[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 171 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10775-S10792]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 4841
The amendment I offer today is very straightforward and modest. It
would simply increase the number of deployed delivery vehicles--in
other words, bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles--allowed for
in the New START treaty from 700 to 720. It simply adds 20 additional
vehicles to the number in order to match up with the administration's
plan presented to the Senate for fielding 720 delivery vehicles rather
than the 700 called for in the text of this treaty.
Before I continue, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Scott Brown
of Massachusetts be added as a cosponsor of this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THUNE. For those watching this debate who may be unfamiliar with
some of the terminology used in these arms control treaties such as the
term ``delivery vehicles,'' it is important to understand that delivery
vehicles simply means the nuclear triad of systems: bombers,
submarines, and land based intercontinental ballistic missiles or
ICBMs. This triad of delivery vehicles is very valuable because it is
resilient, survivable, and flexible, meaning that if, God forbid, we
suffer a nuclear attack, those who attacked us can never be sure that
they have knocked out our ability to respond with a nuclear strike.
Obviously, without the means to deliver nuclear weapons, an adversary
would not take seriously our ability to respond to a nuclear attack. As
the numbers of delivery vehicles goes
[[Page S10783]]
down, it becomes more and more important to make sure they are
modernized and that they work as intended. And as numbers get reduced,
it begins to have an impact on whether we can effectively retain the
triad, making it more likely that our nation would have to eliminate a
leg of the triad.
On July 9, 2009, at an Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN
James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the
administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic
delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems,
and to specify at what point in this range would he become concerned
that delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear
triad into a dyad. General Cartwright responded that he ``would be very
concerned if we got down below those levels about mid point,'' meaning
that he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below 800
delivery vehicles. This treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700,
substantially below the number that General Cartwright stated a year
and a half ago.
Now, the treaty makes this odd distinction between ``deployed'' and
``non-deployed'' delivery vehicles, and the treaty's proponents will
point out that the total cap for the treaty is 800 ``deployed and non-
deployed'' systems. And of course, there is a letter from General
Cartwright in the committee report accompanying the treaty stating that
he is comfortable with the distinction between deployed and non-
deployed delivery vehicles, and the overall limits to delivery
vehicles. But it is important to understand that the administration has
not articulated how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the
number of 700. Instead, the administration has presented a plan for how
it will deploy 720 delivery vehicles. And that is the motivation behind
this amendment. I find it very troubling that the administration has
yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the
number of 700. The comprehensive plan for delivery vehicle force
structure the administration was required to present to Congress under
section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 Defense authorization bill, known
as the 1251 report, provides a very troubling lack of specificity
concerning force structure under the New START treaty. Specifically,
the administration's fact sheet on the section 1251 report explains
that the U.S. nuclear force structure under this treaty could comprise
up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs, and 240 SLBMs. The only number that
is a certainty in the 1251 report is the number of SLBMs. I hope the
members from states with bomber bases and ICBM bases will pay attention
to this important point. Since deployments at the maximum level of all
three legs of the triad under the explanation provided by the
administration's 1251 report add up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is
mathematically impossible for the U.S. to make such a deployment and be
in compliance with the treaty's limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles. Clearly, additional reduction decisions will be made
with respect to U.S. force structure under this treaty, and obviously
those reductions will come out of bombers and/or ICBMs.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged in a hearing before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, that further
reductions would still be required to meet the treaty's central limits.
They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 years
to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to
identify a final force structure at this point; meaning the Senate will
commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without
knowing how that force will be composed.
Compounding this problem of not knowing what the final force
structure will look like is the fact that the Obama administration
conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional prompt
global strike systems by counting conventionally armed strategic
ballistic missiles against the 700 allowed for delivery vehicles. For
those who are unfamiliar with prompt global strike, it is simply a
program that would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere
on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. Development
of these systems is an important niche capability that would allow us
to attack high-value targets or fleeting targets, such as WMD,
terrorist, and missile threats. A recent Defense Science Board report
states that ``the most mature option for prompt, long-range,
conventional strike is the ballistic missile'' and that ``Building on
the legacy of these [intercontinental ballistic missile] weapon systems
provides a relatively low-risk path to a conventional weapon system
with global reach.'' Yet this treaty will not permit us to develop this
low-risk concept for conventional prompt global strike without it
having an impact on the central limits under this treaty of 700
delivery vehicles.
To be very blunt, this treaty was so poorly negotiated that for
every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less
nuclear delivery vehicle will be available to the United States. This
one-for-one reduction in deployed nuclear forces is one we can ill
afford at the levels of delivery vehicles allowed under this treaty.
When the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton,
testified before the Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, he
specifically said that we could not replace the deterrent effects of
nuclear weapons with a conventional capability on a one-for-one basis
or ``even ten-for-one.''
Treaty proponents will point out that there are other potential new
conventional prompt global strike systems on the drawing board that may
not fall under the treaty's limitations, such as a hypersonic glide
delivery vehicle. But why are we tying the hands of future
administrations that may need to quickly field such systems, especially
since converting ICBMs to carry a conventional warhead are the most
advanced systems we have right now on conventional prompt global
strike?
The Senate should not ratify the treaty without knowing what kind of
conventional prompt global strike systems may be counted and how that
will affect our triad at the much reduced delivery vehicle limits.
According to the DOD, an assessment on treaty implications for
conventional prompt global strike proposals will not be ready until
early 2011. If we pass this treaty now, Senators won't know the details
on this important issue until the treaty enters into force, when it is
too late. Adopting my amendment would provide a hedge against the
issues that are raised by the conventional prompt global strike niche
capability and its impact on the treaty's limit of 700 delivery
vehicles. With a 700 delivery vehicle limit, conventional prompt global
strike counting against that number, we will have fewer nuclear
delivery vehicles, and this limit will be a disincentive to develop and
deploy conventional prompt global strike as a result. Moreover, why
should we accept these constraints in a treaty that was about strategic
nuclear weapons?
While we are required under the treaty to cut the number of delivery
vehicles to the bone, Russia will not have to make any similar cut to
their delivery vehicles, leaving one to wonder what we received in
return for this significant concession. The treaty essentially requires
the United States to make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles,
as Russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits and would
have drastically reduced its arsenal with or without this treaty. As
CRS writes, ``[Russia] currently has only 620 launchers, and this
number may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers. This
would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters into force
because Russia is eliminating older missiles as they age, and deploying
newer missiles at a far slower pace than that needed to retain 700
deployed launchers.''
So I want to put a fine point on that, Mr. President. Essentially
what we are doing here is we have about 856 delivery vehicles in our
arsenal today. We are reducing that down to 700. So we are taking a
significant haircut, a significant cut in the number of delivery
vehicles that would be available to us. The Russians, on the other
hand, are currently only at 620 launchers, delivery vehicles, which is
already well below the 700. On the attrition path they are on, it would
very soon be down to about 400 deployed launchers and 444 total
launchers. So the United States has made huge concessions regarding
delivery vehicles in this treaty, and the
[[Page S10784]]
Russians have conceded nothing on this point. It seems to me this is
another area in which we made significant concessions and received very
little in return.
