[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 167 (Thursday, December 16, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10367-S10373]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EXECUTIVE SESSION
F_____
TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS--Continued
Mr. WICKER. Madam President, America had an election on November 2.
Let me begin by reminding my colleagues that the American people spoke
loudly and clearly in November and chose a far different team to serve
in Washington. A vastly different leadership will soon take over in the
House of Representatives, and a substantially different group of
Senators was chosen by the American people in the election on November
2.
It seems the leadership of this lameduck Senate is determined, in the
waning days of 2010, to pack quite a bit of legislation that normally
is debated over a considerable amount of time into just a few days--not
only the START treaty that we are on now but also don't ask, don't tell
and supposedly the majority leader has not given up on the DREAM Act,
which would provide amnesty to many illegal immigrants, and also there
is the massive Omnibus appropriations bill with 2,000-plus pages.
So we are here at this time, realizing that if the Congress doesn't
act, the government will run out of money on Saturday. I assume a
short-term CR will be done to address that. But certainly, it would be
much easier if we passed what the minority leader suggested today; that
is, a reasonable short-term resolution, so the government can be funded
and the lights can stay on until mid-February, and the newly elected
Congress--the people's choice--can best decide these great issues that
are facing our country.
I did find it interesting, a few moments ago, to hear the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee scold the Senate about the number of
filibusters we have supposedly had in this term of Congress. I believe
the statement was made that we have had more filibusters in the last 2
years than we have had in decades or since World War II or words to
that effect. Here is why that statement is only true in a very
technical sense.
It has been the practice of the majority, during the 3 years I have
been in the Senate--and from what I understand much longer before
that--to
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bring a bill to the floor of the Senate. He immediately fills the
amendment tree; that is, he offers all the amendments that are allowed
under the parliamentary rules of the Senate. That is called filling the
tree. It is so nobody else has an opportunity to file an amendment.
Then, the majority leader files cloture on that bill. Technically, yes,
that is considered a filibuster. But I do not believe that is what most
of the American people consider a filibuster and a delaying tactic,
with excessive speechifying, when they hear the term ``filibuster.''
So let's be clear that there has been an unusual practice--at least
in the last 3 or 4 years--of calling up a bill, filling the tree,
filing for cloture, and then that goes down in history as a filibuster.
With all we have to do and all our leadership has determined we must
consider during these waning days of December 2010, we must divide our
attention between an expensive 2,000-page omnibus bill and the
consideration of a very complicated arms control agreement. It is that
agreement I will discuss.
It is hard to imagine a more important, more serious issue than our
nuclear weapons stockpile. In my view, such a debate deserves our
undivided attention. But we will pivot in a few moments and move to the
omnibus bill.
I wish to take what time I have at this point to begin sharing my
concerns over this treaty and the effect it might have on national
security.
Article II of the Constitution requires that the Senate ratify any
treaty the President signs with a two-thirds vote. I take this
responsibility very seriously, as I am sure all my colleagues do. This
responsibility requires us to review any proposed treaty to ensure it
is in the national interest of the United States of America.
As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a member of
the Foreign Relations Committee, I have participated in the review of
this treaty to date. While I appreciate the efforts of my chairman and
my ranking member, I am not convinced that the treaty, in its current
form, is in the national interests of the United States of America.
I might add I am not alone in this view. To hear debate on the floor
from time to time today, one would think all the learned authorities,
all the collective wisdom of the United States of America, present and
past, are in favor of the hasty ratification of this treaty. I simply
point out that there is a wide variety of information and opinion out
there that should be brought to the attention of Members of the Senate
and the American people.
First of all, I point out to my colleagues an op-ed by former
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, which appeared in the December 7,
2010, issue of the Wall Street Journal, entitled ``New Start: Ratify,
with Caveats.'' Secretary Rice is generally in favor of the direction
we are headed in the ratification of the START treaty. But she does say
we need two caveats before ratification takes place. First, she states
that smaller forces make the modernization of our nuclear
infrastructure even more urgent. She commends the valiant efforts of
Members of the Senate, including Senator Jon Kyl, to gain more robust
modernization of our nuclear weapons. Secondly, the former Secretary of
State says the Senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this
treaty, the United States is not reestablishing the Cold War link
between offensive forces and missile defenses. She says it is troubling
that New START's preamble is unclear in this respect.
I wonder, if we do decide as a Senate to move toward consideration of
this treaty, if we will be allowed to offer amendments to the preamble
to address the concerns of our immediate past Secretary of State.
