[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 172 (Tuesday, December 21, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10888-S10921]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                   STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--Resumed

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the treaty.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

  Pending:

       Corker modified amendment No. 4904, to provide a condition 
     and an additional element of the understanding regarding the 
     effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty and 
     United States missile defenses.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will now be 4 minutes of debate equally 
divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Arizona is 
prepared to yield back time, and I will also yield back time.


                             Cloture Motion

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Having all time yielded back, pursuant to rule 
XXII, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending cloture motion, 
which the clerk will state.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

                             Cloture Motion

       We, the undersigned Senators, in accordance with the 
     provisions of rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
     hereby move to bring to a close debate on Treaties Calendar 
     No. 7, Treaty Document No. 111-5, the START treaty.

         Harry Reid, Joseph I. Lieberman, John D. Rockefeller, IV, 
           Byron L. Dorgan, John F. Kerry, Sheldon Whitehouse, 
           Mark L. Pryor, Jack Reed, Robert Menendez, Mark Begich, 
           Benjamin L. Cardin, Kent Conrad, Bill Nelson, Amy 
           Klobuchar, Patty Murray, Barbara A. Mikulski, 
           Christopher J. Dodd, Richard G. Lugar.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. By unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum 
call has been waived.
  The question is, Is it the sense of the Senate that debate on Treaty 
Document No. 111-5, the New START treaty, shall be brought to a close?
  The yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and 
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and 
the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Gillibrand). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 67, nays 28, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 292 Ex.]

                                YEAS--67

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (MA)
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                                NAYS--28

     Barrasso
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Bayh
     Bond
     Brownback
     Gregg
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 67, the nays are 
28. Three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn having voted in 
the affirmative, the motion is agreed to.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Idaho.


                            Predator Wolves

  Mr. CRAPO. Madam President, I wish to rise to speak about an issue 
that has been at the center of debate in the northern Rockies for quite 
some time; that is, the issue of the wolf. The wolf was introduced into 
the northern Rockies in the 1990s and has flourished. Wolves are now 
abundant in the region, but, unfortunately, we have not been able to 
return the management of the wolves to the State, mostly due to 
litigation and to the inflexibility of the Endangered Species Act. In 
the meantime, wolf populations are growing at a rate of about 20 
percent a year, resulting in substantial harm to our big game herds and 
domestic livestock.
  Whenever I am back in Idaho, I hear from hunters who are angry their 
favorite hunting spots are no longer rich with elk and deer or from 
sheep and cattle ranchers who have lost many a head of cattle or sheep 
due to the wolf predation.
  The State of Idaho has done everything it has been asked to do in 
order to manage wolves, and we continue to be denied that much needed 
opportunity. As such, it is time for Congress to act.
  I intend to make a unanimous consent request in a few moments. First, 
I yield a few moments to my colleague from Idaho, Senator Risch.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, I join my colleague from Idaho in 
underscoring the difficulty we have on this issue. Most people on this 
floor don't have a full appreciation of what those of us in the West 
have to deal with. Two out of every three acres in Idaho are owned by 
the Federal Government. The Federal Government came in, in the mid-
1990s, and forced the wolf upon the State. The Governor didn't want it, 
the legislature didn't want it, and the congressional delegation didn't 
want it. Nonetheless, the Federal Government brought us 34 wolves. Now 
they have turned into well over 1,000, and nobody knows exactly how 
many breeding pairs there are. The result is that there has been 
tremendous havoc wreaked on our preferred species in Idaho, the elk. We 
have done an outstanding job of managing elk, the preferred species, 
but they are also the preferred species for the wolf to eat. They are 
not vegetarians.
  As a result, we have had a tremendous problem with wolves in Idaho, 
and we have brought a bill to the Senate to turn the management of 
wolves over to the State. All the other animals are managed by the 
State. We have done a great job for well over 100 years of managing two 
other difficult predators, the bear and various cats. We have done it 
responsibly, on a sustained basis, and we want to do the same thing 
with wolves.
  The Federal Government has to let go of this. We have tried. We have 
the Federal courts that have stepped in. I don't quite understand how 
the Federal

[[Page S10889]]

court can claim the wolf is still an endangered species, when they can 
turn 34 wolves into over 1,000 and the population has exploded. 
Nonetheless, they have. It is time for Congress to act.
  I yield back to Senator Crapo.
  Mr. CRAPO. Madam President, I will make this request on behalf of 
myself, Senator Risch, and the Senators from Utah, Mr. Hatch and Mr. 
Bennett, and the Senators from Wyoming, Mr. Enzi and Mr. Barrasso.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works be discharged from further consideration of S. 3919, and that the 
Senate proceed to its immediate consideration; that the bill be read 
the third time and passed; that the motions to reconsider be laid upon 
the table, and that any statements relating to the measure be printed 
in the Record, as if read.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, reserving the right to object, and I do 
intend to object, first, let me point out to Senator Crapo, he and I 
have worked together on the Water and Wildlife Committee and the 
Environment and Public Works Committee. I think we have had a fine 
relationship over the past couple years, and we have worked together on 
a series of bills that I think will improve water and wildlife in this 
Nation. This legislation has not had a hearing and has not been 
approved by the Environment and Public Works Committee. It deals with 
undermining one of the most important laws in our country, the 
Endangered Species Act. That is one of our most important environmental 
laws and has protected iconic species such as the bald eagle. The act 
has long enjoyed bipartisan support. President Nixon signed the ESA 
into law on December 28, 1973.
  This bill attempts to solve politically what should be done by good 
science. Despite many disagreements in the more than three decades of 
the ESA, there has never been a removal of a species by Congress. Also, 
there have been efforts made to work out a reasonable compromise as it 
relates to the wolf. It is my understanding that it has been blocked on 
the Republican side in trying to get that compromise brought forward.
  I will make one more suggestion to my friend, Senator Crapo. As you 
know, the work product of our subcommittee, along with other bills in 
the Environment and Public Works Committee, and some lands bills have 
been combined into one bill, Calendar No. 30, S. 3003. I encourage the 
Senator to look at that package. If we can get consent to include a 
compromise on the gray wolf, we would be willing to try to get it done 
in the remaining hours of this session. I offer that to my friend.
  Madam President, in its current form, I do object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho has the floor.
  Mr. CRAPO. Madam President, I appreciate the comments of my colleague 
from Maryland and I appreciate working with him on the committee and I 
intend to continue working with him. This is an issue of utmost 
importance in those States in this region of the United States. The 
longer we wait to resolve this issue, the more difficult it will be. 
Cooperation is the key in order for us to get this resolution 
accomplished.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Madam President, I say to all my friends, it is 
imperative we work together to find a compromise. As both Senators from 
Idaho know, you and other Senators have been working on a compromise. 
Under that compromise, Idaho could have a wolf hunt, as they should. 
The State of Montana could have a wolf hunt, as Montana should. 
Northern Utah could. All wolves in Utah would be off the endangered 
species list. I and others have suggested that wolves in northern Utah 
be totally off the endangered species list. This proposal we have been 
working on--you, myself, and others, including Secretary Salazar and 
the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Services, a 
short time ago, all agreed we should allow wolf hunts in all the States 
I mentioned. Yet I have to be honest, your side of the aisle has 
objected to that. You are not coming up with a total abolition, taking 
the wolf out of the Endangered Species Act. That is a solution that 
will not pass. We need a compromise.
  I end where I began. I strongly urge Senators, next year, to keep 
working on a compromise. This is not going to work when the House 
passes a bill that totally takes the wolf off the Endangered Species 
list, which I know is the game plan. If that happens, we are back into 
the soup again. Let's find a solution and compromise that achieves the 
results we all want. It is within our reach. It is right there. Because 
of this interchange, we will not get it done this year. Our States 
desperately need a solution. That proposal was the solution. It was a 
compromise that achieved the results intended. I very much hope we can 
find a compromise to resolve this.
  Mr. CRAPO. Madam President, the compromise the Senator from Montana 
refers to--and he is correct, we have been intensely working on this 
issue to find a compromise with the administration and the affected 
States. The compromise he refers to would have required a change in the 
management of the wolf in Idaho that was unacceptable to the Governor 
in Idaho and others, including myself and Senator Risch. Although there 
was a proposal made, it is not correct that it was approved by 
everybody. I believe, though, we are making progress.
  I am willing to work with the Senator from Montana and the Senator 
from Maryland and others to try not only to find further progress at 
this late date in this session or next year, if necessary, to try to 
find our way to that solution. I appreciate the willingness of both 
Senators to work with us in trying to find that compromise that will 
work.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.


                    FCC Vote on Internet Regulation

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I know the subject we are on now is 
the New START Treaty. It is a very important subject. I appreciate so 
much all the debate we have had. I hope we will be able to go forward 
and allow people to have amendments within this time because it is a 
huge issue for our country.
  I wish to speak on a different subject right now because it is so 
timely. Today, the Federal Communications Commission voted 3 to 2 to 
impose new regulations on the Internet. This is an unprecedented power 
grab by the unelected members of the Federal Communications Commission, 
spearheaded by its chairman.
  The FCC is attempting to push excessive government regulation of the 
Internet through without congressional authority. These actions 
threaten the very future of this incredible technology. The FCC pursuit 
of Net neutrality regulations involves claiming authority under the 
Communications Act that they do not have. Congress did not provide the 
FCC authority to regulate how Internet service providers manage their 
network, not anywhere in the Communications Act nor any other statute 
administered by the Commission.
  Adopting and imposing Net neutrality regulations is, in effect, 
legislating. It takes away the appropriate role of Congress in 
determining the proper regulatory framework for the fastest growing 
sector of our economy. The real-world impact of the FCC's action today 
is that it will be litigated. It will take 18 months to 2 years to sort 
through the briefings and the court decisions, and it will probably go 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the meantime, capital 
investment will slow in core communications networks, and I cannot 
think of a worse possible time for that, as we attempt to create jobs 
and fuel a recovery from the most significant recession in years.
  Elected representatives should determine if regulation is necessary 
in this area. Hearings would bring opposing parties to the table, and 
the process would be open. Instead, an unelected and unaccountable 
group of regulators are creating new authority to intervene in an area 
that represents one-sixth of the Nation's economy.
  I wish to go through a few of the specific provisions in this FCC 
order. The first one is an order to require broadband providers, such 
as Comcast and AT&T, to allow subscribers to send and receive any 
lawful Internet traffic, to go where they want, say what they want, to 
use any nonharmful online devices or applications they want to use.
  These principles are widely supported. I don't object and neither

[[Page S10890]]

would probably anyone. However, these principles are already in use. We 
don't need a big regulatory intervention to accomplish these 
principles. It is the rest of the order that is diametrically opposed 
to this statement of openness and freedom. It installs a government 
arbiter to force their idea of freedom on the users of the Internet and 
on the companies that are trying to make the Internet the economic 
engine of America.
  The first provision that deals with this is that networks must be 
transparent. It says networks must be transparent about how they manage 
their networks, i.e., decisions about engineering, traffic routing, and 
quality of service. Transparency requirements usually translate to 
reporting and consumer disclosure requirements that are heavily 
prescribed and expensive to comply with, and the possible disclosure of 
proprietary information could affect competition. The real-world impact 
of this is higher costs to consumers. The Commission will increase 
regulatory reporting and consumer disclosure requirements as a result 
of this provision, and the cost will be passed along to, of course, the 
consumers in the form of more expensive services.
  The second provision is that you may not unreasonably discriminate. 
The FCC's order states that providers may not unreasonably discriminate 
against lawful Internet traffic. That sounds fine. But the devil is in 
the details. The term is vaguely defined in the order, and how the FCC 
interprets and enforces what is unreasonable will determine how 
limiting this restriction is. For instance, if a provider notices that 
a small number of users are sharing huge files that are leading to 
congestion on the network and determines that slowing down those 
connections would relieve the congestion for the majority of other 
users, the FCC would have the right, under this order, to determine 
that such an action is unreasonable.
  The real-world impact is that this would diminish the company's 
flexibility in managing their own services. The unreasonable 
discrimination provision could undermine the providers' ability to 
manage their network and guarantee all the users a high quality of 
service. Companies that build and maintain the networks that make up 
the Internet need the flexibility to manage the exploding demand for 
services on their network.
  Regrettably, the FCC's order curtails that by establishing that the 
FCC would be an approval portal that companies would have to pass 
through to manage their day-to-day operations. Surely, there is a 
better way.
  The next provision requires that broadband providers must justify new 
specialized services. Under the FCC orders, providers would now have to 
come to the FCC in order to offer consumers a new service, something 
that would be creative and innovative. Instead of offering it to the 
marketplace and having the competitive advantage from something new, 
they have to now expose it to all of their competitors by going through 
a regulatory adjudication at the FCC.
  Let me give an example of what could happen.
  A hospital might want to work with a provider, such as Verizon, to 
offer a new telemedicine service for Verizon subscribers that allows 
patients at home to interact with their doctors via high-definition 
video and uninterruptible remote medical monitoring.
  In order to do this, Verizon might have to prioritize that 
telemedicine traffic ahead of regular Internet traffic to ensure the 
appropriate quality of service, particularly if there is a life-
threatening situation.
  The FCC order allows the Commission to determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether such prioritization is actually unreasonable 
discrimination because presumably the hospital that is offering the 
service would be giving better treatment for that telemedicine traffic 
than the user's regular traffic.
  Going through a whole regulatory process in order to offer that 
service is a burden we do not need and that will stifle the innovation 
that has been a hallmark of the Internet, which led to the explosion of 
opportunities there.
  The Commission says it wants innovation to occur, but the language of 
the order clearly discourages innovation by forcing companies to pass 
through a government regulatory turnstile to determine whether a 
particular service, an innovative service, something new that might be 
a competitive advantage, something new for quality of life, should be 
allowed. This puts the FCC in the position of picking winners and 
losers among the new innovative services, and it certainly slows down 
the opportunity to have new things coming on the market in what is 
usually a fast-paced economic environment.
  In some cases, this may be enough to discourage providers from even 
entering into the special arrangements necessary to offer such 
services. It is a cumbersome process and, furthermore, it is 
unnecessary.
  In another provision, the FCC order will treat wireless broadband 
services more lightly than wireline broadband services, at least for 
now. The FCC reserves rights in this order, which are taken without 
congressional authority, in my opinion--and certainly the courts will 
litigate that and make its decisions--the FCC reserves the right to 
regulate wireless just as harshly in the future as they are now 
attempting to regulate wireline. For now, wireless providers will have 
more leeway to innovate and to manage their networks. But how much 
investment are they going to make for the long term if they do not know 
what the FCC might foresee in the future that needs fixing, even if it 
is not apparently broken.
  The real world impact is that wireless is the fastest growing area of 
communications markets. The threat that the Commission might later 
apply the wireline prohibitions it has ordered today to this wireless 
marketplace is a major concern.
  I commend the two members of the Commission who dissented in the vote 
today--Rob McDowell and Meredith Atwell Baker. They each did op-eds, 
one in the Wall Street Journal and one in the Washington Post. I would 
say the common theme is that this is a solution where there is no 
problem. We have an open Internet. We have an Internet that is working. 
It does not need the heavy hand of government. It does not need a 
government prism through which to determine if the Internet providers 
are doing an allowable service. We have a marketplace, and the 
marketplace is working.
  This is a time for Congress to take a stand. These regulations will 
raise uncertainty about the methods and practices communications 
companies may use to manage their networks. Heavy-handed regulation 
threatens investment and innovation in broadband services, placing 
valuable American jobs at risk.
  Why would this be happening in a recession where we are trying to 
increase jobs, where we are trying to stop the trajectory of 
unemployment in our country?
  We need to lay off, and it is time for Congress to take a stand. 
Individuals and businesses alike are rightfully concerned about 
government attempts to seize control of the Internet. Senator Ensign, 
who is the ranking member of a Commerce subcommittee--I am the ranking 
member on the full Commerce Committee--together we are going to submit 
a resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act in an 
effort to overturn this troubling regulatory overreach by the FCC. It 
is time for Congress to say we have not delegated this authority to the 
FCC. The FCC tried to do this once before using another part of the 
Communications Act. They were struck down by the courts. Now they have 
gone to a different interpretation in a different section of the act to 
try to gain the capability to obstruct freedom on the Internet.
  It is a huge and serious issue on which I hope Congress will take the 
reins and say to the FCC: If we need regulation in this area, Congress 
will do it.
  We are elected. We are accountable. People can vote what they believe 
is the right approach by what we do. The FCC is not accountable to the 
people of our country. Yes, they are accountable to the President and 
the votes for today's order were from Presidential appointees of this 
administration. It is another big government intervention where we do 
not need to suppress innovation.
  What we need is to embrace innovation so we can create jobs in this 
country with the freedom that has marked the economic vitality of 
America for over 200 years.

[[Page S10891]]

  We will have a resolution of disapproval at the appropriate time in 
the next session of Congress. I look forward to working with other 
Members of Congress to take the reins on this issue. It is a 
congressional responsibility.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I understand Senator Sessions is on the 
floor and wishes to speak. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair 
recognize Senator Sessions, and after Senator Sessions, recognize 
myself and then Senator Shaheen, so we stay in order, if that is 
agreeable.
  Mr. SESSIONS. It is agreeable to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I wish to take a brief moment to 
express my pleasure in the fact that the continuing resolution that 
passed and will now be going to the House had within it a provision to 
allow the Navy to award the littoral combat ship competition to two of 
the bidders. It took a bit of a modification of the procedure to allow 
them to do that. It is a product of good news.
  At one point in the late nineties, I chaired the Seapower 
Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee. I have been a member of 
it. I have seen the development of the littoral combat ship concept. 
ADM Vern Clark determined it was the future of the Navy. We expect to 
have 55 of them in the fleet. They would be manned by only 40 sailors. 
They would be high speed, able to travel in shallow waters, and be 
effective for pirates or be effective for mine sweeping and other 
activities of that nature.
  The House put in this language. We had a hearing in the committee a 
few days ago with Admiral Roughead and Navy officials, Secretary of the 
Navy Mabus, and representatives from the CRS, GAO and CBO--those ABC 
agencies that evaluate these kinds of proposals--and it has moved 
forward.
  I thank Senator Levin for his leadership. I thank Senator Inouye and 
Senator Cochran on our side and the House leaders also who saw fit to 
support the Navy's idea. It is not a plan I suggested, but it is one I 
believe is good.
  The good news is this was enabled by the fact that as a surprise, the 
bids on the ships were very much below what was anticipated. The 
legislation required that the bids come in under $480 million per ship, 
and it looks as if these bids are going to be at $450 million. By 
having both shipyards go forward, the Navy gets a fixed price today. In 
other words, if aluminum goes up or electricity goes up, the shipyards 
are going to eat it. We will bring on both ships at the same time.
  Not only that, but we would get 20 ships total in this first tranche 
of ships rather than 19. In addition to that, the Navy scores that it 
will save $1 billion, and that $1 billion they hope to apply to other 
ships the Navy needs in their 313-ship Navy of the future.
  Ashton Carter, the DOD's acquisition executive, said:

       The U.S. Navy's recent decision to buy both classes of 
     Littoral Combat Ship due to lower than expected bid prices is 
     an example of what good competition can do.

  It was a competitive bid. I think the Navy may have made a mistake in 
not allowing more benefit to the bidders based on how valuable the ship 
was, the total value, but they made it a rigorous cost competition and 
apparently got very good bids. The average bids were, as I said, $450 
million.
  The Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Gary Roughead, on December 14--a 
few days ago--testified before the Armed Services Committee. He said:

       I think the two different types [of ships] give us a 
     certain amount of flexibility, versatility that one would 
     not, and as I talked earlier about this ability to mix the 
     capabilities of a force that we put in there.

  This may have been when I asked a question about it at that same 
hearing. He said:

       I . . . believe that the designs of the ships and the 
     flexibility of the ships . . . and also the cost of these 
     ships open up potential of foreign military sales that would 
     otherwise not be there.

  In other words, not only could we create jobs, perhaps 3,000 to 4,000 
jobs immediately, but many of our allies, with the approval of the 
Defense Department, might want to buy these ships for their fleets, and 
we would have the ability to export these products abroad.
  Having been involved in seeing the vision of the Navy over a decade 
plus and to see that finally come to fruition is good. One Navy 
official was quoted in one of the major publications as saying the 
nature of these competitions is such there be a 100-percent chance of a 
protest, whichever one won the bid, and one reason is because the bid 
was so close. We will avoid a protest and will be able to move forward, 
get the ships faster, lock in the lowest possible cost, clearly lower 
than what would be otherwise, and maybe even be able to save enough 
money to build an even larger ship with it.
  I thank my colleagues who worked on this issue. I believe it will be 
a good thing. One of the ships will be built in my hometown of Mobile, 
AL. I know how excited the workers at the shipyards will be to hear 
they will have jobs in the future producing one of the finest, most 
modern warships in the history of the Navy.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, we are now only hours away from when we 
will have a chance to vote on the ratification of the New START treaty. 
The Senate has invoked cloture, so we are in that 30-hour postcloture 
period. We are now in a period where we need to consider some 
additional amendments, and then we will be able to vote on the 
ratification. I think that is good news for the United States, for 
national security.
  I think each Member of the Senate wants to do what is right for our 
national security. And I wish to emphasize the point that whenever I 
look at a national security issue, I want to get the best advice I can 
from the experts--from our military experts, from our experts who are 
charged with making sure we have the best intelligence to protect the 
security of America, from our diplomatic experts, who understand the 
ramifications of what we do here and around the world in other areas of 
concern for national security. I would say it is unanimous that the 
experts are telling us it is in the security interests of the United 
States to ratify the New START treaty.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, would the Senator yield for a moment?
  Mr. CARDIN. I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I want to make a 1-minute comment 
about a Navy fellow who has been in my office. I am reluctant to 
interrupt, but the Senator is so eloquent, I know he can handle the 
interruption almost better than anybody else.
  CDR Brent Breining has been assigned to my office for the year by the 
Navy. I hope it has been beneficial to him. I think it has been. It has 
certainly been beneficial to us on a host of matters. He is a man of 
ability, of integrity and hard work, and he symbolizes the kind of 
bright young men and women we have so many of in our military. I wanted 
to take this moment to express my appreciation for his fabulous 
service.
  I thank the Chair, I yield the floor, and I thank my colleague for 
letting me interrupt him.
  Mr. CARDIN. I am glad I yielded to Senator Sessions for that point 
because I do believe the fellows from the military assigned to our 
offices are extremely valuable in our work. I was fortunate to have CDR 
Andre Coleman in my office from the Navy, and I can tell you that what 
I learned from his presence in my office was important to me, and I 
think it really made me much more informed when it came to decisions I 
have had to make in the Senate. So this program is a very valuable 
program.
  I was pleased to yield to the Senator so he could recognize the 
person in his office. He is from the Navy? He is a Navy officer?
  Mr. SESSIONS. A Navy officer, yes.
  Mr. CARDIN. Navy officers are always the best, and coming from 
Maryland, where we have the Naval Academy, we were pleased to provide 
some help to the Senator from Alabama.
  If I can continue on the New START treaty, the real test here is the 
national security of our Nation. When you listen to the advice given to 
us by our military experts, they tell us the ratification of New START 
will enhance our national security. When you

