[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 171 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10792-S10794]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                           Amendment No. 4847

  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be temporarily set aside and that amendment No. 4847 be 
called up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Florida (Mr. LeMieux), for himself and Mr. 
     Chambliss, proposes an amendment numbered 4847.

  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To amend the Treaty to require negotiations to address the 
         disparity between tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles)

       At the end of Article I of the New START Treaty, add the 
     following:

     3. The Parties shall enter into negotiations within one year 
     of ratification of this Treaty to address the disparity 
     between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons 
     stockpiles of the Parties, in accordance with the September 
     1991 United States commitments under the Presidential Nuclear 
     Initiatives and Russian Federation commitments made by 
     President Gorbachev in October 1991 and reaffirmed by 
     President Yeltsin in January 1992. The negotiations shall not 
     include discussion of defensive missile systems.

  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to the New 
START Treaty--this important treaty that we are discussing between the 
United States of America and Russia concerning strategic nuclear 
weapons.
  I have a lot of concerns about this treaty. Many of those concerns 
have already been expressed by my colleagues. I have concerns about the 
verification procedures, that they are weakened from the previous START 
Treaty. I have concerns about the linkage of missile defense systems 
with strategic offensive weapons. Those concerns have been addressed as 
well, and I share them.
  The biggest concern I have about this treaty is its failure to deal 
with what are called tactical nuclear weapons. Now, to those folks at 
home who may be listening to this, it is probably not readily 
apparent--it wasn't initially to me--the difference between what a 
strategic nuclear weapon is and a tactical nuclear weapon. A strategic 
nuclear weapon is usually considered to be a large vehicle, like an 
intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. It travels over a very 
long range. These strategic nuclear weapons can also be delivered by a 
submarine or a long-range bomber. A tactical nuclear weapon is 
generally much smaller in size. It has a smaller range and has a 
delivery vehicle that may be on the back of a truck, for example.
  In many ways, in the world we live in today, where we are not in the 
Cold War atmosphere with the former Soviet Union, the tactical nuclear 
weapon is of much more concern than the strategic. The great fear we 
all have is that one of these nuclear weapons would get into the hands 
of a terrorist. A tactical nuclear weapon, by its very nature, is 
portable, and it could be something that is even capable of being moved 
by one person or, as I said before, on the back of a truck.
  Why this treaty doesn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons is beyond 
me. I realize in the past, when we were in the Cold War environment 
with the Soviet Union, we didn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons 
because we were concerned about these big missiles that could cross the 
ocean and strike our country. We were concerned about heavy bombers 
delivering missiles or bombs that would hit the homeland. That makes 
sense. But we are in a completely different environment now. While we 
should still be concerned with those strategic weapons, the tactical 
weapons are actually much more of a danger to us because they are the 
very weapons that could get into the hands of a rogue nation. Those are 
the very weapons that could get into the hands of a terrorist.
  This treaty doesn't have anything to do with that. It doesn't address 
it at all. It would be as if we were going to enter into a treaty about 
guns, and we had a big negotiation in a treaty where we talked about 
long arms, shotguns, and rifles, but we failed to talk about pistols. 
It doesn't make any sense to me. It doesn't make any sense to me 
because these are the very weapons about which we should be the most

[[Page S10793]]

