[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 168 (Friday, December 17, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10422-S10441]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                               Good News

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am pleased to report two pieces of 
good news out of Congress today. After 2 years of policies that lacked 
public support, the tide is beginning to turn.
  Today the President will sign a bill that ensures no American--not a 
single one--gets a tax hike on January 1. Republicans have fought hard 
for this legislation. Up until last week, most Democrats resisted. But 
in the end the American people were heard. That is a welcome change 
from the last 2 years.
  The American people have finally been heard on another matter as 
well. Yesterday, Republicans united against a 2,000-page, $1.2 trillion 
spending bill that Democrats were trying to ram through Congress in the 
final hours of this session. The goal of this bill was perfectly clear. 
Its purpose was to lock in for another year the same big government 
policies voters overwhelmingly rejected on November 2.
  By approving this bill, we would have helped cement for another year 
massive increases in spending and helped pave the way for a health care 
bill most Americans are asking us to repeal.
  Once those details became clear, it was imperative that we reject it.
  The voters don't want us to wait to cut spending and debt and fight 
the health care bill next October--they want us to do these things 
immediately.
  So I am proud of my conference for sticking together on these 
principles.
  Here in these final days of the 111th Congress we have held the line 
on taxes.
  We have held the line on spending.
  Next, we turn to cutting spending and cutting debt.
  The American people are seeing change here in Washington.
  They can expect more in the New Year.


                      tribute to retiring senators

                             george lemieux

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to a man who has 
made the most of a short tenure here in the Senate. Shortly after 
George LeMieux was sworn in last September he said that his goal was to 
get years of work done in 16 months. And I don't think there is any 
doubt the junior Senator from Florida made good on that promise.
  In his short tenure, George has served the people of Florida with 
honor, integrity, and purpose. And while he may be leaving us soon, I 
am certain this will not be the last time we hear from this incredibly 
gifted man.
  George grew up in Coral Springs, FL, or ``God's country'' as he 
refers to it. He went on to college at Emory, where he graduated magna 
cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa. As an undergraduate, George interned for 
Congressman Clay Shaw and Senator Connie Mack. And then it was on to 
Georgetown for law school and then private practice back home in 
Florida.
  George got his start in local politics as chairman of the Broward 
County Young Republicans. He then went on to make his own bid for the 
Florida State house in 1998, knocking on more than 10,000 doors in the 
heavily Democratic district he was hoping to represent.
  Despite George's own campaign loss, he impressed a lot of Republicans 
and was elected chairman of Broward County Republican Party. In 2003, 
he was asked to serve as deputy attorney general. And George answered 
the call, leaving the law firm he was working in at the time. As deputy 
attorney general, George was responsible for a team of 400 lawyers. He 
also argued and won a death penalty case that earned a unanimous ruling 
from the U.S. Supreme Court.
  George would go on to serve as the chief of staff to Florida Governor 
Charlie Crist overseeing the Governor's legislative agenda, policy 
initiatives, and messaging.
  After a year as chief of staff, George wanted to return home to his 
young family. ``I've got three little men at home,'' George said at the 
time, ``and a wife who's a saint.''
  Despite the demands of work, George has always made sure not to lose 
sight of his first priorities. And we have all seen and been touched by 
the special pride he has for his wife Meike and their three boys Max, 
Taylor, and Chase, and their newborn daughter Madeleine.
  After a couple of years of private practice, George got the call 
again to serve when Mel Martinez announced he was retiring from the 
Senate.
  And from the moment he got here, he was determined to do the best job 
he could. He wasn't going to be a placeholder or a seat warmer, as he 
put it. Floridians expected vigorous and principled representation, and 
that is exactly what they got. At the time of his appointment, George 
may have been the youngest sitting Member of the Senate, but that 
didn't stop him from rolling up his sleeves and getting to work. He 
made an immediate impact by inserting himself into the health care 
debate as an eloquent and passionate opponent of greater government 
intervention and an enemy of waste, fraud, and abuse. And the first 
bill he introduced was the Prevent Health Care Fraud Act of 2009, which 
proposed a more aggressive approach to recovering the billions of 
dollars that are lost each year to health care waste, fraud, and abuse.
  George has been deeply involved in efforts to raise awareness about 
the national debt and promoting free trade. He has been involved in 
Latin American and Cuban policy. And he was a leader on the gulf 
oilspill.
  He has worked tirelessly to hold BP and the administration 
accountable fo the cleanup and the protection of Florida's beaches. He 
has been an outspoken critic of the bureaucratic red tape that kept 
more skimmers from cleaning up the Florida coast. And through his 
relentless efforts at exposing this lax response, he was able to get 
dozens of skimmers sent to the Florida coast for cleanup. As George put 
it at the time, ``We must ensure that BP does not abandon the 
hardworking families, businesses, and local communities devastated by 
the spill once the media leaves . . .'' After just a few months of on-
the-job training as U.S. Senator, George had found his voice in the 
midst of the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history.
  Upon arriving in this Chamber, George has always maintained a pro-
business, anti-tax, and anti-waste voting record, which has made him 
the recipient of several awards. In August of this year, George was 
recognized as the ``Taxpayer Hero'' by the Council for Citizens Against 
Government Waste for his work to expose and end wasteful government 
spending. The following month, George was honored the ``Guardian of 
Small Business'' by the National Federation of Independent Business, as 
well as the ``Tax Fighter'' award by the National Tax Limitation 
Committee.
  While George's impressive tenure in this Chamber has been brief, we 
enjoyed getting to know him and working

[[Page S10424]]

with him to advance the best interests of Floridians and all Americans. 
He has been one of our sharpest and most passionate spokesmen on some 
of the most important issues we face. He is smart, capable, and willing 
to work hard. He should be proud of his service. I know I have been 
proud to call him a colleague and a friend.
  We thank him for his impressive service to this Chamber, the people 
of Florida, and the Nation. And we wish him and his young family all 
the best in what I hope will be many years of success and happiness 
ahead.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts is 
recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, again, I repeat that we are beginning the 
third day of debate on the START treaty. Senator Lugar and I are 
anxious to begin debate on an actual amendment. We are prepared to do 
so as soon as colleagues decide to come to the floor and bring us those 
amendments. I will repeat that given the press of business and the 
holidays, we are sort of in a place where we want to afford people that 
opportunity, but if people don't want to take advantage of that, we are 
certainly prepared to move to a vote.
  I emphasize that there are no amendments from colleagues on the 
Democratic side. We are prepared to just vote on this treaty. I think 
perhaps we are getting a signal that other colleagues may want to 
likewise try to move to conclude this treaty fairly rapidly. Certainly, 
Senator Lugar and I are prepared to do so. Senator Lugar has pressed me 
to try to see if we can proceed with respect to the procedural votes 
that would bring us to that point. I have suggested that we ought to 
perhaps give that a little more time. We are prepared to do so. At some 
point, I think it will be appropriate for us to do that.
  I know Senator Lugar wants to speak with respect to some of the 
points that were made yesterday. First, would the Senator be agreeable 
to having Senator Franken speak?
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am delighted to delay my remarks to 
listen to other Senators who have come to the floor. We are eager to 
try to expedite all of the statements of our Members.
  Mr. KERRY. Would the Senator agree with me that we have been open for 
business for about 2 days now, and this is the third day, and we need 
to get to a substantive amendment or perhaps to move to close off the 
debate and have our last 30 hours?
  Mr. LUGAR. I agree with the chairman. I hope that, having raised that 
issue, Members will come to the floor promptly, amendments will be 
offered, and votes will be taken.
  It appears to me that a number of our colleagues are prepared to 
conclude business, including our majority leader and the Republican 
leader. I think that is the sentiment of the body. As a result, given 
the 9\1/2\ hours of open time yesterday and a number of good 
statements, we did not progress toward any resolution of either 
amendments or the treaty. I think today we must do so. I support action 
to accelerate that.
  Mr. KERRY. I emphasize that if colleagues want to be here, the 
majority leader has told me he will keep the Senate open Saturday, 
Sunday, through the weekend, in order to do so. So it is our choice. 
But I think, in lieu of complaints about the rapidity with which the 
holiday is arriving, we might spend time on an actual amendment or 
votes.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Minnesota is 
recognized.
  Mr. FRANKEN. Mr. President, may I ask Senator Kerry one question. 
When I was presiding yesterday, a Member rose in opposition to the 
treaty. He was complaining about it coming up now. He pointed to when 
we got the treaty from the White House, which was in May; is that 
right?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, that is correct, I say to the Senator from 
Minnesota. I think it was April that it was signed and May when we 
actually received the submission of the documents themselves.
  Mr. FRANKEN. I ask the chairman, when this Senator was presiding, 
another Senator was on the floor saying that we got this in May, and 
now it is close to the end of the year, and it is outrageous that we 
are doing it now.
  I ask Senator Kerry, didn't he accommodate those on the other side of 
this issue several times when they asked for delay themselves?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the Senator is absolutely correct. There 
was a series of requests from Senators on the other side--which is 
totally appropriate. I am not suggesting that was inappropriate. I 
think the record needs to reflect that on those multiple occasions when 
people requested time in order to be able to prepare, we gave them 
time.
  Senator Lugar was importuned some 13 times to specifically slow down 
the treaty process in order to allow for more time to be able to 
address the modernization process, which is outside the treaty but not 
unlinked from it when you are making judgments about this.
  Senator Kyl brought up some relevant omissions in that modernization 
process. That extra time allowed us to address that--I hope to his 
satisfaction but certainly to the improvement of an understanding of 
where we are proceeding and to increase the funds.
  Then we delayed even further when the committee was prepared to vote. 
There was a request for delay, and we delayed that vote.
  Then we delayed even after that in order to avoid the appearance of 
politicizing the treaty for the election. So we literally took it out 
and said: OK, we will do it after the election, which is why I think 
people feel so adamantly that now is the time.
  There have been an appropriate series of delays. You cannot come in 
and ask for delay and then say: Oh my gosh, we are pushed up against 
the calendar, and it is difficult to do it now--particularly since we 
are in day 3 and we have plenty of time to even exceed the amount of 
time in which we did START I.
  I thank the Senator from Minnesota for clarifying that. I hope not to 
get locked into a discussion of process now or what happens when. Let's 
just do the substance of the treaty and show the country that we have 
the ability to, in a bipartisan way, meet the national security needs 
of our Nation. Again, I thank the Senator for his question.
  Mr. FRANKEN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for that 
clarification.
  I rise to discuss missile defense and the New START treaty. Missile 
defense is one of the persistent areas of concern of the treaty raised 
by some of my colleagues. However, the reasonable questions that have 
been raised on the subject can be answered in a very straightforward 
manner.
  The treatment of missile defense in the treaty is no cause to oppose 
it--quite the opposite. It should garner support for the treaty. Most 
of those who have raised concerns understand that longstanding Russian 
anxiety about our missile defense is misplaced. The purpose of our 
missile defense is not to undermine Russia's deterrent; it is to 
protect us from attack from the likes of Iran or North Korea. In fact, 
the Senator who raised the objection about it coming up now, after 
their request for delay, pointed that out, as if our side didn't 
understand that, for some reason.
  This is longstanding U.S. policy and law across administrations and 
Congresses controlled by both parties, going back to at least the 
administration of George H.W. Bush.
  Nothing in the treaty bars the development and deployment of missile 
defense from countering those very real threats from the likes of Iran 
and North Korea, nor does the treaty give the Russians any say over 
missile defense or any kind of veto over it.
  The fact that we and the Russians remain at odds over missile defense 
is, to some degree, nothing new. It has not prevented overwhelming 
support for arms control agreements in the past, including this 
treaty's predecessor, the original START treaty.
  A more radical strand of criticism argues that our missile defense 
should target Russian forces and should, in fact, seek to render 
Russian strategic forces useless. I won't have much to say about this 
criticism. In reality, it is criticism of the entire foreign policy 
consensus of the United States that has prevailed across party lines at 
least

[[Page S10425]]

since the end of the Cold War. Secretary Gates has spoken about the 
danger and the needless budget-busting expense of this perspective.
  Setting this view aside, I want to focus on the more reasonable 
skeptics of the New START treaty. They have expressed concerns about 
each of the two mentions of missile defense in the treaty.
  Article V, section 3 of the treaty states:

       Each party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM 
     launchers and SLBM launchers--

  That is submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

     for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each 
     party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers 
     of missile defense interceptors for replacement of ICBM and 
     SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM 
     launchers that were converted prior to signature of this 
     treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

  In other words, this provision prohibits the conversion and use of 
ICBM and SLBM launchers from missile defense interceptors and vice 
versa. However, it grandfathers the five missile silos at Vandenberg 
Air Force Base that have already been converted to launchers for 
missile defense interceptors.
  Some have seized on this provision as a constraint on our missile 
defense. In reality, this provision effectively keeps missile defense 
outside the scope of the treaty--an objective that proponents of 
missile defense surely desire--at no real cost to us.
  The ban on conversion of ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to missile 
defense is not a meaningful constraint. As LTG Patrick O'Reilly, 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency, testified, his agency has no 
plans and never had any plans to convert additional ICBM silos at 
Vandenberg. It is both less expensive and operationally more effective 
to build new ground-based interceptors. As General O'Reilly explained, 
replacing ICBMs with interceptors or adapting SLBMs to be interceptors 
would be ``a major setback to the development of our missile 
defenses.''
  Substantial conversion of ICBM silos to missile defense would also be 
unnecessarily risky. Mixing interceptors with their ICBMs, especially 
in or near ICBM fields, would create an ambiguity problem for the 
Russians that risks tragic misunderstanding and devastating 
miscalculation. As GEN Kevin Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic 
Command, put it, seeing a missile launch, the other side may well be 
uncertain whether the launch was of an offensive or defensive missile.
  Eliminating conversion of ICBM silos to defense is eliminating an 
unnecessary and undesirable option. That is why this so-called 
limitation on missile defense in article V of the New START treaty is--
to use Senator McCain's phrase from the committee hearings--not a 
meaningful one. Nevertheless, Senator McCain and others have gone on to 
ask: Even if the limitation is meaningful in itself, why did the 
administration agree to include it in the treaty? Why did we make this 
concession on missile defense to the Russians?
  The short answer is because we got a very good deal on missile 
defense, gaining several benefits by agreeing not to do something we 
were never going to do. That is pretty good negotiating I think.
  The five converted missile silos at Vandenberg were a major source of 
contention in the context of the existing original START treaty. The 
Russians considered the conversion of those silos a compliance problem. 
They worried we would be able to convert them back and forth and 
undermine the treaty's central numerical limits on nuclear weapons. 
Apparently, in negotiations over this new treaty, the Russians pushed 
us to either undo the conversions to missile defense at Vandenberg or 
to count the silos under the New START central limitations on our 
arsenal.
  We met neither of those Russian demands. Instead, in return for 
agreeing not to perform future conversions that are unnecessary and 
undesirable, we got the five existing missile defense silos at 
Vandenberg grandfathered. That means not only do they continue as 
defense silos, but Russia can no longer raise compliance complaints 
because we converted those silos to defense.
  More importantly, with the conversion ban in place, our missile 
defenses are not subject to the treaty and its inspection regime. It is 
true we will exhibit the Vandenberg silos to the Russians on two 
occasions in the future, to assure them that the five converted silos 
remain unable to launch ICBMs. But by keeping Vandenberg out of the 
regular inspection and verification regime established by the new 
treaty, we deprive the Russians of a precedent for extending 
inspections to our defenses elsewhere. If conversion were allowed under 
the New START treaty, our missile defenses at Fort Greely, for 
instance, would potentially be subject to intrusive inspection by the 
Russians, to determine whether any such conversions had taken place.
  Instead, with the conversion ban in place, Fort Greely and other 
missile defenses are off limits. I am not entirely sure why the 
Russians agreed to this, but it is very good for us, and our 
negotiators deserve praise for article V, section 3. We kept something 
of value--namely the existing Vandenberg converted silos--we cleared up 
a source of contention with the Russians, and we kept our missile 
defenses out of the New START regime, ensuring they are not subject to 
intrusive inspection by the Russians. In exchange, we agreed to ban 
something that, again, we were never going to do--further convert 
silos--because that would be unwise in the first place. In other words, 
article V is a good reason to support the treaty.
  But I think the deepest concern of those who have raised questions 
about missile defense go to the treaty's other reference to missile 
defense in the preamble, together with the unilateral statement Russia 
issued on its own on the subject, and the so-called withdrawal clause 
in the treaty. The treaty's preamble recognizes:

