[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 171 (Monday, December 20, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10775-S10794]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                              Byron Dorgan

  Mr. KERRY. I know the Senator from South Dakota is here. I know he 
wishes to speak. I will not be long. I wish to take advantage of this 
moment with the Senator from North Dakota on the floor to say a couple 
of things.
  First of all, I am very grateful to him personally for the comments 
he has made about both my efforts and the efforts of Senator Lugar. I 
appreciate them enormously. But more importantly, the Senator is going 
to be leaving the Senate at the end of this session. I wish to say 
there are few Senators who combine as many qualities of ability as does 
the Senator from North Dakota. He is one of the most articulate Members 
of the Senate. He is one of the most diligent Members of the Senate. He 
is one of the most thoughtful Members of the Senate.
  I have had the pleasure of serving with him on the Commerce 
Committee. I have seen how creative and determined he is with respect 
to the interests of consumers on Internet issues, on fairness issues, 
consumer issues in which he has taken an enormous interest. He has been 
head of the policy committee for I think almost 10 years or so. He has 
been responsible for making sure the rest of us are informed on issues. 
He has kept us up to date on the latest thinking. He has put together 
very provocative weekly meetings with some of the best minds in the 
country so we think about these things.
  So I wanted to say to the Senator from North Dakota personally 
through the Chair how well served I think the citizens of North Dakota 
have been, how grateful we are for his service, and how extraordinarily 
lucky we have been to have someone representing one of the great 50 
States as effectively as he has. I think he has been a superb Senator, 
and he will be much missed here.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I wish to speak to an amendment I have 
pending at the desk, but before I do that, I wish to make some general 
observations as well about where we are with regard to this process 
because there has been a lot said about Republicans not wanting to vote 
on this or trying to delay this. But I think one would have to admit 
that we have now talked about missile defense, which I think is a very 
valid issue with respect to this treaty. There are very significant 
areas of disagreement with regard to how it treats missile defense. We 
have had a discussion about tactical weapons, which, in my judgment, 
also is a very important issue relative to our national security 
interests and the interests of our allies around the world. We have had 
a debate about verification, about which the amendment of Senator 
Inhofe is currently pending. Those are all very valid and substantive 
issues to debate and discuss with regard to this treaty.
  The amendment I will offer will deal with the issue of delivery 
vehicles, which is something that is important as well where this 
treaty is concerned.
  So I would simply say that it is consistent with our role in the U.S. 
Senate to provide advice and consent. If it were just consent, if that 
is what the Founders intended, we could rubberstamp this. But we have a 
role in this process, and that role is to look at these issues in great 
detail and make sure the national security interests of the United 
States are well served by a treaty of this importance.
  So I think the words of the treaty matter, and I think the words of 
the preamble matter. I am not going to relitigate the debate we have 
already had on missile defense, but I believe that if we have language 
in a preamble to a document such as this, not unlike the preamble we 
have in our Constitution which is frequently quoted, it has meaning. To 
suggest that the preamble doesn't mean anything, that it is a throwaway 
and has throwaway language, to me really misses the point. Obviously, 
it matters to someone. It matters greatly to the Russians, and I don't 
think, if it didn't, it would be in there. That is why I believe that 
having this linkage between offensive strategic arms and defensive 
strategic arms in the preamble--it is in there for a reason. Somebody 
wanted it in there, obviously, and I think it certainly has weight and 
consequence beyond what has been suggested here on the floor of the 
Senate.
  I would also argue as well that the signing statement we have already 
talked about where the Russians made it very clear in the signing 
statement, in Prague on April 8 of 2010, that the treaty can operate 
and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from 
developing its missile defense capabilities qualitatively or 
quantitatively--if you tie that back to article XIV of the withdrawal 
clause of the treaty where it talks about being able to withdraw for 
exceptional circumstances, you can certainly see the pretext by which 
the Russians may decide to withdraw from this treaty.
  So missile defense is not an inconsequential issue. It is a very 
important issue with regard to this treaty, and the amendment that was 
offered on Saturday and voted on attempted to address that. 
Unfortunately, that failed. I hope we have subsequent opportunities to 
get at the issue of missile defense because I certainly think it is an 
unresolved issue in my view and in the view of many of us.


                           Amendment No. 4841

  The amendment I offer today is very straightforward and modest. It 
would simply increase the number of deployed delivery vehicles--in 
other words, bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles--allowed for 
in the New START treaty from 700 to 720. It simply adds 20 additional 
vehicles to the number in order to match up with the administration's 
plan presented to the Senate for fielding 720 delivery vehicles rather 
than the 700 called for in the text of this treaty.
  Before I continue, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Scott Brown 
of Massachusetts be added as a cosponsor of this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THUNE. For those watching this debate who may be unfamiliar with 
some of the terminology used in these arms control treaties such as the 
term ``delivery vehicles,'' it is important to understand that delivery 
vehicles simply means the nuclear triad of systems: bombers, 
submarines, and land based intercontinental ballistic missiles or 
ICBMs. This triad of delivery vehicles is very valuable because it is 
resilient, survivable, and flexible, meaning that if, God forbid, we 
suffer a nuclear attack, those who attacked us can never be sure that 
they have knocked out our ability to respond with a nuclear strike. 
Obviously, without the means to deliver nuclear weapons, an adversary 
would not take seriously our ability to respond to a nuclear attack. As 
the numbers of delivery vehicles goes

[[Page S10783]]

down, it becomes more and more important to make sure they are 
modernized and that they work as intended. And as numbers get reduced, 
it begins to have an impact on whether we can effectively retain the 
triad, making it more likely that our nation would have to eliminate a 
leg of the triad.
  On July 9, 2009, at an Armed Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN 
James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the 
administration's commitment at that time to reduce our strategic 
delivery vehicles to somewhere in the range of 500 to 1,100 systems, 
and to specify at what point in this range would he become concerned 
that delivery vehicle reductions would necessitate making our nuclear 
triad into a dyad. General Cartwright responded that he ``would be very 
concerned if we got down below those levels about mid point,'' meaning 
that he would be concerned if the negotiated number fell below 800 
delivery vehicles. This treaty caps delivery vehicles at 700, 
substantially below the number that General Cartwright stated a year 
and a half ago.
  Now, the treaty makes this odd distinction between ``deployed'' and 
``non-deployed'' delivery vehicles, and the treaty's proponents will 
point out that the total cap for the treaty is 800 ``deployed and non-
deployed'' systems. And of course, there is a letter from General 
Cartwright in the committee report accompanying the treaty stating that 
he is comfortable with the distinction between deployed and non-
deployed delivery vehicles, and the overall limits to delivery 
vehicles. But it is important to understand that the administration has 
not articulated how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the 
number of 700. Instead, the administration has presented a plan for how 
it will deploy 720 delivery vehicles. And that is the motivation behind 
this amendment. I find it very troubling that the administration has 
yet to articulate how it will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the 
number of 700. The comprehensive plan for delivery vehicle force 
structure the administration was required to present to Congress under 
section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 Defense authorization bill, known 
as the 1251 report, provides a very troubling lack of specificity 
concerning force structure under the New START treaty. Specifically, 
the administration's fact sheet on the section 1251 report explains 
that the U.S. nuclear force structure under this treaty could comprise 
up to 60 bombers, up to 420 ICBMs, and 240 SLBMs. The only number that 
is a certainty in the 1251 report is the number of SLBMs. I hope the 
members from states with bomber bases and ICBM bases will pay attention 
to this important point. Since deployments at the maximum level of all 
three legs of the triad under the explanation provided by the 
administration's 1251 report add up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is 
mathematically impossible for the U.S. to make such a deployment and be 
in compliance with the treaty's limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles. Clearly, additional reduction decisions will be made 
with respect to U.S. force structure under this treaty, and obviously 
those reductions will come out of bombers and/or ICBMs.

  Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen acknowledged in a hearing before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, that further 
reductions would still be required to meet the treaty's central limits. 
They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 years 
to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it necessary to 
identify a final force structure at this point; meaning the Senate will 
commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 700 without 
knowing how that force will be composed.
  Compounding this problem of not knowing what the final force 
structure will look like is the fact that the Obama administration 
conceded to Russian demands to place limits on conventional prompt 
global strike systems by counting conventionally armed strategic 
ballistic missiles against the 700 allowed for delivery vehicles. For 
those who are unfamiliar with prompt global strike, it is simply a 
program that would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere 
on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. Development 
of these systems is an important niche capability that would allow us 
to attack high-value targets or fleeting targets, such as WMD, 
terrorist, and missile threats. A recent Defense Science Board report 
states that ``the most mature option for prompt, long-range, 
conventional strike is the ballistic missile'' and that ``Building on 
the legacy of these [intercontinental ballistic missile] weapon systems 
provides a relatively low-risk path to a conventional weapon system 
with global reach.'' Yet this treaty will not permit us to develop this 
low-risk concept for conventional prompt global strike without it 
having an impact on the central limits under this treaty of 700 
delivery vehicles.
  To be very blunt, this treaty was so poorly negotiated that for 
every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less 
nuclear delivery vehicle will be available to the United States. This 
one-for-one reduction in deployed nuclear forces is one we can ill 
afford at the levels of delivery vehicles allowed under this treaty. 
When the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Chilton, 
testified before the Armed Services Committee on April 22, 2010, he 
specifically said that we could not replace the deterrent effects of 
nuclear weapons with a conventional capability on a one-for-one basis 
or ``even ten-for-one.''