concerned. It also doesn't make sense to me because of the disparity 
between how many tactical nuclear weapons we have versus how many the 
Russians have. This treaty limits the amount of those weapons to each 
country to around 1,500. But the Russians have 3,000 tactical nuclear 
weapons, and we have 300. So the Russians have a 10-to-1 advantage over 
us in tactical nuclear weapons. If we approve this treaty, the Russians 
then will approximately have 4,500 nuclear weapons, and we will have 
1,800. That doesn't make a lot of sense either. They have a 10-to-1 
advantage on these tactical nuclear weapons.
  I think it is incumbent upon us to realize that we have to have a 
treaty on tactical nuclear weapons. It should have been part of this 
treaty. It wasn't part of these START treaties in the past because the 
total number of weapons that the United States had and the former 
Soviet Union had was immense. When we had 20,000 or 30,000 strategic 
nuclear weapons, the fact that they had 3,000 tacticals didn't matter. 
It wasn't an important number in the overall scheme.
  But now that we are in this new world where we are concerned about 
nuclear proliferation, and we don't want terrorists to get these 
weapons, plus the fact that they are going to end up having 4,500 and 
we are going to end up everything 1,800, it matters a lot.
  My amendment says that within a year of the ratification of this 
treaty, the Russians and the United States must sit down and negotiate 
a tactical nuclear weapon agreement. It doesn't require that it be 
resolved within a year. It requires that it be started. That seems to 
me--I am a little biased, but that seems to me eminently reasonable. I 
am proud that Senators Chambliss and Inhofe have joined me on this 
amendment. Who could be against having the Russians and the United 
States sit down within a year's time of ratification and begin the 
negotiation on tacticals? Who could be against that?
  You will hear from my friends on the other side, who are defending 
this treaty and voting down all of the amendments being offered on this 
side of the aisle, that we can't amend the treaty because, if we do, it 
is a poison pill, and the Russians will not accept it.
  If that is true, then we are not really fulfilling much of a 
function, are we? Under the Constitution, there are some special 
privileges that are imbued to the Senate.
  One of them is the treaty privilege, the treaty power, where all 
treaties must be confirmed by the Senate on a two-thirds vote. If we 
can't amend it, and all we are doing is either saying yes or no, to me 
that limits our ability. If my friends on the other side think this is 
a poison pill, I ask them to look at the language. I am just putting in 
the treaty, if they accept this, that within a year's time, we have to 
sit down at the table and enter into these negotiations on tacticals. 
It is not a heavy lift, it seems to me.
  They will say we can't do this because the Russian Duma will not 
accept it. What does that say? If the Russian Duma, their legislature, 
will not accept an amendment--if the treaty is as it is now, as 
negotiated by the U.S.--and I have said before that I have concerns 
about what is there for verification and about missile defense. Putting 
that aside, if it goes the way it has been drafted and agreed to 
between the President and the leaders of Russia, with just this one 
amendment that says that the two sides will sit down within a year's 
time, will the Russian Parliament not approve that? And if they don't 
approve it, if they will not say they will sit down within a year's 
time and negotiate about the 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons they have, 
about the security of those weapons, about our ability to verify where 
they are and about a reduction of them, because of the disparity in the 
3,000 they have and the 300 we have, what does that say about the 
Russians?
  What it says to me is that they are not, in good faith, really trying 
to come to an agreement about nuclear weapons. Would we want this 
treaty if the Russian Duma said they are not going to agree to sit down 
within a year's time to talk about tactical nuclear weapons?
  I think this is a very important amendment. I have great respect for 
the people who have stood up and supported this treaty. I think there 
are problems with it, but I don't see any reason why a fair-minded 
person could not agree that within a year's time the two parties should 
sit down and talk about what, to me, is the most dangerous part of our 
nuclear challenge with Russia, which is tactical nuclear weapons. We 
don't know where they are, what they are doing, we can't verify them, 
and there is a 10-to-1 advantage that the Russians have over us.
  Mr. President, my amendment is at the desk and has been called up. I 
hope we will have the opportunity to debate this amendment in the 
coming hours and days as we wrap up our consideration of this treaty.
  With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
  Mrs. HAGAN. Mr. President, today I rise in support of Senate 
ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The Secretary 
of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the entire 
uniformed leadership of our military believe it is in our national 
interest. Former Secretaries of State from previous administrations of 
both political parties have also endorsed the New START Treaty.
  Relations between the United States and Russia have evolved beyond 
what they were during the Cold War. Within this context, and in the 
face of aging nuclear stockpiles, strategic arms reduction is in the 
best interest of both nations.
  New START will strengthen strategic nuclear weapons stability, enable 
us to modernize our nuclear triad of strategic weapons and delivery 
systems, and ensure our flexibility to develop and deploy effective 
missile defenses and conventional global strike capabilities.
  It will also promote stability, transparency, and predictability in 
the U.S.-Russia relationship.
  The treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles through effective verification and compliance measures. Our 
negotiators ensured that the United States would be able to protect our 
ability to field a flexible and effective strategic nuclear triad 
composed of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy and strategic 
bombers. Our negotiators also ensured that the United States can enable 
modernization of our strategic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons 
they carry.
  Simply put, our country is better off with New START as opposed to 
not having a treaty at all. There has been no formal verification 
system in place since the last treaty expired a year ago. New START 
reestablishes a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that 
provides access to Russian strategic nuclear capabilities--
specifically, nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It ensures a 
measure of predictability in Russian strategic force deployments over 
the life of the treaty. Access and predictability allow us to 
effectively plan and undergo strategic modernization efforts.
  Failure to ratify the treaty will prevent us from obtaining 
information on Russian strategic nuclear weapons capabilities. Without 
the treaty going into effect, the United States will have no inspectors 
on the ground and no ability to verify Russian nuclear activities. This 
will result in our country losing insight into Russian strategic 
nuclear force deployments. It would also complicate our strategic force 
strategy and modernization planning efforts, as well as drive up costs 
in response to the need to conduct increased intelligence and analysis 
on Russian strategic force capabilities.
  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff ADM Mike Mullen have expressed their support for Senate 
ratification of New START. All indicated that ratifying the treaty 
provides our country with an opportunity to negotiate with Russia on 
tactical nuclear weapons, of which Russia holds a sizable advantage. 
Tactical nuclear weapons are the most vulnerable to theft and the most 
likely to end up in the hands of rogue states and terrorist 
organizations. It is important to understand that we will not be able 
to obtain Russian cooperation on tactical nuclear weapons without 
ratifying New START.

