[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 171 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10795-S10802]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 4833
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it is my understanding in 45 minutes we
are going to be having a couple votes, one on amendment No. 4833 and
one on the Thune amendment No. 4841, having to do with delivery
systems; mine having
[[Page S10796]]
to do with verification. That would mean we would have 45 minutes to
talk about this.
We have already covered it pretty thoroughly. I think we need to have
an understanding of what we are talking about in terms of verification.
There are only 180 inspections that are authorized by the New START
treaty, and that is over a 10-year period. So we are talking about 18
per year versus the 600 inspections over 15 years in START I. If you do
your math, that would be 40 a year in START I, and down to 18 a year in
New START.
One of the arguments for that is that we have fewer sites to inspect,
and for that reason we do not need to have as many inspections. I would
disagree with that pretty strongly. One thing all the experts seem to
have in common and agreeing to is that once you get down to fewer
sites, the verification becomes more important.
John Bolton, on the 3rd of May, said: ``while [verification is]
important in any arms-control treaty, verification becomes even more
important at lower warhead levels.'' I think they all agree. Brent
Scowcroft said the same thing. He said: ``Current force levels provide
a kind of buffer because they are high enough to be relatively
insensitive to imperfect intelligence and modest force changes. . . .
As force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power can become
increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating''--``to cheating''--
``on arms control limits, concerns about `hidden' missiles, and the
actions of nuclear third parties.''
So he is saying the same thing. James Baker said the same thing. He
said, when testifying recently, that the New START verification program
``does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the
numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions under START I.
This complex part of the treaty is even more crucial when fewer
deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than were allowed in the past.''
Do your math, and it figures out. If you have 10 warheads that you
are going to be inspecting, and they hide 1, that is just 10 percent of
them. If it gets down to 2, and they hide 1, that is 50 percent of
them. That is what they are saying, that we need to have more, not
less. Of course, this is less. In fact, if you do the math a little bit
further, as was said by the Senator from Massachusetts--he said: So I
think it is one thing to ask our strategic forces to do that 10 times a
year, or less than once a month. It is another thing for them to be
waiting for 30 inspections a year. Again quoting him: We have two
submarine bases, three bomber bases, and three ICBM bases. On the other
hand, Russia has 3, 3, and 12. So they actually have 18, and we would
have 8, which means, if you do the math further, they would be able to
inspect one site every 2 years, while we would only be able to inspect
every 2 years. They would be inspecting it every 1 year.
That is the reason we should be doing this. The other thing is--and
people keep forgetting about it because it is not fun to talk about
it--but the fact is, they cheat and we do not. Everyone has talked
about this. We have something that was set up to try to measure who is
cheating, who is not cheating.
We had the START treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
That commission reported--they actually had two reports. One report was
in 2005; one in 2010. In the report in 2005 that was on the Biological
Weapons Convention, the State Department concluded--and I am quoting
from the report of 2005--``Russia maintains a mature offensive
biological weapons program and that its nature and status have not
changed.'' That was after it had been in force for 5 years. That was in
2005.
In 2010, that same Commission comes back, and the report states:
Russia confidence-building measure declarations since 1992 have not
satisfactorily documented whether its biological weapons program was
terminated.
Again we have the Biological Weapons Convention reports in 2005 and
2010, saying they are not complying. In other words, they are cheating.
If you sign an agreement and do not do it, then you are cheating. That
makes sense. On the Chemical Weapons Convention, the same thing. In
2005, the State Department assessed that ``Russia is in violation of
its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was
incomplete with respect to declaration of production and development
facilities.'' So that is what they said in 2005, that they are cheating
on the Chemical Weapons Convention obligations they made, their treaty
obligations.
In 2010, still talking about the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
State Department again stated: There was an absence of additional
information from Russia, resulting in the United States being unable to
ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its chemical weapons
stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities, and all of its
chemical weapons development facilities.
Again, they stated in 2010 that they are still cheating. So it is
always difficult, when you look at these. The Senator from
Massachusetts said: Well, wait a minute now. We have to do the same
thing they have to do, and in your amendment, if we are going to have
three times as many inspections, then we have to do three times as many
and they have to do three times as many. We have to prepare for them
here. I said: Yes, that is my point. We need to have more inspections.
We want these inspections to take place. And we want to be sure that
the Russians also adhere to their commitment for inspections, which
they have never done in the past.
When you look at this, we see there are problems with this. When you
talk about using the argument that we cannot change something because
you are changing the treaty, I think that is what we are supposed to
do. We are supposed to be involved in the treaty. The Senator from
Massachusetts was talking about the number of people who were involved
in this thing--the military and all these others in putting this thing
together. Well, guess who was left out? Us. And that is what the
Constitution, under article II, section 2 says, that we in the Senate
are supposed to ratify--advice and consent. Well, we have been advised,
but we have not consented yet. That is what this is all about. The
process works this way.