  Treaty proponents will point out that there are other potential new 
conventional prompt global strike systems on the drawing board that may 
not fall under the treaty's limitations, such as a hypersonic glide 
delivery vehicle. But why are we tying the hands of future 
administrations that may need to quickly field such systems, especially 
since converting ICBMs to carry a conventional warhead are the most 
advanced systems we have right now on conventional prompt global 
strike?
  The Senate should not ratify the treaty without knowing what kind of 
conventional prompt global strike systems may be counted and how that 
will affect our triad at the much reduced delivery vehicle limits. 
According to the DOD, an assessment on treaty implications for 
conventional prompt global strike proposals will not be ready until 
early 2011. If we pass this treaty now, Senators won't know the details 
on this important issue until the treaty enters into force, when it is 
too late. Adopting my amendment would provide a hedge against the 
issues that are raised by the conventional prompt global strike niche 
capability and its impact on the treaty's limit of 700 delivery 
vehicles. With a 700 delivery vehicle limit, conventional prompt global 
strike counting against that number, we will have fewer nuclear 
delivery vehicles, and this limit will be a disincentive to develop and 
deploy conventional prompt global strike as a result. Moreover, why 
should we accept these constraints in a treaty that was about strategic 
nuclear weapons?
  While we are required under the treaty to cut the number of delivery 
vehicles to the bone, Russia will not have to make any similar cut to 
their delivery vehicles, leaving one to wonder what we received in 
return for this significant concession. The treaty essentially requires 
the United States to make unilateral reductions in delivery vehicles, 
as Russia is already well below the delivery vehicle limits and would 
have drastically reduced its arsenal with or without this treaty. As 
CRS writes, ``[Russia] currently has only 620 launchers, and this 
number may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers. This 
would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters into force 
because Russia is eliminating older missiles as they age, and deploying 
newer missiles at a far slower pace than that needed to retain 700 
deployed launchers.''
  So I want to put a fine point on that, Mr. President. Essentially 
what we are doing here is we have about 856 delivery vehicles in our 
arsenal today. We are reducing that down to 700. So we are taking a 
significant haircut, a significant cut in the number of delivery 
vehicles that would be available to us. The Russians, on the other 
hand, are currently only at 620 launchers, delivery vehicles, which is 
already well below the 700. On the attrition path they are on, it would 
very soon be down to about 400 deployed launchers and 444 total 
launchers. So the United States has made huge concessions regarding 
delivery vehicles in this treaty, and the

[[Page S10784]]

Russians have conceded nothing on this point. It seems to me this is 
another area in which we made significant concessions and received very 
little in return.
  Mr. President, we are binding ourselves to the number of delivery 
vehicles we negotiate with Russia, even though we have security 
commitments to extend our nuclear deterrent to more than 30 countries, 
while Russia has none. Given geographic realities, U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces are part of how the United States provides this extended 
deterrence. As we face an uncertain future, where other nations like 
China continue to modernize their nuclear forces, we will need to be 
able to hold more potential targets at risk to deter attacks. That 
means we need to be very careful about reducing delivery vehicle 
levels, and this amendment would simply use the administration's 1251 
report force structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles as the ceiling for 
delivery vehicles under this treaty, rather than the current number of 
700 reflected in the treaty.
  Some of my colleagues will probably warn that even this modest 
amendment is a ``treaty killer'' amendment. But article II, section 2 
of the Constitution says that the President ``shall have power, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties.'' When the 
other side admonishes us about ``treaty killer'' amendments, it becomes 
apparent that we are supposed to be a rubberstamp for this treaty, 
wanting us to provide our consent but not to provide our advice. It 
should be made clear what a ``treaty killer'' amendment is. It is any 
amendment seeking to remedy an issue with the treaty the Russians 
steamrolled us on during the negotiation process but which New START 
proponents do not wish to adopt because protecting American interests 
will annoy the Russians and perhaps jeopardize entry into force of the 
treaty.
  One thing should be clear: The Senate cannot kill New START in the 
way some are suggesting. If the Senate gives its consent to New START 
with amendment to the text, that just means the treaty is sent to 
Russia for its approval with the amendment. The ball will then be in 
Russia's court. As CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the 
Senate in the treaty process: ``Amendments are proposed changes in the 
actual text of the treaty. . . . [They] amount, therefore, to Senate 
counter offers that alter the original deal agreed to by the United 
States and the other country.''
  Simply put, an amendment to the treaty text would not kill the 
treaty, it would merely require Russian consent to the amendment as a 
matter of international negotiation. If Russia chooses to reject that 
amendment, it will not be the Senate that kills the treaty, it will be 
the Russian government.
  As a side note, I believe it is important to recall that General 
Chilton's support for New START levels was predicated on no Russian 
cheating. He testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 
22, 2010, that one of the assumptions made when the Nuclear Posture 
Review was completed was ``an assumption . . . that the Russians in the 
post negotiation time period would be compliant with the treaty.'' It 
has been pointed out many times now how Russia is a serial violator of 
arms control commitments.
  In conclusion, reducing U.S. strategic nuclear forces, especially 
with delivery systems, is a very serious matter that has received 
insufficient attention. We have little to gain, and much to lose, if we 
cannot be certain that the numbers in New START are adequate. I think 
it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that ``as 
to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers 
specified are adequate though barely so.'' Again, this is a modest 
amendment that takes into account the administration's own force 
structure plan of 720 delivery vehicles. This amendment would simply 
use the administration's 1251 report force structure plan of 720 
delivery vehicles as the ceiling for delivery vehicles under this 
treaty rather than the current number of 700 reflected in the treaty. 
In light of all of these issues, I ask my colleagues to carefully 
consider this amendment, and I respectfully ask for a vote in its 
favor.
  Mr. President, I ask my colleagues to support this amendment. I 
simply say that with regard to maintaining a triad and a system of 
bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs, in order to do that, the 700-number ceiling 
makes that very complicated.
  If you assume 420 ICBMs and 240 SLBMs, that leaves room for some 
bombers but not a lot of room. Frankly, if you go down from the 720 
number to the 700 number, if you assume up to 260 bombers--that is, if 
you assume the 700 number and take it out of bombers, you would be down 
to 40 bombers, 96 B-52s and B-1s that are nuclear capable, nuclear 
weapons we use with nuclear-launch vehicles for extended deterrence 
around the globe. Going down to 40 would be a two-thirds reduction in 
the number of bombers we have to provide that type of extended 
deterrence. It strikes me that we are getting perilously close with 
this number to moving from a triad to a dyad.
  Furthermore, we are tying our hands when it comes to our ability to 
have the necessary delivery vehicles at our disposal, if and when that 
time would ever come.
  Again, this is a very straightforward amendment. It takes the number 
from 700 to 720. It is consistent with the 1251 report and what the 
administration says they can accommodate in terms of launch vehicles. I 
hope my colleagues will support it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before I say a few words about the 
amendment, let me see if I can get an agreement from my colleagues. We 
have a lot of colleagues asking when we are going to vote, and we need 
to have some votes. We have only had two votes on this treaty after 6 
days. Obviously, I can move to table, but I do not want to do that, at 
least not yet.
  I ask the Senator from South Dakota if we can set up a time to have a 
vote on his amendment at 12:30.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, we 
are prepared to debate. The Senator from Oklahoma wants to talk at 
length about the verification issue. I do not think we are prepared at 
this point to enter into a time agreement for any time certain on 
votes. Until we can get some indication from our colleagues who would 
like to speak on this amendment, it would be very difficult to do that.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, we are getting into 
the sixth day of debate. Christmas is coming. It is surprising to me 
that we do not have any indication who would like to speak on this 
amendment.
  Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, we 
do have others who want to speak, not only on this amendment but also 
on the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma. These, as I said, are 
very significant, substantive amendments that deal fundamentally with 
the issues that are important to this treaty. I do not think we are 
prepared at this point to cut off that debate. Until we get some 
indication from some of our colleagues about who else might want to 
come down and speak to either of these issues, I object to entering 
into any kind of time agreement.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I accept that. The point I am trying to 
make is, we have allowed each of the prior amendments to come to an up-
or-down vote. We have not tabled them, which is an often-used practice, 
as everybody knows. We could have debated all last night; there was 
nobody here to debate. Now we are here debating. We are happy to leave 
time for debate. But I ask my colleagues if they could inquire into who 
might want to come so we could at least, out of courtesy to our 
colleagues, give them a sense of what the schedule might be, and then 
we can set a time for that debate allowing everybody adequate time.
  I am not suggesting in any way that the topics we are discussing are 
not important. They are important, and they are worthy of debate and 
are worthy of discussion. We welcome that discussion.
  Mr. INHOFE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KERRY. I yield for a question.
  Mr. INHOFE. In addition to what Senator Thune said, there are several 
people who said they want to go into closed session first and address 
issues having to do with my amendment and his amendment before a vote.

[[Page S10785]]

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I respect that. I am perfectly comfortable 
if we are able to set a time after that closed session. I think 
everybody would feel good if we can find the time. I understand the 
need to want to have that session. That is the Senator's right, and we 
respect that. We certainly can do it. Maybe we can find a time when we 
come out of that session when we can have a couple of votes back to 
back. I think that would help a lot of people.
  I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his amendment. It is one 
that is worthy of some discussion. Obviously, some of that discussion 
is going to have to take place in the context of a classified session.
  He said one of the arguments that will be used is that this will 
result in going back to the Russians and having to renegotiate the 
treaty. That is not a casual argument. It is not a small thing. But it 
is not the principal reason--it is one of the reasons, obviously, I 
think this amendment is ill-advised. But, most importantly, this 
amendment is unnecessary.
  All of us on our side have a very clear understanding of the 
importance of delivery vehicles with respect to our national defense. 
But here is what we have to balance the comments of the Senator from 
South Dakota against: the President of the United States, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the U.S. 
Strategic Command, and others have all determined that we can safely 
reduce our deployed ICBMs and our deployed SLBMs and our deployed heavy 
bombers--the three legs of the triad--that they could be reduced to the 
700 number.
  That figure was picked, obviously, after an enormous amount of 
thinking by all of those parties concerned--the Strategic Command, the 
Air Force folks, the Navy SLBM--and they did so only after seeing the 
results of force-on-force analyses of exactly where that would leave us 
in terms of America's response should there--happily in the current 
atmosphere--be the unlikely event of a nuclear confrontation. 
Obviously, we need to think about these issues in that larger context 
of where we are today, what direction we are moving in, and what is the 
reality.
  As the Senator knows, without going into any details, that force-on-
force determination was made not just in the likelihood of a Russian-
U.S. confrontation but in a multiparty confrontation. Again, we will 
discuss some of that later.
  The gravamen of the Senator's complaint is that he is concerned that 
the administration has failed to thus far state precisely how it is 
going to reduce the deployed ICBMs--intercontinental ballistic 
missiles--and the SLBMs--submarine-launched ballistic missiles--and 
heavy bombers, how do we meet the treaty's requirement of 700. I want 
the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee to weigh in.
  I will say quickly, the administration has made it clear that it 
intends to maintain 20 launchers on the 12 ballistic missile submarines 
that we keep operationally deployed, meaning our submarine force will 
account for 240 of the 700 limit. We agree on that. That leaves room 
for 460 deployed delivery vehicles combined from the two other legs of 
the triad--from the ICBMs and from the heavy bomber forces.
  The Senator also said the administration has said in its 1251 report 
that it has not made a final decision on going all the way up to the 
420 ICBMs or all the way up to 60 bombers or somewhere in between. That 
decision has not been made.
  In other words, out of the total deployed delivery vehicle limit of 
700, the administration has left itself some room to maneuver, to make 
a decision on 20 of its ICBMs and bombers.
  Under the agreement, we have 7 years of room before we have to meet 
that limit. When asked about this sort of available time of 7 years, 
General Chilton, the commander of our Strategic Command, told the Armed 
Services Committee for the record:

       The force structure construct, as reported in the section 
     1251 report, is sufficient to meet the Nation's strategic 
     deterrence mission. Furthermore, the New START treaty 
     provides flexibility to manage the force drawdown while 
     maintaining an effective and safe strategic deterrent.