Further, I commend to my colleagues a Wall Street Journal op-ed,
dated November 15, 2010, by R. James Woolsey. As my colleagues know,
and many Americans know, Mr. Woolsey has a distinguished record as a
delegate at large to the START and defense-based negotiations, back
during the mid-1980s, as ambassador and chief negotiator for the
Conventional Armed Forces of Europe Treaty from 1989 to 1991, and was
President Clinton's Director of Central Intelligence from 1993 to 1995.
So this bipartisan, experienced, former government official lists four
concerns that he has with regard to the New START treaty. No. 1, he
wonders about this administration's commitment to modernization. No. 2,
he says it needs to be made clear that the United States, in ratifying
New START, will not be limited at all in its missile defense, and he
does not believe that has been taken care of. No. 3, Director Woolsey,
President Clinton's Director of Central Intelligence, says this treaty
represents a step backward in the verification process between the
United States and Russia. Finally, Mr. Woolsey cites the need for a
binding resolution on Russian submarine-launched cruise missiles. So I
think there is information Members of the Senate need to hear about and
need to consider.
Further, I will mention two opinion pieces. One is by Stephen
Rademaker, an Assistant Secretary of State from 2002 to 2006. It is a
Washington Post op-ed on Friday, August 20, 2010. Secretary Rademaker
authored an opinion piece saying this is no way to approve the New
START treaty. In his opinion piece, Mr. Rademaker said Senate critics
of New START have largely been cut out of the process.
I know this from personal experience as a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee. He goes on to say that all but two Republicans on
the Foreign Relations Committee formally asked the administration to
share with them the negotiating record of the treaty. They were told
no, even though there is precedent for accommodating such requests.
A simple request--had it been accommodated--perhaps could have
allayed some of the concerns we have.
In another op-ed, Mr. Rademaker, on December 10 of this year, said
START will not stop nuclear proliferation. He points out that the claim
that progress in United States-Russian arms control will help stop
countries such as Iran from getting nuclear weapons isn't just an
argument offered in support of New START, it is also one of the key
premises underlying President Obama's embrace of global nuclear
disarmament. There is just one problem. He said the notion that faster
disarmament will lead to greater progress against nuclear proliferation
has never added up.
Then, further, I will quote from a September 8, 2010, Wall Street
Journal piece by John Bolton, a senior fellow at the American
Enterprise Institute and former Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005. Secretary Bolton
observes that the treaty's return to outmoded Cold War limits on
weapons launchers, which will require the United States but not Russia
to dismantle existing delivery systems, is a problem. He goes on to say
this could cripple America's long-range conventional warhead delivery
capabilities, while also severely constraining our nuclear flexibility.
He said: ``We will pay for this mistake in future conflicts entirely
unrelated to Russia.''
I say to my colleagues that the jury is still out on this issue.
These are experienced public servants, experts, and current observers
of the international scene and the nuclear negotiation process. They
have given us words that give me pause. It makes me think there is no
reason to rush into a hasty ratification of this treaty.
With regard to the process, hearings first started in May of this
year. I was one of the Foreign Relations Committee members to request
nine witnesses we believed were important and necessary to cover the
extent of our concerns.
This request was denied. There is no reason such a request would have
been denied. In 12 hearings, there were two witnesses who spoke in
opposition to this treaty. Members of the minority party requested
others, but it nowhere came anywhere near the normal precedent given to
the minority to have at least one witness on each panel. I was
concerned that no former National Lab Directors were invited to
testify.
It is essential that an appropriate amount of time be spent on the
Senate floor considering this treaty. Members who have serious concerns
must be permitted the opportunity to offer amendments that would
address the full range of problems.
I would simply point out, this is the last quote of this speech
today. In endorsing the START treaty, the Washington Post, on November
19, said:
Positive steps had been made and the treaty ought to be
approved.
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But it went on to say, the Editorial Board of the Washington Post
went on to say:
But no calamity will befall the United States if the Senate
does not act this year.
I could not agree more with the Washington Post. It will not be a
calamity if we are given adequate time to fully discuss, to fully
examine, to fully debate all of the ramifications about an issue so
profound as our nuclear weapons capability. The worst thing this body
could do is shirk our constitutional responsibility by rushing this
through in the final days of this lameduck session simply to check the
box before the new team, the newly elected team comes to Washington and
takes office in January.
I ask unanimous consent that the Wall Street Journal article I
referenced be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 2010]
New Start: Ratify, With Caveats
(By Condoleezza Rice)
When U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin signed
the Moscow Treaty in 2002, they addressed the nuclear threat
by reducing offensive weapons, as their predecessors had. But
the Moscow Treaty was different. It came in the wake of
America's 2001 withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972, and for the first time the United States and
Russia reduced their offensive nuclear weapons with no
agreement in place that constrained missile defenses.