If we do pass an amendment such as my amendment that will be voted on
in a few minutes to triple the number of inspections, that will change
the treaty, and I understand that. That means it will have to go back
to the Duma in Russia, and they then would have to look at the treaty
and decide whether they would agree with it, and, if not, have them
make a change, and then it comes back to us. It goes back and forth,
and this is what our forefathers had anticipated would happen. Because
of all the people who they talk about, the Senator from Massachusetts
talks about, who were drafting this, the thing they all have in common
is, they are not answerable to the people. We are. I say to the
Presiding Officer, we were both elected. I say to the Presiding
Officer, he was elected and I was elected; and, therefore, we are the
ears and the eyes in the confirmation process for the public, and I
think that is our constitutional obligation. It is very clearly stated.
So we do have serious problems. One thing that is kind of in the
weeds and is a little bit complicated is, when you talk about that my
amendment triples the number of inspections under New START from the
types under the START I treaty, we had two types of inspections. This
is critical. Type one refers to inspections of the ICBM bases,
submarine bases, air bases--these are the delivery systems--to
demonstrate very clearly that we are going to be able to look at those
sites and see if they are carrying out those obligations under the
treaty.
But type two refers to inspections at formerly declared facilities.
They say we have more inspections right now. That is because we did not
even have type two facilities in the START I treaty, because when you
talk about formerly declared facilities, we are talking about
facilities that are closed down. So we want to inspect to make sure
they are closed down. So the test they use to see whether they are
closed down is--they talk about debris. That is how you satisfy to see
whether type two sites have been treated properly. Well, they can have
debris left over from closing one site, and then leave five open that
are supposed to be closed and scatter the debris around to use it
again. There has been testimony that is what they would do.
[[Page S10797]]
I would be glad to yield, since we are going to have two votes coming
up at 6 o'clock on the Thune amendment as well as my amendment, if the
Senator from South Dakota wishes to talk about his amendment, and then
I would be glad to resume my discussion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time until
6 p.m. today be for debate with respect to the pending Inhofe amendment
No. 4833 and pending Thune amendment No. 4841, with the time divided
between the leaders or their designees, with no amendments in order to
either amendment; that at 6 p.m., the Senate then proceed to vote in
relation to the Inhofe amendment; that upon its disposition, the Senate
then proceed to vote in relation to the Thune amendment, with 2 minutes
of debate, equally divided as provided above, prior to the second vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for
yielding some time. We are going to vote on his amendment and on the
amendment I have offered. Both address important subjects in the
treaty. The Senator from Oklahoma is dealing with the issue of
verification and pointing out the shortcomings in the treaty with
regard to that very important issue. The amendment I will have voted on
deals with the issue of delivery vehicles, which, in my judgment, is a
critically important element in this treaty as well.
As I have said earlier today on the floor, what this amendment does--
it is very straightforward and it is very simple--is it just increases
the number of deployed delivery vehicles, which are the bombers, the
submarines, and the ICBMs allowed for in the treaty from 700 to 720.
In terms of background about why that is important--and I want to
inform my colleagues in the Senate about why it is important we get
that number up to 720--I asked at an Armed Services Committee hearing
at what point between the range of 500 and 1,100 delivery systems that
GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
would be comfortable and where we would avoid making our triad into a
dyad.
He said: ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those
levels about midpoint,'' meaning that he would be concerned if the
negotiated number fell below about 800 delivery vehicles. They have
made a distinction--the administration has--between deployed and
nondeployed, that there are 800 there. And he has subsequently said he
could live with a 700 deployed number. But the fact of the matter is
that the concern that was voiced initially about dropping down below
that midpoint level suggests that we need to at least increase up to
where the administration's I guess you would call it their nuclear
force structure plan settled, and that was 720 delivery vehicles.
So the amendment raises from 700 to 720 the number of delivery
vehicles. As I said earlier in my remarks, if you look at what the 1251
report says, it says up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers, up to 420
deployed ICBMs, and 240 deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
on 14 submarines.
If you add up, up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs and 240 deployed
SLBMs, you get a number of 720 delivery vehicles. That is what the
nuclear force structure plan calls for. Yet the treaty specifies 700
delivery vehicles. So there is a 20-delivery vehicle cap there, which I
think is important.
Frankly, if you ask the question about where would those reductions
come from, obviously it would come from either ICBMs or bombers. People
have suggested it doesn't have to come out of the bombers, but if you
did take it out of the bombers, if you reduce the number of bombers
from the 60 that is specified in the nuclear force structure plan to
get down under 700, you would have to take the bombers from 60 down to
40.
