[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 172 (Tuesday, December 21, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10850-S10852]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I will vote to ratify the New START 
treaty between the United States and Russia because it leaves our 
country with enough nuclear warheads to blow any attacker to kingdom 
come and because the President has committed to an $85 billion 10-year 
plan to make sure those weapons work. I will vote for the treaty 
because it allows for inspection of Russian warheads and because our 
military leaders say it does nothing to interfere with the development 
of a missile defense system.
  I will vote for the treaty because the last six Republican 
Secretaries of State support its ratification. In short, I am convinced 
that Americans are safer and more secure with the New START treaty than 
without it. Last week, I joined Senators Inouye, Cochran, and Feinstein 
in a letter to the President stating that we will vote to ratify the 
treaty and to appropriate funds to modernize our outdated nuclear 
weapons facilities and that he, the President, requests those funds in 
his budget.
  Last night, I received a response to the President saying he would do 
so. I ask unanimous consent to have printed both letters in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, December 16, 2010.
     The White House,
     1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We are writing to express our support 
     for ratification of the New START Treaty and full funding for 
     the modernization of our nuclear weapons arsenal, as outlined 
     by your updated report that was mandated by Section 1251 of 
     the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
       We also ask that, in your future budget requests to 
     Congress, you include the funding identified in that report 
     on nuclear weapons modernization. Should you choose to limit 
     non-defense discretionary spending in any future budget 
     requests to Congress, funding for nuclear modernization in 
     the National Nuclear Security Agency's proposed budgets 
     should be considered defense spending, as it is critical to 
     national security and, therefore, not subject to such 
     limitations. Further, we ask that an updated 1251 report be 
     submitted with your budget request to Congress each year.
       We look forward to working with you on the ratification of 
     the New START Treaty and modernization of the National 
     Nuclear Security Agency's nuclear weapons facilities. This 
     represents a long-term commitment by each of us, as 
     modernization of our nuclear arsenal will require a sustained 
     effort.
           Sincerely,
     Daniel Inouye.
     Dianne Feinstein.
     Thad Cochran.
     Lamar Alexander.
                                  ____



                                              The White House,

                                 Washington DC, December 20, 2010.
     Hon. Lamar Alexander,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Alexander: Thank you for your letter regarding 
     funding for the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex 
     and for your expression of support for ratification of the 
     New START Treaty.
       As you know, in the Fiscal Year 2011 budget, I requested a 
     nearly 10 percent increase in the budget for weapons 
     activities at the National Nuclear Security Administration 
     (NNSA). In May, in the report required by Section 1251 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, I 
     laid out a 10 year, $80 billion spending plan for NNSA. The 
     Administration submitted an update to that report last month, 
     and we now project over $85 billion in spending over the next 
     decade.
       I recognize that nuclear modernization requires investment 
     for the long-term, in addition to this one-year budget 
     increase. That is my commitment to the Congress--that my 
     Administration will pursue these programs and capabilities 
     for as long as I am President.
       In future years, we will provide annual updates to the 1251 
     report. If a decision is made to limit non-defense 
     discretionary spending in any future budget requests, funding 
     for nuclear modernization in the NNSA weapons activities 
     account will be considered on the same basis as defense 
     spending.
       In closing, I thought it important for you to know that 
     over the last two days, my Administration has worked closely 
     with officials from the Russian Federation to address our 
     concerns regarding North Korea. Because of important 
     cooperation like this, I continue to hope that the Senate 
     will approve the New START Treaty before the 111th Congress 
     ends.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Barack Obama.

  Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, why are these two so necessarily 
linked--the treaty and the plan for nuclear weapons modernization? The 
answer is, if we are going to reduce our number of warheads, we want to 
make sure we are not left with what amounts to a collection of wet 
matches. Defense Secretary Gates said:

       There is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible 
     deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile 
     without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing 
     a modernization program.

  In a November 24 statement, Senators Kyl and Corker said they ``could 
not support reductions in U.S. nuclear forces unless there is adequate 
attention to modernizing those forces and the infrastructure that 
supports them.''
  Senators Kyl and Corker deserve credit for untiring efforts to fund 
properly nuclear modernization. President Obama deserves credit for 
updating the nuclear modernization plan in such a significant way.
  I have reviewed that so-called ``1251 plan'' completed November 17 of 
this year, which calls for spending $85 billion over the next 10 years. 
I have visited our outdated nuclear weapons facilities. I am convinced 
the plan's implementation will make giant steps toward modernization of 
those facilities so that we--and our allies and adversaries--can be 
assured that the weapons will work if needed.
  The President's statement that he will ask for these funds and the 
support of senior members of the Appropriations Committee means that 
the plan is more likely to become a reality. The President agrees that 
in tight budgets these funds should be considered as defense spending.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a summary of 
the appropriations recommended by

[[Page S10851]]

the plan mandated by section 1251 of the 2010 Defense authorization 
bill.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
     3. Summary of NNSA Stockpile and Infrastructure Costs
       A summary of estimated costs specifically related to the 
     Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, the supporting infrastructure, and 
     critical science, technology and engineering is provided in 
     Table 1.