[[Page S10892]]

talk to the people who are responsible for collecting intelligence 
information and analyzing that information, they tell us it is in our 
national security interest to ratify the New START treaty. When you 
talk to the political experts, those who are charged with managing our 
foreign policy considerations around the world, they tell us the 
ratification of New START will help protect our national security 
interest.
  The reason is that when you look at this treaty and find out what is 
in this treaty that restricts what the United States can do and you 
look at the number of deployed warheads and the number of delivery 
vehicles we are permitted to have, our experts say those numbers are 
clearly achievable for us without compromising whatsoever all of our 
national security interests. That is what they tell us. And these 
numbers were not developed by the political system; they were developed 
by the military experts as to what is reasonable as far as limitations 
on deployed warheads.
  When you look at the other restrictions--and we have heard a lot of 
debate that we are restricted on other defense issues. There is nothing 
in this agreement that limits missile defense issues. That is going to 
be a matter for our national debate. It will be a matter, in working 
with our allies, of analyzing where our current risks come from. But we 
can make independent judgments, and we are not restricted at all by the 
New START treaty as to how we make those judgments.
  What is in this treaty is our ability to verify what the Russians are 
doing with their nuclear stockpile and what they are doing with their 
warheads and with their delivery systems. It allows us to have 
inspectors on the ground. Since the end of last year, we have not had 
inspectors on the ground. That is intelligence information that is 
extremely valuable for us to have. You can't substitute for that. Yes, 
we can get certain intelligence information from the assets we have, 
but having boots on the ground is critically important to our national 
security. So without the ratification of New START, we do not have the 
inspectors on the ground telling us, in fact, what Russia is doing, 
inspecting the warheads, and inspecting their delivery systems.
  There is a third reason in addition to it being important from the 
point of view of what our experts are saying and in addition to the 
fact that it gives us verification. It also is a very important part of 
our national security system in working with other countries. We want 
to make sure we know what Russia is doing, yes. We understand Russia is 
a country of interest to the United States. But when you look at 
countries that are developing nuclear weapons, we need Russia's help 
and the international community working with us to make sure we prevent 
countries such as Iran from becoming nuclear weapon states. The 
ratification of this treaty will help us in those political efforts.
  When you put all this together, it gives us what we need for 
verification. The restrictions in this treaty were worked out by our 
military as being what they believed was right, and it gives us the 
ability to continue to lead internationally not just on strategic arms 
reduction but on nonproliferation issues. So for all those reasons, I 
would urge my colleagues to vote for ratification.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennet). The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. I wish to thank the Senator from Maryland for being a 
terrific member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I thank both 
him and the Senator from New Hampshire for their help here on the floor 
this afternoon as we try to proceed on amendments as rapidly as 
possible for our colleagues and also try to negotiate a few of these 
amendments at the same time as the Senator from Arizona.
  Having discussed with the Senator from Arizona the path forward, I 
assure colleagues that both of us hear the pleas of our colleagues, and 
we are anxious to try to move as rapidly as possible. But in fairness 
to my colleague from Arizona, I also want to make certain that he has 
an opportunity to have his amendments and that the other amendments are 
properly heard.
  To that end, I ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be 
deemed as pending from those amendments filed at the desk. These would 
be the amendments eligible for consideration. I am not calling them up 
yet; I just want this to be a narrow list.
  I apologize, Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that these 
amendments be in order: Kyl No. 4864; Kyl No. 4892, as modified; Risch 
No. 4878; Risch No. 4879; Ensign re rail-mobile; Wicker No. 4895; Kyl 
No. 4860, as modified; Kyl No. 4893; and McCain No. 4900.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to make a comment. For the benefit of 
Members, what we are trying to do is to identify those matters we need 
to try to deal with in the 30 hours postcloture on the START treaty. If 
Members have amendments they need to deal with, I would appreciate it 
if they would either communicate with me or with Senator Lugar's staff 
or Senator Kerry's staff so that we can determine whether to get them 
on the list and where to plug them in. I would also suggest to Members 
that there isn't a lot of time left, and if they have comments they 
would like to make, now is the time to come to the Senate floor. There 
shouldn't be a minute of quorum call time here. There is a lot to do 
and not a lot of time to do it. So if Members have something, bring it 
to us. If they want to speak, they should come to the floor now or as 
soon as they can get here.
  My goal is to get as many of the amendments as possible dealt with, 
if not with a vote then worked out by unanimous consent. What I have 
tried to do is to take a universe of about 70 amendments and to 
consolidate them into a much smaller group. So there are some specific 
subject areas that are not specifically dealt with. In some cases, the 
consolidations may not be technically related. For example, Senator 
LeMieux would like to add to one of the amendments his language dealing 
with tactical weapons taken from his treaty amendment but to conform it 
to a resolution of ratification amendment. So we may be even combining 
some subjects that don't necessarily relate.
  The object here is to cover as much ground as possible within a 
limited period of time, and in order to do that we will need 
everybody's cooperation. Senator Kerry and I will then--and Senator 
Lugar, of course--primarily try to make sure everybody gets heard who 
wants to be heard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am very grateful to the Senator from 
Arizona for his willingness to try to do exactly what we have just 
done, and I pledge to him that I will work as hard as possible on our 
side to rapidly move on these amendments and to give them time.
  I would ask for the cooperation of colleagues who want to speak on 
the treaty as a whole, that they not do so at the expense of being able 
to move an amendment. So if colleagues would cooperate with us, we will 
certainly, in between any activity on amendments, try to accommodate 
anyone who wants to talk on the treaty.
  We are currently working staff to staff and negotiating out these 
amendments, and on some it may be possible to accept them. We will 
certainly try to avoid any rollcall votes, if possible. I know a number 
of colleagues have asked for some rollcalls on some amendments which 
may not be acceptable. So with that understanding--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. If I can add, I understand Senator Shaheen is in order to 
speak next, and then Senator Risch is available to begin; am I not 
correct?
  Mr. KERRY. No, Senator Shaheen is here managing together with the 
Senator from Maryland while we are negotiating. So Senator Risch would 
be in order to move on an amendment immediately.
  Mr. KYL. OK. His numbers are 4878 and 4879, so we can begin with one 
of those, if it is agreeable.
  Mr. KERRY. That is correct.
  Mr. President, we would welcome that, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL. So, Mr. President, it would be in order to call up for 
consideration--I believe the first is amendment No. 4878, Risch 
amendment No. 4878.
  Well, Mr. President, I said there shouldn't be any quorum call, but 
we are going to be a couple of minutes here. So I suggest the absence 
of a quorum until we are ready to go.

[[Page S10893]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CARPER. Mr. President, about an hour or so ago, our colleagues 
voted on whether we should proceed to final debate and eventually to an 
up-or-down vote on whether to ratify the New START treaty. I think it 
is safe to say most Democrats, most Republicans--even those two 
Independents who hang out with us--have pretty much decided on what 
they want to do on that final vote. I think there is a handful of 
Senators, maybe a half dozen or so, who are still undecided and trying 
to make up their minds. I just want to say I respect that. It is a 
serious matter, very serious matter, and there are strong arguments to 
be made on either side of this issue.
  For those who have already made up their minds, they are probably not 
all that interested in what I have to say. But for the handful of our 
colleagues who have not decided how they believe we should proceed, how 
they ultimately want to vote, I want to take a few minutes and talk to 
them.
  I want to boil this down into four questions that I have focused on 
as I have looked at this issue, looked at the treaty, looked at its 
ramifications. I want to start out by mentioning what I think the four 
maybe critical questions are that we should be asking ourselves.
  The first question is, does this treaty make us safer? I believe it 
does. I think absolutely it makes us safer.
  The second question is, can we afford not to ratify this treaty? I 
believe the answer is no; we cannot afford not to ratify this treaty. 
We need to.
  The third question is, Can we go on to build a robust missile defense 
system, should we need to, if we ratify this treaty? I believe the 
answer is yes; we can do that if we need to.
  The fourth and final question I want us to ponder is, Is ratification 
of the New START treaty the last word on this issue? Quite frankly, the 
answer is no, not at all. In fact, ratification of this treaty would 
just be another step, an important step, in what has been a decades-
long journey. What I would like to do, if I could, is to take these 
questions just one question at a time.
  The first question is, Does this treaty make us safer?
  One of the greatest threats, and some would say the greatest threat, 
to our country and to its people today is the chance that terrorists 
might somehow acquire a nuclear weapon and detonate it inside this 
country. I ask my colleagues, are we doing all that we need to do to 
stop this from happening?
  Sure, we can try to hunt down all the terrorists before they strike. 
In fact, we are doing that now. But we will never know where every 
terrorist is hiding, and I doubt we will ever have the manpower 
necessary to hunt them down if we did know where they were and try to 
stop them.
  Here is what we do know, however. We know where most of the nuclear 
weapons on this planet are today. The majority of them are either in 
Russia or they are in the United States. I would like to think we do a 
good job of securing our nuclear weapons facilities in the United 
States. But Russia, as most of us know, is another story. There is a 
reason terrorists target Russian nuclear facilities.
  While Russian security has improved recently, there are still holes, 
some would say gaping holes, in the physical facilities of some Russian 
facilities, holes that leave openings for terrorists to gain access to 
these weapons. That is one of the reasons we need to ratify this 
treaty. It limits the number of warheads that Russia can hold. Fewer 
Russian warheads translate into fewer chances that those weapons, those 
warheads, will fall into the wrong hands.
  Here is another reason to ratify this treaty: Since the original 
START treaty expired at the end of 2009, the United States has been 
denied the ability to track and to verify the status of Russian nuclear 
weapons. The U.S. and Russian cooperation on verifying and monitoring 
warheads under the original START treaty helped lay the groundwork 
under the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program in the 1990s. 
This program worked and still works to secure and dismantle Russian 
nuclear weapons, to keep them from falling into the hands of terrorists 
or rogue regimes.
  New START will restore our verification and tracking capabilities 
that we lost last year with the expiration of the original START 
treaty. This, in turn, will encourage Russia to continue and to 
participate in the Nunn-Lugar program. In short, Americans will be 
safer if the treaty before us is ratified.
  That leads me to the second question, Can we afford not to ratify 
this treaty? I believe the answer is no; no, we cannot. Let me say why.
  My colleagues opposing this treaty have pointed out what they believe 
to be flaws in it. Some of them say the United States should have held 
out for a better deal. Others say the United States should have 
increased the number of allowed inspections or increased the number of 
delivery systems allowed under the treaty. They say the job of the 
Senate is not to simply ratify treaties but to debate and to amend 
them.
  Let me just say, if this were a seriously flawed treaty, I would 
agree or if this were a flawed treaty I would agree. But it is not. The 
fact that so far all the amendments offered to this treaty have failed, 
mostly by large majorities, bears witness to that fact. Sure, we could 
amend the treaty language to maximize the U.S. position. We could send 
our diplomats back to the negotiating table with the Russians with a 
whole new set of terms the Russians will find unacceptable and 
ultimately nonnegotiable. When the Russians then walk away from the 
talks and the prospects of securing a new treaty die, we will ask 
ourselves, was it worth it to oppose ratification? Was it worth it?
  When a Russian nuclear weapon goes missing and we are left in the 
dark because U.S.-Russian cooperation on tracking and dismantling 
warheads died with the treaty, we will ask ourselves, was it worth it 
to oppose ratification?
  I believe the answer is no. Every living former Secretary of State 
from Kissinger to Baker to Rice shares that opinion.
  Several former Secretaries of Defense, including Secretaries 
Schlesinger, Carlucci, Perry, and Cohen, all believe we ought to ratify 
this treaty in order to make our country--our country--safer. I might 
add, our top intelligence people agree with them.
  This unlikely bipartisan coalition has come to this conclusion 
because they are certain that failure to ratify New START leaves our 
country less safe and more at risk to terror. We ignore the collective 
wisdom and advice of these leaders, past and present, at our peril. 
They have no axe to grind. They are calling it like they see it. I hope 
we will search our hearts--every one of us--and our minds this week and 
come to the same conclusion they have.
  Question No. 3 was: Can we build a robust missile defense system if 
we ratify this treaty? That is an important question. The answer is 
too. And the answer is, yes, we absolutely can. There is simply nothing 
in this treaty that limits the United States from building the kind of 
missile defense system we might want and that we might need.
  You do not have to take my word for it. Last month the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Mike Mullen, bluntly stated, ``There is 
nothing in the treaty that prohibits us from developing any kind of 
missile defense.''
  Let me say his words again. ``There is nothing in the treaty that 
prohibits us from developing any kind of missile defense.'' Those are 
not my words. Those are his words. Nothing, nothing in the treaty 
prohibits us from doing that.
  Just last week Secretary Gates said that the treaty ``in no way 
limits anything we want or have in mind on missile defense.'' Let me 
repeat that as well. He said, ``The treaty in no way limits anything we 
want or have in mind on missile defense.'' In no way.
  Simply put, this treaty gives us both what we want and what we need. 
It reduces the number of nuclear warheads Russia can possess, and it 
does so without constraining U.S. missile defense and deployment.
  Some of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle, who have made 
up their minds that they will oppose ratification, dispute the 
statements of

[[Page S10894]]

both Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Clearly, that is their right 
to do so. These opponents to the treaty argue that this treaty would, 
in fact, create limitations on our ability to build and deploy a 
missile defense system. With all due respect to them, I do not believe 
that is true. And, more importantly, neither do our top military and 
intelligence leaders, upon whom our Nation depends. They do not believe 
it is true either. In supporting this argument, some of the treaty's 
critics point to a provision which states we cannot convert nuclear 
missile launchers into missile defense launchers. We have all heard 
Senators Kerry and Lugar respond to this assertion. We do not want to 
make these conversions. We do not want to make these conversions. Why? 
Because it is not cost effective. It is cheaper to build new silos 
rather than convert the old launchers. This is not a limitation on 
missile defense. It is common sense. It is cost effective. And it is 
certainly not a reason to vote against this important treaty.
  Question No. 4 again. Question No. 4 was: Is ratification of New 
START the last word on this issue? And the answer is, not at all. This 
is not the last word. In fact, ratification is another step, albeit an 
important one, in a decades-long journey. Ratification reflects a 
vision shared by Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Clinton, George 
Herbert Walker Bush, and George W. Bush, as well as the people of our 
country, and the people of the Russian Federation.
  Realizing that vision is vitally important both to Russians and to 
Americans, our two nations must join to lead the global community on 
the issue of nuclear disarmament. If we do not, no one else will.
  The next step in realizing that vision requires us to ratify this New 
START treaty that is before us this week. Once we have done so, we 
should turn to redoubling our efforts to work with Russia, with China, 
and our allies to pressure Iran and North Korea to give up not their 
nuclear energy programs but their nuclear weapons programs. And as we 
do that, we should continue working toward future agreements with the 
Russian Federation on reducing tactical nuclear weapons.
  Fortunately, in the resolution of ratification that contains the New 
START treaty language, there are instructions added by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that order--that order--the Obama 
administration to pursue agreements on the limits of tactical nuclear 
weapons with Russia as well. Two weeks ago, Secretaries Clinton and 
Gates said they would pursue such an agreement with the Russian 
Federation in the coming years. However, we cannot continue down that 
path without first ratifying New START. And we must.
  Let me conclude today by asking my undecided colleagues, however many 
there are out there, one final question. Here it is: How often do we 
see in this body nearly every major national security official from 
just about every Presidential administration of the last four decades 
come together to support one initiative like this? How often? The 
answer is, not very often, at least not on my watch.
  As a captain in the Navy, as my State's Congressman, and Senator, as 
Governor of Delaware, and commander in chief for a while of our State's 
National Guard, I learned a long time ago that the best way to make 
tough decisions, to make the right decision, is to gather together the 
best and brightest minds that we can, people with different 
perspectives, urge them to try to find common ground, and then provide 
their recommendations to me.
  In the case of this treaty, many of the best and brightest national 
security minds our Nation has ever seen, names such as Kissinger, 
Powell, Schlesinger, Baker, Hadley, Scowcraft, Shultz, Rice, Nunn, 
Warner, Lugar, Kerry, Clinton, Bush, and Gates, agree that we should 
ratify New START and ratify it now.
  I urge my colleagues who are still undecided on this critical issue 
to join me, to join us, in moving our Nation forward by voting to 
ratify this treaty.
  Before I yield the floor, I want to take a moment to salute Senator 
Lugar. I thank you and thank your staff for the terrific leadership you 
have provided for years on these issues, along with Sam Nunn, all of 
those years ago, and with John Kerry and others today.
  I am going to thank Senator Kerry for the terrific leadership and the 
great support he has gotten from his committee, from the staff, to get 
us to this point today.
  I am encouraged that we may have the votes to finish our business and 
to conclude by ratifying this treaty tomorrow. I hope that handful of 
our colleagues who are out there who are still trying to figure out 
what is the right thing to do will maybe find some words in the wisdom 
I share today.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.


                           Amendment No. 4855

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we set aside 
the pending amendment and call up amendment No. 4855.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada [Mr. Ensign] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4855.

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:


                           amendment no. 4855

  (Purpose: To amend the Treaty to provide for a clear definition of 
                         rail-mobile missiles)

       In Part One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty, in 
     paragraph 45. (35.), strike ``and the self-propelled device 
     on which it is mounted'' and insert ``and the self-propelled 
     device or railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted''.

  Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak on behalf of this 
amendment, which would clear up any ambiguity by adding the rail mobile 
definition of START I to the New START treaty.
  Specifically, my amendment would amend the protocol annex, part one, 
in terms and definitions protocol. Specifically under START I the 
definition of rail mobile launchers of ICBMs means an erector launching 
mechanism for launching ICBMs, and the rail car or flat car on which it 
is mounted.
  Unfortunately, there is no such definition in New START. According to 
Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Duma International Affairs 
Committee, Senator Kerry's counterpart in the Duma, the understanding 
on rail mobile ICBMs presumes that: ``The Americans are trying to apply 
the New START treaty to rail mobile ICBMs in case they are built.''
  So their definition, their understanding, the Russians' 
understanding, is that rail mobile is not included in this treaty. That 
is according to Mr. Kosachev's statement in the Duma. By making this 
statement, we can infer that it is absolutely Russia's position that 
rail mobile ICBMs are not captured by this treaty or subject to the 
treaty's limitations. So this is an issue we must address and we must 
clarify.
  The administration, in a State Department fact sheet, asserts that 
rail mobiles are covered under the 700 ceiling of deployed delivery 
vehicles in article II. However, Mr. Kosachev's statements imply to the 
contrary. Further, if rail mobiles were to fall under that cap, it 
would be in the definitions. There is zero mention of rail mobiles in 
New START.
  My amendment simply clarifies this ambiguity. In the absence of New 
START limitations on rail mobile ICBMs and launchers, an unlimited 
number of these could be deployed. It may even be possible to take a 
road mobile SS-27 ICBM, including multiple warhead versions, and put it 
on a railcar. This would not in any way violate the conditions of the 
New START limits, because the earlier START I limits on rail mobile 
launchers and nondeployed mobile ICBMs do not appear in this New START.
  Another way to clarify that ambiguity would be if the administration 
gave us full access to the negotiating records. Since they have not, 
however, we must amend the treaty to amend the definition back to as it 
was in START I.
  What happens if the Russian Duma, in its ratification process, adds 
language in its version of their ORR, that excludes rail mobile 
launchers? What do we do at that time? If they do this, I would think 
we would have no choice but to simply take it.
  Mitt Romney highlighted eloquently in an op-ed that:


[[Page S10895]]


       The absence of any mention of rail based launchers should 
     be remedied. U.S. advocates of the treaty say that if Russia 
     again inaugurates a rail program, as some articles in the 
     Russian press have suggested it might, rail mobile ICBMs 
     would count toward the treaty limits. Opponents say that no 
     treaty language supports such an interpretation. Russian 
     commentators have said that rail-based systems would be 
     discussed by the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Such 
     ambiguity should be resolved before the treaty is approved, 
     not after.

  I will yield to the Senator from Indiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the amendment speaks to concerns about rail 
mobile missiles. First, I would emphasize it is important to note that 
neither side currently deploys rail mobile systems.
  The Nunn-Lugar program destroyed the last SS-24 rail mobile system in 
2008. They are all gone. Destroyed. The New START treaty is 
specifically drafted so that if Russia were to revive its rail mobile 
program, it would count under New START's central limits. This is 
underscored in our resolution of ratification through an understanding 
that if such systems are ever deployed by Russia, they will count as 
deployed ICBMs under New START, and that such railcars on BMs.
  I submit that the amendment is unneeded. But more seriously, if in 
fact it were to be adopted, it would require renegotiation of the 
treaty. For that reason, as well as others I have stated as succinctly 
as possible, I oppose the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennet). The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Just to address the one point on the clarification in the 
resolution of ratification, it has been said that our resolution of 
ratification clarifies and we should not need this language in the 
definition. Here is the problem I have.
  Several years ago when we were debating the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and riot control agents, there it is right there in the 
resolution of ratification that these riot control agents can be used 
in operations to protect civilian life. Yet to this day, our State 
Department lawyers continue to argue they cannot, even though in the 
resolution of ratification we clearly stated that these riot control 
agents, tear gas basically, could be used to protect civilian life. Yet 
our State Department continues to argue against that. That is why 
putting it in the definitions within the treaty, we believe, is 
important to clarify the difference we seem to have with the Russians 
based on statements they have made to the press.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this won't take too long. Let me say, first 
of all, I thank the Senator for bringing this up. Let me underscore: 
This is one of the sort of let's see if we can find a problem, and if 
we can find a problem, make it into a bigger problem, and then amend 
the treaty because amending the treaty itself--this amendment seeks to 
amend the treaty, so here we go right back down the road of the old 
``let's open up the negotiations again'' argument. We have been through 
it so many times here. It has appropriately been rejected by 
colleagues.
  I think the last vote was something like 66 to 30 on whether we will 
amend the treaty. That doesn't mean he doesn't have a right to raise 
it, but let me speak to the substance.
  Going back in history on the START treaty, which is why this is a 
complete red herring--if you go back in the history of the START 
treaty, you will recall that the Soviet Union deployed 10 warheads, 10 
MIRV warheads on an SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile, and 
Russia deployed some 36 of those SS-24 rail-based launchers the Senator 
is referring to at the height of their deployment. But to comply with 
START I and with START II, which interestingly, we worked together on 
in terms of START II even though the Russians never ratified it--and 
the reason they didn't ratify it is because we took unilateral action 
and withdrew from the ABM treaty, and they were mad about it. That is 
why what we do matters in this relationship. We ratified the START II 
treaty; they didn't. So the things we choose to do have an effect.
  The fact is, thanks to our colleague to my right, the distinguished 
Senator from Indiana, Mr. Lugar, and Senator Nunn, who had the vision 
to put together the threat reduction program, that program set out to 
destroy Russia's SS-24 ICBMs and rail-based launchers.
  This is important for all those people who have come to the floor and 
argued repeatedly that Russia has acted in bad faith in all of these 
efforts. Take note that Russia continued those cooperative efforts and 
continued to destroy those rail-based launchers even though they had 
not signed on to START II. Guess what. The last Russian SS-24 launcher 
was eliminated in 2007.
  Now START I had a specific sublimit on mobile missiles and on rail 
mobile missiles. So the START treaty's definition, as a result of those 
two sublimits, the START treaty's definition needed to cover both the 
rail mobile and the road mobile launchers that were deployed at the 
time of the treaty. They were both put under the same roof, and that 
roof was the START treaty's definition. Just like the Moscow Treaty, 
the New START treaty contains just a plane limit, an overall limit on 
ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers. We have the two 
categories and heavy bombers with no sublimits.
  That means the characteristics of strategic offensive arms limited by 
the treaty, in particular the deployed and the nondeployed launchers of 
ICBMs and the deployed ICBMs and their warheads, those characteristics 
do not hinge on the treaty's definition of mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
We don't want them to because we want this big umbrella that covers all 
of it, which we have the ability to verify.
  If we look at exactly what the treaty says, it says the following--
and I don't know which lawyers are arguing about this, but the lawyers 
involved between the Russians and the United States and the lawyers 
involved on the negotiating team and the lawyers at the State 
Department are not arguing about this. They understand exactly what the 
treaty says.
  Here is what it says. Article II, 1(a) of the treaty sets the limit 
of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
and deployed heavy bombers. That is really simple. It is very 
straightforward--700 ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers. We have the flexibility to 
decide how many of each of those we want to have. We had a debate 
previously with our colleagues about how many we would have. But that 
is pretty straightforward. There is no ambiguity in that. Where is the 
ambiguity--700, all three, and we believe we can count all three. 
Paragraph 12 of part 1 of the protocol defines deployed ICBM as an ICBM 
that is contained in or on a deployed launcher of ICBMs. That is pretty 
obvious. A launcher is a launcher is a launcher.
  Paragraph 13 of part 1 of the protocol defines deployed launcher of 
ICBMs as an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test 
launcher, an ICBM training launcher or an ICBM launcher located at a 
space launch facility. Those are the only three exceptions. That is it. 
There is no ambiguity.
  It seems to me pretty darn straightforward that a rail mobile ICBM, 
if either side decided to deploy it, obviously falls under the 700. It 
is so obvious that we should not have to risk renegotiating the entire 
treaty over something as obvious as that.
  I might add, a nondeployed launcher of a rail mobile would fall under 
the 700 limit in terms of the launchers. I just ask my colleagues to 
look carefully at this. It would be highly improbable.
  The Senator from Tennessee earlier today gave a terrific speech, Mr. 
Alexander. He said: What is all this fuss about? In the end, we are 
going to have thousands of these things that can destroy the whole 
planet anyway.
  That came from a person who is pretty thoughtful on these issues, who 
understands that you have to put this in a context. We are not talking 
about the Cold War right now. We are not talking about the Soviet Union 
right now. We are talking about a country with which we have a very 
different relationship and where we have a whole set of combined 
interests, and you have to put this treaty into that context. It is 
highly unlikely that during the duration of this treaty with the 
Russian Federation, after years of working with the United States to 
destroy the weapons and work cooperatively under Senator Lugar and 
Senator Nunn's program, it is unbelievably hard to believe

[[Page S10896]]

they are going to divert what we know to be their very limited 
resources and infrastructure from their planned deployment in order to 
do new mobile--we have a planned deployment of new mobile-based ICBM 
forces, and suddenly to have them go out and build and deploy rail 
mobile launchers, which we would observe unbelievably quickly under our 
national technical means.
  The simple answer is that we know what they are going to do. We have 
a strong capacity to track what they are doing. We have every reason to 
believe the Russians agree with what I just said about the allocation 
of resources. The fact is, the resolution the Senate will vote on, in 
order to guarantee that we are certain about this, requires the 
President to communicate to the Russians in the formal instrument that 
ratifies the agreement, when we ratify it, assuming we do it, will 
ratify the understanding of the United States that the treaty would 
cover rail mobile launched ICBMs and their launchers, if Russia or the 
United States were crazy enough to try to build them. So for the life 
of me, I don't know what you can do more than that. But we certainly 
are not going to reopen the treaty for the basis of a nonambiguity like 
that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I wish to add parenthetically a footnote to 
the chairman's presentation.
  As has been mentioned frequently during this debate, for a variety of 
reasons, the Russians reduced the number of ICBMs below the totals that 
were required by the former treaty. Some Senators, in fact, have said 
the New START treaty, by imposing these limits of 1,550 warheads and 
700 launchers, inhibits only the United States because, according to 
those who have argued this, Russia has already fallen below these 
limits.
  Let me add, as a point of personal recollection, one of the reasons 
the Russians are below some of the standards that have been suggested 
is, as they thought more and more about the rail mobile situation, they 
decided this was either useless, expensive, or so vulnerable to 
potential attack that it was not worth maintaining.
  As a result, as has been suggested, as it turned out, using the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States and Russia, 
quite outside of the last treaty, decided we would proceed under the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to simply destroy all the rest of 
the rail, which we did.
  Just for the sake of exhibit, I have a piece of one of the last rails 
to be destroyed. It was presented to us by the Russians with a proper 
inscription on the back of it, recognizing their appreciation to the 
United States for this destruction. Therefore, logically, to argue that 
we are back into a predicament of the Russians wanting to build rails 
again and launch missiles and what have you from them negates the 
history of cooperation, conversations that may have occurred well 
beyond the treaty but that have come from the fact that there were 
Americans working with Russians who were not involved necessarily in 
specifics of the treaty but, in fact, were able to effect results that 
were well beyond what the treaty mandated.
  I mention this, again, to indicate that I believe the amendment is 
unnecessary. But worse still, adoption of it would, in fact, eliminate 
our consideration today. We would go home. It is finished.
  I certainly encourage Senators, recognizing that the Russians don't 
want the rails, have actually worked in the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program with Americans to get rid of all of it, plus 
everything associated with them, that as a commonsense situation that 
seems to be fairly well under control. Even then, the statements we 
have adopted as a part of the treaty take care at least of the counting 
situation if, for any reason, such an emergence should occur again on 
the rails.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, in response to the last argument that the 
Russians don't have any incentive to and we don't believe they are 
going to build the rail mobile system again, I ask, then: What is the 
big deal about ensuring in the treaty that if they do, they would be 
counted under the 700? What is the problem? The problem appears to be 
that the Russians don't have the same view of this as do my colleagues 
or the United States Government.
  My colleague from Nevada quoted earlier from the Interfax report of 
October 29, 2010, where the chairman of the Russian Duma--parliament--
committee responsible for treaties, Konstantin Kosachyov, stated--in 
response to the argument we have just made, that the Senator from 
Nevada just made, that the treaty should include rail-mobile as part of 
the 700 limit--he stated, in response to that claim, and in response to 
the resolution of ratification of the Foreign Relations Committee, that 
U.S. claim compelled the Duma to stop action on the treaty. He said--
and I am quoting:

       The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to 
     rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built.