       The existence of the interrelationship between strategic 
     offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this 
     interrelationship will become more important as strategic 
     nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic 
     defensive arms do not undermine the viability and 
     effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

  I don't think anyone would deny that there is such an 
interrelationship. It is simply a fact. Nor does the preamble impose 
any obligation on us or on the Russians. It is not a binding limit on 
us, it requires nothing of us, and has no effect on the nuclear forces 
limited or not limited by the treaty.
  Russia also issued a unilateral statement on missile defense at the 
time the treaty was signed. This is not part of the treaty and there is 
no binding force whatsoever on us or on the Russians. We issued a 
statement in response as well.
  Russia's unilateral statement asserts the treaty can only be 
effective and viable where there is no qualitative or quantitative 
buildup in our missile defense system capabilities. That is not what 
the actual treaty's preamble says. Beyond that, the statement goes on 
to state that a missile defense buildup ``such that it would give rise 
to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian 
Federation'' would count as an extraordinary event under article XIV of 
the treaty. Article XIV includes the withdrawal clause, which is a 
standard part of arms control treaties. That clause makes clear that 
each country has the right to withdraw from the treaty if it judges 
that extraordinary events related to the treaty's subject matter have 
jeopardized its supreme interests.
  That judgment cannot be second-guessed. Russia or the United States 
can always make a decision that its supreme interests require it to 
withdraw from the treaty under article XIV, and there is nothing the 
other party can do about it.
  Some of my colleagues on the other side are troubled and worried that 
Russia will seek to leverage the mention of missile defense in the 
preamble and their unilateral statement to pressure the United States 
to limit our missile defense. These worries are without foundation. The 
preamble and unilateral statement add no force whatsoever to article 
XIV's power of withdrawal from the treaty. And as Secretary Gates 
testified, we know the Russians have hated missile defense for decades, 
since strategic arms talks started. There is no surprise here. So it is 
no surprise that the Russians say a fundamental change in the strategic 
balance between our countries because of missile defense might lead 
them to withdraw from the treaty.

[[Page S10426]]

  But even that threat is far less than it has been made out to be by 
the treaty's critics. Even the Russians' own unilateral statements 
count only a missile defense buildup that ``would give rise to a threat 
to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation'' as 
potential cause for withdrawal. Right now, we have 30 ground-based 
interceptors and the Russians will be able to deploy up to 1,500 
nuclear warheads. It is accepted you need at least two interceptors for 
each threat missile.
  We can and will continue to improve and deploy our missile defense 
without changing the fundamental situation with Russia. We can improve 
and expand our missile defense without threatening strategic stability 
with Russia. U.S. missile defense simply won't meet the Russians' own 
description of cause for withdrawal.
  But suppose the Russians see things otherwise. What is it that the 
Russians are actually threatening? Are they threatening to withdraw 
from the treaty? No. Here is what President Medvedev said on April 9, 
the day after the treaty was signed, with reference to missile defense:

       If events develop in such a way to ultimately change the 
     fundamental situation, Russia would be able to raise this 
     issue with the USA. This is the sense of the interpretation 
     and the verbal statement made yesterday.

  So if the Russians decide there has been a change in the fundamental 
situation on missile defense and offense, then they will ``raise this 
issue with the USA.'' Not withdraw from the treaty but raise the issue 
with us. That is a threat I think we can handle.
  There is another reason not to be overly concerned. Around the time 
the United States and Soviet Union signed the original START treaty in 
1991, the Soviet Union issued a unilateral statement on the 
antiballistic missile--or ABM--treaty, which language is virtually 
identical to the unilateral statement the Russians just issued in 
connection with the New START treaty.
  As you know, the United States did withdraw from the ABM treaty, and 
Russia, the successor to the U.S.S.R, did not in turn withdraw from the 
original START treaty, as they threatened to do in the unilateral 
statement. Why would the Russians structure their unilateral statement 
exactly like their previous one if they wanted us to take the threat 
more seriously than the last one? The Russian objection to missile 
defense is well known and well understood. Their threat to withdraw 
from the treaty, such as it is, is not strong and the treaty's actual 
preamble imposes no obligation, restraint or pressure upon us.

  The bottom line is that whatever decisions the Obama administration 
and Congress make on missile defense policy can and will be made 
independent of Russian threats. Frankly, our missile defense will not 
threaten strategic stability with them. The New START treaty doesn't 
alter our calculations on missile defense one iota.
  If this is Russia's effort to pressure us on missile defense, it is 
very weak and easily resisted. I, personally, pledge to make judgments 
about our missile defense policy on the basis of technical and 
strategic considerations, entirely independent of Russian pressure, and 
I am sure my colleagues will do the same.
  To sum up, the limitation on conversion of launchers in article V of 
the New START treaty is, in fact, a major success of our negotiators. 
In return for agreeing not to convert more ICBM silos, which we were 
never going to do anyway, we kept our missile defense out of the treaty 
and away from regular Russian inspection, and we put to rest Russian 
complaints about our existing converted silos. We got several things of 
value at very low cost.
  Similarly, the mention of missile defense in the preamble and the 
nonbinding statement made by the Russians will not allow them to 
pressure us or exercise a veto on our missile defense. There is no 
meaningful pressure there. The threat is exceedingly weak and it is 
hard to see how my colleagues would take it seriously.
  There is simply not a missile defense problem with this treaty, but 
don't just take it from me. In addition to the extraordinary support 
this treaty has garnered from foreign policy experts across the 
political spectrum, there is remarkable support amongst our defense 
leadership responsible for missile defense. This ranges from the 
Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the service 
chiefs, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command responsible for our 
nuclear deterrent, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
  What is more, seven former commanders of Strategic Air Command and 
U.S. Strategic Command recently wrote to the Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services Committees to express their support for ratification of 
the treaty and specifically dismissed objections based on missile 
defense.
  I hope we consider the resolution of ratification on the floor of the 
Senate as soon as possible. The substantive case for the treaty could 
not be stronger. It is time to bring it into force.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I have, I guess, a parliamentary inquiry. 
Maybe the Senator from Massachusetts, through you, might answer. I 
think we are at a point in time where it is time for amendments to be 
offered. I encourage people, on our side of the aisle in particular, if 
they have amendments, to offer them. At present, I have no amendments 
personally. I was able to be involved in the resolution of ratification 
that Senator Lugar and I drafted early during the committee. But I know 
a number of my colleagues have been wanting to offer amendments. It 
seems like there is a lot of time for that to occur today. That ought 
to be forthcoming so we can get on.
  I have some comments I would like to make about the treaty and I 
guess concerns I have that we would introduce in the middle of this 
debate some political issues regarding the military that are 
unnecessary at this moment in time. That can be said later. But it is 
my hope we can move this along.
  I would like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts, through the Chair 
how the amendment process is working. I know there has been some 
question on our side about whether amendments to the treaty and 
amendments to the resolution itself can be offered at the same time. I 
think it would be helpful--because everybody is impatient. They are 
wanting to see the amendments come forward and let's move forward with 
this process. It would be good to know how that process actually would 
work. There has been a question about the cloture vote and how that 
impacts pending amendments.
  I think, in order to help move this along, it would be good if that 
could be answered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to the Senator it may be we need 
the Parliamentarian on something, but here is my understanding.
  There is a distinction, obviously, between an amendment to the treaty 
and an amendment to the resolution of ratification. Under the 
parliamentary rules, there is a vagueness, frankly--according, even to 
the Parliamentarian--as to how you go back and forth. I think in the 
language in the particular amendment, you can deal with that issue so 
you can make certain you are either addressing the resolution of 
ratification or the treaty itself.
  Technically speaking, the treaty has to be dealt with first and then 
the resolution of ratification subsequently. We can go back and forth. 
There is no problem in that. Is that accurate, Mr. President--I ask, 
through you, the Parliamentarian--that we can take an amendment at any 
time on either the resolution of ratification or the treaty?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. By unanimous consent that could be 
achieved.
  Mr. KERRY. So we could take them at any time; by unanimous consent we 
could actually be defining what we specifically would be agreeing to 
deal with. But under the rules, technically, you have to do the treaty 
and then move that aside and go to the resolution of ratification; is 
that a fair statement?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.
  The Senator from Tennessee.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I am not sure it is my role, because of 
the way the managers manage this bill, to ask for unanimous consent in 
that regard. I think that is probably something that either the two 
leaders

[[Page S10427]]

should ask or the two managers of the bill. But it would seem to me 
that would clear up any questions people have about the process itself.
  I ask the Senator from Massachusetts, through the Chair, if that is 
the way it should work, to get that unanimous consent.
  Mr. KERRY. To simplify matters, let me say this. We are prepared to 
take any amendment at any time and to proceed to it, and at a time the 
amendment comes to us and we both get a chance to look at it, we will 
address the question to the Parliamentarian, whether we need to ask for 
unanimous consent or to change the initial language of that particular 
amendment so it fits into that moment. What we will do is abide by the 
rules and make sure the amendment is appropriate. But we will take any 
amendment at any time as we always have in dealing with a treaty. We 
have always been able to resolve this question of where it applies.
  In the end, once we have moved onto the final 30 hours of debate, it 
is irrelevant anyway; we simply conclude.
  Mr. CORKER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I would say I was 
here last night on the floor. I think the Senator was, too, when 
discussions took place around the CR. I think emotions around here were 
slightly frayed, and I think everybody wants this session to end. It is 
my hope it will end with us doing what is necessary on the START 
treaty.
  I think it would be good to clear that up. I think the last thing we 
need right now is confusion over that. It seems, instead of taking each 
amendment at a time--I am not up to any trickery here, I am just trying 
to clear this up--I think it would be much better--again, this is maybe 
beyond my pay grade at this moment--if the two bill managers would go 
ahead, by unanimous consent, and ask for that and move on with it. That 
way there is no question about whether people have the ability to try 
to amend either one, and we can move on so people cannot come down here 
later and say they were blocked from offering certain types of 
amendments.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me say to the Senator, we are working on the 
appropriate language so we do not, in fact, wind up inadvertently 
amending the treaty. So we will make certain we proceed in an 
appropriate way.
  But I guarantee any Senator, if they have an amendment, we will be 
able to take it and we are ready to proceed.
  I thank the Senator from Tennessee for his cooperative effort.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I think, having spoken to a couple 
colleagues, it is quite likely the first amendment that will be 
offered, relatively soon, will be on the treaty itself so that issue 
will not have been--we will have time to work the question out that 
Senator Kerry and Senator Corker have been talking about.
  Senator Kerry and I were involved in a discussion about missile 
defense last evening. I think that will be probably further debated in 
connection with the first amendment that is likely to be offered. So 
let me turn to another matter that is of great concern to some of us 
and I think will require some resolution, either in an amendment of the 
treaty or preamble or in the resolution of ratification, and that is 
the limitation that was placed on our potential prompt global strike--
conventional global strike weapon. This is a matter on which the Senate 
gave its advice. Our role, of course, is advice and consent. In the 
last Defense bill, section 1251 of the fiscal year 2010 NDAA, we 
included a statement that the New START treaty should not include any 
limitations on advanced conventional systems, otherwise known as 
conventional prompt global strike.
  For the purposes of this, let me refer to that now as CPGS. Despite 
the assurances from some in the administration that wouldn't happen, it 
did happen. There is both limiting language and language in the 
preamble that sets the stage for further limitations on CPGS. We were 
clear about this because I believe we are going to need this. General 
Chilton has said the same thing. First, let me make it clear, what we 
are talking about is a conventional warhead on top which is a missile 
that has ICBM-like capabilities, that can quickly reach a spot a long 
way away to deliver a nonnuclear warhead.
  With the WMD and terrorist and other rogue state kinds of threats 
that exist today, our administration and many of the rest of us have 
concluded this is a capability we need.
  Let me quote General Chilton:

       To provide the President a better range of non-nuclear 
     options against rapidly emerging threats, we also require a 
     deployed, conventional prompt global strike capability to 
     hold at risk targets in denied territory that can only be 
     rapidly struck today with nuclear weapon platforms.

  That is the rationale for it. That is the administration's statement, 
and I agree with that.
  The Senate provided its advice in Section 1251 of the Defense bill, 
and here is what Under Secretary of Defense Tauscher assured Senators. 
She said:

       [T]here is no effect for prompt global strike in the 
     treaty.

  A March 26, 2010, White House fact sheet assured that:

       . . . the treaty does not contain any constraints on 
     testing, development, or deployment of . . . current or 
     planned United States long-range strike capabilities.

  Obviously, that statement was meant to assure us that CPGS would not 
be constrained or limited. But the kicker in there were the words 
``current'' or ``planned.'' That is because there is no current CPGS, 
and the administration is studying what particular system or systems to 
move forward with.
  So while technically correct that there is nothing current or 
planned, it is also true the constraints in the treaty will limit 
whatever system we eventually come up with. The question, therefore, is 
what happens when, as General Chilton urges us, we develop a CPGS in 
the future.
  Incidentally, General Chilton is the head of our Strategic Command. 
He is the person responsible for understanding what the threats are and 
how we can deliver the right ordnance in the right place with 
perishable intelligence in a very constrained atmosphere, and that is 
why his views on this are very important. Yet we conceded to Russian 
demands to place limits on CPGS.
  How was this done? The Russians were very clever about this. They 
knew they were not going to get the United States to back off our plan, 
so what they said was: You will have to count any of those missiles 
against the 700 launcher limit on your nuclear delivery vehicles.
  That is not a good deal. Most of us believe the 700 is too low to 
begin with. What we will have to do is, for every single one of these, 
we will have to subtract that number from the 700. So if you have 25, 
now you are down to 675 launchers for nuclear weapons.
  That is a constraint. There is no way to describe that in any other 
terms. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said, on March 29:

       For the first time, this treaty sets the ceiling, not only 
     for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but also for those 
     ones which will be fitted with nonnuclear warheads. The U.S. 
     is carrying out this work, which is why it would be extremely 
     important to set a limit precisely on these types of weapons.