                                      TABLE 1--TEN-YEAR PROJECTIONS FOR WEAPONS STOCKPILE AND INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Fiscal Year
           $ Billions           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    2010       2011       2012       2013       2014       2015       2016       2017       2018       2019       2020
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directed Stockpile.............        1.5        1.9        2.0        2.1        2.3        2.5        2.6        2.6        2.6        2.6        2.6
Science Technology &                   1.6        1.7        1.8        1.8        1.8        1.8        1.9        2.0        2.1        2.2        2.3
 Engineering Campaigns.........
Readiness in Technical Base and        1.8        1.8        2.1        2.3        2.5        2.5        2.5        2.7    2.8-2.9    2.9-3.1    2.9-3.3
 Facilities....................
UPF............................        0.1        0.1        0.2        0.2        0.4        0.4        0.4   0.48-0.5   0.48-0.5   0.48-0.5   0.38-0.5
CMRR...........................        0.1        0.2        0.3        0.3        0.4        0.4        0.4   0.48-0.5    0.4-0.5    03.-0.5    02.-0.5
Secure Transportation..........        0.2        0.2        0.3        0.2        0.3        0.3        0.3        0.3        0.3        0.3        0.3
                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Defense Programs Subtotal..        5.2        5.7        6.1        6.5        6.9        7.1        7.3    7.5-7.6    7.7-7.9    7.9-8.2    8.0-8.4
Other Weapons..................        1.2        1.3        1.3        1.3        1.3        1.3        1.4        1.4        1.4        1.4        1.5
                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subtotal, Weapons..........        6.4        7.0        7.4        7.8        8.2        8.5        8.7    8.9-9.0    9.2-9.3    9.4-9.6    9.4-9.8
Contractor Pensions Cost Growth  .........  .........        0.2        0.2        0.2        0.2        0.2          *          *          *          *
                                ========================================================================================================================
    Total, Weapons.............        6.4        7.0        7.6        7.9        8.4        8.7        8.9    8.9-9.0    9.2-9.3    9.4-9.6    9.4-9.8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Numbers may not add due to rounding.
* Anticipated costs for contractor pensions have been calculated only through FY 2016. For FY 2017-2020, uncertainties in market performance, interest
  rate movement, and portfolio management make prediction of actual additional pension liabilities, assets, and contribution requirements unreliable.

  Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I will offer an amendment at the 
appropriate time to the resolution of ratification to require an annual 
update of the 1251 report, which the President's letter says he will 
do.
  Under the terms of the treaty, the United States may have 1,550 
deployed strategic nuclear weapons, each one up to 30 times more 
powerful than the one used at Hiroshima to end World War II.
  The United States will also gain valuable data, including through 
inspection operations that should provide a treasure trove of 
intelligence about Russian activities that we would not have without 
the treaty, and that we have not had since the START treaty expired on 
December 9, 2009.
  Over the weekend, the President sent a letter to the Senate 
reaffirming ``the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile 
defense systems.'' There is nothing within the treaty itself--I 
emphasize ``nothing in the treaty''--that would hamper the development 
of missile defense or its deployment. Our military and intelligence 
leaders all have said that.
  Obviously, something could happen down the road involving differences 
over missile defense systems that could require either country--Russia 
or the United States--to withdraw from the treaty. That is any 
sovereign country's right with any treaty. In 2002, President Bush 
withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because of our desire 
to pursue missile defenses to protect us from an attack by a rogue 
state.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the 
Record the President's letter on missile defense.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                Washington, DC, December 18, 2010.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     Minority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: As the Senate considers the New 
     START Treaty, I want to share with you my views on the issue 
     of missile defense, which has been the subject of much debate 
     in the Senate's review of the Treaty.
       Pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
     (Public Law 106-38), it has long been the policy of the 
     United States to deploy as soon as is technologically 
     possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable 
     of defending the territory of the United States against 
     limited ballistic missile attack, whether accidental, 
     unauthorized, or deliberate. Thirty ground-based interceptors 
     based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, 
     California, are now defending the Nation. All United States 
     missile defense programs--including all phases of the 
     European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (EPAA) 
     and programs to defend United States deployed forces, allies, 
     and partners against regional threats--are consistent with 
     this policy.
       The New START Treaty places no limitations on the 
     development or deployment of our missile defense programs. As 
     the NATO Summit meeting in Lisbon last month underscored, we 
     are proceeding apace with a missile defense system in Europe 
     designed to provide full coverage for NATO members on the 
     continent, as well as deployed U.S. forces, against the 
     growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic 
     missiles. The final phase of the system will also augment our 
     current defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles 
     from Iran targeted against the United States.
       All NATO allies agreed in Lisbon that the growing threat of 
     missile proliferation, and our Article 5 commitment of 
     collective defense, requires that the Alliance develop a 
     territorial missile defense capability. The Alliance further 
     agreed that the EPAA, which I announced in September 2009, 
     will be a crucial contribution to this capability. Starting 
     in 2011, we will begin deploying the first phase of the EPAA, 
     to protect large parts of southern Europe from short- and 
     medium-range ballistic missile threats. In subsequent phases, 
     we will deploy longer-range and more effective land-based 
     Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in Romania and Poland 
     to protect Europe against medium- and intermediate-range 
     ballistic missiles. In the final phase, planned for the end 
     of the decade, further upgrades of the SM-3 interceptor will 
     provide an ascent-phase intercept capability to augment our 
     defense of NATO European territory, as well as that of the 
     United States, against future threats of ICBMs launched from 
     Iran.
       The Lisbon decisions represent an historic achievement, 
     making clear that all NATO allies believe we need an 
     effective territorial missile defense to defend against the 
     threats we face now and in the future. The EPAA represents 
     the right response. At Lisbon, the Alliance also invited the 
     Russian Federation to cooperate on missile defense, which 
     could lead to adding Russian capabilities to those deployed 
     by NATO to enhance our common security against common 
     threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated that the 
     Alliance's missile defenses can be strengthened by improving 
     NATO-Russian relations.
       This comes even as we have made clear that the system we 
     intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and 
     it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's missile 
     defense capabilities. Effective cooperation with Russia could 
     enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of our 
     combined territorial missile defenses, and at the same time 
     provide Russia with greater security. Irrespective of how 
     cooperation with Russia develops, the Alliance alone bears 
     responsibility for defending NATO's members, consistent with 
     our Treaty obligations for collective defense. The EPAA and 
     NATO's territorial missile defense capability will allow us 
     to do that.
       In signing the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation 
     issued a statement that expressed its view that the 
     extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the Treaty 
     include a ``build-up in the missile defense capabilities of 
     the United States of America such that it would give rise to 
     a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian 
     Federation.'' Article XIV(3), as you know, gives each Party 
     the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it believes its 
     supreme interests are jeopardized.
       The United States did not and does not agree with the 
     Russian statement. We believe that the continued development 
     and deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including 
     qualitative and quantitative improvements to such systems, do 
     not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the 
     Russian Federation, and have provided policy and technical 
     explanations to Russia on why we believe that to be the case. 
     Although the United States cannot circumscribe Russia's 
     sovereign rights under Article XIV(3), we believe that the 
     continued improvement and deployment of U.S. missile defense 
     systems do not constitute a basis for questioning the 
     effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty, and 
     therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying 
     Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty.
       Regardless of Russia's actions in this regard, as long as I 
     am President, and as long

[[Page S10852]]

     as the Congress provides the necessary funding, the United 
     States will continue to develop and deploy effective missile 
     defenses to protect the United States, our deployed forces, 
     and our allies and partners. My Administration plans to 
     deploy all four phases of the EPAA. While advances of 
     technology or future changes in the threat could modify the 
     details or timing of the later phases of the EPAA--one reason 
     this approach is called ``adaptive''--I will take every 
     action available to me to support the deployment of all four 
     phases.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Barack Obama.

  Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, ratifying this treaty would extend 
the policies of President Nixon, President Reagan, President George 
H.W. Bush, President George W. Bush, as well as Democratic Presidents.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the statements 
of the last six Republican Secretaries of State, all of whom support 
ratification of the treaty.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Dec. 2, 2010]

              The Republican Case for Ratifying New START

(By Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence 
                  S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. Powell)

