[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 171 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10802-S10805]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 4904, as Modified
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment
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No. 4904 to the resolution of ratification be brought up as pending.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. KYL. Reserving the right to object, I apologize. Did Senator
Corker ask a unanimous consent request?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, to call up an amendment.
Mr. KYL. But to return to the treaty upon its disposition; is that
correct?
Mr. CORKER. That is what I was just getting ready to say.
Mr. KYL. Might I ask the Senator from Tennessee whether he talked
with one of the Senators from South Carolina about this?
Mr. CORKER. I have not. I attempted to do so. He was off the floor by
the time----
Mr. KYL. I do not have any objections as long as we return to the
treaty so those who have amendments to the treaty will at least have
their rights protected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection?
Mr. KYL. I will not object. I simply note that I think we will need
an understanding that we will work with our other interested colleagues
on a way forward on all of these issues. Having expressed that as a
matter of good faith, I suspect we can do that.
Mr. CORKER. Absolutely.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to accept the
modification. It is modified slightly. I want to make sure that is
acceptable.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
Mr. CORKER. It was a modification that the staff of the chairman
suggested.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Corker] proposes an
amendment numbered 4904, as modified.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To provide a condition and a additional element of the
understanding regarding the effectiveness and viability of the New
START Treaty and United States missile defenses)
At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of
Ratification, add the following:
(11) Effectiveness and viability of new start treaty and
united states missile defenses.--Prior to the entry into
force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to
the Senate, and shall communicate to the Russian Federation,
that it shall be the policy of the United States that the
continued development and deployment of United States missile
defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative
improvements to such systems, including all phases of the
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defenses in Europe
maintaining the option to use Ground-Based Interceptors, do
not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the
Russian Federation. Consequently, while the United States
cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian
Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty,
the continued improvement and deployment of United States
missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for
questioning the effectiveness and viability of the Treaty,
and therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying
the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty.
At the end of subsection (b)(1)(C), strike ``United
States.'' and insert the following: ``United States; and
(D) the preamble of the New START Treaty does not impose a
legal obligation on the United States.
Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that we now
return to the treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is on the treaty.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the New START
treaty. Before I begin, I would like to thank Senator Kerry and Senator
Lugar for their leadership on this important arms control agreement.
When I first began to consider this treaty, I considered the
fundamental question of whether we are better off with it or without it
since the previous START treaty expired a year ago. By reducing the
number of deployed nuclear weapons in a mutual and verifiable way, I
believe that this treaty does enhance our security, but it is not
without flaws.
Our choice is not, however, between some ideal treaty and the New
START treaty. It is between this treaty and having no inspection regime
in place at all since the previous START treaty expired in December of
2009.
In evaluating this treaty, I scrutinized several issues including the
effect on our Nation's security, the need to modernize our nuclear
deterrent, the effectiveness of verification and inspection regimes,
and the impact on missile defense.
These and other issues were fully covered in classified briefings as
well as in the seven Senate Armed Services Committee hearings that I
attended that included testimony from Secretary of Defense Gates,
Secretary of State Clinton, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton, the commander of our nuclear
forces. We also heard testimony from the three current directors of our
national nuclear laboratories and a number of former government
officials and national security experts.
I met personally with Rose Gottemoeller, the top U.S. treaty
negotiator, and sought counsel from GEN Brent Scowcroft, who has served
as an adviser to four Republican Presidents and was the National
Security Adviser to President George H. W. Bush.
I also have met with a wide range of Mainers--foreign policy experts,
religious leaders, and former members of the military--who expressed
their views on the treaty to me.
Clearly, the New START treaty enjoys broad bipartisan support.
Secretaries of State for the past five Republican Presidents, including
GEN Colin Powell, support its ratification, as does former Maine
Senator and former Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen.
No Member of this body should support a treaty simply because it has
strong bipartisan support. But neither should we withhold our support
for a treaty simply because it was negotiated and signed by a President
from a different political party.
The fact is that the New START treaty is a modest arms control
agreement. The treaty does not require the destruction of a single
nuclear weapon. Under the New START framework, a 30-percent reduction
in the number of deployed warheads in the arsenals of the United States
and Russia will be required.
