[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 170 (Sunday, December 19, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10726-S10730]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Amendment No. 4833
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, we have another amendment that is up that
I think is very significant. It is one having to do with verification.
I think if we look at all of the problems we are trying to address
with amendments--we have been talking about missile defense, which is
the one I have been most passionate about; we have been talking about
other areas, too--in the case of verification, it is very significant
to understand that this New START treaty has remarkably less
verification than the START I treaty did. There are only 180
inspections over 10 years under New START versus 600 inspections over
15 years in START I. That is a drop of 40 inspections per year to 18
inspections per year.
In a minute, I will tell you why I think it is more precipitous than
that because of the significance of the inspections as the arsenals are
dropping
[[Page S10727]]
down in terms of the percentage of inspections versus the arsenals.
The New START treaty inspections to verify the elimination of nuclear
weapons delivery systems have been fundamentally changed from those in
START I, replaced with a lesser provision of twice a year permitting
the other party to view the debris from half of the eliminated first
stages.
In a minute I will break these down, but what I am talking about is
that we have a treaty now that addresses two things. Type one is the
ICBM bases, the submarine bases and the air bases. These are delivery
systems. I think this has to be talked about as well as the actual
warheads. The type two refers to the formerly declared facilities to
confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes
inconsistent with the treaty.
Now, when I say that, we were talking about trying to verify those
things that are in existence today but also those that have been
eliminated. In the first START I treaty, we were able to actually
witness the destruction of these various warheads and of the systems
that are under the consideration of this treaty. As it is now under the
New START treaty, we cannot witness it. All we can do is look at the
debris that remains after something is destroyed.
Now, my concern is this: If you keep the debris around from something
you have destroyed, you could use the same debris, as evidenced under
the New START treaty, to show you have destroyed something that was
destroyed in the past and not addressing those that are still there
today. So in that area, I think this is very difficult.
Finally, under the New START treaty, 24 hours of advance notice is
required before an inspection, dramatically increased from the 9 hours
of advance notice required under old START. Why is this important? This
is important because as we get down to fewer and fewer inspections that
would be made because we are limiting the arms under the treaty, then
you should actually have a longer period of time of advance notice of
the inspections.
So I have an amendment that will correct these inadequacies. The
amendment triples the number of inspections under New START for the two
types of inspections referred to under START I as the type one and type
two inspections. I mentioned the type one and type two, and this would
actually triple the number of inspections. Type one would increase from
10 to 30 inspections a year; type two inspections would increase from 8
to 24--the total being 54 inspections.
On July 20, 2010, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, that is James N. Miller, testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee--and I was there--that the Russian cheating or
breakout under the treaty would have little effect because of the
United States second-strike strategy nuclear capabilities.
I wholeheartedly disagree. The whole idea that we would say the
current Under Secretary of Defense in the Obama administration--what he
is doing is admitting the Russians cheat, but he is saying it does not
matter.
I would say this: The smaller the size of the nuclear arsenal--that
is what we have today as in New START--the larger impact cheating has
on a strategic nuclear balance. In other words, if you are cheating
with a smaller nuclear arsenal, that is much more significant than if
it were a large one. It is a percentage of a smaller figure. So if it
is 50 percent of a smaller figure, it would have been 10 percent of the
larger figure, of the nuclear arsenals that were there under the
original START treaty.
Increasing the number of type one and two inspections is critical to
New START verification because the total number of inspections has been
dramatically reduced in New START from the old START. So as the weapons
decreased, inspections should actually increase or be enhanced.
Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained this when he said
why this is the case in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee or the original START treaty, and that was in October of
1991. He said:
Verification will become even more important as the numbers
of strategic nuclear weapons on each side decreases because
uncertainties of a given size become a larger percentage of
the total force as this occurs.
That was way back in 1991. Since then you had former Under Secretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton who
stated this year, on May 3:
While [verification is] important in any arms control
treaty, verification becomes even more important at lower
warhead levels.
They agree, and we are talking about going all the way back to 1997.
In 1997, Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kantor said, in a joint statement:
Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they
are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect
intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels
go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly
delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits
concerns about ``hidden'' missiles and the actions of nuclear
third parties.
That was 1996. You have 1991, 1997, then present, and, of course, in
May of this year in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
former Secretary of State James Baker summarized that the New START
verification regime is weaker than its predecessor, testifying to
Congress that the New START verification program ``does not appear as
rigorous or extensive as the one that verified the numerous or diverse
treaty obligations under START I. This complex part of the treaty is
even more crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than
were allowed in the past.''
They all are consistent, agreeing No. 1: Russians cheat
and, No. 2, verification becomes more important as the
arsenals decreased in size.
