[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10938-S10953]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 4892, as Modified
Mr. KYL. I call up amendment No. 4892, as modified. The modification
is at the desk.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment is so modified.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if we could begin the consideration, as I
mentioned, we are working on that language. I do not want to agree to
the modification yet until we have had a chance to talk with the
Senator about it. I am not saying we will not agree to it. I want to
see if we can get that done. If we can begin on the amendment as
originally filed, we can interrupt to do it with the modification. I
want a chance to clear it.
Mr. KYL. I am not asking at this time there be an agreement. I am
simply saying that the amendment I want to bring up is the amendment I
filed.
Mr. KERRY. I have no objection to the as modified to consider it.
Mr. KYL. I will describe the modifications. They were made in an
effort
[[Page S10939]]
to get agreement. If we cannot, that is fine, but I do think it makes
it more palatable to Members.
May we have the amendment read.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] proposes an amendment
numbered 4892, as modified.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To require a certification regarding the design and funding
of certain facilities)
At the end of subsection (a), add the following:
(11) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to
the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President
shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
(A) accelerate the design and engineering phase of the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building
and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF); and
(B) request advanced funding, including on a multi-year
basis, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon completion
of the design and engineering phase for such facilities.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona is
recognized.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this amendment has to do with the
modernization of our nuclear weapons enterprise. It is a subject with
which we began this debate. As we get toward the end of the debate, it
remains a piece of unfinished business with which I think we need to
deal. Remember, the nuclear enterprise we are talking about consists
primarily of the facilities that are used to work on our nuclear
weapons, as well as the weapons and importantly the scientists who work
in those facilities. They represent our National Laboratories, as well
as other production facilities and related facilities.
The point I think is important for people to remember is that unlike
all of the other nuclear powers in the world today, the United States
does not have an active modernization program for our nuclear
deterrent, a program which enables us, for example, to remanufacture a
component of a weapon and replace an existing weapon with that.
The need for this has been made very clear by all of the people in
the administration who have considered this, including Secretary of
Defense Gates. The Secretary, remember, is, in effect, the customer for
the Department of Energy, which is the Department responsible for
producing these weapons. The budget we talk about is a Department of
Energy budget, but it is really to produce weapons for use by the
Secretary of Defense.
Here is what he said about the need to modernize the production
complex, which is what we call that group of facilities, as well as the
stockpile:
To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a
credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our
stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile
or pursuing a modernization program.
Each year, our Laboratory Directors and the Secretary of Energy are
required to provide a certification to the President that certifies the
status of the weapons in the stockpile and makes determinations as to
whether those weapons are safe, secure, and reliable without the need
for testing.
Each year, as we discussed in our closed session, there are reports
about the status of these weapons. I will talk in a moment about the
material we discussed in the closed session. But suffice it to say here
that there is a great need for us to move with alacrity to bring up to
date the weapons that are in our stockpile and that requires
modernization of the facilities and related equipment to accomplish
that task.
This will require a substantial investment over the next decade.
Unfortunately, over the years, these facilities have been allowed to
deteriorate, our capacity to atrophy, and our scientists to retire
without doing what is necessary to bring these weapons up to date.
The current budget projection, as expressed in the 1251 report
update, which was dated November 17, 2010, initiates that modernization
but clearly cannot accurately predict future requirements. This is the
problem we have dealt with here.
The report acknowledges that we have a problem and can estimate today
what we think we can spend over the next few years--say, 5 years--but
it is hard to estimate beyond that as to what the exact cost of this is
going to be. I try to deal with that in this particular amendment.
The Laboratory Directors responsible for certifying our nuclear
weapons recently wrote in a letter:
As we emphasized in our testimonies, implementation of the
future vision of the nuclear deterrent . . . will require
sustained attention and continued refinement.
In other words, each year they can get their estimates more accurate,
as one might expect, and define more specifically what the exact
requirements are. In this case, that generally means an increase in
costs in one area or another. In fact, Vice President Biden, speaking
to this precise problem, said:
[W]e expect that funding requirements will increase in
future budget years.
We know that is going to happen. The question is, can we be any more
particular in the funding that we require. My amendment seeks to be a
little bit more precise or a little bit more specific than the current
language.
At the crux of this modernization program is a need for a firm
commitment for the construction of two critical manufacturing
facilities. They are called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement, or CMRR, plutonium facility--that is at Los Alamos
Laboratory--and the Uranium Processing Facility, or UPF at the so-
called Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge, TN. Without these, the capacity to
perform stockpile maintenance will be lost by 2020 and there will be no
capability to modernize our aging stockpile.
For Members to recall briefly, these are, in many cases, facilities
that go all the way back to the Manhattan Project, the project that
created the atomic weapons that enabled us to conclude World War II.
Some of these buildings were built as early as 1942, and they are not
in good shape. In fact, when I was with one of my colleagues from
Tennessee visiting the Y-12 facility, I asked one of the people
responsible for a particular part of the facility what his biggest
concern was. He said: My biggest concern is keeping this thing going
for another 10 or 12 years. When you see the facility, you can see
that. And that is no way to deal with the most sophisticated weapons
that mankind has ever invented.
As I said, the current plan is a big improvement over what we had
just a year or so ago. We got together with the administration and
asked them to relook at the plan they had submitted and identify areas
where there were deficiencies in funding or planning. They came back
with an updated report that revealed funding requirements that had
previously not been dealt with. There was a little over $4 billion in
funding added to the first 5 years of the 10-year program we are
looking at as a result.
But even there, there was an argument that there were uncertainties,
they were only at a certain point in the planning of these two large
facilities, and that those funds would be inadequate.
To note something for our colleagues and of which the Presiding
Officer is very well aware, being one of the two Senators responsible
for the Los Alamos facilities, he will recall both he and his colleague
and others of us, in visiting Los Alamos, were told about the problems
of building a facility there where there theoretically could be an
earthquake in the near vicinity and the costs of construction have
increased dramatically because of the physical needs to protect that
facility against any conceivable kind of physical problem. That has
increased the cost of the facilities, and they are trying to get a
handle on how much they will actually be. They are pretty clear about a
ball-park estimate, but a ball-park estimate is not quite good enough
for these purposes, as we know.
I will conclude by saying I am a little distressed by the news
stories. We cannot expect the news media to have gotten into the detail
required to actually make policy. They put it in a political context
that the administration put another $4 billion into the pot and why
shouldn't that satisfy people like me.
Of course, that is totally beside the point. We are simply trying to
get a better handle on how much money will
[[Page S10940]]
be needed and to be able to plan for that funding in a way that gets it
to the facilities in the most expeditious way possible so that, A, we
can complete the work that has to be done in time and, B, that will
save a lot of money, about $200 million a year.
There is every reason to want to understand how much it will cost and
get it done quickly. It is not about adding $4 billion. That does not
begin to cover the cost of these items.
It is not a matter of some kind of negotiation that additional money
was thrown in the pot and is that not good enough. It is a matter of
continuing to focus as the cost of these facilities evolves and as the
requirements evolve, so that Congress, with the administration's
request in its budgets, can provide the funding that is necessary when
it is necessary to get these facilities completed as quickly as
possible in order to achieve our modernization goals.
There is no dispute about the fact that there will be additional
money required. It is just a question of what to do about it.
The updated budget, while committing additional funds to repairing
these facilities, will not be able to eliminate even over 10 years, for
example, the more than $2 billion of documented maintenance issues.
There are some things that are simply outside the budget and need to be
dealt with.
My biggest concern in the updated modernization plan is actually that
it added to the delays. What we should be doing is trying to telescope
these projects as much as possible so we can meet the deadlines for the
refurbishing of our weapons--or maintenance of our weapons, I should
say--rather--than extending the time for the completion of the
facilities. But unfortunately, that is what the latest report did.
Instead of accelerating construction of these two most critical
facilities, the CMRR and the UPF, the updated plan now delays
completion to 2023 and 2024, respectively, rather than 2020.
As we recall from the executive session we had a couple of days ago,
there was information presented as to why these facilities absolutely
needed to be completed by 2020 in order to accomplish the life
extension projects for some of our weapons.
Delay in these facilities will hamper efforts to perform these
critical life extensions of our warheads and not inconsequentially add
significant costs, again, primarily to keep these aging facilities
operational.
As an example, we have to put a brandnew roof on the facility at Los
Alamos even though the facility in 10 or 12 years is no longer going to
be used because it will be replaced. But the roof is so bad that the
work we have to do in there is affected by the weather, and so we have
to build a roof. That is an expenditure one hates to make because in 10
or 12 years that building is not going to be used anymore. But that is
the state of repair we are in.
Each year of delay adds to those kinds of maintenance costs. Senator
Corker and I and Senator Alexander were told at the Y-12 facility that
it is about a $200-million-a-year cost to keep these aging facilities
going that we can eliminate if we can complete the construction of
these two large facilities.
One-fourth of the newest increase of this $4.1 billion, of which I
spoke, for the next 4 years does not even go to the buildings or the
facility. It simply meets an obligation for unfunded pensions that have
been allowed to accumulate over the years. The only good news about
that is, I guess, they would probably have stolen the money from one of
the accounts that directly deals with the modernization of our weapons
in order to meet those unfunded pension obligations. So I am glad we
were able to put the billion dollars in there. But when they talk about
$4 billion more for science work on these weapons, that is not true.
Fully one-fourth of it goes to meet these unfunded pension obligations.
There is a need for things outside the science, but clearly the
science requirements are the key ones we are trying to get money to as
much as we can.
The key point also is that the modernization is independent of the
ratification of the treaty. It is true that as we reduce the number of
warheads, there is even more of a requirement that we know the warheads
we have will do their job because we do not have a backup warhead
sitting in a storeroom, basically in the event something does not work
if that is deployed right now. It is true that as we reduce the number,
we have to pay even more attention to whether they are all safe,
secure, and reliable. But it is also a fact that the modernization is
independent of the ratification of the treaty.
During the hearings that were conducted on this treaty, all 16
experts who provided testimony spoke of the requirement for
modernization. Many indicated it is a requirement irrespective of
START. That is a point that has been made by others as well.
For example, former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in an op-ed
recently said:
The Obama administration's decision to support increased
investment in the maintenance of our nuclear weapons lab and
stockpile is correct and long overdue . . . But the fact that
the administration has revised its policy for the better is
in itself no reason for any Senator to endorse START . . .
The START treaty and beefed up funding for our nuclear
enterprise are two separate issues that should remain
distinct.
The point was also made by the person responsible for this
modernization program--Deputy NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino. He
said: ``Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern
security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or not the
START treaty is ratified.''
So this has to be done whether the treaty is ratified or not, and I
think everybody acknowledges that fact.
So we believe the resolution of ratification needs to address these
issues by providing a couple conditions, and we have modified the
original language in order to try to get an agreement. If we can't, we
will vote on it and see what happens, but I am hoping my colleagues
will agree.