As such, the New START treaty places the United States and the
Russian Federation on a path to achieve mutual and verifiable
reductions over the next 7 years. Failure to ratify a treaty that makes
modest reductions in the deployment of nuclear weapons would represent
a giant step backwards in the commitment of the United States to arms
control. If we cannot reduce the deployed nuclear stockpiles of the two
countries that hold 9 of every 10 nuclear weapons in the world, how can
we expect other countries not to seek any nuclear weapons?
Yet the New START treaty has significance beyond its function as an
arms control agreement. New START is one component of our bilateral
relationship with the Russian Federation. In April 2009, I traveled to
Moscow with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl
Levin. At that time, I indicated that while I supported the President's
commitment to reset the U.S.-Russian relationship, it was ultimately up
to the Russians to see if they wanted to have a stronger relationship.
Since then, Russia has expanded the use of northern supply routes for
our military forces in Afghanistan and has cancelled the sale of
advanced surface to air missiles to Iran. These are positive steps.
During that same trip to Moscow, Chairman Levin and I sought to
encourage Russian officials to cooperate on missile defense in Europe.
And this issue of missile defense raises an important point about the
U.S.-Russian relationship. Just because our relationship with the
Russians is important does not mean that we must compromise on an issue
vital to our national security. One of those issues is missile defense.
I was troubled when I read the unilateral statements made by Russian
leaders who sought to make a binding tie between missile defense and
the New START agreement.
The Kerry-Lugar resolution of ratification eliminates any doubt that
the United States will continue to develop missile defense systems. The
proposed resolution of ratification clarifies that the treaty places no
limitation on the
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deployment of U.S. missile defense systems except for those contained
in article 5. It further clarifies that the Russian unilateral
statement regarding missile defense ``does not impose a legal
obligation on the United States.''
The resolution of ratification goes beyond expressing the position
that the United States will deploy an effective national missile
defense system. It declares that the United States is committed to
improving its strategic defensive capabilities, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, during the lifetime of the treaty.
In addition to developing a robust missile defense capability, it is
equally imperative that the United States maintain a modernized nuclear
weapons program as we consider further reductions in nuclear arms.
In March, I traveled with my good friend from Arizona, Senator Kyl,
to discuss nuclear modernization with our allies. I learned a great
deal from an in-depth briefing with French physicists about our need to
modernize our own nuclear arsenal.
As Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, ``The United States is the
only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear
arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.'' The
Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission noted that the nuclear
weapons complex ``physical infrastructure is in serious need of
transformation.''
In response, the administration has made a commitment to invest $14
billion in new funding over the next 10 years for the nuclear weapons
complex. As a result, the safety, stability, and reliability of our
nuclear deterrent can be improved. The new investments will double the
surveillance within the nuclear stockpile from fiscal year 2009 to
fiscal year 2011. Finally, the Administration has proposed nearly $9
billion for our plutonium and uranium facilities, and it has made a
commitment to request additional funding necessary for those facilities
once the designs are completed.
While the New START treaty contributes to reducing the threat of
nuclear war and strengthens nuclear nonproliferation efforts, it is
disappointing to me that the treaty reflects an outdated view of one of
the primary threats to our national security. This treaty does not
address the significant disparity between the number of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in Russia's stockpile compared to our own.
The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission reported that
Russia had an estimated 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons compared to
fewer than 500 in our own stockpile. By maintaining a distinction
between the threats of nuclear attack that warrant the ratification of
a treaty from those nuclear threats that do not simply based upon the
distance from which a nuclear weapon is launched or the method by which
such a weapon is launched, we preserve a Cold War mentality regarding
the nuclear threats facing our country.
The large numerical disparity in the number of warheads each country
maintains is not the only reason they warrant a higher priority than
they were given by either country in this treaty.
As the ranking member of the Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, I believe that the characteristics of tactical
nuclear weapons, particularly their vulnerability for theft and
potential for nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers essential
to our national security.
President Obama correctly described the greatest threat facing our
Nation in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review when he said that ``the
threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear
attack has increased . . . today's most immediate and extreme danger is
nuclear terrorism.''
Several arms control groups, including the Stimson Center, the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Union of Concerned Scientists,
have each stated that the danger of these weapons rests not only in the
destructive power of each weapon but also because they are vulnerable
to theft by rogue nations and terrorist groups.