Mr. President, we are binding ourselves to the number of delivery
vehicles we negotiate with Russia, even though we have security
commitments to extend our nuclear deterrent to more than 30 countries,
while Russia has none. Given geographic realities, U.S. strategic
nuclear forces are part of how the United States provides this extended
deterrence. As we face an uncertain future, where other nations like
China continue to modernize their nuclear forces, we will need to be
able to hold more potential targets at risk to deter attacks. That
means we need to be very careful about reducing delivery vehicle
levels, and this amendment would simply use the administration's 1251
report force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles as the ceiling for
delivery vehicles under this treaty, rather than the current number of
700 reflected in the treaty.
Some of my colleagues will probably warn that even this modest
amendment is a ``treaty killer'' amendment. But article II, section 2
of the Constitution says that the President ``shall have power, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties.'' When the
other side admonishes us about ``treaty killer'' amendments, it becomes
apparent that we are supposed to be a rubberstamp for this treaty,
wanting us to provide our consent but not to provide our advice. It
should be made clear what a ``treaty killer'' amendment is. It is any
amendment seeking to remedy an issue with the treaty the Russians
steamrolled us on during the negotiation process but which New START
proponents do not wish to adopt because protecting American interests
will annoy the Russians and perhaps jeopardize entry into force of the
treaty.
One thing should be clear: The Senate cannot kill New START in the
way some are suggesting. If the Senate gives its consent to New START
with amendment to the text, that just means the treaty is sent to
Russia for its approval with the amendment. The ball will then be in
Russia's court. As CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the
Senate in the treaty process: ``Amendments are proposed changes in the
actual text of the treaty. . . . [They] amount, therefore, to Senate
counter offers that alter the original deal agreed to by the United
States and the other country.''
Simply put, an amendment to the treaty text would not kill the
treaty, it would merely require Russian consent to the amendment as a
matter of international negotiation. If Russia chooses to reject that
amendment, it will not be the Senate that kills the treaty, it will be
the Russian government.
As a side note, I believe it is important to recall that General
Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian
cheating. He testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April
22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made when the Nuclear Posture
Review was completed was ``an assumption . . . that the Russians in the
post negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty.'' It
has been pointed out many times now how Russia is a serial violator of
arms control commitments.
In conclusion, reducing U.S. strategic nuclear forces, especially
with delivery systems, is a very serious matter that has received
insufficient attention. We have little to gain, and much to lose, if we
cannot be certain that the numbers in New START are adequate. I think
it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that ``as
to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers
specified are adequate though barely so.'' Again, this is a modest
amendment that takes into account the administration's own force
structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles. This amendment would simply
use the administration's 1251 report force structure plan of 720
delivery vehicles as the ceiling for delivery vehicles under this
treaty rather than the current number of 700 reflected in the treaty.
In light of all of these issues, I ask my colleagues to carefully
consider this amendment, and I respectfully ask for a vote in its
favor.
Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I
simply say that with regard to maintaining a triad and a system of
bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, in order to do that, the 700-number ceiling
makes that very complicated.
If you assume 420 ICBMs and 240 SLBMs, that leaves room for some
bombers but not a lot of room. Frankly, if you go down from the 720
number to the 700 number, if you assume up to 260 bombers--that is, if
you assume the 700 number and take it out of bombers, you would be down
to 40 bombers, 96 B-52s and B-1s that are nuclear capable, nuclear
weapons we use with nuclear-launch vehicles for extended deterrence
around the globe. Going down to 40 would be a two-thirds reduction in
the number of bombers we have to provide that type of extended
deterrence. It strikes me that we are getting perilously close with
this number to moving from a triad to a dyad.
Furthermore, we are tying our hands when it comes to our ability to
have the necessary delivery vehicles at our disposal, if and when that
time would ever come.
Again, this is a very straightforward amendment. It takes the number
from 700 to 720. It is consistent with the 1251 report and what the
administration says they can accommodate in terms of launch vehicles. I
hope my colleagues will support it.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before I say a few words about the
amendment, let me see if I can get an agreement from my colleagues. We
have a lot of colleagues asking when we are going to vote, and we need
to have some votes. We have only had two votes on this treaty after 6
days. Obviously, I can move to table, but I do not want to do that, at
least not yet.
I ask the Senator from South Dakota if we can set up a time to have a
vote on his amendment at 12:30.
Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, we
are prepared to debate. The Senator from Oklahoma wants to talk at
length about the verification issue. I do not think we are prepared at
this point to enter into a time agreement for any time certain on
votes. Until we can get some indication from our colleagues who would
like to speak on this amendment, it would be very difficult to do that.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, we are getting into
the sixth day of debate. Christmas is coming. It is surprising to me
that we do not have any indication who would like to speak on this
amendment.
Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, we
do have others who want to speak, not only on this amendment but also
on the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma. These, as I said, are
very significant, substantive amendments that deal fundamentally with
the issues that are important to this treaty. I do not think we are
prepared at this point to cut off that debate. Until we get some
indication from some of our colleagues about who else might want to
come down and speak to either of these issues, I object to entering
into any kind of time agreement.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I accept that. The point I am trying to
make is, we have allowed each of the prior amendments to come to an up-
or-down vote. We have not tabled them, which is an often-used practice,
as everybody knows. We could have debated all last night; there was
nobody here to debate. Now we are here debating. We are happy to leave
time for debate. But I ask my colleagues if they could inquire into who
might want to come so we could at least, out of courtesy to our
colleagues, give them a sense of what the schedule might be, and then
we can set a time for that debate allowing everybody adequate time.
I am not suggesting in any way that the topics we are discussing are
not important. They are important, and they are worthy of debate and
are worthy of discussion. We welcome that discussion.
Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. KERRY. I yield for a question.
Mr. INHOFE. In addition to what Senator Thune said, there are several
people who said they want to go into closed session first and address
issues having to do with my amendment and his amendment before a vote.
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Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I respect that. I am perfectly comfortable
if we are able to set a time after that closed session. I think
everybody would feel good if we can find the time. I understand the
need to want to have that session. That is the Senator's right, and we
respect that. We certainly can do it. Maybe we can find a time when we
come out of that session when we can have a couple of votes back to
back. I think that would help a lot of people.
I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his amendment. It is one
that is worthy of some discussion. Obviously, some of that discussion
is going to have to take place in the context of a classified session.
He said one of the arguments that will be used is that this will
result in going back to the Russians and having to renegotiate the
treaty. That is not a casual argument. It is not a small thing. But it
is not the principal reason--it is one of the reasons, obviously, I
think this amendment is ill-advised. But, most importantly, this
amendment is unnecessary.
All of us on our side have a very clear understanding of the
importance of delivery vehicles with respect to our national defense.
But here is what we have to balance the comments of the Senator from
South Dakota against: the President of the United States, the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command, and others have all determined that we can safely
reduce our deployed ICBMs and our deployed SLBMs and our deployed heavy
bombers--the three legs of the triad--that they could be reduced to the
700 number.
That figure was picked, obviously, after an enormous amount of
thinking by all of those parties concerned--the Strategic Command, the
Air Force folks, the Navy SLBM--and they did so only after seeing the
results of force-on-force analyses of exactly where that would leave us
in terms of America's response should there--happily in the current
atmosphere--be the unlikely event of a nuclear confrontation.
Obviously, we need to think about these issues in that larger context
of where we are today, what direction we are moving in, and what is the
reality.
As the Senator knows, without going into any details, that force-on-
force determination was made not just in the likelihood of a Russian-
U.S. confrontation but in a multiparty confrontation. Again, we will
discuss some of that later.