Breaking the link between offensive force reductions and
limits on defense marked a key moment in the establishment of
a new nuclear agenda no longer focused on the Cold War face-
off between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The real threat was
that the world's most dangerous weapons could end up in the
hands of the world's most dangerous regimes--or of terrorists
who would launch attacks more devastating than 9/11. And
since those very rogue states also pursued ballistic
missiles, defenses would (alongside offensive weapons) be
integral to the security of the United States and our allies.
It is in this context that we should consider the potential
contribution of the New Start treaty to U.S. national
security. The treaty is modest, reducing offensive nuclear
weapons to 1,550 on each side--more than enough for
deterrence. While the treaty puts limits on launchers, U.S.
military commanders have testified that we will be able to
maintain a triad of bombers, submarine-based delivery
vehicles and land-based delivery vehicles. Moreover, the
treaty helpfully reinstates on-site verification of Russian
nuclear forces, which lapsed with the expiration of the
original Start treaty last year. Meaningful verification was
a significant achievement of Presidents Reagan and George
H.W. Bush, and its reinstatement is crucial.
Still, there are legitimate concerns about New Start that
must and can be addressed in the ratification process and, if
the treaty is ratified, in future monitoring of the Obama
administration's commitments.
First, smaller forces make the modernization of our nuclear
infrastructure even more urgent. Sen Jon Kyl of Arizona has
led a valiant effort in this regard. Thanks to his efforts,
roughly $84 billion is being allocated to the Department of
Energy's nuclear weapons complex. Ratifying the treaty will
help cement these commitments, and Congress should fully fund
the president's program. Congress should also support the
Defense Department in modernizing our launchers as suggested
in the recent defense strategy study coauthored by former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former National
Security Adviser Stephen Hadley.
Second, the Senate must make absolutely clear that in
ratifying this treaty, the U.S. is not re-establishing the
Cold War link between offensive forces and missile defenses.
New Start's preamble is worrying in this regard, as it
recognizes the ``interrelationship'' of the two.
Administration officials have testified that there is no
link, and that the treaty will not limit U.S. missile
defenses. But Congress should ensure that future Defense
Department budgets reflect this.
Moscow contends that only current U.S. missile-defense
plans are acceptable under the treaty. But the U.S. must
remain fully free to explore and then deploy the best
defenses--not just those imagined today. That includes
pursuing both potential qualitative breakthroughs and
quantitative increases.
I have personally witnessed Moscow's tendency to interpret
every utterance as a binding commitment. The Russians need to
understand that the U.S. will use the full-range of American
technology and talent to improve our ability to intercept and
destroy the ballistic missiles of hostile countries.
Russia should be reassured by the fact that its nuclear
arsenal is far too sophisticated and large to be degraded by
our missile defenses. In addition, the welcome agreements on
missile-defense cooperation reached in Lisbon recently
between NATO and Russia can improve transparency and allow
Moscow and Washington to work together in this field. After
all, a North Korean or Iranian missile is not a threat only
to the United States, but to international stability broadly.
Ratification of the treaty also should not be sold as a way
to buy Moscow's cooperation on other issues. The men in the
Kremlin know that loose nukes in the hands of terrorists--
some who operate in Russia's unstable south--are dangerous.
That alone should give our governments a reason to work
together beyond New Start and address the threat from
tactical nuclear weapons, which are smaller and more
dispersed, and therefore harder to monitor and control.
Russia knows too that a nuclear Iran in the volatile Middle
East or the further development of North Korea's arsenal is
not in its interest. Russia lives in those neighborhoods.
That helps explain Moscow's toughening stance toward Tehran
and its longstanding concern about Pyongyang.
The issue before the Senate is the place of New Start in
America's future security. Nuclear weapons will be with us
for a long time. After this treaty, our focus must be on
stopping dangerous proliferators--not on further reductions
in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals, which are really
no threat to each other or to international stability.
A modern but smaller nuclear arsenal and increasingly
sophisticated defenses are the right bases for U.S. nuclear
security (and that of our allies) going forward. With the
right commitments and understandings, ratification of the New
Start treaty can contribute to this goal. If the Senate
enters those commitments and understandings into a record of
ratification, New Start deserves bipartisan support, whether
in the lame duck session or next year.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, as we take up the consideration of the
New START, we not only have the opportunity, but also an obligation to
provide consent on the ratification of this treaty. It is long overdue.
We need to regain our ability to provide boots-on-the-ground
verification of the Russian nuclear complex.
