 billion for the next decade on these weapons activities, an 
increase of $8.5 billion in the next 5 years over what was portrayed in 
the 2010 budget. We are talking about a lot of additional money that 
has been committed. It shows a commitment to build two nuclear 
facilities that were discussed earlier. I want to mention them because 
it is important to understand what we are doing, the uranium processing 
facility at the Y-12 production complex and the chemistry and 
metallurgy research replacement facility at Los Alamos. There were 
moneys in the 2012 budget in construction funds for these two 
facilities, not as much as some would want in the Senate. But the fact 
is, the design of these two facilities is only 45 percent complete. We 
don't fund things that are 45 percent designed. To come out here and 
say we ought to be providing robust funding for buildings that are not 
even designed just makes no sense. Why, NNSA can't have confidence in 
its funding needs until it reaches about a 90-percent design point and 
that will be in 2013.
  I listened this morning to this discussion and I think what the 
chairman has done and what Senator Kyl has done in reaching an 
agreement is fine. But I want the record to show that this 
administration has proposed robust increases in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 
for a 5-year period in these modernization accounts, life extension 
programs--robust increases. Even that is not enough for some. They want 
to put money into buildings that are not yet designed. That doesn't 
make much sense to me.
  My point is, when we add up all of this, the subtext is how are we 
going to pay for it. Because it is easy to talk about authorizing, to 
talk about appropriating. The question is, Where does the money come 
from at a time when we are borrowing 40 cents of everything we spend in 
this government? The subtext of money and debt is also a significant 
part of this country's national security. If we don't get our fiscal 
house in order, all these debates will pale by comparison. We can't 
lose our economy and have a future collapse of the economy because the 
rest of the world has very little confidence in our ability to make 
smart decisions. We can't risk all that and believe we are going to be 
a world economic power moving forward. If we are going to remain a 
world economic power--and we can, and I believe we will--it will be 
because we start making some smart, tough, courageous decisions. That 
is more than just calling for more money, more spending, which was most 
of this morning's discussion.
  I don't object to the amendment. My colleagues have raised important 
issues. But it is important to understand we have made great progress 
on the modernization funding programs in the past months, and this 
administration has moved very aggressively to meet those needs and meet 
those concerns. That is important with respect to the public record.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I have given a lot of thought to the 
treaty, and having been involved in missile defense and nuclear issues 
serving on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of Armed Services, as 
ranking member and chairman, many of the provisions in the treaty are 
acceptable and should pose no threat to our national security. But 
considered as part of the administration's stated foreign policy and 
strategic policy and in relation to the reality of the world situation 
today, I do not believe the treaty will make us safer. I think that is 
a good test.
  I disagree with my colleagues who are overly confident that this is 
going to make the world safer. I believe the treaty, for that reason, 
should be rejected.
  Some say a defeat for the treaty would harm the United States. I 
think the entire world would see the Senate action as a resurgence of 
America's historical policy of peace through strength and a rejection 
of a leftist vision of a world without nuclear weapons. The negotiating 
posture statements and actions of Russia indicate it is regressing 
sadly into an old Soviet mindset as it views the outside world. This is 
disappointing and indicative of anything but the positive reset we hope 
to achieve with them. It is extremely important for Russian and U.S. 
security and world security, that Russia sees its role as a positive 
force for peace and security. These negotiations, however, show the 
face of the old Soviet Union. They have been so relentless in the way 
they have negotiated.
  Negotiations with any mature power, especially Russia, are difficult 
and serious. This administration began with a naive expectation that a 
treaty could be quickly achieved that would show their leadership 
towards peace and a nuclear-free world. The Obama administration wanted 
to set an example for other nations to reduce their nuclear weapons 
towards a world without any nuclear weapons. We have heard this 
leadership and this setting of an example theme repeatedly from the 
President and the administration. But Russia has not the slightest 
interest in such vague concepts, nor in eliminating all nuclear 
weapons. They have no idea or intention ever of relinquishing nuclear 
weapons. They are focused on their own national interest, on coming out 
ahead in the negotiations for military, political, psychological, and 
hegemonic reasons.
  It seems clear to me that Russia got what it wanted and President 
Obama got a treaty paper which strategically means very little but can 
be touted as a victory for peace.
  So this is what I have concluded during this debate--and the debate 
has been helpful--the debate has caused me to think through a good bit 
of this. A longer debate at a different time of the year, I think, 
could have helped all of our colleagues. I do not believe the success 
in negotiation of the treaty will in any way make the Russians more 
cooperative, as the administration has repeatedly suggested.
  Russia has been inconsistent at best in helping the United States 
with the danger of nuclear Iran and North Korea--the gravest threats to 
peace in the world, with military action being undertaken against our 
ally, South Korea, in recent weeks, and with the real possibility of an 
attack on Iran's nuclear weapons that, hopefully, can be avoided.
  Why has Russia not been more cooperative? They blocked a resolution 
condemning North Korea Sunday in the U.N. Russia attacked Georgia, a 
sovereign nation, and continues to occupy Georgian territory. This 
shocking act