  As a technical matter, the Senator's amendment would require the 
President to go back to the Russians, move the limit up from 700 to 
720, even though the military is perfectly comfortable with the level 
we have. That is when we begin to get into the question, if they are 
telling us that this is good and comfortable and we can do what we need 
to do in this context, I might add, of a very different Russia, very 
different United States, very different set of strategic demands at 
this moment, why would we reopen the treaty for renegotiation?
  I have more to say, particularly on the subject of the Prompt Global 
Strike because the Prompt Global Strike likewise is not impacted 
negatively by this, and there are a number of reasons we have options 
as to how we arm certain legs in the triad and what we choose to do.
  It is important to point out also--I think this is important--there 
may be some concern. I understand the geography of the Senator's 
representation, so there may be some concern from some Senators, and 
the comments that the Senator made that those of you who have people 
concerned with the ICBM bases or the SLBM bases or the bomber bases 
need to be focused on this, let me be clear that the administration has 
made it clear. None of the three ICBM bases are going to be closed 
because of the New START treaty. We are maintaining all of them.
  What is more, the administration has made it clear that it is 
committed to the ICBM force in the years to come. In its updated 1251 
report, the Minuteman III will remain in service through 2030 and then 
be replaced by a follow-on ICBM to be determined.
  If people are concerned about cutting bombers, Senators should 
remember that to meet the New START's limits, we are not going to need 
to eliminate any bombers. We plan to simply convert some bombers to a 
conventional role, at which point they will no longer count toward the 
treaty limits.
  With that stated as part of the Record, I yield 5 minutes, or such 
time as the Senator from Michigan would like to consume, to the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, it was my understanding that we had an 
informal arrangement that we would go back and forth. I would like to 
be recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. I completely understand that. We had the two Senators 
speak. I would like to yield to the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee for 5 minutes and then come back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment of Senator Thune would amend 
the treaty by changing one of the elements of the treaty, which is the 
number of deployed strategic forces that we have. Under the treaty, the 
limit, of course, is 700. But the critically important part to our 
military is that each side would have the ability to change the mix to 
reach 700 as it suits our respective needs.
  The amendment of Senator Thune would alter the limit of 700 to 720 
deployed SLBMs, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear arms, and ICBMs. 
These limits, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has 
just said, were agreed upon only after careful analysis by the U.S. 
military leadership, particularly General Chilton who is the commander 
of our U.S. Strategic Command and the man responsible for these 
strategic systems.
  Senator Kerry has quoted General Chilton. I want to add one 
additional quote of his which he testified to before the Armed Services 
Committee on July 20 of this year. General Chilton stated that the 
force levels in the treaty meet the current guidance for deterrence for 
the United States. By the way, that guidance was laid out by President 
George W. Bush.

       The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring 
     America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, 
     assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as 
     long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted 
     in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary 
     capabilities--

  Here are the key words--

     supports both the agreed-upon limits in the new START and 
     recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

  So General Chilton is on record in a number of places very precisely 
and specifically saying that the options which were provided, including 
the one which was adopted here, rooted in the

[[Page S10786]]

strategy, rooted in the provisions, the guidance as laid out by 
President Bush, support the agreed upon limits in the START treaty. I 
don't know how much more precise and I don't know how much more 
significant you can get with the words of the commander who is in 
charge of these weapons.
  The 1251 report, the report says up to those numbers. It is not 
specifically committed to those numbers. The important thing about the 
report is not just that it says up to in I think at least two of the 
three cases it also says it is important that we remain flexible as to 
this number.
  So the 700 force structure that is in the treaty would retain the 
nuclear triad, retains all three delivery legs, bombers, SLBMs, and 
ICBMs. On that point General Chilton said we are going to retain the 
vital nuclear delivery systems, and if there is a failure technically 
in one of the nuclear systems, we can rearrange our deployed force 
structure and treaty limits to compensate.
  Some have said the United States will have to make significant 
reductions to reach the 700 level and the Russians will have to make 
none. According to General Chilton, this argument is a distraction. 
What he said is that the ``new START limits''--in his words, the ``new 
START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that can 
target the United States, missiles that pose the most prompt threat to 
our forces and our Nation. Regardless of whether Russia would have kept 
its missile force levels within those limits without a new START 
treaty, upon ratification they would now be required to do so.'' And 
that certainly is very important to our Strategic Commander, General 
Chilton, because he said:

       The constraints of the treaty actually do constrain Russia 
     with regard to deployed launchers and deployed strategic 
     weapons, and that is an important element as well. Without 
     that they are unconstrained.

  He explained that the limits were important because without those 
limits

       There would be no constraints placed upon the Russian 
     Federation as the number of strategic delivery systems or 
     warheads they could deploy. And I think it is important for 
     the United States--

he concluded

     that there be limits there, limits that we would also be 
     bound by, obviously.

  General Chilton is not only comfortable with the limits in this 
treaty, it was his analysis that formed the underpinning for the 700 
limit. He doesn't need the strategic, the additional 20 strategic 
nuclear delivery systems to maintain our strong deterrence, and other 
than to kill this treaty there is no reason to add these 20 additional 
systems. We should respect General Chilton's judgment that the United 
States can maintain an effective deterrent and that such a change would 
kill this treaty.
  I yield the floor and I thank the Chair.
  Mr. INHOFE. Madam President, I do want to be recognized for the 
purpose of further explaining my amendment No. 4833 and also to respond 
to the Senator from Massachusetts. Before doing that I would ask if the 
Senator from South Dakota has any responses he wishes to make at this 
time, and then I wish to keep the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. I thank the Senator for giving me the opportunity to 
respond, if I might, to some of these issues.
  One of the issues General Chilton, the Stratcom commander, I think 
testified to was an assumption there would be nobody cheating. As I 
said before, history is replete with examples of the Russians cheating 
on these agreements. And furthermore, what they agreed to was not--the 
treaty is 700, but what General Chilton and the nuclear force structure 
plan would call for is 720. It is 240 submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles, up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers. Again that adds up to 
720. All this amendment does is simply make consistent what the nuclear 
force structure plan as outlined by General Chilton and others would be 
with what the treaty requirements would be as well.
  Again I want to make one point about this. I said this earlier but we 
have 856 launch vehicles, delivery vehicles in our arsenal today. The 
treaty calls for 700 so we are making a 156-delivery vehicle reduction 
to get down to the 700 number. The Russians today at 620 in effect are 
already below the 700 number and they are headed down even lower to 
somewhere in the 400 range. So we have made a significant concession 
with respect for delivery vehicles at no cost whatsoever to the 
Russians. I would point out also that the concern I have, as I said 
before, in taking a 720 number and reducing it to 700 assumes again 
that even if you keep 240 submarine-launched ballistic missile delivery 
vehicles, assume that, and if you assume 420 ICBMs, you would have to 
reduce the bomber inventory down to 40 to get under the 700 level.
  I think most people understand it is the bombers, the heavy bombers 
that have given us the extended deterrence. They are visible, they are 
recallable, they are psychological, they are political. You put them 
into a theater, they loiter, they persist, and that is a powerful 
deterrent to those who would like to proliferate nuclear weapons. If we 
take our bomber fleet and we reduce down to the limits that would be 
talked about under this treaty, we are putting at great risk the triad. 
A lot of these bombers need to be updated and they are getting older. 
We need a next generation bomber which I think is going to be critical 
that that also be a nuclear bomber. But I think it is important to 
point out that this particular treaty relative to where we are today 
and to what our needs could be in the future, particularly as it 
pertains to bombers, the need for extended deterrence, we are reducing 
to a level that I think makes many of us uncomfortable and gets below 
the number that was prescribed in the nuclear force structure plan as 
had been outlined. The 720 as opposed to 700--the 700 number is well 
below where I think we need to be and does put in peril the triad which 
has served us well for a long period of time. In fact, in the early 
stage of the Cold War it was the heavy bombers that provided the bulk 
of the work. When we developed the ICBM, and SLBMs, now some of the 
bombers have been converted to conventional use and they have been 
doing a great job in that mission as well. But if we are going to have 
extended deterrence in the future we are going to have to have a very 
robust nuclear fleet that is nuclear capable, and a 700 number puts 
that in great jeopardy.
  With that, I yield back to the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for one question before he yields 
the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Is it not true that the 1251 report says that the numbers which they 
talk about are up-to numbers, in the case of both ICBMs and the nuclear 
bombers?
  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, it is my understanding that is correct; 
it is up to the 240 SLBMs, up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers.
  Mr. LEVIN. So the 720 is not proscribed by the 1251 report. Thus the 
total of the three numbers, two of which are up-to numbers, is that 
correct?
  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, to answer the question of the Senator 
from Michigan, that I believe to be the case. It is not proscriptive. 
All I am simply saying is if you make an assumption that you are going 
to take the additional 20 delivery vehicles out of the bomber fleet, 
you would take it from 60 down to 40 at a time when we have about 
almost 120 bombers in our inventory. That is a significant reduction in 
our ability to provide extended deterrence, and the bombers are the 
best form of extended deterrence.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator and I thank the Senator from Oklahoma.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. It is my intention now--I made my presentation earlier on 
and a similar presentation yesterday and the Senator from Massachusetts 
responded. I wish to respond to his responses to clarify some of the 
things that might be a little unclear.
  First of all, the Senator from Massachusetts said every Senator on 
our side and, most importantly, the unbelievably experienced 
negotiators who put this treaty together, have made a lifetime of 
trying to understand these kinds of relationships and the ways in which 
you adequately verify, and they