  I think he was more straightforward about this than the spokesman for 
the administration. He said: Sure, we put limits on it, and the United 
States is moving forward on it. That is why we wanted to put limits on 
it.
  So despite the relationship between strategic and tactical nuclear 
weapons--but we would not dare deal with tactical weapons either in the 
preamble or the treaty. Yet in another concession to the Russians, the 
preamble to the treaty notes that the parties are ``mindful of the 
impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic 
stability.''
  Well, first of all, I do not agree with that statement. What is the 
impact? The impact assumes that we cannot segregate the two, which can 
be done. Second, are we to believe that tactical nuclear weapons, which 
the Russians enjoy a huge advantage--some say a 10-to-1 advantage over 
us--have no impact on strategic stability while conventionally armed 
ballistic missiles do?
  What do Russia's neighbors think of that argument, I might wonder. 
Clearly, these limits on CPGS and the dangerous language in the 
preamble were concessions to the Russians. It is not in our interest 
because we do intend to go forward with this. I think, taken to its 
extreme, the treaty could prevent the United States from acquiring the 
nonnuclear strategic capabilities necessary to counter today's 
principal

[[Page S10428]]

threats, terrorists and regional adversaries armed with weapons of mass 
destruction.
  We recognize the resolution of ratification has language on this. It 
does not rescind, and could not rescind, the specific limitation on 
counting conventionally armed ballistic missiles or mitigate the 
potential for severe disagreement with the Russians over this issue in 
the very near future.
  I do not think we should ratify a treaty without knowing what kind of 
CPGS systems may be counted and how that will affect the nuclear triad 
at the much reduced levels now of 700 delivery vehicles. According to 
the Department of Defense, an assessment on treaty implications for 
CPGS proposals will not be ready until 2011. So under the resolution 
approved by the committee, Senators will not know until the treaty 
enters into force, when, obviously, it would be too late.
  So the bottom line is, with a 700-launch vehicle limit, and CPGS 
counting against that limit, we will have fewer nuclear delivery 
vehicles than we negotiated for in the treaty, and that limit will be a 
disincentive to develop the CPGS as a result.
  Second, the language in the preamble regarding the impact of CPGS on 
strategic stability opens the door to further Russian pressure against 
the United States not to develop and deploy these systems. Why should 
we accept these constraints in a treaty that was about nuclear weapons?
  Now, I think Senator Kerry had three main points, if I distilled it 
correctly. First was, well, the Russians wanted to limit us from doing 
this at all. So, in effect, we should be thankful the only limitation 
was on the number. I do not think that is a very good argument. As I 
said, we wanted to talk tactical. The Russians said no, so we did not 
talk tactical in the strategic treaty. There is no reason why, in a 
strategic nuclear treaty, we need to talk conventional arms either. But 
we agreed to do that.
  Another argument that Senator Kerry--well, it goes along with some in 
Russia who have said: Well, it would be very hard for us to know 
whether a missile launch was a strategic nuclear weapon or one of these 
conventional Prompt Global Strike weapons.
  That is sort of a justification for the Russian position. But most of 
the experts with whom I have talked say that is not a limitation we 
need to worry about at all. We could easily agree with the Russians in 
various ways to assuage their concerns. For example, we can deploy the 
conventionally armed ballistic missiles in areas that are distinct from 
our ICBM field, allow them to periodically conduct onsite inspections 
under separate agreement. That could be done. And there are other 
mechanisms as well. The key point is that we need these capabilities. I 
do not think we should limit them in an arms control treaty dealing 
with strategic nuclear weapons.
  The other argument is, well, we are not going to develop these for 
maybe 10 years, which is outside the life of the treaty. First of all, 
we should not have constraints on developing them at any point. We 
should not create the precedent that whatever we do with Prompt Global 
Strike is going to count against our nuclear delivery limits, which is 
what this treaty does.
  But, finally, there are programs that are being studied right now in 
the United States that would allow us to put the Prompt Global Strike 
capability into service quite quickly. We need it; we need it now. For 
example, there have been proposals for weapons on conventional Trident 
missiles, to cite one example, that would count and could be deployed 
in less than 10 years. The National Academy notified Congress in May of 
2007 that conventional Trident missiles could be operationally deployed 
within 2 years of funding. And there are others.
  My point is, we should not be saying: Well, because certain things 
are not going to happen for 10 years, the treaty lasts 10 years, 
therefore, we do not have to worry about it. It takes a long time to 
plan these systems, and if they are going to be constrained by what is 
in the treaty today, they are likely going to be constrained by 
provisions in future treaties as well.
  This is a bad precedent. It is one of the reasons we think before we 
were to proceed with this treaty, we would need to have some resolution 
either in the preamble or the treaty or the resolution of ratification 
that would give us assurance that we could develop Prompt Global Strike 
without detracting from our ability to deliver nuclear warheads as 
well.
  I would like to turn to another matter. I mentioned briefly when I 
began my conversation yesterday morning about the treaty--and that is, 
that looked at in a larger context, some people have said: Well, this 
treaty, in and of itself, may not put that many constraints on the 
United States. Therefore, they are willing to support it. I appreciate 
the rationale behind the argument.
  But there is an argument that this treaty has to be considered in its 
context. That is one of the reasons the people are concerned about the 
missile defense issue. But another element of context is the whole 
modernization issue, which is directly related to, but in a slightly 
different way relevant to the consideration of the treaty.
  But the other aspect of context is that this is a treaty seen by the 
administration as moving a step forward toward the President's vision 
of a world without nuclear weapons. There are a lot of people who 
disagree with that vision and who believe if this treaty is ratified, 
then, in effect, the administration's very next step is going to be to 
begin negotiations to do that.
  Indeed, administration spokesmen have said precisely that. Secretary 
Clinton, when New START was signed, talked about the President's vision 
of the world without nuclear weapons, and said: We are making real 
progress toward that goal.
  There have been numerous administration spokesmen who have made the 
same point. I will just mention three. Under Secretary Tauscher, whom I 
referred to earlier; Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, 
who actually negotiated this treaty; and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Alexander Vershbow have all indicated the next round of negotiations 
the administration intends to engage in, beginning immediately after 
the ratification of the START treaty, is the march toward the 
President's vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
  I said I do not share that vision. I do not share it for two reasons: 
I think it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve, and I question 
whether it is a good idea at all. I do not think anybody believes that 
is something that is achievable in anybody's lifetime, even if it is 
ever achievable.

  But, right now, focusing on this diverts attention, as I think this 
treaty does, from the efforts to deal with the true threats of today: 
countries such as Iran and North Korea and nuclear weapons falling into 
the hands of terrorists. As I said--in fact, let me quote Dr. Rice, who 
just recently wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. December 7 is 
the date. She said:

       Nuclear weapons will be with us for a long time. After this 
     treaty, our focus must be on stopping dangerous 
     proliferators, not on further reductions in the U.S. and 
     Russian strategic arsenals, which are really no threat to 
     each other or to international stability.

  I agree with that. Let me quote George Kennan, who wrote this a long 
time ago, but I think it applies today:

       The evil of these Utopian enthusiasms was not only or even 
     primarily the wasted time, the misplaced emphasis, the 
     encouragement of false hopes. The evil lay primarily in the 
     fact that those enthusiasms distracted our gaze from the real 
     things that were happening. The cultivation of these Utopian 
     schemes, flattering to our own image of ourselves, took place 
     at the expense of our feeling for reality.

  I would apply that to today. While we make a big hullabaloo about 
signing a treaty between Russia and the United States, countries that 
are no longer enemies, who are bringing down our strategic arsenals 
because it is in our own self-interest to do so, and ignore the 
threats--and I should not say ``ignore'' because that is to suggest the 
administration and others have not spent time working on the problem of 
Iran and North Korea. I ask, however, how much success we have had and 
whether we need to devote more attention and effort to resolving those 
problems that are immediately in front of us rather than dealing with a 
nonproblem in the START treaty with Russia.
  Also, I would ask my colleagues to just reflect for a moment on what 
such a world would be like. You can divide, at least in my lifetime, 
barely, pre-August 1945, in the last century, and post-

[[Page S10429]]

August 1945. World War II claimed between 56 and 81 million lives. It 
is astounding to me we cannot even get a more accurate count of that. 
That is how destructive and disruptive and cataclysmic World War II 
was.
  But it was ended with two atomic weapons. Since that time, the major 
powers--Russia, the United States, China--have not fired a shot in 
anger against each other. Major wars such as World War II, World War 
I--these kinds of wars have been avoided at least in part because the 
countries that possess these weapons know they cannot be used against 
each other in a conflict.
  That is the deterrent value. Would it be nice if they had never been 
invented? Yes. Except for what they accomplished in ending World War 
II. But they cannot be uninvented, and the reality is, today it does 
provide a deterrent for the United States to have these weapons, and 31 
other countries in the world rely on that deterrent.
  So I would just ask those who say it would be wonderful if these 
weapons did not exist, what would the world look like today, with all 
of the conflicts that exist, and the opportunity for conventional 
warfare, unconstrained by the deterrent of a nuclear retaliation?
  Nobel Prize winner and arms control expert Thomas Schelling recently 
observed that: In a world without nuclear weapons, countries would 
maintain an ability to rearm, and that ``every crisis would be a 
nuclear crisis . . . the urge to preempt would dominate. . .it would be 
a nervous world.''
  Well, to be sure, and that is an understatement. New York Times 
columnist Roger Cohen wrote:

       A world without nuclear weapons sounds nice, but of course 
     that was the world that brought us World War I and World War 
     II. If you like the sound of that, the touchy-feely `Ground 
     Zero' bandwagon is probably for you.

  General Brent Scowcroft, who is actually a proponent of this treaty 
wrote:

       Second, given the clear risks and the elusive benefits 
     inherent in additional deep cuts, the burden of proof should 
     be on those who advocate such reductions to demonstrate 
     exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance U.S. 
     security. Absent such a demonstration, we should not pursue 
     additional cuts in the mistaken belief that fewer is ipso 
     facto better.

  This is a point that was also made by the Bipartisan Congressional 
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, the so-called 
Perry-Schlesinger Commission, in which they concluded:

       All of the commission members all believe that reaching the 
     ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a 
     fundamental change in geopolitics.

  Again, quite an understatement. As I said, even the notion that we 
would be immediately pursuing, trying to reach this goal after the 
START treaty is ratified is to bring into question--at least I would 
suggest--in the minds of the 31 countries that depend on our nuclear 
deterrent for their security, whether this is a wise idea. There are 
plenty of folks around the world who have commented on this, national 
leaders who have commented on this.
  Let me just quote a couple to illustrate the breadth of concern about 
it.
  The President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy:

       It--

  Referring to the French nuclear deterrent--

     is neither a matter of prestige nor a question of rank, it is 
     quite simply the nation's life insurance policy.

  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, at the 
conclusion of my remarks, a list of comments and quotations by people 
who have spoken to this. Let me just cite maybe one.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1).
  Mr. KYL. Bill Kristol, who is, I think, a very astute observer of 
these matters, wrote in the Washington Post in April of last year:

       Yet to justify a world without nuclear weapons, what Obama 
     would really have to envision is a world without war, or 
     without threats of war . . . The danger is that the allure of 
     a world without nuclear weapons can be a distraction--even an 
     excuse for not acting against real nuclear threats. So while 
     Obama talks of a future without nuclear weapons, the 
     trajectory we are on today is toward a nuclear- and 
     missile-capable North Korea and Iran--and a far more 
     dangerous world.

  The point of all of the people whom I don't quote here but will 
include for the Record is that the genie will not be put back in the 
bottle. Countries will have nuclear weapons. As one of them pointed 
out, if we were ever, by some magic, able to rid the world of nuclear 
weapons, the threat of one nation quickly acquiring them would be the 
most destabilizing thing one could imagine. The reality is, it is not 
going to happen. The United States moving toward that goal is not going 
to influence anyone, including North Korea or Syria or Iran or other 
countries that may mean the United States harm.
  For those who believe this is a bad idea and who would like to see 
the President step back from that goal and instead focus more 
convincingly on dealing with the threats that are near term, 
ratification of this treaty presents a real problem, especially when 
the administration talks about the very next thing they want to do 
after beginning those negotiations is to bring to the Senate the 
comprehensive test ban treaty which this Senate defeated 11 years ago, 
and there are even stronger reasons to reject it today.
  The bottom line is, one can argue that the dramatic reduction in the 
arsenals of Russia and United States of strategic weapons has been a 
good thing. It certainly has been an economically justifiable action 
for both countries because they are costly. But it has had no 
discernible effect on nuclear proliferation. We have had more 
proliferation since, after the Cold War, we began to reduce these 
weapons. They are unlikely, between the United States and Russia, to be 
a cause of future conflict.
  It is time for global disarmament, starting with President Obama, to 
recognize this reality and channel their considerable efforts and good 
intentions toward the true dangers of which I have spoken.
  I would like to address one other subject, if I may.
  Mr. KERRY. I don't want to interrupt the Senator, but I wonder if, 
before he goes to another area, he would like to engage in a discussion 
on this particular one?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I would be happy to do that.
  Mr. KERRY. If he is pressed for time, I understand that.
  Mr. KYL. I am always happy to yield to my friend, and we always 
engage in interesting colloquies. I had indicated that, as a predicate 
to amendments, several of us had opening statements we would like to 
give. I am ready to go to amendments, but there are a couple of things 
I would like to say before we do.
  Mr. KERRY. Then I will reserve my question until later.
  Mr. KYL. I will enjoy the colloquy we have when we do get around to 
it.
  Mr. President, we don't have time to get into a lot of detail, but 
there is the question of verification. This is one of the other major 
matters people have written about, including Senator Bond, who is the 
ranking Republican on the Intelligence Committee. It is going to be 
important for the Senate to have an executive session to go over 
intelligence, classified information that relates to the question of 
verification and past Russian compliance or noncompliance with 
agreements they have made with the United States.
  In this short period, I wish to rebut something that continues to be 
repeated and is simply not true or at least the implication is not 
true--that we have to do this treaty because we need the verification 
provisions. The implication is that they are good and strong and will 
be effective. They won't. The verification provisions are far less than 
we had in the START I treaty. In the view of many people, they are not 
going to be effective.
  Secretary of State James Baker, who testified early on this treaty, 
said:

       [The verification mechanism in the New START treaty] does 
     not appear as rigorous or extensive as the one that verified 
     the numerous and diverse treaty obligations and prohibitions 
     under START I. This complex part of the treaty is even more 
     crucial when fewer deployed nuclear warheads are allowed than 
     were allowed in the past.

  My colleague Senator McCain said:

       The New START treaty's permissive approach to verification 
     will result in less transparency and create additional 
     challenges for our ability to monitor Russia's current and 
     future capabilities.

  Senator Bond said:


[[Page S10430]]


       New START suffers from fundamental verification flaws that 
     no amount of tinkering around the edges can fix.

  He also said:

       The Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at 
     this issue closely over the past several months . . . There 
     is no doubt in my mind that the United States cannot reliably 
     verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.