[[Page S10959]]

of aggression condemned by independent bodies goes without any real 
U.S. response. Georgia is a pro-American, free market, independent 
nation whose attack was calculated and deliberate.
  Russia continues to work to undermine the pro-Western democracy 
movement in the Ukraine. They continue a host of actions that evidence 
a long-term plan to effect a real or de facto reabsorption of these 
three nations into what was the old Soviet Union.
  So these ominous trends, it seems to me, have not been seriously 
considered throughout this quest for the treaty. The events do not give 
me confidence that the treaty, therefore, is a positive step for the 
United States, the world, or for peace.
  Secondly, as I noted, and I will not go into detail now, the 
administration conceded the two-staged, ground-based interceptor site 
that would have been established in Poland, that would provide 
redundant protection to the United States from an Iranian missile and 
protected virtually all of Europe from an Iranian missile. That was 
given away unilaterally by the administration without prior warning to 
our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic. They heard about it in the 
paper. They realized the United States had gone behind them, our 
allies, and made a deal with the Russians. It was a very unfortunate 
event, indeed.
  The plan that has been talked about--the fourth phase of the SM-3 
Phased Adaptive Approach--is not even on the drawing board and is 
unlikely to actually survive. It would be difficult to see it surviving 
in five different budget cycles over the next 10 years it would take to 
develop that system. We walked away from one that could be deployed 
soon.
  I offered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to make clear the Senate 
does not concur in an ill-conceived vision of the administration that 
would move us to a world without nuclear weapons. I thank Senators Kyl, 
LeMieux, Cornyn, Chambliss, and Inhofe for cosponsoring the amendment. 
While I will not insist on a vote at this hour, this matter will be a 
significant subject for the future.
  Thirdly, I would suggest the treaty is promoted as a step towards a 
world free of nuclear weapons. This is a fantastical idea that goes 
beyond insignificance, it is dangerous. Basing any policy, especially a 
nuclear policy, on an idea as cockamamie as zero nuclear weapons in the 
world can only lead to confusion and uncertainty. Confusion and 
uncertainty are the polar opposites of the necessary attributes of 
security and stability. These are the essentials of good strategic 
policy: security and stability.
  Thus, the Obama policy creates a more dangerous world. Some say the 
President's zero nukes policy is just a distant vision, some vague 
wish, so don't worry. The situation would be much better if that were 
so, but it is not. President Obama has made zero nuclear weapons a 
cornerstone of our defense policy. It has, amazingly, already been made 
a centerpiece of our military policy, being advanced by concrete steps 
today. Presidents, Commanders-in-Chief, have the power to make such 
monumental changes in policy, and this President is certainly doing so.
  The change is seen most seriously in the critically important Nuclear 
Posture Review produced in April 2010 by the Defense Department. This 
document is a formal document produced by the new administration's 
Defense Department. The determination to pursue the zero nuclear 
weapons vision is seen throughout this review. Amazingly, there are 30 
references in that document to a world without nuclear weapons.
  The NPR begins with an introductory letter from Secretary of Defense 
Gates, the second sentence of which says this:

       As the President said in Prague last year, a world without 
     nuclear weapons will not be achieved quickly, but we must 
     begin to take concrete steps today.

  The Executive Summary further drives the issue home. The first 
sentence in the Executive Summary recalls that President Obama, in 
Prague, highlighted nuclear dangers and said:

       The United States will seek the peace and security of a 
     world without nuclear weapons.

  The first sentence in the second paragraph of the NPR is particularly 
ominous and even chilling to me. Posture Reviews are defense reviews, 
and by their nature are bottom-up reports, driven by threat assessments 
and the requirements necessary to defend America. These reviews 
historically are objective analyses from experts, not political 
reports. The troubling line reads:

       The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the 
     Administration's approach to promoting the President's agenda 
     for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world 
     without nuclear weapons.

  This statement reveals the whole truth. The NPR is the President's 
policy, sent from the top down, not the bottom up. Stunningly, the 
report lacks a clear focus on the only objective that counts: Securing 
a nuclear arsenal second to none that can, under any circumstances, 
deter attacks on and defend the United States and its allies.
  Fourthly, the Obama vision of a world without nuclear weapons has not 
been well received. Indeed, the breadth of the criticism from experts 
and world leaders is noteworthy.
  Two years ago, Congress adopted an amendment I proposed that called 
for a commission to review the strategic posture of the United States. 
It was bipartisan and chaired by former Secretaries of Defense Dr. 
William Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger. The commission powerfully 
dismissed the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. In somewhat 
diplomatic but clear and strong language, they said this:

       The conditions that might make possible the global 
     elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and 
     their creation would require a fundamental transformation of 
     the world political order.

  They went on to say this:

       All of the commission members believe that reaching the 
     ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a 
     fundamental change in geopolitics.

  Maybe the Second Coming.
  Others have dismissed this concept as a wild chimera. French 
President Sarkozy, from one of our European allies, France, said this:

       It [our nuclear deterrent] is neither a matter of prestige 
     nor a question of rank, it is quite simply the Nation's life 
     insurance policy.

