[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 173 (Wednesday, December 22, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10938-S10953]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                    Amendment No. 4892, as Modified

  Mr. KYL. I call up amendment No. 4892, as modified. The modification 
is at the desk.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment is so modified.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if we could begin the consideration, as I 
mentioned, we are working on that language. I do not want to agree to 
the modification yet until we have had a chance to talk with the 
Senator about it. I am not saying we will not agree to it. I want to 
see if we can get that done. If we can begin on the amendment as 
originally filed, we can interrupt to do it with the modification. I 
want a chance to clear it.
  Mr. KYL. I am not asking at this time there be an agreement. I am 
simply saying that the amendment I want to bring up is the amendment I 
filed.
  Mr. KERRY. I have no objection to the as modified to consider it.
  Mr. KYL. I will describe the modifications. They were made in an 
effort

[[Page S10939]]

to get agreement. If we cannot, that is fine, but I do think it makes 
it more palatable to Members.
  May we have the amendment read.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4892, as modified.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To require a certification regarding the design and funding 
                         of certain facilities)

       At the end of subsection (a), add the following:
       (11) Design and funding of certain facilities.--Prior to 
     the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) accelerate the design and engineering phase of the 
     Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building 
     and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF); and
       (B) request advanced funding, including on a multi-year 
     basis, for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 
     building and the Uranium Processing Facility upon completion 
     of the design and engineering phase for such facilities.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona is 
recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this amendment has to do with the 
modernization of our nuclear weapons enterprise. It is a subject with 
which we began this debate. As we get toward the end of the debate, it 
remains a piece of unfinished business with which I think we need to 
deal. Remember, the nuclear enterprise we are talking about consists 
primarily of the facilities that are used to work on our nuclear 
weapons, as well as the weapons and importantly the scientists who work 
in those facilities. They represent our National Laboratories, as well 
as other production facilities and related facilities.
  The point I think is important for people to remember is that unlike 
all of the other nuclear powers in the world today, the United States 
does not have an active modernization program for our nuclear 
deterrent, a program which enables us, for example, to remanufacture a 
component of a weapon and replace an existing weapon with that.
  The need for this has been made very clear by all of the people in 
the administration who have considered this, including Secretary of 
Defense Gates. The Secretary, remember, is, in effect, the customer for 
the Department of Energy, which is the Department responsible for 
producing these weapons. The budget we talk about is a Department of 
Energy budget, but it is really to produce weapons for use by the 
Secretary of Defense.
  Here is what he said about the need to modernize the production 
complex, which is what we call that group of facilities, as well as the 
stockpile:

       To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a 
     credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our 
     stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile 
     or pursuing a modernization program.

  Each year, our Laboratory Directors and the Secretary of Energy are 
required to provide a certification to the President that certifies the 
status of the weapons in the stockpile and makes determinations as to 
whether those weapons are safe, secure, and reliable without the need 
for testing.
  Each year, as we discussed in our closed session, there are reports 
about the status of these weapons. I will talk in a moment about the 
material we discussed in the closed session. But suffice it to say here 
that there is a great need for us to move with alacrity to bring up to 
date the weapons that are in our stockpile and that requires 
modernization of the facilities and related equipment to accomplish 
that task.
  This will require a substantial investment over the next decade. 
Unfortunately, over the years, these facilities have been allowed to 
deteriorate, our capacity to atrophy, and our scientists to retire 
without doing what is necessary to bring these weapons up to date.
  The current budget projection, as expressed in the 1251 report 
update, which was dated November 17, 2010, initiates that modernization 
but clearly cannot accurately predict future requirements. This is the 
problem we have dealt with here.
  The report acknowledges that we have a problem and can estimate today 
what we think we can spend over the next few years--say, 5 years--but 
it is hard to estimate beyond that as to what the exact cost of this is 
going to be. I try to deal with that in this particular amendment.
  The Laboratory Directors responsible for certifying our nuclear 
weapons recently wrote in a letter:

       As we emphasized in our testimonies, implementation of the 
     future vision of the nuclear deterrent . . . will require 
     sustained attention and continued refinement.

  In other words, each year they can get their estimates more accurate, 
as one might expect, and define more specifically what the exact 
requirements are. In this case, that generally means an increase in 
costs in one area or another. In fact, Vice President Biden, speaking 
to this precise problem, said:

       [W]e expect that funding requirements will increase in 
     future budget years.

  We know that is going to happen. The question is, can we be any more 
particular in the funding that we require. My amendment seeks to be a 
little bit more precise or a little bit more specific than the current 
language.
  At the crux of this modernization program is a need for a firm 
commitment for the construction of two critical manufacturing 
facilities. They are called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Replacement, or CMRR, plutonium facility--that is at Los Alamos 
Laboratory--and the Uranium Processing Facility, or UPF at the so-
called Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge, TN. Without these, the capacity to 
perform stockpile maintenance will be lost by 2020 and there will be no 
capability to modernize our aging stockpile.
  For Members to recall briefly, these are, in many cases, facilities 
that go all the way back to the Manhattan Project, the project that 
created the atomic weapons that enabled us to conclude World War II. 
Some of these buildings were built as early as 1942, and they are not 
in good shape. In fact, when I was with one of my colleagues from 
Tennessee visiting the Y-12 facility, I asked one of the people 
responsible for a particular part of the facility what his biggest 
concern was. He said: My biggest concern is keeping this thing going 
for another 10 or 12 years. When you see the facility, you can see 
that. And that is no way to deal with the most sophisticated weapons 
that mankind has ever invented.
  As I said, the current plan is a big improvement over what we had 
just a year or so ago. We got together with the administration and 
asked them to relook at the plan they had submitted and identify areas 
where there were deficiencies in funding or planning. They came back 
with an updated report that revealed funding requirements that had 
previously not been dealt with. There was a little over $4 billion in 
funding added to the first 5 years of the 10-year program we are 
looking at as a result.
  But even there, there was an argument that there were uncertainties, 
they were only at a certain point in the planning of these two large 
facilities, and that those funds would be inadequate.
  To note something for our colleagues and of which the Presiding 
Officer is very well aware, being one of the two Senators responsible 
for the Los Alamos facilities, he will recall both he and his colleague 
and others of us, in visiting Los Alamos, were told about the problems 
of building a facility there where there theoretically could be an 
earthquake in the near vicinity and the costs of construction have 
increased dramatically because of the physical needs to protect that 
facility against any conceivable kind of physical problem. That has 
increased the cost of the facilities, and they are trying to get a 
handle on how much they will actually be. They are pretty clear about a 
ball-park estimate, but a ball-park estimate is not quite good enough 
for these purposes, as we know.
  I will conclude by saying I am a little distressed by the news 
stories. We cannot expect the news media to have gotten into the detail 
required to actually make policy. They put it in a political context 
that the administration put another $4 billion into the pot and why 
shouldn't that satisfy people like me.
  Of course, that is totally beside the point. We are simply trying to 
get a better handle on how much money will

[[Page S10940]]

be needed and to be able to plan for that funding in a way that gets it 
to the facilities in the most expeditious way possible so that, A, we 
can complete the work that has to be done in time and, B, that will 
save a lot of money, about $200 million a year.
  There is every reason to want to understand how much it will cost and 
get it done quickly. It is not about adding $4 billion. That does not 
begin to cover the cost of these items.
  It is not a matter of some kind of negotiation that additional money 
was thrown in the pot and is that not good enough. It is a matter of 
continuing to focus as the cost of these facilities evolves and as the 
requirements evolve, so that Congress, with the administration's 
request in its budgets, can provide the funding that is necessary when 
it is necessary to get these facilities completed as quickly as 
possible in order to achieve our modernization goals.
  There is no dispute about the fact that there will be additional 
money required. It is just a question of what to do about it.
  The updated budget, while committing additional funds to repairing 
these facilities, will not be able to eliminate even over 10 years, for 
example, the more than $2 billion of documented maintenance issues. 
There are some things that are simply outside the budget and need to be 
dealt with.
  My biggest concern in the updated modernization plan is actually that 
it added to the delays. What we should be doing is trying to telescope 
these projects as much as possible so we can meet the deadlines for the 
refurbishing of our weapons--or maintenance of our weapons, I should 
say--rather--than extending the time for the completion of the 
facilities. But unfortunately, that is what the latest report did. 
Instead of accelerating construction of these two most critical 
facilities, the CMRR and the UPF, the updated plan now delays 
completion to 2023 and 2024, respectively, rather than 2020.
  As we recall from the executive session we had a couple of days ago, 
there was information presented as to why these facilities absolutely 
needed to be completed by 2020 in order to accomplish the life 
extension projects for some of our weapons.
  Delay in these facilities will hamper efforts to perform these 
critical life extensions of our warheads and not inconsequentially add 
significant costs, again, primarily to keep these aging facilities 
operational.
  As an example, we have to put a brandnew roof on the facility at Los 
Alamos even though the facility in 10 or 12 years is no longer going to 
be used because it will be replaced. But the roof is so bad that the 
work we have to do in there is affected by the weather, and so we have 
to build a roof. That is an expenditure one hates to make because in 10 
or 12 years that building is not going to be used anymore. But that is 
the state of repair we are in.
  Each year of delay adds to those kinds of maintenance costs. Senator 
Corker and I and Senator Alexander were told at the Y-12 facility that 
it is about a $200-million-a-year cost to keep these aging facilities 
going that we can eliminate if we can complete the construction of 
these two large facilities.
  One-fourth of the newest increase of this $4.1 billion, of which I 
spoke, for the next 4 years does not even go to the buildings or the 
facility. It simply meets an obligation for unfunded pensions that have 
been allowed to accumulate over the years. The only good news about 
that is, I guess, they would probably have stolen the money from one of 
the accounts that directly deals with the modernization of our weapons 
in order to meet those unfunded pension obligations. So I am glad we 
were able to put the billion dollars in there. But when they talk about 
$4 billion more for science work on these weapons, that is not true. 
Fully one-fourth of it goes to meet these unfunded pension obligations.
  There is a need for things outside the science, but clearly the 
science requirements are the key ones we are trying to get money to as 
much as we can.
  The key point also is that the modernization is independent of the 
ratification of the treaty. It is true that as we reduce the number of 
warheads, there is even more of a requirement that we know the warheads 
we have will do their job because we do not have a backup warhead 
sitting in a storeroom, basically in the event something does not work 
if that is deployed right now. It is true that as we reduce the number, 
we have to pay even more attention to whether they are all safe, 
secure, and reliable. But it is also a fact that the modernization is 
independent of the ratification of the treaty.
  During the hearings that were conducted on this treaty, all 16 
experts who provided testimony spoke of the requirement for 
modernization. Many indicated it is a requirement irrespective of 
START. That is a point that has been made by others as well.
  For example, former Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham in an op-ed 
recently said:

       The Obama administration's decision to support increased 
     investment in the maintenance of our nuclear weapons lab and 
     stockpile is correct and long overdue . . . But the fact that 
     the administration has revised its policy for the better is 
     in itself no reason for any Senator to endorse START . . . 
     The START treaty and beefed up funding for our nuclear 
     enterprise are two separate issues that should remain 
     distinct.