[[Page S10787]]

wanted to expand, which I appreciated, how qualified these people were, 
but here is the problem we have and I think it was articulated by the 
Senator from South Dakota. We have a constitutional responsibility. We 
take an oath of office to support the Constitution, and one of the 
things it is up to us--not to anybody but us--to provide for common 
defense. Article II, section 2 of the Constitution specifically gives 
us not just the right but the obligation for advice and consent, and 
quite often we talk about all these smart people who have agreed with 
this. That leaves one group out. That is us. We happen to be the ones 
who are accountable to the people through our election.
  The Senator from Massachusetts also said that the treaty itself, 
talking about the amendment, my amendment, he said he opposes an 
amendment to the treaty itself which we all understand now after two 
votes that it would kill the treaty, essentially saying that if you 
amend the treaty it is dead.
  I think we need to stop and reevaluate what our obligation is, not 
just the constitutional obligation, as the CRS has outlined in a study 
of the role of the Senate in the treaty process. Amendments are 
proposed changes in the actual text of the treaty. They amount 
therefore to Senate counteroffers that alter the original deal agreed 
upon by the United States and the other country.
  If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the 
text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with the 
amendments. Both the Russian Duma and the United States Senate have a 
constitutional right to change portions of this treaty and it is up to 
them to do. So this reinserts it back into the process. I feel that is 
exactly what our Founding Fathers wanted us to be doing in these 
treaties and that is what we are trying to do.
  The third thing that was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts is, 
he was talking about the concept of the type one inspections and the 
type two inspections as a new one. Well, it is a new process because 
type two inspections are inspections on formerly declared facilities. 
Obviously in the START I treaty we didn't have formally declared 
facilities. They came as a result of the first treaty. Type one refers 
to inspections of ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases to confirm 
the accuracy of declared data on the number and types of deployed and 
nondeployed warheads located on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. So I 
would say that type two inspections weren't even addressed in the first 
treaty.
  The Senator also said we said we ought to send this back ``but it 
doesn't rise to that level in my judgment.'' Now he talks about the 
level of significance. All these amendments are significant. Each one 
of us who is an author has a little bit of bias because we have studied 
a little bit more in our particular area. I can't think of anything 
that is more significant than verification. The interesting thing that 
was brought out by the Senator from North Dakota was General Chilton's 
support. I am reading from the report right now. It says General 
Chilton's support for the New START level was predicated on no Russian 
cheating or changes in the geopolitical environment.
  Well, historically they have been cheating on everything. Let me go 
ahead and reread what I said before. We had the meeting, the convention 
in 2005, and then again 5 years later in 2010, came out in May or June 
of this year, and in that one, talking about the biological weapons 
convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that Russia 
maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and that its 
nature and status have not changed. That is what they said in 2005. Now 
5 years later the new report came out and the State Department report 
states the Russian confidence-building measures since 1992 have not 
satisfactorily documented whether its biological program was 
terminated. Therefore, they are saying the same thing 5 years later, so 
they lied 5 years ago and it appears that they have not done--or they 
cheated, I should say.
  Chemical weapons the same thing.
  In 2005, the State Department assessed that:

       Russia is in violation of its Chemical Weapons Convention 
     obligations because its declaration was incomplete with 
     respect to declaration of production and development 
     facilities.

  Then, in 2010, 5 years later, the State Department again stated there 
was an absence of additional information from Russia, resulting in the 
United States being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all 
of its chemical weapons stockpile and all of its chemical weapons 
development facilities.
  If we are predicating all that on General Chilton, who said cheating 
has all of a sudden miraculously stopped, this is a great reform 
measure, and I would like to see the evidence of it before we assume 
that is the case.
  The Senator from Massachusetts also stated people responsible for 
verification of this treaty would never have been sent to the United 
States. This treaty would never have been sent to the United States if 
the treaty did not have adequate verification measures. So it talks 
about all these verification measures.
  Then he says: It is the judgment of our military, our State 
Department, and our intelligence community that these measures are 
adequate.
  That may be true with those who are currently answering to our 
President who strongly support this treaty. But if we look at the State 
Department and the military and the intelligence of the past, those 
people who have commented, James Baker, as I recall, Secretary of 
State, summarized that the New START verification regime is ``weaker 
than its predecessor,'' testifying to Congress in May of this year. I 
happen to have been there. He said the New START verification program:

       . . . does not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one 
     that verified the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and 
     prohibitions under START I. This complex part of the treaty 
     is even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are 
     allowed than were allowed in the past.

  Insofar as the military is concerned, Richard Perle, former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, stated on December 
2, a few days ago, that:

       New START has a very weak verification regime, one that 
     establishes a dangerous precedent and lowers our standards 
     for verification.

  Here is the military weighing in.
  He goes on to say that:

       New START's verification provisions would provide little or 
     no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the 
     Russians did not declare, are off limits to U.S. inspectors, 
     or are hidden from U.S. satellites.

  James Woolsey--when we talk about intelligence, I have a bias because 
James Woolsey is from Oklahoma. He was the Director of Central 
Intelligence from 1993 to 1995. He was adviser to the SALT I 
negotiations up through 1970, a delegate at large to the START and 
defense and space negotiations.
  He stated, on November 15, that under this treaty, unlike the 
original START treaty, Russia is free to encrypt telemetry from missile 
tests, making it harder for us to know what new capabilities it is 
developing. There is no longer the requirement for permanent onsite 
monitoring of Russia's primary missile production facility, which under 
old START helped us keep track of new mobile missiles entering the 
Soviet force.
  He goes on and on. That is agreed with by Paula DeSutter, former 
Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation at 
the U.S. State Department, who pointed out on July 12 that New START 
has glaring holes in its verification regime. New START is ``much less 
verifiable than the original START.''
  I only say this because my friend from Massachusetts talked about the 
military, the State Department, and the intelligence community. One 
thing that is ingrained in our system is that we have a President who 
is Commander in Chief. He has a lot of influence over the State 
Department and the military. We have heard some very well respected 
people along those lines.
  One of the arguments or rebuttals the Senator from Massachusetts had 
against my opening statement yesterday was that we have fewer sites now 
than during the development of the START I treaty. This is true. We do 
have fewer sites. An argument can be made--and most people agree with 
the fact--that if you have fewer sites, you need more inspections.
  Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International 
Security John Bolton stated, on May 3, that

[[Page S10788]]

``while [verification] is important in any arms-control treaty, 
verification becomes even more important at lower warhead levels.''
  Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter weighed in on the same thing in a 
joint statement:

       Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they 
     are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect 
     intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels 
     go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly 
     delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits, 
     concerns about ``hidden'' missiles, and the actions of 
     nuclear third parties.

  In May of this year, in front of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START 
verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to 
Congress that the New START verification program ``does not appear as 
rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous and diverse 
treaty obligations. . . .''
  He goes on to say it is more significant as you reduce your number of 
inspected facilities.
  Further, the Senator from Massachusetts responded to me by saying 
they are going to demand the same number of inspections of our military 
bases, and we would have to be prepared to host them three times more 
in inspections. That is true. This is bilateral. Everything we are 
asking them to do, we to have do too. I like that idea. He went on to 
talk about the inconvenience, but my amendment applies to both the 
United States and to Russia. My amendment increases inspections for 
both sides, which will improve confidence, trust, and transparency. 
More importantly, it improves our ability to catch the Russians 
cheating and deter Russian cheating. I am fully aware we have to do the 
same thing the Russians have to do.
  Furthermore, it was stated by the Senator from Massachusetts, in his 
response to my statement:

       So I think it's one thing to ask our strategic nuclear 
     forces to do that ten times a year, or less than once a 
     month. It's another thing for them to be waiting for 30 
     inspections a year. We have 2 submarine bases, 3 bomber 
     bases, and 3 ICBM bases.

  I might add, Russia has 3 submarine bases, 3 bomber bases and 12 ICBM 
bases. So we are actually not on parity there.
  Quoting from a letter Secretary Gates sent this summer about whether 
the Russians would cheat on this treaty in a manner that would be 
militarily significant, he said:

       The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs 
     commander, and the U.S. strategic command and I assess that 
     Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant 
     cheating or breakout.

  In other words, they are not going to cheat. This is this conversion 
I guess they have had.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, would the Senator yield for a moment?
  Mr. INHOFE. Just for a moment, for a question.
  Mr. KERRY. I just want to be clear. The Senator read my words 
accurately, which were the quote of the general who said ``militarily 
significant.'' I don't think he said that.
  Mr. INHOFE. I didn't hear the Senator.
  Mr. KERRY. With respect to the issue of cheating, what he said was he 
didn't think there would be anything militarily significant. Again, 
this is material we could go into, which we will probably, in the 
classified session. But I just want that distinction to be clear.

  Mr. INHOFE. I thought that is exactly what I said. I apologize for 
the misunderstanding.
  Further, the Senator from Massachusetts made the statement that:

       Our analysis of the N.I.E. and the potential for Russian 
     cheating or breakout confirms that the treaty's verification 
     regime is effective.

  I have to always be a little suspect of what comes out of the N.I.E. 
I think all of us are. We don't take it as gospel. This is actually a 
true story. Back in the Clinton administration, it was August 24, 1998, 
I asked the question: How long will it be until North Korea has a 
multistage rocket? The response that came back in August of 1998 was 5 
to 10 years. Seven days later, on August 31 of 1998, they fired a 
three-stage rocket.
  I think we need to look at some of the intelligence estimates. They 
have been wrong in the past. When you are talking about something as 
significant as the issue we are talking about here, about the threat 
that is out there, then we have to be right.
  Then, the Senator from Massachusetts quoted Condoleezza Rice. I 
actually agree with her. She said:

       The new start treaty helpfully reinstates on-site 
     verification of Russian nuclear forces which lapsed with the 
     expiration of the original start treaty last year. Meaningful 
     verification was a significant achievement of Presidents 
     Reagan and George H.W. Bush and its reinstatement is crucial.