As I said earlier today, we have about 96 B-52 nuclear bombers, about
20 B-2 nuclear bombers, and those are total deployed and nondeployed,
the number we have in our inventory arsenal. We have about 94, I think,
that are combat ready. But in any case, we are talking about a
significant reduction in the number of bombers we could deploy at any
given time under the treaty if you get it down to the 700 number.
The question as to whether that would come out of ICBMs or whether it
would come out of bombers to get from 720 down to 700, it could be some
combination of both. But the thing that concerns me about this is we
have a bomber fleet that is aging. Most of our bombers today are pre-
Cuban missile crisis-era vintage bombers--about 47 percent of them are.
We need a follow-on, a next-generation bomber that will fill that role,
that will be survivable in the types of modern-era defenses we are
going to encounter, sophisticated air defense systems that are being
employed by some of our potential adversaries around the world. So if
you think about what we need in terms of a next-generation bomber, we
need a field bomber and we need to do it sooner rather than later and
it needs to be nuclear.
But when asked the question about whether the next bomber would be a
nuclear bomber, the military and the administration have been very
ambiguous on that point. They haven't been able to answer clearly, with
any degree of certainty, about whether the next bomber, the follow-on
bomber, would, in fact, be a nuclear bomber, which would suggest to me
the commitment to the bomber wing of the triad is a lot less than it is
to perhaps the other two legs of the triad.
That being said, let's assume for the moment that if we have up to 60
bombers, we have up to 420 ICBMs, and we have 240 submarine launchable
ballistic missiles, we are talking about a 720 number, not a 700
number. So that is why I think this debate is important and why we are
trying to be insistent in getting those two numbers to match.
The other point I wish to make is with regard to delivery vehicles in
the treaty. We start out right now with about 856 delivery vehicles, if
you add up ICBMs, submarine launchable ballistic missiles, and heavy
bombers. We will end up down at 700. So we are going to take about 156
of our delivery vehicles, reduce that, retire those, and get down to
that 700 number. The Russians, on the other hand, start at about 620.
So they are already well below the 700 number called for in the treaty.
It has been suggested that through attrition they will probably get
down to somewhere in the 400s in delivery vehicles. So this particular
provision in the treaty costs them nothing. We give up 156 delivery
vehicles. They give up nothing. In fact, they can come up to the 700
number. They could increase the number of delivery vehicles they
currently have to come up to that 700 number.
So I think it is important to point out the difference that exists
today and the disparity that exists between the Russian number of
delivery vehicles and the number the United States has at our disposal
and the number called for in the treaty and why that disparity is so
important.
Just one final point, if I might, with regard to the nuclear posture
of the country. We also have to defend not only the United States but
about 30 other countries around the world that fall under the nuclear
umbrella, under our deterrence. The Russians have none. So these
delivery vehicle numbers become even more important, given the
geographic realities the United States has to deal with in terms of our
strategic nuclear forces and what they are expected to do in terms of
providing extended deterrence not only to the United States but to many
of our allies around the world.
So I think it is important in this treaty debate--this particular
part of it--that we get a vote on this amendment. It has been suggested
that if this amendment gets adopted, we will have to go back to the
Russians. That is part of our goal of advice and consent in the Senate.
If it were just consent, we would be nothing more than a rubberstamp. I
think we have an important role; that is, to look at these critical
issues, and where there are areas of disagreement, to provide our
advice. I think, in a very straightforward way, we can vote on an
amendment that would increase from 700 to 720 the number of delivery
vehicles specified in the treaty. It is a very straightforward
amendment and one that would then go back, obviously, to
[[Page S10798]]
the Russians, but it is certainly consistent with the Senate's
traditional and historic role of advice and consent.
Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that: ``As to the stated context
of the strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers specified are adequate,
though barely so.''
Well, ``barely so'' does not seem to be good enough for me when we
are talking about the important obligations we have in defending
America's vital national security interests as well as those of many of
our allies around the world. I don't think settling for barely enough
or barely so is sufficient.
So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. I think, as I
said earlier, the triad is critical to our nuclear deterrence and
maintaining both ICBMs and SLBMs, but then also having a very robust
bomber component of that is critical. That is why investing in a next-
generation, follow-on bomber that is nuclear is important. I think the
ambiguity that surrounds the question, the uncertainty that surrounds
the question about whether a follow-on bomber would be nuclear speaks
volumes about the commitment to that leg of the triad, but it is also
important to remember bombers are the best form of extended deterrence.