  That, obviously, means if he is saying: We would have to stop the 
Duma action on this if that is what the U.S. Government is going to 
claim, they are pushing back on this pretty hard. The question is, why? 
I do not know whether they intend to build the rail-mobile system. I do 
not much care whether they build it. All we care about is, if they do, 
it has to be included within the 700 limit.
  Now, the report language of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
confirms the fact that they are not included. Here is what the report 
language says--and this is in direct contradiction to what was said 
just a moment ago--this is from page 17 of the report--

       Nevertheless, while a new rail-mobile system would clearly 
     be captured under the Article II limits despite the exclusion 
     of rail-mobile launchers from the definition of mobile 
     launchers of ICBMs, those provisions that actually use the 
     defined term ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' would not cover 
     rail-mobile systems if Russia were to reintroduce them.

  ``Would not cover.''
  It goes on to say:

       ``Appropriate detailed arrangements for incorporating rail-
     mobile ICBM launchers and their ICBMs into the treaty's 
     verification and monitoring regime would be worked out in the 
     Bilateral Consultative Commission.'' Under Article XV . . . 
     the Parties may make changes to the Protocol or Annexes. . . 
     .

  We have discussed this in the past. If there is a dispute about what 
the treaty means, then you go to this dispute resolution group of 
Russians and Americans, and they try to talk it out and work it out. 
But there is nothing to say they will, and if the Russian chairman of 
the committee is already saying we are trying to insert something into 
the agreement that isn't there, I wonder how successful we would be in 
working it out.
  The report concludes:

       If Russia were again to produce rail-mobile ICBM launchers, 
     the Parties would work within the BCC to find a way to ensure 
     that the treaty's notification, inspection, and monitoring 
     regime would adequately cover them.

  So it is clear that it does not. It is clear from the report that the 
language would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to 
reintroduce them. It is clear we would have to rely upon the Russians' 
good offices, good intentions, to reach some kind of an agreement with 
us in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. There are no assurances 
that will be done.
  Why are we willing to proceed with an agreement that has such built 
in ambiguity? Why say: Well, we will let that be worked out by the BCC 
when we could work it out right now? It is the same answer we get with 
respect to every one of these proposals: Well, the Russians would then 
demand to renegotiate the treaty.
  I ask again: Is the Senate just to be a rubber stamp? We cannot do 
anything to change the treaty or the protocol, or just the resolution 
of ratification, which is what we are trying to do because the Russians 
would say no, and, therefore, we cannot do it?
  I thought we were the Senate. We are one-half of the U.S. Government 
that deals with it. The other is the Executive. The Executive 
negotiated the treaty. Now, why didn't they include this language? We 
do not know because we do not have the record of the negotiations. What 
I am told is that it is because the Russians said they would not 
include it because the rail-mobile system would be unique to Russia, 
and we do not have such a thing. Therefore, there would be a lack of 
parity. You could not have such a unilateral provision. So if that is 
the case, either the

[[Page S10897]]

Russians do intend to develop these systems, and they do not want them 
counted, or there should be no problem with the Ensign amendment, which 
would ensure that they would be counted.
  So you cannot read the report language and agree with what has been 
said--that the treaty covers these weapons--you cannot read it and 
believe they would clearly be covered by the inspection and 
notification and monitoring regime. In fact, it clearly shows that is 
not the case. What you have to believe is that this built-in dispute in 
the treaty may well arise if the Russians decide to proceed to develop 
such a system, and we would then--or would arise if they decide to do 
that, and we would be required to go to the BCC to try to work it out 
with them. That, obviously, builds in a conflict that is not good.
  As I said before, when you have a contract between two parties, the 
first thing the lawyers try to do is ensure there are no ambiguities 
that could cause one side or the other to later come forward and say: I 
did not mean that. Then you have a legal dispute. But it is one thing 
to have a legal dispute about buying a car or a house. It is quite 
another to have a dispute like this between two sovereign nations.
  I would note when the United States had a system we might develop, 
such as the rail-mobile--but we have not made a decision to do it; we 
certainly do not have it--the Russians knew we wanted to at least study 
the possibility of developing a conventional Prompt Global Strike 
capability--that is to say, an ICBM that could carry a conventional 
warhead rather than a nuclear warhead--and they specifically insisted 
that we include that in the treaty.
  Now, you might say: Well, wait a minute. The Russians apparently 
argued that they did not want to include anything on rail-mobile 
because the United States did not have anything on rail-mobile, and 
that would be a lack of parity--it would be a unilateral restriction--
but the same thing is true with conventional Prompt Global Strike. The 
Russians have no intension of doing that, apparently. We might, just 
like for the rail-mobile, the Russians might. Yet they insisted a 
limitation be put on our conventional Prompt Global Strike--by what?--
by counting them against the 700 launcher limit--exactly the same thing 
that should be done with regard to rail-mobile.
  So, apparently, if we might do something in the future the Russians 
do not like, we have to count it. But if the Russians might do 
something in the future we do not like, we cannot count it. Our only 
relief then is to go to this BCC and hope the Russians would agree to 
something in the future that they have not been willing to agree to 
today.
  So all the Ensign amendment does is to clear up an ambiguity and 
avoid a future dispute between the parties. It is clear from the report 
that it is not covered now. Again, the language, ``those provisions 
that actually use the defined term `mobile launchers of ICBMs' would 
not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to re-introduce them.''
  The report acknowledges that, therefore, in order to apply the 
inspection and notification and monitoring regimes, you would have to 
get the Russians to agree in the BCC. Why not solve that problem right 
now?
  Again, we meet with the same argument we are always met with: Well, 
we do not dare change anything in here because the Russians would 
disagree.
  I just ask my colleagues, again, is there any purpose for us being 
here? If every argument is, well, we do not dare change it because the 
Russians would disagree, so we would have to renegotiate it, maybe that 
suggests that there was not such a hot job of negotiating this treaty 
in the first place. If the Senate cannot find errors or mistakes or 
shortcomings and try to correct them without violating some 
superprinciple that is above the U.S. Constitution, which says that the 
Senate has that right, then, again, I do not know what we are doing 
here.
  So I urge my colleagues to support the Ensign amendment, as with some 
other things we have raised, to try to avoid a conflict. Resolve the 
situation now while we still have time to do it rather than after the 
treaty is ratified when it is too late.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I appreciate the concerns my colleague 
from Arizona is raising in regards to mobile launchers, particularly as 
it relates to rail-mobile launchers. But I am reading the same language 
the Senator has put on the floor, and it says very clearly that it is 
subject to the 700 limit. I think what my colleague is referring to is 
the fact that Russia today does not have rail-mobile launchers. So, 
therefore, there are other protocols in the treaty in regard to 
inspection, et cetera, that are not provided for in this treaty because 
it is not relevant since Russia today does not have rail-mobile 
launchers. But if they were to develop rail-mobile launchers, they 
would be subject to the 700 limitation of launchers, if it was being 
deployed. The consultation process will work out the procedures for 
adequate inspection.
  So I think it is already covered under the treaty. In the language of 
the treaty Senator Kerry mentioned it is clear to me it is covered. But 
in the report language I think it is stating the obvious.
  One last point, and that is, again, you do not dispute the fact that 
if we were to adopt this amendment, it would be the effect of denying 
the ratification of the treaty until it was modified in Russia, which 
is the same as saying we are not going to get a ratified treaty on this 
issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, might I pose a question to my colleague 
because I understand exactly the point he makes. He makes it 
accurately. I quoted the language that says that it would clearly be 
captured under article II limits. That is the committee's 
understanding, which is the point my colleague is making. But I go on 
to note that the exclusion of rail-mobile launchers from the definition 
means that it would not cover rail-mobile systems if Russia were to 
reintroduce them and, therefore, there would have to be work by the BCC 
to figure out how to deal with those under the inspection, monitoring, 
and notification regimes.
  I understand that our committee says they believe they are captured. 
I see that in the report. What I am saying is, there is a dispute 
because the Russians do not appear to agree with that. I would just ask 
my colleague, how do you square, then, the Russian response? The 
chairman of their committee--you have dueling committees--in the Duma 
said:

       The Americans are trying to apply the New START Treaty to 
     rail-mobile ICBMs in case they are built.

  It appears to me what he is saying is, but they should not be doing 
that. In fact, his recommendation, I believe, was the Duma not take 
action on the treaty if that was our intent.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KYL. Yes, of course.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. To me, it is the language of the treaty itself. The 
language of the treaty itself is pretty clear as to what the definition 
of a launcher is, with three exclusions. Just look at the language of 
the treaty that any type of launcher would be covered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, if I could just close, and I actually had, 
I think, yielded the floor. So I appreciate the chance to make this 
final point.
  All the Ensign amendment tries to do is clear up the ambiguity. My 
colleague says it is absolutely clear to him that they are included. I 
know the committee says they think it is clear. I do not think the 
Russians think it is clear, and I think there is a basis for an 
argument that it is not clear. Why not clear it up?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, the answer to the question--why not clear 
it up--is because if you clear it up the way the Senator is trying to, 
you kill the treaty. Pretty simple.
  The Senator keeps asking the question, Why can't we do this? We can't 
do it because it kills the treaty. It is pretty simple. And the Senator 
knows it kills the treaty.
  Now, going beyond that, come back again just for an instant to the 
substance. First of all, the Russian general

[[Page S10898]]

staff--I have been known, as chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, to make some comments which occasionally the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff do not agree with. My comments are not going to drive them to do 
what they do not agree with. Likewise, the chairman of their foreign 
relations committee whom he quotes was tweaking us in his comment. But 
the fact is, the general staff of Russia has made it abundantly clear 
they do not want to build these rail-based mobile. They have no 
intention of doing this. They have just been destroying them. They have 
been taking them down and destroying them in a completely verifiable 
manner, and the Senator from Arizona cannot contest that. He knows that 
is absolutely true.
  So this is a completely artificial moment designed, as others have 
been, to try to derail--no pun intended--the treaty.
  That said, let me also point out that if you want to try to rein in 
this issue of rail-based, this amendment is not the way to do it 
because there are a whole series of protocols set up in the treaty for 
how you deal with road-based launchers, and you would need to begin to 
put in place a whole different set of protocols in order to deal with 
rail-based. So if, indeed, the Russians are, as I said, crazy enough, 
as they think it would be crazy--that is the way they define it now and 
we do too--to go back to something we have spent the last 15 years 
destroying, if that happens, we will know it. Moreover, if it happens, 
it is counted, as the Senator has agreed, under the article II limits 
for launchers. So this is a nonissue, with all due respect.
  I know the Senator from Nevada wants to take 2 minutes to make a 
comment, and then I wish to make a unanimous consent request, if I 
could, after that.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, I think the Senator from Arizona wishes 
to make a statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Before my colleague from Nevada closes, I know this whole 
argument is based on the proposition that the Russians wouldn't be 
crazy enough to think about doing a rail system again so we don't need 
to worry about it. What is all the fuss, is what my colleague said.
  Well, here is a December 10--how many days ago is that now? I have 
forgotten. We are about to Christmas, but I have forgotten the date of 
today. It is from Moscow ITAR-TASS, English version. Headline: ``Russia 
Completes Design Work For Use Of RS-24 Missiles On Rail-based 
Systems.''
  I want my colleague from Massachusetts to hear this. The Russians 
aren't crazy enough to think they could do a rail system. Here is the 
headline, December 10: ``Russia Completes Design Work For Use of RS-24 
Missiles On Rail-based Systems.''
  Just to quote a couple lines from the story:

       Russia has completed design work for the use of RS-24 
     missiles railway-based combat systems, but implementation of 
     the project has been considered inexpedient, Moscow Heat 
     Engineering Institute Director Yuri Solomonov said. His 
     institute is the main designer of these missiles. Asked 
     whether the RS-24 missiles could be used in railway-based 
     systems, he said, ``This is possible. The relevant design 
     work was done . . . '' and so on.

  I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Russia Completes Design Work for Use of RS-24 Missiles on Rail-Based 
                                Systems

       Moscow, December 20 (Itar-Tass)--Russia has completed 
     design work for the use of RS-24 missiles railway-based 
     combat systems, but implementation of this project has been 
     considered inexpedient, Moscow Heat Engineering Institute 
     Director Yuri Solomonov said.
       His institute is the main designer of these missiles.
       Asked whether the RS-24 missiles could be used on railway-
     based systems, Solomonov said, ``This is possible. The 
     relevant design work was done, but their development was 
     deemed inexpedient. I agree with this because the 
     survivability of this system is not better than that of the 
     ground-based one, but it costs more.''
       The RS-24 Yars missile system was put on combat duty in 
     Russia this summer.
       Earlier, the chief designer of the Moscow Heat Engineering 
     Institute, which created the system, said that one of the RS-
     24 systems had already been delivered to the Strategic Rocket 
     Forces at the end of last year.
       Solomonov said, ``All journalists are writing about Bulava, 
     but are saying little about the new mobile missile system RS-
     24 Yars with multiple warheads that we created at the same 
     time.''
       The Strategic Rocket Forces intended to deploy the missile 
     system RS-24 with multiple warheads in December 2009, 
     Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces Lieutenant-General 
     Andrei Shvaichenko said in October 2009.
       ``The intercontinental ballistic missile RS-24 put into 
     service will reinforce combat capabilities of the attack 
     group of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Along with the single-
     warhead silo-based and mobile missile RS-12M2 Topol-M already 
     made operational the mobile missile system RS-24 will make up 
     the backbone of the attack group of the Strategic Rocket 
     Forces,'' the general said.
       Silo-based and mobile missile systems Topol-M, as well as 
     RS-24 mobile missile systems were designed by the Moscow Heat 
     Engineering Institute.
       The warheads of Russia's newest Topol-M and RS-24 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles can pierce any of the 
     existing of future missile defences, Strategic Rocket Forces 
     Commander, Lieutenant-General Sergei Karakayev said earlier.
       ``The combat capability of silo-based and mobile Topol-M 
     ICBMs is several times higher than that of Topol missiles. 
     They can pierce any of the existing and future missile 
     defence systems. RS-24 missiles have even better 
     performance,'' Karakayev said.
       The Strategic Rocket Forces have six regiments armed with 
     silo-based Topol-M missiles and two regiments armed with 
     mobile Topol-M missiles. Each missile carries a single 
     warhead. This year, Russia began deploying RS-24 ICBMs with 
     MIRVs. There is currently one regiment armed with RS-24 
     missiles.
       Speaking of other ICBMs, Karakayev said that RS-20V 
     Voyevoda (Satan by Western classification) would remain in 
     service until 2026. ``Their service life has been extended to 
     33 years,'' he said.
       On July 30, 1988, the first regiment armed with RS-20B 
     Voyevoda missiles was placed on combat duty in the Dombarovka 
     missile formation in the Orenburg region.
       ``This is the most powerful intercontinental ballistic 
     missile in the world at the moment,'' the press service of 
     the Strategic Rocket Forces told Itar-Tass.
       With a takeoff weight of over 210 tonnes, the missile's 
     maximum range is 11,000 kilometres and can carry a payload of 
     8,800 kilograms. The 8.8-tonne warhead includes ten 
     independently targetable re-entry vehicles whose total power 
     is equal to 1,200 Hiroshima nuclear bombs. A single missile 
     can totally eliminate 500 square kilometres of enemy 
     defences.
       By 1990, Voyevoda missiles had been placed on combat duty 
     in divisions stationed outside of Uzhur, Krasnoyarsk 
     Territory, and Derzhavinsk, Kazakhstan. Eighty-eight Voyevoda 
     launch sites had been deployed by 1992.

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I am not arguing that this issue has been 
resolved within Russia as to whether to go forward. I am not arguing 
whether it is a good thing or a bad thing. I simply submit it in 
response to the argument that the Russians would be crazy to think 
about doing this. Either they are crazy or--well, in any event, I would 
never attribute that motivation to anybody, even somebody from another 
country. The fact is, they have begun design work on exactly such a 
project.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. It is my understanding that the Russian referred to in 
that article is saying how difficult it is to do the rail-based. But 
here is the simple reality. If they build it, it will count, end of 
issue. That is why this is unnecessary.
  I yield to the Senator from Nevada.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, to wrap up this debate, let me address, 
first of all, the whole idea that changing this treaty in any way kills 
the treaty. Under the Constitution, certainly it is the President's 
role, the administration's role, to negotiate the treaties. We all 
recognize that. But under the Constitution, the Senate is tasked with 
advice and consent. That means we are to look at the treaties, and if 
we think they should be changed--and we have changed treaties over the 
years--then we are free to change the treaties. That is why there is a 
process set up, such as this amendment process, to change the treaties. 
So if we have fundamental objections to the treaty, I think we can have 
a debate on whether we should, on a particular amendment, change the 
treaty on the merits of the amendment, but we shouldn't just say we 
can't change any part of a treaty because it kills the treaty, because 
we have a constitutional role in advice and consent on whether we 
approve treaties.

[[Page S10899]]

  Just a couple points to make.
  First of all, this is from the State Department's Bureau of 
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. I ask unanimous consent 
that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[From the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Aug. 
                                2, 2010]

           Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Missiles

       Key Point: Neither the United States nor Russia currently 
     deploys rail-mobile ICBM launchers. If a Party develops and 
     deploys rail-mobile ICBMs, such missiles, their warheads, and 
     their launchers would be subject to the Treaty.
       Definitions: The New START Treaty defines an ICBM launcher 
     as a ``device intended or used to contain, prepare for 
     launch, and launch an ICBM.'' This is a broad definition 
     intended to cover all ICBM launchers, including rail-mobile 
     launchers if they were to be deployed again in the future. 
     There is no specific mention of rail-mobile launchers of 
     ICBMs in the New START Treaty because neither Party currently 
     deploys ICBMs in that mode. Russia eliminated its rail-mobile 
     SS-24 ICBM system under the START Treaty. Nevertheless, the 
     New START Treaty's terms and definitions cover all ICBMs and 
     ICBM launchers, including a rail-mobile system should either 
     Party decide to develop and deploy such a system.
       A rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs would meet the Treaty's 
     definition for an ICBM launcher. Such a rail-mobile launcher 
     would therefore be accountable under the Treaty's limits.
       Because neither Party has rail-mobile ICBM launchers, the 
     previous definition of a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the 
     START Treaty (``an erector-launcher mechanism for launching 
     ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted'') 
     was not carried forward into the New START Treaty.
       If Russia chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, 
     such missiles and their launchers would be subject to the 
     Treaty and its limitations. Specific details about the 
     application of verification provisions would be worked out in 
     the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Necessary adjustments 
     to the definition of ``mobile launchers of ICBMs''--to 
     address the use of the term ``self-propelled chassis on which 
     it is mounted'' in that definition--would also be worked out 
     in the BCC.
       Accountability: A rail-mobile launcher containing an ICBM 
     would meet the definition of a ``deployed launcher of 
     ICBMs,'' which is ``an ICBM launcher that contains an ICBM.''
       Deployed and non-deployed (i.e., both those containing and 
     not containing an ICBM) rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs would 
     fall within the limit of 800 for deployed and non-deployed 
     launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and non-deployed 
     heavy bombers.
       The ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers would count as 
     deployed and therefore would fall within the 700 ceiling for 
     deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
       Warheads on deployed ICBMs contained in rail-mobile 
     launchers therefore would fall within the limit of 1,550 
     accountable deployed warheads.
       Applicable Provisions: Separate from the status of the 
     rail-mobile ICBM launcher, all ICBMs associated with the 
     rail-mobile system would be Treaty-accountable, whether they 
     were existing or new types of ICBMs, and therefore would, as 
     appropriate, be subject to initial technical characteristics 
     exhibitions, data exchanges, notifications, Type One and Type 
     Two inspections, and the application of unique identifiers on 
     such ICBMs and, if applicable, on their launch canisters.

  Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, let me just read one paragraph from 
this:

       If Russia chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, 
     such missiles and their launchers would be subject to the 
     Treaty and its limitations.

  That is according to our State Department.

       Specific details about the application of verification 
     provisions would be worked out in the Bilateral Consultative 
     Commission.

  So, in other words, if Russia decides to build these things, then the 
verification has to be worked out by the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission. It isn't that it is set in there exactly what would happen, 
but the verification certainly would have to be worked out.
  The bottom line is, we believe there is ambiguity because of the 
statements made by the Russians themselves. That is the problem. If the 
Russians, in their statements in the Duma, if they have been saying: 
Yes, we agree with exactly the interpretation the Americans have been 
making, it would be a different story and we probably wouldn't need 
this amendment. But because their statements--Senator Kerry's 
counterpart in the Russian Duma has said the Americans are trying to 
bring into this New START treaty mobile launchers, and the Russians 
don't think they should be in there. So we think we should clarify that 
language in a very unambiguous way, based on my amendment, to make sure 
there is no question on each side.
  I appreciate what the Senator from Massachusetts is saying, that they 
have destroyed their--it would be crazy for them to build them again. 
But as the Senator from Arizona just talked about, they are at least 
designing. Maybe they have a better system to use for rail-mobile 
launchers. We don't know that. But what we do know is, they don't think 
this language applies, the language in the treaty applies to the mobile 
launchers. So they could get around this treaty and the number of 
warheads they could have, based on the language that is currently in 
the treaty.
  I just ask our colleagues to seriously consider removing the 
ambiguity and voting for the Ensign amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I don't think we need to repeat. I 
appreciate the Senator from Nevada and I understand what he is saying. 
I completely agree with him about the advice and consent role of the 
Senate, but part of that role is to make a judgment about whether the 
consequences of some particular concern merit taking down the whole 
treaty and putting it back in the renegotiation process. It is not that 
we can't or shouldn't under the right circumstances; it is a question 
of balancing what are the right circumstances. We are arguing, I think 
appropriately, because the report of our committee says clearly that 
rail-mobile will be covered under article II and this is unnecessary. 
So weighing it that way, it doesn't make sense to do it.
  Let me say to my colleagues that I think we want to move to the Risch 
amendment, and I think it is the hope of the majority leader to try to 
have two votes around the hour of 6 o'clock, if that is possible, and 
then to proceed to the Wicker amendment.
  I yield the floor to the Senator from Idaho.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.


                           Amendment No. 4878

  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, I wish to call up amendment No. 4878.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to setting aside the 
pending amendment?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Idaho [Mr. Risch] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4878.

  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To provide a condition regarding the return of stolen United 
                       States military equipment)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Return of stolen united states military equipment.--
     Prior to the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the 
     President shall certify to the Committees on Armed Services 
     and Foreign Relations of the Senate that the Russian 
     Federation has returned to the United States all military 
     equipment owned by the United States that was confiscated 
     during the Russian invasion of the Republic of Georgia in 
     August 2008.

