[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 172 (Tuesday, December 21, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10850-S10852]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NEW START TREATY
Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I will vote to ratify the New START
treaty between the United States and Russia because it leaves our
country with enough nuclear warheads to blow any attacker to kingdom
come and because the President has committed to an $85 billion 10-year
plan to make sure those weapons work. I will vote for the treaty
because it allows for inspection of Russian warheads and because our
military leaders say it does nothing to interfere with the development
of a missile defense system.
I will vote for the treaty because the last six Republican
Secretaries of State support its ratification. In short, I am convinced
that Americans are safer and more secure with the New START treaty than
without it. Last week, I joined Senators Inouye, Cochran, and Feinstein
in a letter to the President stating that we will vote to ratify the
treaty and to appropriate funds to modernize our outdated nuclear
weapons facilities and that he, the President, requests those funds in
his budget.
Last night, I received a response to the President saying he would do
so. I ask unanimous consent to have printed both letters in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, December 16, 2010.
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: We are writing to express our support
for ratification of the New START Treaty and full funding for
the modernization of our nuclear weapons arsenal, as outlined
by your updated report that was mandated by Section 1251 of
the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
We also ask that, in your future budget requests to
Congress, you include the funding identified in that report
on nuclear weapons modernization. Should you choose to limit
non-defense discretionary spending in any future budget
requests to Congress, funding for nuclear modernization in
the National Nuclear Security Agency's proposed budgets
should be considered defense spending, as it is critical to
national security and, therefore, not subject to such
limitations. Further, we ask that an updated 1251 report be
submitted with your budget request to Congress each year.
We look forward to working with you on the ratification of
the New START Treaty and modernization of the National
Nuclear Security Agency's nuclear weapons facilities. This
represents a long-term commitment by each of us, as
modernization of our nuclear arsenal will require a sustained
effort.
Sincerely,
Daniel Inouye.
Dianne Feinstein.
Thad Cochran.
Lamar Alexander.
____
The White House,
Washington DC, December 20, 2010.
Hon. Lamar Alexander,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Alexander: Thank you for your letter regarding
funding for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex
and for your expression of support for ratification of the
New START Treaty.
As you know, in the Fiscal Year 2011 budget, I requested a
nearly 10 percent increase in the budget for weapons
activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). In May, in the report required by Section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, I
laid out a 10 year, $80 billion spending plan for NNSA. The
Administration submitted an update to that report last month,
and we now project over $85 billion in spending over the next
decade.
I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment
for the long-term, in addition to this one-year budget
increase. That is my commitment to the Congress--that my
Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities
for as long as I am President.
In future years, we will provide annual updates to the 1251
report. If a decision is made to limit non-defense
discretionary spending in any future budget requests, funding
for nuclear modernization in the NNSA weapons activities
account will be considered on the same basis as defense
spending.
In closing, I thought it important for you to know that
over the last two days, my Administration has worked closely
with officials from the Russian Federation to address our
concerns regarding North Korea. Because of important
cooperation like this, I continue to hope that the Senate
will approve the New START Treaty before the 111th Congress
ends.
Sincerely,
Barack Obama.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, why are these two so necessarily
linked--the treaty and the plan for nuclear weapons modernization? The
answer is, if we are going to reduce our number of warheads, we want to
make sure we are not left with what amounts to a collection of wet
matches. Defense Secretary Gates said:
There is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible
deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile
without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing
a modernization program.
In a November 24 statement, Senators Kyl and Corker said they ``could
not support reductions in U.S. nuclear forces unless there is adequate
attention to modernizing those forces and the infrastructure that
supports them.''
Senators Kyl and Corker deserve credit for untiring efforts to fund
properly nuclear modernization. President Obama deserves credit for
updating the nuclear modernization plan in such a significant way.
I have reviewed that so-called ``1251 plan'' completed November 17 of
this year, which calls for spending $85 billion over the next 10 years.
I have visited our outdated nuclear weapons facilities. I am convinced
the plan's implementation will make giant steps toward modernization of
those facilities so that we--and our allies and adversaries--can be
assured that the weapons will work if needed.