I think we can say Russia has essentially violated every arms control
treaty we have had with them in the past. The State Department this
year submitted a report on foreign country compliance with their arms
control measures. This is a report that came out this year, in 2010.
They refer to the last report which was 2005. START:
There is a number of long-standing compliance issues--such
as an obstruction to U.S. right to inspect warheads--raised
in the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission that remained unresolved when the treaty expired
in December.
This commission endured the time all the way up to December 2009, in
different areas. In the biological weapons convention--there are a lot
of different kinds of weapons of mass destruction. They are not all
nuclear--biological, chemical, conventional. In the biological weapons
convention in 2005, the State Department concluded that ``Russia
maintains a mature offensive biological weapons program and its nature
and status have not changed.''
Then, in 2010, the State Department report said: Russian confidence-
building measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily
documented whether its biological weapons program was terminated.
What they are saying is even back in 2005 they say it was inadequate
because they are still continuing, they are violating the accord. This
is back in 2005, on biological weapons. Then that was renewed in 2010,
saying they are still not doing it today. That was biological weapons.
On chemical weapons we find the same thing. In 2005 the State
Department assessed that ``Russia was in violation of its Chemical
Weapons Convention obligations because its declaration was incomplete
with respect to declaration of production and development facilities.''
In 2010 the State Department again stated that there was an ``absence
of additional information from Russia, resulting in the United States
being unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its
chemical weapons stockpile, all chemical weapons production facilities,
and all of its chemical weapons development facilities.''
With biological weapons, they have not complied there; in the
chemical weapons, they have not complied there; with conventional
weapons in Europe, the United States notes in the 2010 report that
``Russia's actions have resulted in noncompliance with its treaty
obligations.''
The Wall Street Journal recently reported, according to U.S.
officials, the United States believes Russia has moved short-range
tactical nuclear warheads to facilities near NATO allies as recently as
this spring.
I think the Senator from Idaho covered this to some degree. We are
concerned about those tactical problems. I guess what we can say is, we
know one
[[Page S10728]]
thing and nobody seems to disagree with this: Russia cheats. But there
are five things to be considered. One is there are fewer inspections
than there were under the old one. Second, instead of actually seeing
the destruction of these warheads, we depend on the debris that remains
after the destruction has taken place.
I think everyone understands if we are depending on debris, we can be
looking at debris from one destruction effort and they can declare that
they have done it three or four times since then, using the same
debris.
Third is, advance notice is three times longer now. It should be
shorter now because of more significance. As we get the smaller
stockpile, we should have a greater compliance requirement.
The fourth is weapons decrease--we should be paying more attention to
them.
No. 5, Russia does cheat.
I believe of all the amendments, the amendments on the missile
defense are significant. It concerns me that we have something, as I
said on the floor yesterday, and I quoted, several Russians from the
very beginning were saying: We don't want the United States--and it is
the intent of this treaty--to be able to enhance their missile defense
treaties.
Right now, I look at this and, as I said several times: This is fine,
the treaty, except it is with the wrong people. This treaty is with
Russia, not with where the threat is--not with North Korea, not with
Iran. That is where the problem is.
I have had very strong feelings. I disagreed with taking down the
termination of the ground-based system that was to be in Poland because
our intelligence tells us--it is not even classified--that Iran will
have the capability of sending a nuclear warhead and having a delivery
system reaching as far as the eastern part of the United States by
2015. We, with a ground-based interceptor site in Poland, would have
had that opportunity. But now that that site is down, we would be
dependent, as I showed on a chart yesterday, on a 2-B system that we
don't even know--they say maybe it will be done by 2020. We have no
assurance it will.
Look at that: We the United States will be naked in this effort for a
period of time between 2015 and at least 2020. Maybe even longer than
that.
All these things are important. But this one is equally important
because it does not do any good to have a verification system that is
as flawed as this system.
We will have an opportunity to talk about this in more detail. For
that reason it is my understanding, and I assure the Senator from
Massachusetts that my being unwilling to agree to a time agreement is
not--this is not going to shorten it at all. It is my intention to move
on with this as soon as we can get to it. I understand it is pretty
well locked in for tomorrow.
With that, I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma. I know
he is not trying to prolong it. I was just trying to see if we can get
a time certain now, but I am confident we will.
I do not know if the Senator from South Dakota----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. I apologize. I don't know if the Senator from South Dakota
is planning to be here? I ask if anybody knows whether he is.