  Mr. RISCH. Madam President and fellow Senators, I bring you what I 
believe to be the first amendment to the resolution of ratification. We 
have had a number of amendments that have been to the actual treaty 
itself. We have listened to objection after objection that: Oh, my 
gosh, we can't possibly amend the treaty because if we do, we are going 
to have to sit down and talk to the Russians again.
  We don't have to worry about that with this amendment. This is an 
amendment to the resolution of ratification. It will not require that 
we sit down with the Russians and negotiate. Frankly, I don't know what 
is wrong with that. Frankly, I think it is a good idea after all the 
problems that have been raised with the treaty. But, nonetheless, if 
that is an overriding concern, you can set that aside and listen to the 
merits of the amendment.
  I have to tell my colleagues that part of this I bring as a matter of 
frustration. I have been involved with this for months, and I am so 
tired of hearing about accommodation after accommodation after 
accommodation to the Russians. It appears, before we even

[[Page S10900]]

started with this, the Russians said: Well, we are going to have to 
have in the preamble language that says missile defense is related to 
this, and we said no. We have to have the ability to protect our 
country and build missile defense. The Russians said it has to be in 
there. It is in there. The next thing we said: You know, for 40 years 
we have been doing this, and you guys have a 10-to-1 advantage over us 
on tactical weapons; that is, short-range weapons. We ought to talk 
about that because you want to talk about parity on strategic weapons. 
No, it can't be in there. We accommodated the Russians again. Every 
time we turn around and put out a problem here--just as we heard on 
this rail thing--every time we turn around and put out a problem that 
ought to be addressed, the people who are promoting this stand and 
apologize, they accommodate, they say it is OK, they overlook it, and 
we go on and on and on.
  I am sitting here listening to this on the rails, and the one side 
says: Well, don't worry about it; they are never going to build this 
anyway. We pull up an article that says they are in the process of 
doing this. Well, yes, but don't worry about it because it is going to 
be counted anyway.
  So I have something here that, hopefully, we are not going to 
apologize to the Russians for. We are not going to accommodate them. We 
are going to tell them that if you want a relationship with us, you 
have to be honest with us.
  We all know, and it has been widely reported, that they cheat. They 
are serial cheaters. They cheated in virtually every agreement we have 
had with them. If we are going to have a relationship with them and 
press the restart button--and I think we should. We should press the 
reset button. We should have a decent relationship with them. But let's 
wipe the slate clean and let's start with the military equipment they 
have stolen from us. That is all this is about.
  On August 8 of 2008, as we all know, the Russians invaded Georgia, 
and when they invaded Georgia, it was pretty much of a mismatch. They 
ran over the top of them, did a lot of bad things, and eventually there 
was a peace accord that was brokered by President Sarkozy, and the next 
amendment I have deals more in-depth with that.
  But when they ran over the Georgians, the American military had just 
been there doing exercises with the Georgians because the Georgians 
were kind enough to engage with us and help us in Afghanistan. They 
were preparing to send troops to Afghanistan to help us. So we 
Americans went over there and we said: OK. We need to do some military 
exercises, engage in some joint training, so we can get you ready to go 
into Afghanistan. We are now preparing to leave. We have completed the 
exercises. We are preparing to leave. We obviously took a lot of our 
equipment over there, not the least of which were four American 
humvees. The four American humvees were shipped to a port in Georgia 
and were in the process of being shipped back to the United States. 
There is no argument that the title to these four humvees is with the 
people of the United States of America. They belong to me. They belong 
to you. They belong to the U.S. military. They belong to all of us.
  The Russians, when they overran the Georgians and got to the seaport, 
found our humvees, and what did they do? Did they say: Well, yes, they 
belong to the Americans; we will put them on the boat that is supposed 
to go back to the United States? No. They said: We are going to take 
them, and they stole them. Today, they still have them.
  The United States has asked for the four humvees back. But let me 
tell my colleagues where the four humvees are. If you want to see a 
picture of them, you can go to msn.com and search Georgia and humvees 
and you can see a picture of our humvees. Where are they? They are in 
the Russian Central Armed Forces Museum in Moscow, Russia. That is 
where our four humvees are. What are they doing there? They are on 
display as a war trophy, taken by the Russians as a war trophy. Well, 
we weren't engaged in that war.
  So if we are going to have a good relationship with them, is it too 
much to ask to give us back the property they stole from us a little 
over 24 months ago?
  So this is an easy one to vote for. I have had discussions with my 
good friend from Massachusetts. He said this isn't related. This is 
absolutely related. We are entering into a marriage on a very important 
issue.
  Shouldn't we ask that they give us our stolen property back? And 
shouldn't they say: Yes, we want to set the reset button too. We want 
to hold hands and sing ``Kumbaya.'' We want to be friends.
  Well, that is fine, but give us back our stolen military equipment.
  That is all this asks for. It doesn't jeopardize the treaty; it just 
says it goes into force as soon as they give us our four humvees back.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, let me first tell my colleague that I 
support the treaty because it is in the best interest of the United 
States. It is in our national security interest. It is not an 
accommodation to Russia. This treaty helps us on national security. 
That is what our military experts tell us. That is what our 
intelligence experts tell us. That is what our diplomats tell us. On 
all fronts, the ratification of this treaty makes us a safer nation. So 
it is not an accommodation to Russia.
  On the issue the Senator is concerned about, both the Obama 
administration and this body have repeatedly reaffirmed our commitment 
to Georgia's territorial sovereignty and integrity. We very much want 
Russia to withdraw. We are very sympathetic to the issue the Senator 
brings to our attention. We have taken action in this body to support 
Georgia's territorial integrity. The START treaty and its ratification 
is important in reestablishing confidence on verification as it relates 
to our relationship with Russia on strategic arms, but it is also 
important for the engagement of Russia on other issues. We can do more 
than one thing at a time.
  President Saakashvili of the Republic of Georgia said:

       We all want--I personally want--Russia as a partner and not 
     as an enemy. Nobody has a greater stake than us in seeing 
     Russia turn into a country that truly operates within the 
     concert of nations, respects international law, and--this is 
     often connected--upholds basic human rights. This is why I 
     wholeheartedly support the efforts of European and American 
     leaders to strengthen their relationship with Russia.

  The leader of Georgia understands that a better relationship between 
Russia and the United States will help Georgia and its territorial 
integrity. This treaty and its ratification will help not only build 
confidence between Russia and the United States but will help the other 
countries of Europe, particularly a country such as Georgia.
  So the chairman of the committee is absolutely correct--and I think 
we can verify that with the Parliamentarian--that this is not relevant 
on the issue we have before us. It is not part of the treaty we have 
negotiated. It is not part of the ratification process. It is not the 
appropriate forum for this type of amendment to be considered. It 
should be rejected on that basis.
  The important thing in moving forward with U.S. influence on Russia 
as it relates to its neighbors, such as Georgia, is to move forward 
with ratification of this treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I will be very quick. I don't think we 
need to spend a lot of time on this. First of all, we agree with the 
Senator from Idaho that under normal circumstances the equipment they 
have would be best returned to the United States, and there are many 
good-faith ways in which they might do that. But the fact is that the 
way this is phrased, it has just two enormous problems. First, it says 
prior to the entry into force of the treaty. So we are linking this 
ancillary issue to this entire treaty, which bears on a whole set of 
other national security considerations.
  I want the four humvees back, and whatever the small arms are, which 
raises another issue, but I am not willing to see this entire treaty 
get caught up in that particular fracas. We have an unbelievable number 
of diplomatic channels and other ways of prosecuting that concept, and 
I pledge to the Senator that I am prepared, in the Foreign Relations 
Committee, to make certain we attempt to do that, as well as deal

[[Page S10901]]

with the question of Russia's compliance with the peace agreement with 
respect to the cease-fire in Georgia and so forth. These are essential 
ingredients, and we will talk about that in a moment.
  It also says they have to return all military equipment. It doesn't 
specify. This could become one of those things where we are saying, you 
have this, and they say, no, we don't. Are we talking about small arms? 
What about expended ammunition? Who knows what the circumstances are?
  This is not the place or the time for us to get caught up in linking 
this treaty to this particular outcome. I really think that stands on 
its own.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, obviously one of the purposes of these two 
amendments is to respond to one of the arguments that has been raised 
in support of this treaty. We have this wonderful new reset 
relationship with Russia, and were we to not ratify the treaty, that 
relationship would be frayed, and who knows how much Russia might react 
to it? It would be harder to get their cooperation on things. Those are 
all arguments that have been made.
  I think one of the points of these two amendments is to show that the 
reset relationship between Russia and the United States has not 
produced all that much good behavior or cooperation on the part of the 
Russians. I earlier detailed all of the ways--at least a few--in which 
Russia had been very unhelpful to the United States with regard to 
Iran. I noted I think 2 days ago or maybe yesterday that in the U.N., 
they were trying to water down a resolution dealing with North Korea 
that we are working hard to try to obtain. They have been very 
difficult to deal with with regard to North Korea and Iran. At the end 
of the day, I think they only do what is in their best interest, in any 
event--not basing their decisions of what is in their best interests on 
some concept of a new friendliness with the United States.
  I think part of the reason my colleague from Idaho offered these two 
amendments is to simply demonstrate that this new relationship isn't 
all that its cracked up to be if they won't even give us some equipment 
they confiscated when they invaded Georgia. That is not a major point 
in international diplomacy, and it certainly isn't a major point with 
respect to U.S. military capability. It is illustrative of something.
  The point of the amendment is to say that you have quite a bit of 
time before this treaty enters into force. A lot has to happen. It is 
sent to Russia, the Duma has to deal with it, and so on.
  Just return the stuff. Maybe that little gesture of good will would 
help to reestablish this so-called reset relationship in ways they have 
not been able to accomplish by getting Russian support with the U.N. 
resolutions and other actions with regard to sanctions on Iran and 
diplomacy with North Korea.
  One can say it is not a big deal, this military equipment, but on the 
other hand, they say it will destroy the treaty if we have this 
particular amendment. The reality is that we are simply trying to make 
a point that the Russians have not acted well in a variety of 
situations. I cannot think of a better example than the invasion of 
Georgia, the continued violation of the cease-fire agreement they 
signed there, and the violation of the U.N. resolution.
  I would reiterate, at the summit declaration--this is where the NATO 
members, meeting in Lisbon last month, joined together to call for a 
resolution to the problem, saying, ``We reiterate our continued support 
for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its 
internationally recognized borders.'' And then they urge all to play a 
constructive role and to work with the U.N. to pursue a peaceful 
resolution of the internationally recognized territory of Georgia. And 
then the final sentence:

       We continue to call on Russia to reverse its recognition of 
     the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as 
     independent States.

  That is the kind of cooperation we are getting from the Russian 
Federation these days. I appreciate the amendments brought forth by my 
colleague to highlight that fact.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I agree with Senator Kyl and support the 
Risch amendment. I remember at a NATO conference not too many years ago 
President Bush was advocating for Georgia being a member of NATO, to 
show you how serious these matters are. So had we voted to bring 
Georgia into NATO--and they were on the short list--we would be in a 
situation in which the Russians would be invading a NATO country. The 
act of Russia invading Georgia was a dramatic event.
  The proponents of the treaty portrayed this matter as advancing our 
relationship with Russia. I think Senator Kerry has been not so 
aggressive--that hasn't been one of his themes. But a lot of people 
have, and I think he was wise not to go down that road.
  A lot of people have tried to say we are going to get along with 
Russia better by signing this treaty with them. That is not a sound 
basis to sign a treaty. We all need a better relationship with Russia. 
That I certainly acknowledge. Georgia would certainly benefit from it, 
and hopefully the world will have a better relationship with Russia.
  But I am unable to fathom a lot of the Russian activities, frankly. 
It is just difficult for me. Why have they negotiated so hardheadedly 
on this treaty to actually reduce the number of inspections over what 
we had in the previous treaty? Why? I thought Russia was about wanting 
to move forward into the world and be a good citizen in the world 
community. I haven't seen it. I am worried about it.
  So the question is, if we abandon or concede too much, are we helping 
develop a positive relationship? I think Senator Risch is saying: Look, 
we have a serious problem. They are holding our military equipment. Are 
we not even going to discuss that?
  How do we get to a more positive relationship with our Russian 
friends? I think the people of Russia are our friends. How do we get 
there? Is it through strength, constancy, consistency, principle, and 
position, or is it through weakness, placating, concession, and 
appeasing? Is that the way to gain respect and move us into a healthier 
relationship? I don't think so.
  I think we have only one charge, and that is to defend our legitimate 
interests. I believe this administration has been too fixed on a 
treaty, and, as one observer and former treaty negotiator has said: If 
you want it bad, you will get it bad. In other words, if you want the 
treaty too badly, you won't be an effective negotiator. I remember 
during this process, on more than one occasion, warning and expressing 
concern to our negotiators that we appeared to be too anxious to obtain 
this treaty and, if so, the Russians would play us like a fiddle. I am 
afraid that is what has happened.
  I think this Congress would do the President, the world, Russia, and 
our country a service if we said what Senator Risch says: OK, guys, how 
about letting our equipment be sent back. If you are not willing to do 
that, then we have a serious problem.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, first of all, to my good friend from 
Maryland, I agree with much of what he said about our relationship and 
the relationship between Georgia and Russia. I will speak about that in 
the next amendment I am going to offer, which is No. 4879, right after 
this one. I know the Senator didn't talk about our stolen military 
equipment by the Russians.
  To my friend from Massachusetts, who responded to what I said, I say: 
Here we go again. This is exactly why I brought this amendment. We are 
again accommodating the Russians. Why can't we just once ask them to 
behave themselves and say: Look, this is not a big matter, but you are 
acting like a thief.
  Do you want to see what they did? I made reference for you to go on 
the Internet to see the pictures, but here they are. If you are a good 
American, you can go there and you can watch your property right here 
being towed away by the Russians, back to Moscow, to put on display as 
a trophy. Here is another picture of it right here. This is even 
better. This is one of our humvees being towed by the Russians. This 
humvee is headed back to Moscow, where it is now displayed as a trophy.

[[Page S10902]]

  Is it too much to ask, where we are going to enter into this 
agreement and supposedly befriend and supposedly reset the button on 
our relationship, is it too much to say: Look, you stole from us. You 
are acting like a thief. Give us back the property we own.
  Is that asking too much of the Russians? Can we not just once, 
instead of accommodating them, instead of apologizing for them, instead 
of saying we should not tie this to that or we will not get it, can we 
not just once say: Give us our stolen property back.
  That is all we are asking here. It is not a big thing, but it does 
give us a clear indication of what they are thinking, of what their 
relationship is with us, of what they want their relationship to be 
with us.
  This is not asking too much. This does not blow up the treaty. It 
simply says they pack up the four humvees and, and as soon as they do, 
the treaty goes into effect. That is not too much to ask.
  I yield to my good friend from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, this has been cleared on both sides.
  I ask unanimous consent that at 6 p.m., the Senate proceed to votes 
in relation to the following amendments to the START treaty and the 
resolution of ratification: Ensign amendment No. 4855 and Risch 
amendment No. 4878; further, that prior to the votes, there be no 
second-degree amendments in order to the amendment, and that the time 
before the votes be divided equally between the sponsors and myself or 
their designees.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Madam President, I will share one thought I remember so 
vividly before Russia invaded Georgia. We were at a NATO conference. 
There was a discussion outside the normal meeting. One weak-kneed, I 
suppose, European explained to the Georgians why it was difficult for 
the other nations to support Georgia in their idea to be in NATO and 
suggested it was difficult because Russia was a big and powerful 
country.
  The Georgian replied--and I have never forgotten it--saying: Well, 
sir, we think it is a question of values. Mr. Putin said last year the 
greatest disaster of the 20th century was the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. We in Georgia believe it was the best thing that happened in the 
20th century. It is a question of values. We share your values. We want 
to be with you.
  I have to say it is deeply troubling to me that our Russian friends 
are being so recalcitrant and so aggressive and so hostile to sovereign 
states such as Georgia, the Ukraine, the Baltics, and Poland. They used 
to be a part of the Soviet empire. They are now sovereign nations, 
independent in every way.
  Conceding, as part of these negotiations, the deployment of a ground-
based interceptor missile defense system in Poland to comply with 
Russian demands during this treaty process was a terrible thing, 
especially when we did not even tell our friends in the sovereign 
nation of Poland we intended to do it before we announced it with the 
Russians.
  The Senator is just raising a reality. I say to Senator Risch, we 
have some problems here, and we might as well put it out on the table, 
be realistic about it, and take off the rose-colored glasses. This 
amendment is one way to say let's get serious and talk with our Russian 
friends about some serious difficulties we have.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, I call up Risch amendment No. 4879.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, at this time there is, until we have an 
opportunity--we were going to work this out with Senator Kyl after the 
vote. So I object to it at this moment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. KERRY. I believe Senator Kyl had two amendments he wanted to get 
up at this point in time.
  Mr. KYL. What was the unanimous consent request?
  Mr. KERRY. The Senator from Idaho requested to go to his next 
amendment, which is No. 4879. That was the one the Senator from Arizona 
and I were talking about with respect to an issue we wanted to work out 
with the Parliamentarian before we go to it. I think the Senator and I 
had agreed he would like to go to two other amendments next in line. We 
will come back to this issue.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, that understanding is fine. There are two 
Members who I think will be ready to go forward with their amendments 
immediately following the two votes at 6 o'clock.
  Again, for benefit of the Members, it is my hope that we can continue 
to work through as many amendments as possible this evening, maybe have 
debate a couple at a time and vote, whatever the body desires. But 
perhaps we could continue at least to work through a few more 
amendments yet this evening.
  Mr. KERRY. I agree with that completely. We have a fairly limited 
list, and I think it is possible to move through them rapidly. I 
appreciate the efforts of the Senator from Arizona to do so.
  Madam President, how much time do we have on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Madam President, I thank my colleague from 
Massachusetts, Senator Kerry. I wish to respond to Senator Risch's 
amendment because I am very sympathetic to the concerns he is raising.
  All who watched Russia's invasion of Georgia had to be outraged about 
what happened. In fact, I have a resolution I have submitted with 
Senators Graham and Lieberman. I hope, perhaps, the Senator from Idaho 
might be willing to take a look at this resolution and work with us on 
it next year because one of the things it does is it calls upon the 
Government of Russia to take steps to fulfill all the terms and 
conditions of the 2008 cease-fire agreement, including returning 
military forces to prewar positions and ensuring access to 
international humanitarian aid to all those affected by the conflict.
  It also deals with a number of other provisions in that resolution 
with respect to Georgia.
  I also point out, as I am sure my friend from Idaho knows, that 
Georgia has recognized it is in their interest to have relations with 
Russia that can address their border concerns in a way that is 
positive, to have Russia working with the international community as 
opposed to working as a pariah. They may represent what we have heard 
from all our NATO allies with respect to the START treaty; that it is 
in the best interest of our NATO allies. We have heard from those 
countries that border Russia--Latvia, Poland, and a number of other 
countries--that they would like to see the United States ratify the New 
START treaty.
  I am in agreement with the concerns Senator Risch raised. I have 
questions about whether this is the best way to do it, given the 
confines of the New START treaty and our efforts to get this into 
effect as soon as possible so we do not continue to have a situation 
where we do not have inspectors on the ground in Russia who can help 
gather intelligence, who can see what is going on with their nuclear 
arms in a way that would also benefit Georgia.
  I understand the concerns. I agree with those. But I cannot support 
this amendment because of the negative impact it might have on 
ratifying the treaty.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, may I respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, somehow the debate about the relationship 
between Russia and Georgia and our relationship as far as Georgia is 
concerned has crept into this debate. This amendment has nothing to do 
with Georgia, other than the fact that is where the theft took place. 
The international criminal offense of theft of our military property 
took place in Georgia. That is the only thing Georgia has to do with 
this. This has nothing to do with the relationship. Amendment No. 4879 
has a lot to do with it. When we get there, we will talk about that.
  I regret my good friend from New Hampshire cannot support this 
amendment, because although I suspect I will

[[Page S10903]]

support the resolution, we do a lot of these resolutions. We do the 
resolution and send it off to the Russians. They are going to be 
laughing up their sleeve at us, whilst they are fondling our equipment 
that they have possession of.
  There are no teeth in these resolutions. We actually have the 
opportunity to do something to get our military equipment back. If they 
are acting in good faith, if they are people of good will, if they want 
a relationship with us, then they are going to have to make a choice: 
Do we keep four humvees or do we give them back so this treaty can go 
into effect? That is the choice they are going to have to make.
  That is not too tough a choice to put on them. Do you want to 
continue to be thieves or do you want to be honest about this and 
deliver the goods you have stolen? There is nothing wrong about that. 
This gives us the opportunity, I say to the good Senator, to do what 
you exactly do on the resolution, but it is going to give it some 
teeth.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. On both sides? How much remains on the proponents' side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority has 19 seconds; the majority has 
3 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. I suggest the absence of a quorum. I withhold that 
request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, I, first, thank the Senator from Idaho 
for bringing up this issue. I might tell him, I have a laundry list of 
issues with which I would like to deal with Russia.
  I have the honor of chairing the Helsinki Commission. We have a lot 
of human rights issues with Russia, and we raise them all the time as 
aggressively as we can. I am proud the Obama administration has raised 
these issues at the highest level with the Russian Federation. We are 
very sympathetic to the issue the Senator has brought up. It is the 
wrong vehicle to deal with this issue. It is the wrong vehicle. This 
treaty is important for U.S. national security. That is why I support 
the ratification. That is why I urge my colleagues to support the 
ratification.
  Yes, it is appropriate in our advise-and-consent role for us to take 
up issues that are relevant to the subject matter of the treaty. The 
problem is, the issues the Senator from Idaho is bringing up are not 
relevant to the subject matter of the treaty. Therefore, it is the 
wrong vehicle to take up this issue.
  I do not want the Senator from Idaho to interpret my opposition to 
his amendment as opposing what he is trying to do. I agree with what he 
is trying to do. It is the wrong vehicle on which to put it. I urge the 
Senator to work with Senator Shaheen, work with the Helsinki Commission 
on other issues.
  The issue the Senator is bringing up about the return of property is 
very important to America. We believe in many cases the Russian 
Federation is not living up to their international commitments under 
international agreements. We will bring those up, and we will fight in 
those forums. But this treaty is in our interest. This treaty and our 
actions should deal with the four corners of the agreement.
  In that respect, I very much oppose the Senator's amendment.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, may I claim my 19 seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. RISCH. Madam President, with all due respect to my good friend 
from Maryland, this is exactly the right vehicle to bring this up. This 
is a vehicle of trust, and it is a vehicle that puts some teeth in an 
otherwise toothless thing.
  As far as human rights versus this stolen property, this is very 
objective, it is hard, you can see it. The human rights violations I 
think are entirely different. They certainly are important. They 
certainly rise to as high a level, but this is objective.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I believe all time has expired; is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute remaining.
  Mr. KERRY. I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is yielded back. All time is expired.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 4855

  The question is on agreeing to the Ensign amendment No. 4855.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and 
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and 
the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 32, nays 63, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 293 Ex.]

                                YEAS--32

     Barrasso
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--63

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Bayh
     Bond
     Brownback
     Gregg
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4855) was rejected.


                       Vote on Amendment no. 4878

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Udall of Colorado). Under the previous 
order, the question is on agreeing to the Risch amendment No. 4878.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to table the Risch amendment. I ask 
for the yeas and nays, and I ask unanimous consent this be a 10-minute 
vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion to table.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh), the 
Senator from New York (Mrs. Gillibrand), and the Senator from Oregon 
(Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New 
York (Mrs. Gillibrand) would vote ``yea.''
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the 
Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Oklahoma 
(Mr. Coburn).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 61, nays 32, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 294 Ex.]

                                YEAS--61

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Begich
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Kirk
     Klobuchar

[[Page S10904]]


     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                                NAYS--32

     Barrasso
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Cochran
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     Lieberman
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Voinovich
     Wicker

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bayh
     Bond
     Brownback
     Coburn
     Gillibrand
     Gregg
     Wyden
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. CORKER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are in a position now--we don't have the 
consent agreement completely fixed, but we know what we are going to 
do. We are going to have three votes, three different amendments. There 
would be a half hour debate on each amendment. So we likely will have a 
series of votes at 8:15 or thereabouts tonight. Senator Kerry will 
offer a consent agreement to this effect very shortly. In the meantime, 
we can start debating one of the amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I understand there will be three amendments 
we will proceed with. Two will be offered by Senator Kyl and one by 
Senator Wicker. Senator Wicker is prepared to call up his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 4895

  Mr. WICKER. I ask unanimous consent to call up amendment No. 4895 by 
Wicker and Kyl.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Wicker], for himself and 
     Mr. Kyl, proposes an amendment numbered 4895.

  Mr. WICKER. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To provide an understanding that provisions adopted in the 
  Bilateral Consultative Commission that affect substantive rights or 
   obligations under the Treaty are those that create new rights or 
 obligations for the United States and must therefore be submitted to 
                 the Senate for its advice and consent)

       At the end of subsection (b) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (4) Bilateral consultative commission.--It is the 
     understanding of the United States that provisions adopted in 
     the Bilateral Consultative Commission that affect substantive 
     rights or obligations under the Treaty are those that create 
     new rights or obligations for the United States and must 
     therefore be submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent.

  Mr. WICKER. Mr. President, I rise this evening to offer another 
amendment to the resolution of ratification. This amendment rises out 
of concerns over the Bilateral Consultative Commission known as the 
BCC. The BCC has been referred to numerous times in debate today. 
Article XII of the treaty establishes the BCC as a forum for the 
parties to resolve issues concerning implementation of the treaty. Part 
six of the protocol says the BCC has the authority to resolve questions 
relating to compliance, agree to additional measures to improve the 
viability and effectiveness of the treaty, and discuss other issues 
raised by either party. This clearly is very broad authority given to 
the BCC. In effect, the subject matter jurisdiction of the BCC seems 
limitless, based on the clear language of article XII.
  Former National Security Adviser under President George W. Bush, 
Stephen Hadley, appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee and 
expressed concerns over this treaty. He stated, with regard to the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission:

       The Bilateral Consultative Commission seems to have been 
     given authority to adopt, without Senate review, measures to 
     improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty which 
     could include restrictions on missile defense.