Over the past 8 months, we have all had ample opportunity to review
the documents and reports related to the New START. We have conducted
20 hearings, taken over 900 questions. They were questions asked by
Members of the Senate, mainly to the administration, in which those
answers have been provided; 900 questions, over 900 for the record.
In short, we have given significant consideration to the ratification
of New START. I know my colleagues on both sides of the aisle are
committed to guaranteeing the security of our country and also
recognize the obligation to ratify this arms control agreement
immediately.
I want to take you back a little bit because I hear my colleagues
talking about not having enough time. I want to take you back to a hot
day this summer in the Foreign Relations Committee, where--Madam
President, you were at that meeting in which those who are now saying
we do not have enough time, asked for just a little bit more time,
during the impending recess, so we could orderly consider the
ratification process.
That was a hot summer day. It is now a snowy day in December, and
they are still saying the same thing: Just give us more time. We have
had plenty of time.
I compliment Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar for the manner in which
they have considered this treaty. This is a very important treaty for
America, and they have made sure that the Senate has had, and each
Senator has had, ample opportunity to get all of the information we
need--all of the information we need from administration individuals or
from experts or from anyone. They have been very open in this process.
They have also given every Member of the Senate ample time to get
every question answered, to get all of the material they need, and it
is now time for us to take on our responsibility; that is, to take up
this treaty for ratification and vote it up or down.
I certainly hope my colleagues will vote to ratify this treaty. I
think it is critically important to our national security. In addition
to its contributions to American security, one of the most compelling
reasons we should ratify this treaty, and do so before we recess, is to
regain our insight into Russia's strategic offensive arms.
Since START I expired over a year ago, we have had no comprehensive
verification regime in place in order to help us understand Russia's
strategic nuclear force. We need the transparency to know what Russia
is doing to provide confidence and stability, and we need that
confidence and stability to contribute to a safer world. We will
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only regain that transparency by ratifying this treaty, and we are in
dangerous territory without it.
Let me repeat. We need this treaty for verification. We need this
treaty to know what Russia is doing, so we can verify what Russia tells
us, to make sure, in fact, that it is true. Not only will this treaty
enhance the national security of the United States, it will serve as a
significant step forward in our relationship with Russia, a key partner
in the overall U.S. strategy to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons
worldwide.
Let's be perfectly clear about this. There are still two nations that
have the majority of the nuclear weapon capacity in this world; it is
Russia and the United States. Working together, we can make this world
safer. Working together, we can move forward with reductions in
strategic arms around the world. Working together, we provide the
leadership so we can move forward against proliferation of nuclear
weapons. In fact, we have done that.
But the failure to ratify this treaty could have a major negative
impact on the leadership of the United States in this area. The U.S.
relationship with the Russian Federation is key in our efforts to
curtail Iran's nuclear ambitions. In June, Russia voted for the latest
U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran and later canceled the sale of
an advanced arms defensive missile system.
The ratification of New START is essential in reinitiating
verification inspections and, more importantly, for the United States
and Russia to lead the way in reducing the world's nuclear arms
stockpile. This is for leadership. We all talk about making sure Iran
does not become a nuclear weapons state. Ratifying the New START treaty
will help us in making sure Iran does not become a nuclear weapons
state. It keeps the United States and Russia focused on strategic arms
reduction and focused on nonproliferation.
The failure to ratify this treaty is a setback in our ability to
effectively stop Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. New START,
the first treaty with Russia in almost a decade, calls for both sides
to reduce their deployed warheads modestly from 2,200 to 1,550. The new
treaty would restore verification, inspections, and other exchanges of
information about the American and Russian arsenals. New START could
pay dividends not only by improving nuclear security but by paving the
way to greater cooperation between the two powers in dealing with such
hot spots as Iran and Afghanistan.
Let me just point out one other part, if I might; that is, previous
arms treaties have been ratified with overwhelming bipartisan support.
START I was passed 93 to 6 in 1994. The Moscow Treaty passed 95 to 0 in
2003. Legislators recognized then that arms control agreements between
Russia and the United States are not just good for the security of our
two nations but can lead the way to the world to reduce proliferation
of nuclear weapons.
During last month's NATO Summit in Lisbon, the NATO Secretary General
stated:
The New START treaty would also pave the way for arms
control and disarmament initiatives and other areas that are
vital to Euro-Atlantic security.
So I think this is a key moment in the history of the Senate. I know
there are many important votes that we take in the Senate. There are
many votes we take that have very significant consequences. The
ratification of this treaty is just one of those moments. It keeps us
on path and enhances our credibility to make the world safer, and does
it in a way that enhances the security of the people of the United
States of America.