The gravamen of the Senator's complaint is that he is concerned that
the administration has failed to thus far state precisely how it is
going to reduce the deployed ICBMs--intercontinental ballistic
missiles--and the SLBMs--submarine-launched ballistic missiles--and
heavy bombers, how do we meet the treaty's requirement of 700. I want
the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee to weigh in.
I will say quickly, the administration has made it clear that it
intends to maintain 20 launchers on the 12 ballistic missile submarines
that we keep operationally deployed, meaning our submarine force will
account for 240 of the 700 limit. We agree on that. That leaves room
for 460 deployed delivery vehicles combined from the two other legs of
the triad--from the ICBMs and from the heavy bomber forces.
The Senator also said the administration has said in its 1251 report
that it has not made a final decision on going all the way up to the
420 ICBMs or all the way up to 60 bombers or somewhere in between. That
decision has not been made.
In other words, out of the total deployed delivery vehicle limit of
700, the administration has left itself some room to maneuver, to make
a decision on 20 of its ICBMs and bombers.
Under the agreement, we have 7 years of room before we have to meet
that limit. When asked about this sort of available time of 7 years,
General Chilton, the commander of our Strategic Command, told the Armed
Services Committee for the record:
The force structure construct, as reported in the section
1251 report, is sufficient to meet the Nation's strategic
deterrence mission. Furthermore, the New START treaty
provides flexibility to manage the force drawdown while
maintaining an effective and safe strategic deterrent.
As a technical matter, the Senator's amendment would require the
President to go back to the Russians, move the limit up from 700 to
720, even though the military is perfectly comfortable with the level
we have. That is when we begin to get into the question, if they are
telling us that this is good and comfortable and we can do what we need
to do in this context, I might add, of a very different Russia, very
different United States, very different set of strategic demands at
this moment, why would we reopen the treaty for renegotiation?
I have more to say, particularly on the subject of the Prompt Global
Strike because the Prompt Global Strike likewise is not impacted
negatively by this, and there are a number of reasons we have options
as to how we arm certain legs in the triad and what we choose to do.
It is important to point out also--I think this is important--there
may be some concern. I understand the geography of the Senator's
representation, so there may be some concern from some Senators, and
the comments that the Senator made that those of you who have people
concerned with the ICBM bases or the SLBM bases or the bomber bases
need to be focused on this, let me be clear that the administration has
made it clear. None of the three ICBM bases are going to be closed
because of the New START treaty. We are maintaining all of them.
What is more, the administration has made it clear that it is
committed to the ICBM force in the years to come. In its updated 1251
report, the Minuteman III will remain in service through 2030 and then
be replaced by a follow-on ICBM to be determined.
If people are concerned about cutting bombers, Senators should
remember that to meet the New START's limits, we are not going to need
to eliminate any bombers. We plan to simply convert some bombers to a
conventional role, at which point they will no longer count toward the
treaty limits.
With that stated as part of the Record, I yield 5 minutes, or such
time as the Senator from Michigan would like to consume, to the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it was my understanding that we had an
informal arrangement that we would go back and forth. I would like to
be recognized.
Mr. KERRY. I completely understand that. We had the two Senators
speak. I would like to yield to the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee for 5 minutes and then come back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment of Senator Thune would amend
the treaty by changing one of the elements of the treaty, which is the
number of deployed strategic forces that we have. Under the treaty, the
limit, of course, is 700. But the critically important part to our
military is that each side would have the ability to change the mix to
reach 700 as it suits our respective needs.
The amendment of Senator Thune would alter the limit of 700 to 720
deployed SLBMs, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear arms, and ICBMs.
These limits, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has
just said, were agreed upon only after careful analysis by the U.S.
military leadership, particularly General Chilton who is the commander
of our U.S. Strategic Command and the man responsible for these
strategic systems.
Senator Kerry has quoted General Chilton. I want to add one
additional quote of his which he testified to before the Armed Services
Committee on July 20 of this year. General Chilton stated that the
force levels in the treaty meet the current guidance for deterrence for
the United States. By the way, that guidance was laid out by President
George W. Bush.
The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring
America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries,
assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as
long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted
in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary
capabilities--
Here are the key words--
supports both the agreed-upon limits in the new START and
recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
So General Chilton is on record in a number of places very precisely
and specifically saying that the options which were provided, including
the one which was adopted here, rooted in the
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strategy, rooted in the provisions, the guidance as laid out by
President Bush, support the agreed upon limits in the START treaty. I
don't know how much more precise and I don't know how much more
significant you can get with the words of the commander who is in
charge of these weapons.
The 1251 report, the report says up to those numbers. It is not
specifically committed to those numbers. The important thing about the
report is not just that it says up to in I think at least two of the
three cases it also says it is important that we remain flexible as to
this number.
So the 700 force structure that is in the treaty would retain the
nuclear triad, retains all three delivery legs, bombers, SLBMs, and
ICBMs. On that point General Chilton said we are going to retain the
vital nuclear delivery systems, and if there is a failure technically
in one of the nuclear systems, we can rearrange our deployed force
structure and treaty limits to compensate.
Some have said the United States will have to make significant
reductions to reach the 700 level and the Russians will have to make
none. According to General Chilton, this argument is a distraction.
What he said is that the ``new START limits''--in his words, the ``new
START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that can
target the United States, missiles that pose the most prompt threat to
our forces and our Nation. Regardless of whether Russia would have kept
its missile force levels within those limits without a new START
treaty, upon ratification they would now be required to do so.'' And
that certainly is very important to our Strategic Commander, General
Chilton, because he said:
The constraints of the treaty actually do constrain Russia
with regard to deployed launchers and deployed strategic
weapons, and that is an important element as well. Without
that they are unconstrained.
He explained that the limits were important because without those
limits
There would be no constraints placed upon the Russian
Federation as the number of strategic delivery systems or
warheads they could deploy. And I think it is important for
the United States--
he concluded
that there be limits there, limits that we would also be
bound by, obviously.
General Chilton is not only comfortable with the limits in this
treaty, it was his analysis that formed the underpinning for the 700
limit. He doesn't need the strategic, the additional 20 strategic
nuclear delivery systems to maintain our strong deterrence, and other
than to kill this treaty there is no reason to add these 20 additional
systems. We should respect General Chilton's judgment that the United
States can maintain an effective deterrent and that such a change would
kill this treaty.
I yield the floor and I thank the Chair.
Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I do want to be recognized for the
purpose of further explaining my amendment No. 4833 and also to respond
to the Senator from Massachusetts. Before doing that I would ask if the
Senator from South Dakota has any responses he wishes to make at this
time, and then I wish to keep the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). The Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. THUNE. I thank the Senator for giving me the opportunity to
respond, if I might, to some of these issues.
One of the issues General Chilton, the Stratcom commander, I think
testified to was an assumption there would be nobody cheating. As I
said before, history is replete with examples of the Russians cheating
on these agreements. And furthermore, what they agreed to was not--the
treaty is 700, but what General Chilton and the nuclear force structure
plan would call for is 720. It is 240 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers. Again that adds up to
720. All this amendment does is simply make consistent what the nuclear
force structure plan as outlined by General Chilton and others would be
with what the treaty requirements would be as well.