The President's statement that he will ask for these funds and the
support of senior members of the Appropriations Committee means that
the plan is more likely to become a reality. The President agrees that
in tight budgets these funds should be considered as defense spending.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a summary of
the appropriations recommended by
[[Page S10851]]
the plan mandated by section 1251 of the 2010 Defense authorization
bill.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
3. Summary of NNSA Stockpile and Infrastructure Costs
A summary of estimated costs specifically related to the
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, the supporting infrastructure, and
critical science, technology and engineering is provided in
Table 1.
TABLE 1--TEN-YEAR PROJECTIONS FOR WEAPONS STOCKPILE AND INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
$ Billions ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directed Stockpile............. 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
Science Technology & 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
Engineering Campaigns.........
Readiness in Technical Base and 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8-2.9 2.9-3.1 2.9-3.3
Facilities....................
UPF............................ 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.48-0.5 0.48-0.5 0.48-0.5 0.38-0.5
CMRR........................... 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.48-0.5 0.4-0.5 03.-0.5 02.-0.5
Secure Transportation.......... 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Programs Subtotal.. 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.1 7.3 7.5-7.6 7.7-7.9 7.9-8.2 8.0-8.4
Other Weapons.................. 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, Weapons.......... 6.4 7.0 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.5 8.7 8.9-9.0 9.2-9.3 9.4-9.6 9.4-9.8
Contractor Pensions Cost Growth ......... ......... 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 * * * *
========================================================================================================================
Total, Weapons............. 6.4 7.0 7.6 7.9 8.4 8.7 8.9 8.9-9.0 9.2-9.3 9.4-9.6 9.4-9.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numbers may not add due to rounding.
* Anticipated costs for contractor pensions have been calculated only through FY 2016. For FY 2017-2020, uncertainties in market performance, interest
rate movement, and portfolio management make prediction of actual additional pension liabilities, assets, and contribution requirements unreliable.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I will offer an amendment at the
appropriate time to the resolution of ratification to require an annual
update of the 1251 report, which the President's letter says he will
do.
Under the terms of the treaty, the United States may have 1,550
deployed strategic nuclear weapons, each one up to 30 times more
powerful than the one used at Hiroshima to end World War II.
The United States will also gain valuable data, including through
inspection operations that should provide a treasure trove of
intelligence about Russian activities that we would not have without
the treaty, and that we have not had since the START treaty expired on
December 9, 2009.
Over the weekend, the President sent a letter to the Senate
reaffirming ``the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile
defense systems.'' There is nothing within the treaty itself--I
emphasize ``nothing in the treaty''--that would hamper the development
of missile defense or its deployment. Our military and intelligence
leaders all have said that.
Obviously, something could happen down the road involving differences
over missile defense systems that could require either country--Russia
or the United States--to withdraw from the treaty. That is any
sovereign country's right with any treaty. In 2002, President Bush
withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because of our desire
to pursue missile defenses to protect us from an attack by a rogue
state.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record the President's letter on missile defense.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, DC, December 18, 2010.
Hon. Mitch McConnell,
Minority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McConnell: As the Senate considers the New
START Treaty, I want to share with you my views on the issue
of missile defense, which has been the subject of much debate
in the Senate's review of the Treaty.
Pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999
(Public Law 106-38), it has long been the policy of the
United States to deploy as soon as is technologically
possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable
of defending the territory of the United States against
limited ballistic missile attack, whether accidental,
unauthorized, or deliberate. Thirty ground-based interceptors
based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, are now defending the Nation. All United States
missile defense programs--including all phases of the
European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (EPAA)
and programs to defend United States deployed forces, allies,
and partners against regional threats--are consistent with
this policy.
The New START Treaty places no limitations on the
development or deployment of our missile defense programs. As
the NATO Summit meeting in Lisbon last month underscored, we
are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe
designed to provide full coverage for NATO members on the
continent, as well as deployed U.S. forces, against the
growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic
missiles. The final phase of the system will also augment our
current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles
from Iran targeted against the United States.