If you want to make those who would proliferate nuclear weapons pay
attention, you send a bomber in. A bomber is very visible, it is
recallable, it is survivable, and it brings great psychological and
political advantage to our country when it comes to trying to
discourage proliferation by other countries around the world.
So I hope my colleagues will support this amendment. It is an
important amendment. The delivery vehicle issue is, to me, critical to
this debate not only in terms of the numbers but also the modernization
of those various elements of the triad. The triad, over time, has given
us great survivability, great flexibility, and if ever called upon, we
want to be as prepared as we possibly can be to encounter any nuclear
threat that might exist to the United States. I hope my colleagues will
support this amendment.
I will reserve my time and yield back now to the Senator from
Oklahoma, who I think probably wants to continue to talk about the
verification issues.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, first of all, I concur in everything the
Senator from South Dakota said, and I join him in encouraging people to
vote favorably on his amendment. It seems as though the other side has
had the opportunity to do a lot more testing, a lot more modernization
than we have, and I am very much concerned about that.
I wish to elaborate on one thing. The fact that there is--that the
other side--and I read all the quotes from the previous Commissions
that took place in 2005 and 2010 to demonstrate very clearly that the
Russians would sign a treaty and then they will cheat. They would not
comply with the treaty. We saw it with the chemical weapons treaty and
the biological weapons treaty and START I. So there is no reason to
believe they are going to do this. So in terms of verification, we have
to try to do something where we are convinced, knowing full well in
advance that they are going to cheat.
That brings up one issue that I haven't mentioned before in this
treaty; that is, the length of time we have between notification and
actually causing an inspection. Under the START I treaty it was 9
hours, and it has gone up to 24 hours in this treaty. In other words,
if someone is going to cheat, if someone is going to hide something so
we would not know where to look and we might not be able to find
something, why give them three times as much time as we did under START
I, when we know more today about the fact that they cheat than we knew
before? The second issue is, it becomes more important--as you get
closer to the inspections and as there are fewer facilities to inspect,
each one becomes more important, and we have had an opportunity to see
that everyone seems to agree with that.
Former Secretary Harold Brown explained this in his testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That was way back in 1991. He
said:
Verification will become even more important as the numbers
of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases, because
uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of
the total force as this occurs.
I think I used the example that if you had 10 and you cheat on 1,
that is 10 percent, but if you have 2 and you cheat on 1, that is 50
percent.
That statement is agreed with by John Bolton, who said:
While [verification is] important in any arms-control
treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower
warhead levels.
Again, he agrees.
Scowcroft, the same thing. He said:
. . . as force levels go down, the balance of nuclear power
can become increasingly delicate and vulnerable to cheating
on arms control limits, concerns about ``hidden'' missiles,
and the actions of nuclear third parties.
So I think everyone does understand and does agree that as they
decrease, then each one becomes more significant in terms of being
inspected.
In this amendment, we are changing it from the 180 inspections over a
10-year period to what they would have under New START versus the old
one, which was 600 inspections over 15 years. Do the math on that, and
you come up with 18 inspections a year as opposed to 40 inspections a
year.
They are trying to say there are only 36 sites, which means--if this
is true--we would only get to inspect each site in Russia once every 2
years, while the math works out that they would be able to do our side
once every year. So that is something that is very concerning to me.
We talked a lot about where we are in this process. We have talked
about our constitutional obligations, about what we are supposed to do
under the Constitution. We talked about what we are supposed to provide
for the common defense in article II, section 2 of the Constitution,
which gives the President the prime role, but we have to advise and
consent. I saw something recently, just today I think it is, that came
out--yes, it was just today. It came out from Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov in his statement. He said:
``I can only underscore that the Strategic Nuclear Arms
Treaty, worked out on the strictest basis of parity, in our
view fully answers to the national interests of Russia and
the United States,'' Interfax quoted Lavrov as saying in an
interview.
``It cannot be opened up and become the subject of new
negotiations,'' Lavrov said.
Who is this guy telling us what we can do under our Constitution? I
find it almost laughable because it is just as if all he has to do is
say that and we have to follow the course.
But he said Russian lawmakers would closely examine the U.S.
ratification resolution and any declarations or notes accompanying it
to ensure no significant changes were made.
If changes are made, then they have not kept up their responsibility.
I would only remind my colleagues that:
As CRS has outlined in its study--
And this is a study they did not too long ago--
on the role of the Senate in a treaty process: Amendments are
proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty . . .
[They] amount, therefore, to Senate counter offers that alter
the original deal agreed to by the United States and the
other country.
If the Senate gives its consent to New START with an amendment to the
text, the treaty is sent back over to Russia and the Duma meets and
they decide what they are going to do with it. Then, of course, they
make changes and then it comes back over here. This is something that
has been going on for 200 years.