Let me speak to the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma for a few
minutes. I thank him for this amendment on verification. It is an
amendment that will help us to flesh out this question of verification,
which is important to anybody in the Senate. I guess three words that
have become famous beyond what people might have thought when they were
first uttered is the pronouncement of President Reagan, ``trust, but
verify,'' which at the time was accompanied by his articulation of the
Russian words for that.
Obviously, any agreement we would enter into with the Russians, or
with anybody, can never rely completely on somebody's word--either
word--because neither side is going to be satisfied with somebody's
word with whom they have the necessity of actually having to reach this
kind of an agreement to reduce weapons that are pointed at each other
for lots of different reasons over a long period of time.
I assure the Senator from Oklahoma that every Senator on our side--
and most importantly the unbelievably experienced negotiators who put
this treaty together, who made a lifetime of trying to understand these
kinds of relationships and the ways in which to adequately verify--they
would not be standing in front of the country and the world and the
Congress saying to us this treaty provides better verification in many
ways than we had previously.
Tomorrow, in the classified session, we will have an opportunity to
dig into a little bit of what exactly those ingredients are that fill
that out--better. I am not going to go into them all now.
But let me talk specifically about the amendment the Senator has
proposed. He proposes an amendment to the treaty itself, which we all
understand now after two votes, both of which have been to reject a
change to the treaty itself because of the implications of changing it.
Those do not change here with this particular amendment. But let me go
beyond that so we, hopefully, could enlist the opposition to this
amendment of some people who will see why it is unnecessary and, in
fact, conceivably even counterproductive.
The Senator wants to increase the number of type one inspections. I
might add this concept of a type one inspection and a type two
inspection is new to the New START treaty. It is new to the process.
What the Senator would like to do is triple the number of inspections
currently set forth in the treaty.
The second reason, after the question of why you do not want, for
this reason particularly, to amend the treaty, there might be a
circumstance where a treaty were so egregious or it presented us with
such a challenge that the Senate might decide to advise and consent,
and we would all say we ought to send this back. But this does not rise
to that level, in my judgment, and I think colleagues will share that
opinion.
Let me say why.
We can achieve effective verification with the number of inspections
that are set forth in the treaty. Admiral Mullen has said we can, the
Strategic Command says we can, the national intelligence community says
we can--the people responsible for verification. This treaty would
never have been sent to the Senate if this treaty did not have adequate
verification measures in it that would allow the intelligence community
to sign off and say to Senators: Please vote for this treaty.
But let's go underneath that and examine it a little bit. That is the
judgment of our military, the State Department, our intelligence
community. James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, told
us we should approve this treaty the earlier, the sooner, the better. I
think we need to heed his judgment and the judgment of our military.
The Senator expresses the concern that there are fewer inspections
here than the original START treaty had. In sort of on-its-face terms,
that is a truth. That is a true statement if you simply compared the
total number that existed in START I and you compare the number that
are set forth in the New START. But that is not what we are comparing.
The reason for that is, in 1992, when we approved START I, there were
four countries that we were approving inspections for--Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia--because they all had nuclear
facilities. There were about 70 sites that we inspected back then in
1992.
But as we all know, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of cold
warriors for years and years from the end of World War II until this
historic moment of 1992, the fact is, we were inspecting those 70 sites
with a very different relationship and a very different world.
Today, the New START agreement only seeks 35 Russian sites to inspect
because Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine no longer have any nuclear
weapons. Those weapons were consolidated in Russia, and the sites in
Russia were reduced. So you do not want an apples and oranges
comparison here. The comparison of how many fixed number of inspections
there were back in 1992 is simply not applicable to what you need in
2010, given the change of locations, the change of relationship,
[[Page S10729]]
and the numbers of sites where there are nuclear weapons.
The comparison is also problematic beyond that because, in fact,
under the New START, the inspections we do have, because of the way
they have been set up in the type one, type two and the way they have
been laid out, they are actually about two inspections equivalent to
one inspection under START I.
Let me explain that. Under the original START treaty, an inspection
of a missile to see whether it had too many warheads, that inspection
of a missile was counted as a separate inspection from so-called update
inspections of the base. In other words, there was an inspection of the
base, which might take place because we had been told or learned that
there was some change in delivery vehicles or other aspects of the
base. So we could go to the base and have an update inspection, and
that was counted as a separate inspection from the inspection of a
missile that might have been located there.
But under the new START, we are allowed to conduct up to ten type one
inspections a year, and each inspection includes both the counting of
the warheads mounted on one missile bomber and the conducting of the
equivalent of the START I treaty separate update inspection. So you get
two for one--two inspections for one.