  In very simple terms, the reason he is saying that is that there is 
no overall verification of those warheads. We can look at an individual 
missile and see how many warheads are on the top, but that doesn't tell 
us whether they are in compliance with 1,550. That is one of the 
fundamental flaws.
  The amount of telemetry, unencrypted telemetry, from Russian missile 
tests is reduced to zero unless the Russians decide to give us more 
than zero.
  There is no longer onsite monitoring of the mobile missile final 
assembly facility at Votkinsk, which has existed for all these years 
under START I. The Russians didn't want us hanging around there 
anymore. We didn't even fight for that. It is a critical verification 
issue with respect to potentially a railcar or other mobile missiles 
the Russians will be developing. Secretary Gates spoke to that 
eloquently with respect to the verification provisions in START I. 
There are fewer onsite inspections. And I can't imagine the Russians 
would declare a facility, which is the only place we get to visit, and 
then be doing something nefarious at that particular declared facility. 
It is the undeclared facilities that represent a big part of the 
problem.
  Former CIA Director James Woolsey said:

       New START's verification provisions will provide little or 
     no help in detecting illegal activity at locations the 
     Russians fail to declare, are off-limits to U.S. inspectors, 
     or are underground or otherwise hidden from our satellites.

  He makes the point, when he refers to satellites, those are sometimes 
referred to as our national assets. They do good and they tell us a 
lot, but they can't possibly tell us all we need to know. That is why 
we had much more vigorous verification under START I.
  There are other things we will be discussing when we get into the 
classified session on this, but let me conclude this point and my 
presentation with this reality. We will find--I can say this much, at 
least, in open session--that the Russians have violated major 
provisions of most of the agreements we have entered into with them for 
a long, long time: START I, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Biological Weapons Convention, the conventional forces in Europe 
treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and, by the way, others I won't mention.
  The concern would be for a breakout. Today, Russia and the United 
States are not enemies. That is why a lot of this is of less concern 
than it ordinarily would be. The big concern is just that ultimate 
concern of a breakout. What if all of a sudden they decided to confront 
us over some issue relating to a country on their border or something 
else and we were not aware they had gained a significant advantage over 
us? Again, the preparation of the United States to deal with that takes 
a long time. I won't get into it here, but it takes a long time. That 
is why verification and intelligence is so important.
  I have talked about two things this morning: the conventional global 
strike and the verification issues, as well as the general concept of a 
world without nuclear weapons, which, unfortunately, this treaty, at 
least in the minds of a lot of people, is viewed as a predicate for and 
which would be very dangerous.
  There are some other issues I eventually wish to speak to, including 
the whole question of whether, as a rationale for this treaty, the 
reset relations with Russia have really provided very much help to the 
United States and whether this treaty should be used as a way of 
assuaging Russian sensitivities or convincing them to cooperate with us 
on other things.

  Others have talked about tactical nuclear weapons, and there will be 
amendments we will be offering to deal with that, and we can discuss 
that later.
  There is also the very important matter of the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission, recognizing that this group of Russian and American 
negotiators could in secret change terms of the treaty. The resolution 
of ratification provided for a notice provision, but it is not 
adequate. I am hoping my colleagues will agree with us on that. We will 
provide a longer term for notification, with an ability of the Senate 
to reject terms that are deemed central to the treaty and for which we 
really need to be providing our consent or nonconsent.
  Then finally, something I alluded to here, which is that the United 
States really ought to be spending more time dealing with the threats 
that I think are more real to us today, threats coming from places such 
as Iran and North Korea, rather than assuming that our top priority is 
to rush it right up to Christmas in order to get it done.
  We will have more opportunity to talk about all of those matters 
later. Hopefully this afternoon, we can begin debating amendments, and 
we do need to get squared away the issue that Senator Corker and 
Senator Kerry talked about, which is how we go about doing that in a 
way that does not cut off people's rights to offer amendments which are 
to the resolution of ratification.

                               Exhibit 1

               Additional Statements on the Folly of Zero

       ``The presumption that U.S. movement toward nuclear 
     disarmament will deliver nonproliferation success is a 
     fantasy. On the contrary, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has itself 
     been the single most important tool for nonproliferation in 
     history, and dismantling it would be a huge setback.'' \94\
       ``The Obama administration's push for nuclear disarmament 
     has a seductive intellectual and political appeal, but its 
     main points are in contradiction with reality. And when a 
     security policy is built on fantasy, someone usually gets 
     hurt.'' \95\
       Kenneth Waltz, leading arms controller and professor 
     emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley: ``We now have 
     64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and 
     against all historical precedent that for that substantial 
     period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.'' 
     \96\
       ``And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, 
     Israel, India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their 
     weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could 
     quickly and secretly rearm.'' \97\
       Secretary James Schlesinger, post-Reykjavik (1986): 
     ``Nuclear arsenals are going to be with us as long as there 
     are sovereign states with conflicting ideologies. Unlike 
     Aladdin with his lamp, we have no way to force the nuclear 
     genie back into the bottle. A world without nuclear weapons 
     is a utopian dream.'' \98\
       Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France: ``It [the French 
     nuclear deterrent] is neither a matter of prestige nor a 
     question of rank, it is quite simply the nation's life 
     insurance policy.'' \99\
       ``The idea of a world free of nuclear weapons is not so 
     much an impossible dream as an impossible nightmare.'' \100\
       ``A world that was genuinely free of nuclear weapons would 
     look very different. War between big powers would once again 
     become thinkable. In previous eras, the rise and fall of 
     great powers has almost always been accompanied by war. The 
     main reason for hoping that the rise of China will be an 
     exception to this grisly rule is that both the U.S. and China 
     have nuclear weapons. They will have to find other ways to 
     act out their rivalries.'' \101\
       William Kristol: ``Yet to justify a world without nuclear 
     weapons, what Obama would really have to envision is a world 
     without war, or without threats of war . . . The danger is 
     that the allure of a world without nuclear weapons can be a 
     distraction--even an excuse for not acting against real 
     nuclear threats . . . So while Obama talks of a future 
     without nuclear weapons, the trajectory we are on today is 
     toward a nuclear- and missile-capable North Korea and Iran--
     and a far more dangerous world.'' \102\
       ``As long as a nukeless world remains wishful thinking and 
     pastoral rhetoric, we'll be all right. But if the Nobel 
     Committee truly cares about peace, its members will think a 
     little harder about trying to make it a reality. Open a 
     history book and you'll see what the modern world looks like 
     without nuclear weapons. It is horrible beyond description.'' 
     \103\
       ``So when last we saw a world without nuclear weapons, 
     human beings were killing one another with such feverish 
     efficiency that they couldn't keep track of the victims to 
     the nearest 15 million. Over three decades of industrialized 
     war, the planet averaged about 3 million dead per year. Why 
     did that stop happening?'' \104\
       ``A world with nuclear weapons in it is a scary, scary 
     place to think about. The industrialized world without 
     nuclear weapons was a scary, scary place for real. But there 
     is no way to un-ring the nuclear bell. The science and 
     technology of nuclear weapons is widespread, and if nukes are 
     outlawed someday, only outlaws will have nukes.'' \105\


                                endnotes

       \94\ Keith Payne, ``A Vision Shall Guide Them?'' National 
     Review. November 2, 2009.
       \95\ Id.
       \96\ Jonathan Tepperman, ``Why Obama Should Learn to Love 
     the Bomb.'' Newsweek. August 29,2009.

[[Page S10431]]

       \97\ Id.
       \98\ Sec. James Schlesinger, ``The Dangers of a Nuclear-
     Free World.'' Time. October 27, 1986.
       \99\ French President Nicolas Sarkozy Nuclear Policy 
     speech, March 21, 2008.
       \100\ Gideon Rachman, ``A nuclear-free world? No Thanks.'' 
     Financial Times. May 4, 2010.
       \101\ Id.
       \102\ William Kristol, ``A World Without Nukes--Just Like 
     1939.'' Washington Post. April 7, 2009.
       \103\ David Von Drehle, ``Want Peace? Give a Nuke the 
     Nobel.'' Time. October 11, 2009.
       \104\ Id.
       \105\Id.
  Mr. KYL. I think it is true, Senator Kerry said that under the 
precedents of the Senate, we first have to attempt to amend the treaty 
and the preamble, and to do otherwise or to mix the two up would 
require unanimous consent.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have no intention of trying to use any 
technicality to deny an ability to offer an amendment. When each 
amendment comes up, we will find a way to make certain it is 
appropriate. We obviously have to send a signal at this point where you 
have to go off the treaty and onto the resolution of ratification. That 
happens automatically when we file cloture. So once that is done, it 
really becomes irrelevant.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, when the Senator says that happens 
automatically, if cloture is filed and invoked, then both amendments to 
the treaty, the preamble, and the resolution of ratification are cut 
off at that point, correct?
  Mr. KERRY. No. There still are germane amendments allowed to the 
resolution of ratification at that point, providing we have at that 
point completed issues on the treaty.
  Mr. KYL. In other words, cloture cuts off both the resolution of 
ratification amendments as well as treaty and preamble amendments.
  Mr. KERRY. Correct. Once it has been invoked, that is correct.
  Let me say a couple of things to my friend, if I may. I know he has 
to run, but in his earlier argument with respect to the prompt global 
strike--we can get into this, and we will a little bit later, but he 
said something about how you could eliminate the issue of confusion 
with the Russians because you could just agree with them, and they 
could agree, and then you have sort of an identification. The whole 
point is, they won't agree. They are not going to agree. You can't sort 
of make this supposition all of a sudden that you can erase a problem 
simply because they will agree to something they don't want to agree 
to, which is why we are in the place we are with respect to that issue. 
That is No. 1.
  No. 2, we made the decision, our generals made the decision, our 
defense folks, that we are better off with this because it, in fact, 
gives us a greater capacity to be able to verify what they are doing as 
well as what we are doing and to understand the makeup of ICBMs as we 
go forward.
  I won't go into this at great length, but let me say to the Senator, 
I urge him to reread the resolution of ratification. In that 
resolution, condition 6 addresses these questions. Condition 7 
addresses these questions. Understanding 5 addresses strategic range 
nonnuclear weapons systems and declaration 3 addresses them. I will not 
go through all of that language right now, but we have addressed this 
question. Any future treaty with respect to this question of global 
zero that keeps coming back up--I will talk about this later with the 
Senator, but the Senator must have a very different vision of where he 
would like to see the world go and of what would be in the long-term 
interest globally and of what the impact is of multiple nuclear weapons 
in the world with a lot more fissionable material, a lot more ability 
for terrorists to be able to access that fissionable material.
  The fact is that in testimony before our committee, Secretary Baker 
was very clear about the linkage of the Nunn-Lugar threat reduction 
program and the START treaty. He said directly to the committee that 
were it not for the START treaty, we would not have been able to reduce 
the numbers of nuclear weapons and therefore the amount of fissionable 
material that in many cases was badly guarded or not guarded at all and 
completely available to the possibility of black market sale and 
falling into the hands of terrorists. There are many ways to proceed 
forward.
  I would also say to my friend, with respect to this global nuclear 
zero, it is stunning to me that colleagues are coming to the floor 
fighting against an organizing principle and concept for how you could 
move the entire world to a safer place, ultimately, none of which will 
happen, clearly, without extraordinary changes globally in the way 
nations relate to each other and behave, how you control fissionable 
material, and what kind of dispute resolution mechanisms might be 
available in the future.
  But, for heaven's sake, it is incredible to me that you cannot 
imagine and have a vision of the possibility of a world in which you 
ultimately work to get this. That is the purpose of human endeavor in 
this field, in a sense. It is why we have a United Nations. It is why 
President after President has talked about a world without nuclear 
weapons, a world that is safer.
  Does that mean that all of a sudden we are discarding the present day 
notion of deterrence? No. Does that mean we are ignoring the reality of 
how countries have made judgments over the course of the Cold War about 
peace and war and what the risk is of going to war? Obviously not.
  One of the things the Navy did for me was send me to nuclear, 
chemical, biological warfare school, and I spent an interesting time 
learning about throw weight and the concentric circles of damage and 
the extent to which one nuclear weapon wreaks havoc in the world. The 
concept, to me, of 1,550 of them aimed at each other is still way above 
any sort of reasonable standards, in my judgment, about what it takes 
to deter. Do you think we would think about bombing China today or 
going to war with them? China has, in published, unclassified 
assessments, one-tenth maybe of the number of weapons we have. I do not 
think they are feeling particularly threatened by the United States in 
that context, nor we they, because you arrive at other ways of sort of 
working through these kinds of things.
  So I just think this concept of a nuclear zero is so irrelevant to 
this debate, particularly given the fact that we are debating a treaty 
which is the only way to agree to reduce the weapons that requires 67 
votes in the Senate. So even if President Obama wanted to try to do 
something in the future, this treaty does not open the door to it 
because it would require a next treaty in order to accomplish it and 
that would require 67 votes and it is pretty obvious you would never 
get that in the Senate in the current world.
  So what are we talking about here? It is sort of a distraction. It is 
one of these hobgoblins of some folks who are so ideologically narrowly 
focused that they cannot see the forest for the trees. The choice is 
between having a treaty that gives you inspection, that every Member of 
our intelligence community says can be verified, that helps to provide 
security or not having one and having no inspection and having no 
verification--none, whatsoever. That is the choice. This is not 
particularly complicated, unless you want to make it so, for a whole 
lot of other reasons.
  So the concept that doing this treaty is a distraction from dealing 
with terror is absolutely contradicted by the facts. Witness what Jim 
Baker and others have said about the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction 
Program and its linkage to START I, not to mention the myriad of other 
benefits that come, and there you see what Russia has done with the 
United States in recent months to move with respect to Iran. If we had 
not had a reset button, if we had not improved the relationship with 
Russia, if we had not been able to share information and have a 
cooperative atmosphere, partly increased by virtue of this treaty 
agreement, if we had not done that, Russia would not have joined with 
the United States because the relationship would not have been such 
that they would have been willing to in order to bring greater 
sanctions against Iran and try to deal with Iran's nuclear program.
  So all of these things are linked. To suggest somehow that you can 
walk in here and just separate them and treat them differently is to 
ignore the nature of government-to-government relations, to ignore the 
nature of bilateral relationships, to ignore the nature of human nature 
in which people react to what other people do, and countries are

[[Page S10432]]

the same way. They react to the sense of where we are headed. By 
working together cooperatively, I think we have been able to say we are 
headed in the same direction, and that is an important message.
  There is a lot more to be said on all this, but I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, during the debate, several Senators have 
noted concerns about the U.S. triad of submarines, land-based missiles, 
and those weapons with which we will equip our heavy bombers over the 
duration of the treaty.
  Others have cited concerns with the administration's plans for ICBM 
modernization in the updated 1251 report. They note it could somehow 
constrain our flexibility and serves to meet some arms control 
aspirations rather than weapons modernization.
  Our resolution of ratification incorporated a declaration concerning 
the so-called triad. This was done in the committee with an amendment 
offered by Senator Risch.
  That declaration, No. 13, states:

       It is the sense of the Senate that United States deterrence 
     and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic 
     delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States is 
     committed to accomplishing the modernization and replacement 
     of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and to ensuring 
     the continued flexibility of United States conventional and 
     nuclear delivery systems.