The first is something I know has been agreed to; that is, a
condition the President will provide an annual update of the section
1251 report.
The administration is agreeable to this, and it is the way for
Congress to be annually advised of the status of this construction, the
status of the facilities, and what more may need to be done on that.
Presumably, that will be provided at or about the time the budget is
sent to Congress from the administration.
Secondly, a condition the President will certify, prior to entry into
force of the treaty, that the President intends--so this is not a
requirement that he has achieved a particular result, but he intends to
accelerate the design and engineering phase, to the extent possible, of
the CMRR and UPF.
In other words, we are not asking the impossible be done, just that
to the extent we can possibly do it, we accelerate the design and
engineering of these two facilities so they can get done on time,
rather than with the delays.
Third, that the administration--or the President--request advance
funding, including on a multiyear basis, for these two facilities--the
CMRR and the UPF--upon completion of the design and engineering phase
of the planning.
What that means is, we are not asking them to provide advance funding
for the entire projects, as is done, for example, when we construct an
aircraft carrier. We are not asking it be done now, when there are
still some uncertainties about exactly what these facilities need and
how much they will cost. Los Alamos is still being tweaked, among other
things, as I said, because of the need to make it earthquake-proof.
What we are saying is, upon completion of the design and engineering
phase of planning, then the administration requests advance funding and
on a multiyear basis.
What that means is--and this is frequently done with large Defense
Department contracts, in order to get them done as quickly as possible
and as inexpensively as possible--there are multiyear advances of
funding so the money can be spent, let us just say hypothetically,
within a 5-year period by the Defense Department for an aircraft
carrier, for example. Instead of having the Appropriations committees
each year appropriate a particular amount of money, and the work that
is done can only be done within the constraints of that particular
amount of money appropriated in that particular year, what they say
is--and I am just
[[Page S10941]]
speaking hypothetically--the cost is, let's say, $4 billion, and we
know it is going to take about 4 years to do this. Instead of saying:
Well, we are going to do $1 billion of appropriations each year, what
they say is: All right. You have $4 billion, and if you can get it done
more quickly by spending this money more quickly, fine. That will save
us money and it will get the project done quicker. If you can't, then
you can't. But that money is set aside in an account for that purpose.
That is all we are asking be done here too. These two facilities are
both, in terms of order of magnitude, about $5 billion facilities. They
might be a little less. They are likely to be a little more--
potentially, in the neighborhood of $6 billion or so. Originally, when
the administration presented its first 1251 report, the entire 10-year
program was set at $10 billion. We knew that wasn't adequate. We went
to the administration, they recalculated everything, brought their
estimates up to date, and said: That is right, $10 billion is not going
to be enough. We will add another $4 billion to $6 billion over the
first 4 to 6 years.
Undoubtedly, the cost will increase above that, as has been testified
to. My guess is, just in terms of order of magnitude, you are looking
at roughly $20 billion over 10 to 12 years. We will know more each year
this goes forward. But to construct these two facilities, if we could
advance fund at least some money--let's say, 3 years' worth of the
money--then it will be possible for the people who are responsible for
the construction of those facilities, if they can get 15 months of work
out of the first 12 months and spend more than 12 months' worth of
money to get that done, that is great. They will have been able to
accomplish their job more quickly. Each month that goes by adds costs
to the program. So if we can provide them advance funding of some
amount--we are not specifying it in here--they can probably get the
project done more quickly and less expensively, and that should be a
good thing. I think everybody agrees this would be the way to do it.
There have been two objections posited, to my knowledge. First, the
Department of Energy has never done it this way. That, of course, is
not the way for us to set policy. I saw my colleague on television this
morning saying what we need is a plan. We are too focused always on
what is right in front of our face. A lot of times, if we have a basic
plan everybody knows we are trying to work toward, it is amazing how
much you can accomplish in terms of the details. Well, this is the
basic plan.
The Department of Defense does this every year because they have
large-cost construction projects. The Department of Energy has never
done it that way--except I am not sure that is true. Before there was a
Department of Energy, the Manhattan Project was being built, and GEN
Leslie Groves, who is sort of the father of the Manhattan Project,
didn't have any problem at all about advance funding. He went to the
President and the Congress and said: I need this money. They said: What
do you need it for? He said: Don't ask questions, it is secret, and he
got the money. That is an oversimplification, but he got that project
done in less time than anybody could have possibly imagined because he
had the resources provided to him to get it done.
So when they say it has never been done before, well, actually, it
has been done before on this exact--on this exact--national defense
item; namely, our nuclear enterprise. It is just that it was back in
the early 1940s when people were not so, I guess, concerned about each
year's budget and the appropriations that would accompany those
budgets.
Secondly, the argument is made that--and this one may surprise
folks--well, if we have, let's say, 3 years' worth of funding out there
and that money is provided to the Department of Energy, the Members of
Congress who are on the Appropriations Committee will grab that money--
or parts of it that are unspent--and apply it to other things.
Think about that for a minute. The very people responsible for
funding these projects in the Congress, who know they have to be done
and who have agreed to the advanced funding in the first place, I think
are highly unlikely, after that money has been provided, to say: Well,
we need money for some water projects or something so we will go grab
some of that money that isn't spent. The whole reason it isn't spent is
because you have provided multiyear funding for the project for
efficiency purposes. So I don't think that is a reason for us to not
advance funds.
I would like to call to my colleagues' attention--and I will let my
colleague, Senator Corker, put this in the Record because I think
either he or Senator Alexander might talk about it--a letter signed by
Senators Inouye, Feinstein, Cochran, and Alexander, who presumably, in
the next Congress, will be the chairmen and ranking members of the full
committee and subcommittees responsible for this funding. This letter
makes it clear they are committed to the full funding of the
modernization of our nuclear weapons arsenal and that they are asking
the President to submit budgets which will provide for the necessary
funding for this and they commit themselves to support that funding.
That is important, and I don't think we can attribute a motive to
Senators like this, who we all know are entirely trustworthy, that
somehow after this money is advance funded, that Congress or
appropriators are going to reach back and grab money they have already
provided because they think there is another purpose they want to spend
it for right now. So those are the reasons why I don't think that is a
principled argument for why we shouldn't do this. Having this advance
funding could complete these facilities on time, rather than with a 2-
or 3-year delay, and we could save literally hundreds of millions of
dollars.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
some additional quotations on the need for modernization from former
laboratory Directors, an Under Secretary of Defense, the current
Secretary of Defense, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,
and there are many more we could produce.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Additional Quotes on Modernization
Former laboratory directors: ``However, we believe there
are serious shortfalls in stockpile surveillance activities,
personnel, infrastructure, and the basic sciences necessary
to recover from the successive budget reductions of the last
five years.'' \7\
Secretary Kissinger: ``As part of a number of
recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz,
Sam Nunn, and I have called for significant investments in a
repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and
added resources for the three national laboratories.'' \8\
Under Secretary Joseph: ``New START must be assessed in the
context of a robust commitment to maintain the necessary
nuclear offensive capabilities required to meet today's
threats and those that may emerge. . . This is a long-term
commitment, not a one-year budget bump-up'' \9\
Secretary Gates: ``This calls for a reinvigoration of our
nuclear weapons complex that is our infrastructure and our
science technology and engineering base. And I might just
add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to
get money for this and this is the first time I think I've
got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear
arsenal.\10\
endnotes
\7\ Harold Agnew et al., Letter from 10 Former National
Laboratory Directors to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. May 19, 2010.
\8\ Secretary Henry Kissinger, Testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. May 25, 2010.
\9\ Under Secretary Robert Joseph, Testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. June 24, 2010.
\10\ Secretary Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee. June 17, 2010.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair, and I will have more to say, but I will
let other Senators speak.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, as I did yesterday on the floor, I wish to
say I cannot thank, and I hope the Senate will feel the same way--I
think our country will when they understand what Senator Kyl has done--
I cannot thank him enough for his thoughtful, dogged, persistent
efforts as it relates to modernizing our nuclear arsenal. As a matter
of fact, the Presiding Officer and I accompanied Senator Kyl on a
bipartisan trip to Sandia and Los Alamos to look at some of the many
needs we have throughout our complex in our country, which resides at
seven facilities across the country. It is that foresight that Senator
Kyl has displayed,
[[Page S10942]]
beginning years ago but especially focused over this last year, that I
think has led to incredible results.
While the Senator and I are obviously going to end up in different
places, it appears, on this treaty--and there is no question the treaty
and modernization are two very different things--there is no question
in my mind that we would not have the modernization commitments we have
in hand today if it were not for the treaty. So, for me, it is this
whole body of work that works together, and in my opinion makes this
decision one that is very easy to make because of the entire body of
work.
I wish to say that Senator Kyl, through his efforts, has caused there
to be two updates to what is called the Defense authorization 1251.
That is something that is required by our Defense authorization bill.
It focuses on expenditures to our nuclear arsenal.
I think people will realize, over the next decade, as a result of
Senator Kyl's efforts--and Senator Kerry's cooperation and the
appropriators and the President and others--that $86 billion will be
invested in modernizing our nuclear arsenal, and $100 billion will be
invested in those delivery vehicles that relate to our warheads. I
think people realize that while we are talking about 1,550 warheads
being our deployed limit, we have 3,500 other warheads that are
stockpiled all across our country and those also need to be modernized.
We need to know they are available.
I think the Presiding Officer and I were able to see where neutron
generators were going to expire, where the guidance system that guides
many of our missiles is far less sophisticated than the cell phones we
have today. In some cases, they still had tubes, such as we had in our
old black-and-white televisions.
So I wish to thank the Senator from Arizona for everything he has
done to cause there to be focus on this and for the fact he has caused
it to be dovetailed; the fact we have an updated 1251 that reflects the
needs of our country; the fact that we have four appropriators who now
have committed to the President they will support this effort; the fact
the President has said to them--and all this has been entered into the
Record--that he will ask for these moneys to modernize our nuclear
arsenal.
So, again, Senator Kyl has done incredible work in this regard. I
think he has informed this body, and I think it is due to his efforts
and those of us who have supported his efforts that have helped to find
gaps in our modernization program. We have been able to talk to the
head of the NNSA and the Lab Directors to focus on those gaps.
The senior Senator from Tennessee has helped tremendously in that
regard. He and Senator Kyl and Senator Lugar have actually gone through
other sites--sites I did not go through with Senator Kyl myself. So
this has been a collective effort led by Senator Kyl.
Again, I know we will end up in a different place on the treaty as a
whole, but it is my hope that the administration and Senator Kerry will
accept the changes Senator Kyl has put forth in his amendment. It is my
hope that by unanimous consent we can add this to the treaty. Even if
that does not occur, there is no question that the contributions of
Senator Kyl to the commitments that are so important to ensuring our
country is safe and secure by virtue of having a reliable, safe,
dependable, nuclear arsenal not only will be evident today, but they
will be evident for generations to come. For that, I thank him deeply.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is
recognized.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I came to the floor to express my
admiration for the Senator from Arizona. I was listening to his address
and I heard my colleague from Tennessee.