  It is that element of Senate review that this amendment would inject 
back into the process.
  Others have voiced concern that the mandate of the BCC is overly 
broad. This should trouble Senators. It is why I offer this amendment 
to place proper limits on the power of the BCC.
  I hold in my hand a fax sheet written by the Department of State 
Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, dated August 
11, 2010. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

[From the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Aug. 
                               11, 2010]

                Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)

       Key Point: The New START Treaty establishes the BCC to work 
     questions related to Treaty implementation. The use of 
     treaty-based commissions to agree on limited technical 
     changes to improve or clarify implementation of treaty 
     provisions is a well-established practice in arms control 
     treaties.
       Background: The New START Treaty authorizes the Parties to 
     use the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to reach 
     agreement on changes in the Protocol to the Treaty, including 
     its Annexes, that do not affect substantive rights or 
     obligations. The START Treaty's Joint Compliance and 
     Inspection Commission and the Intermediate and Shorter Range 
     Nuclear Forces Treaty's Special Verification Commission were 
     assigned similar responsibilities by those treaties.
       The Chemical Weapons Convention, the Open Skies Treaty, and 
     the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty provide similar 
     authority to effect technical changes that are deemed 
     necessary by the Parties during the implementation of the 
     respective treaty.
       Authority of the BCC: In addition to making technical 
     changes to the Protocol, including its Annexes, that do not 
     affect substantive rights or obligations, the BCC may: 
     resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations 
     assumed by the Parties; agree upon such additional measures 
     as may be necessary to improve the viability and 
     effectiveness of the Treaty; discuss the unique features of 
     missiles and their launchers, other than ICBMs and ICBM 
     launchers, or SLBMs and SLBM launchers, referred to in 
     paragraph 3 of Article V of the Treaty, that distinguish such 
     missiles and their launchers from ICBMs and ICBM launchers, 
     or SLBMs and SLBM launchers; discuss on an annual basis the 
     exchange of telemetric information under the Treaty; resolve 
     questions related to the applicability of provisions of the 
     Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm; and discuss 
     other issues raised by either Party.
       If amendments to the Treaty are necessary, the Parties may 
     use the BCC as a framework within which to negotiate such 
     amendments. However, once negotiated, such amendments may 
     enter into force only in accordance with procedures governing 
     entry into force of the Treaty. This means that they would be 
     subject to the advice and consent of the United States 
     Senate.
       This provision ensures that the Senate's Constitutional 
     role in providing advice and consent to the ratification of 
     treaties is not undermined.


                  Rules Governing the Work of the BCC

       The BCC is required to meet at least twice each year in 
     Geneva, Switzerland, unless the Parties agree otherwise.
       The work of the BCC is confidential, except if the Parties 
     agree in the BCC to release the details of the work.
       BCC agreements reached or results of its work recorded in 
     writing are not confidential, except as otherwise agreed by 
     the BCC.

  Mr. WICKER. The fax sheet mentions on more than one occasion that 
changes adopted by the BCC cannot affect substantive rights or 
obligations. It says under background: ``The New START treaty 
authorizes the parties to use the Bilateral Consultative Commission, 
BCC, to reach agreement on changes in the protocol to the treaty, 
including its annexes, that do not affect substantive rights or 
obligations.''
  Further down under authority of the BCC, the State Department fax 
sheet says: ``In addition to making technical changes to the protocol, 
including its annexes that do not affect substantive rights or 
obligations, the BCC may,'' and then it lists the six bullets. First, 
resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed 
by the parties. Secondly, agree upon such

[[Page S10905]]

additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of the treaty. Next, discuss the unique features of 
missiles and their launchers other than ICBM and ICBM launchers or SLBM 
and SLBM launchers referred to in paragraph 3 of article V of the 
treaty that distinguish such missiles and their launchers from ICBM and 
ICBM launchers and SLBM and SLBM launchers. Next, discuss on an annual 
basis the exchange of telemetric information under the treaty. Fifth, 
resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the 
treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm. And finally, discuss 
other issues raised by either party. But the changes may not affect 
substantive rights or obligations of the parties.
  ``Rules governing the work of the BCC: The BCC is required to meet at 
least twice a year in Geneva unless the parties agree otherwise. The 
work of the BCC is confidential, except if the parties agree in the BCC 
to release details of the work,'' and ``BCC agreements reached or 
result of its work recorded in writing are not confidential . . . '' 
The BCC can agree to amendments in the treaty, but they must be 
submitted back to the Senate for advice and consent. It is a very 
powerful commission, no doubt. And it is reassuring to have this fax 
sheet saying that substantive changes cannot be made by the BCC.
  It would be more reassuring if we put this in writing, and that is 
what the Wicker-Kyl amendment 4895 does. It is very simple and it uses 
the State Department language, stating that provisions adopted by the 
BCC that affect substantive rights--and these are the words used by the 
State Department in the fax sheet--are those that create new rights or 
obligations for the United States and must therefore be submitted to 
the Senate for its advice and consent.
  The bottom line is this: If it is determined that a substantive 
change has been made by a decision of the BCC, then that change should 
be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
  I urge a ``yes'' vote to this very simple but straightforward 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment offered by Senator Wicker is 
an amendment that is looking for an issue. There is no issue that is 
joined here with respect to the bilateral commission or what it might 
do with respect to the creation of rights. But if this amendment were 
to pass, there would be an issue, not only an issue with respect to 
Russian participation but actually an issue that could be harmful to 
the United States. This is a little bit technical and it is a tricky 
thing to follow in some ways, but let me lay this out.
  Under the START treaty, the prior treaty under which we have lived 
since 1992, and now under the proposed New START treaty, the 
consultative commission that we create in the treaty will get together 
in order to work out the problems that may or may not arise and is 
allowed to agree upon ``such additional measures as may be necessary to 
improve the viability and the effectiveness of the treaty.'' If those 
additional measures they might approve at some point in time are 
changes to the protocol or to its annexes and if the changes don't 
affect substantive rights or obligations under the treaty, then it is 
entirely allowable for those changes to be adopted without referring 
them back to the Senate for any advice or ratification. The Senators' 
proposed amendment would make it U.S. policy all of a sudden that the 
phrase ``do not affect substantive rights or obligations'' means 
``doesn't create new rights or obligations.'' So there is a distinction 
between affecting substantive rights and then having the operative 
language that kicks it into gear become the creation of rights or 
obligations. This proposal is unnecessary.
  Why? We have operated without it for 15 years under the START treaty 
without a single problem. The New START treaty uses the exact same 
approach that has worked for 15 years. We have a lot of experience in 
determining what constitutes substantive rights or obligations.
  More importantly, I mentioned a moment ago that this could be harmful 
to American interests. Here is how. It would actually require that 
agreements we want to move on and that act in our national security 
interest would be delayed and referred to the Senate, and we all know 
how long that could take, even if the new rights or obligations that 
they created were absolutely technical in nature. No matter how 
technical or trivial, they have to come to the Senate to become hostage 
to one Senator or another Senator's other agenda in terms of our 
ability to move, at least as structured here.
  Under START, the compliance commission adopted provisions on how 
inspectors would use radiation detection equipment to determine that 
the objects on a missile that Russia declared not to be warheads were, 
in fact, nonnuclear and, therefore, not warheads. There was absolutely 
no need for the Senate to hold hearings, write reports, or have a floor 
debate on that provision, even though it created a new right for the 
inspecting side and a new obligation for the hosting side in an 
inspection. We don't want to take away our ability to be able to do 
that. This amendment would do that.
  Similarly, the commission under START reached agreement from time to 
time on changes in the types of inspection and equipment that a country 
could use. Equipment changes over time, as we know. Technology 
advances, so the equipment changes. Giving U.S. inspectors the new 
right to use that equipment or the new obligation to let Russian 
inspectors use it hardly warrants referral to the Senate for its advice 
and consent.
  In summary, this amendment is unneeded. We have done well without it. 
Not well--we have done spectacularly without it for 15 years. No 
problems whatsoever. On the other side, it is a dangerous amendment 
because it forces us to delay for months the implementation of 
technical agreements that our inspectors ought to be allowed to 
implement without delay.
  I reserve the remainder of my time and ask unanimous consent that 
upon the use or yielding back of time specified below, the Senate 
proceed to votes in relation to the following amendments to the 
resolution of ratification: Wicker 4895, Kyl 4860, and Kyl 4893; 
further, that prior to the votes there be no second-degree amendment in 
order to any of the amendments and that there be 30 minutes of debate 
on each amendment equally divided between the sponsors of the amendment 
and myself and/or my designee or the designee of the sponsors; further, 
I ask unanimous consent that the time already consumed by Senator 
Wicker and myself be counted toward this agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 9 minutes remaining on the 
Wicker amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Let me thank Senator Wicker for bringing forward this 
amendment. I know it is an amendment he feels very strongly about. I 
compliment him because I believe a good part of what he was concerned 
about is already in the resolution of advice and consent on 
ratification.
  As the Senator pointed out, there is a consultation process before 
the Bilateral Consultative Commission to meet on any changes that would 
modify the treaty itself. There has to be consultation with Congress on 
those issues, as the Senator pointed out in his comments. So I think we 
have already taken care of the major concern the Senator has that it 
would be a substantive decision made by the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission.
  Secondly, let me point out that whatever the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission does, it is limited by the treaty itself, which, hopefully, 
will have been ratified by both the United States and Russia. So there 
will be a limit on the ratification already in the process.
  As Senator Kerry pointed out, we certainly do not want to hold up 
Senate ratification for minor administrative issues, knowing how long 
Senate ratification of anything related to a treaty could take.
  The last point I want to bring out is, the Senator mentioned missile 
defense, and I know this has been brought up over and over and over. 
But in our advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty, we 
have already put in that:

       . . . the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations 
     on the deployment of

[[Page S10906]]

     missile defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 
     of Article V of the New START Treaty, which states, ``Each 
     Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers or 
     SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors 
     therein.''

  So we already put in the resolution the concern that the Senator has 
voiced as the major reason he wanted to expand the consultative 
process, which is also already included in the resolution.
  I think the point Senator Kerry has raised is that this would make it 
technically unworkable for the Bilateral Consultative Commission to do 
its work if we required Senate consultation or ratification every time 
the Commission wanted to meet.
  For all those reasons, I urge my colleagues to reject the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Mississippi.
  Mr. WICKER. Mr. President, if no one else seeks time on this 
amendment, I would be prepared to close.
  It may be that my friend from Maryland is satisfied that there are no 
restrictions on missile defense in this aspect of the treaty. But it 
did not satisfy Stephen Hadley, the National Security Adviser to former 
President George W. Bush, who came before our committee with concerns.
  It seems to me we have a very simple way to address those concerns. 
Let me reiterate to my colleagues the quote of Mr. Hadley:

       The Bilateral Consultative Commission seems to have been 
     given authority to adopt without Senate review measures to 
     improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty which 
     could include restrictions on missile defense.

  I would also agree with my colleague from Maryland that, indeed, the 
BCC has the authority to negotiate amendments to the treaty. That is 
acknowledged in the factsheet by the State Department.
  The simple step beyond that I am trying to do with my amendment is to 
make it clear, using the terms supplied to us by the State Department 
that say: The BCC cannot make changes that affect the substantive 
rights or obligations of the United States. I am trying to make that 
part of the resolution of ratification, and that is all it does. It 
says if the BCC adopts provisions that affect substantive rights or 
obligations under the treaty that create new rights or obligations, 
that those changes must come back to the Senate. It is in addition to 
the requirement that amendments to the treaty come back to the Senate 
for ratification, and it is a protection of the rights of this body to 
continue to have a role in substantive modifications that might come 
out of the BCC.
  I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I will say, I think we just have a 
disagreement. I think where Senate confirmation would be at issue is 
where there is an amendment to the treaty, and that is exactly what is 
included in our resolution.
  I think it is unworkable to try to get the Senate involved in all the 
changes in trying to say what is substantive and what is not. I think 
you would be interfering with the administration of the verification 
systems, et cetera. So I would just urge our colleagues to reject the 
amendment.
  I say to Senator Wicker, I think on our side we are prepared to yield 
back. So if the Senator would like to----
  Mr. WICKER. Mr. President, I yield back.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, we yield back the time on this amendment.
  As I understand the unanimous consent agreement, it is 30 minutes per 
amendment. Then I think we are prepared to go to Senator Kyl for his 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a point of inquiry before I begin. Is there a 
reason I should speak to either amendment No. 4860 or amendment No. 
4893 first?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator can speak in whatever order he 
wishes, but neither amendment has been offered.
  Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. President.


                           Amendment No. 4860

  Then, Mr. President, with that, I would like to offer amendment No. 
4860, SLCM side agreement, which I believe is pending at the desk. I 
would ask for its consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, the clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4860.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To require a certification that the President has negotiated 
 a legally binding side agreement with the Russian Federation that the 
  Russian Federation will not deploy a significant number of nuclear-
armed sea-launched cruise missiles during the duration of the New START 
                                Treaty)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Limitation on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise 
     missiles.--Prior to the entry into force of the New START 
     Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that the 
     President has negotiated a legally binding side agreement 
     with the Russian Federation that the Russian Federation will 
     not deploy a significant number of nuclear-armed sea-launched 
     cruise missiles during the duration of the New START Treaty.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this is actually a very straightforward 
amendment. It simply seeks to repeat in this New START treaty the same 
thing the then-Soviet Union and United States did in the previous START 
I treaty with respect to a particular kind of weapon--a Russian weapon 
called the SLCM or sea-launched cruise missile.
  As part of START I, we reached a binding side agreement--a side 
agreement--because the Senate had said we needed to include these 
weapons in the treaty. So a side agreement was reached that they would 
limit a deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles or the SLCMs due to 
their impact on strategic stability, the point being that whether these 
sea-launched cruise missiles are deemed tactical or strategic, they 
actually have a strategic component, especially if they are sitting 
right off your coast and they are launched and they can hit your 
country. So that agreement was put into a side agreement between the 
then-Soviet Union and the United States.
  But when this New START treaty was negotiated, there was no similar 
side agreement. So there were no restrictions on SLCM deployments. The 
side agreement in the START treaty limited both nations to fewer than 
800 SLCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers. In the 2010 Nuclear 
Posture Review, the administration committed to unilaterally 
eliminating our SLCM capability.

       The United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-
     launched cruise missile (TLAM-N).

  Under Secretary Miller said:

       The timeline for its retirement will be over the next two 
     or three years.

  Now Russia is developing a new version of its SLCM, with a range of 
up to, approximately, 5,000 kilometers, which is a longer range than 
some of the ballistic missiles that are covered by the New START 
treaty.
  So that is why we believe there should be a side agreement, just like 
there was in START I, that deals with these SLCMs. We are not going to 
have them, Russia is. Yet there is nothing in the treaty that would 
count their SLCMs against the total limit of warheads or delivery 
vehicles that are allowed under the treaty or in any other way deal 
with them.
  The administration assures us we should not be concerned about a lack 
of a formal agreement. Secretary Clinton noted that the START I treaty 
did have a limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles and said that 
both parties ``voluntarily agreed to cease deploying any nuclear SLCMs 
on surface ships or multipurpose submarines.''
  But today it is obvious, with the information about Russian plans, 
that there is going to be a great disparity between the United States 
and Russia. As I said, it is not obvious that saying one is tactical, 
as opposed to the strategic weapons that are otherwise limited by this 
treaty, is a very important distinction. I think it is really a 
distinction without a difference.
  Steve Hadley, the former head of the NSC, said:

       And if you're living in eastern or central Europe, a so-
     called tactical nuclear weapon,

[[Page S10907]]

     if you're within range, looks pretty strategic to you. So 
     what are we going to do about those?

  As I said, he was the National Security Adviser.
  Ambassador Bob Joseph, in testimony before the Foreign Relations 
Committee, said:

       Every time I hear the term ``nonstrategic nuclear 
     weapons,'' I recall that no nuclear weapon is nonstrategic.

  If you stop and think about it, that is certainly true.
  So these weapons, which are very powerful, and can have a range of up 
to 5,000 kilometers, clearly need to be dealt with.
  Now, we did not want to insist that they go back and renegotiate the 
treaty because we heard that argument before, so what we are suggesting 
by this amendment is simply to do the same thing we did in START I--
just have it be a side agreement where the two parties would agree to 
limit the number. Our administration would limit the Russians so they 
would not have a significant number of these particular weapons.
  Just a point, by the way: In the event there are folks who do not 
believe the Russians intend to rely on their weapons such as the SLCMs, 
Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy said: The Russians are ``actually 
increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons and the role of nuclear 
weapons in their strategy.''
  Secretary Gates has made the same point. He said:

       Ironically, that is the case with Russia today, which has 
     neither the money nor the population to sustain its Cold War 
     conventional force levels. Instead, we have seen an increased 
     reliance on its nuclear force with new ICBM and sea-based 
     missiles, as well as a fully functional infrastructure that 
     can manufacture a significant number of warheads each year.

  And the Strategic Posture Commission noted:

       This imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons, which 
     greatly favors Russia, is of rising concern and an 
     illustration of the new challenges of strategic stability as 
     reductions in strategic weapons proceed.

  The point has been made by many others as well.
  So I think this is fairly straightforward. It would require the 
United States to negotiate a side agreement with Russia, very similar 
to the side agreement we had under START I, to deal with a weapon that 
we are no longer going to have, but the Russians are apparently 
developing a new version of, that has a pretty substantial range--5,000 
kilometers. Clearly, it is very difficult to distinguish the difference 
between a weapon like that and the strategic offensive weapons that are 
otherwise dealt with in the treaty.
  I hope my colleagues will recognize this is not a treaty killer, and 
it is something that needs t be addressed.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Maryland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. First, let me thank Senator Kyl for bringing this issue 
to our attention. I think this is a very important issue. We have a lot 
of security issues as they relate to Russia, as they relate to Europe, 
and as they relate to the sea-launch cruise missiles. I couldn't agree 
with the Senator more. But this falls under the same category of the 
discussion we had earlier about a side agreement on tactical weapons.
  These are all beneficial issues, but it is not the key issue that is 
before us today. If we were to adopt this amendment, I think we all 
would agree it would cause a considerable delay in the implementation 
of the START treaty.
  Let me remind my colleagues that the START treaty, according to our 
military experts, is needed now. We have been a year without having 
inspection regimes in Russia so we can get the intelligence information 
we need by people on the ground. That expired in December of last year. 
So we have already been delayed through this year, and the longer we 
delay, the less reliable the information we have for our own national 
security.
  Although it would be nice to have all of these side agreements with 
Russia on a lot of other issues, every time we ask our negotiators to 
do that, it takes time. It takes a lot of time to negotiate. It is not 
all one-sided when you negotiate. My colleagues know that. We know that 
here as we negotiate issues.
  This is an important issue, but it shouldn't delay the ratification 
and implementation of the New START treaty so that we can get our 
inspectors on the ground, giving us the information we need for our own 
national security as it relates to the strategic capacity of Russia.
  For all of those reasons, I urge my colleagues to reject the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Senator from Maryland is absolutely 
correct, and I appreciate him pointing that out. I think I have said 
many times in the course of this debate that it is imperative for us to 
deal with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, the 
resolution of ratification has a section in it which specifically 
addresses this and urges the President to move to that.
  I might add that the Senator from Florida, Mr. LeMieux--we are just 
finishing up an agreement on an amendment which will, in fact, add an 
additional component. It is an amendment we intend to accept, and it 
will add an additional emphasis on this question of tactical weapons.
  But not only is there no benefit to delaying this treaty from going 
into effect--I mean, that is what the amendment of the Senator from 
Arizona will do. Until this new verification and limitation mechanism 
is put into effect--the fact is that most of our experts, from 
Secretary Gates through Admiral Mullen and others, have all said to us: 
If we don't get this treaty, we are not going to get to the tactical 
nuclear discussion with the Russians.
  If we were the Russians and the U.S. Senate said: We are not going to 
do this until this, we would be looking at a long road where we have 
reopened all of the different relationships and we have discarded this 
one component of our nuclear deterrent that we find so critical, which 
is the submarine-launched missiles, the intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, and the heavy bombers. That is the heart of our nuclear 
deterrence. We want to know what they are doing and they want to know 
what we are doing, and that is how you provide the greatest stability.
  In addition to that, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton have both 
reinforced that many times, but here is the important thing to think 
about as we think about what the impact on this treaty would be. 
Nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles--or SLCMs, as we call them 
in the crazy vernacular of this place--these are tactical weapons, and 
although this amendment seems to suggest that Russian SLCMs could upset 
the strategic balance between the United States and Russia, the truth 
is, they cannot. They don't do what this amendment seems to suggest.
  For many years, going back at least to the Reagan administration, we 
have considered these kinds of weapons to be nonstrategic weapons, 
tactical weapons. Even if they are long range, we consider them that. 
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen explained why in their answer to a 
specific question from the Senate. They said:

       Russian nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles . . . 
     could not threaten deployed submarine-launched ballistic 
     missiles (which will comprise a significant fraction of U.S. 
     strategic force under New START), and would pose a very 
     limited threat to the hundreds of silo-based ICBMs that the 
     United States will retain under New START.

  In other words, Russian nuclear SLCMs can't take out our nuclear 
deterrent in a first strike. That means if Russia were to use nuclear 
SLCMs against us, we could still use most of our strategic nuclear 
weapons and deliver an absolutely devastating blow in return. No logic 
in the sort of give-and-take of war planning, as horrible and as 
incomprehensible as it is to most people with respect to nuclear 
weapons, but it has all been done, appropriately, because they do 
exist, and it is important to our security. But no warfighting under 
those situations is going to reduce our ability to not just defend 
ourselves but to annihilate anyone who would propose or think about 
doing that.
  Ironically, it was the Soviets who once wanted to do what Senator Kyl 
is actually seeking to do. They wanted to categorize SLCMs as strategic 
weapons because we used to deploy a nuclear version of the Tomahawk on 
our attack submarines, and the Soviets

[[Page S10908]]

worked very hard to get the original START treaty to cover SLCMs. Guess 
what. We didn't bite. We didn't do that. The first Bush administration 
explicitly rejected those Soviet efforts to add legally binding limits 
on sea-launched cruise missiles. They considered SLCMs tactical 
weapons, and they also thought that limits on nuclear sea-launched 
cruise missiles are inherently unverifiable. That is, in part, because 
we didn't want to give the Soviets that much access to our submarines 
in return for access to theirs, and we don't want to do it now with the 
Russians. Now, maybe people were wrong about that, but I just don't see 
the wisdom in putting the treaty we have agreed on on the shelf while 
we go out and try to experiment with a new approach that nobody has 
argued is imperative for the security of our country.
  Back then, we did agree in politically binding declarations to a 
limit of 880 deployed long-range nuclear SLCMs and to declare at the 
beginning of the year how many SLCMs we intended to deploy for that 
year. Those political declarations stayed operative for many years, 
and, in fact, Secretary Gates stated for the record that as recently as 
December of 2008, Russia has declared that it planned to deploy zero 
nuclear SLCMs.
  Shortly after START was signed in 1991, the United States and Russia 
each pledged as part of the Presidential nuclear initiative to cease 
deploying any nuclear SLCMs on surface ships or attack submarines. So 
while we have four former ballistic missile submarines converted to 
cruise missile submarines, we are no longer deploying our nuclear 
Tomahawk missiles on any U.S. submarines. The Presidential nuclear 
initiatives are still operative for us and for the Russians, and we 
think we are more secure that way.
  So I see nothing to be gained from negotiating a new binding 
agreement in the context of holding up this treaty, of putting it on 
the shelf, and of going back in an effort to do that.
  This amendment would delay the New START for months or years, throw 
an entire curveball back into what I talked about yesterday, which is 
that theory of negotiation that nothing is agreed upon until everything 
is agreed upon. And in this case, if we say: Oh, no, ain't agreed upon, 
sorry, we are coming back to say you have to agree with us on tacticals 
before any of this becomes law, we have opened the entire negotiation 
again. How reliable and what kind of partnership is that? I don't think 
that makes sense. I fail to see any point in going down that road.
  I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment, and I reserve the 
remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has just under 8 
minutes.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am a little bit flummoxed here because I 
thought in a conversation I had a couple of days ago with Senator Kerry 
that side agreements might be all right; that we didn't want to amend 
the preamble or didn't want to amend the treaty but that we could 
perhaps do some side agreements. So we structured this as a side 
agreement just exactly as was done in START I.
  Mr. KERRY. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KYL. On the Senator's time, I would be happy to.
  Mr. KERRY. I would be happy to urge, if he wants to change the 
amendment or if he wants to submit--it is too late now, but we could 
perhaps do a modification by unanimous consent to urge the President to 
enter into an agreement but not shelve the whole treaty until that 
happens. That is the difference. So I am not going back on the notion. 
It would be great to get a side agreement, but don't hold this 
agreement up in the effort to do it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, there was no delay in the implementation of 
the START I agreement because of a requirement that a side agreement be 
entered into between the then-Soviet Union and the United States on 
SLCMs. So I don't buy the notion that this necessarily would delay 
anything.
  Secondly, we are not talking about tactical missile limitations 
generally. All we are doing is talking about the same kinds of missiles 
that were the subject of the side agreement under START I. I suspect 
that part of the reason was because it is pretty difficult to 
distinguish as to whether these weapons are being used for a strategic 
or a tactical purpose. Senator Kerry has said they cannot upset the 
strategic balance. I simply totally disagree with that proposition. 
They absolutely can upset the strategic balance, depending upon where 
they are located or how they intend to be used. That is one of the 
reasons I suspect they were limited under the START I treaty.
  My colleague said they can't threaten our submarine fleet at sea and 
they pose only a limited threat to ICBM sites. Well, that may be the 
opinion of our experts. They could sure threaten our submarine bases in 
Washington State at King's Bay. They could take out bases or other 
assets we have.
  In fact, let me quote from a Russian article, the RIA Novosti Report 
of April 14, 2010, on the Graney class nuclear submarines:

       Graney class nuclear submarines are designed to launch a 
     variety of long-range cruise missiles up to 3,100 miles or 
     500 kilometers with nuclear warheads and effectively engage 
     submarines, surface warships, and land-based targets.