       Republican presidents have long led the crucial fight to 
     protect the United States against nuclear dangers. That is 
     why Presidents Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. 
     Bush negotiated the SALT I, START I and START II agreements. 
     It is why President George W. Bush negotiated the Moscow 
     Treaty. All four recognized that reducing the number of 
     nuclear arms in an open, verifiable manner would reduce the 
     risk of nuclear catastrophe and increase the stability of 
     America's relationship with the Soviet Union and, later, the 
     Russian Federation. The world is safer today because of the 
     decades-long effort to reduce its supply of nuclear weapons.
       As a result, we urge the Senate to ratify the New START 
     treaty signed by President Obama and Russian President Dmitry 
     Medvedev. It is a modest and appropriate continuation of the 
     START I treaty that expired almost a year ago. It reduces the 
     number of nuclear weapons that each side deploys while 
     enabling the United States to maintain a strong nuclear 
     deterrent and preserving the flexibility to deploy those 
     forces as we see fit. Along with our obligation to protect 
     the homeland, the United States has responsibilities to 
     allies around the world.
       The commander of our nuclear forces has testified that the 
     1,550 warheads allowed under this treaty are sufficient for 
     all our missions--and seven former nuclear commanders agree. 
     The defense secretary, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff and the head of the Missile Defense Agency--all 
     originally appointed by a Republican president--argue that 
     New START is essential for our national defense.
       We do not make a recommendation about the exact timing of a 
     Senate ratification vote. That is a matter for the 
     administration and Senate leaders. The most important thing 
     is to have bipartisan support for the treaty, as previous 
     nuclear arms treaties did.
       Although each of us had initial questions about New START, 
     administration officials have provided reasonable answers. We 
     believe there are compelling reasons Republicans should 
     support ratification.
       First, the agreement emphasizes verification, providing a 
     valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the 
     original START expired last December, Russia has not been 
     required to provide notifications about changes in its 
     strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been 
     unable to conduct on-site inspections. Each day, America's 
     understanding of Russia's arsenal has been degraded, and 
     resources have been diverted from national security tasks to 
     try to fill the gaps. Our military planners increasingly lack 
     the best possible insight into Russia's activity with its 
     strategic nuclear arsenal, making it more difficult to carry 
     out their nuclear deterrent mission.
       Second, New START preserves our ability to deploy effective 
     missile defenses. The testimonies of our military commanders 
     and civilian leaders make clear that the treaty does not 
     limit U.S. missile defense plans. Although the treaty 
     prohibits the conversion of existing launchers for 
     intercontinental and submarine-based ballistic missiles, our 
     military leaders say they do not want to do that because it 
     is more expensive and less effective than building new ones 
     for defense purposes.
       Finally, the Obama administration has agreed to provide for 
     modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining 
     our nuclear arsenal. Funding these efforts has become part of 
     the negotiations in the ratification process. The 
     administration has put forth a 10-year plan to spend $84 
     billion on the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex. 
     Much of the credit for getting the administration to add $14 
     billion to the originally proposed $70 billion for 
     modernization goes to Sen. Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican 
     who has been vigilant in this effort. Implementing this 
     modernization program in a timely fashion would be important 
     in ensuring that our nuclear arsenal is maintained 
     appropriately over the next decade and beyond.
       Although the United States needs a strong and reliable 
     nuclear force, the chief nuclear danger today comes not from 
     Russia but from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea and 
     the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of 
     terrorists. Given those pressing dangers, some question why 
     an arms control treaty with Russia matters. It matters 
     because it is in both parties' interest that there be 
     transparency and stability in their strategic nuclear 
     relationship. It also matters because Russia's cooperation 
     will be needed if we are to make progress in rolling back the 
     Iranian and North Korean programs. Russian help will be 
     needed to continue our work to secure ``loose nukes'' in 
     Russia and elsewhere. And Russian assistance is needed to 
     improve the situation in Afghanistan, a breeding ground for 
     international terrorism.
       Obviously, the United States does not sign arms control 
     agreements just to make friends. Any treaty must be 
     considered on its merits. But we have here an agreement that 
     is clearly in our national interest, and we should consider 
     the ramifications of not ratifying it.
       Whenever New START is brought up for debate, we encourage 
     all senators to focus on national security. There are plenty 
     of opportunities to battle on domestic political issues 
     linked to the future of the American economy. With our 
     country facing the dual threats of unemployment and a growing 
     federal debt bomb, we anticipate significant conflict between 
     Democrats and Republicans. It is, however, in the national 
     interest to ratify New START.

  Mr. ALEXANDER. Madam President, I will vote to ratify this treaty. 
The vote we are about to have today is about whether to end debate. The 
majority's decision to jam through other matters during this lameduck 
session has poisoned the well, driven away Republican votes, and 
jeopardized ratification of this important treaty.
  Nevertheless, this treaty was presented in the Senate on May 13, 
after 12 hearings in two committees and many briefings. The Foreign 
Relations Committee reported the treaty to the Senate on September 16 
in a bipartisan vote of 14 to 4. For several months, there have been 
intense negotiations to develop a realistic plan and the funding for 
nuclear modernization. That updated plan was reported on November 17. 
The Senate voted to proceed to the treaty last Wednesday. I voted no 
because I thought there should still be more time allowed for amendment 
and debate.
  Despite the flawed process, I believe the treaty and the nuclear 
modernization plan make our country safer and more secure. It will 
allow us to resume inspection and verification of disarmament of 
nuclear weapons in Russia. The head of our missile defense system says 
the treaty will not hamper our missile development program--and if it 
does, we can withdraw from the treaty.
  All six former Republican Secretaries of State support ratification 
of this treaty. Therefore, I will vote to ratify the New START treaty 
and during the next several years vote to fund the nuclear 
modernization plan.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________