Senator Kyl's work on nuclear modernization is no surprise to any of
us who know him very well because his approach to issues is a
principled one, and once he determines the principle, he is dogged. He
is a determined person. He basically took this issue of nuclear
modernization, which is not on the lips of very many people in the
United States--the question of whether our nuclear weapons are safe and
reliable, whether they will work--he pulled it out of a trash bin and
put it on the front page of a national debate.
He did it in connection with the START treaty, but as he said in his
own remarks, this should be done whether you are for the START treaty
or against the START treaty. It is completely independent, in that
sense.
In my view, under no circumstances should the START treaty be
ratified without doing this. That would be like reducing our weapons
and leaving us with a collection of wet matches. We need to make sure
what we have left works. But this is sort of the showhorse/workhorse
Senator distinction. This is an issue on the back burner. It is an
unpleasant issue. No one likes to talk about making nuclear weapons,
each one of which could be 30 times as powerful as the bomb that was
dropped on Hiroshima and ended the war, but it is a part of the reality
in the United States and in the world today.
As Senator Corker was saying and as Senator Kyl said when each of us
visited in different times, different places--Senator Kyl came to
Tennessee. I was with him there. He has talked to many more people than
I have on this subject--these weapons are being modernized in
facilities that are completely outdated. It would be as if we were
making Corvettes in a Model T factory.
Worse than that, it is not just an inconvenience to the workers
there, it is a threat to their safety, and it is a waste of taxpayers'
money. As the Senator from Arizona said, after a certain number of
years--I am not sure of the exact number anymore, maybe 15 years, some
number of years--this pays for itself. The modernization of these
facilities, the bringing them up to date, means the taxpayers will pay
just as much to operate these old facilities as they would to spend $5
billion or $6 billion or whatever it is to improve these two big new
facilities and the other infrastructure and the other things we need to
do.
It ought to be said as well that not one of these facilities is in
Arizona. This is not home cooking by Jon Kyl. This is a man who, for a
couple decades, has made our nuclear posture his business and has made
sure he knows as much about it as anyone and has made sure the rest of
us paid attention to it when we might be more interested in the issue
of the moment. So it is an example of a Senator doing his job very
well. I am deeply grateful for that and I am proud to serve in the
Senate with such a person.
I would like to mention the letters I had printed in the Record
yesterday. They are such an integral part of the remarks of Senator Kyl
and Senator Corker--the letter to the President of December 16, from
Senators Inouye and Cochran, the ranking members of the Appropriations
Committee on both sides of the aisle, and Senator Feinstein and I, who
are both members of the appropriate subcommittee for dealing with this,
as well as the President's response of December 20.
In concluding my remarks, I would like to also congratulate Senator
Kyl for his comments about advanced funding. We want to do things in an
orderly way in government, but it makes no sense for us to build
buildings in the most expensive way, particularly when there is an
urgent deadline that is in the national interest. So if indeed by
building these buildings more rapidly and saving the annual maintenance
costs we could save the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars at a
time when we are borrowing 42 cents out of every $1 and every one of us
is going to be looking for ways to save money, Senator Kyl's suggestion
about advanced funding, which may not be the way the Department of
Energy has done it before, ought to be the way we do it now. We didn't
used to have a big dip like we do now. Let's look for ways to save
hundreds of millions of dollars. We know we are going to have to
modernize these weapons, START treaty or no START treaty, as the
Senator said. We know we are going to have to save money. Let's accept
the Senator's suggestion about advanced funding of these large
facilities. As one member of the appropriations committee, I am going
to do my best to follow his suggestion.
I am here to congratulate him for a superior, statesmanlike piece of
work, both on the treaty which he has
[[Page S10943]]
worked to improve but also on the nuclear modernization issue which he
single-handedly has put upfront before those of us in the Senate and
the American people and it makes our country safer and more secure.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to thank both my colleagues from
Tennessee for their very kind remarks. Actually, the place we have
gotten, what we have achieved, is due to the efforts of a lot of
people. It starts with Secretary Gates in the Department of Defense;
Secretary Chu; Tom D'Agostino; his Deputy Director of NNSA, Don Cook;
the Lab Directors who are incredible public servants. We visited with
them. These are some of the brightest people in the country and the
folks who work with them, many of whom, almost all of whom are about
ready to retire, those people who actually designed and developed the
weapons we now have. There are a lot of people who devoted their lives
to what very few people know or understand. They are now being asked to
do a very difficult and complicated job in very difficult surroundings.
Part of what we are asking for--it is not just a matter of
convenience, as Senator Alexander said, it is a matter of absolute
necessity that these facilities be capable of dealing with these
complex weapons. That is why they are expensive, but they are
absolutely needed. I thank both my colleagues for having devoted a lot
of their own time and attention to this issue and in supporting the
efforts of modernization so we can get this job done properly. I
appreciate their remarks.
I also would like to proffer a unanimous consent request. I ask
unanimous consent to yield 1 hour of the time allocated to the
Republican leader postcloture to Senator Kyl.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KYL. I thank my colleagues.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Dakota is
recognized.
Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I do want to rise in support of the Kyl
amendment No. 4892 and echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague
from Tennessee about the good work of the Senator from Arizona. He has
been a tireless advocate for modernization. It is something that needed
to happen, irrespective of whether there was a treaty, but it certainly
became a condition in order to have a treaty. If you are talking about
reducing the number of your nuclear weapons, you certainly want to
improve the quality of the ones you have.
Unlike other nuclear powers, the United States has not had an active
modernization program for our nuclear deterrent.
We have heard from people who recognize the importance of modernizing
our nuclear deterrent. I will not reiterate all of those, but I wish to
point out, Secretary Gates said recently--he couldn't be any more clear
that nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear reductions when
he said:
To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a
credible deterrent and reduce the numbers of weapons in our
stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile
or pursuing a modernization program.
Similarly, Thomas D'Agostino, the head of the National Security
Administration or NNSA said nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to
nuclear reductions, stating: `` . . . as our stockpile gets smaller, it
becomes increasingly important that our remaining forces are safe,
secure and effective.''
In the same speech I just quoted from by Secretary Gates, he pointed
out: ``Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power
that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability
to produce a new nuclear warhead.''
It is difficult to overstate the dire condition of the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex. Its physical infrastructure is crumbling and its
intellectual edifice is aging. The Strategic Posture Commission,
chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger, found that certain
facilities of the nuclear weapons complex are ``genuinely decrepit''
and the complex's ``intellectual infrastructure . . . is in serious
trouble.''
I met with experts throughout the Senate's consideration of New
START, and they confirm for me the accuracy of these descriptions. I
might say to the Presiding Officer, whose State is home to Los Alamos
and Sandia National Laboratories, we were able to visit those along
with Senator Kyl, the Senator from Tennessee and others, and had an
opportunity to observe some of the facilities and buildings which are
referenced in this amendment. It is absolutely clear, beyond the shadow
of a doubt, that we have to make the necessary upgrades and
improvements if we intend to keep our nuclear arsenal modern and
prepared to deal with the threats we might face in the future.
The idea that the modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex and
delivery force is an absolute prerequisite for nuclear reductions
envisioned in New START has been clear to the Obama administration
throughout the New START process. In fact, in December of 2009, 41
Senators wrote to the President and said in that letter:
Funding for such a modernization program beginning in
earnest in your 2011 budget is needed as the United States
considers the further nuclear weapons reductions proposed in
the START follow-on negotiations.
Just to be clear, what is modernization? This includes improvements
to the physical elements of the nuclear weapons complex. It involves
the warheads and delivery vehicles themselves as well as facility
infrastructure. Modernization also requires maintenance of the
intellectual capacity and capabilities underlying that complex; namely,
the designer and technical workforce.
The amendment, as proposed by Senator Kyl, makes clear in the
resolution of ratification how critical modernization is to the United
States while it is reducing its nuclear arsenal. First, the amendment
places a condition in the resolution of ratification requiring the
President to submit an annual update to the section 1251 report. The
1251 report is something annually that comes up here that gives us an
update on the nuclear weapons arsenal. Now we will have, thanks to the
amendment adopted earlier, a certification with regard to the necessary
investment in delivery vehicle modernization, which is an issue I
addressed in an amendment earlier in this debate and a critically
important one. The Senator has already addressed that in a previous
amendment that was accepted by the proponents of the treaty. That was
an important step forward.
This particular amendment deals with the facilities and is also
critically important. What it will do is require, in the 1251 report,
that the President, when he submits his 10-year plan with budget
estimates for modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex, that he also
presents an accelerated design and engineering plan for the nuclear
facilities and a commitment to funding those.
So this amendment, such as the one that would call for modernization
of the delivery vehicles, is a critical part of the nuclear complex we
have, of making sure it is reliable, that it works, and that it is
ready and prepared for whatever challenge may face us in the future. As
I said earlier, there are many of the experts, and you talk to the Lab
Directors themselves, who recognize the importance of making the
investments that need to be made in this if we are going to keep that
nuclear arsenal ready.
I wish to read one other quote again. Deputy Administrator D'Agostino
said:
Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern
security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or
not the START treaty is ratified.
I suspect before all is said and done, the START treaty will be
ratified. But in any event, this process needed to be undertaken
irrespective of whether there is a treaty because it is that important
to the future of our country and our national security.
Again, if I might point out, very briefly, what this amendment does,
the resolution of ratification must clearly call for a condition that
the President will provide an annual update to the section 1251 report
in that as a condition the President will certify prior to entry into
force of the treaty that he intends to accelerate the design and
engineering phase of the chemical facility and the uranium processing
facility, request full funding for both of those facilities upon
completion of the design and engineering phase of the plan, and an
understanding that failure to fund the modernization plan would
[[Page S10944]]
constitute a basis for withdrawal from the START treaty.
This is, again, a fairly straightforward amendment. The Senator from
Arizona has done, as has already been noted, a superb job of putting on
the radar screen of all Members of the Senate the essential and
critical nature of getting this issue of modernization addressed. He
deserves great credit for doing that. I appreciate the work of the
Senator from Massachusetts in cooperating with him in this treaty
process to have these amendments and this language accepted because it
is essential.
I think it will make not only this treaty stronger, but it will also
make the nuclear complex that much stronger. And that, of course, is
absolutely essential when it comes to America's national security
interests.
So I support the amendment of the Senator from Arizona. I hope it
will be accepted and adopted in the resolution of ratification, and
that before this treaty is adopted this essential issue will be not
only addressed, as it is in the underlying treaty, but addressed--that
language even strengthened and made more durable by these amendments.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Casey.) The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. President, I yield my hour of
postcloture time to Senator Kerry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The Senator from
Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico very
much. I do not intend to use that much time, but we will see what
develops here.