  That, as I say, was included in our committee work.
  Secondly, I wrote to Secretary Gates last week, our Secretary of 
Defense, regarding the concerns that many Senators have noted about the 
age and weaponry for our heavy bombers, notably the B-52 and its air-
launched cruise missile, and about modernization plans for our ICBMs. I 
wanted assurances that over the duration of the treaty we will have a 
triad of systems that is credible, particularly the bomber leg of our 
triad.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
the response I received from Secretary Gates on December 10.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                             Secretary of Defense,


                                                     Pentagon,

                                Washington, DC, December 10, 2010.
     Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
     Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lugar: Thank you for your letter of December 
     6, 2010, regarding future U.S. strategic force structure in 
     light of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the Section 1251 
     Report, and the Update to the 1251 Report. I would like to 
     take this opportunity to address the issues raised in your 
     letter regarding the continuing viability of the U.S. air-
     launched cruise missile (ALCM) capability and the heavy 
     bomber force, as well as the basing and warhead options for a 
     follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
       Regarding your first concern on the viability of the ALCM 
     inventory and the heavy-bomber leg of the Triad, the 
     Administration intends to replace the current ALCM with an 
     advanced penetrating long range standoff (LRSO) cruise 
     missile. The current ALCM will be maintained through 2030 
     with multiple service life extension programs to ensure 
     viability of the propulsion systems, guidance and flight 
     control systems and warhead arming components. The Department 
     of Defense intends to field an advanced LRSO capability to 
     replace the ALCM and the Air Force has programmed 
     approximately $800 million for research, development, test, 
     and evaluation over the next five years for the development 
     of LRSO. As this effort proceeds, we will work with the 
     National Nuclear Security Administration to study options for 
     a safe, secure, and effective nuclear warhead for the LRSO. 
     The Administration is committed to providing a sufficient and 
     credible nuclear standoff attack capability, and ensuring 
     that the bomber leg of the Triad remains fully capable of 
     supporting U.S. deterrent requirements. This commitment to 
     maintaining an effective nuclear standoff attack capability 
     is coupled with the Administration's plans to sustain the 
     heavy-bomber leg of the Triad for the indefinite future and 
     its commitment to the modernization of the heavy bomber 
     force.
       The Administration is also committed to sustaining the 
     silo-based Minuteman III force through 2030, as mandated by 
     Congress. This sustainment includes substantial life 
     extension programs and security upgrades, which will allow us 
     to sustain up to 420 single warhead ICBMs at three bases 
     under the New START Treaty. The Administration believes that 
     preparatory analysis for a follow-on ICBM capability in the 
     2030 timeframe should examine a wide range of options. Silo-
     based ICBMs have clear advantages; at the same time, 
     considering other alternatives will help to determine a cost-
     effective approach for a follow-on ICBM that supports 
     continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting 
     stable deterrence. It should be noted that deployment of the 
     follow-on ICBM, in whatever form it takes, will occur well 
     beyond the expiration of New START, if it is ratified and 
     enters into force in the near term. Finally, neither the 
     Update to the 1251 Report nor planning and guidance for a 
     follow-on ICBM will constrain the flexibility of a follow-on 
     design with respect to warhead loadings. In the meantime, 
     plans are currently in work to retain the capability to 
     deploy multiple warheads on the Minuteman III missile, to 
     include periodic operational test launches with more than one 
     warhead.
       Thank you for the opportunity to address the important 
     matters you have raised in connection with our Nation's 
     nuclear deterrent, and for your leadership on the New START 
     Treaty.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Robert M. Gates.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I asked for an assurance that over the 
duration of the New START treaty the Defense Department will not permit 
a situation to arise where heavy bombers lack sufficient and credible 
nuclear standoff attack capability.
  Secretary Gates responded that the current air-launched cruise 
missile will be maintained through 2030 with multiple lifetime 
extensions and that ``the Administration is committed to providing a 
sufficient and credible nuclear standoff attack capability, and ensure 
that the bomber leg of the Triad remains fully capable of supporting 
U.S. deterrent requirements.''
  I also sought assurance that the language in the 1251 update will in 
no way modify the basing of the ICBM leg of the triad nor constrain its 
future designs with respect to warhead loadings; that is, constraining 
it to meet some arms control goal of fewer warheads for ICBMs.
  Secretary Gates responded that ``The Administration is also committed 
to sustaining the silo-based Minuteman III force through 2030, as 
mandated by Congress'' and that ``[N]either the Update to the 1251 
Report nor planning and guidance for a follow-on ICBM will constrain 
the flexibility of a follow-on design with respect to warhead 
loadings.''
  Bombers will have sufficient nuclear weapons under New START. We are 
not going to constrain a future ICBM for purposes of arms control.
  With these commitments, and our declaration, I am assured by 
Secretary of Defense Gates that we will have a credible bomber leg, one 
that allows us sufficient and flexible responses to strategic change, 
and that a future ICBM will not be less effective or flexible than our 
present ICBMs.
  Moreover, regarding New START force levels, the combatant commander 
responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations and planning 
for nuclear operations, General Chilton, has said this about the New 
START treaty and its force structure:

       Under the New START Treaty, based on U.S. Strategic Command 
     analysis, I assess that the triad of diverse and 
     complementary delivery systems will provide sufficient 
     capabilities to make our deterrent credible and effective. . 
     . . Under the New START Treaty, the United States will retain 
     the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these 
     for the period of the treaty. . . . U.S. Strategic Command 
     analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle 
     force structure and posture to meet current guidance and 
     provided options for consideration by the Department of 
     Defense . . . this rigorous appraisal rooted in both 
     deterrence strategy and an assessment of potential adversary 
     capabilities, validated both the agreed-upon reductions in 
     the New START Treaty and recommendations in the Nuclear 
     Posture Review.

  End of quote from General Chilton.
  Note what he said--that this analysis take into account potential 
adversary capabilities. General Chilton is confident in our deterrent 
and that the force structure under the treaty and our triad will meet 
our needs.
  I do not think we should dispute either General Chilton or Secretary 
Gates--long-serving professionals who have served both Presidents Bush 
and Obama so very well.
  I would add, supplementing the excellent comments made by my 
colleague, the chairman, that from the beginning of our debates in the 
Senate on arms control treaties or even before that, the so-called 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, there have been many 
Senators very sincere in their viewpoints that they simply do not like 
arms control treaties. Furthermore, they would counsel that you cannot 
trust the Russians. Therefore, adding the two together, if you have an

[[Page S10433]]

aversion to arms control treaties and agreements and you do not trust 
the Russians and, furthermore, you do not want to trust the Russians or 
have any further dealings with them quite apart from treaties on arms 
control, this leads to certain skepticism, if not outright opposition, 
to those of us who have been proposing arms control treaties for 
several years and arms control treaties with the Russians in 
particular.
  I would simply point out, as I tried to yesterday informally, that 
there are always extraordinary problems with verification of any 
treaty, and much of the debate on this treaty, in terms of our 
committee responsibilities and initial statements made by Senators on 
the floor, zero in on such points, as to the fact that you cannot trust 
the Russians, and/or there are other things in the world we ought to be 
paying attention to, much more important than the Russians for that 
matter, and, further, that somehow this treaty, in particular, will 
inhibit the defense of our country, specifically through missile 
defense.
  Members of administrations past and present have affirmed it is 
important to have arms control treaties with the Russians. It has not 
ever been a question of trusting the Russians. It has been a question 
of trying to provide verification that the provisions of the treaties 
that we have negotiated are, in fact, fulfilled. It is a fact, as has 
been suggested by some Senators, that on several occasions we have 
found violations or very dubious conduct on the part of the Russians. I 
have no idea how many times they have testified they have found 
something doubtful about our performance, but in any event, in the real 
world of deterrence and the real world of verifiability, there have 
been abrasions and arguments and disputes.

  I would simply say one of the values of the treaties we have had with 
the Russians, and specifically the START treaty regime, is that they 
have allowed many of us--the distinguished chairman has made a good 
number of trips to Russia and to countries that surround Russia. I have 
had that responsibility and opportunity for many years likewise.
  I testified yesterday during our debate that on one occasion, when I 
was invited to come to Sevmash, the submarine base, I saw things no 
American had ever seen before, apparently. When we talk about our 
intelligence facilities, there were no pictures taken by our 
intelligence folks, or very good dimensions of what a Typhoon submarine 
actually looked like or what it did. We had various suppositions. 
Incredibly, after my visit to Sevmash, where we were not allowed to 
take pictures, a Russian sent to me a picture of me standing in front 
of a Typhoon submarine. From our intelligence standpoint, this was the 
first time anyone had seen a picture of a Typhoon, quite apart from a 
diligent Senator standing in front of it. Furthermore, we had good 
opportunities with the Russians to discuss the Typhoon.
  I don't specialize in submarines, but I was able to take notes and to 
make known at least my impressions of that particular situation. Why in 
the world would someone invite a Senator to come see something of that 
variety? It came about because we literally had not only boots on the 
ground in terms of our military but some of us even as Senators. The 
relationship was such that the Russians, perceiving they needed to get 
rid of the Typhoon submarines and it was going to be very expensive, 
technically maybe even dangerous with regard to removal of all of the 
200 missiles, decided it was time to do business. The opportunities 
that come, in other words, from a relationship of that sort sometimes 
move in directions no one might have anticipated--but to the good, in 
my judgment. I admitted yesterday only three of the six Typhoons have, 
in fact, been destroyed. It is a tedious, expensive, difficult process.
  But getting back to our debates on the floor of the Senate, I can 
recall not only during the initial discussion of the Nunn-Lugar Act, 
but almost annually as appropriations were sought to continue this 
work, skeptical colleagues, first of all, doubting the value of any 
type of arrangement with the Russians, and doubting very much whether a 
dime of American taxpayer money should ever be spent on the Russians in 
this regard. So some of us, as reasonably and calmly as possible, could 
say, Well, we think it is probably important that if there are, in 
fact, nuclear warheads, thousands of them, aimed at our cities as well 
as our military installations, and we have opportunities and 
cooperative threat reduction to work as contractors, as Senators, as 
military officials, whoever, with the Russians, we ought to take those 
warheads that are aimed at us off the missiles. We ought to physically 
take the missiles down. We ought to, in fact, destroy the silos in 
which they are located, and we think this is probably a valuable use of 
taxpayer money in terms of our own defense.
  Each year, by and large, that argument won, although rarely 
unanimously. On one occasion, incredible as it may be, Members of the 
Senate added so many qualifications, so many additional reports that 
had to be filed by the Defense Department or the State Department or 
intelligence authorities that the whole fiscal year passed without a 
single dollar being available for expenditure on any of this armament 
reduction. In other words, Senators were so involved in attempting to 
demonstrate their mistrust of the Russians, their demand that our 
bureaucracy fulfill all sorts of impossible goals, that nothing got 
done. Eventually over the course of the decade, we evolved to a point 
where by and large those sorts of debates began to taper off--and I am 
grateful for that--and we began to see the possibilities not only with 
regard to the Russians but other countries who had strange weapons that 
they reported to us and sought our cooperation. This is well beyond 
even the ability to wind up the nuclear situation in Ukraine or 
Kazakhstan or Belarus or what have you.
  I would cite one more, and that is in the year 2004, the first year 
in which the Senate voted that at least $50 million--just $50 million 
of about $500 million that year of the Nunn-Lugar program could be used 
outside of Russia. So strong were feelings of some in opposition to the 
Nunn-Lugar program that they saw the fact that it might spread outside 
of Russia almost as a contaminant, something that ought to be 
contained. They felt it was bad enough that we had ever had such a 
thing in Russia, quite apart that we ought to destroy weapons anywhere 
else. But nevertheless, a majority of the Senate did allow for $50 
million. That very summer authorities in Albania notified the Pentagon 
that they had found some strange drums up above the capital city of 
Tirana in Albania, and they wanted to report that to us because they 
thought they needed assistance, probably for safety's sake of the 
Albanians who had found the drums. Our officials, having been invited 
by the Albanians, went in fact to the mountains and they found the 
drums were filled with nerve gas. Very quickly, they simply put up a 
modest fence and began to roll the drums in behind the fence.
  I was invited to come over at that stage and I did, and I had good 
visits to our Ambassador to Albania, with their foreign minister and 
their defense minister, members of their Parliament. Albania at that 
time was a state that was coming out of a terrible dictatorship--a 
dictatorship so adverse that it was even difficult for the Soviet Union 
or China to deal with. Where in the world the nerve gas came from is a 
matter of conjecture. But in any event, once we had indicated our hopes 
that we could work with the Albanians, they invited us to do so and to 
help them destroy it.
  As a matter of fact, as a bonus, while we were up in the mountains 
they took us by several sheds where there were hundreds of MANPAD 
missiles--not weapons of mass destruction, but missiles we had 
furnished, as a matter of fact, to forces in Afghanistan in an earlier 
war to drive out the former Soviet Union. So we were able to destroy 
those while we were at it. As an added bonus, the Defense Minister of 
Albania said, We believe we ought to set up a military academy along 
the same standards of your military academy at West Point. As a further 
gesture, we are going to have as a requirement that each of our cadets 
must master the English language so that we are going to be able to 
deal with you for some time to come. I felt that was an important 
gesture. I mention this because in the course of arms control, a

[[Page S10434]]

good number of things happen that are very important.
  I will conclude by saying that Albania 2 years later invited all of 
the countries of the world to come to their capital and to celebrate 
the fact that Albania claimed to be the first nation state to fulfill 
the chemical weapons convention, that all chemical weapons in the 
country had been destroyed, and we celebrated with them, and it was 
literally a derivative of the situation we are describing today.
  So I ask those who are normally skeptical to continue to ask good 
questions but likewise to understand the history at least of the last 
two decades that has been very constructive for our country.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wish to thank the ranking member, Senator 
Lugar, for sharing that account with the Senate. I think it is first of 
all historic, but secondly I think it is relevant to the 
interconnectedness between what we are doing here and the long-term 
ways in which we make our country safer. One can only imagine if one 
group or another that we are all too familiar with the labels and names 
of these days had gotten hold of those barrels. The havoc that could 
have been wreaked somewhere is extraordinary. As the Senator from 
Indiana knows better than anybody here, some of these nuclear materials 
were behind creaky old rusty gates; maybe one guard, if any guard; a 
lock that was so easy to break--I mean, it was infantile, the notion 
that something was secured. Much of that has changed as a consequence 
of the program that he and Senator Nunn began, but also the 
consciousness that has been raised in a lot of countries around the 
world. This effort, we believe, continues that.
  So I thank him for his leadership, again, on that score. We are 
awaiting amendments from colleagues and we look forward to entertaining 
them when they get here.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for the 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as the New START 
treaty, which was signed by President Obama and Russian President 
Medvedev on April 8, 2010, and would replace the START treaty that 
expired on December 5, 2009.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have had the 
opportunity to review the implications of this treaty over the course 
of five hearings and multiple briefings. I am convinced that 
ratification of this treaty is essential to the security of the United 
States, and not simply in the context of our relationship with Russia 
but also in our efforts to counter nuclear proliferation throughout the 
world.
  As a starting point to consider this treaty, it is important to 
recognize that since December 5, 2009, when the START treaty expired, 
we have not had inspectors on the ground in Russia to monitor their 
nuclear weapons complex. It wasn't until December 2008 that the Bush 
administration and Russia agreed they wanted to replace START before it 
expired but acknowledged that the task would have to be left to the 
Obama administration, leaving them 1 year before the treaty was set to 
expire so they could begin these negotiations.
  The reality is that we have not had a verification regime in place or 
inspectors on the ground in Russia for over a year, and every day that 
goes by without this treaty in place is another day that the United 
States lacks the ability to verify effectively and inspect Russia's 
strategic nuclear forces.
  If the Senate rejects this treaty, it may be many years, if ever, 
before we once again have American inspectors on the ground in Russia.
  President Obama stated:

       In the absence of START, without the New START treaty being 
     ratified by the Senate, we do not have a verification 
     mechanism to ensure that we know what the Russians are doing 
     . . . . And when you have uncertainty in the area of nuclear 
     weapons, that's a much more dangerous world to live in.