Earlier this month, I wrote to Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton
about my concerns regarding this issue and requested a commitment from
them to seek reductions in the number of Russian tactical nuclear
weapons.
I would like to read a portion of their response for those of my
colleagues who share my concern regarding this disparity:
The Administration is committed to seeking improved
security of, and reductions in, Russian tactical nuclear
weapons. We agree with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's call, in the resolution of advice and consent to
ratification of the New START treaty, to pursue an agreement
with the Russians to address them. These negotiations offer
our best chance to constrain Russian tactical nuclear
weapons, but we believe Russia will be unlikely to begin such
negotiations if the New START treaty does not enter into
force.
The letter further states that:
With regard to future agreements, we strongly agree with
you that the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons--
particularly their vulnerability to theft, misuse, or
acquisition by terrorists--make reducing their numbers and
enhancing their safety and security extremely important.
I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretaries and their
response be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
So where does that leave us? Does the New START treaty lead to mutual
and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms? Does the New START treaty
renew our Nation's commitment to arms control? Given the commitments by
the administration, will it reinvigorate our nuclear nonproliferation
efforts?
The answers to these questions were most succinctly addressed in a
statement by the leader who negotiated and signed the first START
treaty, former President George H.W. Bush. I will conclude by
associating myself with his comments on the issue, which I will read in
full: ``I urge the United States Senate to ratify the [New] START
treaty.''
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, December 3, 2010.
Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State,
Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Clinton: I want to thank the Administration
for making its experts available to discuss the proposed New
START and its associated issues, including the importance of
modernizing the nuclear weapons complex in light of proposed
reductions in our deployed nuclear forces. I support the
recent commitment President Obama made to increase the
investments for nuclear modernization by $4.1 billion and to
fully fund the costs associated with new facilities as the
design for these facilities are completed. The Administration
has also answered many of my concerns about verification and
inspections. Although I believe the verification and
inspection requirements of the now expired START treaty were
preferable, the explanations regarding the new verification
methods have helped to assuage my concerns.
There is, however, a remaining issue that must be resolved
before I can conclude that the treaty warrants my support.
The New START treaty does not address the significant
disparity between the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons
in the stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United
States. By maintaining a distinction between the threats of
nuclear attack that warrant the ratification of a treaty from
those nuclear threats that do not simply based upon the
distance from which a nuclear weapon is launched or the
method by which such a weapon is delivered, we preserve an
outdated model regarding the nuclear threats facing our
country. Any nuclear attack on our country or one of our
allies, not just those that are launched quickly from a great
distance, would be devastating.
The characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons,
particularly their vulnerability for theft and misuse for
nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers important now.
Several arms control groups, including the Stimson Center,
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Union of
Concerned Scientists, have stated that the danger of tactical
nuclear weapons rests not only in the destructive power of
each weapon, but also because they are vulnerable to theft by
terrorist groups. President Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review echoes the concern of nuclear terrorism: ``The threat
of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of
nuclear attack has increased . . . today's most immediate and
extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their
extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons.''
Non-strategic delivery systems are also as capable as some
of the strategic delivery vehicles covered under New START of
delivering a swift nuclear attack. For example, the Russian
Federation is capable of deploying submarine-launched cruise
missiles armed with nuclear warheads. According to press
reports, a new type of Russian attack submarine capable of
launching nuclear-armed cruise missiles is expected to enter
service in late 2010. My understanding is that, unlike
submarine launched ballistic
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missiles, these nuclear-tipped cruise missiles would not be
counted under New START. In addition, I was troubled to learn
of reports in the New York Times that the Russian Federation
moved short-range tactical nuclear weapons closer to the
territory of our NATO allies and U.S. deployed forces in
Europe earlier this year, apparently in response to the
deployment of missile defense capabilities there.
Insufficiently addressing these weapons may make it more
difficult to achieve future nuclear arms control agreements.
According to the independent Perry-Schlesinger Strategic
Posture Commission report, the Russian Federation has about
3,800 tactical nuclear weapons and the United States has less
than 500 tactical nuclear weapons. If the New START treaty is
ratified, the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by
both countries will be evenly balanced. Absent a significant
unilateral reduction in tactical nuclear warheads by the
Russian Federation, any effort to reduce the disparity in
these weapons may lead to unacceptable concessions regarding
U.S. capabilities that are not tied to the size of the
nuclear stockpiles maintained by each country, such as
concessions regarding missile defense or conventional prompt
global strike.