Again I want to make one point about this. I said this earlier but we
have 856 launch vehicles, delivery vehicles in our arsenal today. The
treaty calls for 700 so we are making a 156-delivery vehicle reduction
to get down to the 700 number. The Russians today at 620 in effect are
already below the 700 number and they are headed down even lower to
somewhere in the 400 range. So we have made a significant concession
with respect for delivery vehicles at no cost whatsoever to the
Russians. I would point out also that the concern I have, as I said
before, in taking a 720 number and reducing it to 700 assumes again
that even if you keep 240 submarine-launched ballistic missile delivery
vehicles, assume that, and if you assume 420 ICBMs, you would have to
reduce the bomber inventory down to 40 to get under the 700 level.
I think most people understand it is the bombers, the heavy bombers
that have given us the extended deterrence. They are visible, they are
recallable, they are psychological, they are political. You put them
into a theater, they loiter, they persist, and that is a powerful
deterrent to those who would like to proliferate nuclear weapons. If we
take our bomber fleet and we reduce down to the limits that would be
talked about under this treaty, we are putting at great risk the triad.
A lot of these bombers need to be updated and they are getting older.
We need a next generation bomber which I think is going to be critical
that that also be a nuclear bomber. But I think it is important to
point out that this particular treaty relative to where we are today
and to what our needs could be in the future, particularly as it
pertains to bombers, the need for extended deterrence, we are reducing
to a level that I think makes many of us uncomfortable and gets below
the number that was prescribed in the nuclear force structure plan as
had been outlined. The 720 as opposed to 700--the 700 number is well
below where I think we need to be and does put in peril the triad which
has served us well for a long period of time. In fact, in the early
stage of the Cold War it was the heavy bombers that provided the bulk
of the work. When we developed the ICBM, and SLBMs, now some of the
bombers have been converted to conventional use and they have been
doing a great job in that mission as well. But if we are going to have
extended deterrence in the future we are going to have to have a very
robust nuclear fleet that is nuclear capable, and a 700 number puts
that in great jeopardy.
With that, I yield back to the Senator.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for one question before he yields
the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Is it not true that the 1251 report says that the numbers which they
talk about are up-to numbers, in the case of both ICBMs and the nuclear
bombers?
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, it is my understanding that is correct;
it is up to the 240 SLBMs, up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers.
Mr. LEVIN. So the 720 is not proscribed by the 1251 report. Thus the
total of the three numbers, two of which are up-to numbers, is that
correct?
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, to answer the question of the Senator
from Michigan, that I believe to be the case. It is not proscriptive.
All I am simply saying is if you make an assumption that you are going
to take the additional 20 delivery vehicles out of the bomber fleet,
you would take it from 60 down to 40 at a time when we have about
almost 120 bombers in our inventory. That is a significant reduction in
our ability to provide extended deterrence, and the bombers are the
best form of extended deterrence.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator and I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. It is my intention now--I made my presentation earlier on
and a similar presentation yesterday and the Senator from Massachusetts
responded. I wish to respond to his responses to clarify some of the
things that might be a little unclear.
First of all, the Senator from Massachusetts said every Senator on
our side and, most importantly, the unbelievably experienced
negotiators who put this treaty together, have made a lifetime of
trying to understand these kinds of relationships and the ways in which
you adequately verify, and they
[[Page S10787]]
wanted to expand, which I appreciated, how qualified these people were,
but here is the problem we have and I think it was articulated by the
Senator from South Dakota. We have a constitutional responsibility. We
take an oath of office to support the Constitution, and one of the
things it is up to us--not to anybody but us--to provide for common
defense. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution specifically gives
us not just the right but the obligation for advice and consent, and
quite often we talk about all these smart people who have agreed with
this. That leaves one group out. That is us. We happen to be the ones
who are accountable to the people through our election.
The Senator from Massachusetts also said that the treaty itself,
talking about the amendment, my amendment, he said he opposes an
amendment to the treaty itself which we all understand now after two
votes that it would kill the treaty, essentially saying that if you
amend the treaty it is dead.
I think we need to stop and reevaluate what our obligation is, not
just the constitutional obligation, as the CRS has outlined in a study
of the role of the Senate in the treaty process. Amendments are
proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. They amount
therefore to Senate counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed
upon by the United States and the other country.
If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the
text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with the
amendments. Both the Russian Duma and the United States Senate have a
constitutional right to change portions of this treaty and it is up to
them to do. So this reinserts it back into the process. I feel that is
exactly what our Founding Fathers wanted us to be doing in these
treaties and that is what we are trying to do.
The third thing that was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts is,
he was talking about the concept of the type one inspections and the
type two inspections as a new one. Well, it is a new process because
type two inspections are inspections on formerly declared facilities.
Obviously in the START I treaty we didn't have formally declared
facilities. They came as a result of the first treaty. Type one refers
to inspections of ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases to confirm
the accuracy of declared data on the number and types of deployed and
nondeployed warheads located on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. So I
would say that type two inspections weren't even addressed in the first
treaty.
The Senator also said we said we ought to send this back ``but it
doesn't rise to that level in my judgment.'' Now he talks about the
level of significance. All these amendments are significant. Each one
of us who is an author has a little bit of bias because we have studied
a little bit more in our particular area. I can't think of anything
that is more significant than verification. The interesting thing that
was brought out by the Senator from North Dakota was General Chilton's
support. I am reading from the report right now. It says General
Chilton's support for the New START level was predicated on no Russian
cheating or changes in the geopolitical environment.
Well, historically they have been cheating on everything. Let me go
ahead and reread what I said before. We had the meeting, the convention
in 2005, and then again 5 years later in 2010, came out in May or June
of this year, and in that one, talking about the biological weapons
convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that Russia
maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and that its
nature and status have not changed. That is what they said in 2005. Now
5 years later the new report came out and the State Department report
states the Russian confidence-building measures since 1992 have not
satisfactorily documented whether its biological program was
terminated. Therefore, they are saying the same thing 5 years later, so
they lied 5 years ago and it appears that they have not done--or they
cheated, I should say.
Chemical weapons the same thing.
In 2005, the State Department assessed that:
Russia is in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention
obligations because its declaration was incomplete with
respect to declaration of production and development
facilities.
Then, in 2010, 5 years later, the State Department again stated there
was an absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the
United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all
of its chemical weapons stockpile and all of its chemical weapons
development facilities.
If we are predicating all that on General Chilton, who said cheating
has all of a sudden miraculously stopped, this is a great reform
measure, and I would like to see the evidence of it before we assume
that is the case.
The Senator from Massachusetts also stated people responsible for
verification of this treaty would never have been sent to the United
States. This treaty would never have been sent to the United States if
the treaty did not have adequate verification measures. So it talks
about all these verification measures.
Then he says: It is the judgment of our military, our State
Department, and our intelligence community that these measures are
adequate.
That may be true with those who are currently answering to our
President who strongly support this treaty. But if we look at the State
Department and the military and the intelligence of the past, those
people who have commented, James Baker, as I recall, Secretary of
State, summarized that the New START verification regime is ``weaker
than its predecessor,'' testifying to Congress in May of this year. I
happen to have been there. He said the New START verification program:
. . . does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one
that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and
prohibitions under START I. This complex part of the treaty
is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are
allowed than were allowed in the past.