  The bottom line is this: If you don't trust the Russians, then you 
should be voting for this treaty because that is the only way we are 
going to get, in a timely, effective way, American inspectors back on 
the ground looking at their nuclear complex.
  There is another aspect. Without the New START treaty in place, there 
is additional strain on our intelligence network to monitor Russia's 
activities.
  In his testimony to the Armed Services Committee, GEN Kevin Chilton, 
commander of STRATCOM, stated:

       Without New START, we would rapidly lose some of our 
     insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and 
     activities . . . we would be required increasingly to focus 
     low-density/high-demand intelligence collection and analysis 
     assets on Russian nuclear forces.

  These intelligence assets include our satellites, which are already 
in high demand, particularly in our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
as well as in emerging threat locations such as Yemen, Somalia, and the 
Pacific. Furthermore, these national technical means can never supplant 
the quality of intelligence gathered from onsite inspections by 
American weapons experts in verifying the quantity, type, and location 
of Russia's nuclear arsenal.
  Dr. James Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, remarked:

       Onsite inspectors are a vital complement to the data that 
     the United States will receive under New START. They provide 
     the boots-on-the-ground presence to confirm the validity of 
     Russian data declarations and to add to our confidence and 
     knowledge regarding Russian strategic forces located at 
     facilities around the country.

  The failure to ratify may present a significant operational cost to 
our efforts in the war on terrorism. To compensate for the lack of a 
treaty, our satellite assets could be shifted to maintain some coverage 
of Russia, which, in the short run, would deny the capability of 
looking at other places, such as Sudan or Yemen, where we know al-Qaida 
and its affiliates are establishing sanctuaries. In the longer term, we 
may consider putting up new satellites--a tremendous cost that would be 
difficult to bear in a continuing budget crisis and one that would not 
give us the same kind of information as having inspectors on the 
ground.
  Let me emphasize this again. If this treaty goes unratified, if we 
don't have inspectors on the ground, then we must rely on our national 
technical means of verification, which is significantly satellites. 
Those are, as General Chilton said, high-demand assets. If they are 
being flown over Russia, I cannot conceive, if we let this treaty 
elapse over several years, that military commanders will feel confident 
in not putting more and more satellites over Russia. That takes away 
from efforts right now to monitor troubled spots around the globe, and 
it is a real cost to the failure to ratify this treaty.
  Ratifying this treaty is also a vital part of our relationship with 
Russia. It is the essential element in the process of controlling 
nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia.
  I wish to quote my esteemed colleague and manager on the other side, 
Senator Lugar, who has long been not only a leader in this effort but 
someone whose vision and actions already--particularly through his work 
with Senator Sam Nunn--have made this world a much safer place and one 
whose debt we are all in nationally. I thank him for that.
  Senator Lugar stated:

       We should not be cavalier about allowing our relationship 
     with Moscow to drift or about letting our knowledge of 
     Russian weaponry atrophy.

  He is right, as he has been on so many issues with respect to 
national and international policy.
  This process has had a long history of bipartisan support--from the 
first formal agreements with the Soviet Union under the Carter 
administration that limited nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, 
through both terms of President Reagan's administration, which produced 
the original START treaty, to the overwhelming support of the Senate to 
ratify these important agreements. All of these agreements had strong, 
bipartisan support.
  This treaty is an important part of renewing our relationship with 
Russia and will provide the foundation for future negotiations on other 
nuclear issues.

[[Page S10435]]

  Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, stated:

       It's my calculation that we need to get this done now 
     because every day that we don't is a day that not only don't 
     we have boots on the ground, but it's also a day that we 
     can't move on to other parts of the agenda. This was the New 
     START Treaty, but it was also the start of the reset of the 
     relationship, and it is a very big agenda.

  We have other issues to consider, such as tactical nuclear devices, 
which the Russians may have and former countries of the Soviet Union 
may have. We have a whole set of issues. We have issues with respect to 
Iran and North Korea. If we can ratify this treaty, we now have 
momentum to move forward on these other issues.
  We all know the proliferation of nuclear weapons threatens more than 
the security of just Russia and the United States. Indeed, this treaty 
is central to the continuing need for a worldwide effort to control 
nuclear weapons. It is every President's worst nightmare that somewhere 
in the world a nuclear accident will occur, that a rogue state will 
attain nuclear capability or a nuclear weapon or materials will fall 
into the hands of a terrorist group. This treaty is an important step 
toward reducing the number of nuclear weapons around the world and 
demonstrates to the international community that the United States and 
Russia are committed to this goal.
  If we don't ratify this agreement and don't continue this 40-year 
process of working with Russia on limiting nuclear weapons, how can we 
get them to assist us effectively in addressing the nuclear ambitions 
of North Korea and Iran? What credibility will we have among the 
international community to restrain Iran's development of nuclear 
weapons if it is perceived that we have abandoned our longlasting, 
long-term, and mutually beneficial attempts with the Russians to limit 
our nuclear weapons?
  We must do everything possible to counter proliferation through 
protection, containment, interdiction, and a host of different 
programs.
  I again quote Senator Lugar:

       This process must continue if we are to answer the 
     existential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction.

  Every missile destroyed, every warhead deactivated, and every 
inspection implemented makes us safer. Russia and the United States 
have a choice whether to continue this effort, and that choice is 
embodied in the New START treaty.
  We also understand, too, that as long as we have nuclear weapons, we 
have to have an effective nuclear arsenal. In its fiscal year 2011 
budget, the Obama administration requested $7 billion for the National 
Nuclear Security Administration--NNSA--which overseas the U.S. nuclear 
complex. This request is about 10 percent more than the previous year's 
budget. That is a significant increase for any department in this 
government, particularly as we face challenging economic times and an 
increased deficit.
  Indeed, Linton Brooks, the former NNSA Administrator under President 
George W. Bush, said: ``I'd have killed for that budget and that much 
high-level attention in the administration.''
  So the issue of dealing with our nuclear arsenal is being addressed 
with more energy and more resources and more attention than it was in 
the preceding administration, and I don't think that argument can be 
used as an attempt to delay the ratification of this treaty.
  Many have argued that before we consider this treaty, we must commit 
to substantial funding increases in the future budgets to modernize the 
nuclear infrastructure. We are doing that. While I support the need to 
ensure a safer, more reliable nuclear arsenal--and I applaud the Obama 
administration's efforts to commit significant resources to do so--we 
have to recognize this is a recent change. In fact, the Obama 
administration is not only bringing this treaty to the Senate, it also 
is bringing to the Congress a level of commitment that was lacking 
previously. I think both of those are necessary, both of those mutually 
reinforce one another and, together, are strong support for the 
ratification of this treaty.
  During an Armed Services Committee hearing in July, I asked Directors 
of the national labs about the significant commitment of resources this 
administration has made to the nuclear enterprise. Dr. George Miller, 
the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, responded:

       It is clearly a major step in the right direction. The 
     budget has been declining since about 2005 . . . and this 
     represents a very important and very significant turnaround.

  The Obama administration has also outlined an $85 billion, 10-year 
plan for NNSA's nuclear weapons activities, which includes an 
additional $4.1 billion in spending for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. 
The $85 billion represents a 21-percent rise above the fiscal year 2011 
spending level. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote in his 
preface to the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review:

       These investments, and the NPR's strategy for warhead life 
     extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary 
     to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our 
     Nation's deterrent.

  Ratifying this treaty presents us with the opportunity to recommit 
ourselves to preserving and reinvesting in our nuclear enterprise, 
including the highly trained workforce, which is so necessary. But 
again, ratifying this treaty is such an essential part of our national 
security that it both complements and, in some cases, transcends simply 
reinvesting in our modernization efforts. But we are doing that, and 
that should give comfort, I think, to those who see that as an issue, 
which may--and I don't think so--present some inhibition in ratifying 
this treaty.
  In all the discussions we have had on the content of this treaty, we 
have often failed to note the caliber and professionalism of the 
American negotiators who have worked tirelessly on this treaty. This 
elite cadre of experts have devoted their lives to serving our Nation 
in promoting nuclear arms control and doing it from very wise, very 
experienced, and I think very critical notions of what is necessary to 
protect the United States because that is their first and foremost 
responsibility.
  This impressive team consisted of State Department negotiators, 
representatives from the Department of Defense's Joint Staff, and from 
STRATCOM, our military command that is responsible for all these 
nuclear devices. Most of them took part in the development of START I 
and the subsequent treaties. They have had the experience of years and 
years of dealing with the Russians, of understanding the strengths and 
the weaknesses of our approaches. They captured the lessons learned on 
what we need to know about the Russian nuclear enterprise and the best 
means of achieving our national strategic objectives.
  This was not the labor of amateurs, this was the work of people who 
have devoted their lifetime to try to develop an effective nuclear 
regime involving inspections and verification, and they know more about 
what the Russians do and vice versa than anyone else. They were at the 
heart of these negotiations. Many of the principles behind these 
treaties are, as a result, complex and nuanced. Most Americans, 
frankly--and, indeed, many of our colleagues--don't have the means to 
invest the time to become versed in the technical aspect of launchers, 
telemetry, and verification regimes. These individuals have spent their 
lives doing that. We are quite fortunate they have committed themselves 
to this enterprise and that they have produced this treaty.
  Furthermore, former Secretaries of State and Defense from both 
Republican and Democratic administrations and military commanders, 
including seven previous commanders of STRATCOM these are the military 
officers whose professional lives have been devoted to protecting 
America and commanding every unit that has a nuclear capability--have 
all urged us to support this START treaty. That is a very, I think, 
strong endorsement as to the effectiveness of this treaty and the need 
for this treaty. All of them understand this is in our best national 
security interest.
  Again, all the commanders, all the individuals who have spent every 
waking hour and, indeed, probably sleepless nights, thinking about 
their responsibilities for nuclear weapons and their use, consider this 
treaty essential. That, I think, should be strong evidence for its 
ratification.
  As I mentioned before, the New START treaty builds upon decades of

[[Page S10436]]

diplomacy and agreements between the United States and Russia. The New 
START treaty is appropriately structured to address the present 
conditions of our nuclear enterprise and national security interests, 
while building on the lessons we have learned from decades of previous 
treaty negotiations, from decades of implementing past treaties, of 
finding out what works on the ground, and setting nonproliferation 
goals for the future. It is important to understand how we got to this 
point today.
  The United States and the Soviet Union signed their first formal 
agreements limiting nuclear offensive and defensive weapons in May 
1972. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks--known as SALT--produced two 
agreements--the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to 
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. In 1979, these agreements 
were followed by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty--
known as SALT II--which sought to codify equal limits on U.S. and 
Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. However, President Carter 
eventually withdrew this treaty from Senate consideration due to the 
Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan.
  Throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration participated in 
negotiations on the development of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces--INF--Treaty, which was ultimately signed in 1988. At the 
negotiations, the Reagan administration called for a ``double zero'' 
option, which would eliminate all short- as well as long-range INF 
systems, a position that, at the time, was viewed by most observers as 
unattractive to the Soviets.
  President Reagan also worked extensively to reduce the number of 
nuclear warheads, which led to the signing by President George Herbert 
Walker Bush of the initial START treaty in 1991. Again, the work of 
President Reagan, and the work of President George Herbert Walker Bush 
all led to the historic START I treaty. It limited long-range nuclear 
forces--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles--ICBMs 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles--SLBMs and heavy bombers. START 
also contained a complex verification regime. Both sides collected most 
of the information needed to verify compliance with their own 
satellites and remote sensing equipment--known as the national 
technical means of verification.

  But the parties also used data exchanges, notifications, and onsite 
inspections to gather information about forces and activities limited 
by the treaty. Taken together, these measures were designed to provide 
each nation with the ability to deter and detect militarily significant 
violations. The verification regime and the cooperation needed to 
implement many of these measures instilled confidence and encouraged 
openness among the signatories.
  The original START treaty was ratified by the Senate in October 1992 
by a vote of 93 to 6. We are building literally on the pathbreaking 
work of President Ronald Reagan and President George Herbert Walker 
Bush in limiting these classes of systems, using a national means of 
technology, and putting inspectors on the ground. I find it ironic that 
we might be at the stage of turning our back on all that work, of 
walking away from a bipartisan consensus--93 to 6. I don't think that 
would be in the best interest of this country.
  In January 1993, the United States and Russia signed START II, which 
would further limit warheads. After some delay, the treaty eventually 
received approval by the Senate in January 1996, but it never entered 
into force, mainly because of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
in June 2002. But, once again, there was another effort along these 
same lines to limit the numbers of launchers and warheads, and in that 
same spirit today we have this New START treaty before us.
  During a summit meeting with President Putin in November 2001, 
President George W. Bush announced that the United States would reduce 
its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level 
between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads during the decade. He stated the 
United States would reduce its forces unilaterally without signing a 
formal agreement. However, President Putin indicated Russia wanted to 
use a formal arms control process, emphasizing the two sides should 
focus on ``reaching a reliable and verifiable agreement'' and a 
``legally binding document.'' Yet the Bush administration wanted to 
maintain the flexibility to size and structure its nuclear forces in 
response to its own needs and preferred a less formal process.
  The United States and Russia ultimately did sign the Strategic 
Offensive Reductions Treaty, also known as the Moscow Treaty, on May 
24, 2002. The Senate ratified the treaty on March 6, 2003, by a vote of 
95 to 0; and the Russian Duma approved the treaty also. Once again, a 
high-level arms treaty negotiated by President George W. Bush with the 
Russians came to this floor and was unanimously approved.
  In mid-2006, the United States and Russia began to discuss their 
options for arms control after START. However, the two countries were 
unable to agree on a path forward. Neither side wanted to extend START 
in its original form. Russia wanted to replace START with a new treaty 
that would further reduce deployed forces while using many of the same 
definitions and counting rules in START. The Bush administration 
initially did not want to negotiate a new treaty but would have been 
willing to extend some of the START monitoring provisions. President 
Bush and President Putin agreed at the Sochi summit in April 2008 they 
would proceed with negotiating a new, legally binding treaty. As I 
mentioned before, it wasn't until December 2008 that the two sides 
agreed to replace START before it expired but acknowledged this task 
would fall to the Obama administration. This administration took that 
work seriously and diligently and produced a treaty and now it is not 
only our opportunity but I think our obligation to ratify the treaty.
  Some of my colleagues have already described measures in the New 
START treaty. Let me suggest some of the important details.
  Under the New START treaty, the United States and Russia must reduce 
the number of their strategic arms within 7 years from the date the 
treaty enters into force. This treaty sets a limit of 1,550 deployed 
strategic warheads. All warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs 
count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for 
nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward the limit. This limit is 
74 percent lower than the limit of the 1991 START treaty.
  Again, let me stop and say, I think if you asked every American the 
question: Would we be safer with fewer nuclear warheads in the 
strategic forces of Russia and the United States, the answer would be 
yes. I think people all recognize the potential danger of the existence 
of more than enough nuclear weapons to wreak havoc if they were somehow 
launched.