So you cannot compare these inspections in the way the Senator from
Oklahoma has. Ten type one and eight type two inspections per year,
under the New START agreement, is at least comparable to the 15 data
update inspections and 10 reentry vehicle inspections we had under the
old START. The 10 reentry vehicle inspections per year under New START
are the same as under the old START. So the truth is, the inspection
numbers under New START are comparable to those under the original
START treaty.
That is precisely why our military and intelligence officials told us
this number would be sufficient to comply, to provide verification
compliance with this treaty. As I said, we can discuss more of this in
the closed session tomorrow. I wish to remind my colleagues, tripling
the number of inspections per year, as the Senator's amendment would
require, is not a freebie. It is not something we can just say to the
Russians: we are going to triple your inspections. Guess what. They are
going to demand the same number of inspections of us.
Our military bases would have to be prepared to host three times as
many inspections per year as they are currently preparing for. Frankly,
that could certainly disrupt day-to-day operations of strategic forces.
Anytime the Russians select one of our bases for inspections, we would
have to lock down the movements of any treaty items at that base for 24
hours before and throughout the inspection, which is at least another
day. That means dropping everything, stopping any movements of our
delivery vehicles, halting any work on these systems, and you have to
get ready to protect any unrelated classified information that you do
not want the Russians to see.
So I think it is one thing to ask our strategic nuclear forces to do
that 10 times a year or less than once a month. It is another thing for
them to be waiting for 30 inspections a year. We have two submarine
bases, three bomber bases, and three ICBM bases that are going to be
subject to type one inspections. If we follow through with those
amendments, frankly, I think our base commanders, not to mention the
Pentagon, would be less than satisfied. Right now, they are comfortable
with what we have in this treaty. But far more important, they are
comfortable we can verify, which is the key to the ratification of any
treaty.
Let me also remind my colleagues that the verification provisions in
this treaty were developed with the concerns and the perspective of the
U.S. Department of Defense totally in that mix. They helped guide what
came out here. ADM Mike Mullen agreed. Let me quote him: ``The
verification regimes that exist in the New START treaty is in ways
better than the one that has existed in the past.''
Why would we want to challenge that? Why would we want to open now a
whole new can of worms of renegotiation when we think what we have is
better than what we had previously?
Admiral Mullen also stated he is convinced the verification regime is
as stringent as it is transparent and borne of more than 15 years of
lessons learned under the original START treaty.
General Chilton has said:
Without New START, we would rapidly lose some of our
insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and
activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging
strategy would be more complex and more costly.
Let me also quote a letter Secretary Gates sent me this summer about
whether Russia could cheat on this treaty in a manner that would be
militarily significant. He said:
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs
Commander, the U.S. Strategic Command, and I, assess that
Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant
cheating or breakout under New START due to both the New
START verification regime, and the inherent survivability and
flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure.
Our analysis of the NIE and the potential for Russian
cheating or breakout confirms that the treaty's verification
regime is effective, and that our national security is
stronger with this treaty than without it.
I mentioned before that Ronald Reagan was one great advocate for this
kind of verification. So I wish to quote what Condoleezza Rice wrote
the other week:
The New START treaty helpfully reinstates on-site
verification of Russian nuclear forces which lapsed with the
expiration of the original START treaty last year. Meaningful
verification was a significant achievement of Presidents
Reagan and George H. W. Bush, and its reinstatement is
crucial.
Finally, I would like to point out that we addressed the importance
of this verification question in condition 2 of the resolution of
ratification. That condition requires that before New START can enter
into force, and every year thereafter, the President has to certify to
the Senate that our national technical means, in conjunction with the
verification activities provided for in the New START treaty, are
sufficient to ensure the effective monitoring of Russian compliance
with provisions of the New START treaty and timely warning of any
Russian preparation to breakout of the limits. So we are going to
remain seized of this issue for every year the treaty is in force.
So not only could we lose the treaty if this amendment were to pass,
not only could we impose unwanted and unneeded requirements on our
military bases and our military, not only would we not effectively
increase the verification because of the advantages that were built
into the New START treaty by our negotiators, which have been attested
to by the very people who need to enforce it, not only that, but we
could be without any verification at all for maybe 1 year, 2 years,
longer, who knows whether we get any agreement or not.
Clearly, that exposes our country in ways I do not think we want to,
and it certainly is no guarantee of an increase in the inspections
themselves.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me make a couple of comments and
observations. I know the Senator from Massachusetts started out by
saying we have to take someone's word for it. My concern is, and I
agree with his statement in reference to quotes that were made by
Ronald Reagan, the ``trust, but verify.''