All of a sudden, why are we in a position where we are not going to
do it and we look at our constitutional responsibility as something
that is in the past?
So I feel we have this obligation, and I know so far every amendment
that would have amended the treaty has been defeated, and it has been
defeated on party--well, not necessarily on party lines but, by and
large, on party lines. This is something very concerning to me.
The other issue is, when we talk about tripling the number of
inspections under the New START, we have heard it said several times:
Well, there are fewer sites. But I would like to suggest that the type
two--keep in mind type one refers to inspections of ICBM bases, air
bases, those facilities that are active today.
[[Page S10799]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have 14 minutes 45 seconds.
Mr. KERRY. Did my colleague need to finish up a thought? If so, I am
happy to yield him a minute.
Mr. INHOFE. No.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma for the
discussion we had yesterday and again today about verification. I know
it is an issue he thinks is critical. I think every Senator here is
absolutely convinced we need to have the strongest verification regime
possible. The fact is that this treaty, the New START treaty, has
exactly that. It has an effective verification system. Does it have a
perfect system? No treaty that has ever been passed or been negotiated
would be that one-sided and be able to achieve that. It is an effective
verification system, which is the standard we have used ever since
President Reagan negotiated those treaties, and Paul Nitze, one of our
great arms control statesmen, really defined that concept of effective
verification.
I wish to quote what Secretary Gates said about this. I don't need to
remind colleagues, but I guess people in the public who don't
necessarily focus on it might be impacted to know that Secretary Gates
was appointed by President George Bush, and he was held over as
Secretary of Defense by President Obama. By everybody's judgment here
in the Senate, he is a man of great credibility and distinction who has
worked through many different layers of American government. He is one
of the people for whom we have great respect. In a letter he wrote to
Senator Isakson this summer, he said:
I believe that the number of inspections provided for by
the New START Treaty, along with other verification
mechanisms, provides a firm basis for verifying Russia's
compliance with its Treaty obligations while also providing
important insights into the size and composition of Russian
strategic forces.
I know the Senator from Oklahoma is concerned about the number of
inspections. He has several times raised the question of cutting the
inspections from the original START to the New START. I want to walk
through it again so we are absolutely clear.
Comparing the number of inspections under START I to the number of
inspections under New START is literally an apples-to-oranges
comparison for three reasons--one, today we are only conducting
inspections in one country instead of four. Under START I, we had
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
Mr. KERRY. Yes, as long as I don't lose my right to the floor.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time be
extended by 10 minutes--5 minutes for the Senator from Massachusetts
and 5 additional minutes for the Senator from South Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, I want to make sure because
people were planning schedules around it.
We have no objection, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, Secretary Gates said this about the--well,
let me finish that thought about the difference. So when we had those 4
countries, we had 70 sites that were subject to inspection. Under this
treaty, there were 35 sites subject to inspection, but they are all in
one country--Russia--because all of the weapons were moved to Russia
after the fall of the Soviet Union.
Secondly, we are inspecting half as many facilities, and when we
inspect those facilities, we, thirdly, have a type one inspection and a
type two inspection, which allows us to be able to go in and look at
the missile but to also do an update inspection, which is sort of a
general inspection of the up-to-date status of the various things we
look at in the course of an inspection, which, in effect, really
doubles the amount of inspections we have because under START I, if you
went in and did an update inspection, that was it. You didn't get to do
the missile inspection or vice versa. We really have a two-for-one
here. It is disingenuous to reflect that in the comments about how we
count here. We are talking about a completely comparable inspection
regime under New START as under START I.
Finally, we addressed this question of verification in condition 2 of
the resolution of ratification. That condition requires that before New
START can enter into force--and every year thereafter--the President of
the United States has to certify to the Senate that our national
technical means, in conjunction with New START's verification
activities, are sufficient to ensure adequate and effective monitoring
of Russian compliance. So we are going to remain right in the center of
this issue of verification every year this treaty is in force, and the
Senate is going to be part of that process.
Let me briefly turn back to something Senator Thune said earlier. He
said this treaty was negotiated with the assumption that the Russians
weren't going to cheat. No, Mr. President, it is not accurate that
there was any such assumption whatsoever, and that is precisely why we
have a verification structure here. It is why we are taking this
discussion so seriously, because we don't take people at their word. We
have to verify. That is what the verification regime is for.
Let me also be clear on what Secretary Gates said here. Senator
Inhofe quoted the Secretary saying that the Russians would not be able
to achieve any militarily significant cheating under this verification
regime. That is the judgment of our intelligence community, but it
doesn't mean that they think or that we think they might not try to
cheat. It means that if they do, it is going--if it is militarily
significant, we will see it, we will know it, and we will understand
exactly what they are doing. So we can respond, as Secretary Gates has,
by increasing the size of our force, by increasing the alert level of
SSBNs and bombers, and by uploading warheads on bombers, SSBNs, and on
ICBMs. There are all kinds of things we can do to respond the minute we
notice that kind of militarily significant event.