Including non-strategic weapons in strategic arms
negotiations is not unprecedented. On July 31, 1991, the day
START I was signed by President George H.W. Bush and Mikhail
Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. publicly committed to providing the
United States with annual declarations regarding the
deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for the
duration of START I. In addition, the Soviet Union committed
to deploying no more than a single warhead on each cruise
missile and to not exceed the deployment of more than 880
nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in any one year.
On July 27, 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for foreign policy and a member of the
Perry-Schlesinger Commission, testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee that the reason he believed tactical
nuclear weapons were not included in the New START treaty was
because, ``the Russians did not want to engage in
negotiations on their tactical nuclear weapons.'' I think
they will be very wary about ever engaging in serious
negotiations on their tactical nuclear weapons. I also
understand, and would expect, that any reductions of non-
strategic nuclear weapons in Europe would rest, in part, upon
the position of our NATO allies.
Nonetheless, the concerns I have regarding non-strategic
weapons remain outstanding as I consider whether or not the
New START treaty warrants my support. As such, I request that
you provide, in writing, the Administration's plan to address
the disparity between the numbers of non-strategic warheads
of the Russian Federation compared to the United States, in
order that I may consider this information prior to a vote on
the ratification of the New START treaty.
Thank you for your attention to this matter, and for your
service to our nation.
Sincerely,
Susan M. Collins,
United States Senator.
____
Hon. Susan M. Collins,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Collins: Thank you for your letter of December
3, 2010, regarding the New START Treaty. We believe
ratification of the Treaty is essential to preserving core
U.S. national security interests.The Treaty will establish
equal limits on U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads
and strategic delivery systems, and will provide the U.S.
with essential visibility into Russian strategic forces
through on-site inspections, data exchanges, and other
verification provisions.
As you note, the Strategic Posture Commission expressed
concern regarding Russian tactical nuclear weapons. At the
same time, the Commission recommended moving forward quickly
with a new treaty focused on strategic weapons. With the
expiration of the START Treaty in early December 2009, for
the past year the U.S. has had no inspectors with ``boots on
the ground'' to verify Russian strategic forces.
The Administration is committed to seeking improved
security of, and reductions in, Russian tactical (also known
as non-strategic) nuclear weapons. We agree with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's call, in the resolution of
advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty,
to pursue an agreement with the Russians to address them.
These negotiations offer our best chance to constrain Russian
tactical nuclear weapons, but we believe Russia will likely
be unwilling to begin such negotiations if the New START
Treaty does not enter into force. We will consult closely
with Congress and our Allies in planning and conducting any
follow-on negotiations.
At the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, Allied
leaders expressed their strong support for ratifying the New
START Treaty now, and welcomed the principle of including
tactical nuclear weapons in future U.S.-Russian arms control
talks. The U.S. remains committed to retaining the capability
to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in support of its
Alliance commitments. As such, we will replace our nuclear-
capable F-16s with the dual-capable F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, and conduct a full scope Life Extension Program for
the B-61 nuclear bomb to ensure its functionality with the F-
35 and enhance warhead surety.
Your letter notes recent press reports alleging that Russia
has moved tactical nuclear warheads and missiles closer to
Europe. We note that a short-range ballistic missile unit has
long been deployed near Russia's border with Estonia, and
earlier this year the Russians publicly announced that some
SS-26 short-range ballistic missiles would be located there.
Although this deployment does not alter either the balance in
Europe or the U.S.-Russia strategic balance, the U.S. has
made clear that we believe Russia should further consolidate
its tactical nuclear weapons in a small number of secure
facilities deep within Russia.
With regard to future agreements, we strongly agree with
you that the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons--
particularly their vulnerability to theft, misuse, or
acquisition by terrorists--make reducing their numbers and
enhancing their safety and security extremely important. That
is why when President Obama signed the New START Treaty in
April, he made clear that ``going forward, we hope to pursue
discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and
tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons.''
Thank you for the opportunity to address the important
matters you have raised in connection with the new START
Treaty. We look forward to continuing to work with you on
this and other issues of mutual interest, and urge your
support of New START.
Sincerely,
Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State.
Robert M. Gates,
Secretary of Defense.