[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 171 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10795-S10805]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                    Amendment No. 4904, as Modified

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment

[[Page S10803]]

No. 4904 to the resolution of ratification be brought up as pending.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KYL. Reserving the right to object, I apologize. Did Senator 
Corker ask a unanimous consent request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, to call up an amendment.
  Mr. KYL. But to return to the treaty upon its disposition; is that 
correct?
  Mr. CORKER. That is what I was just getting ready to say.
  Mr. KYL. Might I ask the Senator from Tennessee whether he talked 
with one of the Senators from South Carolina about this?
  Mr. CORKER. I have not. I attempted to do so. He was off the floor by 
the time----
  Mr. KYL. I do not have any objections as long as we return to the 
treaty so those who have amendments to the treaty will at least have 
their rights protected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection?
  Mr. KYL. I will not object. I simply note that I think we will need 
an understanding that we will work with our other interested colleagues 
on a way forward on all of these issues. Having expressed that as a 
matter of good faith, I suspect we can do that.
  Mr. CORKER. Absolutely.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to accept the 
modification. It is modified slightly. I want to make sure that is 
acceptable.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object.
  Mr. CORKER. It was a modification that the staff of the chairman 
suggested.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Corker] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4904, as modified.

  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To provide a condition and a additional element of the 
  understanding regarding the effectiveness and viability of the New 
            START Treaty and United States missile defenses)

       At the end of subsection (a) of the Resolution of 
     Ratification, add the following:
       (11) Effectiveness and viability of new start treaty and 
     united states missile defenses.--Prior to the entry into 
     force of the New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
     the Senate, and shall communicate to the Russian Federation, 
     that it shall be the policy of the United States that the 
     continued development and deployment of United States missile 
     defense systems, including qualitative and quantitative 
     improvements to such systems, including all phases of the 
     Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defenses in Europe 
     maintaining the option to use Ground-Based Interceptors, do 
     not and will not threaten the strategic balance with the 
     Russian Federation. Consequently, while the United States 
     cannot circumscribe the sovereign rights of the Russian 
     Federation under paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty, 
     the continued improvement and deployment of United States 
     missile defense systems do not constitute a basis for 
     questioning the effectiveness and viability of the Treaty, 
     and therefore would not give rise to circumstances justifying 
     the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Treaty.
       At the end of subsection (b)(1)(C), strike ``United 
     States.'' and insert the following: ``United States; and
       (D) the preamble of the New START Treaty does not impose a 
     legal obligation on the United States.

  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that we now 
return to the treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is on the treaty.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the New START 
treaty. Before I begin, I would like to thank Senator Kerry and Senator 
Lugar for their leadership on this important arms control agreement.
  When I first began to consider this treaty, I considered the 
fundamental question of whether we are better off with it or without it 
since the previous START treaty expired a year ago. By reducing the 
number of deployed nuclear weapons in a mutual and verifiable way, I 
believe that this treaty does enhance our security, but it is not 
without flaws.
  Our choice is not, however, between some ideal treaty and the New 
START treaty. It is between this treaty and having no inspection regime 
in place at all since the previous START treaty expired in December of 
2009.
  In evaluating this treaty, I scrutinized several issues including the 
effect on our Nation's security, the need to modernize our nuclear 
deterrent, the effectiveness of verification and inspection regimes, 
and the impact on missile defense.
  These and other issues were fully covered in classified briefings as 
well as in the seven Senate Armed Services Committee hearings that I 
attended that included testimony from Secretary of Defense Gates, 
Secretary of State Clinton, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton, the commander of our nuclear 
forces. We also heard testimony from the three current directors of our 
national nuclear laboratories and a number of former government 
officials and national security experts.
  I met personally with Rose Gottemoeller, the top U.S. treaty 
negotiator, and sought counsel from GEN Brent Scowcroft, who has served 
as an adviser to four Republican Presidents and was the National 
Security Adviser to President George H. W. Bush.
  I also have met with a wide range of Mainers--foreign policy experts, 
religious leaders, and former members of the military--who expressed 
their views on the treaty to me.
  Clearly, the New START treaty enjoys broad bipartisan support. 
Secretaries of State for the past five Republican Presidents, including 
GEN Colin Powell, support its ratification, as does former Maine 
Senator and former Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen.
  No Member of this body should support a treaty simply because it has 
strong bipartisan support. But neither should we withhold our support 
for a treaty simply because it was negotiated and signed by a President 
from a different political party.
  The fact is that the New START treaty is a modest arms control 
agreement. The treaty does not require the destruction of a single 
nuclear weapon. Under the New START framework, a 30-percent reduction 
in the number of deployed warheads in the arsenals of the United States 
and Russia will be required.
  As such, the New START treaty places the United States and the 
Russian Federation on a path to achieve mutual and verifiable 
reductions over the next 7 years. Failure to ratify a treaty that makes 
modest reductions in the deployment of nuclear weapons would represent 
a giant step backwards in the commitment of the United States to arms 
control. If we cannot reduce the deployed nuclear stockpiles of the two 
countries that hold 9 of every 10 nuclear weapons in the world, how can 
we expect other countries not to seek any nuclear weapons?
  Yet the New START treaty has significance beyond its function as an 
arms control agreement. New START is one component of our bilateral 
relationship with the Russian Federation. In April 2009, I traveled to 
Moscow with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl 
Levin. At that time, I indicated that while I supported the President's 
commitment to reset the U.S.-Russian relationship, it was ultimately up 
to the Russians to see if they wanted to have a stronger relationship.
  Since then, Russia has expanded the use of northern supply routes for 
our military forces in Afghanistan and has cancelled the sale of 
advanced surface to air missiles to Iran. These are positive steps.
  During that same trip to Moscow, Chairman Levin and I sought to 
encourage Russian officials to cooperate on missile defense in Europe. 
And this issue of missile defense raises an important point about the 
U.S.-Russian relationship. Just because our relationship with the 
Russians is important does not mean that we must compromise on an issue 
vital to our national security. One of those issues is missile defense.
  I was troubled when I read the unilateral statements made by Russian 
leaders who sought to make a binding tie between missile defense and 
the New START agreement.
  The Kerry-Lugar resolution of ratification eliminates any doubt that 
the United States will continue to develop missile defense systems. The 
proposed resolution of ratification clarifies that the treaty places no 
limitation on the