  The point was also made by the person responsible for this 
modernization program--Deputy NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino. He 
said: ``Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern 
security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or not the 
START treaty is ratified.''
  So this has to be done whether the treaty is ratified or not, and I 
think everybody acknowledges that fact.
  So we believe the resolution of ratification needs to address these 
issues by providing a couple conditions, and we have modified the 
original language in order to try to get an agreement. If we can't, we 
will vote on it and see what happens, but I am hoping my colleagues 
will agree.
  The first is something I know has been agreed to; that is, a 
condition the President will provide an annual update of the section 
1251 report.
  The administration is agreeable to this, and it is the way for 
Congress to be annually advised of the status of this construction, the 
status of the facilities, and what more may need to be done on that. 
Presumably, that will be provided at or about the time the budget is 
sent to Congress from the administration.
  Secondly, a condition the President will certify, prior to entry into 
force of the treaty, that the President intends--so this is not a 
requirement that he has achieved a particular result, but he intends to 
accelerate the design and engineering phase, to the extent possible, of 
the CMRR and UPF.
  In other words, we are not asking the impossible be done, just that 
to the extent we can possibly do it, we accelerate the design and 
engineering of these two facilities so they can get done on time, 
rather than with the delays.
  Third, that the administration--or the President--request advance 
funding, including on a multiyear basis, for these two facilities--the 
CMRR and the UPF--upon completion of the design and engineering phase 
of the planning.
  What that means is, we are not asking them to provide advance funding 
for the entire projects, as is done, for example, when we construct an 
aircraft carrier. We are not asking it be done now, when there are 
still some uncertainties about exactly what these facilities need and 
how much they will cost. Los Alamos is still being tweaked, among other 
things, as I said, because of the need to make it earthquake-proof. 
What we are saying is, upon completion of the design and engineering 
phase of planning, then the administration requests advance funding and 
on a multiyear basis.
  What that means is--and this is frequently done with large Defense 
Department contracts, in order to get them done as quickly as possible 
and as inexpensively as possible--there are multiyear advances of 
funding so the money can be spent, let us just say hypothetically, 
within a 5-year period by the Defense Department for an aircraft 
carrier, for example. Instead of having the Appropriations committees 
each year appropriate a particular amount of money, and the work that 
is done can only be done within the constraints of that particular 
amount of money appropriated in that particular year, what they say 
is--and I am just

[[Page S10941]]

speaking hypothetically--the cost is, let's say, $4 billion, and we 
know it is going to take about 4 years to do this. Instead of saying: 
Well, we are going to do $1 billion of appropriations each year, what 
they say is: All right. You have $4 billion, and if you can get it done 
more quickly by spending this money more quickly, fine. That will save 
us money and it will get the project done quicker. If you can't, then 
you can't. But that money is set aside in an account for that purpose.
  That is all we are asking be done here too. These two facilities are 
both, in terms of order of magnitude, about $5 billion facilities. They 
might be a little less. They are likely to be a little more--
potentially, in the neighborhood of $6 billion or so. Originally, when 
the administration presented its first 1251 report, the entire 10-year 
program was set at $10 billion. We knew that wasn't adequate. We went 
to the administration, they recalculated everything, brought their 
estimates up to date, and said: That is right, $10 billion is not going 
to be enough. We will add another $4 billion to $6 billion over the 
first 4 to 6 years.
  Undoubtedly, the cost will increase above that, as has been testified 
to. My guess is, just in terms of order of magnitude, you are looking 
at roughly $20 billion over 10 to 12 years. We will know more each year 
this goes forward. But to construct these two facilities, if we could 
advance fund at least some money--let's say, 3 years' worth of the 
money--then it will be possible for the people who are responsible for 
the construction of those facilities, if they can get 15 months of work 
out of the first 12 months and spend more than 12 months' worth of 
money to get that done, that is great. They will have been able to 
accomplish their job more quickly. Each month that goes by adds costs 
to the program. So if we can provide them advance funding of some 
amount--we are not specifying it in here--they can probably get the 
project done more quickly and less expensively, and that should be a 
good thing. I think everybody agrees this would be the way to do it.
  There have been two objections posited, to my knowledge. First, the 
Department of Energy has never done it this way. That, of course, is 
not the way for us to set policy. I saw my colleague on television this 
morning saying what we need is a plan. We are too focused always on 
what is right in front of our face. A lot of times, if we have a basic 
plan everybody knows we are trying to work toward, it is amazing how 
much you can accomplish in terms of the details. Well, this is the 
basic plan.
  The Department of Defense does this every year because they have 
large-cost construction projects. The Department of Energy has never 
done it that way--except I am not sure that is true. Before there was a 
Department of Energy, the Manhattan Project was being built, and GEN 
Leslie Groves, who is sort of the father of the Manhattan Project, 
didn't have any problem at all about advance funding. He went to the 
President and the Congress and said: I need this money. They said: What 
do you need it for? He said: Don't ask questions, it is secret, and he 
got the money. That is an oversimplification, but he got that project 
done in less time than anybody could have possibly imagined because he 
had the resources provided to him to get it done.
  So when they say it has never been done before, well, actually, it 
has been done before on this exact--on this exact--national defense 
item; namely, our nuclear enterprise. It is just that it was back in 
the early 1940s when people were not so, I guess, concerned about each 
year's budget and the appropriations that would accompany those 
budgets.
  Secondly, the argument is made that--and this one may surprise 
folks--well, if we have, let's say, 3 years' worth of funding out there 
and that money is provided to the Department of Energy, the Members of 
Congress who are on the Appropriations Committee will grab that money--
or parts of it that are unspent--and apply it to other things.
  Think about that for a minute. The very people responsible for 
funding these projects in the Congress, who know they have to be done 
and who have agreed to the advanced funding in the first place, I think 
are highly unlikely, after that money has been provided, to say: Well, 
we need money for some water projects or something so we will go grab 
some of that money that isn't spent. The whole reason it isn't spent is 
because you have provided multiyear funding for the project for 
efficiency purposes. So I don't think that is a reason for us to not 
advance funds.
  I would like to call to my colleagues' attention--and I will let my 
colleague, Senator Corker, put this in the Record because I think 
either he or Senator Alexander might talk about it--a letter signed by 
Senators Inouye, Feinstein, Cochran, and Alexander, who presumably, in 
the next Congress, will be the chairmen and ranking members of the full 
committee and subcommittees responsible for this funding. This letter 
makes it clear they are committed to the full funding of the 
modernization of our nuclear weapons arsenal and that they are asking 
the President to submit budgets which will provide for the necessary 
funding for this and they commit themselves to support that funding.
  That is important, and I don't think we can attribute a motive to 
Senators like this, who we all know are entirely trustworthy, that 
somehow after this money is advance funded, that Congress or 
appropriators are going to reach back and grab money they have already 
provided because they think there is another purpose they want to spend 
it for right now. So those are the reasons why I don't think that is a 
principled argument for why we shouldn't do this. Having this advance 
funding could complete these facilities on time, rather than with a 2- 
or 3-year delay, and we could save literally hundreds of millions of 
dollars.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
some additional quotations on the need for modernization from former 
laboratory Directors, an Under Secretary of Defense, the current 
Secretary of Defense, the former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
and there are many more we could produce.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   Additional Quotes on Modernization

       Former laboratory directors: ``However, we believe there 
     are serious shortfalls in stockpile surveillance activities, 
     personnel, infrastructure, and the basic sciences necessary 
     to recover from the successive budget reductions of the last 
     five years.'' \7\
       Secretary Kissinger: ``As part of a number of 
     recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz, 
     Sam Nunn, and I have called for significant investments in a 
     repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and 
     added resources for the three national laboratories.'' \8\
       Under Secretary Joseph: ``New START must be assessed in the 
     context of a robust commitment to maintain the necessary 
     nuclear offensive capabilities required to meet today's 
     threats and those that may emerge. . . This is a long-term 
     commitment, not a one-year budget bump-up'' \9\
       Secretary Gates: ``This calls for a reinvigoration of our 
     nuclear weapons complex that is our infrastructure and our 
     science technology and engineering base. And I might just 
     add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to 
     get money for this and this is the first time I think I've 
     got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear 
     arsenal.\10\


                                endnotes

       \7\ Harold Agnew et al., Letter from 10 Former National 
     Laboratory Directors to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 
     Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. May 19, 2010.
       \8\ Secretary Henry Kissinger, Testimony to the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee. May 25, 2010.
       \9\ Under Secretary Robert Joseph, Testimony to the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee. June 24, 2010.
       \10\ Secretary Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee. June 17, 2010.

  Mr. KYL. I thank the Chair, and I will have more to say, but I will 
let other Senators speak.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, as I did yesterday on the floor, I wish to 
say I cannot thank, and I hope the Senate will feel the same way--I 
think our country will when they understand what Senator Kyl has done--
I cannot thank him enough for his thoughtful, dogged, persistent 
efforts as it relates to modernizing our nuclear arsenal. As a matter 
of fact, the Presiding Officer and I accompanied Senator Kyl on a 
bipartisan trip to Sandia and Los Alamos to look at some of the many 
needs we have throughout our complex in our country, which resides at 
seven facilities across the country. It is that foresight that Senator 
Kyl has displayed,

[[Page S10942]]