Let me speak quickly to this amendment. I want to begin by saying
everyone in this Senate is respectful of how hard the Senator from
Arizona has worked to bring attention, appropriate attention, to the
effort to keep up our nuclear deterrent. He has pushed to correct what
this administration saw as too many years of neglect for the work of
the nuclear weapons complex. I am glad to say this administration has
not only heard him, but many other Members of the Senate, from both
sides of the aisle, have joined in this effort to call attention to the
modernization needs of our nuclear deterrent.
The administration has appropriately pushed hard for an unprecedented
level of funding for this work. In these difficult budgetary times, I
do not think anybody here would argue that moving a 10-year budget from
$70 billion to over $85 billion, which they have done, what President
Obama has done, shows an extraordinary commitment to this enterprise by
this administration.
That is why the three directors of the nuclear laboratories told
Senator Lugar and me, ``The proposed budgets provide adequate support
to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of
America's nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed
strategic warheads established by the New START treaty, with adequate
confidence and acceptable risk.''
That is also why Tom D'Agostino, the head of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, could say a few days ago, ``Having been
appointed to my position by President George W. Bush, and reappointed
by President Barack Obama, I can say with certainty that our nuclear
infrastructure has never received the level of support that we have
today.''
Given all that has happened in the past year, all that has been
certified and pledged, and all that we know the administration
absolutely plans to do, it is hard to understand why anyone has a
question about the nuclear stockpile provision at this point in time.
This particular amendment, unnecessary therefore in the light of what
I have just said, does not present fundamental problems in terms of the
words ``to the extent possible we should accelerate.'' That is exactly
what they are doing. They are accelerating, to the extent possible.
But paragraph B presents a number of different issues. Most
importantly, the amendment itself requires that the treaty not go into
force until all of the these additional certifications are made. The
administration has made it crystal clear that it is committed to
funding these facilities. If you read the update section of the 1251
report that the administration provided, at Senator Kyl's request, and
they provided that in November, here is what they say: The
administration is committed to fully fund the construction of the
uranium processing facility and the chemistry-metallurgy research
replacement, and is doing so in a manner that does not redirect funding
from the core mission of managing the stockpile and sustaining the
science, technology, and engineering foundation.
So before we come to this moment, Senators were concerned about
whether the administration was committed to the facilities. Then the
administration made it very clear they are committed. The President
made that commitment as clear as could be in 1251. Now the concern is,
they are not building the facilities fast enough.
Well, that runs completely contrary to what the people designing it
think is happening and want to do. And, incidentally, if you put
additional funding into hiring additional people, by the time you find
them and get them, and they are qualified and they come, they are going
to be finished with the job of the additional design and early
construction planning.
If this were a post office we were trying to think about building,
maybe you could be a little more sanguine about saying, go ahead and
accelerate it. But we are talking about multibillion-dollar,
complicated facilities that require very significant, sensitive,
difficult substances management. They are going to take a certain
number of years to build. That is a reality. That is how complex and
challenging the task is.
The early cost and design estimates are that the uranium facility is
going to cost somewhere between $4 billion and $6 billion, and the
plutonium facility is going to cost about the same. So we all remember
the old saying around here, we have got a lot of Senators who are
talking about waste in the process of governance. The last thing we
want to do in this budget, in my judgment, is create an environment of
haste that does not measure properly what we are doing. We ought to
listen to the experts on this a little bit, the people who are doing
the design and the engineering, who tell us it is no simple matter in
the world of nuclear weapons production. It involves hundreds of
scientists and engineers working on every single aspect of the plant,
in order to make sure it is going to work, that it is going to be
secure, and it is going to be as safe as humanly possible.
You cannot just throw money at an ongoing design and engineering
effort and then automatically expect it can accelerate beyond an
already significant increase. We have gone up $15 billion. If you hire
a whole bunch of engineers who are new to the project, they do not know
what they are doing yet. That is a recipe for both inefficiency and
possibly even the increase of design risks or other kinds of issues.
The truth is, if you cram all of these billions into a very short
fiscal period, in addition to that, as this amendment seeks to try to
force, you could unnecessarily create competition within other nuclear
weapons activities, such as the ongoing warhead life extension
programs, and our critical warhead surveillance efforts.
The bottom line here is there is a place and a way to do this. We
have an authorizing committee. The Armed Services Committee is the
committee that ought to be doing this, not some amendment that comes in
attached to the treaty, and linking the treaty going into force to all
of these other things being certified.
I think the Appropriations Committee, as well as the Armed Services
Committee, would powerfully endorse that notion here on the floor at
this point in time. We can compel the President to ask for upfront
funding. But that does not guarantee that the President is necessarily
going to receive it. And this links it to the notion he can certify
that he has.
So I agree with my colleague, the last administration took way too
long to focus on this issue, and Senator Kyl has done an important
service to the Senate, to the country, and to this process, to help to
focus on it. But it makes no sense to use a resolution on a treaty to
lock the President into doing something he cannot necessarily do
because of the Congress and other things that are tied to it.
I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page S10945]]
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is
recognized.
Mr. ALEXANDER. I ask unanimous consent to have 4 or 5 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. ALEXANDER. I listened to Senator Kerry's remarks just now. This
is an excellent discussion. Not only do I applaud Senator Kyl for
resurrecting the whole focus on nuclear modernization, I applaud the
President for the updated report that was received on November 17. A
lot of work was done. This is a lot of money to say we want to make
sure these nuclear weapons work and we are going to spend $85 billion
over 10 years.
The intent of Senator Kyl's amendment, though, is not to tie the
President's hands, it is to give him more options. I think it is to
encourage this big, slow-moving government not to waste the money but
to save money. The language says: The President shall certify to the
Senate the President intends to accelerate, to the extent possible, the
design and engineering phase.
At the Oak Ridge facilities, which Senator Kyl visited, he was told
that the savings annually to taxpayers of having the new facility
versus the old facility are in excess of $200 million. So every year we
do it, every year this is completed, the taxpayers save $200 million.
So if the President and the Appropriations Committee should decide that
a 2-year or 3-year advanced funding will save $200 million a year at a
time when we are all dedicated to trying to save money, we should do
that.
You might say, well, why do we need to say this in the Senate? The
answer is, we have never done it before. And the U.S. Government, if
you have never done it before, takes a little nudge to pay attention to
it.
So Senator Kyl has made an amendment, and if I understand it
correctly, Senator Kerry amended the amendment a little bit to make it
softer, to say, the President intends to accelerate, to the extent
possible. So this is suggesting to the Department of Energy, which has
never done it this way before, that we think it is a good idea, if it
is practical, and if it saves money.
There is also the matter of getting it done on time. Senator Kyl
talked about that, the dates we talked about in the executive session.
So I would argue to my colleagues that the Kyl amendment is respectful
of the President's prerogatives, which he ought to have. He is the
manager of the government. He is the Commander in Chief. But it says:
If we can think of a way to do this in a way that saves $200 million a
year, year after year after year, why should we not do it?
I will bet during the next session of Congress, if we do our job
properly in this body, we are going to be competing with each other to
find ways to save $10 million a year, $20 million a year, $100 million
a year, because of the incredible deficit. We have got bipartisan
concern about that deficit. We had two Democratic Senators and three
Republican Senators support the debt commission.
I would suggest to my friend from Massachusetts it is not possible
that you have modified the Kyl amendment to the extent it ought to be
accepted, so that the President can get a signal from the Senate that
if he thinks he can do this, to the extent possible, that accelerating
the building of these big facilities by 2 or 3 years, if it would save
$400, $500, $600 million, that we want to encourage him to do that.
That is my only thought.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his
participation and contribution to this effort. I am trying to work to
see if--as I have said, there are certain components of this that make
it difficult to accept, that multiyear piece and so forth.
But the notion of reaffirming the commitment the President has made
is not difficult to make. From our judgment, the President has really
addressed this as significantly as one can by putting the $85 billion
there, by making it clear they are moving forward, they are going to
fully fund it, and by helping the Appropriations Committee members to
provide the letter which speaks to their good faith going forward. All
of those steps have taken place.
We just don't want to get into a situation where we are creating
another hurdle to get over before the treaty goes into effect. If we
could find a way as a declaration or some way to reframe this
condition--I am working with the administration to see if we can do
that--we would be happy to try to restate it.
Mr. ALEXANDER. I thank the Senator. No one is doubting the
President's commitment. He has made an extraordinary commitment. I
congratulate him for that. It is just the suggestion of doing it a
little differently, if the President thinks it is practical, because it
might save $200 million a year, year after year after year. A
suggestion from us like that could make the difference in those
savings. I thank the Senator for working in that spirit.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, as we continue to work through the
amendments, I rise to outline what is at stake in the debate and
describe what the world would be like without the New START treaty
accord.
Every Senator here took an oath to support and defend the
Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. We have an
obligation to support a strong national defense.
First, a world without New START is one in which more nuclear
missiles are pointed at Americans. This treaty reduces that number.
A world without a New START accord is one in which we have no nuclear
inspectors on the ground in Russia. These inspectors have more than a
decade of experience inspecting Russian nuclear sites. They were
involved in the negotiation process to ensure that there are strong
inspection provisions in the treaty. But without New START, these
inspectors would not be able to return to work. Furthermore, without
onsite inspections, our intelligence services will still be required to
collect information on Russia's nuclear weapons infrastructure.
On December 20 of this year, ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, wrote to the Senate:
An extended delay in ratification may eventually force an
inordinate and unwise shift in scarce resources from other
high priority requirements to maintain adequate awareness of
Russian nuclear forces.
In a world without New START, our intelligence capabilities will be
stretched, which could give the enemies of our troops on the ground an
advantage. We cannot allow that to happen.
These are just some of the direct effects. What about some of the
indirect effects of a world without New START? The cascade effect on
U.S. national security interests without New START is substantial.
A world without New START is one in which the Russians are less
likely to provide land and air access to supply U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network is a crucial supply
route for our troops in Afghanistan. This means that just as we have
reached full troop strength in Afghanistan, supply lines would become
increasingly strained. Today, supply routes through Pakistan are
increasingly dangerous. Just the other day, two fuel tankers meant to
supply our troops were attacked and the drivers were killed in
Pakistan. This is one of the reasons the leadership of our uniformed
military want New START ratified.
A world without New START is one in which there is more Russian
fissile material in existence, material which could be stolen for use
in a terrorist attack.
There are many reasons top U.S. counterterrorism officials in the
International Atomic Energy Agency want New START ratified.
A world without New START is one in which Russia's Government is
perhaps less likely to help stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. A
world without New START is one in which Iran perhaps is given access to
Russian S-300 missiles, a weapon capable of reaching the State of
Israel. This is one reason the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith,
the American Jewish Committee, and other prominent pro-Israel groups
want New START ratified.