  Obviously, at 5,000 kilometers, as I said, that is a range longer 
than some of the ballistic missiles that are covered by the New START 
treaty. So these weapons--it is a little hard to characterize them as 
either tactical or strategic. I think it depends upon how they are 
used.
  But the point is, if my colleague believes they can't threaten 
anything, then what is the problem with trying to set a limit on them? 
Well, obviously--or at least I assume obviously--the Russians don't 
want to do that. I assume we raised this, though we don't have the 
negotiation record, so I don't know whether it was raised. If it 
wasn't, why wasn't it? And if it was because we didn't think there was 
any threat to the United States, then I think it would be very 
important to ask some of our military folks why they think that is the 
case given the kinds of targets that could be held at risk here and 
given the fact that we apparently reached a different conclusion during 
the START I treaty implementation phase when the side agreement was 
negotiated with the then-Soviet Union.
  So I don't think it would delay anything. We do posit it as a side 
agreement rather than an amendment. We just say that the administration 
should negotiate so that there wouldn't be a significant number of SLCM 
deployments by the Russians given the fact that we are not doing any.
  I do have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the assertion of 
my colleague that this kind of weapon can't upset the strategic 
balance. If you have a weapon that can fly over 3,000 miles with a 
nuclear warhead, which could be just as big of a nuclear warhead as on 
a bomber or an intercontinental ballistic missile, with all of the 
targets on our eastern seaboard or western seaboard that would be held 
at risk for such a weapon--in fact, 3,000 miles--you won't have to be 
far off either of our two U.S. coasts to hit most targets within the 
continental United States.
  This is a weapon that it seems to me we should be concerned about. 
Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support calling for a side agreement 
that would deal with the SLCMs just as we did under the START I treaty.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. President, I say to Senator Kyl, these missiles are 
not strategic. Do they affect our strategic balance? I say that 
everything in our defense toolbox can affect our strategic balance. 
That was taken into consideration in the negotiations. I thank him for 
bringing this issue to our attention, but for the reasons we have 
stated, we urge our colleagues to reject the amendment.
  We are prepared to go to the Senator's next amendment if he is 
prepared to go forward.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will respond with about 30 seconds. Then I 
will be prepared to go to my next amendment. Perhaps I can reserve 
whatever time I have left on there to make a closing argument.
  I really do sincerely appreciate the characterization of these issues 
we have raised as serious and important. I do appreciate that. I do 
think, though,

[[Page S10909]]

that it would be appropriate to have a better response than just that 
this will upset the Russians, they won't want to do it, so we will have 
to renegotiate the treaty, and that it will delay things and that will 
create problems.
  The purpose is not to delay, as I said. I don't think the START I 
treaty was delayed when we reached a side agreement.
  I think, in any event, the question is this: Should the United States 
delay, if that is what is called for, in order to improve the treaty in 
important respects? If it is conceded that this is an important aspect, 
then it seems to me that it is worth taking time to do it right.
  Most of the arguments that have been made in response to the 
amendments we have raised boil down to: The Russians won't want to do 
what you say, and therefore we need to reject your amendment because it 
would require some renegotiation. I get back to the point I have made 
over and over: Then what is the Senate doing here? Why would the 
Founders have suggested we should have a role in relation to treaties 
if every time we try to change something, the argument is that you 
cannot change a comma because the other side wouldn't like that and 
that would require renegotiation?
  There is nothing that serious about this treaty that it has to go 
into effect tomorrow. The Washington Post had an editorial, and they 
said that no great calamity will befall the United States if this 
treaty is not concluded before the end of the year. I think that is 
almost a direct quotation. There is no immediate national security 
reason to do so. I know the administration would like to get on with 
it, but no great harm will befall us if we take time to do it right. If 
we are not willing to do that, the Senate might as well rubberstamp 
what the President sends up because the argument will be that if we try 
to suggest changes, the other side will reject them and we could not 
possibly abide that.
  I will reserve the remainder of time on this amendment.


                           Amendment No. 4893

  Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 4893, which I believe is at 
the desk, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4893.

  Mr. KYL. I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide that the advice and consent of the Senate to 
  ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to an understanding 
regarding the non-use of covers by the Russian Federation that tend to 
 interfere with Type One inspections and accurate warhead counting, is 
  subject to the United States and the Russian Federation reaching an 
    agreement regarding access and monitoring, and is subject to a 
 certification that the Russian Federation has agreed that it will not 
 deny telemetric exchanges on new ballistic missile systems it deploys 
                   during the duration of the Treaty)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Covers.--Prior to entry into force of the New START 
     Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that the 
     President has reached an agreement with the Government of the 
     Russian Federation on the non-use of covers by the Russian 
     Federation that tend to interfere with Type One inspections 
     and accurate warhead counting.
       (12) Telemetry.--Prior to entry into force of the New START 
     Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate that the 
     United States has reached a legally-binding agreement with 
     the Russian Federation that each party to the Treaty is 
     obliged to provide the other full and unimpeded access to its 
     telemetry from all flight-test of strategic missiles limited 
     by the Treaty.
       (13) Telemetric exchanges on ballistic missiles deployed by 
     the russian federation.--Prior to the entry into force of the 
     New START Treaty, the President shall certify to the Senate 
     that the Russian Federation has agreed that it will not deny 
     telemetric exchanges on new ballistic missile systems it 
     deploys during the duration of the Treaty.

       At the end of subsection (b), add the following:
       (4) Type one inspections.--The United States would consider 
     as a violation of the deployed warhead limit in section 1(b) 
     of Article II of the Treaty and as a material breach of the 
     Treaty either of the following actions:
       (A) Any Type One inspection that revealed the Russian 
     Federation had deployed a number of warheads on any one 
     missile in excess of the number they declared for that 
     missile.
       (B) Any action by the Russian Federation that impedes the 
     ability of the United States to determine the number of 
     warheads deployed on any one missile prior to or during a 
     Type One inspection.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would have preferred to deal with each of 
the subjects in this amendment individually because each one is very 
important. To accommodate the other side's desire to try to get as much 
done as quickly as possible, we consolidated some amendments, and there 
is a lot in this. I regret that we don't have time to get into detail 
about each one of them.
  This amendment amounts to an effort to try to improve the 
verification of the treaty to deal with a variety of issues which have 
been raised in the past and which we believe are inadequately dealt 
with by the treaty. One of them involves covers, the kinds of things 
the then-Soviet Union and now Russians consistently put over the 
warheads so that it is impossible for our inspectors to see what is 
under them, to see how many warheads are under them. That has been a 
problem in the past.
  On telemetry, we say the President should certify to the Senate that 
he has reached a legally binding agreement with the Russian Federation 
so that each party is obliged to provide full and unimpeded access to 
its telemetry from all flight tests of strategic missiles limited by 
the treaty. That is important because while we are not developing a new 
generation of missiles, the Russians are. We will be denied the 
telemetry of those missile tests if the Russians decide to deny it. Our 
intelligence community has told us that this is of great value to us in 
assessing the capabilities of Russian missiles. Under the treaty, they 
don't have to provide anything. They could provide telemetry on old 
missiles they are testing, and they don't have to provide any on any of 
the new missiles they are testing. We believe that should be done. The 
same thing with respect to any ballistic missiles deployed during the 
duration of the treaty.
  Then we turn to the subject of inspections. There are different kinds 
of inspections, but we are talking here about type one inspections in 
which we say that the United States would consider it a violation of 
the deployed warhead limit and a material breach of the treaty if the 
Russians do one of two things: No. 1, any type one inspection that 
revealed that the Russian Federation had deployed a number of warheads 
on any one missile in excess of the number they declared for that 
missile; No. 2, any action by the Russian Federation that impedes the 
ability of the United States to determine the number of warheads 
deployed on any one missile prior to or during a type one inspection.
  That gets to the issue of covers again. Why is this important? 
Because we are supposedly counting weapons in this treaty, warheads. 
There is a limit of 1,550 warheads. How can we possibly verify 
compliance if, when we seek to count the number of warheads on top of 
missiles we have designated and have a right to inspect, we can't count 
the warheads? You tell me how we are supposed to assume how many 
warheads there are on the top of that particular missile or why we 
should not deem it a material breach if they declared a certain number 
of warheads and it turns out there are more.
  I think these are commonsense changes that would strengthen the 
verification provisions of the treaty.
  It is too bad Senator Bond is not here tonight. He is the ranking 
Republican member of the Intelligence Committee. In the classified 
session we had yesterday, he talked about the deficiencies in 
verification under this treaty. This subject doesn't permit us to get 
into a lot of detail in open session.
  We have heard a lot about past cheating by the Russians and the kinds 
of things that were done. What we are trying to do with these basic 
components is to make it less likely that the Russians would cheat, and 
if they do, it would less likely have an impact on the

[[Page S10910]]

key element of the treaty, which is the limitation on warheads of 
1,550.
  I will note a couple of things here that put this into context.
  There have been allegations that there is better verification than 
ever before under this treaty. That is just not true. The verification 
provisions of this treaty are not as strong as under the START I 
treaty. There is an argument that they don't need to be for various 
reasons or the Russians weren't willing to allow them to be for various 
reasons. I don't think you can say the verification is better.
  Former Secretary of State James Baker, who testified, said:

       The verification mechanism in the New START Treaty does not 
     appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the 
     numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions 
     under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more 
     crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than 
     were allowed in the past.

  That is obvious. The more you get down to a smaller number, the more 
important cheating is, the more dramatic the effect can be, and the 
better verification you need.
  Senator McCain said this:

       The New START Treaty's permissive approach to verification 
     will result in less transparency and create additional 
     challenges for our ability to monitor Russia's current and 
     future capabilities.

  Former CIA Director James Woolsey said:

       New START's verification provisions will provide little or 
     no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the 
     Russians fail to declare, are off-limits to U.S. inspectors, 
     or are underground or otherwise hidden from our satellites.

  Senator Bond made a comment that I have quoted before, which is this:

       New START suffers from fundamental verification flaws that 
     no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix. . . . The 
     Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this 
     issue closely over the past several months. . . . There is no 
     doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably 
     verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.

  To conclude, the amendment would require the President to certify 
that he has reached an agreement with Russia on the nonuse of covers 
that interfere with type one inspections and accurate warhead counting 
during those inspections. It doesn't solve the problem of determining 
the total number of warheads Russia deploys, but it would reduce a 
method of deception Russia has used in the past.
  On telemetry, the amendment would require the President to certify 
that he has reached a legally binding agreement with Russia that each 
party is obliged to provide the other full and unimpeded access to its 
telemetry from all flight tests of strategic missiles, including on new 
ballistic missile systems deployed by the Russians. They are free now 
to encrypt those tests. That makes it much harder to get information we 
have found to be very valuable.
  Finally, with regard to the material breach, the amendment contains 
an understanding that the United States would consider a violation of 
the deployed warhead limits to be a material breach of the treaty. This 
would include any type one inspection that revealed the Russians had 
deployed a number of warheads on any one missile in excess of the 
number they declared for that missile or that they continued to use 
covers that deny us the ability to see exactly how many warheads they 
have on their missiles.
  Mr. President, I hope my colleagues would recognize that verification 
is a problem under the treaty. This is a modest way to try to deal with 
specific aspects of that verification. I hope my colleagues would be 
willing to support the amendment.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate votes on the three amendments, as provided under the previous 
order, those votes occur in the order listed in that agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Might we also add that the second two votes would be 10-
minute votes?
  Mr. KERRY. That is a good suggestion. I ask unanimous consent that 
the second two votes be 10 minutes in length.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me first compliment my colleague from 
Arizona, who has been dogged, if nothing else, in his advocacy with 
respect to his points of view regarding this treaty. And while I and 
other Senators may disagree with a specific amendment he proposes 
because of its impact as well as, in some cases, because of something 
else, that doesn't mean the Senator isn't raising valid questions for 
future discussions and things on which we ought to be focused. I know 
he spends a lot of time with this. I think all of us have a lot of 
respect for the ways in which he has already impacted this treaty. I 
give him credit for that.
  This particular amendment is a combination of about four different 
amendments that have come together. I understand why that happened. I 
am not complaining about that at all. It is just that there is a lot in 
it, and therefore there are different reasons one ought to oppose this 
amendment.
  Let me say that, first of all, the New START, I think in most 
people's judgment, addresses the concerns that have been raised by the 
Senator from Arizona.
  The purpose of warhead inspections is to count the number of warheads 
on the missile. Neither side is comfortable with the other actually 
seeing the warheads, looking into it and seeing it. We are not 
comfortable with them doing that to us, and they are not comfortable 
with us doing that to them. That is not so much about the counting of 
the warhead as it is often the issue of failsafe devices or counter-
shoot-down devices and other kinds of things that might be in there 
that we don't necessarily have a right to see and they don't want us to 
see. So neither side is sort of looking at the actual warhead. The 
START treaty--the original START treaty, therefore, to deal with that 
issue, lets the inspected party cover the warheads on the front of the 
inspected missile, but it allows us to inspect any cover before it is 
used so that we know what it can and can't conceal. We know what that 
cover is permitting us to see.
  What is more, paragraph 11 of section (2) in the treaty's annex on 
inspections says explicitly--this is in New START:

       The covers shall not hamper inspectors.

  We did not have that previously. That is new to this treaty.
  As a result of what we have learned in START, we have learned how to 
look and how to ask for things more appropriately, and our negotiators 
worked that into this treaty so as to protect our interests.
  In fact, the covers are not allowed to hamper the inspectors in 
ascertaining that the front section contains a number of reentry 
vehicles equal to the number of reentry vehicles that were declared for 
that deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM.
  The virtue of the New START treaty is that these declarations and the 
specific alphanumeric numbers that are going to be attached to the 
launchers and these warheads allow us enormous certainty in the 
randomness of our choices of where we go. If the Russians are cheating 
or somebody is over for one reason or another, we have great capacity 
to decide where that might be, where we think the best target of 
opportunity is, and to lock that place down and go in and check it. 
There are enormous risks of being discovered as a consequence of the 
way we have set that up.
  The treaty already forbids Russia from using covers that interfere 
with warhead counting. It would create a very dangerous precedent, in 
my judgment, to require that we negotiate now, before we put the treaty 
into effect, a side agreement on the very same thing. That might 
suggest that other New START provisions do not need to be obeyed 
because there is no side deal reinforcing them. What is the impact of 
the side deal? Does the side agreement, incidentally, have to be 
ratified by the Senate before it goes into effect? There are a lot of 
imponderables here.
  With respect to the agreement on telemetry, the requirement for a 
legally binding agreement with Russia that both parties have to provide 
telemetry on all flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, which is what the 
Senator is seeking, would also delay the START treaty into force by the 
same months or years about which we talked.
  That argument has been hammered around here the last 7 days 
adequately.

[[Page S10911]]

This delays the treaty. It does not act to increase the security of our 
country, and it already is in the resolution of ratification in the 
treaty.
  Given what we already understand, we know that the Russians do not 
like trading in telemetry. I find it hard to believe, therefore, that 
if we make this treaty condition precedent on the agreement of a side 
agreement, which we know the Russians hate to do, that is a way of 
buying into gridlock, deadlock, nothing.
  I do not think anybody would suggest--we have already been through 
this a little bit, incidentally. I and others strongly urged the 
President and his negotiators to seek as significant telemetry as 
possible. For a lot of reasons, it did not turn out that it was 
achievable from their side, but it also did not turn out it was 
desirable on our side altogether.
  Russia is testing new systems such as the Belava SLBM, and the United 
States may test only existing types of missiles during the next decade. 
That is a reason why the Russians obviously resist this very 
significantly.
  A lot of people have suggested that our military does not want to 
share the telemetry on all our flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs. They 
are pretty happy the way the treaty is structured now, including the 
provisions for telemetry which allow us five telemetry exchanges. We 
have to agree on them, but they are allowed under the treaty. If that 
were not true, there is no way the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Admiral Mullen would have sent the letter he sent to the entire 
Senate where he stated he wants this treaty ratified now, he wants it 
implemented now, and he believes, consistent with everything people 
said within our national security network, that this treaty is both 
verifiable and enhances our capacity to be able to count and know what 
the Russians are doing.
  The requirement for Russian agreement not to deny telemetry on the 
new ballistic missile systems it develops during the duration of the 
treaty is redundant with the previous part about which we just talked.
  Again, the amendment requires a side agreement with the Russians. It 
is the absolute equivalent of amending the treaty itself and, 
therefore, I would oppose that.
  The New START's telemetry exchange regime involves negotiating the 
beginning of next year, assuming this goes into effect, which missile 
tests from the past year we are willing to share.
  May I ask how much time I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 6 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to reserve time for the Senator from 
New Hampshire.
  The New START regime requires us to negotiate at the beginning of 
next year what we are going to share. If we do not offer anything 
interesting, Russia is not going to offer anything. That is the nature 
of a negotiation. You have to give to get. This amendment would change 
that basic principle from a negotiated exchange to a literally ``give 
me something for next to nothing.'' It does not work. The Russians 
would have to give us the good stuff while we would give them telemetry 
from launches that were no different from 30 other tests over the last 
20 years.
  I have to tell you, that sort of agreement is not going to happen. It 
is in a fantasy land, and the President would never get that side deal 
with Russia. The New START treaty would never come into force.
  I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mrs. SHAHEEN. Mr. President, I will speak only for about 1 minute and 
then give the rest of my time to Senator Feinstein who wishes to speak 
to the question of the covers.
  I do not want to speak to the technicalities that have been raised, 
but I want to make two points in response to Senator Kyl's concern 
about verification.
  We should all be concerned about the fact that right now we have no 
inspectors on the ground. We have no way to verify what is going on in 
Russia. Anything that delays our ability to get that intelligence back 
on the ground in Russia adds to the urgency of the situation. That is a 
very important point.
  The other issue he raised was relative to why do we need to do this 
now. The fact is, as Senator Kerry pointed out, we received a letter 
from ADM Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, yesterday that 
said the sooner we ratify the treaty, the better. James Clapper, 
Director of National Intelligence, said about New START the earlier, 
the sooner, the better we get this done. There is a lot of reason to 
believe we need to act on this treaty and need to do it now.
  I yield to the Senator from California.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New 
Hampshire.
  Senator Kyl is a very smart man. This is a major amendment. In my 
view, it is a deal breaker. It is a poison pill for the entire treaty. 
It essentially provides real changes in the treaty.
  It says the President, prior to the treaty going into effect, must 
certify that he has achieved certain side agreements, and those side 
agreements strike directly at some of the heart of the treaty. 
Therefore, it will effectively, in my view, be unacceptable to the 
Russians and will destroy the treaty.
  The treaty now says you cannot block an inspector's ability to 
ascertain warheads on a reentry vehicle. That covers the cover issue. 
This again says that telemetry by a prior agreement--that there be a 
side agreement on full access to telemetry for all missiles, and then 
on new missiles, is one-sided. Clearly, this is not going to be 
acceptable. Then it goes into the type one inspections.
  If you are for the treaty, there is only one vote, and it is to vote 
no. I very much regret this because I respect the Senator. As I see 
it--and there are things I cannot go into here that I tried to go into 
yesterday--this is a poison pill amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Might I inquire how much time remains on this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me take 3, 4, 5 of those minutes. I 
appreciate my colleagues' compliments about important issues being 
brought up, and I also appreciate their concern that amendments of this 
significance would cause heartburn for the Russians and might well 
require them to want to renegotiate aspects of the treaty. I am trying 
to address that through the mechanism of the side agreement rather than 
amendment to the treaty or some kind of other more restrictive method. 
I thought that would be the preferable way to do it.
  It is not my intention, as with the previous amendment, to delay 
things. I do not think it necessarily would. But I do appreciate that 
on a couple of these items the Russians would not likely want to 
renegotiate.
  I am not so sure that would be the case with regard to the covers, 
this question of the kind of shroud or cover you put over the missile 
bus, the top of the missile that has the warheads since the treaty does 
deal with it, as my colleagues have pointed out, but I do not think it 
does so in a conclusive way.
  The 2005 compliance report issued by the State Department to discuss 
compliance of the Russian Government with respect to the START I treaty 
had a couple of longstanding issues. The issue of shrouds was one that 
they characterized as of long standing. They had a very hard time 
getting that resolved with the Russians. In the end, there was a 
particular accommodation reached, but it took forever. And during that 
time, we did not have the kind of satisfaction we wanted.
  We asked how disputes would be dealt with, and we get the same basic 
answer. That would go to the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the 
group of Russian and U.S. negotiators who are supposed to work these 
things out.
  What I can see is a kind of repeat of what we had before. They like 
to cover these things up and that does not seem to me the way to enter 
into a treaty where we are supposed to be in agreement with our 
counterparts and yet we have unresolved issues we have to leave to 
another day to be resolved through a long and probably difficult 
negotiation process.

[[Page S10912]]

  Also, my colleague from Massachusetts--these were his words; he was 
not quoting anyone--thought we had enormous certainty about this. I 
suggest I do not think the intelligence community would use a phrase 
such as ``enormous certainty.'' We cannot get into here the degree of 
percentage they attach to being able to know certain things under this 
treaty.
  Suffice it to say that we are not absolutely sure we can do what 
needs to be done here, and I do not think characterizing it as 
``enormous certainty'' would be an accurate way to do it.
  Let me mention with regard to telemetry--first of all, let me correct 
one thing that is a little bit of misdirection and then agree with my 
colleagues on something else.
  There is a suggestion that we can get telemetry on five missiles, and 
that is true if the Russians agree. In other words, they have to 
volunteer to do it. The five missiles they tell us about can be old 
missiles. They do not have to be new missiles. It is a fact there is 
nothing in this treaty that requires the Russians or the United States 
to exchange telemetry on new missile tests; that is to say, tests of 
missiles currently being developed. There are at least two the Russians 
are developing right now.
  That leads to the second point. I think it is probably true the 
reason they did not want to agree to this is it would require them to 
give us very valuable information. Right now, they would not be getting 
any information from the United States because we are not testing 
missiles. But I ask, is that an asymmetry that is justified or that 
justifies a provision that says if you are not modernizing your forces 
and we are modernizing our forces, it is not fair to have us tell you 
what our missiles are like?
  Under the previous treaty, both sides had to do that, and it gave 
both sides more confidence. The Russians are developing new missiles. 
Should we not have some understanding of the capability of those 
missiles? We are not developing any. It is almost as if the United 
States would have to be modernizing its forces too in order to be able 
to justify a provision that said we had to exchange telemetry.
  Maybe the United States ought to get on with the modernization of our 
missile force so we can then go back to the Russians and say: You are 
modernizing, we are modernizing, now how about the exchange. To me that 
is not an argument to require the Russians not to provide us 
information. And in fact, when the shoe is on the other foot, that 
argument falls by the wayside, and we end up putting limitations in the 
treaty.
  Here is an example. The Russians are not developing and do not seem 
to have any intention of developing something called conventional 
Prompt Global Strike, which is a fancy way of saying: Put a 
conventional warhead on top of an ICBM so you do not have to send a 
nuclear warhead halfway around the world to destroy a target.
  We can see in today's conflict that we are not going to be engaging 
in a multiple nuclear exchange with another country but might well have 
a need based upon intelligence that does not have a very long shelf 
life that we want to send a conventional warhead to a specific target 
and that is something we would like to develop but the Russians are not 
interested in doing that. So did we say to the Russians: So because you 
are not doing it and we are, therefore, we are not going to have any 
limitation on this? No. We agreed, in fact, to a very important 
limitation. Any missiles we use in that regard have to be counted as if 
there were a nuclear warhead on top of it. So there is a 700-vehicle 
limit. That is all the number of missiles we can have. And yet any 
missiles that we put a conventional warhead on that have this ICBM 
range have to be counted against that limit.