Insofar as the military is concerned, Richard Perle, former Assistant
Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, stated on December
2, a few days ago, that:
New START has a very weak verification regime, one that
establishes a dangerous precedent and lowers our standards
for verification.
Here is the military weighing in.
He goes on to say that:
New START's verification provisions would provide little or
no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the
Russians did not declare, are off limits to U.S. inspectors,
or are hidden from U.S. satellites.
James Woolsey--when we talk about intelligence, I have a bias because
James Woolsey is from Oklahoma. He was the Director of Central
Intelligence from 1993 to 1995. He was adviser to the SALT I
negotiations up through 1970, a delegate at large to the START and
defense and space negotiations.
He stated, on November 15, that under this treaty, unlike the
original START treaty, Russia is free to encrypt telemetry from missile
tests, making it harder for us to know what new capabilities it is
developing. There is no longer the requirement for permanent onsite
monitoring of Russia's primary missile production facility, which under
old START helped us keep track of new mobile missiles entering the
Soviet force.
He goes on and on. That is agreed with by Paula DeSutter, former
Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at
the U.S. State Department, who pointed out on July 12 that New START
has glaring holes in its verification regime. New START is ``much less
verifiable than the original START.''
I only say this because my friend from Massachusetts talked about the
military, the State Department, and the intelligence community. One
thing that is ingrained in our system is that we have a President who
is Commander in Chief. He has a lot of influence over the State
Department and the military. We have heard some very well respected
people along those lines.
One of the arguments or rebuttals the Senator from Massachusetts had
against my opening statement yesterday was that we have fewer sites now
than during the development of the START I treaty. This is true. We do
have fewer sites. An argument can be made--and most people agree with
the fact--that if you have fewer sites, you need more inspections.
Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security John Bolton stated, on May 3, that
[[Page S10788]]
``while [verification] is important in any arms-control treaty,
verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels.''
Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter weighed in on the same thing in a
joint statement:
Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they
are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect
intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels
go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly
delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits,
concerns about ``hidden'' missiles, and the actions of
nuclear third parties.
In May of this year, in front of the Foreign Relations Committee,
former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START
verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to
Congress that the New START verification program ``does not appear as
rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous and diverse
treaty obligations. . . .''
He goes on to say it is more significant as you reduce your number of
inspected facilities.
Further, the Senator from Massachusetts responded to me by saying
they are going to demand the same number of inspections of our military
bases, and we would have to be prepared to host them three times more
in inspections. That is true. This is bilateral. Everything we are
asking them to do, we to have do too. I like that idea. He went on to
talk about the inconvenience, but my amendment applies to both the
United States and to Russia. My amendment increases inspections for
both sides, which will improve confidence, trust, and transparency.
More importantly, it improves our ability to catch the Russians
cheating and deter Russian cheating. I am fully aware we have to do the
same thing the Russians have to do.
Furthermore, it was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts, in his
response to my statement:
So I think it's one thing to ask our strategic nuclear
forces to do that ten times a year, or less than once a
month. It's another thing for them to be waiting for 30
inspections a year. We have 2 submarine bases, 3 bomber
bases, and 3 ICBM bases.
I might add, Russia has 3 submarine bases, 3 bomber bases and 12 ICBM
bases. So we are actually not on parity there.
Quoting from a letter Secretary Gates sent this summer about whether
the Russians would cheat on this treaty in a manner that would be
militarily significant, he said:
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs
commander, and the U.S. strategic command and I assess that
Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant
cheating or breakout.
In other words, they are not going to cheat. This is this conversion
I guess they have had.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, would the Senator yield for a moment?
Mr. INHOFE. Just for a moment, for a question.
Mr. KERRY. I just want to be clear. The Senator read my words
accurately, which were the quote of the general who said ``militarily
significant.'' I don't think he said that.
Mr. INHOFE. I didn't hear the Senator.
Mr. KERRY. With respect to the issue of cheating, what he said was he
didn't think there would be anything militarily significant. Again,
this is material we could go into, which we will probably, in the
classified session. But I just want that distinction to be clear.
Mr. INHOFE. I thought that is exactly what I said. I apologize for
the misunderstanding.
Further, the Senator from Massachusetts made the statement that:
Our analysis of the N.I.E. and the potential for Russian
cheating or breakout confirms that the treaty's verification
regime is effective.
I have to always be a little suspect of what comes out of the N.I.E.
I think all of us are. We don't take it as gospel. This is actually a
true story. Back in the Clinton administration, it was August 24, 1998,
I asked the question: How long will it be until North Korea has a
multistage rocket? The response that came back in August of 1998 was 5
to 10 years. Seven days later, on August 31 of 1998, they fired a
three-stage rocket.
I think we need to look at some of the intelligence estimates. They
have been wrong in the past. When you are talking about something as
significant as the issue we are talking about here, about the threat
that is out there, then we have to be right.
Then, the Senator from Massachusetts quoted Condoleezza Rice. I
actually agree with her. She said:
The new start treaty helpfully reinstates on-site
verification of Russian nuclear forces which lapsed with the
expiration of the original start treaty last year. Meaningful
verification was a significant achievement of Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush and its reinstatement is crucial.
I agree with that. Obviously, she is not saying she supports this.
She is saying she supports some kind of a verification. There is none
today, so anything is better than nothing. I think that is what she is
saying. She also agreed, in her next statement in the Wall Street
Journal of December 7:
Still, there are legitimate concerns about New Start that
must and can be addressed in the ratification process. . . .
Implying that there is nothing wrong with having amendments.
Lastly, one of the statements the Senator from Massachusetts made in
response to my comments was:
Finally, I'd like to point out that we addressed the
importance of this verification question in condition of the
resolution of ratification. That condition requires that
before New START can enter into force and every year
thereafter, the President has to certify to the Senate that
our national technical means, in conjunction with the
verification activities provided for in the New START treaty,
are sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of Russian
compliance with the provisions of the New START treaty and
timely warning of Russian preparation.
Here is the problem I have with that. The President can only certify
what he knows. Our intelligence experts are telling him what they are
seeing in Russia. This amendment provides that the President will have
more information. I would think, if that is the concern, we would want
to give the President more information.
Lastly, I see the Senator from Arizona is here, and I know he wants
to be heard. Let me mention one last thing my good friend, the Senator
from Massachusetts, stated. He was talking about the fact that these
are killer amendments. I think it is worth restating what we said
before.
The CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the Senate in the
treaty process:
Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the
treaty. [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counteroffers
that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States
and the other country.
If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the
text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with an amendment.
That means we go back and forth and hopefully come out with a treaty
that would be workable.
According to the 2005 and 2010 State Department reports on arms
compliance, Russia has a bad habit of cheating on these agreements. In
fact, I think we have covered that adequately at this time.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I wish to talk about both the Thune
amendment and the Inhofe amendment. With respect to the Inhofe
amendment on verification, we are going to go into executive session of
the Senate at 2 o'clock this afternoon, where there will be an
opportunity for all Senators to examine classified materials that have
been presented by our intelligence agencies, some of which relate
specifically to the treaty and, in particular, the verification
provisions in the treaty. It is too bad it is not possible for us to
discuss with very much specificity the nature of the intelligence we
will be discussing, but I will say I think it is a good thing we will
be voting on the Inhofe amendment following that session, because a lot
of the material we are going to be exposed to in executive session
relates to the verification provisions of this treaty and past
experience with verification.