[[Page S10946]]
In a world without New START, there is no way the Russians will agree
to decrease their tactical nuclear weapons. Our friends in Eastern
Europe and those across the continent will be less secure in the
knowledge that threats to their security are not diminishing but could,
in fact, be growing. That is the reason 25 European Foreign Ministers
want this treaty ratified.
A world without New START is one in which the 1970 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT, the cornerstone of preventing
nuclear weapons states, is severely threatened. What does this mean in
practical terms? The New START accord is a clear demonstration that the
United States is upholding our obligations under the NPT, which in turn
can help secure support from other countries for a strong arms control
regime and assistance on other nonproliferation issues. Many countries
see nuclear terrorism as a problem for the United States and for the
West. In a world without New START, these countries would seriously
question our commitment to the NPT. These countries would question that
right away.
Without New START, government officials around the world will
question the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation itself. They will ask:
If the United States is not seriously committed to arms control and
nonproliferation, why should we be?
A world without New START contains many hard realities for the United
States. Ratification of this treaty is not a political victory for one
party or another; it is a national security victory for our great
Nation, for our nuclear security--from nuclear security, to the
security of our troops in Afghanistan, to the security of our ally
Israel.
A world without New START is one in which the enemies of America will
breathe a little easier. Strained U.S. supply lines make life easier
for the Taliban. Fewer available intelligence capabilities would make
life easier for al-Qaida terrorists in Pakistan tribal areas. A
strained U.S.-Russian relationship makes life easier for the government
of the regime in Iran.
A world without New START makes life easier for terrorists
trafficking in fissile material to travel across borders.
A world without New START means no negotiations with the Russians to
decrease their tactical nuclear weapons.
The world I just described isn't a world we have to settle for. A
world without New START is not a world we have to accept. We must give
the American people some peace of mind as to our national security.
That is a world with a New START treaty. We must ratify this treaty and
diminish the number of nuclear weapons pointed at the United States
today. We must deploy nuclear inspectors to Russia, thus returning
stability and transparency to our nuclear relationship, and take the
burden off of our intelligence agencies.
A world with New START means a more constructive relationship with
Russia, which is good for our troops in Afghanistan and bad for the
regime in Iran.
A world with New START means the beginning of a conversation with the
Russians on tactical nuclear weapons.
A world with New START is one in which there is less fissile material
for terrorists to steal or buy on the black market.
A world with New START means increased cooperation with countries
combating nuclear terrorism. The most serious threat to U.S. national
security is the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists.
In 1961, at the United Nations, President John F. Kennedy said:
Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of
Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of
being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by
madness.
Some have observed that in this post-9/11 era of increased terrorism,
we may be more vulnerable to a nuclear attack than we were during the
Cold War. Today, the sword of Damocles still hangs by the slenderest of
threads, but we have the ability to prevent this threat by minimizing
access terrorists would have to nuclear material.
President Obama's nuclear security summit earlier this year was a
historic event. It helped create a foundation upon which other
countries will take up the challenge of nuclear security and cooperate
with the United States to accomplish the President's goal of securing
all fissile material in 4 years. We cannot do this alone. In order to
confront this most serious threat to U.S. national security, we need to
build stronger ties with our allies around the world, and part of
building that trust is rebuilding our own credibility on
nonproliferation issues. This New START agreement is a very positive
step in that direction. It is an essential predicate for fulfilling our
commitments under the nonproliferation treaty--a key marker for many
potential allies on a range of nuclear security issues. Upon
ratification of New START, we must make progress on securing fissile
material around the world.
This is a strong resolution of ratification. It passed out of the
Foreign Relations Committee by a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4. It
includes strong language on missile defense, verification, and tactical
nuclear weapons.
Finally, the American people are watching. According to a November
2010 CNN poll, 73 percent of Americans support ratification of this
treaty. They understand the implications of a world without the New
START agreement.
In a hurricane of partisan rancor and political battles, the national
security consensus is as strong as an oak tree in support of the New
START agreement--all six living former Secretaries of State, five
former Secretaries of Defense, three former National Security Advisers,
seven former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command, the entire Joint
Chiefs of Staff, our intelligence services, the President, and three
former Presidents.
The American people have a right to expect ratification of New START.
They want New START and will hold us accountable if we do not ratify
it. Let's vote for New START's resolution of ratification and cast a
strong bipartisan vote in favor of our national security.
I close with commendations for both our chairman, Senator Kerry, and
Ranking Member Lugar and so many others who have worked so hard to make
sure we can ratify this treaty.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Texas is
recognized.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, may I inquire, is there any time
limitation on Senators at this point?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate is operating
postcloture, and each Senator has up to 1 hour.
Mr. CORNYN. I thank the Chair. I assure my colleagues, I will not use
the full hour, which I am sure is good news.
Mr. President, I oppose the ratification of the New START treaty for
the reasons many of my colleagues have articulated and to which I have
previously spoken. The treaty requires unilateral reductions of the
United States on strategic nuclear weapons. It fails to address
tactical nuclear weapons--an area in which the Russian Federation has a
10-to-1 advantage. This is not an idle or incidental matter.
GEN Nikolai Patrusheb, Secretary of the Russian National Security
Council, a body in charge of military doctrine, has declared that
Russia may not only use nuclear weapons preemptively in local conflicts
such as Georgia or Chechnya but may deliver a nuclear blow against the
aggressor in a critical situation, based on intelligence evaluations of
his intentions.
I submit also that the verification provisions of this treaty are
weak, allowing only 18 inspections a year for an arsenal of more than
1,500 weapons. Obviously, the ability to get more than a sampling of
Russian Federation compliance would be impossible given the relatively
few number of inspections permitted under the treaty.
As we have discussed off and on over the last few days, the preamble
of the treaty itself is ambiguous and has been construed by the
Russians themselves as limiting the ability of the United States to
expand its own missile defense system.
I realize the President of the United States has submitted a letter
stating his unilateral opinion of what that treaty obligation means,
but, of course, treaty obligations are not unilateral declarations,
they are bilateral agreements. Of course, the consequence of a
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misunderstanding over this important issue of missile defense could
allow either side to withdraw from the treaty and, indeed, the threat
of withdrawal from the treaty because of this misunderstanding is
something that could be avoided in the first instance if, in fact, some
of the amendments addressing missile defense were allowed and the
treaty modified to that extent. At that time, the Russians could then
be asked: Will you agree with this modification, and we would know
upfront, not on the back end, their sincere intentions.
But I would say that the New START treaty has flaws when you look at
it, not only in its various provisions; that is, when you reason from
the whole to its parts, but I would suggest the treaty also fails when
you look at it the other way around, when you reason from the parts to
the whole, when you see this treaty is another example, another
symptom, of a foreign policy that sends a message of timidity, even
ambivalence, not only about our own security but about America's
leadership role in a very dangerous world.
This larger strategic context is what we need to keep in mind. We all
know that President Obama has set incredibly high expectations for his
Presidency in terms of how he would conduct American foreign policy. In
an early Presidential debate, for example, he promised to meet with the
leaders of five rogue nations--Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and North
Korea--``without precondition during the first year of [his]
administration.'' Well, we now know that never happened.
After he won the nomination, you will recall, in his famous speech he
gave in the city of Berlin, while still a candidate for the Presidency,
he declared he was a ``citizen of the world.'' Also, he said: ``This is
the moment when we must come together to save this planet.''
President Obama was not the only one promoting a grandiose vision of
his Presidency. Remember the Nobel Prize Committee received his
nomination for the Peace Prize less than 6 weeks after President Obama
took office. In the citation for the award last year, they said:
[President] Obama has as President created a new climate in
international politics. . . .
Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama
captured the world's attention and given its people hope for
a better future.
You might ask, What relevance does this have to our consideration of
the START treaty? The relevance is that a big part of this utopian
dream of a ``new climate in international politics'' has been the
elimination of all nuclear weapons.
In that Berlin speech, then-Senator Obama said that one of his
priorities was to ``renew the goal of a world without nuclear
weapons.''
The citation for the Nobel Peace Prize included this observation:
The Committee has attached special importance to Obama's
vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons.
The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully
stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations.
Indeed, in an op-ed piece, authored by the Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, dated April 7, 2010, in the Guardian, she argues that the
START treaty is an important step toward a nuclear-free world.
So you might ask, what is wrong with a vision of the world without
nuclear weapons? Can't we hope and dream? Of course, even without
nuclear weapons, we know that in World War I and World War II tens of
millions of people lost their lives in armed conflict. So it is not as
if a world without nuclear weapons is a world without war and a world
without danger for peace-loving nations such as ours and our allies.
We also know that any number of foreign policy experts have expressed
serious reservations about indulging in this fantasy of a world without
nuclear weapons.
George Kennan has said:
The evil of these utopian enthusiasms was not only or even
primarily the wasted time, the misplaced emphasis, the
encouragement of false hopes. The evil lay primarily in the
fact that those enthusiasms distracted our gaze for the real
things that were happening. . . .The cultivation of these
utopian schemes, flattering to our own image of ourselves,
took place at the expense of our feeling for reality.
The President of the United States has not only mused about fantastic
notions that have no basis in the real world, he has criticized his own
country on foreign soil so often that some called that particular trip
``the world apology tour.''
So what should our competitors and would-be adversaries make of these
statements of a fantasy world that is nuclear free and a President who
travels abroad and apologizes for America's strength? Regretfully, I
can only conclude it sends an impression of weakness and a lack of
determination to maintain America's leadership in the world. We know
there are dangerous consequences associated with an interpretation by
others that America has lost its resolve to lead the world or to
maintain its own security and to protect its allies.
President Reagan said famously:
We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only
invites aggression.
Experience has proven the truth of those words.
We should recall that the President of the United States conducted
YouTube diplomacy by recording a video for Iran's leaders--but then
withheld comment when those same leaders were brutally crushing a pro-
democracy movement and their own people's hopes for freedom.
The President has treated several of our allies without the respect
they deserve. Some have been, like Britain, slighted; others, like
Israel, have been lectured; and other of our allies have been thrown
under the bus on missile defense, like Poland and the Czech Republic.
He has been so idealistic and naive, you might say, about the subject
of nuclear weapons that President Sarkozy of France remarked about it
publicly at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He said:
We live in the real world, not in a virtual one. . . .
President Obama himself has said that he dreams of a world
without nuclear weapons.
Before our very eyes, two countries are doing exactly the
opposite at this very moment.
President Sarkozy said:
Since 2005, Iran has violated five Security Council
Resolutions. . . .
He said:
I support America's ``extended hand.'' But what have these
proposals for dialogue produced for the international
community?
Nothing but more enriched uranium and more centrifuges.
And last but not least, it has resulted in a statement by
Iranian leaders calling for wiping off the map a Member of
the United Nations.