  I agree with that. Obviously, she is not saying she supports this. 
She is saying she supports some kind of a verification. There is none 
today, so anything is better than nothing. I think that is what she is 
saying. She also agreed, in her next statement in the Wall Street 
Journal of December 7:

       Still, there are legitimate concerns about New Start that 
     must and can be addressed in the ratification process. . . .

  Implying that there is nothing wrong with having amendments.
  Lastly, one of the statements the Senator from Massachusetts made in 
response to my comments was:

       Finally, I'd like to point out that we addressed the 
     importance of this verification question in condition of the 
     resolution of ratification. That condition requires that 
     before New START can enter into force and every year 
     thereafter, the President has to certify to the Senate that 
     our national technical means, in conjunction with the 
     verification activities provided for in the New START treaty, 
     are sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of Russian 
     compliance with the provisions of the New START treaty and 
     timely warning of Russian preparation.

  Here is the problem I have with that. The President can only certify 
what he knows. Our intelligence experts are telling him what they are 
seeing in Russia. This amendment provides that the President will have 
more information. I would think, if that is the concern, we would want 
to give the President more information.
  Lastly, I see the Senator from Arizona is here, and I know he wants 
to be heard. Let me mention one last thing my good friend, the Senator 
from Massachusetts, stated. He was talking about the fact that these 
are killer amendments. I think it is worth restating what we said 
before.
  The CRS has outlined in its study on the role of the Senate in the 
treaty process:

       Amendments are proposed changes in the actual text of the 
     treaty. [They] amount, therefore, to Senate counteroffers 
     that alter the original deal agreed to by the United States 
     and the other country.

  If the Senate gives its consent to New START with amendments to the 
text, the treaty is sent to Russia for its approval with an amendment. 
That means we go back and forth and hopefully come out with a treaty 
that would be workable.
  According to the 2005 and 2010 State Department reports on arms 
compliance, Russia has a bad habit of cheating on these agreements. In 
fact, I think we have covered that adequately at this time.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I wish to talk about both the Thune 
amendment and the Inhofe amendment. With respect to the Inhofe 
amendment on verification, we are going to go into executive session of 
the Senate at 2 o'clock this afternoon, where there will be an 
opportunity for all Senators to examine classified materials that have 
been presented by our intelligence agencies, some of which relate 
specifically to the treaty and, in particular, the verification 
provisions in the treaty. It is too bad it is not possible for us to 
discuss with very much specificity the nature of the intelligence we 
will be discussing, but I will say I think it is a good thing we will 
be voting on the Inhofe amendment following that session, because a lot 
of the material we are going to be exposed to in executive session 
relates to the verification provisions of this treaty and past 
experience with verification.
  That is about all I wish to say right now, except that I hope 
colleagues would attend that session because their vote on the Inhofe 
amendment would at least be partially predicated on their being briefed 
in that executive session.
  With respect to the Thune amendment, I very much support it as well. 
The reason is because the whole point of this treaty was to reduce the 
nuclear

[[Page S10789]]

warheads and the delivery vehicles of the Russian Federation and the 
United States. That is the essence of the treaty. There is a lot more 
to it, but it reduces to 1,550 the actual warheads and reduces to 700 
the delivery vehicles. There is a special definition or counting rule 
of those delivery vehicles that we don't need to get into here, but the 
reality is, it is 700 deployed delivery vehicles, with another 100 that 
could theoretically be deployed at a later date.
  But 700 is the number. That is important for a couple of reasons. As 
we have talked about before, the Russians will actually have room to 
build up. There are a lot of different estimates over the number of 
delivery vehicles they are planning on having. But because missiles and 
bombers and submarines are expensive, the Russians could be well below 
that number in a few years. So that number does not help the United 
States at all. The Russians are already below it by at least--well, 
over 100--and they will be going lower than that.
  One unfortunate consequence of that is they are MIRVing their ICBM 
delivery vehicles in a way that, obviously, is going to be much more 
destabilizing. Throughout the Cold War, both sides developed missiles 
that allowed them to put more than one warhead on top of a missile. The 
problem is, that is very destabilizing in a potential nuclear conflict 
because of the notion that you lose it if you do not use it.
  So it was an incentive for either side to launch their missiles 
before the other side could attack them and destroy them. If you hit 
one missile silo and that missile in the silo has 8 warheads on it or 
10 warheads on it, you have killed 10 warheads, not just one. Those 
warheads--the way they work is, when the missile gets up to the top of 
its apogee, those warheads are splayed out, and each one has a 
different trajectory down to potentially 8 or 10 different targets. So 
they are very destabilizing. The incentive is for the person doing the 
first strike to kill them all so the other side does not have that 
capability coming back at you.
  Well, both the United States and the then-Soviet Union recognized how 
destabilizing this was and moved toward a single warhead per missile, 
which is much less destabilizing, obviously. Since one of the benefits 
of this treaty is allegedly the stability that comes from it, one is 
very troubled by the idea that, unfortunately, that is not the way it 
works. The treaty is much more destabilizing, not stabilizing, because 
of this incentive for the Russians to put more than one warhead on each 
missile. The United States, by contrast, is limiting our missiles to 
one warhead apiece. In a way, that puts us at a big disadvantage.
  Another way it puts us at a disadvantage is we are above the 700, and 
we are going to have to retire a lot of our delivery vehicles to get 
down to 700. So the treaty is not symmetrical in this regard. They 
could actually build up to 700. We will have to bring down to 700.
  It is also not symmetrical because our obligations around the world 
are much more diverse than are Russia's obligations. Russia will be 
defending Russia. The United States has an understanding with 31 other 
countries that our nuclear umbrella is available to them for their 
nuclear deterrence as well. So this requires a more sophisticated 
defense plan on our part as to how we would deliver various warheads to 
what targets, and it essentially expands the number of weapons we need.
  So it is a big deal to get down to the number of 700. As Senator 
Thune has noted--and I will not repeat this--before the treaty was 
negotiated, a lot of our miliary people were testifying to various 
numbers that, obviously, led to the conclusion that 700 was way too 
low. Dr. Schlesinger has, for example, said that 700 might be barely 
enough.
  The problem is, that, A, we are even going to go below 700 if we 
proceed with something the administration wants to do, many of us here 
want to do; that is, to develop what is called a conventional Prompt 
Global Strike. A conventional Prompt Global Strike is using an ICBM but 
with a conventional warhead on it, not a nuclear warhead, to strike at 
a target of potentially a rogue nation or some terrorist group or 
someplace where you have actionable intelligence that is of very short 
life. You want to destroy a target. You obviously do not want to use a 
nuclear warhead. But you want to get there fast, and it is a long way 
away. So you might need to use, essentially, the same kind of missile 
you would use to deliver a nuclear warhead.
  Well, the Russians did not like that, so they said: If you do any of 
those, you are going to have to count them against your nuclear 
delivery limit. So if we did 25 of those, let's say, then instead of 
700 vehicles to deliver nuclear weapons, we would only have 675. That 
is why the Thune amendment talks about going back up to 730, which, 
without getting into classified material, I believe represents a number 
that more closely approximates what people think is going to be 
necessary for the United States on into the future.
  The other thing that is troubling about it is, the administration has 
yet to commit to a full triad nuclear capable. Even though they have 
said they are fully committed to the triad, which means bombers, 
submarines, and ICBMs, they have not been willing to say the new 
bombers we build will be nuclear capable or will have cruise missiles 
that can deliver a nuclear warhead.
  So while they say ``triad,'' they are not willing to commit to 
anything but a diad. The problem with that is, there is much less 
stability and capability if you only have two ways of delivering your 
nuclear weapons. If there is something wrong with your ICBM force--
remember, about 2 months ago, the power went out in several States, and 
our ICBMs were actually down for--I have forgotten what it was--an hour 
and a half or something like that because they did not have any 
electrical power.
  Well, obviously, nothing happened during that period of time. But a 
single point of failure is never desirable in the military context, 
where if one thing goes wrong, a lot of weapons or capability is taken 
off the table. The problem is, if you get down to just two ways of 
delivering these weapons, rather than the three we have today, you are 
going to be much less capable. Your deterrent is not going to deter as 
much. That is what Senator Thune is trying to get at.
  Let's at least modestly increase the number of delivery vehicles we 
have. It is a modest amendment. It is an appropriate amendment. Yet as 
we have just seen from Reuters today--something we already knew but the 
latest iteration of it--``Russia warns U.S. not to change nuclear 
pact.'' In effect, what they are saying is, the Senate can debate all 
it wants to, but if it makes one change, changes one comma, one thing 
is different in the treaty, well, then what? Then, as my colleague, 
Senator Kerry, said, we would have to see if the Russians were willing 
to agree to it. Otherwise, they would have to renegotiate at least that 
part of the treaty.
  Well, what is wrong with that? Unless you think the U.S. Constitution 
was stupid to give the Senate a role in this, it does not seem to me 
there is anything wrong with the Senate saying: You got about nine-
tenths of it just fine, President Obama and President Medvedev, your 
negotiators. These negotiators are good, smart people and they are 
dedicated public servants, but they are not necessarily the last word. 
The Senate is the last word, according to our Constitution. We gave our 
advice. The administration did not take our advice in two specific 
ways, but yet they expect us to give them their consent to the treaty.
  The reality is, the Senate should not be a rubberstamp. In the first 
START treaty, we said: You have not dealt with a subject here that 
needs to be dealt with--the potential for Russian submarine-launched 
cruise nuclear weapons. We need to have a side agreement on that. It 
did not blow up START. We did a side agreement. The world did not end 
when the Senate said no to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The 
predictions were that this was going to destroy our relations with 
Russia forever. It did not. Here we are today now told again: If you 
change one thing in this treaty, then Russia will not go along with it 
and our relationship could deteriorate significantly.
  Well, if our relationship depends upon ratification of the treaty 
exactly like it is, then it is a lot weaker than the President and Vice 
President are making it out to be when they talk about this wonderful 
new reset relationship. Surely, it could stand the Senate making a 
modest change to the

[[Page S10790]]

treaty. If it cannot, then I do not buy the argument that this is a 
wonderful reset relationship.
  So for my colleagues who say: We will not abide by any amendments to 
the treaty, I say: Well, then, you have just said the Senate is 
irrelevant in the treaty process. We might as well forget about having 
the Senate consider these treaties in the first place.