  The New START treaty also sets a limit of 800 deployed and 
nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers--which 
are warheads but also launching systems--puts separate limits on 
deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. The 
limit, again, is less than half the limit established by the 1991 START 
treaty for deployed delivery vehicles. The sooner we ratify this 
treaty, the sooner these limitations will be in place and can be 
enforced.
  We are at a point, I think, where we can continue the progress that 
began--the breakthrough, really, that began with President Reagan, 
President George Herbert Walker Bush, and, to a degree at least in 
spirit, carried on with the Moscow Treaty by President George W. Bush, 
and now can be ratified with legally binding terms in this New START 
treaty. Once ratified, the new START treaty will be in force for 10 
years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement, and of course the 
United States and Russia have the option to extend the treaty for a 
period of no more than 5 years and there are withdrawal clauses if we 
believe our national security requires such a withdrawal. Furthermore, 
the 2002 Moscow Treaty will terminate with the adoption of this START 
treaty.
  Like the first START treaty, the New START treaty establishes a 
complex verification and transparency regime that will guard against 
cheating and will enable the United States to monitor Russia's 
compliance with the treaty's terms.

[[Page S10437]]

  The treaty's verification measures build on the lessons learned 
during the 15 years of implementing the 1991 START treaty and adds new 
elements tailored to the limitations of this treaty and to the 
application of this treaty.
  Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, the head of 
the U.S. negotiating delegation, stated, ``Much was learned over the 15 
years in which the START treaty verification regime was implemented, 
and the United States and Russia sought to take advantage of that 
knowledge in formulating the verification regime for the new treaty--
seeking to maintain elements which proved useful, to include new 
measures where necessary, improve those measures that were an 
unnecessary drag on our strategic forces, and eliminate those that were 
not essential for verifying the obligations of the New START treaty.''
  These verification measures include onsite inspections--which we do 
not have at the moment--data exchanges--which we do not have at the 
moment--and notifications as well as provisions to facilitate the use 
of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase 
confidence and transparency, the treaty also provides for the exchange 
of telemetry information.
  Under the terms of the treaty, the parties are required to exchange 
data on the numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of 
deployed and nondeployed strategic arms that are subject to the treaty. 
The parties also agreed to assign and exchange unique identification 
numbers for each deployed and nondeployed ICBM, SLBM, and nuclear-
capable heavy bomber. We literally now will have the serial numbers 
with which we can monitor their systems. The treaty also establishes a 
notification regime to track the movement and changes in status of 
strategic arms. Through these notifications and the unique 
identification numbers, the United States will be better able to 
monitor the status of Russian arms throughout their life cycle.
  The New START treaty will also allow each nation up to 18 onsite 
inspections each year. These inspections will include deployed and 
nondeployed systems at operating bases, as well as nondeployed systems 
at storage sites, test ranges, and conversion/elimination facilities. 
These onsite inspections will help verify and confirm the information 
provided in the data exchanges and notifications, ensuring that Russia 
is staying within the numbers of the treaty.
  Some have asked why have a treaty if Russia is allowed to cheat? It 
is important to remind ourselves of several points. First, because of 
its commitment under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Russia has 
already been operating under tighter constraints than the United 
States. They are signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 
1996, President Clinton and President Yeltsin signed the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. The Russian Duma approved the treaty in 2000, but we 
have yet to ratify the treaty, so Russia, indeed, is operating under 
more constraints with respect to comprehensive testing than we are.
  Second, over a year has passed since the expiration of the original 
START treaty. Again, since that time there have been no verifications, 
no inspections, no process in place to work with Russia.
  It seems ironic to me that people who are worrying about signing a 
treaty and having the Russians cheat are not preoccupied with what the 
Russians are doing today, since we can't verify. It does not seem to me 
to make sense to say the way you can eliminate the treaty is eliminate 
the laws so they cannot cheat.
  Again, I think the logic as well as the history as well as the 
details of this treaty are so compelling and persuasive that we have to 
ratify this treaty.
  Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher stated also:

       The urgency to verify the treaty is because we currently 
     lack verification measures with Russia. The longer that goes 
     on, the more opportunity there is for misunderstanding and 
     mistrust.

  There is a letter to Senator Kerry addressing concerns about cheating 
from Secretary Gates. Let me at this point commend the Senator from 
Massachusetts for his extraordinary leadership on this issue. No one 
knows more about the details of this treaty, the ramifications, the 
nuances than Senator Kerry. No one has been more articulate, no one has 
talked with more wisdom, more experience, and more compelling logic 
than the Senator from Massachusetts when it comes to ratification of 
this treaty. For his leadership, I thank him. Thank you, Senator.
  But Secretary Gates wrote to Senator Kerry to remind him that:

       [T]he survivable and flexible U.S. strategic posture 
     planned for New START will help deter any future Russian 
     leaders from cheating or breakout from the treaty, should 
     they ever have such an inclination.

  Finally, ratifying the New START treaty will actually provide the 
right incentive structure to prevent cheating rather than to encourage 
it.
  Let me conclude. Let me again remind my colleagues that this treaty 
will provide a significantly increased degree of certainty in a very 
uncertain world. It will continue our relationship with Russia, one 
that we forged over decades and one that we must use--not just for our 
mutual benefit but to act against even more pressing threats such as 
North Korea, such as Iran, and such as thousands of other emerging 
threats over the next several years.
  This treaty will allow us to advance our counterproliferation 
initiatives across the globe. As such, I urge my colleagues to support 
ratification of the New START treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Franken). The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island. I 
first of all thank him for his generous comments on a personal level. 
But let me thank him for his work. I think everybody in the Senate will 
agree he is, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, one of the 
most respected voices in the Senate, one of the most diligent, hard-
working members of that committee. He knows and understands our weapons 
systems, our military needs, our security concerns as well as anybody 
in the Senate. I have enjoyed enormously the history that he provided 
in his discussion today. I think it is an important predicate to this 
debate and I thank him for his work very much, and for the comments he 
made on the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I support this treaty. The 
support is overwhelming, and it is bipartisan. The fact that the entire 
defense establishment and the Pentagon supports this treaty should be 
significant. The questions that have been raised about the 
modernization of our, basically, arsenal of nuclear weapons are 
legitimate. But they are questions that are constantly tended to not 
only by the appropriate committees in the Congress but by the defense 
and national security establishment.
  The Cold War has now been over for two decades. The United States and 
Russia still possess 90 percent of the nuclear weapons. The fact is, we 
need stability in these huge arsenals of nuclear weapons between our 
two countries. To have this stability then allows us to be able to 
confront the rest of the world and the dangers that exist with regard 
to a potential nuclear threat.
  While our nuclear triad remains an important component to our overall 
national security, it is no longer necessary for us to maintain such a 
huge stockpile. We are facing new threats, and we need new answers.
  Here is what we know about the bottom line. This treaty enhances 
cooperation with Russia. It allows for onsite inspections. It allows 
for verification of Russia's nuclear arsenal. It also demonstrates to a 
worldwide audience our commitment to oversight and monitoring of 
nuclear weapons. This START treaty reduces the number of nuclear 
warheads in Russia by 30 percent. Preventing a nuclear terrorist attack 
is paramount. The more we create stability with Russia, it allows us 
then to increase pressure elsewhere on other countries that we are 
always concerned about having nuclear weapons. And we

[[Page S10438]]

are always concerned about those nuclear weapons getting out of their 
control and getting into the hands of people who would do us harm. Of 
course, we are certainly concerned about those other countries with 
nuclear ambitions--one, North Korea, that apparently already possesses 
nuclear weapons, and the country of Iran, which is certainly trying to 
possess nuclear weapons. It is commonsense that what you do is take an 
arsenal of some over 2,2200 nuclear weapons and reduce them. It is just 
common sense that you would, under a treaty between the two nuclear 
powers that have 90 percent of the nuclear weapons, that you would 
start to reduce delivery systems. It just makes common sense that we 
would be able to have an inspection and verification regime so that we 
can have that stability between Russia and the United States.
  You can always bring up all kinds of things. This does not affect in 
any way our ability to have a national missile defense system. If we do 
not ratify this treaty--and it is not only my hope but it is my 
expectation that we are going to be able to get the 67 votes to ratify 
this treaty, but if we did not, we would put ourselves in a much less 
safe position because the previous START treaty expired a year ago.
  Without START, there is no recourse or system to inspect warheads. We 
have been analyzing this treaty now for the last 7 months. The 
bipartisan support of this treaty, Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, 
along with my colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, we have been combing through these 
details.
  We constantly have to develop new ways to safeguard our national 
security. Developing new state-of-the-art systems allows for a more 
vigorous inspection regime. We have built up some of that experience 
since the Cold War ended.
  When it comes around to investment, the Obama administration has 
agreed to invest $85 billion into the nuclear weapons complex. The 
administration agreed to Senator Kyl wanting another $4 billion 
increase. That is a modernization that needs to take place at several 
of our facilities. So let's move on and ratify this treaty. This treaty 
does not limit our missile defense options. We have clearly and 
consistently heard from Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others in the Defense 
Department state that this is the case.
  The treaty's ratification is long overdue in order to secure our 
Nation's security. I believe we must ratify this treaty now.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
legislative session and as in morning business for up to 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                  Unanimous Consent Request--H.R. 6517

  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I rise to speak about legislation that has 
broad bipartisan support and will have a positive impact, if we pass 
it, on job creation in the United States. This is H.R. 6517, which is 
known as the MTB, the miscellaneous terror bill. I will provide some 
highlights and then ask my colleague, Senator Brown of Ohio, to comment 
as well. Then we have a consent request.
  First, this bill supports manufacturing jobs. The National 
Association of Manufacturers supports the bill. When the last bill was 
signed into law earlier this year, the last MTB bill, at that time it 
passed the House by a vote of 378 to 43. This was in July. The national 
manufacturers praised it as ``a victory for job creation.'' This bill, 
combined with the last bill of the same kind, is expected to increase 
U.S. production by at least $4.6 billion over the next 3 years and to 
support 90,000--imagine that--manufacturing jobs, according to a study.
  As I said before, and should repeat again, it has strong bipartisan 
support. The bill has 40 Republican-sponsored provisions and 40 
Democratic-sponsored provisions. It has not just bipartisan support but 
the support of manufacturers across the country. Domestic producers in 
the United States are relying on the new provisions in the bill to 
remain competitive, and these same producers are more likely to grow 
and support good-paying manufacturing jobs, just at a time when we need 
jobs in general, but in particular, there is a crying need for 
manufacturing jobs in the United States as well as a State such as the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
  A couple of words about one aspect of the bill and then I will turn 
to Senator Brown.
  One of the provisions, of course, is trade adjustment assistance. The 
2009 trade adjustment assistance--known by the acronym TAA--those 
reforms made significant improvements in this program for workers. 
Since these changes were implemented, more than 155,000 additional 
trade-impacted workers who would not have been certified under the 
former program became eligible for trade adjustment assistance for 
worker benefits and training opportunities. In total, more than 367,000 
workers were certified as eligible for that support in that same 
timeframe.
  A word about Pennsylvania. We have lost--and I think the 
corresponding number is similar in other States--but imagine this: 
Since 2001, less than a decade, our State has lost 200,000 
manufacturing jobs. This program, the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Program, has played a vital role in helping those workers who have lost 
their jobs in that time period.
  There is much more I could say about Pennsylvania, and I will hold 
that for later. But I did want to turn to my colleague from Ohio, who 
has worked tirelessly on this issue here in the Senate and in the years 
when he was a Member of the House of Representatives.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from 
Pennsylvania. I agree with him that this bill has as broad a public 
support as you get on a trade bill, a bill that deals directly with 
tariffs and trade relationships and manufacturing and help for workers 
who are laid off and help both with training dollars and with health 
care dollars and health care tax incentives.
  It is supported--that is why it passed, I believe, by a voice vote in 
the House of Representatives last night, meaning nobody spoke out 
against it when it was passed overwhelmingly by voice vote. There may 
have been a few scattered ``nos.'' I am not even sure there was that.
  The ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, who will be 
chairman, Congressman Camp, from Michigan, was supporting it. The Ways 
and Means outgoing chairman, also from Michigan, Congressman Levin, 
also supported this.
  The AFL-CIO supports it. The National Retail Federation and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce recognize this is good for the country. That is why 
I am so hopeful my colleagues will not block this legislation.
  One person standing up in this Chamber and blocking legislation 
because it is late in the year--I do not know if they are trying to cut 
some deal or what the reason is they would use for blocking it. But 
forget the politics of the support for it around the country, but look 
what it does that is so important: trade adjustment assistance. Since 
2009, 367,000 workers were certified eligible for TAA, trade adjustment 
assistance. These workers use TAA to acquire new skills. When a worker 
is laid off, in Erie or right across the State line in Ashtabula, OH, 
you want to encourage them to go back to school and become, for 
example, a nurse, if they were working in a plant, and they are 45 
years old, or you want them to go back to school and become a computer 
operator or to have some kind of job that you would hope would pay 
something comparable to the job they lost. This legislation is 
essential to do that.
  The health care tax credit program helps these trade-affected workers 
and retirees purchase private health insurance to replace the employer-
sponsored coverage they lost. We want people to be able to get back on 
their feet.
  An objection to this motion by Senator Casey, a ``no'' vote on this, 
really does say: Stop. We are not interested in helping you do this.
  If we allow the program to go back, if this is defeated, the jobs 
that are shipped to China or India or other countries we do not have a 
trade agreement with would no longer be eligible.
  I can name by name factories in places such as Cleveland and 
Mansfield and Toledo and Dayton--and Senator

[[Page S10439]]

Casey can in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, and Altoona and all over his 
State--companies that have shut down or moved much of their production 
to China or India. We want them to be eligible, even though we do not 
have a bilateral trade agreement with those countries as we do with 
NAFTA or CAFTA or some of the other bilateral trade agreements we have.
  That is why this is so important. I particularly ask my colleagues 
not to object to the passage of this bill. It has passed the House. We 
have the exact same language here. It is vetted. The Republican and 
Democratic leaders in both Houses say we ought to do it. Senator Baucus 
has worked very hard, harder than anyone, to renew TAA before the end 
of the year.
  But I particularly am concerned about the health care tax credit. We 
have tried to come to the floor and move that already. We have not been 
successful in doing it because of the peculiar nature of Senate rules 
and that a very small handful, sometimes as few as one, can stop 
legislation.
  But without the HCTC, come January 1, there will be thousands of 
people in my State who lose their health insurance. Hundreds of them--
if not several thousand--have spouses who will lose their health 
insurance because of what this will do in terms of the tax credit for 
health insurance.
  So I guess my question to Senator Casey--and then he can make the 
motion, which I fully support--is, why? What do you see in this that 
anybody would object to? I am at a loss to understand why anybody would 
object to this.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, I cannot understand it, especially when you 
consider the fact that we have 15 million Americans out of work. I know 
the numbers are high in all of our States. In Pennsylvania, we are 
fortunate. We are below 9 percent. We are at about 8.8 percent right 
now--8.6 percent, actually, is the most recent number. That number has 
been going down, thank goodness. But it is still just below 550,000 
people. It was up above 590,000. So we are making some progress, but we 
are badly in need of manufacturing jobs, and I know the same is true in 
Ohio.
  Mr. President, as if in legislative session, I ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 6517, 
the Omnibus Trade Act, which was received from the House and is at the 
desk; that the bill be read three times and passed, and the motion to 
reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or 
debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I 
will object, I wish to share a few thoughts with my colleagues. I think 
if they knew the basis for the objection I have, they would be 
supportive of it, and I do object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, let me say, with regard to this 
legislation, I have supported free trade probably more than my 
colleagues. I believe in the Andean Trade Agreement that is a part of 
this. I support the trade assistance that is in the bill and would be 
glad to remove my objections to them if they wish to move forward with 
that.
  But I have worked for 2 years to try to obtain a simple justice to 
close a loophole in the tariff laws that has impacted and will close a 
sleeping bag textile manufacturer in my State. It is in Haleyville, in 
Winston County, AL. It is in northwest Alabama. It is a poor county. 
They have a great history. They call it ``the free State of Winston.'' 
They claim they seceded from the State of Alabama during the Civil War, 
and most of their public officials from then until today remain 
Republicans. But they are an independent, hard-working people. This 
bill, as written, will close that plant, and it should not happen.
  I want to share with you the Chamber of Commerce, NAM and the AFL-CIO 
have been made aware of this, as we have discussed it over the past 
years, and they believe this company should receive some relief. But 
the people who put the bill together did not. And I am very much of the 
belief--I know my colleagues are--that when you have good people in 
your State who are being put out of business by a company that was 
moved to Bangladesh to try to capture this loophole--it is not a little 
matter.