I fear the New START treaty will serve as another data point in the
narrative of weakness, pursuing diplomacy for its own sake--or
indulging in a utopian dream of a world without nuclear weapons,
divorced from hard reality.
Last week, I mentioned that Doug Feith, formerly of the Defense
Department, helped negotiate the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
known as the SORT treaty. Mr. Feith said that during the negotiations
of the SORT treaty, the Russians were constantly trying to get the
United States to negotiate away our right to defend ourselves from
missile attacks through a robust missile defense program.
The Bush administration rightly rejected those Russian demands and--
you know what--we got a good treaty anyway. The Obama administration,
on the other hand, gave Russia what it wanted--or what it says it
wanted--among other concessions. But that is not the only concession
that was given under the New START treaty.
I would ask my colleagues, Where are the concessions that Russia made
to us in this treaty? Where are the concessions that Russia made to us?
And what in the treaty is a good deal for the United States?
But my colleagues may reply, So what. So what if the Obama
administration's world view is a little bit naive. So what if the
Russians negotiated a much better deal for themselves than the Obama
administration got for the United States. Shouldn't we go ahead and
approve the treaty anyway? What harm could it do? Couldn't it help
build a better relationship with the Russian Federation and help
transform America's reputation in the world?
Those are actually good questions. But the answers are sobering. The
administration has long argued that its approach to diplomacy was not
only
[[Page S10948]]
good for its own sake, but it would strengthen relationships with
nations all around the world. I would ask you, how has that worked out?
Charles Krauthammer reviewed the global response to President Obama's
diplomatic overtures in this way. He said:
Unilateral American concessions and offers of unconditional
engagement have moved neither Iran nor Russia nor North Korea
to accommodate us.
Nor have the Arab states--or even the powerless Palestinian
Authority--offered so much as a gesture of accommodation in
response to heavy and gratuitous American pressure on Israel.
Nor have even our Europe allies responded: They have anted
up essentially nothing in response to our pleas for more
assistance in Afghanistan.
And, of course, we could look at the results of the New START treaty
itself. Russian leaders have responded to American concessions with
contempt. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said that the
treaty ``cannot be opened up and become the subject of new
negotiations.'' Prime Minister Putin has threatened a new arms race if
Russia does not get its way with this version of the treaty. Russian
leaders have the temerity to lecture and attempt to intimidate the
Senate from discharging our constitutional responsibilities. We should
not succumb.
In deciding whether to vote for the treaty, I would respectfully ask
whether some Senators have been asking themselves the wrong question.
Instead of asking ourselves the question, Why not ratify? What is the
harm? I would suggest that the better question is, Why should we? I
would urge my colleagues to vote against this treaty not because I do
not care about the message it will send to Russia and other nations but
because I do care about that message, and it is time we stop sending a
message of weakness that only encourages our adversaries.
I urge my colleagues to vote no on this treaty, to require the
administration to go back to the negotiating table with the Russians,
to get a better deal for the United States, and to make clear that the
era of unilateral American concessions is over.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. VITTER addressed the Chair.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would simply ask to get a sense of how
long the Senator thinks he might speak. We might line up the next
speaker.
Mr. VITTER. Five minutes.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the
Senator from Louisiana is finished, the Senator from Florida, Mr.
Nelson, be recognized for 5 minutes.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. I thank my colleague.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Louisiana is
recognized.
Mr. VITTER. Mr. President, I too am opposing the ratification of this
New START treaty because I think it makes us less secure, not more
secure, as a nation. Of course, that has to be the ultimate test.
A toughly negotiated, balanced treaty with Russia which allowed for
adequate and reliable inspections and data exchange could make us more
secure. But this is not such a treaty. It is clear to me that President
Obama went into negotiations willing to give up almost anything for a
treaty, and that basic posture produced what it always will--a bad deal
for us.
The proponents of the treaty suggest as much when they lay out as
their top arguments for ratification: a better relationship with
Russia, the help from Russia on other issues that ratification could
engender, and progress with world opinion.
I think it is dangerous to count on any of that or to look at all
beyond the four corners of the treaty--the pros and cons of the details
and the substance of the treaty itself.
When I look within the four corners of the treaty, I am particularly
concerned about four cons of the treaty.
First, serious roadblocks to missile defense: I think it is a
fundamental mistake and a dangerous precedent for any treaty on
offensive arms to even mention missile defense, and Russia has made it
clear that any major progress on U.S. missile defense will cause them
to leave the treaty. Particularly with President Obama in office, this
creates real political obstacles to the full missile defense I support
and the American people support in great numbers. Indeed, President
Obama has already abandoned our missile defense sites in Eastern Europe
to help produce an agreement on this treaty by the Russians.
Second, fundamentally imbalanced arms reductions: In this treaty, we
reduce our nuclear arms significantly; Russia stays where they already
are. Meanwhile, we still aren't getting to the issue of tactical
weapons, a category where Russia has a huge 10-to-1 advantage. We have
talked about that for decades, and we still aren't getting there.
Clearly, when the United States has leverage to commit Russia to reduce
their tactical nuclear weapons as we do right now before this treaty,
and those nuclear weapons are the most vulnerable to end up in
terrorists' hands, we must use that leverage and not throw it away for
U.S. and global security. Instead, proponents of this treaty argue that
a further treaty addressing tactical nuclear weapons in the future will
materialize, but the leverage we have to get there is being given up,
essentially, with this treaty.
Third, inability to verify: This treaty does not give us the
inspections and data we need to verify Russian compliance, and we know
Russia has cheated on every previous arms control treaty with us.
Verification is clearly less under New START than in START I, but it
now needs to be greater because the nuclear deterrent under this treaty
would be much smaller and thus produce much less room for error.
Fourth and finally, major but ultimately inadequate progress on
nuclear modernization: Now, major progress has been made during the
ratification debate on the administration's commitment and concrete
plans for nuclear modernization. I thank everyone who has helped
produce that, particularly the leader in that effort, Senator Jon Kyl,
for his work which, again, did produce real progress. But, ultimately,
neither the specificity of the administration's commitment, including
on the nuclear triad issue, nor the proposed schedule is adequate to
our security needs, so I will certainly continue fighting to get where
we need to be.
So, in closing, I urge my colleagues to look hard at this treaty and
to ask the only ultimate question: Does it make us less secure or more
secure? I think clearly for the four major reasons I have outlined, and
others, it makes us less secure, and we need to do far better.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Florida is
recognized.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise in support of the New
START treaty. I wish to make a comment. I was raised in a time that
when the President of the United States went abroad, he spoke for our
country and there was no partisanship when that occurred.
It is troubling to this Senator to hear comments about our President
when he goes abroad in an apology tour. I would beg to differ, and I
think we ought to rise above that partisanship when issues of national
security are at stake.
Now to the treaty. This agreement with Russia is going to strengthen
our national security. Look at all the people in the Pentagon who have
embraced it--the former Secretaries of State, the former Secretaries of
Defense, from both sides of the political aisle, and it deserves our
support too. I expect today we are going to get an overwhelming
bipartisan vote in favor of this treaty.
I wish to specifically address the question that has been raised
about modernization of our nuclear stockpile--an issue I had the
privilege, as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee of the Armed
Services Committee, to be engaged in over a 4-year period. Arguments
have been made that somehow this treaty is going to interfere with the
modernization of our nuclear weapons infrastructure. Well, it is
exactly the opposite. Ratification of this treaty is so important to
give security and stability to the question of the use of those nuclear
weapons that it will allow us to spend the needed resources on the
modernization of our nuclear complex, which is an equally important
matter.
As part of this year's Nuclear Posture Review, the administration has
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made a commitment to modernize our nuclear weapons arsenal and the
complex. We must do so to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent because
as these weapons in stockpile age, we have to update them and we have
to modernize them so they are effective, secure, but also safe. We need
to be sure our nuclear weapons are going to work as designed and that
they will remain stable and secure.
In the past, when we maintained a larger and more expensive nuclear
stockpile, our weapons were developed and tested frequently. That is
very expensive. By the mid-1990s, we had developed sophisticated
computer models that can identify and resolve the problems without the
nuclear testing. Unfortunately, because of lessened funding back in the
era of about 2006 that research diminished, resulting in the layoffs of
a lot of the people in our National Labs. I have had the privilege of
visiting those three National Labs. There is an incredible array of
talent, but that is what happened back in 2006.
I think we have, especially in this administration, a new resolve to
turning the situation around and to modernizing the nuclear complex. So
what does this modernization entail? The comprehensive plan includes an
$85 billion investment over the next decade and a $4 billion increase
over the next 5 years, and that investment is going to accomplish
several things. It is going to fund the construction of the 21st
century uranium and plutonium processing facilities, it is going to
spur a reinvestment in the scientists and engineers who perform the
mission, and it is going to enhance the lifetime extension program for
our nuclear weapons. By the way, it is not only just extending the life
of those weapons, it is also making them safer.
Some Senators have expressed concerns about the level of funding for
this modernization. I believe our President and this administration
have adequately addressed those concerns, and I would note that the
Directors of the three labs--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and
Sandia--all believe the administration's current plan will allow them
to execute their requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable,
and effective stockpile.
While we move forward with that modernization program, we should also
move forward--it is a separate issue--with the treaty. Passing this
treaty is going to safeguard our national security while demonstrating
to the men and women of our nuclear complex that we have reached a
national consensus on nuclear sustainability.
Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that cosponsors be
added to Corker amendment No. 4904, as modified, as follows: Senator
Lieberman, Senator Brown of Massachusetts, and Senator Murkowski.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are awaiting the Senator from Arizona
who, I know, is working on a couple of things right now. We need to
clear a couple of things with the Senator, and we are working on the
possibility of accepting his amendment. We just need to tie up those
loose ends.
So I think the Senator from Wyoming may have had a request he wanted
to make. We can do that now, and then we will see where we are.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the importance
of Minutemen III intercontinental ballistic missiles, known as ICBMs,
and an amendment I intend to offer. The ICBM is just one leg of our
nuclear triad. The nuclear triad spans sea, air, and land. It relies on
mobile bombers, hard-to-detect ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs.
They all work together to complicate and deter any attempt at a
successful first strike on our country. Like a stool, if you shorten
just one leg too much, the stool will become unstable.
Our nuclear triad is not just a weapons system, it is a deterrent.
The further we weaken our nuclear forces, the less of a deterrent our
triad will become.
Those folks who believe in nuclear zero and arms control seek a world
without nuclear weapons at any expense--in my opinion, never at the
expense of our national security. The fact is, for over 50 years our
ICBM force has deterred a nuclear attack against the United States and
our allies.
Some arms control supporters claim our ICBMs are on ``hair-trigger
alert.'' They believe an ICBM can be launched by simply pushing a
button. This misleading claim that an unauthorized launch can destroy
the world in a matter of minutes could not be further from the truth.