  Well, the Russians aren't doing it, so why did we have to agree to 
something they are not doing? That is asymmetrical. That is not parity.
  So it is okay for the Russians to say: Hey, if we are doing something 
you are not doing, we are not going to be bound by anything in the 
treaty on it. But by the way, if you are doing something we are not 
doing, we are going to hold you accountable and bind you with a very 
important limitation in the treaty.
  You see, the argument doesn't hold water. Russia and the United 
States are not acting exactly the same with regard to our weapons. So 
to argue that anything we are doing differently from the other 
shouldn't count in the treaty is suspicious. And, in any event, it 
turns out we don't make that argument.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time on this amendment has 
expired. The Senator has time remaining on the previous amendment.
  Mr. KYL. Let me finish my sentence on this.
  In any event, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. If 
we put a limitation on the United States on something they are not 
developing, then it is only fair to put a limitation on them with 
regard to something we are not developing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, do we have any time remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 minute 40 seconds remaining.
  Mr. KERRY. I yield all that time to the Senator from Michigan, the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Massachusetts.
  There has been reference made to a side agreement which was entered 
into at the time of START I. There is a major difference between what 
happened then and what is being proposed by Senator Kyl now.
  That side agreement, first of all, was in front of the Senate but 
there was no effort at that time to do what Senator Kyl's amendment 
does, which is to say prior to the entry into force of that treaty the 
President shall certify to the Senate that there was a legally binding 
side agreement. That was not part of START I, and it would seem to me 
would absolutely derail this New START agreement.
  Second, that was a political agreement, that side agreement that was 
entered into, which would last as long as the Presidents of both 
countries were in office but would not necessarily last beyond that 
because it was not a legally binding agreement in that sense.
  So there are two major differences between what happened at the time 
of START I and what is being proposed here by Senator Kyl. I hope we 
could defeat the Kyl amendment No. 4860.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if any time remains, we yield it back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is yielded back.
  Mr. KERRY. What is the parliamentary situation, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is still time remaining on the Wicker 
amendment, and Kyl 4860.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to speak briefly to that now, in 
direct response to my colleague from Michigan.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before he does that, do we have time 
remaining on either of those amendments?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has time 
remaining on both amendments.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me quote from the START I treaty, Text of 
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification as Approved by the 
Senate:

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     START Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which 
     shall be binding upon the President: Legal and Political 
     Obligations of U.S.S.R.: That the legal and political 
     obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
     reflected in the four related separate agreements, seven 
     legally binding letters, four areas of correspondence, two 
     politically binding declarations, thirteen joint statements . 
     . .

  And so on. The two politically binding declarations are precisely the 
reference to the limitation of the SLCM numbers for both countries. I 
mean there is a dispute about whether it is legally binding in the same 
sense that the treaty itself is, but the heading of this is Legal and 
Political Obligations of the U.S.S.R., and it goes on to talk about . . 
.

       The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with 
     these legal obligations as equivalent under international law 
     to actions inconsistent with the START Treaty.

  And so on and so on. We believe these were binding and should be. It 
is no argument, however, to say that if somebody else didn't see it 
that way, therefore, what we are asking for here is not

[[Page S10913]]

a binding agreement. Whether you call it binding legally or binding 
politically, in any event, I wish to see it done, because there is no 
limitation on the SLCMs the Russians are planning to develop, and the 
submarine that is under development to carry them, and they could have 
a strategic value as well as a tactical value. They were a subject of 
the previous START I agreement and I think they should be a subject of 
this agreement as well.
  Let me summarize. The first amendment our colleagues will be voting 
on is, I believe, the Wicker amendment, and then the second amendment 
is the amendment which would provide a side agreement for a limitation 
on the number of Russian SLCMs--the submarine launch cruise missiles--
and the third vote will be on the Kyl amendment relative to 
verification relating to covers on the ICBMs and telemetry on ICBM 
tests.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. How much times remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 3 minutes 
on the Kyl amendment and 5 minutes on the Wicker amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, is Senator Wicker here?
  I wonder, Senator Kyl, if we can yield back time. I know colleagues 
are waiting to vote.
  Mr. President, by unanimous consent we yield back all time on both 
sides and go to regular order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If all time is yielded back, under the 
previous order, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 4895 
offered by the Senator from Mississippi, Mr. Wicker.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh), the 
Senator from Alaska (Mr. Begich), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. 
Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the 
Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama 
(Mr. Shelby).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 34, nays 59, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 295 Ex.]

                                YEAS--34

     Alexander
     Barrasso
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Isakson
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--59

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bayh
     Begich
     Bond
     Brownback
     Gregg
     Shelby
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4895) was rejected.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 4860

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on 
agreeing to amendment No. 4860 offered by the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh), the 
Senator from Alaska (Mr. Begich), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. 
Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the 
Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama 
(Mr. Shelby).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 31, nays 62, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 296 Ex.]

                                YEAS--31

     Barrasso
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Collins
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--62

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bayh
     Begich
     Bond
     Brownback
     Gregg
     Shelby
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4860) was rejected.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay 
that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are going to have one more vote tonight. 
Senators Kerry, Lugar, Kyl, and others are working on how we are going 
to work tomorrow morning. They will work this evening. Hopefully, we 
can come in at 9 in the morning with, hopefully, an hour of debate on 
an amendment, and then we will find out where we are after that. The 
reason I asked for the attention of the Senate was to announce that.
  However, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Levin, chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, and the ranking member, Senator McCain, each 
be recognized for 2 minutes to explain something they are working on on 
the Defense authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I think all of us have an interest in the 
Defense authorization bill. Senator McCain and I have been working on 
this bill with members of the committee for about a year. This is a 
bill that has a lot of provisions critically important to our troops.
  To give a few examples, it authorizes health care coverage for 
military children, impact aid to local civilian schools, so-called CERP 
authority, which is the commander's emergency response program, and 
transfer of defense articles to the Afghan Army. It is about 800 pages. 
We have removed from this bill what we thought were the controversial 
items so that we could get it passed. We don't have the time to go 
through them, but that was our intent. We missed one controversial item 
which came over from the House having to do with Guam funding. We have 
now reached an agreement that we would remove that provision from the 
bill. That is a removal. But we can't add any controversial items to 
this bill; it will be objected to.
  The only way we can do this for the troops, as we have done for 45 
years, is if we proceed with a unanimous consent agreement tonight. We 
haven't

[[Page S10914]]

yet gotten there. I plead with our colleagues to let us get to this 
unanimous consent agreement tonight. It is the only time we can do it. 
The House will be in tomorrow. They could take it up tomorrow, if we 
pass it tonight. That is the status.
  Senator McCain, I know, will speak on his support. But this is a plea 
from the two of us who have worked so hard with Members and our staffs 
on a critically important bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. The only thing I would add to the comments of Senator 
Levin is that there are policy provisions regarding training and 
equipment and readiness that cannot be just done by money. These are 
important policy decisions, important authorizations, including a pay 
raise--not for us. I urge my colleagues not to object to this Defense 
Authorization Act. I argue it is critical to sustaining this Nation's 
security.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we will offer this later tonight. We are 
not offering it at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on 
agreeing to amendment No. 4893 offered by the Senator from Arizona, Mr. 
Kyl.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh), the 
Senator from Alaska (Mr. Begich), and the Senator from Oregon (Mr. 
Wyden) are necessarily absent.
  Mr. KYL. The following Senators are necessarily absent: the Senator 
from Missouri, (Mr. Bond), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), the 
Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Gregg), and the Senator from Alabama 
(Mr. Shelby).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Merkley). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 30, nays 63, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 297 Ex.]

                                YEAS--30

     Barrasso
     Brown (MA)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Chambliss
     Coburn
     Cochran
     Cornyn
     Crapo
     DeMint
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Graham
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Johanns
     Kirk
     Kyl
     LeMieux
     McCain
     McConnell
     Risch
     Roberts
     Sessions
     Snowe
     Thune
     Vitter
     Wicker

                                NAYS--63

     Akaka
     Alexander
     Baucus
     Bennet
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carper
     Casey
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coons
     Corker
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Franken
     Gillibrand
     Hagan
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Isakson
     Johnson
     Kerry
     Klobuchar
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     Manchin
     McCaskill
     Menendez
     Merkley
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (NE)
     Nelson (FL)
     Pryor
     Reed
     Reid
     Rockefeller
     Sanders
     Schumer
     Shaheen
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Tester
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Webb
     Whitehouse

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bayh
     Begich
     Bond
     Brownback
     Gregg
     Shelby
     Wyden
  The amendment (No. 4893) was rejected.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DURBIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to colleagues how we are going 
to proceed. With the consent of the Senator from Arizona and Senator 
Lugar, we are going to accept two amendments, I believe. One of them we 
are checking with the White House and making certain we are all in sync 
on it. But assuming we are, we will be able to have Senator LeMieux of 
Florida speak for a few minutes on his amendment. In addition, there is 
Senator Kyl's amendment, which we will accept.
  Subsequent to that, I believe Senator Thune wants to raise an issue 
regarding an amendment. We will do that. Then I think we will probably 
be at a point where we will have an opportunity if people want to talk 
on the treaty, or conceivably even on something else, I imagine there 
may be a moment there, but I do not want to speak for the leadership on 
that yet until we have cleared it.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent--the Senator from Ohio has 
been trying to get the floor for most of the day, and because he wanted 
to give us the opportunity to move on the amendments, he has been very 
patient. I ask unanimous consent that he be granted 5 minutes to speak 
as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I ask the Senator, will you go ahead and handle the 
unanimous consent agreement on the two amendments. I do not have to be 
here for that.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I will do that and guarantee the Senator 
that his amendment will be adopted. And I thank him. I want to thank 
Senator Kyl. He has actually--I know we have all been struggling here, 
but the Senator has been extremely helpful in processing a lot of 
amendments this evening, and I want to thank him for his good-faith 
efforts in doing that.
  Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I appreciate the generosity of the senior Senator from Massachusetts 
and especially his leadership on one of the most important debates in 
the 4 years I have been in the Senate. I thank Senator Kerry for that.


                     Omnibus Trade Act/TAA and HCTC

  Mr. President, I hold in my hand 500 pieces of paper, 500 
testimonials from retirees who lost their pensions and health care 
during the GM bankruptcy. These are some of the 50,000 Americans who 
will be hurt if we do not pass an extension of the health coverage tax 
credit this week before the year is out.
  This stack of paper here does not represent Delta retirees and it 
does not represent other retirees--thousands of others--who are in the 
same boat as the Delphi/GM retirees.
  Their pensions have been cut. Their employee-sponsored health care 
has been eliminated. If we do not pass the omnibus trade bill--which 
includes GSP, trade adjustment, the Andean trade agreement, and the 
health care tax credit, and some miscellaneous tariffs--if we do not 
pass this, H.R. 6517, they will take in another economic blow. The 
blood from this one will be on our hands.
  We must pass the omnibus trade bill before this Congress ends. I want 
to share a handful of letters. I know the Senator from Massachusetts 
yielded for 5 minutes, so I will do this quickly.
  Mary Ann from Warren, OH, writes that she lost 40 percent of her 
pension, all her health care, and all her life insurance earned from 
GM/Delphi. Here is what she said:

       My husband is self employed and he is on my healthcare. He 
     suffers terribly with chronic pain due to degenerative disc 
     disease. He forces himself to work at least part time but 
     it's a struggle. . . . I have a cerebral condition recently 
     diagnosed. I spent a week in the hospital early this year and 
     am still paying on that too. A 75 percent hike in our 
     healthcare premiums--

  And that is what will happen if we do not renew this, which will help 
these 500 and another 50,000--

     while we try to pay these medical balances on a reduced 
     pension would force us and many others into a downward spiral 
     of existence. Those who we entrust to represent us must 
     realize that our story could be theirs if life situations 
     were different. When do we start treating others how we 
     ourselves want to be treated?

  Here are others.
  Dan from Columbus, IN, writes:

       Dear Senator Brown--I am a retired Delta Air Line pilot. 
     During my retirement, Delta took my retirement money that I 
     had spent a career of time accumulating and left me out in 
     the cold. The health care tax credit stepped in and helped by 
     giving our family some insurance premium help. Now this is 
     being destroyed too.

  David from Atlanta, GA:


[[Page S10915]]


       It is very important that the health care tax credit . . . 
     be continued. After losing the pension income and insurance 
     benefits I was promised when I retired from Delta Airlines, I 
     have made significant adjustments to try to compensate for 
     the losses.
       Still, after cutting back, the cost of living, skyrocketing 
     insurance premiums, and 2 years of trying to sell my house at 
     a substantial reduction of price while competing with 
     foreclosures, the finances of my friends and me continued to 
     erode.

  Gary from Arrowhead, CA: Since Delta Airlines eliminated my pension 
and health coverage, I looked forward to a Kaiser Permanente HCTC 
qualified health insurance policy starting January 1. Without this HCTC 
passage, my premiums will be $2,600 a month.
  These go on and on. The omnibus trade bill has received unanimous 
approval from every Democratic Member of this body. It is supported by 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Retail Federation, the AFL-
CIO. It is my understanding most Republicans here support it. There are 
just a few blocking the passage of it.
  On Friday, Senator Sessions objected to a request Senator Casey and I 
made to pass the trade act. I understand his objection. I believe it 
can be worked through. Senator Sessions said he supports the rest of 
the package. I hope this obstruction doesn't interfere with the need to 
move on this omnibus trade package. These 500 letters, if each of my 
colleagues would read two or three of them, I think they would see how 
important it is we pass the Omnibus Trade Act. It is about the trade 
adjustment assistance language. It is about 50,000 people who will not 
be able to afford their health insurance come January 1. Happy New Year 
to them. It also will help us with Colombia and other countries around 
the world in our trade policies. This makes so much sense.
  Tomorrow, Senator Casey and I and perhaps some others will ask for a 
UC. I hope my colleagues can see fit to move forward on this. It is 
supported by business groups, by labor groups, by the majority of 
people in this body. I am hopeful we can bring in the few people who 
still disagree and make this work for our country.
  I yield the floor. I thank Senator Kerry for his indulgence.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I have had the opportunity to work out 
with the Senator from Massachusetts an amendment to the resolution, 
which I will be offering in a second.
  To my colleagues, what this does--we had this discussion the other 
day on the treaty. This is an amendment to the resolution that would 
require, within a year's time of ratification, that the President of 
the United States certify to the Senate that the United States will 
seek to initiate with the Russian Federation negotiations on the 
disparity between nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons and to make 
sure we secure those weapons and reduce the number of tactical nuclear 
weapons in a verifiable manner.
  Remember, the Russians have a 10-to-1 ratio of tactical nuclear 
weapons over us--3,000 to 300--not talked about in this treaty, an 
important issue. This requires that the President will certify within a 
year's time that the parties are going to sit down and have a 
negotiation about the disparity, about verification, and about securing 
these weapons. It has been agreed to by all parties.
  With that, amendment No. 4908 has been cleared on both sides. I now 
ask that the amendment, as modified by the changes at the desk, be 
offered and agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, we just have 
to jump through a few hoops over here. We will not object ultimately, 
but if I could ask the Senator if we could just wait a little longer, I 
would object at this time but not ultimately. We need to get this 
cleared and put all the next steps together into one effort, if we can. 
It doesn't mean we can't talk about some of the other issues, if you 
want to, while we are waiting for that to be ready. It might be better 
to just wait until we have the agreement.
  So, in the meantime, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida has the floor.
  Mr. LeMIEUX. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Florida wants to 
speak on this amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the following two 
amendments be considered and agreed to: Senator Kyl No. 4864 and 
LeMieux No. 4908, as modified.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments (Nos. 4864 and 4908, as modified), were agreed to, as 
follows:


                           amendment no. 4864

  (Purpose: To require a certification that the President intends to 
      modernize the triad of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.--Prior to the 
     entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that the President intends to--
       (A) modernize or replace the triad of strategic nuclear 
     delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-launched cruise 
     missile, an ICBM, and an SSBN and SLBM; and
       (B) maintain the United States rocket motor industrial 
     base.


                    amendment no. 4908, as modified

  (Purpose: To require negotiations to address the disparity between 
                  tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the resolution of advice 
     and consent to the New START Treaty, add the following:
       (11) Tactical nuclear weapons.--(A) Prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate that--
       (i) the United States will seek to initiate, following 
     consultation with NATO allies but not later than one year 
     after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, 
     negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to 
     address the disparity between the non-strategic (tactical) 
     nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of 
     the United States and to secure and reduce tactical nuclear 
     weapons in a verifiable manner; and
       (ii) it is the policy of the United States that such 
     negotiations shall not include defensive missile systems.
       (B) Not later than one year after the entry into force of 
     the New START Treaty, and annually thereafter for the 
     duration of the New START Treaty or until the conclusion of 
     an agreement pursuant to subparagraph (A), the President 
     shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
     Services of the Senate a report--
       (i) detailing the steps taken to conclude the agreement 
     cited in subparagraph (A); and
       (ii) analyzing the reasons why such an agreement has not 
     yet been concluded.
       (C) Recognizing the difficulty the United States has faced 
     in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical 
     nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the 
     security of those weapons, the Senate urges the President to 
     engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of--
       (i) establishing cooperative measures to give each Party to 
     the New START Treaty improved confidence regarding the 
     accurate accounting and security of tactical nuclear weapons 
     maintained by the other Party; and
       (ii) providing United States or other international 
     assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate 
     accounting and security of its tactical nuclear weapons.
       Strike paragraph (11) of subsection (c) of the resolution 
     of advice and consent to the New START Treaty.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, does the Senator wish to speak?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts 
for working on this with us. I think this is an important improvement 
that will require that the United States seek to initiate negotiations 
with the Russian Federation within a year's period of time. I thank my 
colleague from Massachusetts, as well as other colleagues who were 
willing to make this happen as part of the ratification.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. This is a constructive 
amendment. We all agree that we need to reduce tactical nuclear 
weapons. Everybody who testified to us reiterated the importance of 
that being the next step in terms of our relationship and increased 
stability. NATO allies also said it was essential to proceed to that. 
The Senator's amendment helps us to make it clear that is the direction 
in

[[Page S10916]]

which we need to go. I thank him for his efforts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amended No. 
4920 be made pending.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do object. I want to say to the Senator 
that I am delighted to have a discussion with him about this particular 
issue. But I think given the efforts we have made thus far to deal with 
a fixed set of amendments has been affected somewhat by some of those 
amendments that were filed late, and also not germane, requiring 
colleagues at the last minute to consider a lot of issues on the floor 
that are not pertaining directly to the treaty itself.
  The subject the Senator wants to bring up and talk about, which is 
Russian cooperation on Iran, is absolutely essential to us as a matter 
of foreign policy. I want to join with the Senator in emphasizing that. 
I look forward to hearing his comments about it. I think we can have an 
important colloquy that could add to the record of our discussions with 
respect to this treaty without negatively impacting the direction we 
are moving in at this point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, if I might, given that, speak to the 
amendment. I regret that the amendment can't be voted on. The process 
has been fairly open. A number of amendments have been considered. This 
amendment was filed sometime this afternoon. It deals with an important 
subject, which is germane to the debate that we are having with regard 
to the New START treaty.
  One of the predicates for improving the START treaty is the so-called 
reset of our relationship with Russia. Of course, the President, as 
recently as November 18, 2010, made a statement, which is in this 
amendment:

       ``The New START Treaty is also a cornerstone of our 
     relations with Russia'' for the reason that ``Russia has been 
     fundamental to our efforts to put strong sanctions in place 
     to put pressure on Iran to deal with its nuclear program.'' 
     Accordingly, the advice and consent of the Senate to 
     ratification of the New START Treaty is conditioned on the 
     expectation that the Russian Federation will cooperate fully 
     with United States and international efforts to prevent the 
     Government of Iran from developing a nuclear weapons 
     capability.

  What this amendment does is to provide some assurance that all those 
intentions and statements actually come to pass. It would require the 
President to certify to the Senate the following:

       Prior to entry into force of the New START Treaty, 1, the 
     President shall certify to the Senate that (i) the Russian 
     Federation is in full compliance with all United Nations 
     Security Council Resolutions relating to Iran; (ii) the 
     Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United 
     States that neither it nor any entity subject to its 
     jurisdiction and control will (I) transfer to Iran the S-300 
     air defense system or other advanced weapons systems or any 
     parts thereof; or (II) transfer such items to a third party 
     which will in turn transfer such items to Iran; (iii) the 
     Government of the Russian Federation has assured the United 
     States that neither it nor any entity subject to its 
     jurisdiction and control will transfer to Iran goods, 
     services, or technology that contribute to the advancement of 
     the nuclear or missile programs of the Government of Iran; 
     and (iv) the Government of the Russian Federation has assured 
     the United States that it will support efforts at the United 
     Nations Security Council and elsewhere to increase political 
     and economic pressure on the Government of Iran to abandon 
     its nuclear weapons program.

  That would be a commitment, a certification, that would be issued 
prior to the entry in force of the treaty by the President each year, 
and on December 31 of each subsequent year a similar certification 
would be issued by the President. In fact, if the President fails to 
certify, then it would require that he consult with the Senate and 
submit a report on whether adherence to the New START treaty remains in 
the U.S. national security interest.
  I say this because I think there is a direct connection and 
correlation between this treaty and the efforts of the Russians that we 
assume the Russians are going to commit to in terms of putting pressure 
on Iran regarding its nuclear program and not doing things that would 
put in jeopardy the security of the region.
  I have to say, obviously, this has a big impact on our great ally, 
Israel, as well as the whole region. It would be very destabilizing if 
the Iranians have a nuclear weapon. So I think the effort made by the 
administration to ``reset relations with Russia,'' bears directly on 
this treaty. As I said, it was stated clearly by the President as 
recently as November 18, where he recognized that important 
relationship. I simply say this amendment, I don't think, is anything 
that anybody would not agree with. All it does is require not just a 
statement that this is going to be part of our ongoing relationship 
with Russia, but it provides an assurance, a certification that the 
administration would make to the Senate before the treaty would enter 
into force and each year subsequent to that with those basic issues.
  The issues are fairly straightforward. It simply requires a condition 
that the Russian Federation is in full compliance with all U.N. 
Security Council resolutions relating to Iran and the government of the 
Russian Federation assures the United States that neither it nor any 
entity subject to its jurisdiction and control will transfer to Iran 
the S-300 air defense system or other advanced weapons systems or any 
parts thereof or transfer such items to a third party, which will in 
turn transfer such items to Iran.
  While the S-300--for the time being, Russia has refrained from doing 
that. There are concerns and reports that Russia has recently provided 
Tehran with a new radar system allegedly through third party mediators 
from Venezuela and Belarus. So the concern about that coming into Iran 
through some third party is also something that I think is of great 
concern to America's national security interests as well as those of 
our allies.
  Mr. President, the amendment, again, is very straightforward. It 
requires a certification before the entry into force of the treaty, and 
then each year thereafter about those basic conditions that the 
Russians be in compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, that 
they would not try to get the S-300 to the Iranians, directly or 
indirectly, and they would continue putting pressure on the Iranians 
with respect to their nuclear program.
  We know too that the nuclear reactor in Bashir is now producing 
plutonium. Russia has fueled a nuclear reactor there that is now 
producing plutonium in Iran. That ought to be of great concern to 
everybody here as we pass judgment on this treaty, which is obviously 
important to our relationship with Russia, but also bears on the 
relationship we have with other countries around the world.
  I think anybody in the foreign policy community that you talk to 
today, when you ask what is the most dangerous threats the United 
States and its allies face around the world today, Iran and nuclear 
weapons in the hands of Iran top that list.

  So the efforts that we make to persuade the Russians to put pressure 
on the Iranians and make sure there isn't anything going on there that 
would destabilize or put in peril America's national security interest 
is certainly an objective we have.
  This would require the President certify that those things are taking 
place rather than relying on the statements and good intentions of the 
Russians. I wish, again, that I could get this amendment pending and 
get it voted on. I think it is important to have the Senate on record 
with regard to this issue. I regret that the amendment has been 
objected to.
  I appreciate the opportunity to at least raise the issue, and I 
certainly hope it is something that the administration and our leaders 
in the Senate and the entire military establishment of this country 
pays close attention to in the days ahead. This issue will not go away. 
I think it bears definitely on the treaty.
  With that, I will conclude my remarks and say I wish we had an 
opportunity to get a vote on it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in, I think, 7 days, I have not made an 
objection to an amendment that we tried to take up. I am sensitive to 
that because we, obviously, want to provide as much opportunity to go 
into these issues as is possible. I say to my friend from South Dakota 
that I am happy to stay here with him and do as much as we could do to 
impress on anybody the importance of the issue he is raising.