It is my judgment that this amendment does not give us anything in
the way of additional confidence, but it certainly will give us months
of unnecessary and even counterproductive renegotiation of the treaty.
That means that by reaching for three times the number of inspections,
we would guarantee that for months and months we will have zero,
absolutely none. That is the tradeoff.
I think we need to get our verification team back in place, and I
think that is what is most imperative in terms of the national security
interests of the country.
I thank Senator Thune for his amendment. I thank him also for the
constructive discussion we have had about these numbers with respect to
missiles and bombers in order to maintain our nuclear deterrent.
I think this is another place where it is pretty important for all of
us to listen to our military. They have made the judgments here, and
they have been very transparent about how they have made those
judgments. We have been able to query them in the Armed Services
Committee, the Intelligence Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee,
and the National Security Working Group. They have arrived at the
judgment--not a political judgment but a military judgment--that the
treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles is perfectly adequate to defend
our Nation and our allies at the same time.
As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, GEN James Cartwright, who
was a former strategic commander, said:
I think we have more than enough capacity and capability
for any threat that we see today or that might emerge in the
foreseeable future.
This amendment seeks to insert sort of our arbitrary judgment that,
oh, we ought to have 20 additional. I remind the Senators what LTG
Frank Klotz, the commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command,
said. That is the command that oversees ICBMs and bombers. Just last
Friday, he said:
I think the START Treaty ought to be ratified, and it ought
to be ratified now, this week.
The military came to this conclusion after the Department of Defense
conducted a very thorough review of our
[[Page S10800]]
nuclear posture, including detailed force-on-force analyses. We shared
some of that discussion in the classified session earlier. Our nuclear
commanders have done the math, run the scenarios, and they have
concluded that we only need 700 delivery vehicles.
General Chilton, head of the Strategic Command, said:
The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring
America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries,
assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as
long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted
in deterrent strategy and assessment of potential adversary
capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon limits in New
START and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review.
I do know the Senator expressed some concern about our ability to
field Prompt Global Strike systems. It is true that conventionally
armed ICBMs will count toward the treaty's limits, but again, let's
listen to what the military says.
Secretary Gates stated for the record that:
Should we decide to deploy them, counting this small number
of conventional strategic systems and their warheads towards
the treaty limits will not prevent the United States from
maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.
Admiral Mullen said as far back as March that the treaty protects our
ability to develop a conventional global strike capability should that
be required.
I also point to our resolution of ratification, condition 6,
understanding 3, and declaration 3, all of which go toward preserving
our ability to deploy conventional Prompt Global Strike forces.
Finally, the Senator raised the possibility that we are moving from a
triad to a dyad. I wish to be especially clear on this point. The
administration has stated forcefully and again today reiterated in a
letter sent to us by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Mullen, in which he reiterates the administration's commitment to the
triad. As it said in the ``update'' section of the 1251 report:
The administration remains committed to the sustainment and
modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems.
Regarding heavy bombers, that same report says:
DOD plans to sustain a heavy bomber leg of the strategic
triad for the indefinite future and is committed to the
modernization of the heavy bomber force.
To be clear, our existing nuclear bombers will be in operation at
least for the next 20 years, and probably at most this treaty could be
a 10- to 15-year treaty. Our existing bombers will outlive this treaty.
The administration has also made clear that we are committed to the
triad in the resolution of ratification, including our nuclear bombers.
I might add that they have also said they are not going to close bases,
and they are not going to reduce the total number of bombers.
I believe there should not be concern on these points.
This amendment, once again, is one of those that would force
renegotiation of the entire treaty. I might mention for my colleagues
that one of the reasons that is so important to all of us--we can all
remember negotiating around here many times on different bills and
pieces of legislation. We always begin that negotiation--I can remember
Senator George Mitchell, when he was majority leader and we did the
complicated Clean Air Act reauthorization in 1990, he would begin every
session by reminding people that nothing is agreed upon until
everything is agreed upon. We negotiate that way here all the time.
So if all of a sudden nothing is agreed upon and that is the way this
treaty was negotiated--if nothing is agreed upon until everything is
agreed upon, when you take one piece out of there and change it
unilaterally, nothing is agreed upon. At that point, you reopen all of
the other issues, and some of them are contentious, which are
difficult, which people may have a different view on, and which will
affect our relationship.