GEN Kevin Chilton, the outgoing commander of STRATCOM, once described
our nuclear posture as:
The weapon is in the holster . . . the holster has two
combination locks on it, it takes two people to open those
locks, and they can't do it without authenticated orders from
the President of the United States.
The Minuteman III ICBM force is the most stabilizing leg of the
nuclear triad.
ICBMs are strategically located and broadly dispersed in order to
prevent them from successfully being attacked. The ICBMs protect the
survivability of other legs of the triad as a deterrent. They offer an
umbrella of protection to our most-valued allies. ICBMs also represent
the most cost-effective delivery systems the United States processes.
Unlike a bomber, ICBMs ensure a second attack capability.
As required by section 1251 of the 2010 National Defense
Authorization Act, earlier this year, the administration submitted its
force structure plan. The President's 1251 force structure plan
provides up to 420 ICBMs, 14 submarines carrying up to 240 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs, and up to 60 nuclear-capable
heavy bombers.
We are being asked to ratify this treaty without knowing what our
force structure will actually be. We are being told: Pass the treaty,
and then we will tell you what the force structure will actually look
like.
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid out our force structure in plain
view, while the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is silent on the force
structure.
This report also laid out the administration's plan to modernize and
maintain our nuclear delivery vehicles.
With respect to the next generation of ICBMs, the update states:
While a decision on an ICBM follow-on is not needed for
several years, preparatory analysis is needed and is in fact
now underway. This work will consider a range of deployment
options, with the objective of defining a cost-effective
approach for an ICBM follow-on that supports continued
reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable
deterrence.
The amendment I plan to offer has no impact on the treaty. It simply
requires the President to certify that further reductions in our land-
based strategic nuclear deterrent will not be considered when reviewing
the options for a follow-on ICBM. This is something I have worked on
with Senator Conrad. He has a second-degree amendment to mine, and it
is something we both support.
LTG Frank Klotz, the new commander of Global Strike Command, was
quoted last year at the Air Force Air and Space Conference and
Technology Exposition here in Washington, DC, as saying:
Continuously on alert and deployed in 450 widely dispersed
locations, the size and characteristics of the overall
Minuteman III force presents any potential adversary with an
almost insurmountable challenge should he contemplate
attacking the United States. Because he cannot disarm the
ICBM force without nearly exhausting his own forces in the
process, and at the same time, leaving himself vulnerable to
our sea-launched ballistic missiles and bombers, he has no
incentive to strike in the first place. In this case, numbers
do matter . . . and the ICBM thus contributes immeasurably to
both deterrence and stability in a crisis.
The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to maintaining
an effective deterrent.
In 2008, Secretary Gates coauthored a white paper titled ``National
Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' This paper argued
for a strong nuclear deterrent. The forward stated:
We believe the logic presented here provides a sound basis
on which this and future administrations can consider further
adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and
force structure.
The white paper by Secretary Gates recommended a U.S. strategic
nuclear force baseline that includes 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, 14 Ohio
class submarines, and 76 bombers, 20 B-2 and 26
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B-52 bombers, for a total of 862. The administration cannot explain how
the threat environment has changed since the 2008 recommendation to
maintain 862 delivery vehicles. They cannot explain what has changed to
allow our nuclear deterrent to be reduced to 700 delivery vehicles.
It sounds to me as if this administration has been a little too eager
in negotiating the treaty.
James Woolsey, in a recent Wall Street Journal article, described his
experiences negotiating with the Russians. He said:
The Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian
counterparts, don't appear eager--friendly, yes, eager,
never.
I think Mr. Woolsey would know; he was involved in the SALT I treaty
in 1970 and many more arms control agreements with the Russians before
he took over as the Director of Central Intelligence.
I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 4880, a Barrasso-
Enzi amendment, and then a second-degree by Senator Conrad.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, we had a discussion
about this, and I am constrained to object. I think he understands why.
I welcome further debate if he would like, but I must object.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard.
Mr. BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. President.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the issue, as it is
important. I understand its importance to the part of the country where
those particular weapons are housed today. I am confident--and I know
this--that the administration, because we have talked about it, has a
plan that I think will meet with the consent and approval of the
Senators' concern, but they need to go through the further evaluation
and analysis of all of these decisions. Decisions have not yet been
made, and it would be inappropriate at this time to constrain the
latitude they need in order to be able to make those judgments. It is
an important issue, but I think it is inappropriate for us to constrain
them and particularly to do so in the context of the treaty itself.
Mr. President, we are working with our friends on the other side of
the aisle to really try to get the final agreement as to how we are
going to proceed. I believe it is going to be possible for us to work
out the issues with Senator Kyl and his amendment. So I hope we will
not need any other votes other than the final vote on the treaty. That
is our hope at this point. We will try to work through that over the
course of the next few minutes.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, knowing that we are getting to that moment
at which point we are going to have an understanding of how we are
proceeding forward and knowing that because of the 30-hour limitation,
no matter what, we are getting toward the end, rather than chew up time
for Senators later on, I thought I would take a moment now to say thank
you to a few folks involved in this process. Before I do that, I also
will reserve some time, as I will for Senator Kyl and Senator Lugar--
and this, I assume, will be part of the agreement we are going to
reach--to speak to the substance of the treaty at the appropriate time
before we vote.
It has been an incredible team effort by an awful lot of people over
the course of a lot of months. I wish to thank all of them for their
involvement.
Senator Lugar has been an unbelievable partner and a visionary with
respect to these issues but, importantly, just a very steady, wise, and
thoughtful collaborator in the effort to get the treaty to where we are
today. It hasn't always been easy for him because there were times when
he was a lonely voice with respect to those who were prepared to
support this treaty. I wish to pay tribute to his statesmanship and his
personal courage in steadily hanging in there with us.
I thank President Obama for his determination to make certain that
this was the priority that he felt it was and that I think it is. He
and so many folks in the administration have been helpful in this
effort.
I will reserve some comments later more specifically, but I think the
Vice President has been, at the President's request, an invaluable
collaborator in this effort. He has talked to any number of colleagues,
made any number of phone calls, been involved in any number of
strategic choices here, and I am deeply grateful to him for taking his
prior stewardship of this committee and being as thoughtful as he has
been in the way he has approached this particular treaty.
Secretary Clinton likewise has dedicated herself and her staff to the
effort to work through unbelievable numbers of questions, to make
themselves available and to make herself available to talk with
colleagues.
This has been a tremendous team effort with Secretary Gates,
Secretary Chu, Admiral Mullen, General Chilton, LTG O'Reilly, and
others. None of these things can happen if there isn't a team pulling
together to answer questions and deal with the issues colleagues have.
At the State Department, Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller has
been unbelievably available, patient, thoughtful, and very detailed in
her efforts to answer the questions of Senators and be precise about
this negotiation. She led a tremendous team and worked very closely
with Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Rich Verma,
who likewise helped coordinate and pull people together to deal with
the issues we faced. Dave Turk, Terri Lodge, Paul Dean, and Marcie Ries
have all been key members of that team, and we thank them for their
amazing commitment of hours and the dedication they have shown to the
effort to try to get us to where we are today, to this final vote.
Likewise, at the Pentagon, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Jim
Miller; the chief Defense Department representative on the negotiating
team, Ted Warner; Marcell Lettre; Eric Pierce; Michael Elliott; and
Chris Comeau--all of them, together with the State Department, provided
the kind of linkage we needed and the consistent effort to answer
questions and deal with their principals in order to get the
information necessary for Senators to be able to make good judgments.
At the Energy Department, Tom D'Agostino and Kurt Siemon were also
constantly available.
At the White House, I thank Pete Rouse, chief of staff, and Tom
Donilon, the National Security Adviser, and I especially thank Brian
McKeon, Vice President Biden's National Security Deputy, who has just
done an extraordinary job of helping to provide the bridge between
various agencies, as well as strategy, and has been consistently
available to us. Louisa Terrell and Jon Wolfsthal have been part of
that team. We are very grateful to all of them.
On the Foreign Relations Committee, it has been a great team effort
with Senator Lugar. The chief of staff of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Frank Lowenstein, has worked countless hours on this treaty,
together with Doug Frantz, Ed Levine, and Anthony Wier. These two
gentlemen, Ed Levine and Anthony Wier, are unbelievable veterans of
this kind of effort. They worked with Senator Biden for years. I am
delighted they were willing to stay over and continue with the
committee.
In the case of Ed Levine, he lost his dad during the course of this
debate a few days ago and, nevertheless, hung in there with us and
stayed right at it. The wisdom and experience he has brought to this
task is invaluable, together with his collaborator Anthony Wier. Peter
Scoblic, Andrew Keller, Jason Bruder, and Jen Berlin have been enormous
contributors to this effort. I am grateful to all of them.
On the Republican side, Ken Myers--Ken brings so much experience and
wisdom to this task. He has been with Senator Lugar for a long time.
What he has done to help us bridge the divide is immeasurable. Tom
Moore and Mike Mattler worked with him.
Our staff in S-116, which has sort of been headquarters for us, Meg
Murphy
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and Matt Dixon have put up with strange hours and interruptions. We are
eternally grateful to them.
Obviously, nothing happens in the Senate without the floor staff, the
folks who put in these long hours. Jessica Lewis and Tommy Ross on
Senator Reid's staff have been invaluable to us. Lula Davis, Tim
Mitchell, and Stacy Rich are invaluable on every issue here. The Senate
would not work without them. We are deeply grateful to all these
people.
I am glad the schedule allows us a moment where we can actually thank
them all publicly. They do a service for our country that many people
in the country never have a sense of. They do not see it. Government
gets a lot of criticism, but let me tell you, these folks work as hard
as any people I know anywhere, and a lot of things could not happen
without them.
As I said, I wish to speak to the substance of the treaty before we
vote, but for the moment I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I wish to seize the moment, along with my
distinguished chairman, because we are indebted to all the great people
he has enumerated, to embellish his congratulations by mentioning that
we are grateful, first of all, that the President invited Senator Kerry
and me to be part of conversations on two occasions during the
negotiation of the treaty. That, we thought, was very valuable and gave
us some insight as to where the negotiators were headed and to offer
what counsel we could about those issues we felt were important and
those issues we were certain all Senators would feel were important as
we sought ratification of the New START treaty.
Likewise, those conversations were carried on rigorously by the Vice
President, our former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Joe Biden, who has worked with Senator Kerry and with me
over the course of three decades or so of active participation and
several arms control treaties. Vice President Biden has a very good
idea of how the ratification process works and what counsel he can
give, not only to us but to all Members and colleagues with whom he has
worked so well in the past.
I am especially pleased, likewise, that Rose Gottemoeller, who headed
the negotiation team, has been very available to Senators throughout
the time of the negotiation abroad and during her trips to Washington
and certainly throughout the hearings the Foreign Relations Committee
held.