beginning years ago but especially focused over this last year, that I 
think has led to incredible results.
  While the Senator and I are obviously going to end up in different 
places, it appears, on this treaty--and there is no question the treaty 
and modernization are two very different things--there is no question 
in my mind that we would not have the modernization commitments we have 
in hand today if it were not for the treaty. So, for me, it is this 
whole body of work that works together, and in my opinion makes this 
decision one that is very easy to make because of the entire body of 
work.
  I wish to say that Senator Kyl, through his efforts, has caused there 
to be two updates to what is called the Defense authorization 1251. 
That is something that is required by our Defense authorization bill. 
It focuses on expenditures to our nuclear arsenal.
  I think people will realize, over the next decade, as a result of 
Senator Kyl's efforts--and Senator Kerry's cooperation and the 
appropriators and the President and others--that $86 billion will be 
invested in modernizing our nuclear arsenal, and $100 billion will be 
invested in those delivery vehicles that relate to our warheads. I 
think people realize that while we are talking about 1,550 warheads 
being our deployed limit, we have 3,500 other warheads that are 
stockpiled all across our country and those also need to be modernized. 
We need to know they are available.
  I think the Presiding Officer and I were able to see where neutron 
generators were going to expire, where the guidance system that guides 
many of our missiles is far less sophisticated than the cell phones we 
have today. In some cases, they still had tubes, such as we had in our 
old black-and-white televisions.
  So I wish to thank the Senator from Arizona for everything he has 
done to cause there to be focus on this and for the fact he has caused 
it to be dovetailed; the fact we have an updated 1251 that reflects the 
needs of our country; the fact that we have four appropriators who now 
have committed to the President they will support this effort; the fact 
the President has said to them--and all this has been entered into the 
Record--that he will ask for these moneys to modernize our nuclear 
arsenal.
  So, again, Senator Kyl has done incredible work in this regard. I 
think he has informed this body, and I think it is due to his efforts 
and those of us who have supported his efforts that have helped to find 
gaps in our modernization program. We have been able to talk to the 
head of the NNSA and the Lab Directors to focus on those gaps.
  The senior Senator from Tennessee has helped tremendously in that 
regard. He and Senator Kyl and Senator Lugar have actually gone through 
other sites--sites I did not go through with Senator Kyl myself. So 
this has been a collective effort led by Senator Kyl.
  Again, I know we will end up in a different place on the treaty as a 
whole, but it is my hope that the administration and Senator Kerry will 
accept the changes Senator Kyl has put forth in his amendment. It is my 
hope that by unanimous consent we can add this to the treaty. Even if 
that does not occur, there is no question that the contributions of 
Senator Kyl to the commitments that are so important to ensuring our 
country is safe and secure by virtue of having a reliable, safe, 
dependable, nuclear arsenal not only will be evident today, but they 
will be evident for generations to come. For that, I thank him deeply.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is 
recognized.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I came to the floor to express my 
admiration for the Senator from Arizona. I was listening to his address 
and I heard my colleague from Tennessee.
  Senator Kyl's work on nuclear modernization is no surprise to any of 
us who know him very well because his approach to issues is a 
principled one, and once he determines the principle, he is dogged. He 
is a determined person. He basically took this issue of nuclear 
modernization, which is not on the lips of very many people in the 
United States--the question of whether our nuclear weapons are safe and 
reliable, whether they will work--he pulled it out of a trash bin and 
put it on the front page of a national debate.
  He did it in connection with the START treaty, but as he said in his 
own remarks, this should be done whether you are for the START treaty 
or against the START treaty. It is completely independent, in that 
sense.
  In my view, under no circumstances should the START treaty be 
ratified without doing this. That would be like reducing our weapons 
and leaving us with a collection of wet matches. We need to make sure 
what we have left works. But this is sort of the showhorse/workhorse 
Senator distinction. This is an issue on the back burner. It is an 
unpleasant issue. No one likes to talk about making nuclear weapons, 
each one of which could be 30 times as powerful as the bomb that was 
dropped on Hiroshima and ended the war, but it is a part of the reality 
in the United States and in the world today.
  As Senator Corker was saying and as Senator Kyl said when each of us 
visited in different times, different places--Senator Kyl came to 
Tennessee. I was with him there. He has talked to many more people than 
I have on this subject--these weapons are being modernized in 
facilities that are completely outdated. It would be as if we were 
making Corvettes in a Model T factory.
  Worse than that, it is not just an inconvenience to the workers 
there, it is a threat to their safety, and it is a waste of taxpayers' 
money. As the Senator from Arizona said, after a certain number of 
years--I am not sure of the exact number anymore, maybe 15 years, some 
number of years--this pays for itself. The modernization of these 
facilities, the bringing them up to date, means the taxpayers will pay 
just as much to operate these old facilities as they would to spend $5 
billion or $6 billion or whatever it is to improve these two big new 
facilities and the other infrastructure and the other things we need to 
do.
  It ought to be said as well that not one of these facilities is in 
Arizona. This is not home cooking by Jon Kyl. This is a man who, for a 
couple decades, has made our nuclear posture his business and has made 
sure he knows as much about it as anyone and has made sure the rest of 
us paid attention to it when we might be more interested in the issue 
of the moment. So it is an example of a Senator doing his job very 
well. I am deeply grateful for that and I am proud to serve in the 
Senate with such a person.
  I would like to mention the letters I had printed in the Record 
yesterday. They are such an integral part of the remarks of Senator Kyl 
and Senator Corker--the letter to the President of December 16, from 
Senators Inouye and Cochran, the ranking members of the Appropriations 
Committee on both sides of the aisle, and Senator Feinstein and I, who 
are both members of the appropriate subcommittee for dealing with this, 
as well as the President's response of December 20.
  In concluding my remarks, I would like to also congratulate Senator 
Kyl for his comments about advanced funding. We want to do things in an 
orderly way in government, but it makes no sense for us to build 
buildings in the most expensive way, particularly when there is an 
urgent deadline that is in the national interest. So if indeed by 
building these buildings more rapidly and saving the annual maintenance 
costs we could save the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars at a 
time when we are borrowing 42 cents out of every $1 and every one of us 
is going to be looking for ways to save money, Senator Kyl's suggestion 
about advanced funding, which may not be the way the Department of 
Energy has done it before, ought to be the way we do it now. We didn't 
used to have a big dip like we do now. Let's look for ways to save 
hundreds of millions of dollars. We know we are going to have to 
modernize these weapons, START treaty or no START treaty, as the 
Senator said. We know we are going to have to save money. Let's accept 
the Senator's suggestion about advanced funding of these large 
facilities. As one member of the appropriations committee, I am going 
to do my best to follow his suggestion.
  I am here to congratulate him for a superior, statesmanlike piece of 
work, both on the treaty which he has

[[Page S10943]]

worked to improve but also on the nuclear modernization issue which he 
single-handedly has put upfront before those of us in the Senate and 
the American people and it makes our country safer and more secure.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to thank both my colleagues from 
Tennessee for their very kind remarks. Actually, the place we have 
gotten, what we have achieved, is due to the efforts of a lot of 
people. It starts with Secretary Gates in the Department of Defense; 
Secretary Chu; Tom D'Agostino; his Deputy Director of NNSA, Don Cook; 
the Lab Directors who are incredible public servants. We visited with 
them. These are some of the brightest people in the country and the 
folks who work with them, many of whom, almost all of whom are about 
ready to retire, those people who actually designed and developed the 
weapons we now have. There are a lot of people who devoted their lives 
to what very few people know or understand. They are now being asked to 
do a very difficult and complicated job in very difficult surroundings.
  Part of what we are asking for--it is not just a matter of 
convenience, as Senator Alexander said, it is a matter of absolute 
necessity that these facilities be capable of dealing with these 
complex weapons. That is why they are expensive, but they are 
absolutely needed. I thank both my colleagues for having devoted a lot 
of their own time and attention to this issue and in supporting the 
efforts of modernization so we can get this job done properly. I 
appreciate their remarks.
  I also would like to proffer a unanimous consent request. I ask 
unanimous consent to yield 1 hour of the time allocated to the 
Republican leader postcloture to Senator Kyl.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. I thank my colleagues.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Dakota is 
recognized.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I do want to rise in support of the Kyl 
amendment No. 4892 and echo the sentiments expressed by my colleague 
from Tennessee about the good work of the Senator from Arizona. He has 
been a tireless advocate for modernization. It is something that needed 
to happen, irrespective of whether there was a treaty, but it certainly 
became a condition in order to have a treaty. If you are talking about 
reducing the number of your nuclear weapons, you certainly want to 
improve the quality of the ones you have.
  Unlike other nuclear powers, the United States has not had an active 
modernization program for our nuclear deterrent.
  We have heard from people who recognize the importance of modernizing 
our nuclear deterrent. I will not reiterate all of those, but I wish to 
point out, Secretary Gates said recently--he couldn't be any more clear 
that nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to nuclear reductions when 
he said:

       To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a 
     credible deterrent and reduce the numbers of weapons in our 
     stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile 
     or pursuing a modernization program.

  Similarly, Thomas D'Agostino, the head of the National Security 
Administration or NNSA said nuclear modernization is a prerequisite to 
nuclear reductions, stating: `` . . . as our stockpile gets smaller, it 
becomes increasingly important that our remaining forces are safe, 
secure and effective.''
  In the same speech I just quoted from by Secretary Gates, he pointed 
out: ``Currently, the United States is the only declared nuclear power 
that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability 
to produce a new nuclear warhead.''
  It is difficult to overstate the dire condition of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons complex. Its physical infrastructure is crumbling and its 
intellectual edifice is aging. The Strategic Posture Commission, 
chaired by William Perry and James Schlesinger, found that certain 
facilities of the nuclear weapons complex are ``genuinely decrepit'' 
and the complex's ``intellectual infrastructure . . . is in serious 
trouble.''
  I met with experts throughout the Senate's consideration of New 
START, and they confirm for me the accuracy of these descriptions. I 
might say to the Presiding Officer, whose State is home to Los Alamos 
and Sandia National Laboratories, we were able to visit those along 
with Senator Kyl, the Senator from Tennessee and others, and had an 
opportunity to observe some of the facilities and buildings which are 
referenced in this amendment. It is absolutely clear, beyond the shadow 
of a doubt, that we have to make the necessary upgrades and 
improvements if we intend to keep our nuclear arsenal modern and 
prepared to deal with the threats we might face in the future.
  The idea that the modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex and 
delivery force is an absolute prerequisite for nuclear reductions 
envisioned in New START has been clear to the Obama administration 
throughout the New START process. In fact, in December of 2009, 41 
Senators wrote to the President and said in that letter:

       Funding for such a modernization program beginning in 
     earnest in your 2011 budget is needed as the United States 
     considers the further nuclear weapons reductions proposed in 
     the START follow-on negotiations.

  Just to be clear, what is modernization? This includes improvements 
to the physical elements of the nuclear weapons complex. It involves 
the warheads and delivery vehicles themselves as well as facility 
infrastructure. Modernization also requires maintenance of the 
intellectual capacity and capabilities underlying that complex; namely, 
the designer and technical workforce.
  The amendment, as proposed by Senator Kyl, makes clear in the 
resolution of ratification how critical modernization is to the United 
States while it is reducing its nuclear arsenal. First, the amendment 
places a condition in the resolution of ratification requiring the 
President to submit an annual update to the section 1251 report. The 
1251 report is something annually that comes up here that gives us an 
update on the nuclear weapons arsenal. Now we will have, thanks to the 
amendment adopted earlier, a certification with regard to the necessary 
investment in delivery vehicle modernization, which is an issue I 
addressed in an amendment earlier in this debate and a critically 
important one. The Senator has already addressed that in a previous 
amendment that was accepted by the proponents of the treaty. That was 
an important step forward.
  This particular amendment deals with the facilities and is also 
critically important. What it will do is require, in the 1251 report, 
that the President, when he submits his 10-year plan with budget 
estimates for modernization of the U.S. nuclear complex, that he also 
presents an accelerated design and engineering plan for the nuclear 
facilities and a commitment to funding those.
  So this amendment, such as the one that would call for modernization 
of the delivery vehicles, is a critical part of the nuclear complex we 
have, of making sure it is reliable, that it works, and that it is 
ready and prepared for whatever challenge may face us in the future. As 
I said earlier, there are many of the experts, and you talk to the Lab 
Directors themselves, who recognize the importance of making the 
investments that need to be made in this if we are going to keep that 
nuclear arsenal ready.
  I wish to read one other quote again. Deputy Administrator D'Agostino 
said:

       Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern 
     security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or 
     not the START treaty is ratified.