  Senator Thune and Senator Inhofe have good amendments. I am looking 
forward to supporting both of them when we return from our closed 
session this afternoon. I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. KYL. I would be happy to yield for a question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. The Senator from Arizona made some good points, I think, 
about the importance of the triad in maintaining our nuclear capability 
and deterrence.
  I am interested in knowing if the Senator is aware that even if you 
assume the numbers that are in the 1251 report that would take the 
number of bombers down to 60--and it is up to 60, but the treaty calls 
for 700 delivery vehicles, which, if you took that out of bombers, 
would take you down to 40--that even taking it to 60 would cut in half 
the number of nuclear bombers.
  Is the Senator also aware bombers are the best vehicle to enforce 
extended deterrence? The ICBMs, the missiles we have, our adversaries 
sometimes cannot see those. A bomber is visible. A bomber can be sent 
into theater. It has an impact, a psychological impact, a political 
impact. It is recallable. It is something that can be out there that 
makes those who would proliferate nuclear weapons even more concerned 
about the capability we have to respond.
  The importance of maintaining that leg of the triad is, in this 
Senator's judgment, critical. It sounds like, from what the Senator is 
saying, he understands that as well.
  I want to know if the Senator is aware that the limits that are 
imposed not only in the 1251 report but, more important, in the treaty 
would significantly reduce the number of nuclear bombers we have at our 
disposal today.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I say to Senator Thune, I was not aware it 
would be cut in half. I was aware it would be drastically reduced. That 
is a huge reduction, especially if the administration is unwilling to 
commit that we are even going to have a nuclear-capable bomber force in 
the next generation of our triad. They have been willing to say we have 
a great triad today. That is true as far as it goes. But part of that 
triad on the bomber force, for example, are B-52s that were designed--
when--back in the 1950s and built in the 1960s and 1970s.
  We have to replace all three legs of our triad. The decision has been 
made on the submarine. That is a good thing. But the decisions have not 
yet been made on the ICBM or on the bomber force.
  One of our concerns about modernization is that modernization of the 
nuclear warheads is fine--I mean, it is necessary. But if we do not 
also modernize the method by which we deliver those warheads, then 
modernizing our warheads is of little significance.
  The final point to Senator Thune's question, of course, is that other 
countries, including Russia and China, are all modernizing both their 
warheads and their delivery vehicles. So the United States does not 
want to get caught in the position where we are down to very few 
workable weapons, especially the bomber force, which, as the Senator 
noted, can also be called back, unlike the missiles that are launched 
either from ground or from submarine. Once they are launched, they are 
launched. At least a bomber can be called back.
  Mr. THUNE. I guess the concern and observation the Senator raised I 
would make as well. With regard to a follow-on bomber, a next-
generation bomber, much of our bomber fleet today--47 percent of it is 
pre-Cuban missile era. So they are older. They need to be replaced. We 
need a next-generation bomber. The question the Senator raised about 
the ambiguity coming out of whether a next-generation bomber would, in 
fact, be nuclear is a real concern because that would put at risk the 
existence of the triad, which I think allows us to maintain the 
flexibility, the versatility we have today in terms of nuclear 
deterrence.
  So I would echo what the Senator from Arizona has voiced as a concern 
about this discussion of a next-generation bomber and whether, one, it 
will be done, and, two, it will be a nuclear bomber.
  Mr. KYL. I will conclude by saying, I hope we have at least a short 
moment or period of debate following the closed session so both Senator 
Thune and Senator Inhofe can make a brief closing argument to remind 
our colleagues about what the debate has been all about. I regret more 
of our colleagues were not on the floor to hear the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, of course, we will accommodate, 
hopefully, some brief statements prior to the votes, and I am confident 
we can agree on some reasonable period, hopefully, not more than 5 
minutes or something like that, to summarize.
  But let me say to my friend from Arizona, because I heard him saying 
fairly passionately: What is the point of having the Senate involved if 
it cannot advise and consent and cannot amend the treaty, none of us on 
our side are arguing we should not have that right, that we do not have 
that right, that this is not a worthy debate, and that we should not 
debate a legitimate attempt to amend the treaty. That is not what we 
are saying. In fact, if I thought it was a flawed treaty and if I 
thought there were enormous gaps in it, I would try to amend the 
treaty, I am sure. I think if that were true, we wouldn't have had a 
60-to-30 vote against doing it yesterday. Sixty Senators made the 
judgment that we don't want to; we don't think it rises to that level.

  I would simply say to my colleague, it is not that the amendment--
that we shouldn't have the debate and that somehow not doing this now 
rejects the notion that we are capable of doing it; it is that we don't 
think it is a good amendment. We don't think the amendment rises to the 
level where it raises an issue that it merits sending the treaty back 
to the Russians.
  So we will retain that right--and I will protect that as long as I am 
a Senator--to give that proper advice and consent. But I believe we 
gave the proper advice and consent and we rejected an amendment, as I 
hope we will reject these other two amendments, and I will further the 
arguments with respect to that later.
  I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is waiting for time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask the indulgence of the Senator from 
Pennsylvania for a moment. Let me also reiterate I don't know where 
this constant questioning of the triad keeps coming from, because the 
Secretary of Defense, in testimony as well as in letters, not to 
mention the Defense Department through the Joint Chiefs and then 
others, have repeatedly stated their commitment to a viable, forward-
going triad. The triad is not in question here. There will be a triad, 
we are committed to the triad, and I will have something more to say 
about that later.
  I yield the floor, and I thank my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cardin). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 
15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about two or three topics 
in this debate on the START treaty, but first and foremost, one that 
speaks directly to the amendment that is pending. That is the question 
of verification--the ability for the United States to verify by way of 
inspection and other means what the Russian Federation has in terms of 
its nuclear weapons.
  First of all, I would say as a foundational principle in this debate, 
nothing in this treaty will in any way compromise the safety, security, 
effectiveness, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. That is critical 
to make that point, and I think the American people understand that. 
But as the American people are listening to this debate

[[Page S10791]]

about verification, I think it is important to outline the distinctions 
between the amendment and I think what is, in fact, the case in the 
treaty.
  The treaty itself allows each party up to 18 short-notice, on-site 
inspections, and that is each year, with up to 10 so-called type one 
inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-
powered ballistic missiles, submarines, and finally nuclear-capable 
heavy bombers. So that is the type one inspections, up to 18 of those, 
which are short-notice inspections. Secondly, under the type two 
inspections, these are conducted in places such as storage sites, test 
ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination 
facilities.
  Some have asked whether we lose any valuable elements of the original 
START agreement's inspection regime. The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy James Miller replied to that question, a similar question I 
posed during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the 
verification of the New START treaty. It was a hearing I chaired. He 
said that under New START, we will conduct, as I said a moment ago, 18 
inspections per year for 35 sites; so 18 inspections, 35 Russian sites. 
Under START I, there were 28 inspections for 70 Russian facilities. We 
are going from a verification regime where there are 28 inspections for 
70 sites to one that goes to 18 inspections for 35 sites. The ratio is 
actually better under this treaty in terms of the numbers of 
inspections and sites.
  Mr. Miller, Under Secretary of Defense Miller, said that the ratio of 
inspections to facilities ``is improved under the New START treaty 
relative to the original START treaty.'' That is Under Secretary of 
State Miller. That is not my words but his.
  ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated 
this point on March 26 of 2010 when he said that the New START 
``features a much more effective transparent verification method that 
demands quicker data exchanges and notifications.''
  In addition, this does not take into account that some of the 
inspections under the New START treaty allow us to do two inspections 
at once, unlike the first START treaty. I would also say the inspection 
regime we have in place under this treaty has also been changed to 
reflect the current security environment, an enhanced relationship with 
the Russian Federation and more than a decade of our experience in 
conducting inspections. The New START inspection regime is simpler and 
cheaper than that which was conducted under the original START treaty. 
We conduct fewer overall inspections under this new treaty because 
there are, in fact, fewer sites in Russia to inspect, and we have 
gotten better at inspecting in the years since this has transpired.
  I would also say we are standing here today on December 20 of 2010, 
380 days without inspectors on the ground in Russia. That is one of the 
reasons why I say ratification of this New START treaty makes us safer 
than not ratifying this treaty; in fact, makes us less safer. One of 
the reasons for that--not the only reason, but one of the reasons--is 
that 380 days have passed without inspectors on the ground. This is, in 
a word, unacceptable to our national security. I think the American 
people believe that as well.
  We need to vote on this treaty. While I and many of our colleagues 
who have worked on this believe there is a sense of urgency, we also 
believe the views of the other side of the aisle have been engaged in a 
serious debate. We have had day after day now of debate on the floor. 
Of course, all of the debate here now and last week--almost a full week 
now--all of that was preceded by months and months of work on the 
Foreign Relations Committee, the Intelligence Committee, and other 
parts of the Senate.
  This is not new. The President made an agreement back in the spring 
of this year. We passed this treaty out of our committee back in the 
fall. We have had a lot of work. More than 900 questions have been 
asked of the administration and more than 900 questions have been 
answered by the administration; something like 20 separate hearings 
among several committees. We have had a lot of time and a lot of work 
put into this. The pace of this, in my judgment, has not been too fast, 
but it has been done with a sense of urgency to finally--after all of 
these months of work, all of these months of debate, all of these 
months of hearings, we are at a point now where we can ratify this 
treaty. I think in the end there is going to be bipartisan and broad 
support for ratification and we look forward to that vote.
  My decision to support the New START treaty came after informed study 
of this issue as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and it is 
based, in large part, on relying upon and asking questions of folks 
such as Admiral Mullen, to name one--someone who has spent years in the 
service of this country, concerned about and doing something about the 
defense and the security of this country. So often we hear in this 
Chamber we should respect the opinions of commanders on the ground, and 
we should. We have heard that in the context of the war in Iraq, and we 
continue to hear it in the context of the war in Afghanistan. We should 
respect and take into consideration the determinations and judgments 
made by commanders on the ground, those who have direct experience with 
military questions and, in this case, have direct experience with the 
defense of our country.
  I think when it comes to the New START treaty, we should apply the 
same rule as well when it comes to Admiral Mullen or any other military 
leader who has an opinion about this treaty. The commanders on the 
ground as it relates to this treaty have spoken and they have done so 
without equivocation and, I would argue, unanimously. On this vital 
treaty and on this national security issue, they have spoken with one 
voice: We need to take action to secure our country and we need to take 
action to defend our country. We need to make sure we are taking 
actions that will result in a nuclear arsenal that will be safe, 
secure, effective, and reliable, and one of the steps to get there is 
to make sure we ratify this treaty.