That is about all I wish to say right now, except that I hope
colleagues would attend that session because their vote on the Inhofe
amendment would at least be partially predicated on their being briefed
in that executive session.
With respect to the Thune amendment, I very much support it as well.
The reason is because the whole point of this treaty was to reduce the
nuclear
[[Page S10789]]
warheads and the delivery vehicles of the Russian Federation and the
United States. That is the essence of the treaty. There is a lot more
to it, but it reduces to 1,550 the actual warheads and reduces to 700
the delivery vehicles. There is a special definition or counting rule
of those delivery vehicles that we don't need to get into here, but the
reality is, it is 700 deployed delivery vehicles, with another 100 that
could theoretically be deployed at a later date.
But 700 is the number. That is important for a couple of reasons. As
we have talked about before, the Russians will actually have room to
build up. There are a lot of different estimates over the number of
delivery vehicles they are planning on having. But because missiles and
bombers and submarines are expensive, the Russians could be well below
that number in a few years. So that number does not help the United
States at all. The Russians are already below it by at least--well,
over 100--and they will be going lower than that.
One unfortunate consequence of that is they are MIRVing their ICBM
delivery vehicles in a way that, obviously, is going to be much more
destabilizing. Throughout the Cold War, both sides developed missiles
that allowed them to put more than one warhead on top of a missile. The
problem is, that is very destabilizing in a potential nuclear conflict
because of the notion that you lose it if you do not use it.
So it was an incentive for either side to launch their missiles
before the other side could attack them and destroy them. If you hit
one missile silo and that missile in the silo has 8 warheads on it or
10 warheads on it, you have killed 10 warheads, not just one. Those
warheads--the way they work is, when the missile gets up to the top of
its apogee, those warheads are splayed out, and each one has a
different trajectory down to potentially 8 or 10 different targets. So
they are very destabilizing. The incentive is for the person doing the
first strike to kill them all so the other side does not have that
capability coming back at you.
Well, both the United States and the then-Soviet Union recognized how
destabilizing this was and moved toward a single warhead per missile,
which is much less destabilizing, obviously. Since one of the benefits
of this treaty is allegedly the stability that comes from it, one is
very troubled by the idea that, unfortunately, that is not the way it
works. The treaty is much more destabilizing, not stabilizing, because
of this incentive for the Russians to put more than one warhead on each
missile. The United States, by contrast, is limiting our missiles to
one warhead apiece. In a way, that puts us at a big disadvantage.
Another way it puts us at a disadvantage is we are above the 700, and
we are going to have to retire a lot of our delivery vehicles to get
down to 700. So the treaty is not symmetrical in this regard. They
could actually build up to 700. We will have to bring down to 700.
It is also not symmetrical because our obligations around the world
are much more diverse than are Russia's obligations. Russia will be
defending Russia. The United States has an understanding with 31 other
countries that our nuclear umbrella is available to them for their
nuclear deterrence as well. So this requires a more sophisticated
defense plan on our part as to how we would deliver various warheads to
what targets, and it essentially expands the number of weapons we need.
So it is a big deal to get down to the number of 700. As Senator
Thune has noted--and I will not repeat this--before the treaty was
negotiated, a lot of our miliary people were testifying to various
numbers that, obviously, led to the conclusion that 700 was way too
low. Dr. Schlesinger has, for example, said that 700 might be barely
enough.
The problem is, that, A, we are even going to go below 700 if we
proceed with something the administration wants to do, many of us here
want to do; that is, to develop what is called a conventional Prompt
Global Strike. A conventional Prompt Global Strike is using an ICBM but
with a conventional warhead on it, not a nuclear warhead, to strike at
a target of potentially a rogue nation or some terrorist group or
someplace where you have actionable intelligence that is of very short
life. You want to destroy a target. You obviously do not want to use a
nuclear warhead. But you want to get there fast, and it is a long way
away. So you might need to use, essentially, the same kind of missile
you would use to deliver a nuclear warhead.
Well, the Russians did not like that, so they said: If you do any of
those, you are going to have to count them against your nuclear
delivery limit. So if we did 25 of those, let's say, then instead of
700 vehicles to deliver nuclear weapons, we would only have 675. That
is why the Thune amendment talks about going back up to 730, which,
without getting into classified material, I believe represents a number
that more closely approximates what people think is going to be
necessary for the United States on into the future.
The other thing that is troubling about it is, the administration has
yet to commit to a full triad nuclear capable. Even though they have
said they are fully committed to the triad, which means bombers,
submarines, and ICBMs, they have not been willing to say the new
bombers we build will be nuclear capable or will have cruise missiles
that can deliver a nuclear warhead.
So while they say ``triad,'' they are not willing to commit to
anything but a diad. The problem with that is, there is much less
stability and capability if you only have two ways of delivering your
nuclear weapons. If there is something wrong with your ICBM force--
remember, about 2 months ago, the power went out in several States, and
our ICBMs were actually down for--I have forgotten what it was--an hour
and a half or something like that because they did not have any
electrical power.
Well, obviously, nothing happened during that period of time. But a
single point of failure is never desirable in the military context,
where if one thing goes wrong, a lot of weapons or capability is taken
off the table. The problem is, if you get down to just two ways of
delivering these weapons, rather than the three we have today, you are
going to be much less capable. Your deterrent is not going to deter as
much. That is what Senator Thune is trying to get at.
Let's at least modestly increase the number of delivery vehicles we
have. It is a modest amendment. It is an appropriate amendment. Yet as
we have just seen from Reuters today--something we already knew but the
latest iteration of it--``Russia warns U.S. not to change nuclear
pact.'' In effect, what they are saying is, the Senate can debate all
it wants to, but if it makes one change, changes one comma, one thing
is different in the treaty, well, then what? Then, as my colleague,
Senator Kerry, said, we would have to see if the Russians were willing
to agree to it. Otherwise, they would have to renegotiate at least that
part of the treaty.
Well, what is wrong with that? Unless you think the U.S. Constitution
was stupid to give the Senate a role in this, it does not seem to me
there is anything wrong with the Senate saying: You got about nine-
tenths of it just fine, President Obama and President Medvedev, your
negotiators. These negotiators are good, smart people and they are
dedicated public servants, but they are not necessarily the last word.
The Senate is the last word, according to our Constitution. We gave our
advice. The administration did not take our advice in two specific
ways, but yet they expect us to give them their consent to the treaty.
The reality is, the Senate should not be a rubberstamp. In the first
START treaty, we said: You have not dealt with a subject here that
needs to be dealt with--the potential for Russian submarine-launched
cruise nuclear weapons. We need to have a side agreement on that. It
did not blow up START. We did a side agreement. The world did not end
when the Senate said no to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The
predictions were that this was going to destroy our relations with
Russia forever. It did not. Here we are today now told again: If you
change one thing in this treaty, then Russia will not go along with it
and our relationship could deteriorate significantly.
Well, if our relationship depends upon ratification of the treaty
exactly like it is, then it is a lot weaker than the President and Vice
President are making it out to be when they talk about this wonderful
new reset relationship. Surely, it could stand the Senate making a
modest change to the
[[Page S10790]]
treaty. If it cannot, then I do not buy the argument that this is a
wonderful reset relationship.