[[Page S10917]]

But if we stayed here and went through the process of a vote, which 
would conceivably take us a lot longer in terms of the other amendments 
we have to finish tomorrow morning, as well as keep the Senate in even 
later, only the votes--I think we had only one motion to table. Almost 
every vote has been straight up or down. The votes have been 60 to 30, 
or 60-something to 28, or something like that. I think the reason is 
that there is a fundamental flaw in the approach of this particular 
amendment and the others we have had because they seek to prevent the 
treaty from going into force.
  The language says ``prior to the entry into force of the New START 
Treaty,'' the President has to do a series of things. Some of those may 
read in a fairly straightforward and literal way, but they are not 
necessarily what can be done immediately or are even subject to our 
control, in which case we wind up with a treaty that we have actually 
partially ratified because it cannot go into force, and it may never go 
into force, depending on what happens with some of those things that 
are out of our control.
  There are a lot of reports requested on one thing or another. I think 
there is a more effective way to go at this, personally, that doesn't 
wind up with a negative impact on the treaty, where we are veering from 
our military and national intelligence leaders who would like to see 
this put into effect as rapidly as possible. The effect of this is not 
to let that happen as rapidly as possible.
  The Senator is 100 percent correct about our concern about Iran. We 
need Russian cooperation in order to ever have a chance of enforcing 
the sanctions that have been put in place, as well as finding the other 
tiers of cooperation that are going to be critical as we go forward, 
absent Iranian shifts in policy. The fact is, what has happened through 
Russian cooperation right now is that the most significant sanctions we 
have been able to put in place to date have been put in place. They 
were largely achieved because of the relationship President Obama has 
achieved with President Medvedev and the reset button and the sense 
that we are coming together, not going apart.
  It is easy for us in the Senate to stand here and say we have to 
require this, we have to require that. A lot of these things I have 
found increasingly--particularly in this time I have been chairman of 
this committee--a lot of the things we sometimes do with good intention 
in the Senate actually very significantly complicate the life and work 
of our diplomats who spend as much time trying to meet some kind of 
certification as they do doing the diplomacy they are meant to do.
  I am happy to work with the Senator as chairman of this committee. We 
will have hearings early next year on this topic of Iran and where we 
stand with respect to that nuclear program. We will look at this issue 
of Russian cooperation, and we will look at it hopefully within the 
context of a START treaty that is going to be ratified by the Duma and 
implemented and that can only strengthen the resolve of both our 
countries to focus on the challenges of Iran.
  I thank my colleague. I have been in that position before when we 
have not been able to get an amendment in.
  I might add, the amendment was filed a day and a half after cloture 
was filed. I said to Jon Kyl very clearly that we were going to try to 
be as flexible as we could. That flexibility needed to be mostly 
focused on those amendments that directly affect the treaty or are to 
the treaty in its most direct sense. If we raised a point of order, 
this would be an amendment that would be found to be not germane 
because it is outside those direct treaty issues. With that in mind, I 
have taken the position I have taken. But I look forward to working 
with my colleague, if we can, as we go forward from here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Massachusetts that 
if he would allow me to vote on the amendment, I would try to break 
that 35-vote threshold that we have seen, to blow through that cap.
  I appreciate the fact that the Senator shares the concerns I have 
about Iran. All I would say is I think what this provides is an 
additional safeguard as we move into this process and we have this 
treaty and a clearly established connection between what is a great 
threat, a regional threat and, I would argue, a threat beyond the 
region, certainly to our national security as well, the Iranian threat, 
and the relationship we have with Russia and this treaty and the good-
faith effort that we are making through this treaty with the Russians 
to reset, that this would provide an additional level of assurance that 
they are, in fact, cooperating and that they are following through on 
the commitments they are making to the administration and to us as we 
debate this treaty.
  Again, I will not belabor the point. The point has been made. I do 
think this is a germane amendment. I take issue with the chairman's 
contention that it is not. But at this particular late hour and with 
his objection to this, I know I am probably not going to have an 
opportunity to have this amendment voted on, but I hope the issue 
continues to stay front and center, in front of this body and before 
the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee on 
which I serve.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I say to the Senator, let's commit to work 
to make sure that happens. I certainly will do that on my part. I look 
forward to those hearings next year. Perhaps the Senator would even 
want to find a way to take part in them.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, Senator Reid asked me a few minutes ago if 
I would communicate where we are with respect to the START treaty, and 
I will do so.
  As it stands now, we have two amendments that remain. One is an 
amendment by Senator Kyl on modernization, which I believe is the 
intention, though not yet locked in, of the majority leader to try to 
take up around 9 o'clock in the morning. We expect to spend somewhere 
in the vicinity of an hour on it, maybe a little bit longer than that, 
to accommodate the speakers for Senator Kyl. Then there will be one 
other amendment after that on missile defense, I believe an amendment 
that will be offered by Senator Corker and Senator Lieberman together. 
That amendment will be the last barrier remaining before we can get to 
the final vote on the treaty itself.
  It would be my hope, depending on the negotiations going on and 
discussions with respect to the 9/11 first responders--those are 
discussions taking place now--depending on that, we will have a better 
sense of when that final vote will be able to take place. I know a lot 
of colleagues are trying to figure that out in the context of flights, 
family, and other things. Our hope is that will become clearer in the 
next minutes, hours, moments of the Senate.
  That is the lay of the land. I know the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee and the ranking member have made their request to 
the Senate regarding the Defense authorization bill.
  Our hope is that tomorrow morning we can move rapidly through the 
remaining two amendments. It may even be possible for us to accept the 
amendment on the missile defense. We are working on that language now. 
If that happens, obviously it will clear the possibilities of a final 
vote to an earlier hour, again dependent on this discussion regarding 
the 9/11 first responders.
  That is the state of play.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the approval by 
the Senate of the New START treaty.
  On December 16, I joined Senators Inouye, Feinstein and Alexander in 
a letter to President Obama to express my support for ratification of 
the treaty and funding for the modernization of our nuclear weapons 
arsenal. At the time, I was concerned that this might not be taken 
seriously as a long-term commitment. The President has responded to our 
request and assured me that nuclear modernization is a priority for his 
administration and that

[[Page S10918]]

he will request funding for these programs and capabilities as long as 
he is in office. I appreciate his commitment to this long-term 
investment.
  The treaty before us is not perfect. Many of our colleagues have 
brought forth ideas and offered amendments that will help address 
concerns about the treaty. I share concerns about missile defense, 
tactical nuclear weapons, and limits on delivery vehicles, but I cannot 
deny the potential national security consequences of not ratifying the 
New START treaty.
  After listening carefully to national security experts and the debate 
on the Senate floor, I have been convinced that failure to ratify this 
treaty would diminish cooperation between our two countries on several 
fronts, including nuclear proliferation, and limit our understanding of 
Russian capabilities. Furthermore, failure to ratify this treaty would 
cause further delays in getting our inspectors back to Russia after a 
1-year absence.
  While I am dissatisfied with the way this treaty has been considered 
by the Senate in a lameduck session, I take our responsibility to 
provide advice and consent to international treaties very seriously; 
and I do not think that the politics of the moment should trump our 
national security priorities. I am cognizant of the fact that the New 
START treaty has received unanimous endorsement by both our country's 
diplomatic and military leadership, and it would be an unusual response 
for the Senate not to respect and consider their views on how best to 
support our national security interests.
  I agree with them on the merits of this treaty, and I will support 
ratification.
  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today and proudly stand among the 
long, bipartisan list of Senators, statesmen, and military leaders in 
support of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The New START 
treaty is critical to our Nation's security because it places limits on 
U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, supports an improving bilateral 
relationship with Russia, and advances international nuclear 
nonproliferation efforts.
  Over the last three decades, both the United States and Russia have 
benefited greatly from the bilateral reduction of nuclear weapons. 
Through the efforts of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, 
the two superpowers embarked on gradual nuclear disarmament, agreeing 
to reduce the number of their strategic warheads and deployed delivery 
vehicles through the negotiation and signing of the first START treaty. 
Under President Obama's leadership, we are now considering the New 
START treaty, which, when ratified, will reduce these numbers even more 
in both countries.
  The ratification of the New START treaty is vital to our national 
security.
  First, this treaty helps to decrease the threat of nuclear 
destruction and strategic miscalculation by requiring the reduction of 
strategic offensive arms such as warheads and launchers in Russia and 
the U.S. Supporting this effort is a strong verification regime that 
includes on-site inspections. Without this treaty, our inspectors do 
not have the ability to monitor Russian activities. We have not had 
access to the Russian nuclear stockpile for over a year. Our ability to 
``trust, but verify'' must be restored.
  Second, this treaty reinforces our important relationship with 
Russia. It advances our Nation's capacity to build durable, 
multilateral cooperation to confront international security risks from 
countries like Iran and North Korea. In addition, a strong relationship 
with Russia helps to keep available the supply chains that deliver 
equipment to the brave Americans serving in Afghanistan.
  Finally, this treaty strengthens our nonproliferation efforts around 
the world. By ratifying the New START treaty and taking the focus off 
of strategic weapons, the United States and Russia can increase their 
efforts on tactical nuclear weapons and proliferation. The risks 
associated with nuclear proliferation are particularly serious and 
include acts of nuclear terrorism against the United States and its 
allies and the destabilizing effects of new nuclear arms races.
  For many years I have been concerned about these risks. During the 
111th Congress, I have introduced bills that would decrease the spread 
of potentially dangerous nuclear technologies around the world and 
implement key nuclear nonproliferation recommendations offered by the 
Commission on the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Terrorism. I have also called for more oversight of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical Cooperation Program and 
its proliferation vulnerabilities. Ratifying the New START treaty will 
reinforce these and many other nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
  I urge my colleagues to strengthen national security by ratifying the 
New START treaty.
  Mr. UDALL of New Mexico. Mr. President, I rise today to echo the call 
of the Senators and Presidents who have furthered the cause of peace. I 
rise to continue this body's longstanding work to reduce the threat 
that nuclear weapons still pose to our Nation and world.
  Much has changed since the groundbreaking arms treaties of the 1990s. 
The cold war has ended, and with its end the balance of power changed 
greatly. But the threat of nuclear war has not entirely gone away.
  Over the last decade, we have seen the U.S. attacked on 9-11. And we 
learned about al-Qaida's ambition to acquire a weapon of mass 
destruction.
  One mishap or one intentional attack is all that is needed to throw 
our entire global society into a tailspin.
  Thanks to the work done through Nunn-Lugar, the U.S. has been 
involved in efforts since the end of the cold war to prevent nuclear 
materials from falling into the wrong hands.
  But today, with our resources spread thin due to two wars overseas 
and the threat from failed states and unstable regimes in possession of 
nuclear weapons the risk of nuclear proliferation has steadily 
increased.
  That is why the goal articulated by President Kennedy, built upon by 
President Reagan, and further advanced by President Obama is more 
important than ever. Moving toward a world with zero nuclear weapons is 
a move toward a safer and more peaceful future.
  Through committed negotiations on the New START treaty, the U.S. and 
Russia have renewed their commitments to this important goal. Passing 
New START would be another momentous step toward that more peaceful 
world.
  But, as we have all seen in recent days, and over the course of the 
year since the U.S. and Russia reached this historic agreement, some in 
this Chamber are playing partisan politics with an issue that has the 
potential to impact every person in America and across the world.
  This political posturing is short-sighted at best. And it is 
dangerous at worst. The threat of nuclear weapons is not a partisan 
issue. It is an American issue. And, more importantly, a human issue.
  When START One was ratified in 1991, it was ratified not with just a 
simple majority but with 93 Members of the Senate voting in favor of 
the legislation.
  Similarly, START Two, ratified in 1993, had the support of 87 Members 
of the Senate.
  The New START treaty deserves similar support from this body. 
Obstruction of this treaty does not strengthen our country. It reduces 
our security. And arguments to the contrary go against decades of 
bipartisan work to reduce the threat of nuclear annihilation.
  Those opposed to ratification say this treaty will diminish our 
national security. They argue that we cannot rely on a smaller nuclear 
arsenal to effectively deter an opponent.
  These concerns have been overhyped and hyperpoliticized. And they 
fall flat in light of the scientific evidence provided by our 
scientists and engineers at the National Labs.
  Along with Senator Bingaman, I helped lead a visit to New Mexico's 
National Labs while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was debating 
ratification. The scientists and engineers at the Labs briefed the 
delegation, which also included Senators Kyl, Corker, Risch, and Thune, 
on issues pertinent to this debate.
  After participating in these briefings, I am confident of two things. 
One, that the United States can assure our allies

[[Page S10919]]

that our nuclear arsenal remains an effective deterrent. And two, that 
our scientists and engineers will be able to verify that Russia is 
abiding by its end of the bargain.
  New Mexico will be at the forefront of verification measures because 
the Los Alamos and Sandia National Labs have the requisite professional 
expertise to aid the monitoring of Russian forces.
  I have been continually amazed by the work of our National Labs in 
New Mexico. The Los Alamos and Sandia National Labs, and the 
hardworking men and women who serve there, are truly a treasure of the 
Nation.
  Unfortunately, some on the other side of the aisle have derided the 
labs as ``decrepit and dangerous.'' This poorly imagined and strikingly 
inaccurate description couldn't be further from the truth.
  Los Alamos National Labs Director Michael Anastasio, Sandia National 
Labs Director Paul Hommert, and Lawrence Livermore Director George 
Miller, have been unequivocal in their testimony to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  They all agree that our labs are prepared to maintain our nuclear 
stockpile, and they are ready to lend their scientific expertise to the 
overall mission of verification and reduction.
  To quote Director Anastasio's Senate testimony:

       I do not see New START fundamentally changing the role of 
     the Laboratory. What New START does do, however, is emphasize 
     the importance of the Laboratories' mission and the need for 
     a healthy and vibrant science, technology and engineering 
     base to be able to continue to assure the stockpile into the 
     future:

  Sandia National Labs also plays a major role in stockpile 
stewardship, life extension, and stockpile surveillance.
  Director Hommert's testimony makes clear that Sandia understands the 
challenges involved under New START but that it is ready to undertake 
those challenges. He said:

       As a whole package, the documents describing the future of 
     U.S. nuclear policy represent a well founded, achievable path 
     forward.

  I believe that it is no small coincidence that the progression toward 
a world without nuclear weapons will require the continued, diligent 
work of those who first created and then secured our arsenals.
  The safety, security, and reliability of our available nuclear 
weapons will become increasingly important to our country as we reduce 
our stockpile.
  For New Mexico, President Obama's strategy will mean an expanded role 
for our National Labs in managing our Nation's nuclear deterrent.
  For our country, President Obama's strategy means that we are one 
step closer to closing the curtain of the cold war's legacy of nuclear 
arms races.
  For the world, it means we will be taking a step forward toward 
greater cooperation and peace, and one step back from catastrophe.
  Fewer weapons mean fewer opportunities for mistakes or losses of 
warheads. Fewer weapons also mean fewer opportunities for unstable 
regimes such as North Korea, Iran, or Myanmar, or individuals with 
malicious intentions to acquire or build a nuclear weapon.
  The two nations with the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons have a 
duty to remain vigilant in protecting the rest of the world from the 
unthinkable. By ratifying this treaty, the Senate is upholding its duty 
to protect our Nation and to protect our shared planet.
  President Kennedy said the following during his 1962 State of the 
Union Address:

       World order will be secured only when the whole world has 
     laid down these weapons which seem to offer us present 
     security but threaten the future survival of the human race.

  By ratifying this treaty, we move a step closer toward realizing this 
legacy and continuing a longstanding policy goal of our country--the 
goal of creating a more peaceful and secure world.
  Let us continue our work together by ratifying this treaty and 
sending a message to the world that the United States of America will 
continue making significant steps towards peace.
 Mr. BOND. Mr. President, New START is a bad deal for the 
United States. It requires us to reduce our deployed strategic forces 
while the Russians can add to theirs. This amounts to unilateral 
reductions.
  The treaty gives Russia political leverage, which they will use, to 
try to prevent us from expanding our missile defenses to protect us 
against North Korea and Iran. This is unacceptable.
  The treaty fails to deal with Russia's reported ten to one advantage 
in tactical nuclear weapons or their nuclear, sea-launched cruise 
missiles. However, the Treaty will limit our nonnuclear ballistic 
missiles.
  Compounding these deficiencies, the treaty's verification is weak and 
the Russians have a poor compliance record.
  As vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I 
have reviewed all the relevant classified intelligence concerning this 
treaty. I come away convinced that the United States has no reliable 
means to verify the treaty's central 1,550 warhead limit.
  It is also inexcusable that the United States has forfeited in this 
treaty the rights it enjoyed under START to full and open access to 
Russian telemetry. This amounts to giving up the ``keys to the 
kingdom,'' as it will harm our ability understand new Russian missile 
developments.
  The administration has attempted to justify giving up Russian 
telemetry on the basis that it is not needed to verify the New START 
treaty. This is only true if you believe that the treaty's ten or fewer 
yearly inspections of Russian missiles will provide adequate 
verification. They do not. In fact, these inspections have three 
strikes against them.
  Strike One: The 10 annual warhead inspections allowed under New START 
only permit us to sample 2 to 3 percent of the Russian force.
  Strike Two: The inspections cannot provide conclusive evidence of 
whether Russia is complying with the 1,550 warhead limit. If we found a 
missile loaded with more warheads than Russia declared, it would be a 
faulty and suspicious declaration. However, we could not infer that 
Russia had thereby violated the overall 1,550 limit. The Russians could 
just make some excuse for the faulty declaration, as they have in the 
past.
  Strike Three: New START relies on a type of on-site inspections that 
Russia illegally obstructed on certain missile types for almost the 
entire 15 year history of START. Russia's use of illegal, oversized 
covers were a clear violation of our on-site inspection rights under 
that treaty. As the old adage goes, ``fool me once, shame on you, fool 
me twice, shame on me.''
  Common sense tells us that the worse a treaty partner's compliance 
history, the stronger verification should be. However, according to 
official State Department reports by this administration and the 
previous one, Russia has violated, or is still violating, important 
provisions of most key arms control treaties to which they have been a 
party. In addition to START, this includes the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Conventional Forces 
in Europe Treaty, and Open Skies.
  We also know that the lower the limits on our weapons, the stronger 
the verification should be. But with these lower New START limits, our 
verification of warhead limits is much worse than under the previous 
START treaty, with its higher limits.
  With all these arguments against the treaty, proponents can only 
point to one tangible benefit--that we will know more about Russian 
forces with the treaty than without it. This is hardly a ringing 
endorsement.
  Learning more will hardly compensate the United States for the major 
concessions included in this Treaty. What are these concessions? 
Unilateral limits, unlimited Russian nuclear systems, limited U.S. 
nonnuclear systems, unreliable verification, the forfeiture of our 
telemetry rights, and perhaps most importantly, handing Russia a vote 
on our missile defense decisions.
  In many cases, concerns about particular treaties can be solved 
during the ratification process. My colleagues have my respect for 
their attempts to do so. Unfortunately, New START suffers from 
fundamental flaws that no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix.
  For these and other reasons, I cannot in good conscience vote to 
ratify the New START treaty.

[[Page S10920]]

  Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                    Interest on Legal Trust Accounts

  Mr. MERKLEY. Madam President, I rise this evening to talk about a 
program that is of great importance to our citizens across America who 
are struggling to access legal services. There is a program that is 
called the Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts or IOLTA. This is a very 
interesting arrangement that I was not familiar with until I came to 
the Senate.
  Essentially, IOLTA is interest on lawyer trust accounts, and it works 
like this. When lawyers need to put money into a trust account, they 
are putting it in that account on behalf of a client or on behalf of an 
estate. It is not allowed under the law for the client to earn 
interest. However, there is an arrangement that has been made over the 
years in which banks agree to pay interest on those accounts, since 
they are accessing those deposits--those funds--but the interest gets 
donated to legal services for poor Americans across the United States 
of America. So it is a win-win. The client isn't allowed to get the 
interest, but the banks pay the interest to benefit low-income 
Americans across our Nation.
  That is the structure of the IOLTA accounts. All 50 States have these 
programs. Forty-two States require lawyers to deposit client funds that 
do not earn net interest for the client into these IOLTA accounts so 
they will earn interest to pay for civil legal services for the poor.
  During the financial crisis, the FDIC created a program to guarantee 
that the business and trust checking accounts that do not pay interest 
are insured--they are guaranteed--and IOLTA was included in this 
because they do not pay interest to the client. The Dodd-Frank reform 
bill we had, which extended these arrangements for 2 years for accounts 
that do not pay interest to the clients, forgot to include the IOLTA 
accounts that do not pay interest to the clients but do pay interest 
that goes to fund civil legal services for poor Americans in all 50 
States.
  So we are seeking to fix this glitch. I wish to note that hundreds of 
thousands of Americans who don't otherwise have access to legal 
services are in a position to benefit when they need such services 
across our Nation.
  In Oregon, we have the Oregon Law Foundation, the nonprofit, 
nonpartisan organization that administers legal aid for the poor. They 
benefited to the tune of over $1 million in revenue in 2009. When 
interest was a little better, they had more revenue in 2008--$2.2 
million. That was a decrease from 2007 of $3.6 million. So as interest 
rates have declined, the amount of funds that have gone to fund legal 
services for the poor have declined, but still, a few million dollars 
is better than none in terms of providing assistance.
  In a case such as this--the Oregon Law Foundation--IOLTA funding 
makes up 95 percent of their total revenue. So if the guarantee is not 
extended for 2 more years, we have a real problem, and it goes like 
this. A lawyer has a fiduciary responsibility to a client to put the 
funds into an account that protects the client. They would not be able 
to put the funds into an IOLTA account if it is not guaranteed, if they 
have the option of putting it into a noninterest-bearing fund that is 
guaranteed and, thus, the bank's willingness to pay interest. So the 
funding that goes for legal services across our Nation will disappear.
  I rise to talk about this because the deadline for this is December 
31. We have a bill to fix this before the Senate. But for those who are 
familiar, in the Senate, any Senator has the ability to put a hold on 
legislation, and we have a situation where a Senator has put a hold on 
this. I think, in general, this hasn't gotten much attention, the fact 
that this assistance that goes to low-income Americans across this 
country will be deeply damaged, even if 99 Senators support this, 
because we don't have 100 Senators. So I am rising to basically make an 
appeal to my colleagues to take a look at the legal programs in your 
States that are funded by this.
  There are legal education programs that are funded. I hope my 
colleagues will recognize that what we have is a lose-lose situation if 
we don't change this law, and that lose-lose is legal education and 
legal services. The banks will actually make more money because they 
will not have to pay interest. So you have a lose-lose and a win--a 
loss for the poor, a loss for the students wanting legal education, and 
a win for banks receiving greater profits.
  In this situation, the banks have been absolutely stellar citizens of 
our communities. In Oregon, we have a host of banks that not only pay 
interest on these lawyer trust funds, but they have agreed to maintain 
a floor of 1 percent interest. I would like to mention these banks 
recognized by the Oregon Law Foundation as leadership banks. I believe 
this list is as of the end of the year 2009. By mentioning these banks, 
I am basically saying thank you to these banks for being involved in 
this program. They include: the Albina Community Bank, the Bank of 
Eastern Oregon, the Bank of the Cascades, the Bank of the West, Capital 
Pacific Bank, Century Bank, Columbia River Bank, Key Bank, Northwest 
Bank, Peoples Bank of Commerce, the Pioneer Trust Bank, Premier West 
Bank, Siuslaw Bank, South Valley Bank and Trust, the Bank of Oswego, 
the Commerce Bank of Oregon, Umpqua Bank--a bank that originated in 
southern Oregon, in timber country, Douglas County, where I come from--
U.S. Bank, Washington Trust Bank, and Wells Fargo.
  So all these banks have been willing to pay interest on these lawyer 
trust accounts, knowing they are doing good work in the community by 
assisting legal programs.
  I mentioned one of those programs in Oregon. Let me mention a couple 
more. The Juvenile Rights Project provides legal services to children 
and families who do not otherwise have the means to retain counsel 
through individual representation in juvenile court and school 
proceedings and through classwide advocacy in the courts, the 
legislature, and public agencies. It has the only help line offering 
legal advice for children and teenagers in Oregon. So that is the 
Juvenile Rights Project.
  Disability Rights Oregon. The Oregon Advocacy Center provides 
statewide legal services to Oregonians with disabilities who are 
victims of abuse or neglect or have problems obtaining health care, 
special education, housing, employment, public benefits, and access to 
public and private services. Oregonians with disabilities look to OAC--
that is the Oregon Advocacy Center or Disability Rights Oregon--to 
protect and advocate for their rights in courts, with public agencies 
and with the State legislature.
  The Classroom Law Project promotes understanding of the law and legal 
process for 15,000 elementary and secondary school students in the 
State of Oregon by incorporating the lessons and principles of 
democracy into school curriculum. Their programs include the High 
School Mock Trial Competition. That is an extraordinary competition. It 
is wonderful to see how a high school student can blossom when 
preparing to argue before his or her peers the facts of a case and the 
legal principles of a case. It is an enormous education.
  The Classroom Law Project also includes the Summer Institute training 
for teachers. This program enables those teachers to better address the 
issues of law and legal process in their classrooms.
  Also included is the We the People program on the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights. A lot of us often carry the Constitution. We understand 
it is the foundation for our government of, by, and for the people, and 
we want our children to get an education in the Constitution. This is 
funded in this fashion.
  We also have help for citizens who are trying to get into a home 
mortgage modification, such as HAMP--the Housing Affordable 
Modification Program--and also families who are working through issues 
of domestic violence.
  So here is the situation. Families addressing domestic violence 
issues, families addressing wrongful home foreclosures, children--
juveniles--seeking legal assistance, the disabled seeking resolution of 
issues regarding access to health care, special education, housing or 
employment are being helped. The Classroom Law Project is helping 
educate our children about the Constitution, about the Bill of Rights, 
funding

[[Page S10921]]

mock trial competitions, and funding the Summer Institute training for 
teachers. These are the types of tremendous programs that are funded 
through the interest on lawyer trust accounts. That line of funding, 
due to a technical overrsight, ends on December 31.
  So I am rising to ask my colleagues, if you are the Senator who is 
holding this up, I encourage you to get the facts from your State 
because all 50 States participate, and then let this funding, provided 
through a wonderful arrangement between the banks and our lawyers and 
these trust accounts, go forward. Who knows how many thousands, the 
multiple of thousands who will be assisted in challenging situations if 
we fix this before we adjourn.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________