[[Page S10794]]

  The treaty will not affect our ability to improve our missile 
defenses either qualitatively or quantitatively, to defend our homeland 
against missile attacks, and to protect our deployed forces, allies, 
and partners from growing regional missile threats. Secretary of State 
Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates have testified that our phased 
adaptive approach to overseas missile defense is not constrained by the 
treaty.
  Senate ratification of New START will demonstrate that the United 
States is committed to reducing nuclear weapons, which is important as 
we advance our nonproliferation goals. This will assist us in obtaining 
international consensus regarding nuclear weapons proliferation 
challenges from rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea. It will 
also send a positive message in achieving consensus with other 
countries on nuclear issues.
  It is important to keep in mind that the United States and Russia 
hold over 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. If the two nations 
that possess the most nuclear weapons agree on verification and 
compliance and are committed to nonproliferation, it will improve our 
ability to achieve consensus with other countries.
  Failure to ratify the treaty will have a detrimental effect on our 
ability to influence other nations with regard to nonproliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. It will also send conflicting messages 
about the administration's emphasis and commitment to the 
nonproliferation treaty.
  Additionally, failure to ratify New START would send a negative 
signal to Russia that may cause them to not support our objectives with 
respect to dealing with the Iranian nuclear program. As Secretary of 
Defense Gates has said, without ratification, we put at risk the 
coalition and momentum we have built to pressure Iran.
  The debate over New START has facilitated a consensus to modernize 
our nuclear deterrent. The Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Mr. Thomas D'Agostino, indicated that for the 
first time since the end of the Cold War, there is broad national 
consensus on the role nuclear weapons play in our defense and the 
requirements to maintain our nuclear deterrent. The NNSA and the three 
National Laboratories support Senate ratification of New START and 
congressional approval of the President's budget to invest in nuclear 
security and modernization. Our nuclear enterprise and stockpile have 
been neglected for too long.
  Consistent with recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review, we 
need to move forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment 
projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and control 
structure, continuing development and deployment of our triad of 
delivery systems, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, 
and revitalizing our aging infrastructure.
  On December 1, the Directors of the three nuclear national 
laboratories signed a letter to the Senate emphasizing that they were 
very pleased with the administration's plan to spend $85 billion over 
the next decade to upgrade the nuclear weapons complex. They believe 
the requested amount will further a balanced program that sustains the 
science, technology, and engineering base. They also believe that the 
proposed budget will support the ability to sustain the safety, 
security, reliability, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent 
within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by 
New START.
  The Nuclear Posture Review also recognizes the importance of 
supporting a highly capable workforce with specialized skills to 
sustain the nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes three key elements of 
stockpile stewardship: hands-on work on the stockpile; the science, 
technology, and engineering base; and the infrastructure at the 
laboratories and plants.
  I share the concerns expressed by Secretary Chu regarding our ability 
to recruit the best and brightest nuclear scientists and engineers. We 
need to infuse a sense of importance and financial stability to the 
stockpile stewardship and life extension programs. Nuclear scientists 
and engineers need to believe the U.S. Government cares about nuclear 
life extension. An effective science, technology, and engineering human 
capital base is needed to conduct effective nuclear weapons system 
lifetime extension programs, increase nuclear weapons reliability, 
certify nuclear weapons without the need to undergo nuclear testing, 
and provide annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance.
  I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me in 
voting to ratify New START.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise for a few moments to comment on the 
amendment our colleague from Florida spoke about a few moments ago. 
Tactical nuclear weapons and how that is addressed was the subject of a 
long debate yesterday. I wish to reiterate some of those arguments 
because we had this debate yesterday. It is an important debate.
  First of all, if we listen to a couple of folks who have not only 
experience but have a real interest in our urgent priority of 
addressing tactical nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that the best way 
to address that issue is, in fact, to ratify this treaty. By way of 
example, if you want to highlight a country that has much at stake when 
the question is raised about Russian tactical nuclear weapons, you can 
point to few if any countries that have more at stake than Poland.
  The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Sikorski, said:

       Without a [New START] treaty in place, holes will soon 
     appear in the nuclear umbrella that the United States 
     provides to Poland and other allies under article 5 of the 
     Washington Treaty, the collective security guarantee for NATO 
     members. Moreover, New START is a necessary stepping stone to 
     future negotiations with Russia about reductions in tactical 
     nuclear arsenals and a prerequisite for the successful 
     revival of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

  That is not a commentator in Washington; that is the Foreign Minister 
of Poland, whose country has a lot at stake in this debate.
  Also, we have had a lot of discussions about the treaty and what is 
in the treaty or what would come about as a result of the treaty. It is 
not as if these arguments just landed here when the bill landed on the 
floor. We had months and months of hearings in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Our ranking member, Senator Lugar, was not just 
there for those hearings but played a leading role in helping us reach 
the point where we are now. We have a treaty on the floor because of 
his good work over many months and, I would argue in his case, many 
years on this issue. The same is true with the Presiding Officer 
sitting in on those hearings and asking questions of the relevant 
parties, many of them military leaders.
  I note for the record--and I will close with this--that the vote by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification. Subsection 11 on tactical nuclear weapons 
says:

       The Senate calls upon the President to pursue, following 
     consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian 
     Federation that would address the disparity between the 
     tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation 
     and of the United States and would secure and reduce tactical 
     nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.

  It is right in the resolution, and I argue that addresses squarely 
this amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.