We are indebted, in fact, to all the witnesses who came before our
committee in the 16 hearings that have often been enumerated in
conversation on the floor. The witnesses were generous with their time,
very forthcoming with their testimony and followup questions the
Senators had. Because of that testimony, there is a very solid block of
support for the treaty based upon these distinguished Americans who
have had enormous experience, not only with arms control treaties but
the actual implementation of these with the former Soviet Union--and
now with Russia--in the past.
I am indebted, as John Kerry is, to Ken Myers, Tom Moore and Mike
Mattler of our staff and to Marik String and Corey Gill. I cite these
five members of a very devoted staff who have devoted extraordinary
talents and time and devotion to the treaty formulation and to the
counsel they have given me, for which I am very much indebted.
Finally, I thank all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee for their diligence and attendance at hearings and their
questioning of each other, as well as the witnesses and the discussions
we have had both in informal and formal sessions. We have had a
difference of opinions. Our views were not unanimous in the 14-to-4
vote by which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent this New
START treaty to the floor. But I respect deeply each of those views,
and I respect the ways in which members of the committee have
participated during this very important debate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I say Merry Christmas to all my
colleagues. We never expected to find ourselves here this time of year,
but obviously there are very important issues to discuss.
On November 2, Americans made a pretty historic statement. After 2
years of many things being crammed down their throat that they did not
like, they made historic changes in the House and the Senate. I think
all expectations were that the new Congress would come in and begin to
change things. Very few Americans--and I think very few of us in the
Senate--actually thought we would use the time between that election
and the swearing in of the new Members of Congress to continue to cram
through more things America does not want.
Most businesses have learned that if they ever have to make the
difficult decision of firing someone, it is very important that person
be sent home right away because getting fired usually makes people
angry and less loyal to the company that fired them. Instead of dealing
with all the mischief that might occur, the fired employee is sent home
right away.
We are a fired Congress in a lot of ways. America has sent us home.
Many people who set the policies for the last 2 years have been
unelected. Some have retired. But the decisions that are being made now
in this Congress are decisions being made by people who have either
retired or who have been turned out of office. So much is being pushed
through because of the fear that if we actually let the newly elected
Congressmen and Senators be sworn in before we take up these important
issues that they will actually reflect the opinions of the American
people and stop what we are doing.
We have decided to use this lameduck session to push many items
through. It is a very unaccountable Congress. We tried to push through
a huge omnibus spending bill with thousands of earmarks, exactly the
thing about which Americans have said no more. Thankfully, Republicans
stood together to stop that bill.
We needed to extend our current tax rates, but even in order to get a
temporary extension, we in the minority had to agree to more deficit
spending. In this lameduck session, we have pushed our political
correctness on to our military by repealing don't ask, don't tell
without the proper studies, without the proper phase-in time, and no
rational approach to this. It was just check the box of another
political payback.
In another check the box of amnesty, the DREAM Act, which was brought
up and fortunately Republicans stood against something that again
avoided the big issue of border security. This Congress has
continuously rejected the idea of carrying through on our own law to
complete the double-layer fencing we put into law to protect the
southern border. Thousands of people are being killed on the border
because we refuse to take action. Yet we are continuing to try to
expand the problem with more amnesty and citizenship and public
benefits to those who came here illegally.
The threat is now to keep us here until Christmas or beyond to pass
what we are calling a 9/11 bill. Every Member of this Chamber--
Republicans and Democrats--wants to do what is right for the first
responders who may have been injured after 9/11. But we owe it to the
American people to be accountable to how we spend money. To put a bill
on the floor, in an unaccountable lameduck Congress, that has not been
through hearings, when we do not know how the millions of dollars have
been used that we have already given to the same cause certainly is
worth a few weeks of committee hearings and understanding exactly how
to spend taxpayer money effectively in a way we know will help the
people who have been injured.
But, no, we have to push that through in a fired, unaccountable
Congress. Of course, now the big issue of the day is somehow, in a time
of economic recession and so many people being out of work, that we
want to use this lameduck, unaccountable Congress to push through a
major arms control treaty with Russia. Somehow that ended up on the top
of our priority list, using Christmas as a backstop to try to force us
to pass this bill.
It is pretty interesting how this has progressed. The treaty had no
chance of ratification until the President
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agreed to billions of dollars in modernization of our nuclear weapons.
We have to stop and ask ourselves: Why should we have to have
backroom trading going on to modernize our nuclear weapons? That should
be something the President is committed to, that we are committed to.
We should not have to trade for modernization. But now we appear to
have enough Republicans who have decided this is a good treaty to
ratify a few days before Christmas in a fired, unaccountable Congress,
with the need to push it through before America's representatives
actually get here the first of January. The sense here is if we let the
people America just elected come, that maybe the treaty will need some
modifications.
There have been many questions expressed about the treaty. I think
some of them are very legitimate. Clearly, missile defense is a
problem. The Russians have expressed that Americans cannot develop any
kind of comprehensive missile defense system under this treaty. We say:
No, no. We can develop a limited missile defense system. We are going
through all kinds of convoluted language to put things in nonbinding
areas of this agreement, to say we are committed or we are going to
communicate to the Russians that we are committed, but we even were
unwilling to put it in the preamble that there is no linkage between
the development of our missile defense system and this treaty
agreement. Clearly, there is a linkage. The Russians believe there is a
linkage.
All the correspondence from the President says ``limited missile
defense system.'' We obviously have agreed to it. We never could get
the negotiating records to confirm that, but everything suggests there
is an implicit and explicit agreement that America will not attempt to
develop a missile defense system capable of defending against Russian
missiles. Perhaps capable of defending against a rogue missile launch
or an accidental missile launch, but the language in this treaty,
communications from the White House, the hearings all say we will only
have a limited missile defense system.
There should be no mistake, there should be no confusion, the
agreement to this treaty is an agreement for America not to develop a
comprehensive missile defense system. If that is satisfactory, then
let's ratify. Clearly, there are holes in the verification process of
this treaty. The growing and biggest threat is tactical nuclear
weapons. Shorter range missiles, ground-based, sub-based are not even
included in this agreement. The Russians are fine with this. They were
going down to the same long-range missile count we require in this
treaty anyway. They give up nothing. We don't restrict any of their
tactical developments. The verification is less stringent than in START
I, with fewer inspections, and the ability to actually look at things
such as telemetry are obviously omitted here.
We can't ratify this treaty with any pretense that America is going
to be any safer. In fact, I think the biggest problem with this treaty
is the whole presumption it is built on--that America should be at
parity with Russia. We have talked about it here in this Chamber, that
we do not have the same role as Russia in this world. Russia is a
protector of none and a threat to many. America is the protector of
many and a threat to none. Over 30 countries live in peace under our
nuclear umbrella, but we are saying we are going to reduce it, with a
lot of questions as to whether we are going to modernize it, and we are
telling our allies that tactical nuclear weapons are not going to be
restricted in any way, which is probably their biggest concern because
of their contiguous location to Russia.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. DeMINT. Yes.
Mr. INHOFE. When you talk about the missile defense aspect of this, I
wonder if it has occurred to a lot of people that maybe this treaty is
with the wrong people. We know right now that Iran is going to have the
capability--and this is not even classified--of a nuclear weapon, a
delivery system, by 2015. I think one of the worst things for America--
and this President did it--was to take down the sites we were planning
in Poland that would give us this protection.
My point I want to make, and then to ask the Senator about, is that
in the event this is ratified and we are restricted in any way from
developing further our missile defense system, doesn't that put us
directly in an impaired position in terms of North Korea, maybe Syria,
but definitely Iran, that has already indicated and already has the
capability of reaching us by that time?
It is interesting that the site would have been in effect to knock
down a missile coming from Iran by 2015, the same year our intelligence
community tells us they will have that capability. Isn't that the
threat we are concerned about, more than Russia?
Mr. DeMINT. I want to thank the Senator from Oklahoma for bringing
out another very important point. We are laser focused on this treaty
with Russia, which obviously restricts our ability to develop missile
defense. Yet we all seem to acknowledge the greatest growing threat in
this world is from Iran and North Korea and other rogue nations that
can develop nuclear technology.
It is almost like watching a magician at play here, of getting us to
look at one hand while other things are going on. We are not paying
attention to the Nation's business here, and I am afraid this is just
another ``check the box''--a foreign policy victory for the
administration. If it did not have so many questions related to it,
that would be fine, but not to jam this through with a fired,
unaccountable Congress, and rushing it through before the
representatives America just elected have been sworn in, and doing it
as part of a list of legislation--a long list over the last 2 years--
that America does not want.
I want good relations with Russia and countries all over the world,
but I am afraid this is part of a continued effort of accommodation and
appeasement; that if we show weakness, other countries will accommodate
us. We need Russia to cooperate--with Russia and North Korea. Folks, I
don't think this is the way to get it, and I don't think we are going
to gain respect for our process of trying to do this under the cover of
a distraction of a major holiday with a lameduck, unaccountable
Congress.
In the way this is being presented, it is a mockery of the debate
process here in the Senate. We are not amending a treaty. We were told
at the outset it is ``take it or leave it.'' The Russians are
negotiating, clearly, from a position of strength, because they said,
here is the treaty, take it or leave it; any changes and the treaty is
dead. Is that the way America needs to deal with other countries? Is
that the way the Senate should debate a major arms control agreement,
where the majority party is saying, you can go talk about it if you
want, but we are going to kill every amendment, even though we say we
agree with a lot of them. There will be no changes in this.
We are trying to stick some things in here in the areas of the treaty
that have no binding aspect and say we have covered it, but we are
making a mockery of the whole debate and ratification processes with an
unaccountable, fired Congress, under the cover of Christmas, and a
debate where we have been told ``take it or leave it.'' This is not
what the Senate is about, this is not what Congress is supposed to be
about, and certainly we should not be passing major legislation at this
time of year with this Congress.
Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I still hope my
colleagues will come to their senses and show the American people that
we are going to act in a responsible way that respects what they told
us on November 2; that this Congress needs to go, a new one needs to
come in, and we need to stop cramming things down their throats they do
not want.
With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennet of Colorado). The Senator from
Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are now in the final throes of getting
together a unanimous consent request. The leadership has asked us to
proceed forward on the amendment. Senator Kyl has asked me--I think he
wanted to be here when we do his amendment on modernization, which we
are now prepared to accept, with further modification. So I will wait
for Senator Kyl in order to do that.
In the meantime, I understand we also have an agreement on the
missile
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defense amendment, and that amendment is now going to be cosponsored by
Senator Lieberman and Senator McCain. So if the Senator from Tennessee
wants to talk about that amendment, we are prepared to accept it. I
think we should have the discussion of that amendment at this point in
time.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to at this moment ask unanimous
consent to change the name of the amendment to McCain-Lieberman-Corker.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CORKER. I would also ask unanimous consent to add Senators
Johanns, Levin, and Bayh as cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. KERRY. No objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.