  He made clear they had no intention of giving that up.
  Secretary James Schlesinger, back when President Reagan was meeting 
in Reykjavik over nuclear issues, made this wise comment:

       Nuclear arsenals are going to be with us as long as there 
     are sovereign states with conflicting ideologies. Unlike 
     Aladdin with his lamp, we have no way to force the nuclear 
     genie back into the bottle. A world without nuclear weapons 
     is a utopian dream.

  Keith Payne, who served on this nuclear commission, writing recently 
in the National Review, said:

       The presumption that United States movement toward nuclear 
     disarmament will deliver nonproliferation success is a 
     fantasy. On the contrary, the United States nuclear arsenal 
     has itself been the single most important tool for 
     nonproliferation in history, and dismantling it would be a 
     huge setback.

  Remember the commission.
  Jonathan Tepperman, in Newsweek, said:

       And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel, 
     India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their 
     weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could 
     quickly and secretly rearm.

  Gideon Rachman, in Financial Times, said:

       The idea of a world free of nuclear weapons is not so much 
     an impossible dream as an impossible nightmare.

  William Kristol, writing in the Washington Post, in October, said:

       Yet to justify a world without nuclear weapons, what Obama 
     would really have to envision is a world without war, or 
     without threats of war. . . .The danger is that the allure of 
     a world without nuclear weapons can be a distraction--even an 
     excuse for not acting against real nuclear threats. . . .So 
     while Obama talks of a future without nuclear weapons, the 
     trajectory we are on today is toward a nuclear--and missile-
     capable North Korea and Iran--and a far more dangerous world.

  Others have also written about this.
  David Von Drehle, writing in Time Magazine, said:

       A world with nuclear weapons in it is a scary, scary place 
     to think about. The industrialized world without nuclear 
     weapons was a scary, scary place for real. But there is no 
     way to un-ring the nuclear bell. The science and technology 
     of nuclear weapons is widespread, and if nukes are outlawed 
     someday, only outlaws will have nukes.

  Kenneth Waltz, leading arms controller and professor emeritus of 
political science at UC Berkeley, said:


[[Page S10960]]


       We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's 
     striking and against all historical precedent that for that 
     substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear 
     states.

  Importantly, the administration's planned further diminishment of our 
nuclear stockpile--further diminishing it from these numbers--and 
President Obama's hostility to the utility of nuclear weapons generally 
has caused a great deal of unease among our non-nuclear allies. These 
nations are not so open about their concerns, but the problem is a very 
real one.
  The American nuclear umbrella, our extended deterrence, has allowed 
our allies, free democratic nations, to remain nuclear free, without 
having nuclear weapons. But if the Obama policy continues, the Perry-
Schlesinger report concludes real dangers may await:

       If we are unsuccessful in dealing with current challenges, 
     we may find ourselves at a tipping point, where many 
     additional states conclude that they require nuclear 
     deterrents of their own. If this tipping point is itself 
     mishandled, we may well find ourselves faced with a cascade 
     of proliferation.

  The nuclear commission--President Obama appointed a number of the 
Members on the Democratic side--said that if our allies who feel they 
have been protected by our nuclear umbrella become uncertain, we could 
be faced with a cascade of proliferation. Is that what we want? I know 
the President wants nonproliferation. I know that is what he wants. I 
am not attacking his goal. Throughout my remarks, I am raising the 
question of whether these goals will be furthered by the actions of 
this treaty and these policies or whether they will not.
  One final concern. The administration has made it clear that this 
treaty's nuclear reductions are just the first step in a long march to 
a nuclear-free world. Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller, who 
negotiated the treaty, said in April:

       We will also seek to include non-strategic, non-deployed 
     weapons in future reductions.

  Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and 
former Ambassador Alexander Vershbow a few weeks ago said that the 
administration, in follow-on talks, will seek further reductions in 
strategic, nondeployed, and nonstrategic weapons. And the President has 
said that repeatedly.
  We Senators, in the end, only have our judgment. My best judgment 
tells me that if our weapons fall too low in numbers, such an event 
could inspire rogue and dangerous lesser nuclear powers to seek to 
become peer nuclear competitors to the United States--a dangerous event 
for the entire world. Thus, I must conclude that the Obama plan is to 
diminish the power and leadership of the United States. Carefully read, 
this is what the goal does. I think this conclusion cannot be disputed. 
The leader of the one nation that has been the greatest force for 
freedom and stability in the world, with our large nuclear arsenal, is 
displaying a naivete beyond imagining.
  Since this treaty is a calculated step in the President's plan to 
achieve dangerous and unacceptable policies, this treaty must not be 
ratified. The treaty and the policy behind it must be rejected.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. We are shortly going to propound a unanimous consent 
request. I have been saying that a couple of times now, but we really 
are shortly going to do it. There are several Senators who wish to 
speak. I would like to see if we could set up an order for them.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Washington proceed for 
10 minutes, then the Senator from Texas for up to 10 minutes, then the 
Senator from North Dakota for 5 minutes. I ask unanimous consent also 
that each of those Senators would allow the interruption for the 
propounding of the unanimous consent request if it comes during the 
time they are speaking.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.