All NATO allies agreed in Lisbon that the growing threat of
missile proliferation, and our Article 5 commitment of
collective defense, requires that the Alliance develop a
territorial missile defense capability. The Alliance further
agreed that the EPAA, which I announced in September 2009,
will be a crucial contribution to this capability. Starting
in 2011, we will begin deploying the first phase of the EPAA,
to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and
medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases,
we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-based
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in Romania and Poland
to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planned for the end
of the decade, further upgrades of the SM-3 interceptor will
provide an ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our
defense of NATO European territory, as well as that of the
United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from
Iran.
The Lisbon decisions represent an historic achievement,
making clear that all NATO allies believe we need an
effective territorial missile defense to defend against the
threats we face now and in the future. The EPAA represents
the right response. At Lisbon, the Alliance also invited the
Russian Federation to cooperate on missile defense, which
could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed
by NATO to enhance our common security against common
threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the
Alliance's missile defenses can be strengthened by improving
NATO-Russian relations.
This comes even as we have made clear that the system we
intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and
it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile
defense capabilities. Effective cooperation with Russia could
enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our
combined territorial missile defenses, and at the same time
provide Russia with greater security. Irrespective of how
cooperation with Russia develops, the Alliance alone bears
responsibility for defending NATO's members, consistent with
our Treaty obligations for collective defense. The EPAA and
NATO's territorial missile defense capability will allow us
to do that.
In signing the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation
issued a statement that expressed its view that the
extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty
include a ``build-up in the missile defense capabilities of
the United States of America such that it would give rise to
a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian
Federation.'' Article XIV(3), as you know, gives each Party
the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it believes its
supreme interests are jeopardized.
The United States did not and does not agree with the
Russian statement. We believe that the continued development
and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including
qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do
not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the
Russian Federation, and have provided policy and technical
explanations to Russia on why we believe that to be the case.
Although the United States cannot circumscribe Russia's
sovereign rights under Article XIV(3), we believe that the
continued improvement and deployment of U.S. missile defense
systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the
effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty, and
therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying
Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty.
Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I
am President, and as long
[[Page S10852]]
as the Congress provides the necessary funding, the United
States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile
defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces,
and our allies and partners. My Administration plans to
deploy all four phases of the EPAA. While advances of
technology or future changes in the threat could modify the
details or timing of the later phases of the EPAA--one reason
this approach is called ``adaptive''--I will take every
action available to me to support the deployment of all four
phases.
Sincerely,
Barack Obama.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, ratifying this treaty would extend
the policies of President Nixon, President Reagan, President George
H.W. Bush, President George W. Bush, as well as Democratic Presidents.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the statements
of the last six Republican Secretaries of State, all of whom support
ratification of the treaty.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2010]
The Republican Case for Ratifying New START
(By Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence
S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. Powell)
Republican presidents have long led the crucial fight to
protect the United States against nuclear dangers. That is
why Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush negotiated the SALT I, START I and START II agreements.
It is why President George W. Bush negotiated the Moscow
Treaty. All four recognized that reducing the number of
nuclear arms in an open, verifiable manner would reduce the
risk of nuclear catastrophe and increase the stability of
America's relationship with the Soviet Union and, later, the
Russian Federation. The world is safer today because of the
decades-long effort to reduce its supply of nuclear weapons.
As a result, we urge the Senate to ratify the New START
treaty signed by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev. It is a modest and appropriate continuation of the
START I treaty that expired almost a year ago. It reduces the
number of nuclear weapons that each side deploys while
enabling the United States to maintain a strong nuclear
deterrent and preserving the flexibility to deploy those
forces as we see fit. Along with our obligation to protect
the homeland, the United States has responsibilities to
allies around the world.
The commander of our nuclear forces has testified that the
1,550 warheads allowed under this treaty are sufficient for
all our missions--and seven former nuclear commanders agree.
The defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the head of the Missile Defense Agency--all
originally appointed by a Republican president--argue that
New START is essential for our national defense.