This is a treaty that needs to be ratified and needs to be ratified
now. I urge my colleagues to vote in the interests of national
security, to move swiftly, and pass this treaty.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I understand Senator Thune is the next
to speak on the Republican side. I ask unanimous consent to follow him
after he has spoken, and Senator Chambliss would then follow me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. THUNE. I thank the Senator from Illinois for locking in the time.
I want to start by saying here we are, jammed against the Christmas
break with the majority using Christmas as a backstop to rush through
an arms control treaty with the Russians and a trillion-dollar spending
bill on a dual-track basis.
What that means is that we are considering, at the same time, two
documents encompassing thousands of pages with very little ability to
offer meaningful amendments or devote meaningful time to consider the
full impact of these documents that will have a far-reaching and long-
term impact on our Nation.
As I wrote recently in an op-ed that appeared in National Review
Online:
New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain
a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To
remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the
Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for
debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the
Russians.
I ask unanimous consent that the op-ed I wrote for National Review
Online entitled ``Don't Force New START,'' dated December 9, 2010, be
printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1)
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, the Nation's attention is fixed firmly on
this travesty of an omnibus trillion-dollar appropriations bill which
we should be debating now because the current funding resolution for
the government ends tomorrow. We should not be debating a significant
arms control treaty at this late date and trying to dual-track what I
said earlier are thousands of pages of documents that need appropriate
time on the floor of the Senate.
I want to speak, if I might, briefly today to the substance of the
START agreement and my concerns about that agreement in its current
form. First of all, I want to speak to the issue of missile defense.
The New START treaty not only contains specific limitations on
missile defense in article V but also reestablishes an unwise linkage
in the preamble to the treaty between offense and defense that was
broken when the ABM treaty came to an end.
Moreover, Russia's unilateral statement that the treaty ``can operate
and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from
developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively or
qualitatively'' is extremely troubling.
When viewed together, the New START treaty's preamble and Russia's
unilateral statement amount to a Russian attempt to find a leverage
point and exert political pressure upon the United States to forestall
deploying a robust missile defense capability, by threatening to
withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense
capabilities.
The remedy for this concern is for the Senate to strike the offensive
preamble language. That is why I would wholeheartedly support an effort
to strike the preamble as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of
article V of the treaty.
Now, with regard to delivery vehicle modernization, and I want to
speak specifically in that regard to bombers, nearly 2 years ago I
began to have serious concerns about the administration's commitment to
developing a follow-on bomber aircraft and its overall commitment to
the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. These concerns were aggravated
by the administration's decision to terminate the development program
for a new bomber and reexamine the need, the requirement, and the
technology.
I was also troubled by Secretary Gates's statement on April 6, 2009,
that we will examine all of our strategic requirements in light of
post-START arms control negotiations, which leads me to be concerned
that this administration would allow the Russians to have a say in
whether we would develop a new bomber.
I was gratified to see that the Nuclear Posture Review determined
that the United States should sustain the nuclear triad for decades.
However, as the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
recently stated in a report entitled, ``Sustaining America's Strategic
Advantage in Long-Range Strike,'' the triad is in
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danger of becoming a dyad by default because nearly half of the bomber
inventory of the United States, 47 percent, predates the Cuban missile
crisis, and the only aircraft the United States possesses today with
reach and survivability to have a chance of successfully executing
missions more than 1,000 nautical miles into enemy territory from the
last air-to-air refueling are 16 combat-ready B-2 bombers.
Madam President, the B-2 was designed in the 1980s and achieved
initial operational capability over a decade ago, and they will
eventually lose their ability to penetrate advanced air defense
systems. The need, the requirement, and the technology for the next-
generation bomber is well understood. The need for a new long-range
strike capability is urgent because the conflicts of the future will
likely feature heavily defended airspace due in large part to the
proliferation of relatively inexpensive but extremely sophisticated and
deadly air defense systems. We have heard testimony before the Armed
Services Committee from intelligence officials that Russia is the
developer of most of these advanced air defense systems and is
exporting those systems both to China and to other countries in the
world.
Various past and present combatant commanders of the Pacific Command,
Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command have each testified in
support of the capability the next-generation bomber will provide.
As Senator McCain summarized in his letter to the Foreign Relations
Committee on the treaty, the 1251 plan and even the updated plan lack
critical details about decisions related to the follow-on ICBM, the
next-generation bomber, or a follow-on air-launched cruise missile.
General Chilton, the most recent STRATCOM commander, has spoken about
how conversations about these matters need to start now.