If this weren't so substantive and I thought we were buying a pig in
a poke, I would say I understand why we have to do that.
But the military, our national security people, our national
intelligence community--there is not anybody who works at this day to
day--our Strategic Command, our National Defense Missile Command--all
of them say: Ratify this treaty. And that is what I believe we ought to
do as soon as possible.
I reserve the remainder of our time.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I wonder if I might engage in a colloquy
briefly with my colleague from Massachusetts and then propound a
unanimous consent agreement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Shaheen). The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, there are two votes scheduled on the Thune
amendment and the Inhofe amendment. Have we locked in the LeMieux
amendment yet?
Mr. KERRY. I do not believe so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, does my colleague anticipate that it is
possible there would be a third vote tonight, depending upon whether
Senator LeMieux is ready to have that vote?
Mr. KERRY. I suspect the majority leader would be delighted to have
another vote if we can. I am speaking without authorization.
Mr. KYL. At some point, just for the benefit of Members, there could
theoretically be a third amendment tonight if Senator LeMieux is ready
to have that vote and if there is no objection by any other Member.
The other point, I inform my colleague, is I have the exact numbers
of the five amendments I would like to get pending. Let me make that
request at this time. They are amendments Nos. 4900, McCain amendment;
4893, Kyl amendment; 4892, Kyl amendment; 4867, Kyl amendment; and No.
4860, Kyl amendment. These are all proposed amendments to the
resolution of ratification.
I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to call up five
amendments to the resolution of ratification; provided further that
these be the only amendments in order to the resolution of ratification
at this time; and I ask unanimous consent that following the
disposition of the amendments solicited, the Senate then resume
consideration of the treaty.
Before my colleague responds, I will also say this: I believe there
are only four other amendments pending, and one of them is mine. I will
agree to waive my right to bring that up. I cannot say for the others,
and I need to talk with those Members during the vote. I do not know
whether they would want votes on their amendments. In any event, there
are no more than three of them. So it is a locked-in number.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, reserving the right to object, I want to
make clear that as we move to these amendments with respect to the
resolution of ratification, we are going to preserve the right, then,
to go back only to those three that are pending. And the Senator has
agreed to make a good-faith effort to see if that could be reduced to
simply one; is that accurate?
Mr. KYL. No. I am saying one is mine, and I would eliminate it now.
Mr. KERRY. I understand that the Senator, in our conversation
earlier, was going to try to see if the other two could also make the
same decision he has made so we, in effect, have one on the treaty
itself.
Mr. KYL. If that was the impression, I do not think I can do that.
But in any event, I did not try to do that. There are four all told. I
would eliminate my one, and there would be a fixed number--only three
possibilities after that.
Mr. KERRY. Could we then say for the record which amendment is being
withdrawn at this point?
Mr. KYL. It would be the only Kyl amendment remaining pending to the
treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will withhold. There is no Kyl
amendment pending.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, if I may say to my colleague, the
majority leader would like to work with us in this process. I think
what we should do, if I may ask my colleague to do this, I would like
to take a moment, if we can, to work through this with the majority
leader. We can do it during the votes, and then at the end of the votes
we can hopefully propound something that has his engagement.
Mr. KYL. I can tell my colleague that the amendment I would be
agreeing not to bring up is amendment No.
[[Page S10801]]
4854. I misspoke when I said it is pending. It is filed to the treaty.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator. That helps us a lot. That clarifies
it. What I would like to do is work with the majority leader and the
Senator from Arizona, and I am sure we can come together, and at the
end of the vote we can propound an appropriate UC.
Mr. KYL. I am not willing to withdraw my request. What I am afraid
of, quite frankly, is that we are not going to be able to get unanimous
consent before a cloture vote on the treaty and we are going to be iced
out here.
I have propounded a unanimous consent request. I will be happy to
read it again. If there is an objection, fine. I want to get agreement
on this, if at all possible.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator from Arizona could repeat his
request, that would be helpful.
Mr. KYL. I would be happy to. Madam President, I ask unanimous
consent that it be in order to call up five amendments to the
resolution of ratification; provided further that these be the only
amendments in order to the resolution of ratification at this time; and
I ask unanimous consent that following the disposition of the
amendments solicited, the Senate then resume consideration of the
treaty.
Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, I personally am supportive
of our trying to do that. I have said to the Senator in good faith that
we need to have some amendments to the resolution of ratification. We
are working on them. I am confident that we will be able to accommodate
his request, but I am in a position where I need to have the input of
the majority leader to do that. I will personally advocate we do it.
At this moment only, I must object to that request, but I look
forward to trying to propound it after the votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I appreciate the explanation. That
ordinarily would be information given to the two leaders, and we did
not do that in this case. I do appreciate this.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, it is my understanding that I have a
minute in which to wrap up debate on this amendment; is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All of the time has been used.