  Let me move to one other topic. I know we have colleagues here who 
wish to speak. Let me ask how much time I have remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  Mr. CASEY. Thank you. I wish to speak about missile defense and I may 
be able to do it within that time or less. First of all, I wish to 
commend the work by this administration for the letter that was sent 
recently that reiterated once again the commitment of the United 
States. I would argue that is an unwavering commitment to missile 
defense, consistent with the goal of having a nuclear arsenal and 
having defense for this country--but especially as it relates to the 
nuclear arsenal--that is safe, secure, effective, and reliable. This 
New START treaty does not place any constraints on our ability to 
defend ourselves. Over the past few days, this has been made clear by 
Chairman Kerry on the floor, making these strong arguments, as well as 
those made repeatedly by our uniformed military leadership.
  Let me give some flavor of that by reading the following. This is a 
quotation from LTG Patrick O'Reilly who thinks the New START treaty 
could actually provide more flexibility in implementing our missile 
defense plans. He said:

       The New START treaty reduces constraints on the development 
     of the missile defense program in several areas. For example, 
     MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target booster system, used in 
     key tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and 
     components of the new European Phased Adaptive Approach, was 
     accountable under the previous START treaty, because it 
     employed the first range of the now-retired Trident 1 SLBM. 
     Under New START, this missile is not accountable, thus we 
     will have greater flexibility in conducting testing with 
     regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, and 
     processing, thus allowing more efficient test architectures 
     and operationally realistic intercept geometries.

  That is a very technical summation by LTG Patrick O'Reilly. He is the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency. He is not just making some 
casual observation in a think tank or even as a Member of Congress. We 
listen to a lot of voices here and many of them are respected voices. 
But I think when we are listening to the Missile Defense Agency 
Director, who is a lieutenant general, and he talks about this New 
START treaty providing more flexibility as it relates to missile 
defense, I think we should listen very carefully.

[[Page S10792]]

  I know Republicans here in Washington have over many days now 
directly or indirectly tried to assert that this administration is not 
committed to missile defense. They are wrong. I think the record is 
very clear. The President made clear that this administration is 
inalterably committed--my words--to a missile defense that is 
effective. I would argue as well to a missile defense that ensures we 
have a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear arsenal. It is 
also a missile defense that is capable of growing and adapting to 
threats posed by countries such as Iran.
  I have heard a lot of folks here on both sides of the aisle stand up 
and make statements about the threat caused by Iran's nuclear program. 
We should listen to voices that are concerned about that in the context 
of making sure that this ratification is consistent with that, which it 
is. It is consistent with our efforts to ensure that Iran does not have 
that capability.
  So what are these capabilities? Well, here is a quick summation.
  We currently have 30 ground based interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, 
and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California defending the homeland. 
Defense Under Secretary Flournoy and General Cartwright have asserted 
that we will continue to improve and further augment these existing 
ground-based interceptor systems, noting that these ``U.S. based 
defenses will be made more effective by the forward basing of a TPY-2 
radar--which we plan by 2011.''
  In Europe, the United States has worked to defend our allies in NATO. 
The European Phased Adaptive Approach is a network of increasingly 
capable sensors and standard missile SM-3 interceptors that will 
provide a capacity to address near term threats, while also developing 
new technologies to combat future threats.
  The first stage, to be completed in 2011, will deploy Aegis ships 
with SM-3 interceptors in Northern and Southern Europe to protect our 
troops and Allies from short-range medium regional ballistic missile 
threats.
  The second phase, estimated to be operational by 2015, it will field 
upgraded sea- and land-based SM-3s in Southern and Central Europe to 
expand protection of the continent.
  The third phase will introduce a more capable version of the SM-3 
that is currently under development, which will provide full protection 
for our allies in Europe from short, medium, and intermediate range 
ballistic missiles by 2018.
  The final phase, planned for 2020, it will field an even further 
improved SM-3 missile with anti-ICBM capabilities to augment current 
defense of the U.S. homeland from Iranian long-range missile threats.
  So when you look at it from each of these three points of view--
meaning the three phases--we are going to have in place a system that 
will defend our homeland and will also help our European allies.
  Let me conclude with one quotation. I mentioned Admiral Mullen, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This is what he said about the so-called 
phased adaptive approach:

       The Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders and I also fully 
     concur with the Phased Adaptive Approach as outlined in the 
     Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. As with the Nuclear 
     Posture Review, the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders 
     were deeply involved throughout the review process.

  So whether it is the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, or other 
commentators, we are going to make sure that in the aftermath of the 
ratification of this treaty and consistent with and as part of and 
because of the ratification of this treaty, our missile defense will be 
as strong as it can be. And we are going to make sure that, without a 
doubt, we are going to protect the American people and take every step 
necessary to make sure our nuclear arsenal is safe, secure, effective, 
and reliable.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 
10 minutes on the New START Treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 4847

  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be temporarily set aside and that amendment No. 4847 be 
called up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Florida (Mr. LeMieux), for himself and Mr. 
     Chambliss, proposes an amendment numbered 4847.

  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

 (Purpose: To amend the Treaty to require negotiations to address the 
         disparity between tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles)

       At the end of Article I of the New START Treaty, add the 
     following:

     3. The Parties shall enter into negotiations within one year 
     of ratification of this Treaty to address the disparity 
     between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons 
     stockpiles of the Parties, in accordance with the September 
     1991 United States commitments under the Presidential Nuclear 
     Initiatives and Russian Federation commitments made by 
     President Gorbachev in October 1991 and reaffirmed by 
     President Yeltsin in January 1992. The negotiations shall not 
     include discussion of defensive missile systems.

  Mr. LeMIEUX. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment to the New 
START Treaty--this important treaty that we are discussing between the 
United States of America and Russia concerning strategic nuclear 
weapons.
  I have a lot of concerns about this treaty. Many of those concerns 
have already been expressed by my colleagues. I have concerns about the 
verification procedures, that they are weakened from the previous START 
Treaty. I have concerns about the linkage of missile defense systems 
with strategic offensive weapons. Those concerns have been addressed as 
well, and I share them.
  The biggest concern I have about this treaty is its failure to deal 
with what are called tactical nuclear weapons. Now, to those folks at 
home who may be listening to this, it is probably not readily 
apparent--it wasn't initially to me--the difference between what a 
strategic nuclear weapon is and a tactical nuclear weapon. A strategic 
nuclear weapon is usually considered to be a large vehicle, like an 
intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. It travels over a very 
long range. These strategic nuclear weapons can also be delivered by a 
submarine or a long-range bomber. A tactical nuclear weapon is 
generally much smaller in size. It has a smaller range and has a 
delivery vehicle that may be on the back of a truck, for example.
  In many ways, in the world we live in today, where we are not in the 
Cold War atmosphere with the former Soviet Union, the tactical nuclear 
weapon is of much more concern than the strategic. The great fear we 
all have is that one of these nuclear weapons would get into the hands 
of a terrorist. A tactical nuclear weapon, by its very nature, is 
portable, and it could be something that is even capable of being moved 
by one person or, as I said before, on the back of a truck.
  Why this treaty doesn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons is beyond 
me. I realize in the past, when we were in the Cold War environment 
with the Soviet Union, we didn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons 
because we were concerned about these big missiles that could cross the 
ocean and strike our country. We were concerned about heavy bombers 
delivering missiles or bombs that would hit the homeland. That makes 
sense. But we are in a completely different environment now. While we 
should still be concerned with those strategic weapons, the tactical 
weapons are actually much more of a danger to us because they are the 
very weapons that could get into the hands of a rogue nation. Those are 
the very weapons that could get into the hands of a terrorist.
  This treaty doesn't have anything to do with that. It doesn't address 
it at all. It would be as if we were going to enter into a treaty about 
guns, and we had a big negotiation in a treaty where we talked about 
long arms, shotguns, and rifles, but we failed to talk about pistols. 
It doesn't make any sense to me. It doesn't make any sense to me 
because these are the very weapons about which we should be the most

[[Page S10793]]