He also said, and when I look at this, I think this is--I think it is
flawed in all the ways we talked about this before. But I remember the
statement actually, I was here, when Reagan came back from Iceland. He
said what Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United
States agree to a new version of the 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the
Soviet Union had already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds
of deals in the United States. We prefer no agreement than to bring
home a bad agreement to the United States.
I think we are--most of us who have questions that were unanswered
and we want amendments--are those who do not believe this is a good
treaty.
When the Senator talks about the number of inspections, let's keep in
mind when we did the first treaty, we were only inspecting new
facilities, existing facilities, facilities that could be used,
warheads that could be used, looking at the MIRV situation.
But now, on this one, we also want to inspect to make sure those
things they had agreed to destroy they actually
[[Page S10730]]
have destroyed. That is why I talked about the debris--rather than
seeing something destroyed, they look at the debris that is left over.
On the argument, on the fact that you talked about the one time in
Kazakhstan and Ukraine. When you look at the vastness of Russia, I
remember--and one thing the Senator from Massachusetts and I have in
common is we both are aviators. I had occasion--I will share with my
friend from Massachusetts--a few years to fly an airplane around the
world, replicating the flight of Wiley Post, a very famous Oklahoman.
In doing this, I went all the way from Moscow to Provideniya, all the
way across Siberia. I can remember going from time zone after time zone
and not seeing anything except vast wilderness and perhaps a few bears
now and then.
When I think about the areas they have where things can be hidden,
compared to any of these other countries, including our own, it is kind
of a scary thing.
I do believe we need to have the opportunity to increase the
inspections because there is so much more area to inspect. The idea
that it is not a freebie--I know it is not. I know anything in this
treaty that I would change, such as the number of inspections, would
apply to us as well as them. I understand that. But in that respect, I
don't mind doing it because there is one big difference between the
United States and Russia: They cheat and we don't. It is fine with me
if we have to subject ourselves to a greater number of inspections so
long as we can do the same with them.
I will stand by the statements made and also the statements that were
discovered in the 2010 Department report which I quoted from having to
do with biological weapons, chemical weapons, and conventional forces
in Europe. I am glad to repeat the quotes, but I don't think I have to.
In 2010, the State Department said that Russia's confidence-building
measure declarations since 1992 have not satisfactorily been
documented, whether it is biological weapons or any other program, such
as chemical weapons. So with the fact that they have not complied as
they stated they would in the past--and we are now dealing with that--I
think we have to take more precautions, more inspections, more
verifications, because they have demonstrated clearly that they are not
telling the truth, and they have not complied with commitments in the
past.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I will not engage in a long discussion. I
don't know if the Senator from Indiana wants to say something.
First of all, I am envious of that flight. I would love to have made
that. Secondly, as the Senator knows--and I think I will reserve most
of this for the classified session tomorrow--we have great ability to
observe construction in Siberia or any part of Russia and to notice
changes of various kinds, notwithstanding the vastness. Yes, there have
been occasions when there have been some misunderstandings or
differences of opinion about enforcement requirements. We have had some
differences on those things. We can again discuss some of those in
closed session. But the treaties have worked. The process set up by
which we get into dispute resolution and sort of raise these issues has
worked. When we notice something they are doing that we think is, in
fact, not in compliance or likewise when they have with us, we have
gotten together, and, because of the treaty, we have come into a
discussion, and we have worked those things through.
I think our intelligence community's conclusion is that they have
never exceeded the limits, though there have been some
misunderstandings about sort of the process of getting from one place
to another with respect to one system or another.
Let's have that discussion in a place where we can do it without a
sense of restraint, but I think it is a good one to have. I look
forward to continuing that with my colleague.
I don't know if the Senator from Indiana has anything he wants to
add.
Mr. President, I understand the Senator from South Dakota will not be
here, so unless there is another Senator seeking recognition or looking
for an amendment to be acted on at this point, I yield the floor and
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. INHOFE. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. INHOFE. Let me make one last comment. I think the Senator from
Massachusetts is right that we have covered enough of this tonight.
There are some things that would be worth going into in a closed
session. One thing that doesn't have to be in a closed session is the
fact that there is a long record of Russians not complying with the
first treaty. I would rather use another word than ``cheating,'' but
that is one that everyone understands, and that has characterized
Russia's behavior in previous treaties.
The statement we are making right now, everyone is in agreement that
the lower the arsenal becomes, the more significant it is for
inspections for verification. I think everyone is in agreement with
that. That is something that is probably the strongest point of our
argument.
The last thing I will say is just to repeat something I said for
which I was a little bit overwhelmed when I said it. This is the first
in 51 years that we have missed our wedding anniversary. And what I was
trying to say before I got choked up is to my wife at home: I love you
more today than I did 51 years ago.
I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Begich). The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
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