Mr. THUNE. I ask unanimous consent to have a couple minutes to
summarize a couple points. I had 5 minutes which I think just got
burned.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, I will make a couple quick points before
we vote on the delivery vehicle amendment, and the first one is this
because it has been observed that this would impact Prompt Global
Strike. The supporters of the treaty have said it will not impact
Prompt Global Strike. The fact is that the 700 number of delivery
vehicles--if, for example, we were to mount a conventional warhead on
an ICBM to strike a target in some geographic area that is hard to hit
and we need to get there in short order, the ICBM currently is the best
way to do that. If we do that, it reduces the number of nuclear
delivery vehicles we have one for one. If we were to do that on 20
ICBMs, we would mount conventional warheads on those, and it would
reduce by 20 the number of nuclear delivery vehicles we would have.
That is a fact in the treaty.
The final point I will make about the number 700, because it has been
pointed out that military personnel in the country support that number,
but I also want to mention that it is important to recall that General
Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian
cheating. He testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
April 22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made was an assumption that
the Russians in the postnegotiation time period would be compliant with
the treaty. We all know it has been pointed out many times on the floor
how Russia is a serial violator of arms control commitments. I think it
is important, as we discuss the 700 number, that people bear in mind
that number was agreed upon by our military commanders assuming there
would be no cheating by the Russians.
There still is a conflict between the 720 called for in the nuclear
force structure plan and the 700 in the treaty. All I am simply saying
is, let's make those two numbers consistent. Let's get the 700 number
up to 720.
With that, I yield back my time and ask for the yeas and nays.
Mr. KERRY. I yield back the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection to asking for the yeas
and nays? Without objection, it is so ordered.
Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on
agreeing to the Inhofe amendment.
Mr. KERRY. Does Senator Inhofe want to ask for the yeas and nays?
Mr. THUNE. I also request the yeas and nays on the Inhofe amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk call the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Bayh) and
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden) are necessarily absent.
Mr. KYL. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator
from Kansas (Mr. Brownback).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 33, nays 64, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 285 Ex.]
YEAS--33
Barrasso
Bond
Brown (MA)
Bunning
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Cochran
Collins
Cornyn
Crapo
DeMint
Ensign
Enzi
Graham
Grassley
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Johanns
Kirk
Kyl
LeMieux
McCain
McConnell
Risch
Roberts
Sessions
Shelby
Snowe
Thune
Vitter
Wicker
NAYS--64
Akaka
Alexander
Baucus
Begich
Bennet
Bennett
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown (OH)
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Conrad
Coons
Corker
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Franken
Gillibrand
Gregg
Hagan
Harkin
Inouye
Isakson
Johnson
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
Manchin
McCaskill
Menendez
Merkley
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (NE)
Nelson (FL)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Rockefeller
Sanders
Schumer
Shaheen
Specter
Stabenow
Tester
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Voinovich
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
NOT VOTING--3
Bayh
Brownback
Wyden
The amendment (No. 4833) was rejected.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is now 2 minutes, equally divided--
The majority leader.
Mr. REID. Madam President, first of all, I ask unanimous consent that
the vote on the Thune amendment be 10 minutes in duration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. No. 2, Senator LeMieux has an amendment that is pending. I
ask unanimous consent that vote follow the Thune amendment and that
vote also be 10 minutes in duration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. REID. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be no
amendments--
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader has the floor.
Mr. REID. Let me finish my unanimous consent request, and if someone
does not like it, we can worry about that. I ask unanimous consent
that--we are going to vote on the Thune amendment; that will be a 10-
minute vote; that is amendment No. 4841--following that vote, we
consider the LeMieux amendment No. 4847; that prior to the vote, there
be 4 minutes of debate, equally divided and controlled in the usual
form; that is, of course, with the Thune amendment and the LeMieux
amendment; that upon the use or yielding back of the time, the Senate
then proceed to vote in relation to the LeMieux amendment, with no
amendment in order to the amendment prior to the vote.
[[Page S10802]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. I would also say, Madam President, that will very likely be
the last vote tonight. I have had a conversation with Senator Kyl and
Senator Kerry. They are going to meet early in the morning to see if
there is a way we can work through some of these issues that are still
outstanding.
The one message I wish to make sure everyone gets--I know everyone
has lots to do this week--but on this most important treaty, no one
needs to feel they are being jammed on time, as busy as we all are and
as many things as we want to do in the next few days. So if anyone has
any issues they still want to deal with, talk to Senator Kerry or
Senator Kyl or Senator Lugar, who is the comanager on the other side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?