[[Page S10804]]

deployment of U.S. missile defense systems except for those contained 
in article 5. It further clarifies that the Russian unilateral 
statement regarding missile defense ``does not impose a legal 
obligation on the United States.''
  The resolution of ratification goes beyond expressing the position 
that the United States will deploy an effective national missile 
defense system. It declares that the United States is committed to 
improving its strategic defensive capabilities, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, during the lifetime of the treaty.
  In addition to developing a robust missile defense capability, it is 
equally imperative that the United States maintain a modernized nuclear 
weapons program as we consider further reductions in nuclear arms.
  In March, I traveled with my good friend from Arizona, Senator Kyl, 
to discuss nuclear modernization with our allies. I learned a great 
deal from an in-depth briefing with French physicists about our need to 
modernize our own nuclear arsenal.
  As Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, ``The United States is the 
only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear 
arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.'' The 
Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission noted that the nuclear 
weapons complex ``physical infrastructure is in serious need of 
transformation.''
  In response, the administration has made a commitment to invest $14 
billion in new funding over the next 10 years for the nuclear weapons 
complex. As a result, the safety, stability, and reliability of our 
nuclear deterrent can be improved. The new investments will double the 
surveillance within the nuclear stockpile from fiscal year 2009 to 
fiscal year 2011. Finally, the Administration has proposed nearly $9 
billion for our plutonium and uranium facilities, and it has made a 
commitment to request additional funding necessary for those facilities 
once the designs are completed.
  While the New START treaty contributes to reducing the threat of 
nuclear war and strengthens nuclear nonproliferation efforts, it is 
disappointing to me that the treaty reflects an outdated view of one of 
the primary threats to our national security. This treaty does not 
address the significant disparity between the number of nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons in Russia's stockpile compared to our own.
  The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission reported that 
Russia had an estimated 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons compared to 
fewer than 500 in our own stockpile. By maintaining a distinction 
between the threats of nuclear attack that warrant the ratification of 
a treaty from those nuclear threats that do not simply based upon the 
distance from which a nuclear weapon is launched or the method by which 
such a weapon is launched, we preserve a Cold War mentality regarding 
the nuclear threats facing our country.
  The large numerical disparity in the number of warheads each country 
maintains is not the only reason they warrant a higher priority than 
they were given by either country in this treaty.
  As the ranking member of the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, I believe that the characteristics of tactical 
nuclear weapons, particularly their vulnerability for theft and 
potential for nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers essential 
to our national security.
  President Obama correctly described the greatest threat facing our 
Nation in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review when he said that ``the 
threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear 
attack has increased . . . today's most immediate and extreme danger is 
nuclear terrorism.''
  Several arms control groups, including the Stimson Center, the Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Union of Concerned Scientists, 
have each stated that the danger of these weapons rests not only in the 
destructive power of each weapon but also because they are vulnerable 
to theft by rogue nations and terrorist groups.
  Earlier this month, I wrote to Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton 
about my concerns regarding this issue and requested a commitment from 
them to seek reductions in the number of Russian tactical nuclear 
weapons.
  I would like to read a portion of their response for those of my 
colleagues who share my concern regarding this disparity:

       The Administration is committed to seeking improved 
     security of, and reductions in, Russian tactical nuclear 
     weapons. We agree with the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee's call, in the resolution of advice and consent to 
     ratification of the New START treaty, to pursue an agreement 
     with the Russians to address them. These negotiations offer 
     our best chance to constrain Russian tactical nuclear 
     weapons, but we believe Russia will be unlikely to begin such 
     negotiations if the New START treaty does not enter into 
     force.