So for my colleagues who say: We will not abide by any amendments to
the treaty, I say: Well, then, you have just said the Senate is
irrelevant in the treaty process. We might as well forget about having
the Senate consider these treaties in the first place.
Senator Thune and Senator Inhofe have good amendments. I am looking
forward to supporting both of them when we return from our closed
session this afternoon. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. KYL. I would be happy to yield for a question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. THUNE. The Senator from Arizona made some good points, I think,
about the importance of the triad in maintaining our nuclear capability
and deterrence.
I am interested in knowing if the Senator is aware that even if you
assume the numbers that are in the 1251 report that would take the
number of bombers down to 60--and it is up to 60, but the treaty calls
for 700 delivery vehicles, which, if you took that out of bombers,
would take you down to 40--that even taking it to 60 would cut in half
the number of nuclear bombers.
Is the Senator also aware bombers are the best vehicle to enforce
extended deterrence? The ICBMs, the missiles we have, our adversaries
sometimes cannot see those. A bomber is visible. A bomber can be sent
into theater. It has an impact, a psychological impact, a political
impact. It is recallable. It is something that can be out there that
makes those who would proliferate nuclear weapons even more concerned
about the capability we have to respond.
The importance of maintaining that leg of the triad is, in this
Senator's judgment, critical. It sounds like, from what the Senator is
saying, he understands that as well.
I want to know if the Senator is aware that the limits that are
imposed not only in the 1251 report but, more important, in the treaty
would significantly reduce the number of nuclear bombers we have at our
disposal today.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I say to Senator Thune, I was not aware it
would be cut in half. I was aware it would be drastically reduced. That
is a huge reduction, especially if the administration is unwilling to
commit that we are even going to have a nuclear-capable bomber force in
the next generation of our triad. They have been willing to say we have
a great triad today. That is true as far as it goes. But part of that
triad on the bomber force, for example, are B-52s that were designed--
when--back in the 1950s and built in the 1960s and 1970s.
We have to replace all three legs of our triad. The decision has been
made on the submarine. That is a good thing. But the decisions have not
yet been made on the ICBM or on the bomber force.
One of our concerns about modernization is that modernization of the
nuclear warheads is fine--I mean, it is necessary. But if we do not
also modernize the method by which we deliver those warheads, then
modernizing our warheads is of little significance.
The final point to Senator Thune's question, of course, is that other
countries, including Russia and China, are all modernizing both their
warheads and their delivery vehicles. So the United States does not
want to get caught in the position where we are down to very few
workable weapons, especially the bomber force, which, as the Senator
noted, can also be called back, unlike the missiles that are launched
either from ground or from submarine. Once they are launched, they are
launched. At least a bomber can be called back.
Mr. THUNE. I guess the concern and observation the Senator raised I
would make as well. With regard to a follow-on bomber, a next-
generation bomber, much of our bomber fleet today--47 percent of it is
pre-Cuban missile era. So they are older. They need to be replaced. We
need a next-generation bomber. The question the Senator raised about
the ambiguity coming out of whether a next-generation bomber would, in
fact, be nuclear is a real concern because that would put at risk the
existence of the triad, which I think allows us to maintain the
flexibility, the versatility we have today in terms of nuclear
deterrence.
So I would echo what the Senator from Arizona has voiced as a concern
about this discussion of a next-generation bomber and whether, one, it
will be done, and, two, it will be a nuclear bomber.
Mr. KYL. I will conclude by saying, I hope we have at least a short
moment or period of debate following the closed session so both Senator
Thune and Senator Inhofe can make a brief closing argument to remind
our colleagues about what the debate has been all about. I regret more
of our colleagues were not on the floor to hear the debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, of course, we will accommodate,
hopefully, some brief statements prior to the votes, and I am confident
we can agree on some reasonable period, hopefully, not more than 5
minutes or something like that, to summarize.
But let me say to my friend from Arizona, because I heard him saying
fairly passionately: What is the point of having the Senate involved if
it cannot advise and consent and cannot amend the treaty, none of us on
our side are arguing we should not have that right, that we do not have
that right, that this is not a worthy debate, and that we should not
debate a legitimate attempt to amend the treaty. That is not what we
are saying. In fact, if I thought it was a flawed treaty and if I
thought there were enormous gaps in it, I would try to amend the
treaty, I am sure. I think if that were true, we wouldn't have had a
60-to-30 vote against doing it yesterday. Sixty Senators made the
judgment that we don't want to; we don't think it rises to that level.
I would simply say to my colleague, it is not that the amendment--
that we shouldn't have the debate and that somehow not doing this now
rejects the notion that we are capable of doing it; it is that we don't
think it is a good amendment. We don't think the amendment rises to the
level where it raises an issue that it merits sending the treaty back
to the Russians.
So we will retain that right--and I will protect that as long as I am
a Senator--to give that proper advice and consent. But I believe we
gave the proper advice and consent and we rejected an amendment, as I
hope we will reject these other two amendments, and I will further the
arguments with respect to that later.
I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is waiting for time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask the indulgence of the Senator from
Pennsylvania for a moment. Let me also reiterate I don't know where
this constant questioning of the triad keeps coming from, because the
Secretary of Defense, in testimony as well as in letters, not to
mention the Defense Department through the Joint Chiefs and then
others, have repeatedly stated their commitment to a viable, forward-
going triad. The triad is not in question here. There will be a triad,
we are committed to the triad, and I will have something more to say
about that later.
I yield the floor, and I thank my colleague.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cardin). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to
15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two or three topics
in this debate on the START treaty, but first and foremost, one that
speaks directly to the amendment that is pending. That is the question
of verification--the ability for the United States to verify by way of
inspection and other means what the Russian Federation has in terms of
its nuclear weapons.
First of all, I would say as a foundational principle in this debate,
nothing in this treaty will in any way compromise the safety, security,
effectiveness, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. That is critical
to make that point, and I think the American people understand that.
But as the American people are listening to this debate
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about verification, I think it is important to outline the distinctions
between the amendment and I think what is, in fact, the case in the
treaty.
The treaty itself allows each party up to 18 short-notice, on-site
inspections, and that is each year, with up to 10 so-called type one
inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-
powered ballistic missiles, submarines, and finally nuclear-capable
heavy bombers. So that is the type one inspections, up to 18 of those,
which are short-notice inspections. Secondly, under the type two
inspections, these are conducted in places such as storage sites, test
ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination
facilities.
Some have asked whether we lose any valuable elements of the original
START agreement's inspection regime. The Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy James Miller replied to that question, a similar question I
posed during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the
verification of the New START treaty. It was a hearing I chaired. He
said that under New START, we will conduct, as I said a moment ago, 18
inspections per year for 35 sites; so 18 inspections, 35 Russian sites.
Under START I, there were 28 inspections for 70 Russian facilities. We
are going from a verification regime where there are 28 inspections for
70 sites to one that goes to 18 inspections for 35 sites. The ratio is
actually better under this treaty in terms of the numbers of
inspections and sites.
Mr. Miller, Under Secretary of Defense Miller, said that the ratio of
inspections to facilities ``is improved under the New START treaty
relative to the original START treaty.'' That is Under Secretary of
State Miller. That is not my words but his.
ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated
this point on March 26 of 2010 when he said that the New START
``features a much more effective transparent verification method that
demands quicker data exchanges and notifications.''