  These are human beings. As I said, I do believe in trade. I think it 
is best for the world. But I would say to my colleagues, we have to 
have fair trade. We have to have just trade. And nations around the 
world, I think, have taken advantage of the overconfidence of the 
United States in our economy that they can cheat on agreements and 
manipulate agreements and close down businesses in the United States, 
and that somehow we are going to pass on by, and that eventually we 
will get to the point where we just have banking and hospitals in this 
country.
  But manufacturing is an important part of our economy. This company 
has been able to withstand competition from China and has been 
successful. But they cleverly figured out how to move it to Bangladesh, 
using 85 percent Chinese products, and shipping it to the United States 
and getting around the small tariff that makes a difference between 
success and failure.
  I plead with my colleagues to consider the justice of this matter. 
Move your bill. I do not think there is any real substantive objection 
to it. The U.S. Trade Representative expressed a lot of sympathy for 
this situation, and I thought somewhere the bureaucrats and the 
politicians were going to put together a bill that would grant relief 
so this company would have a chance to continue to be very competitive. 
They are modern, have high-tech equipment, sewing equipment, good 
employees. They pay them health care and benefits far more than they 
are paid anywhere else in the world. And they can still win except for 
this loophole.
  I am at a point where I am not going to go for it anymore. I am not 
going to stand by and allow nations to cheat on their trade agreements 
and manipulate trade agreements that, in effect, destroy our 
industries. I am aware that the Smoot-Hawley trade agreement was part 
of the Depression. I know all that argument, and I am not against free 
trade. But I am telling you, we need to stand and defend our 
industries. I know both of my colleagues share that.
  I want to say, I feel strongly about it. I believe this is just. And 
I think this bureaucracy, this Senate, this Congress, ought to listen 
to what we are saying and give us some relief. Otherwise, I would be 
willing to move the parts of the legislation that are not directly 
relevant to this.
  I thank the Presiding Officer.
  Mr. CASEY. Mr. President, let me say by way of response to our 
colleague from Alabama, I have great respect for and appreciate the 
sentiments he is expressing for workers and employers in his State, 
fighting hard for them, and the concern about jobs going overseas.
  I would say a couple things: No. 1, we did have an opportunity this 
fall to vote on legislation which would provide both incentives and 
disincentives to the shipment of jobs overseas by changing the Tax 
Code. We had a debate about it. One side voted for it--this side--and 
the other side did not. I just wanted to make that point.
  But the other point is that, look, we have a disagreement about this. 
What I would hope we could do is try to find a way to help firms such 
as the one that our colleague is trying to protect, and that is 
certainly understandable. But, at the same time, if we do not pass this 
bill in totality, we are going to shortchange the ability to impact not 
just the creation of 90,000 manufacturing jobs around the country, 
including in all of our States, but also trade adjustment 
assistance. So for the hundreds of thousands of people--tens of 
thousands in a State such as Pennsylvania, and potentially even more 
than that, and certainly in all of our States--we have to get this done 
even if we are trying to work on problems that arise that are specific 
to one employer or one portion of a particular community.

  Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, I will be glad to discuss it with my 
colleague, but I would note that the exemption I am concerned about 
goes to Third World countries. They are given, under the generalized 
system of preferences, or GSP, the right to import pretty much duty-
free, but it comes with a crucial condition. That condition is that you 
do not get to import into the United States under this zero tariff if 
you are competing with American companies and American jobs--unemployed

[[Page S10440]]

Americans. If we don't have that manufacturing in the United States, 
they get this exemption. This is a loophole they achieved under the 
tariff rules by calling a sleeping bag not a textile, and it is a 
textile and it should be covered by this. That is all I am saying.
  I would ask my colleagues, isn't it true that if the leadership of 
both parties agree to this amendment, there is plenty of time for it to 
be accepted, go back to the House, and be passed before we recess? That 
is what I would ask to be done.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. BROWN of Ohio. I see some real potential here. I thank the 
Senator from Alabama. I know Senator Casey and I have fought for 
American manufacturing for pretty much our whole careers. I know 
Senator Sessions has had some disagreements sometimes with our trade 
policy in this country. I think our trade policy has done more--and the 
way we do globalization has done as much damage to our country as 
almost anything in terms of jobs, especially manufacturing jobs.
  There are several parts of this bill, as the Senator recognizes--the 
GSP, about which the Senator obviously has some strong feelings; there 
are things the Senator has sounded as though he was agreeing with on 
TAA and with HCTC, with the Andean, and with the other part of the 
trade issue--I am drawing a blank on the other part of the tariff 
issue. It seems to me that except for the general standardized 
preferences, or GSP, it sounds as though we have a lot of agreement.
  I hope I can speak for Senator Casey as well in saying I will 
certainly work with the Senator on trying to fix the part of the GSP 
that doesn't work for Alabama. If we can either separate the other ones 
out and get a UC or work with them together and go back to the House, 
we are certainly willing to do that.
  I just don't want to see us adjourn--whatever day we adjourn, whether 
it is Monday or Tuesday or Christmas Day, I don't want to see us walk 
out of here without helping with trade adjustment, without helping with 
the health care tax credit, and leaving out Andean trade preferences 
and those things. So let's work together and see if we can do this in 
the next 24 hours and come back to the floor and work something 
through, if Senator Casey agrees with that too.
  Mr. SESSIONS. I thank Senator Brown and Senator Casey. I do believe 
that is possible, and I think maybe there is a growing belief that 
somewhere in this debate about trade, we can reach a common accord 
across the aisle that, yes, we want to have trade, we want to expand 
trade that can benefit America, but at the same time we have to not 
unnecessarily destroy American jobs, and this little part of it is 
damaging. I tried last year. We spent a year talking about this. It is 
not something that just got sprung on the floor here at this moment. I 
think there is a way out of it.
  I thank the Senators for being openminded today.
  Mr. CASEY. I thank both of my colleagues.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I support H.R. 6517. This bill extends 
three of my longstanding trade priorities, Trade Adjustment Assistance, 
TAA, the Generalized System of Preferences, GSP, and the Andean Trade 
Preference Act, ATPA. TAA provides job training for workers here at 
home, training that is more important than ever in these difficult 
economic times. And GSP and ATPA support thousands of jobs here in the 
United States and provide livelihoods for millions of people in the 
developing world as well. If we do not act, these programs will expire 
on December 31. The bill also includes miscellaneous tariff bill 
provisions, and provisions to replenish the wool trust fund, all of 
which will support jobs in Montana and across America. I urge swift 
passage of this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. DeMINT. Mr. President, I know we are discussing a number of 
different issues on the floor right now, and one of the most important, 
as my colleagues know, is the START treaty with Russia, and I wish to 
take a few minutes to talk about it.
  We all take our responsibility of advice and consent very seriously 
for nominations and particularly on a treaty of this magnitude. I am 
very disappointed that on something of this importance, we are bringing 
it up in a lameduck Congress at a time when Americans are distracted by 
one of the most holy holidays for Christians in this country.
  None of us minds working through the holidays or through the night on 
the Nation's business, but it is important that Americans participate 
in this process with us. They know many of the people who will be 
voting on this treaty are those who have been turned out of office by 
Americans in the last election, and they will also know that the reason 
to rush it through before new Members are sworn in is that those who 
will be carrying the voice of Americans into the next session may have 
a different view of some of the things we are doing here.
  It is important, as we look at this START treaty, to understand the 
implications and the background of this treaty. A number of my 
colleagues have talked about various aspects of it--about verification, 
the number of missiles--and I will touch on a few of these things.
  I respect the administration's intent to try to enlist the 
cooperation of Russia on other major issues, such as dealing with Iran 
and North Korea, and that this is a symbol of our willingness to work 
with them. I understand that. I understand that is one of the reasons a 
number of past Secretaries of State have said we need to do this.
  I think the administration and many recognize that this treaty only 
deals with intercontinental ballistic missiles--ICBMs--missiles we have 
had for years on the shelf as a deterrent, as part of that strategy of 
mutually assured destruction. Russia had its number of missiles and we 
had ours, with the understanding that if they fired missiles at us, we 
would fire missiles at them, and we would destroy each other--mutually 
assured destruction. These missiles don't defend Americans, except if 
you say maybe to deter Russians from firing their missiles at us. But 
as we understand that this treaty only deals with the ICBMs, we 
recognize it doesn't include many other weapons, such as tactical 
nuclear weapons, and we also understand it does not have any 
prohibitions on other countries developing nuclear weapons, nuclear 
missiles.
  We also understand that Russia has basically already met the 
limitations in this agreement. They are not going to have to draw down 
their number of missiles or warheads. The United States will reduce the 
number of missiles--ICBMs--it has. But, again, the other weapons, which 
are perhaps more dangerous and of more concern to some of our allies, 
are not included in this treaty.
  So I think part of the rationale of moving through with this is that 
it only deals with one type of missile that is perhaps of limited 
importance in today's world--although certainly the deterrence will 
continue to be part of our strategy--and we are just dealing with these 
so-called strategic weapons and not tactical weapons, and that we can 
give this up, we can reduce the number we have in order to gain 
Russia's cooperation in other matters. I understand that rationale. But 
this is more than just a treaty between the United States and Russia; 
it is a signal to our allies and to the whole world on what posture 
America will take in the future on defending our allies, what posture 
we will take particularly on missile defense. That is where I wish to 
focus most of my comments today.
  There was no argument in the hearings that this treaty is an implicit 
and explicit agreement by the United States not to develop a missile 
defense system that can defend against Russian missiles. That should be 
clear, and there is no argument.
  I think we have played with words a little bit in saying it does not 
limit our plans in missile defense. Our plans are to develop an 
unlimited system that can shoot down a rogue missile. But in the 
hearings with Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, Chairman Kerry, it 
was made very clear that this treaty--it made it clear to the Russians 
and to the whole world that the United States would not even attempt to 
develop a missile defense system capable of shooting down multiple 
missiles.
  Now, if Russia was the only country in the world capable of 
developing multiple nuclear missiles, perhaps we

[[Page S10441]]

could discuss that within that context. But as we know today, there has 
been a proliferation of nuclear technology to many countries, including 
Iran and North Korea. We know that other countries such as Pakistan 
have nuclear weapons. It is not unrealistic to suggest that within a 
few years there may be numerous countries that have capabilities to 
fire multiple missiles at the United States or one of our allies.
  Americans need to know we are agreeing with this START treaty not to 
even attempt to develop a system to defend our citizens or our allies 
against multiple missiles. In the hearing, I made this very clear with 
a question: Is it our intent not to develop a missile defense system 
capable of defending against Russian missiles? Senator Kerry, Secretary 
Gates, and Secretary Clinton agreed that would destabilize our 
relationship with Russia. So everyone should be clear about what is 
happening here--that in order to enlist Russia's cooperation in other 
matters, we are agreeing to a continued strategy of mutually assured 
destruction not just with Russia but with any country that chooses to 
develop the ability to fire multiple missiles at one time.
  I don't think this treaty is going to decrease proliferation. I think 
on its face it will increase the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
around the world. Our enemies will know we don't have the ability to 
defend against missiles, and our allies will develop their own nuclear 
weapons because they know we no longer have the capability to defend 
against not just Russia's missiles, not just strategic missiles, but 
against tactical nuclear weapons.
  Russia has a 10-to-1 advantage right now with modern tactical nuclear 
weapons that are developed not as a deterrence but to be used on the 
battlefield. This treaty does not limit their ability to continue to 
develop these weapons. This treaty implicitly and I think explicitly 
says we are not going to develop any means to shoot down those shorter 
range missiles.
  For us to be considering something of this gravity during the 
holidays, when Americans are rightly paying attention to things other 
than politics, and to rush this through with a few days of debate, when 
for the last treaty I looked at, we had 9 days with many amendments, a 
lot of debate, and finally agreement--we will not only have limited 
debate and limited amendments, but we are going to try to push this 
through before we leave to go home for Christmas. The process is wrong.
  I would appeal to my colleagues to let this go until next year. Let's 
give a specific time agreement next year that we will debate this and 
we will have a vote on it and we will offer amendments and vote on 
those amendments and show the American people this was a full debate 
with full transparency about what is in this treaty and then let 
Senators vote on it, the Senators Americans have elected to speak for 
them here in the Senate.
  I have heard folks say on the Senate floor that we need to rush into 
this because we can no longer go days, weeks, and months without 
verification. I think a close look at the verification of the last 
treaty shows we weren't very close to what was actually going on. There 
are big loopholes in the verification aspects of this treaty, loopholes 
that are big enough to hide missiles and nuclear warheads, and I don't 
think there is a lot of debate about that. A few more weeks is not 
going to put our country in any more jeopardy. In fact, I think rushing 
this through could make the world much more dangerous.
  My hope is that my colleagues, particularly my Republican colleagues, 
those who have expressed an interest in voting for this, will say: 
Enough is enough. Pushing this legislation, along with repealing don't 
ask, don't tell, the DREAM Act and other bills we are doing at the same 
time, and all of these requests for unanimous consent to pass bills 
that people haven't read--there is just too much business, too many 
distractions to take on something of this gravity at this time in a 
lameduck Congress.
  So I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I respect those who feel as 
though this treaty is something we should do. But it is my hope that 
those people will reflect on the importance of this treaty, the signal 
it sends to our allies all over the world, and work with us to get an 
open and honest debate on this treaty at the beginning of next year.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. ISAKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.