  I suspect before all is said and done, the START treaty will be 
ratified. But in any event, this process needed to be undertaken 
irrespective of whether there is a treaty because it is that important 
to the future of our country and our national security.
  Again, if I might point out, very briefly, what this amendment does, 
the resolution of ratification must clearly call for a condition that 
the President will provide an annual update to the section 1251 report 
in that as a condition the President will certify prior to entry into 
force of the treaty that he intends to accelerate the design and 
engineering phase of the chemical facility and the uranium processing 
facility, request full funding for both of those facilities upon 
completion of the design and engineering phase of the plan, and an 
understanding that failure to fund the modernization plan would

[[Page S10944]]

constitute a basis for withdrawal from the START treaty.
  This is, again, a fairly straightforward amendment. The Senator from 
Arizona has done, as has already been noted, a superb job of putting on 
the radar screen of all Members of the Senate the essential and 
critical nature of getting this issue of modernization addressed. He 
deserves great credit for doing that. I appreciate the work of the 
Senator from Massachusetts in cooperating with him in this treaty 
process to have these amendments and this language accepted because it 
is essential.
  I think it will make not only this treaty stronger, but it will also 
make the nuclear complex that much stronger. And that, of course, is 
absolutely essential when it comes to America's national security 
interests.
  So I support the amendment of the Senator from Arizona. I hope it 
will be accepted and adopted in the resolution of ratification, and 
that before this treaty is adopted this essential issue will be not 
only addressed, as it is in the underlying treaty, but addressed--that 
language even strengthened and made more durable by these amendments.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Casey.) The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. President, I yield my hour of 
postcloture time to Senator Kerry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right. The Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Mexico very 
much. I do not intend to use that much time, but we will see what 
develops here.
  Let me speak quickly to this amendment. I want to begin by saying 
everyone in this Senate is respectful of how hard the Senator from 
Arizona has worked to bring attention, appropriate attention, to the 
effort to keep up our nuclear deterrent. He has pushed to correct what 
this administration saw as too many years of neglect for the work of 
the nuclear weapons complex. I am glad to say this administration has 
not only heard him, but many other Members of the Senate, from both 
sides of the aisle, have joined in this effort to call attention to the 
modernization needs of our nuclear deterrent.
  The administration has appropriately pushed hard for an unprecedented 
level of funding for this work. In these difficult budgetary times, I 
do not think anybody here would argue that moving a 10-year budget from 
$70 billion to over $85 billion, which they have done, what President 
Obama has done, shows an extraordinary commitment to this enterprise by 
this administration.
  That is why the three directors of the nuclear laboratories told 
Senator Lugar and me, ``The proposed budgets provide adequate support 
to sustain the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of 
America's nuclear deterrent within the limit of 1,550 deployed 
strategic warheads established by the New START treaty, with adequate 
confidence and acceptable risk.''
  That is also why Tom D'Agostino, the head of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration, could say a few days ago, ``Having been 
appointed to my position by President George W. Bush, and reappointed 
by President Barack Obama, I can say with certainty that our nuclear 
infrastructure has never received the level of support that we have 
today.''
  Given all that has happened in the past year, all that has been 
certified and pledged, and all that we know the administration 
absolutely plans to do, it is hard to understand why anyone has a 
question about the nuclear stockpile provision at this point in time.
  This particular amendment, unnecessary therefore in the light of what 
I have just said, does not present fundamental problems in terms of the 
words ``to the extent possible we should accelerate.'' That is exactly 
what they are doing. They are accelerating, to the extent possible.
  But paragraph B presents a number of different issues. Most 
importantly, the amendment itself requires that the treaty not go into 
force until all of the these additional certifications are made. The 
administration has made it crystal clear that it is committed to 
funding these facilities. If you read the update section of the 1251 
report that the administration provided, at Senator Kyl's request, and 
they provided that in November, here is what they say: The 
administration is committed to fully fund the construction of the 
uranium processing facility and the chemistry-metallurgy research 
replacement, and is doing so in a manner that does not redirect funding 
from the core mission of managing the stockpile and sustaining the 
science, technology, and engineering foundation.
  So before we come to this moment, Senators were concerned about 
whether the administration was committed to the facilities. Then the 
administration made it very clear they are committed. The President 
made that commitment as clear as could be in 1251. Now the concern is, 
they are not building the facilities fast enough.
  Well, that runs completely contrary to what the people designing it 
think is happening and want to do. And, incidentally, if you put 
additional funding into hiring additional people, by the time you find 
them and get them, and they are qualified and they come, they are going 
to be finished with the job of the additional design and early 
construction planning.
  If this were a post office we were trying to think about building, 
maybe you could be a little more sanguine about saying, go ahead and 
accelerate it. But we are talking about multibillion-dollar, 
complicated facilities that require very significant, sensitive, 
difficult substances management. They are going to take a certain 
number of years to build. That is a reality. That is how complex and 
challenging the task is.
  The early cost and design estimates are that the uranium facility is 
going to cost somewhere between $4 billion and $6 billion, and the 
plutonium facility is going to cost about the same. So we all remember 
the old saying around here, we have got a lot of Senators who are 
talking about waste in the process of governance. The last thing we 
want to do in this budget, in my judgment, is create an environment of 
haste that does not measure properly what we are doing. We ought to 
listen to the experts on this a little bit, the people who are doing 
the design and the engineering, who tell us it is no simple matter in 
the world of nuclear weapons production. It involves hundreds of 
scientists and engineers working on every single aspect of the plant, 
in order to make sure it is going to work, that it is going to be 
secure, and it is going to be as safe as humanly possible.
  You cannot just throw money at an ongoing design and engineering 
effort and then automatically expect it can accelerate beyond an 
already significant increase. We have gone up $15 billion. If you hire 
a whole bunch of engineers who are new to the project, they do not know 
what they are doing yet. That is a recipe for both inefficiency and 
possibly even the increase of design risks or other kinds of issues.
  The truth is, if you cram all of these billions into a very short 
fiscal period, in addition to that, as this amendment seeks to try to 
force, you could unnecessarily create competition within other nuclear 
weapons activities, such as the ongoing warhead life extension 
programs, and our critical warhead surveillance efforts.
  The bottom line here is there is a place and a way to do this. We 
have an authorizing committee. The Armed Services Committee is the 
committee that ought to be doing this, not some amendment that comes in 
attached to the treaty, and linking the treaty going into force to all 
of these other things being certified.
  I think the Appropriations Committee, as well as the Armed Services 
Committee, would powerfully endorse that notion here on the floor at 
this point in time. We can compel the President to ask for upfront 
funding. But that does not guarantee that the President is necessarily 
going to receive it. And this links it to the notion he can certify 
that he has.
  So I agree with my colleague, the last administration took way too 
long to focus on this issue, and Senator Kyl has done an important 
service to the Senate, to the country, and to this process, to help to 
focus on it. But it makes no sense to use a resolution on a treaty to 
lock the President into doing something he cannot necessarily do 
because of the Congress and other things that are tied to it.
  I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page S10945]]

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee is 
recognized.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I ask unanimous consent to have 4 or 5 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I listened to Senator Kerry's remarks just now. This 
is an excellent discussion. Not only do I applaud Senator Kyl for 
resurrecting the whole focus on nuclear modernization, I applaud the 
President for the updated report that was received on November 17. A 
lot of work was done. This is a lot of money to say we want to make 
sure these nuclear weapons work and we are going to spend $85 billion 
over 10 years.
  The intent of Senator Kyl's amendment, though, is not to tie the 
President's hands, it is to give him more options. I think it is to 
encourage this big, slow-moving government not to waste the money but 
to save money. The language says: The President shall certify to the 
Senate the President intends to accelerate, to the extent possible, the 
design and engineering phase.
  At the Oak Ridge facilities, which Senator Kyl visited, he was told 
that the savings annually to taxpayers of having the new facility 
versus the old facility are in excess of $200 million. So every year we 
do it, every year this is completed, the taxpayers save $200 million. 
So if the President and the Appropriations Committee should decide that 
a 2-year or 3-year advanced funding will save $200 million a year at a 
time when we are all dedicated to trying to save money, we should do 
that.
  You might say, well, why do we need to say this in the Senate? The 
answer is, we have never done it before. And the U.S. Government, if 
you have never done it before, takes a little nudge to pay attention to 
it.
  So Senator Kyl has made an amendment, and if I understand it 
correctly, Senator Kerry amended the amendment a little bit to make it 
softer, to say, the President intends to accelerate, to the extent 
possible. So this is suggesting to the Department of Energy, which has 
never done it this way before, that we think it is a good idea, if it 
is practical, and if it saves money.
  There is also the matter of getting it done on time. Senator Kyl 
talked about that, the dates we talked about in the executive session. 
So I would argue to my colleagues that the Kyl amendment is respectful 
of the President's prerogatives, which he ought to have. He is the 
manager of the government. He is the Commander in Chief. But it says: 
If we can think of a way to do this in a way that saves $200 million a 
year, year after year after year, why should we not do it?
  I will bet during the next session of Congress, if we do our job 
properly in this body, we are going to be competing with each other to 
find ways to save $10 million a year, $20 million a year, $100 million 
a year, because of the incredible deficit. We have got bipartisan 
concern about that deficit. We had two Democratic Senators and three 
Republican Senators support the debt commission.
  I would suggest to my friend from Massachusetts it is not possible 
that you have modified the Kyl amendment to the extent it ought to be 
accepted, so that the President can get a signal from the Senate that 
if he thinks he can do this, to the extent possible, that accelerating 
the building of these big facilities by 2 or 3 years, if it would save 
$400, $500, $600 million, that we want to encourage him to do that. 
That is my only thought.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his 
participation and contribution to this effort. I am trying to work to 
see if--as I have said, there are certain components of this that make 
it difficult to accept, that multiyear piece and so forth.
  But the notion of reaffirming the commitment the President has made 
is not difficult to make. From our judgment, the President has really 
addressed this as significantly as one can by putting the $85 billion 
there, by making it clear they are moving forward, they are going to 
fully fund it, and by helping the Appropriations Committee members to 
provide the letter which speaks to their good faith going forward. All 
of those steps have taken place.
  We just don't want to get into a situation where we are creating 
another hurdle to get over before the treaty goes into effect. If we 
could find a way as a declaration or some way to reframe this 
condition--I am working with the administration to see if we can do 
that--we would be happy to try to restate it.
  Mr. ALEXANDER. I thank the Senator. No one is doubting the 
President's commitment. He has made an extraordinary commitment. I 
congratulate him for that. It is just the suggestion of doing it a 
little differently, if the President thinks it is practical, because it 
might save $200 million a year, year after year after year. A 
suggestion from us like that could make the difference in those 
savings. I thank the Senator for working in that spirit.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, as we continue to work through the 
amendments, I rise to outline what is at stake in the debate and 
describe what the world would be like without the New START treaty 
accord.
  Every Senator here took an oath to support and defend the 
Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. We have an 
obligation to support a strong national defense.
  First, a world without New START is one in which more nuclear 
missiles are pointed at Americans. This treaty reduces that number.
  A world without a New START accord is one in which we have no nuclear 
inspectors on the ground in Russia. These inspectors have more than a 
decade of experience inspecting Russian nuclear sites. They were 
involved in the negotiation process to ensure that there are strong 
inspection provisions in the treaty. But without New START, these 
inspectors would not be able to return to work. Furthermore, without 
onsite inspections, our intelligence services will still be required to 
collect information on Russia's nuclear weapons infrastructure.
  On December 20 of this year, ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, wrote to the Senate:

       An extended delay in ratification may eventually force an 
     inordinate and unwise shift in scarce resources from other 
     high priority requirements to maintain adequate awareness of 
     Russian nuclear forces.

  In a world without New START, our intelligence capabilities will be 
stretched, which could give the enemies of our troops on the ground an 
advantage. We cannot allow that to happen.
  These are just some of the direct effects. What about some of the 
indirect effects of a world without New START? The cascade effect on 
U.S. national security interests without New START is substantial.
  A world without New START is one in which the Russians are less 
likely to provide land and air access to supply U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan. The Northern Distribution Network is a crucial supply 
route for our troops in Afghanistan. This means that just as we have 
reached full troop strength in Afghanistan, supply lines would become 
increasingly strained. Today, supply routes through Pakistan are 
increasingly dangerous. Just the other day, two fuel tankers meant to 
supply our troops were attacked and the drivers were killed in 
Pakistan. This is one of the reasons the leadership of our uniformed 
military want New START ratified.
  A world without New START is one in which there is more Russian 
fissile material in existence, material which could be stolen for use 
in a terrorist attack.
  There are many reasons top U.S. counterterrorism officials in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency want New START ratified.
  A world without New START is one in which Russia's Government is 
perhaps less likely to help stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. A 
world without New START is one in which Iran perhaps is given access to 
Russian S-300 missiles, a weapon capable of reaching the State of 
Israel. This is one reason the Anti-Defamation League, B'nai B'rith, 
the American Jewish Committee, and other prominent pro-Israel groups 
want New START ratified.