Development of replacement delivery vehicles for all three legs of
the triad need to begin during the life of New START. Decisions need to
be made and development needs to begin within the next 10 years or
replacement systems will not be available when current systems reach
the end of their service lives. There is no assurance that the next
long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. Therefore, I plan to offer
an amendment which will require the administration to certify that the
President has made a commitment to develop a replacement heavy bomber
that is both nuclear and conventionally capable.
With regard to delivery vehicle numbers, on July 9, 2009, at an Armed
Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN James Cartwright, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the administration's commitment at
that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the
range of 500 to 1,100 systems and to specify at what point in this
range would he become concerned that delivery vehicle reductions would
necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad. General Cartwright
responded, ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those
levels about midpoint,'' meaning he would be concerned if the
negotiated number fell below 800 delivery vehicles. This treaty caps
delivery vehicles at 700--substantially below the number General
Cartwright stated a year and a half ago.
The administration makes this odd distinction between deployed and
nondeployed delivery vehicles and points out that the total cap for the
treaty is 800 deployed and nondeployed systems. Of course, there is a
letter from General Cartwright in the Record stating he is comfortable
with the distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles
and the overall limits to delivery vehicles. But the real number we are
working with here is 700.
I think it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger
testified to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that,
``as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers
specified are adequate, though barely so.''
With regard to this limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, I find
it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it
will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. The
administration has informed the Senate how it might field a force of
720 delivery vehicles, which Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen
acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
June 17, 2010, would still require further reductions to meet the
treaty's central limits.
They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7
years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it
necessary to identify a final force structure at this point, meaning
the Senate will commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of
700 without knowing how that force will be composed. This problem is
compounded by the fact that the treaty was so poorly negotiated, that
for every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less
nuclear vehicle will be available to the United States.
The treaty essentially requires the United States to make unilateral
reductions in delivery vehicles, as Russia is already well below the
delivery vehicle limits and would drastically reduce its arsenal with
or without this treaty. As the Congressional Research Service writes:
Russia currently has only 620 launchers, and this number
may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers.
This would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters
into force because Russia is eliminating older missiles as
they age and deploying newer missiles at a far slower pace
than that needed to retain 700 deployed launchers.
Therefore, in light of all these facts, I will seek to offer an
amendment or two regarding the delivery vehicle numbers in this treaty.
I am also working on several other amendments that I may seek to offer
regarding prompt global strike and other issues.
Ultimately, this is a very significant treaty that deserves full and
fair consideration, and we should not be jamming the consideration of
this treaty up against the Christmas break. As I have indicated, there
are substantial issues here that need to be fully vetted, and we
obviously do not have the time to consider these issues this year. We
should wait until next year to fully consider this treaty and have a
full, free, and wide-open debate on this matter, with no restrictions
on amendments.
Exhibit 1
[From the National Review, Dec. 9, 2010]
Don't Force New Start
The treaty should not be a Christmas present for Russia
Twenty-four years ago, Pres. Ronald Reagan traveled to
Reykjavik, Iceland, to negotiate an arms control treaty with
the Soviet Union. When the Soviets insisted that the treaty
must limit America's missile defense program, which was
designed to guard against intercontinental ballistic
missiles, Reagan walked away. He later explained, ``We prefer
no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United
States.''
Apparently times have changed. President Obama wants to jam
a deeply flawed arms-control treaty with Russia, known as New
START, through a lame-duck session of the Senate just to rack
up an accomplishment before the end of the year.
New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain
a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To
remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the
Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for
debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the
Russians.
First and foremost, missile defense remains a major point
of disagreement between the United States and Russia, and
this treaty only makes the situation worse. Russia has
threatened to withdraw from the treaty if we expand our
missile-defense capabilities. It made a similar threat when
the original START was completed under the first President
Bush. At that time, President Bush said directly that our
missile-defense activities have no bearing on Russia's arms-
control obligations. I am concerned that President Obama's
response to the Russian threat this time is weaker.
Moreover, the treaty contains a direct limitation on U.S.
missile-defense-system deployments. Why does a treaty
ostensibly about offensive weapons mention missile defense at
all? It appears to have been included only to appease Russia.
Treaty proponents argue that New START furthers the legacy
of Ronald Reagan's vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
Let's be clear about one thing: President Reagan never would
have sacrificed missile defense on the altar of arms control.
Second, Russia has an estimated ten-to-one advantage over
the United States in tactical nuclear weapons, a situation
that was not addressed at all by New START. These are the
kinds of weapons that are most susceptible to theft or
diversion to emerging threats, including terrorists and rogue
nations such as North Korea and Iran. They are the weapons
Russia has reportedly moved closer to our NATO allies. One of
our top
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goals going into negotiations on this treaty should have been
to close that gap, so why wasn't it mentioned? Because the
Russians didn't want to talk about it.