  The letter further states that:

       With regard to future agreements, we strongly agree with 
     you that the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons--
     particularly their vulnerability to theft, misuse, or 
     acquisition by terrorists--make reducing their numbers and 
     enhancing their safety and security extremely important.

  I ask unanimous consent that my letter to the Secretaries and their 
response be printed in the Record at the end of my statement.
  So where does that leave us? Does the New START treaty lead to mutual 
and verifiable reductions in nuclear arms? Does the New START treaty 
renew our Nation's commitment to arms control? Given the commitments by 
the administration, will it reinvigorate our nuclear nonproliferation 
efforts?
  The answers to these questions were most succinctly addressed in a 
statement by the leader who negotiated and signed the first START 
treaty, former President George H.W. Bush. I will conclude by 
associating myself with his comments on the issue, which I will read in 
full: ``I urge the United States Senate to ratify the [New] START 
treaty.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                 Washington, DC, December 3, 2010.
     Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton,
     Secretary of State,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Clinton: I want to thank the Administration 
     for making its experts available to discuss the proposed New 
     START and its associated issues, including the importance of 
     modernizing the nuclear weapons complex in light of proposed 
     reductions in our deployed nuclear forces. I support the 
     recent commitment President Obama made to increase the 
     investments for nuclear modernization by $4.1 billion and to 
     fully fund the costs associated with new facilities as the 
     design for these facilities are completed. The Administration 
     has also answered many of my concerns about verification and 
     inspections. Although I believe the verification and 
     inspection requirements of the now expired START treaty were 
     preferable, the explanations regarding the new verification 
     methods have helped to assuage my concerns.
       There is, however, a remaining issue that must be resolved 
     before I can conclude that the treaty warrants my support. 
     The New START treaty does not address the significant 
     disparity between the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons 
     in the stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United 
     States. By maintaining a distinction between the threats of 
     nuclear attack that warrant the ratification of a treaty from 
     those nuclear threats that do not simply based upon the 
     distance from which a nuclear weapon is launched or the 
     method by which such a weapon is delivered, we preserve an 
     outdated model regarding the nuclear threats facing our 
     country. Any nuclear attack on our country or one of our 
     allies, not just those that are launched quickly from a great 
     distance, would be devastating.
       The characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons, 
     particularly their vulnerability for theft and misuse for 
     nuclear terrorism, make reducing their numbers important now. 
     Several arms control groups, including the Stimson Center, 
     the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and the Union of 
     Concerned Scientists, have stated that the danger of tactical 
     nuclear weapons rests not only in the destructive power of 
     each weapon, but also because they are vulnerable to theft by 
     terrorist groups. President Obama's 2010 Nuclear Posture 
     Review echoes the concern of nuclear terrorism: ``The threat 
     of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of 
     nuclear attack has increased . . . today's most immediate and 
     extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their 
     extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons.''
       Non-strategic delivery systems are also as capable as some 
     of the strategic delivery vehicles covered under New START of 
     delivering a swift nuclear attack. For example, the Russian 
     Federation is capable of deploying submarine-launched cruise 
     missiles armed with nuclear warheads. According to press 
     reports, a new type of Russian attack submarine capable of 
     launching nuclear-armed cruise missiles is expected to enter 
     service in late 2010. My understanding is that, unlike 
     submarine launched ballistic