[[Page S10946]]

  In a world without New START, there is no way the Russians will agree 
to decrease their tactical nuclear weapons. Our friends in Eastern 
Europe and those across the continent will be less secure in the 
knowledge that threats to their security are not diminishing but could, 
in fact, be growing. That is the reason 25 European Foreign Ministers 
want this treaty ratified.
  A world without New START is one in which the 1970 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT, the cornerstone of preventing 
nuclear weapons states, is severely threatened. What does this mean in 
practical terms? The New START accord is a clear demonstration that the 
United States is upholding our obligations under the NPT, which in turn 
can help secure support from other countries for a strong arms control 
regime and assistance on other nonproliferation issues. Many countries 
see nuclear terrorism as a problem for the United States and for the 
West. In a world without New START, these countries would seriously 
question our commitment to the NPT. These countries would question that 
right away.
  Without New START, government officials around the world will 
question the U.S. commitment to nonproliferation itself. They will ask: 
If the United States is not seriously committed to arms control and 
nonproliferation, why should we be?
  A world without New START contains many hard realities for the United 
States. Ratification of this treaty is not a political victory for one 
party or another; it is a national security victory for our great 
Nation, for our nuclear security--from nuclear security, to the 
security of our troops in Afghanistan, to the security of our ally 
Israel.
  A world without New START is one in which the enemies of America will 
breathe a little easier. Strained U.S. supply lines make life easier 
for the Taliban. Fewer available intelligence capabilities would make 
life easier for al-Qaida terrorists in Pakistan tribal areas. A 
strained U.S.-Russian relationship makes life easier for the government 
of the regime in Iran.
  A world without New START makes life easier for terrorists 
trafficking in fissile material to travel across borders.
  A world without New START means no negotiations with the Russians to 
decrease their tactical nuclear weapons.
  The world I just described isn't a world we have to settle for. A 
world without New START is not a world we have to accept. We must give 
the American people some peace of mind as to our national security. 
That is a world with a New START treaty. We must ratify this treaty and 
diminish the number of nuclear weapons pointed at the United States 
today. We must deploy nuclear inspectors to Russia, thus returning 
stability and transparency to our nuclear relationship, and take the 
burden off of our intelligence agencies.
  A world with New START means a more constructive relationship with 
Russia, which is good for our troops in Afghanistan and bad for the 
regime in Iran.
  A world with New START means the beginning of a conversation with the 
Russians on tactical nuclear weapons.
  A world with New START is one in which there is less fissile material 
for terrorists to steal or buy on the black market.
  A world with New START means increased cooperation with countries 
combating nuclear terrorism. The most serious threat to U.S. national 
security is the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists. 
In 1961, at the United Nations, President John F. Kennedy said:

       Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of 
     Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of 
     being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by 
     madness.

  Some have observed that in this post-9/11 era of increased terrorism, 
we may be more vulnerable to a nuclear attack than we were during the 
Cold War. Today, the sword of Damocles still hangs by the slenderest of 
threads, but we have the ability to prevent this threat by minimizing 
access terrorists would have to nuclear material.
  President Obama's nuclear security summit earlier this year was a 
historic event. It helped create a foundation upon which other 
countries will take up the challenge of nuclear security and cooperate 
with the United States to accomplish the President's goal of securing 
all fissile material in 4 years. We cannot do this alone. In order to 
confront this most serious threat to U.S. national security, we need to 
build stronger ties with our allies around the world, and part of 
building that trust is rebuilding our own credibility on 
nonproliferation issues. This New START agreement is a very positive 
step in that direction. It is an essential predicate for fulfilling our 
commitments under the nonproliferation treaty--a key marker for many 
potential allies on a range of nuclear security issues. Upon 
ratification of New START, we must make progress on securing fissile 
material around the world.
  This is a strong resolution of ratification. It passed out of the 
Foreign Relations Committee by a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4. It 
includes strong language on missile defense, verification, and tactical 
nuclear weapons.
  Finally, the American people are watching. According to a November 
2010 CNN poll, 73 percent of Americans support ratification of this 
treaty. They understand the implications of a world without the New 
START agreement.
  In a hurricane of partisan rancor and political battles, the national 
security consensus is as strong as an oak tree in support of the New 
START agreement--all six living former Secretaries of State, five 
former Secretaries of Defense, three former National Security Advisers, 
seven former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command, the entire Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, our intelligence services, the President, and three 
former Presidents.
  The American people have a right to expect ratification of New START. 
They want New START and will hold us accountable if we do not ratify 
it. Let's vote for New START's resolution of ratification and cast a 
strong bipartisan vote in favor of our national security.
  I close with commendations for both our chairman, Senator Kerry, and 
Ranking Member Lugar and so many others who have worked so hard to make 
sure we can ratify this treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Texas is 
recognized.
  Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, may I inquire, is there any time 
limitation on Senators at this point?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate is operating 
postcloture, and each Senator has up to 1 hour.
  Mr. CORNYN. I thank the Chair. I assure my colleagues, I will not use 
the full hour, which I am sure is good news.
  Mr. President, I oppose the ratification of the New START treaty for 
the reasons many of my colleagues have articulated and to which I have 
previously spoken. The treaty requires unilateral reductions of the 
United States on strategic nuclear weapons. It fails to address 
tactical nuclear weapons--an area in which the Russian Federation has a 
10-to-1 advantage. This is not an idle or incidental matter.
  GEN Nikolai Patrusheb, Secretary of the Russian National Security 
Council, a body in charge of military doctrine, has declared that 
Russia may not only use nuclear weapons preemptively in local conflicts 
such as Georgia or Chechnya but may deliver a nuclear blow against the 
aggressor in a critical situation, based on intelligence evaluations of 
his intentions.
  I submit also that the verification provisions of this treaty are 
weak, allowing only 18 inspections a year for an arsenal of more than 
1,500 weapons. Obviously, the ability to get more than a sampling of 
Russian Federation compliance would be impossible given the relatively 
few number of inspections permitted under the treaty.
  As we have discussed off and on over the last few days, the preamble 
of the treaty itself is ambiguous and has been construed by the 
Russians themselves as limiting the ability of the United States to 
expand its own missile defense system.
  I realize the President of the United States has submitted a letter 
stating his unilateral opinion of what that treaty obligation means, 
but, of course, treaty obligations are not unilateral declarations, 
they are bilateral agreements. Of course, the consequence of a

[[Page S10947]]

misunderstanding over this important issue of missile defense could 
allow either side to withdraw from the treaty and, indeed, the threat 
of withdrawal from the treaty because of this misunderstanding is 
something that could be avoided in the first instance if, in fact, some 
of the amendments addressing missile defense were allowed and the 
treaty modified to that extent. At that time, the Russians could then 
be asked: Will you agree with this modification, and we would know 
upfront, not on the back end, their sincere intentions.
  But I would say that the New START treaty has flaws when you look at 
it, not only in its various provisions; that is, when you reason from 
the whole to its parts, but I would suggest the treaty also fails when 
you look at it the other way around, when you reason from the parts to 
the whole, when you see this treaty is another example, another 
symptom, of a foreign policy that sends a message of timidity, even 
ambivalence, not only about our own security but about America's 
leadership role in a very dangerous world.
  This larger strategic context is what we need to keep in mind. We all 
know that President Obama has set incredibly high expectations for his 
Presidency in terms of how he would conduct American foreign policy. In 
an early Presidential debate, for example, he promised to meet with the 
leaders of five rogue nations--Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and North 
Korea--``without precondition during the first year of [his] 
administration.'' Well, we now know that never happened.
  After he won the nomination, you will recall, in his famous speech he 
gave in the city of Berlin, while still a candidate for the Presidency, 
he declared he was a ``citizen of the world.'' Also, he said: ``This is 
the moment when we must come together to save this planet.''
  President Obama was not the only one promoting a grandiose vision of 
his Presidency. Remember the Nobel Prize Committee received his 
nomination for the Peace Prize less than 6 weeks after President Obama 
took office. In the citation for the award last year, they said:

       [President] Obama has as President created a new climate in 
     international politics. . . .
       Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama 
     captured the world's attention and given its people hope for 
     a better future.

  You might ask, What relevance does this have to our consideration of 
the START treaty? The relevance is that a big part of this utopian 
dream of a ``new climate in international politics'' has been the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons.
  In that Berlin speech, then-Senator Obama said that one of his 
priorities was to ``renew the goal of a world without nuclear 
weapons.''
  The citation for the Nobel Peace Prize included this observation:

       The Committee has attached special importance to Obama's 
     vision of and work for a world without nuclear weapons.
       The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully 
     stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations.

  Indeed, in an op-ed piece, authored by the Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, dated April 7, 2010, in the Guardian, she argues that the 
START treaty is an important step toward a nuclear-free world.
  So you might ask, what is wrong with a vision of the world without 
nuclear weapons? Can't we hope and dream? Of course, even without 
nuclear weapons, we know that in World War I and World War II tens of 
millions of people lost their lives in armed conflict. So it is not as 
if a world without nuclear weapons is a world without war and a world 
without danger for peace-loving nations such as ours and our allies.
  We also know that any number of foreign policy experts have expressed 
serious reservations about indulging in this fantasy of a world without 
nuclear weapons.
  George Kennan has said:

       The evil of these utopian enthusiasms was not only or even 
     primarily the wasted time, the misplaced emphasis, the 
     encouragement of false hopes. The evil lay primarily in the 
     fact that those enthusiasms distracted our gaze for the real 
     things that were happening. . . .The cultivation of these 
     utopian schemes, flattering to our own image of ourselves, 
     took place at the expense of our feeling for reality.

  The President of the United States has not only mused about fantastic 
notions that have no basis in the real world, he has criticized his own 
country on foreign soil so often that some called that particular trip 
``the world apology tour.''
  So what should our competitors and would-be adversaries make of these 
statements of a fantasy world that is nuclear free and a President who 
travels abroad and apologizes for America's strength? Regretfully, I 
can only conclude it sends an impression of weakness and a lack of 
determination to maintain America's leadership in the world. We know 
there are dangerous consequences associated with an interpretation by 
others that America has lost its resolve to lead the world or to 
maintain its own security and to protect its allies.
  President Reagan said famously:

       We maintain the peace through our strength; weakness only 
     invites aggression.

  Experience has proven the truth of those words.
  We should recall that the President of the United States conducted 
YouTube diplomacy by recording a video for Iran's leaders--but then 
withheld comment when those same leaders were brutally crushing a pro-
democracy movement and their own people's hopes for freedom.
  The President has treated several of our allies without the respect 
they deserve. Some have been, like Britain, slighted; others, like 
Israel, have been lectured; and other of our allies have been thrown 
under the bus on missile defense, like Poland and the Czech Republic.
  He has been so idealistic and naive, you might say, about the subject 
of nuclear weapons that President Sarkozy of France remarked about it 
publicly at a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He said:

       We live in the real world, not in a virtual one. . . .
       President Obama himself has said that he dreams of a world 
     without nuclear weapons.
       Before our very eyes, two countries are doing exactly the 
     opposite at this very moment.

  President Sarkozy said:

       Since 2005, Iran has violated five Security Council 
     Resolutions. . . .

  He said:

       I support America's ``extended hand.'' But what have these 
     proposals for dialogue produced for the international 
     community?
       Nothing but more enriched uranium and more centrifuges.
       And last but not least, it has resulted in a statement by 
     Iranian leaders calling for wiping off the map a Member of 
     the United Nations.