concerned. It also doesn't make sense to me because of the disparity 
between how many tactical nuclear weapons we have versus how many the 
Russians have. This treaty limits the amount of those weapons to each 
country to around 1,500. But the Russians have 3,000 tactical nuclear 
weapons, and we have 300. So the Russians have a 10-to-1 advantage over 
us in tactical nuclear weapons. If we approve this treaty, the Russians 
then will approximately have 4,500 nuclear weapons, and we will have 
1,800. That doesn't make a lot of sense either. They have a 10-to-1 
advantage on these tactical nuclear weapons.
  I think it is incumbent upon us to realize that we have to have a 
treaty on tactical nuclear weapons. It should have been part of this 
treaty. It wasn't part of these START treaties in the past because the 
total number of weapons that the United States had and the former 
Soviet Union had was immense. When we had 20,000 or 30,000 strategic 
nuclear weapons, the fact that they had 3,000 tacticals didn't matter. 
It wasn't an important number in the overall scheme.
  But now that we are in this new world where we are concerned about 
nuclear proliferation, and we don't want terrorists to get these 
weapons, plus the fact that they are going to end up having 4,500 and 
we are going to end up everything 1,800, it matters a lot.
  My amendment says that within a year of the ratification of this 
treaty, the Russians and the United States must sit down and negotiate 
a tactical nuclear weapon agreement. It doesn't require that it be 
resolved within a year. It requires that it be started. That seems to 
me--I am a little biased, but that seems to me eminently reasonable. I 
am proud that Senators Chambliss and Inhofe have joined me on this 
amendment. Who could be against having the Russians and the United 
States sit down within a year's time of ratification and begin the 
negotiation on tacticals? Who could be against that?
  You will hear from my friends on the other side, who are defending 
this treaty and voting down all of the amendments being offered on this 
side of the aisle, that we can't amend the treaty because, if we do, it 
is a poison pill, and the Russians will not accept it.
  If that is true, then we are not really fulfilling much of a 
function, are we? Under the Constitution, there are some special 
privileges that are imbued to the Senate.
  One of them is the treaty privilege, the treaty power, where all 
treaties must be confirmed by the Senate on a two-thirds vote. If we 
can't amend it, and all we are doing is either saying yes or no, to me 
that limits our ability. If my friends on the other side think this is 
a poison pill, I ask them to look at the language. I am just putting in 
the treaty, if they accept this, that within a year's time, we have to 
sit down at the table and enter into these negotiations on tacticals. 
It is not a heavy lift, it seems to me.
  They will say we can't do this because the Russian Duma will not 
accept it. What does that say? If the Russian Duma, their legislature, 
will not accept an amendment--if the treaty is as it is now, as 
negotiated by the U.S.--and I have said before that I have concerns 
about what is there for verification and about missile defense. Putting 
that aside, if it goes the way it has been drafted and agreed to 
between the President and the leaders of Russia, with just this one 
amendment that says that the two sides will sit down within a year's 
time, will the Russian Parliament not approve that? And if they don't 
approve it, if they will not say they will sit down within a year's 
time and negotiate about the 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons they have, 
about the security of those weapons, about our ability to verify where 
they are and about a reduction of them, because of the disparity in the 
3,000 they have and the 300 we have, what does that say about the 
Russians?
  What it says to me is that they are not, in good faith, really trying 
to come to an agreement about nuclear weapons. Would we want this 
treaty if the Russian Duma said they are not going to agree to sit down 
within a year's time to talk about tactical nuclear weapons?
  I think this is a very important amendment. I have great respect for 
the people who have stood up and supported this treaty. I think there 
are problems with it, but I don't see any reason why a fair-minded 
person could not agree that within a year's time the two parties should 
sit down and talk about what, to me, is the most dangerous part of our 
nuclear challenge with Russia, which is tactical nuclear weapons. We 
don't know where they are, what they are doing, we can't verify them, 
and there is a 10-to-1 advantage that the Russians have over us.
  Mr. President, my amendment is at the desk and has been called up. I 
hope we will have the opportunity to debate this amendment in the 
coming hours and days as we wrap up our consideration of this treaty.
  With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
  Mrs. HAGAN. Mr. President, today I rise in support of Senate 
ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The Secretary 
of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the entire 
uniformed leadership of our military believe it is in our national 
interest. Former Secretaries of State from previous administrations of 
both political parties have also endorsed the New START Treaty.
  Relations between the United States and Russia have evolved beyond 
what they were during the Cold War. Within this context, and in the 
face of aging nuclear stockpiles, strategic arms reduction is in the 
best interest of both nations.
  New START will strengthen strategic nuclear weapons stability, enable 
us to modernize our nuclear triad of strategic weapons and delivery 
systems, and ensure our flexibility to develop and deploy effective 
missile defenses and conventional global strike capabilities.
  It will also promote stability, transparency, and predictability in 
the U.S.-Russia relationship.
  The treaty limits strategic offensive nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles through effective verification and compliance measures. Our 
negotiators ensured that the United States would be able to protect our 
ability to field a flexible and effective strategic nuclear triad 
composed of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy and strategic 
bombers. Our negotiators also ensured that the United States can enable 
modernization of our strategic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons 
they carry.
  Simply put, our country is better off with New START as opposed to 
not having a treaty at all. There has been no formal verification 
system in place since the last treaty expired a year ago. New START 
reestablishes a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that 
provides access to Russian strategic nuclear capabilities--
specifically, nuclear warheads and delivery systems. It ensures a 
measure of predictability in Russian strategic force deployments over 
the life of the treaty. Access and predictability allow us to 
effectively plan and undergo strategic modernization efforts.
  Failure to ratify the treaty will prevent us from obtaining 
information on Russian strategic nuclear weapons capabilities. Without 
the treaty going into effect, the United States will have no inspectors 
on the ground and no ability to verify Russian nuclear activities. This 
will result in our country losing insight into Russian strategic 
nuclear force deployments. It would also complicate our strategic force 
strategy and modernization planning efforts, as well as drive up costs 
in response to the need to conduct increased intelligence and analysis 
on Russian strategic force capabilities.
  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff ADM Mike Mullen have expressed their support for Senate 
ratification of New START. All indicated that ratifying the treaty 
provides our country with an opportunity to negotiate with Russia on 
tactical nuclear weapons, of which Russia holds a sizable advantage. 
Tactical nuclear weapons are the most vulnerable to theft and the most 
likely to end up in the hands of rogue states and terrorist 
organizations. It is important to understand that we will not be able 
to obtain Russian cooperation on tactical nuclear weapons without 
ratifying New START.

[[Page S10794]]

  The treaty will not affect our ability to improve our missile 
defenses either qualitatively or quantitatively, to defend our homeland 
against missile attacks, and to protect our deployed forces, allies, 
and partners from growing regional missile threats. Secretary of State 
Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates have testified that our phased 
adaptive approach to overseas missile defense is not constrained by the 
treaty.
  Senate ratification of New START will demonstrate that the United 
States is committed to reducing nuclear weapons, which is important as 
we advance our nonproliferation goals. This will assist us in obtaining 
international consensus regarding nuclear weapons proliferation 
challenges from rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea. It will 
also send a positive message in achieving consensus with other 
countries on nuclear issues.
  It is important to keep in mind that the United States and Russia 
hold over 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. If the two nations 
that possess the most nuclear weapons agree on verification and 
compliance and are committed to nonproliferation, it will improve our 
ability to achieve consensus with other countries.
  Failure to ratify the treaty will have a detrimental effect on our 
ability to influence other nations with regard to nonproliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. It will also send conflicting messages 
about the administration's emphasis and commitment to the 
nonproliferation treaty.
  Additionally, failure to ratify New START would send a negative 
signal to Russia that may cause them to not support our objectives with 
respect to dealing with the Iranian nuclear program. As Secretary of 
Defense Gates has said, without ratification, we put at risk the 
coalition and momentum we have built to pressure Iran.
  The debate over New START has facilitated a consensus to modernize 
our nuclear deterrent. The Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration, Mr. Thomas D'Agostino, indicated that for the 
first time since the end of the Cold War, there is broad national 
consensus on the role nuclear weapons play in our defense and the 
requirements to maintain our nuclear deterrent. The NNSA and the three 
National Laboratories support Senate ratification of New START and 
congressional approval of the President's budget to invest in nuclear 
security and modernization. Our nuclear enterprise and stockpile have 
been neglected for too long.
  Consistent with recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review, we 
need to move forward with a number of nuclear enterprise sustainment 
projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and control 
structure, continuing development and deployment of our triad of 
delivery systems, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile, 
and revitalizing our aging infrastructure.
  On December 1, the Directors of the three nuclear national 
laboratories signed a letter to the Senate emphasizing that they were 
very pleased with the administration's plan to spend $85 billion over 
the next decade to upgrade the nuclear weapons complex. They believe 
the requested amount will further a balanced program that sustains the 
science, technology, and engineering base. They also believe that the 
proposed budget will support the ability to sustain the safety, 
security, reliability, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent 
within the limit of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by 
New START.
  The Nuclear Posture Review also recognizes the importance of 
supporting a highly capable workforce with specialized skills to 
sustain the nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes three key elements of 
stockpile stewardship: hands-on work on the stockpile; the science, 
technology, and engineering base; and the infrastructure at the 
laboratories and plants.
  I share the concerns expressed by Secretary Chu regarding our ability 
to recruit the best and brightest nuclear scientists and engineers. We 
need to infuse a sense of importance and financial stability to the 
stockpile stewardship and life extension programs. Nuclear scientists 
and engineers need to believe the U.S. Government cares about nuclear 
life extension. An effective science, technology, and engineering human 
capital base is needed to conduct effective nuclear weapons system 
lifetime extension programs, increase nuclear weapons reliability, 
certify nuclear weapons without the need to undergo nuclear testing, 
and provide annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance.
  I hope my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join me in 
voting to ratify New START.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise for a few moments to comment on the 
amendment our colleague from Florida spoke about a few moments ago. 
Tactical nuclear weapons and how that is addressed was the subject of a 
long debate yesterday. I wish to reiterate some of those arguments 
because we had this debate yesterday. It is an important debate.
  First of all, if we listen to a couple of folks who have not only 
experience but have a real interest in our urgent priority of 
addressing tactical nuclear weapons, it becomes clear that the best way 
to address that issue is, in fact, to ratify this treaty. By way of 
example, if you want to highlight a country that has much at stake when 
the question is raised about Russian tactical nuclear weapons, you can 
point to few if any countries that have more at stake than Poland.
  The Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Sikorski, said:

       Without a [New START] treaty in place, holes will soon 
     appear in the nuclear umbrella that the United States 
     provides to Poland and other allies under article 5 of the 
     Washington Treaty, the collective security guarantee for NATO 
     members. Moreover, New START is a necessary stepping stone to 
     future negotiations with Russia about reductions in tactical 
     nuclear arsenals and a prerequisite for the successful 
     revival of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

  That is not a commentator in Washington; that is the Foreign Minister 
of Poland, whose country has a lot at stake in this debate.
  Also, we have had a lot of discussions about the treaty and what is 
in the treaty or what would come about as a result of the treaty. It is 
not as if these arguments just landed here when the bill landed on the 
floor. We had months and months of hearings in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Our ranking member, Senator Lugar, was not just 
there for those hearings but played a leading role in helping us reach 
the point where we are now. We have a treaty on the floor because of 
his good work over many months and, I would argue in his case, many 
years on this issue. The same is true with the Presiding Officer 
sitting in on those hearings and asking questions of the relevant 
parties, many of them military leaders.
  I note for the record--and I will close with this--that the vote by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification. Subsection 11 on tactical nuclear weapons 
says:

       The Senate calls upon the President to pursue, following 
     consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian 
     Federation that would address the disparity between the 
     tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation 
     and of the United States and would secure and reduce tactical 
     nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.

  It is right in the resolution, and I argue that addresses squarely 
this amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.