In addition, this does not take into account that some of the
inspections under the New START treaty allow us to do two inspections
at once, unlike the first START treaty. I would also say the inspection
regime we have in place under this treaty has also been changed to
reflect the current security environment, an enhanced relationship with
the Russian Federation and more than a decade of our experience in
conducting inspections. The New START inspection regime is simpler and
cheaper than that which was conducted under the original START treaty.
We conduct fewer overall inspections under this new treaty because
there are, in fact, fewer sites in Russia to inspect, and we have
gotten better at inspecting in the years since this has transpired.
I would also say we are standing here today on December 20 of 2010,
380 days without inspectors on the ground in Russia. That is one of the
reasons why I say ratification of this New START treaty makes us safer
than not ratifying this treaty; in fact, makes us less safer. One of
the reasons for that--not the only reason, but one of the reasons--is
that 380 days have passed without inspectors on the ground. This is, in
a word, unacceptable to our national security. I think the American
people believe that as well.
We need to vote on this treaty. While I and many of our colleagues
who have worked on this believe there is a sense of urgency, we also
believe the views of the other side of the aisle have been engaged in a
serious debate. We have had day after day now of debate on the floor.
Of course, all of the debate here now and last week--almost a full week
now--all of that was preceded by months and months of work on the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and other
parts of the Senate.
This is not new. The President made an agreement back in the spring
of this year. We passed this treaty out of our committee back in the
fall. We have had a lot of work. More than 900 questions have been
asked of the administration and more than 900 questions have been
answered by the administration; something like 20 separate hearings
among several committees. We have had a lot of time and a lot of work
put into this. The pace of this, in my judgment, has not been too fast,
but it has been done with a sense of urgency to finally--after all of
these months of work, all of these months of debate, all of these
months of hearings, we are at a point now where we can ratify this
treaty. I think in the end there is going to be bipartisan and broad
support for ratification and we look forward to that vote.
My decision to support the New START treaty came after informed study
of this issue as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and it is
based, in large part, on relying upon and asking questions of folks
such as Admiral Mullen, to name one--someone who has spent years in the
service of this country, concerned about and doing something about the
defense and the security of this country. So often we hear in this
Chamber we should respect the opinions of commanders on the ground, and
we should. We have heard that in the context of the war in Iraq, and we
continue to hear it in the context of the war in Afghanistan. We should
respect and take into consideration the determinations and judgments
made by commanders on the ground, those who have direct experience with
military questions and, in this case, have direct experience with the
defense of our country.
I think when it comes to the New START treaty, we should apply the
same rule as well when it comes to Admiral Mullen or any other military
leader who has an opinion about this treaty. The commanders on the
ground as it relates to this treaty have spoken and they have done so
without equivocation and, I would argue, unanimously. On this vital
treaty and on this national security issue, they have spoken with one
voice: We need to take action to secure our country and we need to take
action to defend our country. We need to make sure we are taking
actions that will result in a nuclear arsenal that will be safe,
secure, effective, and reliable, and one of the steps to get there is
to make sure we ratify this treaty.
Let me move to one other topic. I know we have colleagues here who
wish to speak. Let me ask how much time I have remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. CASEY. Thank you. I wish to speak about missile defense and I may
be able to do it within that time or less. First of all, I wish to
commend the work by this administration for the letter that was sent
recently that reiterated once again the commitment of the United
States. I would argue that is an unwavering commitment to missile
defense, consistent with the goal of having a nuclear arsenal and
having defense for this country--but especially as it relates to the
nuclear arsenal--that is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. This
New START treaty does not place any constraints on our ability to
defend ourselves. Over the past few days, this has been made clear by
Chairman Kerry on the floor, making these strong arguments, as well as
those made repeatedly by our uniformed military leadership.
Let me give some flavor of that by reading the following. This is a
quotation from LTG Patrick O'Reilly who thinks the New START treaty
could actually provide more flexibility in implementing our missile
defense plans. He said:
The New START treaty reduces constraints on the development
of the missile defense program in several areas. For example,
MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target booster system, used in
key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and
components of the new European Phased Adaptive Approach, was
accountable under the previous START treaty, because it
employed the first range of the now-retired Trident 1 SLBM.
Under New START, this missile is not accountable, thus we
will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with
regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, and
processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures
and operationally realistic intercept geometries.
That is a very technical summation by LTG Patrick O'Reilly. He is the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency. He is not just making some
casual observation in a think tank or even as a Member of Congress. We
listen to a lot of voices here and many of them are respected voices.
But I think when we are listening to the Missile Defense Agency
Director, who is a lieutenant general, and he talks about this New
START treaty providing more flexibility as it relates to missile
defense, I think we should listen very carefully.
[[Page S10792]]
I know Republicans here in Washington have over many days now
directly or indirectly tried to assert that this administration is not
committed to missile defense. They are wrong. I think the record is
very clear. The President made clear that this administration is
inalterably committed--my words--to a missile defense that is
effective. I would argue as well to a missile defense that ensures we
have a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear arsenal. It is
also a missile defense that is capable of growing and adapting to
threats posed by countries such as Iran.
I have heard a lot of folks here on both sides of the aisle stand up
and make statements about the threat caused by Iran's nuclear program.
We should listen to voices that are concerned about that in the context
of making sure that this ratification is consistent with that, which it
is. It is consistent with our efforts to ensure that Iran does not have
that capability.
So what are these capabilities? Well, here is a quick summation.
We currently have 30 ground based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK,
and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California defending the homeland.
Defense Under Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright have asserted
that we will continue to improve and further augment these existing
ground-based interceptor systems, noting that these ``U.S. based
defenses will be made more effective by the forward basing of a TPY-2
radar--which we plan by 2011.''
In Europe, the United States has worked to defend our allies in NATO.
The European Phased Adaptive Approach is a network of increasingly
capable sensors and standard missile SM-3 interceptors that will
provide a capacity to address near term threats, while also developing
new technologies to combat future threats.
The first stage, to be completed in 2011, will deploy Aegis ships
with SM-3 interceptors in Northern and Southern Europe to protect our
troops and Allies from short-range medium regional ballistic missile
threats.
The second phase, estimated to be operational by 2015, it will field
upgraded sea- and land-based SM-3s in Southern and Central Europe to
expand protection of the continent.
The third phase will introduce a more capable version of the SM-3
that is currently under development, which will provide full protection
for our allies in Europe from short, medium, and intermediate range
ballistic missiles by 2018.
The final phase, planned for 2020, it will field an even further
improved SM-3 missile with anti-ICBM capabilities to augment current
defense of the U.S. homeland from Iranian long-range missile threats.
So when you look at it from each of these three points of view--
meaning the three phases--we are going to have in place a system that
will defend our homeland and will also help our European allies.
Let me conclude with one quotation. I mentioned Admiral Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This is what he said about the so-called
phased adaptive approach:
The Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders and I also fully
concur with the Phased Adaptive Approach as outlined in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. As with the Nuclear
Posture Review, the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders
were deeply involved throughout the review process.
So whether it is the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, or other
commentators, we are going to make sure that in the aftermath of the
ratification of this treaty and consistent with and as part of and
because of the ratification of this treaty, our missile defense will be
as strong as it can be. And we are going to make sure that, without a
doubt, we are going to protect the American people and take every step
necessary to make sure our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective,
and reliable.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
Mr LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to
10 minutes on the New START Treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
Senator is recognized.