  I fear the New START treaty will serve as another data point in the 
narrative of weakness, pursuing diplomacy for its own sake--or 
indulging in a utopian dream of a world without nuclear weapons, 
divorced from hard reality.
  Last week, I mentioned that Doug Feith, formerly of the Defense 
Department, helped negotiate the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 
known as the SORT treaty. Mr. Feith said that during the negotiations 
of the SORT treaty, the Russians were constantly trying to get the 
United States to negotiate away our right to defend ourselves from 
missile attacks through a robust missile defense program.
  The Bush administration rightly rejected those Russian demands and--
you know what--we got a good treaty anyway. The Obama administration, 
on the other hand, gave Russia what it wanted--or what it says it 
wanted--among other concessions. But that is not the only concession 
that was given under the New START treaty.

  I would ask my colleagues, Where are the concessions that Russia made 
to us in this treaty? Where are the concessions that Russia made to us? 
And what in the treaty is a good deal for the United States?
  But my colleagues may reply, So what. So what if the Obama 
administration's world view is a little bit naive. So what if the 
Russians negotiated a much better deal for themselves than the Obama 
administration got for the United States. Shouldn't we go ahead and 
approve the treaty anyway? What harm could it do? Couldn't it help 
build a better relationship with the Russian Federation and help 
transform America's reputation in the world?
  Those are actually good questions. But the answers are sobering. The 
administration has long argued that its approach to diplomacy was not 
only

[[Page S10948]]

good for its own sake, but it would strengthen relationships with 
nations all around the world. I would ask you, how has that worked out?
  Charles Krauthammer reviewed the global response to President Obama's 
diplomatic overtures in this way. He said:

       Unilateral American concessions and offers of unconditional 
     engagement have moved neither Iran nor Russia nor North Korea 
     to accommodate us.
       Nor have the Arab states--or even the powerless Palestinian 
     Authority--offered so much as a gesture of accommodation in 
     response to heavy and gratuitous American pressure on Israel.
       Nor have even our Europe allies responded: They have anted 
     up essentially nothing in response to our pleas for more 
     assistance in Afghanistan.

  And, of course, we could look at the results of the New START treaty 
itself. Russian leaders have responded to American concessions with 
contempt. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said that the 
treaty ``cannot be opened up and become the subject of new 
negotiations.'' Prime Minister Putin has threatened a new arms race if 
Russia does not get its way with this version of the treaty. Russian 
leaders have the temerity to lecture and attempt to intimidate the 
Senate from discharging our constitutional responsibilities. We should 
not succumb.
  In deciding whether to vote for the treaty, I would respectfully ask 
whether some Senators have been asking themselves the wrong question. 
Instead of asking ourselves the question, Why not ratify? What is the 
harm? I would suggest that the better question is, Why should we? I 
would urge my colleagues to vote against this treaty not because I do 
not care about the message it will send to Russia and other nations but 
because I do care about that message, and it is time we stop sending a 
message of weakness that only encourages our adversaries.
  I urge my colleagues to vote no on this treaty, to require the 
administration to go back to the negotiating table with the Russians, 
to get a better deal for the United States, and to make clear that the 
era of unilateral American concessions is over.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. VITTER addressed the Chair.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would simply ask to get a sense of how 
long the Senator thinks he might speak. We might line up the next 
speaker.
  Mr. VITTER. Five minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senator from Louisiana is finished, the Senator from Florida, Mr. 
Nelson, be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank my colleague.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Louisiana is 
recognized.
  Mr. VITTER. Mr. President, I too am opposing the ratification of this 
New START treaty because I think it makes us less secure, not more 
secure, as a nation. Of course, that has to be the ultimate test.
  A toughly negotiated, balanced treaty with Russia which allowed for 
adequate and reliable inspections and data exchange could make us more 
secure. But this is not such a treaty. It is clear to me that President 
Obama went into negotiations willing to give up almost anything for a 
treaty, and that basic posture produced what it always will--a bad deal 
for us.
  The proponents of the treaty suggest as much when they lay out as 
their top arguments for ratification: a better relationship with 
Russia, the help from Russia on other issues that ratification could 
engender, and progress with world opinion.
  I think it is dangerous to count on any of that or to look at all 
beyond the four corners of the treaty--the pros and cons of the details 
and the substance of the treaty itself.
  When I look within the four corners of the treaty, I am particularly 
concerned about four cons of the treaty.
  First, serious roadblocks to missile defense: I think it is a 
fundamental mistake and a dangerous precedent for any treaty on 
offensive arms to even mention missile defense, and Russia has made it 
clear that any major progress on U.S. missile defense will cause them 
to leave the treaty. Particularly with President Obama in office, this 
creates real political obstacles to the full missile defense I support 
and the American people support in great numbers. Indeed, President 
Obama has already abandoned our missile defense sites in Eastern Europe 
to help produce an agreement on this treaty by the Russians.
  Second, fundamentally imbalanced arms reductions: In this treaty, we 
reduce our nuclear arms significantly; Russia stays where they already 
are. Meanwhile, we still aren't getting to the issue of tactical 
weapons, a category where Russia has a huge 10-to-1 advantage. We have 
talked about that for decades, and we still aren't getting there. 
Clearly, when the United States has leverage to commit Russia to reduce 
their tactical nuclear weapons as we do right now before this treaty, 
and those nuclear weapons are the most vulnerable to end up in 
terrorists' hands, we must use that leverage and not throw it away for 
U.S. and global security. Instead, proponents of this treaty argue that 
a further treaty addressing tactical nuclear weapons in the future will 
materialize, but the leverage we have to get there is being given up, 
essentially, with this treaty.
  Third, inability to verify: This treaty does not give us the 
inspections and data we need to verify Russian compliance, and we know 
Russia has cheated on every previous arms control treaty with us. 
Verification is clearly less under New START than in START I, but it 
now needs to be greater because the nuclear deterrent under this treaty 
would be much smaller and thus produce much less room for error.
  Fourth and finally, major but ultimately inadequate progress on 
nuclear modernization: Now, major progress has been made during the 
ratification debate on the administration's commitment and concrete 
plans for nuclear modernization. I thank everyone who has helped 
produce that, particularly the leader in that effort, Senator Jon Kyl, 
for his work which, again, did produce real progress. But, ultimately, 
neither the specificity of the administration's commitment, including 
on the nuclear triad issue, nor the proposed schedule is adequate to 
our security needs, so I will certainly continue fighting to get where 
we need to be.
  So, in closing, I urge my colleagues to look hard at this treaty and 
to ask the only ultimate question: Does it make us less secure or more 
secure? I think clearly for the four major reasons I have outlined, and 
others, it makes us less secure, and we need to do far better.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Florida is 
recognized.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise in support of the New 
START treaty. I wish to make a comment. I was raised in a time that 
when the President of the United States went abroad, he spoke for our 
country and there was no partisanship when that occurred.
  It is troubling to this Senator to hear comments about our President 
when he goes abroad in an apology tour. I would beg to differ, and I 
think we ought to rise above that partisanship when issues of national 
security are at stake.
  Now to the treaty. This agreement with Russia is going to strengthen 
our national security. Look at all the people in the Pentagon who have 
embraced it--the former Secretaries of State, the former Secretaries of 
Defense, from both sides of the political aisle, and it deserves our 
support too. I expect today we are going to get an overwhelming 
bipartisan vote in favor of this treaty.
  I wish to specifically address the question that has been raised 
about modernization of our nuclear stockpile--an issue I had the 
privilege, as chairman of the Strategic Subcommittee of the Armed 
Services Committee, to be engaged in over a 4-year period. Arguments 
have been made that somehow this treaty is going to interfere with the 
modernization of our nuclear weapons infrastructure. Well, it is 
exactly the opposite. Ratification of this treaty is so important to 
give security and stability to the question of the use of those nuclear 
weapons that it will allow us to spend the needed resources on the 
modernization of our nuclear complex, which is an equally important 
matter.
  As part of this year's Nuclear Posture Review, the administration has

[[Page S10949]]

made a commitment to modernize our nuclear weapons arsenal and the 
complex. We must do so to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent because 
as these weapons in stockpile age, we have to update them and we have 
to modernize them so they are effective, secure, but also safe. We need 
to be sure our nuclear weapons are going to work as designed and that 
they will remain stable and secure.
  In the past, when we maintained a larger and more expensive nuclear 
stockpile, our weapons were developed and tested frequently. That is 
very expensive. By the mid-1990s, we had developed sophisticated 
computer models that can identify and resolve the problems without the 
nuclear testing. Unfortunately, because of lessened funding back in the 
era of about 2006 that research diminished, resulting in the layoffs of 
a lot of the people in our National Labs. I have had the privilege of 
visiting those three National Labs. There is an incredible array of 
talent, but that is what happened back in 2006.
  I think we have, especially in this administration, a new resolve to 
turning the situation around and to modernizing the nuclear complex. So 
what does this modernization entail? The comprehensive plan includes an 
$85 billion investment over the next decade and a $4 billion increase 
over the next 5 years, and that investment is going to accomplish 
several things. It is going to fund the construction of the 21st 
century uranium and plutonium processing facilities, it is going to 
spur a reinvestment in the scientists and engineers who perform the 
mission, and it is going to enhance the lifetime extension program for 
our nuclear weapons. By the way, it is not only just extending the life 
of those weapons, it is also making them safer.
  Some Senators have expressed concerns about the level of funding for 
this modernization. I believe our President and this administration 
have adequately addressed those concerns, and I would note that the 
Directors of the three labs--Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and 
Sandia--all believe the administration's current plan will allow them 
to execute their requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, 
and effective stockpile.
  While we move forward with that modernization program, we should also 
move forward--it is a separate issue--with the treaty. Passing this 
treaty is going to safeguard our national security while demonstrating 
to the men and women of our nuclear complex that we have reached a 
national consensus on nuclear sustainability.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that cosponsors be 
added to Corker amendment No. 4904, as modified, as follows: Senator 
Lieberman, Senator Brown of Massachusetts, and Senator Murkowski.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are awaiting the Senator from Arizona 
who, I know, is working on a couple of things right now. We need to 
clear a couple of things with the Senator, and we are working on the 
possibility of accepting his amendment. We just need to tie up those 
loose ends.
  So I think the Senator from Wyoming may have had a request he wanted 
to make. We can do that now, and then we will see where we are.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. BARRASSO. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on the importance 
of Minutemen III intercontinental ballistic missiles, known as ICBMs, 
and an amendment I intend to offer. The ICBM is just one leg of our 
nuclear triad. The nuclear triad spans sea, air, and land. It relies on 
mobile bombers, hard-to-detect ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs. 
They all work together to complicate and deter any attempt at a 
successful first strike on our country. Like a stool, if you shorten 
just one leg too much, the stool will become unstable.
  Our nuclear triad is not just a weapons system, it is a deterrent. 
The further we weaken our nuclear forces, the less of a deterrent our 
triad will become.
  Those folks who believe in nuclear zero and arms control seek a world 
without nuclear weapons at any expense--in my opinion, never at the 
expense of our national security. The fact is, for over 50 years our 
ICBM force has deterred a nuclear attack against the United States and 
our allies.
  Some arms control supporters claim our ICBMs are on ``hair-trigger 
alert.'' They believe an ICBM can be launched by simply pushing a 
button. This misleading claim that an unauthorized launch can destroy 
the world in a matter of minutes could not be further from the truth.
  GEN Kevin Chilton, the outgoing commander of STRATCOM, once described 
our nuclear posture as:

       The weapon is in the holster . . . the holster has two 
     combination locks on it, it takes two people to open those 
     locks, and they can't do it without authenticated orders from 
     the President of the United States.