We do not make a recommendation about the exact timing of a
Senate ratification vote. That is a matter for the
administration and Senate leaders. The most important thing
is to have bipartisan support for the treaty, as previous
nuclear arms treaties did.
Although each of us had initial questions about New START,
administration officials have provided reasonable answers. We
believe there are compelling reasons Republicans should
support ratification.
First, the agreement emphasizes verification, providing a
valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the
original START expired last December, Russia has not been
required to provide notifications about changes in its
strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been
unable to conduct on-site inspections. Each day, America's
understanding of Russia's arsenal has been degraded, and
resources have been diverted from national security tasks to
try to fill the gaps. Our military planners increasingly lack
the best possible insight into Russia's activity with its
strategic nuclear arsenal, making it more difficult to carry
out their nuclear deterrent mission.
Second, New START preserves our ability to deploy effective
missile defenses. The testimonies of our military commanders
and civilian leaders make clear that the treaty does not
limit U.S. missile defense plans. Although the treaty
prohibits the conversion of existing launchers for
intercontinental and submarine-based ballistic missiles, our
military leaders say they do not want to do that because it
is more expensive and less effective than building new ones
for defense purposes.
Finally, the Obama administration has agreed to provide for
modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining
our nuclear arsenal. Funding these efforts has become part of
the negotiations in the ratification process. The
administration has put forth a 10-year plan to spend $84
billion on the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex.
Much of the credit for getting the administration to add $14
billion to the originally proposed $70 billion for
modernization goes to Sen. Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican
who has been vigilant in this effort. Implementing this
modernization program in a timely fashion would be important
in ensuring that our nuclear arsenal is maintained
appropriately over the next decade and beyond.
Although the United States needs a strong and reliable
nuclear force, the chief nuclear danger today comes not from
Russia but from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea and
the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of
terrorists. Given those pressing dangers, some question why
an arms control treaty with Russia matters. It matters
because it is in both parties' interest that there be
transparency and stability in their strategic nuclear
relationship. It also matters because Russia's cooperation
will be needed if we are to make progress in rolling back the
Iranian and North Korean programs. Russian help will be
needed to continue our work to secure ``loose nukes'' in
Russia and elsewhere. And Russian assistance is needed to
improve the situation in Afghanistan, a breeding ground for
international terrorism.
Obviously, the United States does not sign arms control
agreements just to make friends. Any treaty must be
considered on its merits. But we have here an agreement that
is clearly in our national interest, and we should consider
the ramifications of not ratifying it.
Whenever New START is brought up for debate, we encourage
all senators to focus on national security. There are plenty
of opportunities to battle on domestic political issues
linked to the future of the American economy. With our
country facing the dual threats of unemployment and a growing
federal debt bomb, we anticipate significant conflict between
Democrats and Republicans. It is, however, in the national
interest to ratify New START.
Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I will vote to ratify this treaty.
The vote we are about to have today is about whether to end debate. The
majority's decision to jam through other matters during this lameduck
session has poisoned the well, driven away Republican votes, and
jeopardized ratification of this important treaty.
Nevertheless, this treaty was presented in the Senate on May 13,
after 12 hearings in two committees and many briefings. The Foreign
Relations Committee reported the treaty to the Senate on September 16
in a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4. For several months, there have been
intense negotiations to develop a realistic plan and the funding for
nuclear modernization. That updated plan was reported on November 17.
The Senate voted to proceed to the treaty last Wednesday. I voted no
because I thought there should still be more time allowed for amendment
and debate.
Despite the flawed process, I believe the treaty and the nuclear
modernization plan make our country safer and more secure. It will
allow us to resume inspection and verification of disarmament of
nuclear weapons in Russia. The head of our missile defense system says
the treaty will not hamper our missile development program--and if it
does, we can withdraw from the treaty.
All six former Republican Secretaries of State support ratification
of this treaty. Therefore, I will vote to ratify the New START treaty
and during the next several years vote to fund the nuclear
modernization plan.
I yield the floor.
____________________