Third, treaty proponents argue that the Senate must rush
consideration of New START because we now lack the ability to
verify what Russia is doing. This would make sense if the
verification provisions in the treaty were something to be
celebrated and worth rushing into place.
However, New START's verification provisions are much
weaker than what we had under the previous treaty. This is a
serious concern, because experts say Russia has essentially
cheated in one way or another on pretty much every major
arms-control treaty to which it is a party.
What's more, as the expiration date of the previous START
approached last year, the administration promised it would
come up with some sort of ``bridging agreement'' to keep
verification efforts going until the new treaty could be
ratified. The parties never finished that agreement, and so
any verification gap has been created by the administration.
The Senate has a responsibility to consider treaties
thoroughly to ensure they are in our country's best interest.
It should not rush its duty now to make up for the Obama
administration's mistakes. We lose nothing by postponing
consideration of this treaty until the new Congress convenes
in a few weeks.
This flawed treaty has too great an impact on America's
national security to be taken lightly or rushed for the sake
of political pride.
Mr. THUNE. Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, before the Senate at this moment is the
New START treaty, an agreement between the United States and Russia.
This is an effort to try to make this a safer world, to make certain
that the nuclear weapons that are in this world are carefully
monitored, that they are watched and inspected, and that we reduce any
urge to expand nuclear weaponry. It is an attempt to make this is a
safer world.
The President worked long and hard on this. He brought it for
consideration months ago, almost 7 months ago, and we have had
hundreds--at least 200 hearings. I am sorry, let me restate that. We
have had many Senate hearings--I don't have the exact number before me,
but I will get it--on this matter. We have had many efforts at every
level to bring experts from across America and from around the world to
support our effort and bring this matter before us.
What troubles me, Madam President, is the same thing we discussed
earlier at a press conference. We brought this matter to the floor of
the Senate over 24 hours ago. Yet speaker after speaker on the
Republican side has used this time on the floor of the Senate to come
and complain that they do not have any time to speak on the floor of
the Senate. They can't have it both ways. They can't come and give a
speech about the treaty, yet say the reason we shouldn't take it up is
they don't have an opportunity to speak on the treaty. They do have an
opportunity to speak on the treaty, and they have had it for more than
24 hours.
I asked Senator Kerry, as he left the floor: I know the Republicans
want to offer amendments to this treaty. How many amendments have been
filed?
He said: I will check, but I think only one amendment has been filed.
His staff has said that is the current situation--one amendment by
Senator McCain. Here we are, 26 hours into this debate, and one
amendment has been filed and no amendments have been called. Yet
speaker after speaker comes from the Republican side of the aisle and
says: The problem with this treaty is we don't have time to speak--as
they speak--and we don't have time to offer amendments--as they fail to
offer amendments.
So one has to step back and say that maybe the problem is not a
problem of time; maybe the problem is they just don't want to see this
treaty passed.
Thank goodness for Senator Lugar of Indiana, who has spoken up in
favor of this treaty. I said earlier at the press conference and would
say again with him on the floor that there aren't a handful of people
in America who are as expert as he is on this issue of nuclear arms and
the safety of those that currently exist. There was a time when people
across America thought his name was Senator Nunn-Lugar because they
kept hearing Nunn-Lugar, Nunn-Lugar. It was a time when Senator Sam
Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, and Senator Lugar, a Republican from
Indiana, really led this Nation and this world in taking an honest look
at nuclear weapons to see how we can make sure they are safe and don't
threaten our future. Senator Lugar knows--because he said as much
publicly--that this treaty moves us in the direction of a safer world.
During the height of the Cold War, there were enough nuclear weapons
on our planet to destroy all life many times over. Thank goodness the
Soviet Union is gone and we are in a new era, a more peaceful era.
Still, 20 years later, both Russia and the United States have thousands
of nuclear weapons in their arsenals--far more than either side needs
for maintaining security.
In an era of terrorist threats, we are faced with new challenges,
including a nuclear-armed Pakistan with al-Qaida operating within its
borders and countries such as Iran and North Korea pursuing their own
nuclear programs.
This week, we have a chance to make a difference--to reduce the
number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons in a way that not only makes
us safer but also strengthens America's authority in persuading other
nations around the world to halt their destabilizing practices.
Senator Lugar said:
START would strengthen our nonproliferation diplomacy
worldwide, limit potential arms competition, and help us
focus our defense resources effectively.
What a succinct description of a critically important measure before
us. Yet day after day--2 days now--hour after hour, Senate Republicans
come to the floor and say we just don't have time to do this.
Efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons have always been
bipartisan in the past, and they should be bipartisan today. As they
say, partisanship should end at the water's edge whether the President
is a Democrat or a Republican. If it is good for America, if it makes
us safer; if it moves us forward in the goal of a more peaceful world,
we should stand together with both parties working on it.
Unfortunately, the opposition we have heard over and over on the floor
has been from the other side.
I thank Senator John Kerry. I tell you, this man is a dogged and
determined legislator, and he has been working this issue harder than I
have ever seen him work anything in my life, for the last several
weeks, to get to this moment where we bring it up on the floor. He
understands that last December when the START I treaty expired, it left
the United States without key inspectors in Russia and reduced
important security transparency.
I would say to Senator Kerry, the modern patron saint of the
Republican Party is Ronald Reagan, and Ronald Reagan, in a few words,
summarized his view when it came to negotiating: Trust, but verify. For
376 days, we have been unable to verify what is going on in Russia with
their nuclear weapons. We don't know if they are being held safely--
treaty compliant. We just don't know. How can we be safer as a nation
in blissful ignorance of what is happening?
This New START treaty President Obama brings to us will put
inspectors on the ground in Russia and in the United States to make
certain both sides live up to the treaty obligations. That is
essential. It is something Russian President Medvedev called a ``truly
historic event.'' President Obama said at the signing that this is ``an
important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation, and for
U.S.-Russia relations.'' I couldn't agree with them more.
Here is the number I was searching for earlier. The Senate has
conducted 21 hearings and briefings on the New START treaty--a
significant number of opportunities to debate and assess the treaty.
In September, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
overwhelmingly approved the treaty on a bipartisan basis. The people
supporting this treaty across the board, Democrats and Republicans,
represent the best minds in America in recent history on the
subject. They include current administration officials, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, as well as Madeleine
Albright, former Senator Chuck Hagel, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Colin
Powell, James Schlesinger, George Shultz, Brent
[[Page S10373]]
Scowcroft, and John Warner. At least seven generals and admirals who
commanded our nuclear forces feel the same way.
This does not restrict the United States when it comes to missile
defense. It is very clear it does not. It is one of the things that has
been said, but the people who say it ignore the obvious. It was several
weeks ago when we had a NATO meeting on missile defense moving forward
to make our Nation safer, and the Russians were engaged in that dialog.
It was a historic breakthrough. They ignored that when they raised that
issue.
As Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said, the new treaty will
impose ``no limits on us'' when it comes to missile defense.
There is a concern, as well, expressed that the treaty does nothing
to address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, where the Russians
apparently outnumber us. I agree it is a serious issue that needs to be
addressed, especially from a nonproliferation viewpoint, since many of
these weapons are deployed in undisclosed locations. However, this
treaty, like the Moscow Treaty and the original START agreement,
deliberately and rightly focuses on strategic nuclear weapons.
Bipartisanship on issues of national security has been the hallmark
of our Nation. Even in the toughest of times and in the most desperate
political circumstances we have come together.
For example, in 1992, just after the Cold War came to an end, the
Senate ratified the first strategic arms reduction treaty by an
overwhelming vote of 93 to 6. Of my Republican Senators who are still
here today who were in attendance for the vote--Senators Bond, Cochran,
Grassley, Hatch, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, and Shelby--all voted in
support.
In 1996, the Senate voted 87 to 4 in support of START II, including
the votes of Republican Senators Bennett, Bond, Cochran, Grassley,
Gregg, Hatch, Hutchison, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, and Snowe.
In 2002, the Senate voted 95 to 0--that is right, 95 to 0--in support
of the Moscow Treaty, and 26 of the 27 Republicans there at the time
are still here today and they voted in support of that treaty.
At the peak of the Cold War, the stockpile of nuclear weapons held by
all nuclear weapons states was some 70,000 warheads, 1.6 million times
the power of the bomb at Hiroshima. We have reduced the number of those
weapons by more than two-thirds. Yet today the combined nuclear weapon
capability is still equal to 150,000 of the nuclear bombs used in World
War II.
Today we have an opportunity to further reduce this threat in a
responsible bipartisan way. I do not know when this session will end
tonight, but I will say to my colleagues on the other side of the
aisle: You have ample opportunity to debate. You have ample opportunity
to offer amendments.
Time is not a good excuse. We have been in session now, this day and
yesterday--we started at about 3:30. Only one amendment has been filed
on the Republican side. If they truly want to engage us in an important
debate about this treaty issue, do it now. Don't put it off. We have to
reach the point where we can verify what is being done in Russia to
make this a safer nation and to move us toward a more peaceful world.
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