  The Minuteman III ICBM force is the most stabilizing leg of the 
nuclear triad.
  ICBMs are strategically located and broadly dispersed in order to 
prevent them from successfully being attacked. The ICBMs protect the 
survivability of other legs of the triad as a deterrent. They offer an 
umbrella of protection to our most-valued allies. ICBMs also represent 
the most cost-effective delivery systems the United States processes. 
Unlike a bomber, ICBMs ensure a second attack capability.
  As required by section 1251 of the 2010 National Defense 
Authorization Act, earlier this year, the administration submitted its 
force structure plan. The President's 1251 force structure plan 
provides up to 420 ICBMs, 14 submarines carrying up to 240 submarine-
launched ballistic missiles or SLBMs, and up to 60 nuclear-capable 
heavy bombers.
  We are being asked to ratify this treaty without knowing what our 
force structure will actually be. We are being told: Pass the treaty, 
and then we will tell you what the force structure will actually look 
like.
  The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid out our force structure in plain 
view, while the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is silent on the force 
structure.
  This report also laid out the administration's plan to modernize and 
maintain our nuclear delivery vehicles.
  With respect to the next generation of ICBMs, the update states:

       While a decision on an ICBM follow-on is not needed for 
     several years, preparatory analysis is needed and is in fact 
     now underway. This work will consider a range of deployment 
     options, with the objective of defining a cost-effective 
     approach for an ICBM follow-on that supports continued 
     reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable 
     deterrence.

  The amendment I plan to offer has no impact on the treaty. It simply 
requires the President to certify that further reductions in our land-
based strategic nuclear deterrent will not be considered when reviewing 
the options for a follow-on ICBM. This is something I have worked on 
with Senator Conrad. He has a second-degree amendment to mine, and it 
is something we both support.
  LTG Frank Klotz, the new commander of Global Strike Command, was 
quoted last year at the Air Force Air and Space Conference and 
Technology Exposition here in Washington, DC, as saying:

       Continuously on alert and deployed in 450 widely dispersed 
     locations, the size and characteristics of the overall 
     Minuteman III force presents any potential adversary with an 
     almost insurmountable challenge should he contemplate 
     attacking the United States. Because he cannot disarm the 
     ICBM force without nearly exhausting his own forces in the 
     process, and at the same time, leaving himself vulnerable to 
     our sea-launched ballistic missiles and bombers, he has no 
     incentive to strike in the first place. In this case, numbers 
     do matter . . . and the ICBM thus contributes immeasurably to 
     both deterrence and stability in a crisis.

  The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to maintaining 
an effective deterrent.
  In 2008, Secretary Gates coauthored a white paper titled ``National 
Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.'' This paper argued 
for a strong nuclear deterrent. The forward stated:

       We believe the logic presented here provides a sound basis 
     on which this and future administrations can consider further 
     adjustments to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and 
     force structure.

  The white paper by Secretary Gates recommended a U.S. strategic 
nuclear force baseline that includes 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, 14 Ohio 
class submarines, and 76 bombers, 20 B-2 and 26

[[Page S10950]]

B-52 bombers, for a total of 862. The administration cannot explain how 
the threat environment has changed since the 2008 recommendation to 
maintain 862 delivery vehicles. They cannot explain what has changed to 
allow our nuclear deterrent to be reduced to 700 delivery vehicles.
  It sounds to me as if this administration has been a little too eager 
in negotiating the treaty.
  James Woolsey, in a recent Wall Street Journal article, described his 
experiences negotiating with the Russians. He said:

       The Soviets taught me that, when dealing with Russian 
     counterparts, don't appear eager--friendly, yes, eager, 
     never.

  I think Mr. Woolsey would know; he was involved in the SALT I treaty 
in 1970 and many more arms control agreements with the Russians before 
he took over as the Director of Central Intelligence.
  I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 4880, a Barrasso-
Enzi amendment, and then a second-degree by Senator Conrad.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, we had a discussion 
about this, and I am constrained to object. I think he understands why. 
I welcome further debate if he would like, but I must object.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the issue, as it is 
important. I understand its importance to the part of the country where 
those particular weapons are housed today. I am confident--and I know 
this--that the administration, because we have talked about it, has a 
plan that I think will meet with the consent and approval of the 
Senators' concern, but they need to go through the further evaluation 
and analysis of all of these decisions. Decisions have not yet been 
made, and it would be inappropriate at this time to constrain the 
latitude they need in order to be able to make those judgments. It is 
an important issue, but I think it is inappropriate for us to constrain 
them and particularly to do so in the context of the treaty itself.
  Mr. President, we are working with our friends on the other side of 
the aisle to really try to get the final agreement as to how we are 
going to proceed. I believe it is going to be possible for us to work 
out the issues with Senator Kyl and his amendment. So I hope we will 
not need any other votes other than the final vote on the treaty. That 
is our hope at this point. We will try to work through that over the 
course of the next few minutes.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, knowing that we are getting to that moment 
at which point we are going to have an understanding of how we are 
proceeding forward and knowing that because of the 30-hour limitation, 
no matter what, we are getting toward the end, rather than chew up time 
for Senators later on, I thought I would take a moment now to say thank 
you to a few folks involved in this process. Before I do that, I also 
will reserve some time, as I will for Senator Kyl and Senator Lugar--
and this, I assume, will be part of the agreement we are going to 
reach--to speak to the substance of the treaty at the appropriate time 
before we vote.
  It has been an incredible team effort by an awful lot of people over 
the course of a lot of months. I wish to thank all of them for their 
involvement.
  Senator Lugar has been an unbelievable partner and a visionary with 
respect to these issues but, importantly, just a very steady, wise, and 
thoughtful collaborator in the effort to get the treaty to where we are 
today. It hasn't always been easy for him because there were times when 
he was a lonely voice with respect to those who were prepared to 
support this treaty. I wish to pay tribute to his statesmanship and his 
personal courage in steadily hanging in there with us.
  I thank President Obama for his determination to make certain that 
this was the priority that he felt it was and that I think it is. He 
and so many folks in the administration have been helpful in this 
effort.
  I will reserve some comments later more specifically, but I think the 
Vice President has been, at the President's request, an invaluable 
collaborator in this effort. He has talked to any number of colleagues, 
made any number of phone calls, been involved in any number of 
strategic choices here, and I am deeply grateful to him for taking his 
prior stewardship of this committee and being as thoughtful as he has 
been in the way he has approached this particular treaty.
  Secretary Clinton likewise has dedicated herself and her staff to the 
effort to work through unbelievable numbers of questions, to make 
themselves available and to make herself available to talk with 
colleagues.
  This has been a tremendous team effort with Secretary Gates, 
Secretary Chu, Admiral Mullen, General Chilton, LTG O'Reilly, and 
others. None of these things can happen if there isn't a team pulling 
together to answer questions and deal with the issues colleagues have.
  At the State Department, Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller has 
been unbelievably available, patient, thoughtful, and very detailed in 
her efforts to answer the questions of Senators and be precise about 
this negotiation. She led a tremendous team and worked very closely 
with Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Rich Verma, 
who likewise helped coordinate and pull people together to deal with 
the issues we faced. Dave Turk, Terri Lodge, Paul Dean, and Marcie Ries 
have all been key members of that team, and we thank them for their 
amazing commitment of hours and the dedication they have shown to the 
effort to try to get us to where we are today, to this final vote.
  Likewise, at the Pentagon, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Jim 
Miller; the chief Defense Department representative on the negotiating 
team, Ted Warner; Marcell Lettre; Eric Pierce; Michael Elliott; and 
Chris Comeau--all of them, together with the State Department, provided 
the kind of linkage we needed and the consistent effort to answer 
questions and deal with their principals in order to get the 
information necessary for Senators to be able to make good judgments.
  At the Energy Department, Tom D'Agostino and Kurt Siemon were also 
constantly available.
  At the White House, I thank Pete Rouse, chief of staff, and Tom 
Donilon, the National Security Adviser, and I especially thank Brian 
McKeon, Vice President Biden's National Security Deputy, who has just 
done an extraordinary job of helping to provide the bridge between 
various agencies, as well as strategy, and has been consistently 
available to us. Louisa Terrell and Jon Wolfsthal have been part of 
that team. We are very grateful to all of them.
  On the Foreign Relations Committee, it has been a great team effort 
with Senator Lugar. The chief of staff of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Frank Lowenstein, has worked countless hours on this treaty, 
together with Doug Frantz, Ed Levine, and Anthony Wier. These two 
gentlemen, Ed Levine and Anthony Wier, are unbelievable veterans of 
this kind of effort. They worked with Senator Biden for years. I am 
delighted they were willing to stay over and continue with the 
committee.
  In the case of Ed Levine, he lost his dad during the course of this 
debate a few days ago and, nevertheless, hung in there with us and 
stayed right at it. The wisdom and experience he has brought to this 
task is invaluable, together with his collaborator Anthony Wier. Peter 
Scoblic, Andrew Keller, Jason Bruder, and Jen Berlin have been enormous 
contributors to this effort. I am grateful to all of them.
  On the Republican side, Ken Myers--Ken brings so much experience and 
wisdom to this task. He has been with Senator Lugar for a long time. 
What he has done to help us bridge the divide is immeasurable. Tom 
Moore and Mike Mattler worked with him.
  Our staff in S-116, which has sort of been headquarters for us, Meg 
Murphy

[[Page S10951]]