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     missiles, these nuclear-tipped cruise missiles would not be 
     counted under New START. In addition, I was troubled to learn 
     of reports in the New York Times that the Russian Federation 
     moved short-range tactical nuclear weapons closer to the 
     territory of our NATO allies and U.S. deployed forces in 
     Europe earlier this year, apparently in response to the 
     deployment of missile defense capabilities there.
       Insufficiently addressing these weapons may make it more 
     difficult to achieve future nuclear arms control agreements. 
     According to the independent Perry-Schlesinger Strategic 
     Posture Commission report, the Russian Federation has about 
     3,800 tactical nuclear weapons and the United States has less 
     than 500 tactical nuclear weapons. If the New START treaty is 
     ratified, the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 
     both countries will be evenly balanced. Absent a significant 
     unilateral reduction in tactical nuclear warheads by the 
     Russian Federation, any effort to reduce the disparity in 
     these weapons may lead to unacceptable concessions regarding 
     U.S. capabilities that are not tied to the size of the 
     nuclear stockpiles maintained by each country, such as 
     concessions regarding missile defense or conventional prompt 
     global strike.
       Including non-strategic weapons in strategic arms 
     negotiations is not unprecedented. On July 31, 1991, the day 
     START I was signed by President George H.W. Bush and Mikhail 
     Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. publicly committed to providing the 
     United States with annual declarations regarding the 
     deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for the 
     duration of START I. In addition, the Soviet Union committed 
     to deploying no more than a single warhead on each cruise 
     missile and to not exceed the deployment of more than 880 
     nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles in any one year.
       On July 27, 2010, Dr. Keith Payne, former Deputy Assistant 
     Secretary of Defense for foreign policy and a member of the 
     Perry-Schlesinger Commission, testified before the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee that the reason he believed tactical 
     nuclear weapons were not included in the New START treaty was 
     because, ``the Russians did not want to engage in 
     negotiations on their tactical nuclear weapons.'' I think 
     they will be very wary about ever engaging in serious 
     negotiations on their tactical nuclear weapons. I also 
     understand, and would expect, that any reductions of non-
     strategic nuclear weapons in Europe would rest, in part, upon 
     the position of our NATO allies.
       Nonetheless, the concerns I have regarding non-strategic 
     weapons remain outstanding as I consider whether or not the 
     New START treaty warrants my support. As such, I request that 
     you provide, in writing, the Administration's plan to address 
     the disparity between the numbers of non-strategic warheads 
     of the Russian Federation compared to the United States, in 
     order that I may consider this information prior to a vote on 
     the ratification of the New START treaty.
       Thank you for your attention to this matter, and for your 
     service to our nation.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Susan M. Collins,
     United States Senator.
                                  ____

     Hon. Susan M. Collins,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Collins: Thank you for your letter of December 
     3, 2010, regarding the New START Treaty. We believe 
     ratification of the Treaty is essential to preserving core 
     U.S. national security interests.The Treaty will establish 
     equal limits on U.S. and Russian deployed strategic warheads 
     and strategic delivery systems, and will provide the U.S. 
     with essential visibility into Russian strategic forces 
     through on-site inspections, data exchanges, and other 
     verification provisions.
       As you note, the Strategic Posture Commission expressed 
     concern regarding Russian tactical nuclear weapons. At the 
     same time, the Commission recommended moving forward quickly 
     with a new treaty focused on strategic weapons. With the 
     expiration of the START Treaty in early December 2009, for 
     the past year the U.S. has had no inspectors with ``boots on 
     the ground'' to verify Russian strategic forces.
       The Administration is committed to seeking improved 
     security of, and reductions in, Russian tactical (also known 
     as non-strategic) nuclear weapons. We agree with the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee's call, in the resolution of 
     advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty, 
     to pursue an agreement with the Russians to address them. 
     These negotiations offer our best chance to constrain Russian 
     tactical nuclear weapons, but we believe Russia will likely 
     be unwilling to begin such negotiations if the New START 
     Treaty does not enter into force. We will consult closely 
     with Congress and our Allies in planning and conducting any 
     follow-on negotiations.
       At the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010, Allied 
     leaders expressed their strong support for ratifying the New 
     START Treaty now, and welcomed the principle of including 
     tactical nuclear weapons in future U.S.-Russian arms control 
     talks. The U.S. remains committed to retaining the capability 
     to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in support of its 
     Alliance commitments. As such, we will replace our nuclear-
     capable F-16s with the dual-capable F-35 Joint Strike 
     Fighter, and conduct a full scope Life Extension Program for 
     the B-61 nuclear bomb to ensure its functionality with the F-
     35 and enhance warhead surety.
       Your letter notes recent press reports alleging that Russia 
     has moved tactical nuclear warheads and missiles closer to 
     Europe. We note that a short-range ballistic missile unit has 
     long been deployed near Russia's border with Estonia, and 
     earlier this year the Russians publicly announced that some 
     SS-26 short-range ballistic missiles would be located there. 
     Although this deployment does not alter either the balance in 
     Europe or the U.S.-Russia strategic balance, the U.S. has 
     made clear that we believe Russia should further consolidate 
     its tactical nuclear weapons in a small number of secure 
     facilities deep within Russia.
       With regard to future agreements, we strongly agree with 
     you that the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons--
     particularly their vulnerability to theft, misuse, or 
     acquisition by terrorists--make reducing their numbers and 
     enhancing their safety and security extremely important. That 
     is why when President Obama signed the New START Treaty in 
     April, he made clear that ``going forward, we hope to pursue 
     discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and 
     tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons.''
       Thank you for the opportunity to address the important 
     matters you have raised in connection with the new START 
     Treaty. We look forward to continuing to work with you on 
     this and other issues of mutual interest, and urge your 
     support of New START.
           Sincerely,
     Hillary Rodham Clinton,
                                               Secretary of State.
     Robert M. Gates,
                                             Secretary of Defense.