and Matt Dixon have put up with strange hours and interruptions. We are 
eternally grateful to them.
  Obviously, nothing happens in the Senate without the floor staff, the 
folks who put in these long hours. Jessica Lewis and Tommy Ross on 
Senator Reid's staff have been invaluable to us. Lula Davis, Tim 
Mitchell, and Stacy Rich are invaluable on every issue here. The Senate 
would not work without them. We are deeply grateful to all these 
people.
  I am glad the schedule allows us a moment where we can actually thank 
them all publicly. They do a service for our country that many people 
in the country never have a sense of. They do not see it. Government 
gets a lot of criticism, but let me tell you, these folks work as hard 
as any people I know anywhere, and a lot of things could not happen 
without them.
  As I said, I wish to speak to the substance of the treaty before we 
vote, but for the moment I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I wish to seize the moment, along with my 
distinguished chairman, because we are indebted to all the great people 
he has enumerated, to embellish his congratulations by mentioning that 
we are grateful, first of all, that the President invited Senator Kerry 
and me to be part of conversations on two occasions during the 
negotiation of the treaty. That, we thought, was very valuable and gave 
us some insight as to where the negotiators were headed and to offer 
what counsel we could about those issues we felt were important and 
those issues we were certain all Senators would feel were important as 
we sought ratification of the New START treaty.
  Likewise, those conversations were carried on rigorously by the Vice 
President, our former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Joe Biden, who has worked with Senator Kerry and with me 
over the course of three decades or so of active participation and 
several arms control treaties. Vice President Biden has a very good 
idea of how the ratification process works and what counsel he can 
give, not only to us but to all Members and colleagues with whom he has 
worked so well in the past.
  I am especially pleased, likewise, that Rose Gottemoeller, who headed 
the negotiation team, has been very available to Senators throughout 
the time of the negotiation abroad and during her trips to Washington 
and certainly throughout the hearings the Foreign Relations Committee 
held.
  We are indebted, in fact, to all the witnesses who came before our 
committee in the 16 hearings that have often been enumerated in 
conversation on the floor. The witnesses were generous with their time, 
very forthcoming with their testimony and followup questions the 
Senators had. Because of that testimony, there is a very solid block of 
support for the treaty based upon these distinguished Americans who 
have had enormous experience, not only with arms control treaties but 
the actual implementation of these with the former Soviet Union--and 
now with Russia--in the past.
  I am indebted, as John Kerry is, to Ken Myers, Tom Moore and Mike 
Mattler of our staff and to Marik String and Corey Gill. I cite these 
five members of a very devoted staff who have devoted extraordinary 
talents and time and devotion to the treaty formulation and to the 
counsel they have given me, for which I am very much indebted.
  Finally, I thank all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee for their diligence and attendance at hearings and their 
questioning of each other, as well as the witnesses and the discussions 
we have had both in informal and formal sessions. We have had a 
difference of opinions. Our views were not unanimous in the 14-to-4 
vote by which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent this New 
START treaty to the floor. But I respect deeply each of those views, 
and I respect the ways in which members of the committee have 
participated during this very important debate.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I say Merry Christmas to all my 
colleagues. We never expected to find ourselves here this time of year, 
but obviously there are very important issues to discuss.
  On November 2, Americans made a pretty historic statement. After 2 
years of many things being crammed down their throat that they did not 
like, they made historic changes in the House and the Senate. I think 
all expectations were that the new Congress would come in and begin to 
change things. Very few Americans--and I think very few of us in the 
Senate--actually thought we would use the time between that election 
and the swearing in of the new Members of Congress to continue to cram 
through more things America does not want.
  Most businesses have learned that if they ever have to make the 
difficult decision of firing someone, it is very important that person 
be sent home right away because getting fired usually makes people 
angry and less loyal to the company that fired them. Instead of dealing 
with all the mischief that might occur, the fired employee is sent home 
right away.
  We are a fired Congress in a lot of ways. America has sent us home. 
Many people who set the policies for the last 2 years have been 
unelected. Some have retired. But the decisions that are being made now 
in this Congress are decisions being made by people who have either 
retired or who have been turned out of office. So much is being pushed 
through because of the fear that if we actually let the newly elected 
Congressmen and Senators be sworn in before we take up these important 
issues that they will actually reflect the opinions of the American 
people and stop what we are doing.

  We have decided to use this lameduck session to push many items 
through. It is a very unaccountable Congress. We tried to push through 
a huge omnibus spending bill with thousands of earmarks, exactly the 
thing about which Americans have said no more. Thankfully, Republicans 
stood together to stop that bill.
  We needed to extend our current tax rates, but even in order to get a 
temporary extension, we in the minority had to agree to more deficit 
spending. In this lameduck session, we have pushed our political 
correctness on to our military by repealing don't ask, don't tell 
without the proper studies, without the proper phase-in time, and no 
rational approach to this. It was just check the box of another 
political payback.
  In another check the box of amnesty, the DREAM Act, which was brought 
up and fortunately Republicans stood against something that again 
avoided the big issue of border security. This Congress has 
continuously rejected the idea of carrying through on our own law to 
complete the double-layer fencing we put into law to protect the 
southern border. Thousands of people are being killed on the border 
because we refuse to take action. Yet we are continuing to try to 
expand the problem with more amnesty and citizenship and public 
benefits to those who came here illegally.
  The threat is now to keep us here until Christmas or beyond to pass 
what we are calling a 9/11 bill. Every Member of this Chamber--
Republicans and Democrats--wants to do what is right for the first 
responders who may have been injured after 9/11. But we owe it to the 
American people to be accountable to how we spend money. To put a bill 
on the floor, in an unaccountable lameduck Congress, that has not been 
through hearings, when we do not know how the millions of dollars have 
been used that we have already given to the same cause certainly is 
worth a few weeks of committee hearings and understanding exactly how 
to spend taxpayer money effectively in a way we know will help the 
people who have been injured.
  But, no, we have to push that through in a fired, unaccountable 
Congress. Of course, now the big issue of the day is somehow, in a time 
of economic recession and so many people being out of work, that we 
want to use this lameduck, unaccountable Congress to push through a 
major arms control treaty with Russia. Somehow that ended up on the top 
of our priority list, using Christmas as a backstop to try to force us 
to pass this bill.
  It is pretty interesting how this has progressed. The treaty had no 
chance of ratification until the President

[[Page S10952]]

agreed to billions of dollars in modernization of our nuclear weapons.
  We have to stop and ask ourselves: Why should we have to have 
backroom trading going on to modernize our nuclear weapons? That should 
be something the President is committed to, that we are committed to. 
We should not have to trade for modernization. But now we appear to 
have enough Republicans who have decided this is a good treaty to 
ratify a few days before Christmas in a fired, unaccountable Congress, 
with the need to push it through before America's representatives 
actually get here the first of January. The sense here is if we let the 
people America just elected come, that maybe the treaty will need some 
modifications.
  There have been many questions expressed about the treaty. I think 
some of them are very legitimate. Clearly, missile defense is a 
problem. The Russians have expressed that Americans cannot develop any 
kind of comprehensive missile defense system under this treaty. We say: 
No, no. We can develop a limited missile defense system. We are going 
through all kinds of convoluted language to put things in nonbinding 
areas of this agreement, to say we are committed or we are going to 
communicate to the Russians that we are committed, but we even were 
unwilling to put it in the preamble that there is no linkage between 
the development of our missile defense system and this treaty 
agreement. Clearly, there is a linkage. The Russians believe there is a 
linkage.
  All the correspondence from the President says ``limited missile 
defense system.'' We obviously have agreed to it. We never could get 
the negotiating records to confirm that, but everything suggests there 
is an implicit and explicit agreement that America will not attempt to 
develop a missile defense system capable of defending against Russian 
missiles. Perhaps capable of defending against a rogue missile launch 
or an accidental missile launch, but the language in this treaty, 
communications from the White House, the hearings all say we will only 
have a limited missile defense system.
  There should be no mistake, there should be no confusion, the 
agreement to this treaty is an agreement for America not to develop a 
comprehensive missile defense system. If that is satisfactory, then 
let's ratify. Clearly, there are holes in the verification process of 
this treaty. The growing and biggest threat is tactical nuclear 
weapons. Shorter range missiles, ground-based, sub-based are not even 
included in this agreement. The Russians are fine with this. They were 
going down to the same long-range missile count we require in this 
treaty anyway. They give up nothing. We don't restrict any of their 
tactical developments. The verification is less stringent than in START 
I, with fewer inspections, and the ability to actually look at things 
such as telemetry are obviously omitted here.

  We can't ratify this treaty with any pretense that America is going 
to be any safer. In fact, I think the biggest problem with this treaty 
is the whole presumption it is built on--that America should be at 
parity with Russia. We have talked about it here in this Chamber, that 
we do not have the same role as Russia in this world. Russia is a 
protector of none and a threat to many. America is the protector of 
many and a threat to none. Over 30 countries live in peace under our 
nuclear umbrella, but we are saying we are going to reduce it, with a 
lot of questions as to whether we are going to modernize it, and we are 
telling our allies that tactical nuclear weapons are not going to be 
restricted in any way, which is probably their biggest concern because 
of their contiguous location to Russia.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. DeMINT. Yes.
  Mr. INHOFE. When you talk about the missile defense aspect of this, I 
wonder if it has occurred to a lot of people that maybe this treaty is 
with the wrong people. We know right now that Iran is going to have the 
capability--and this is not even classified--of a nuclear weapon, a 
delivery system, by 2015. I think one of the worst things for America--
and this President did it--was to take down the sites we were planning 
in Poland that would give us this protection.
  My point I want to make, and then to ask the Senator about, is that 
in the event this is ratified and we are restricted in any way from 
developing further our missile defense system, doesn't that put us 
directly in an impaired position in terms of North Korea, maybe Syria, 
but definitely Iran, that has already indicated and already has the 
capability of reaching us by that time?
  It is interesting that the site would have been in effect to knock 
down a missile coming from Iran by 2015, the same year our intelligence 
community tells us they will have that capability. Isn't that the 
threat we are concerned about, more than Russia?
  Mr. DeMINT. I want to thank the Senator from Oklahoma for bringing 
out another very important point. We are laser focused on this treaty 
with Russia, which obviously restricts our ability to develop missile 
defense. Yet we all seem to acknowledge the greatest growing threat in 
this world is from Iran and North Korea and other rogue nations that 
can develop nuclear technology.
  It is almost like watching a magician at play here, of getting us to 
look at one hand while other things are going on. We are not paying 
attention to the Nation's business here, and I am afraid this is just 
another ``check the box''--a foreign policy victory for the 
administration. If it did not have so many questions related to it, 
that would be fine, but not to jam this through with a fired, 
unaccountable Congress, and rushing it through before the 
representatives America just elected have been sworn in, and doing it 
as part of a list of legislation--a long list over the last 2 years--
that America does not want.
  I want good relations with Russia and countries all over the world, 
but I am afraid this is part of a continued effort of accommodation and 
appeasement; that if we show weakness, other countries will accommodate 
us. We need Russia to cooperate--with Russia and North Korea. Folks, I 
don't think this is the way to get it, and I don't think we are going 
to gain respect for our process of trying to do this under the cover of 
a distraction of a major holiday with a lameduck, unaccountable 
Congress.
  In the way this is being presented, it is a mockery of the debate 
process here in the Senate. We are not amending a treaty. We were told 
at the outset it is ``take it or leave it.'' The Russians are 
negotiating, clearly, from a position of strength, because they said, 
here is the treaty, take it or leave it; any changes and the treaty is 
dead. Is that the way America needs to deal with other countries? Is 
that the way the Senate should debate a major arms control agreement, 
where the majority party is saying, you can go talk about it if you 
want, but we are going to kill every amendment, even though we say we 
agree with a lot of them. There will be no changes in this.
  We are trying to stick some things in here in the areas of the treaty 
that have no binding aspect and say we have covered it, but we are 
making a mockery of the whole debate and ratification processes with an 
unaccountable, fired Congress, under the cover of Christmas, and a 
debate where we have been told ``take it or leave it.'' This is not 
what the Senate is about, this is not what Congress is supposed to be 
about, and certainly we should not be passing major legislation at this 
time of year with this Congress.
  Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I still hope my 
colleagues will come to their senses and show the American people that 
we are going to act in a responsible way that respects what they told 
us on November 2; that this Congress needs to go, a new one needs to 
come in, and we need to stop cramming things down their throats they do 
not want.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennet of Colorado). The Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we are now in the final throes of getting 
together a unanimous consent request. The leadership has asked us to 
proceed forward on the amendment. Senator Kyl has asked me--I think he 
wanted to be here when we do his amendment on modernization, which we 
are now prepared to accept, with further modification. So I will wait 
for Senator Kyl in order to do that.
  In the meantime, I understand we also have an agreement on the 
missile

[[Page S10953]]

defense amendment, and that amendment is now going to be cosponsored by 
Senator Lieberman and Senator McCain. So if the Senator from Tennessee 
wants to talk about that amendment, we are prepared to accept it. I 
think we should have the discussion of that amendment at this point in 
time.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I wish to at this moment ask unanimous 
consent to change the name of the amendment to McCain-Lieberman-Corker.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CORKER. I would also ask unanimous consent to add Senators 
Johanns, Levin, and Bayh as cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. No objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.