[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 167 (Thursday, December 16, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10367-S10373]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           EXECUTIVE SESSION

                                 F_____
                                 

TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
                 STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS--Continued

  Mr. WICKER. Madam President, America had an election on November 2. 
Let me begin by reminding my colleagues that the American people spoke 
loudly and clearly in November and chose a far different team to serve 
in Washington. A vastly different leadership will soon take over in the 
House of Representatives, and a substantially different group of 
Senators was chosen by the American people in the election on November 
2.
  It seems the leadership of this lameduck Senate is determined, in the 
waning days of 2010, to pack quite a bit of legislation that normally 
is debated over a considerable amount of time into just a few days--not 
only the START treaty that we are on now but also don't ask, don't tell 
and supposedly the majority leader has not given up on the DREAM Act, 
which would provide amnesty to many illegal immigrants, and also there 
is the massive Omnibus appropriations bill with 2,000-plus pages.
  So we are here at this time, realizing that if the Congress doesn't 
act, the government will run out of money on Saturday. I assume a 
short-term CR will be done to address that. But certainly, it would be 
much easier if we passed what the minority leader suggested today; that 
is, a reasonable short-term resolution, so the government can be funded 
and the lights can stay on until mid-February, and the newly elected 
Congress--the people's choice--can best decide these great issues that 
are facing our country.
  I did find it interesting, a few moments ago, to hear the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee scold the Senate about the number of 
filibusters we have supposedly had in this term of Congress. I believe 
the statement was made that we have had more filibusters in the last 2 
years than we have had in decades or since World War II or words to 
that effect. Here is why that statement is only true in a very 
technical sense.
  It has been the practice of the majority, during the 3 years I have 
been in the Senate--and from what I understand much longer before 
that--to

[[Page S10368]]

bring a bill to the floor of the Senate. He immediately fills the 
amendment tree; that is, he offers all the amendments that are allowed 
under the parliamentary rules of the Senate. That is called filling the 
tree. It is so nobody else has an opportunity to file an amendment. 
Then, the majority leader files cloture on that bill. Technically, yes, 
that is considered a filibuster. But I do not believe that is what most 
of the American people consider a filibuster and a delaying tactic, 
with excessive speechifying, when they hear the term ``filibuster.''
  So let's be clear that there has been an unusual practice--at least 
in the last 3 or 4 years--of calling up a bill, filling the tree, 
filing for cloture, and then that goes down in history as a filibuster. 
With all we have to do and all our leadership has determined we must 
consider during these waning days of December 2010, we must divide our 
attention between an expensive 2,000-page omnibus bill and the 
consideration of a very complicated arms control agreement. It is that 
agreement I will discuss.
  It is hard to imagine a more important, more serious issue than our 
nuclear weapons stockpile. In my view, such a debate deserves our 
undivided attention. But we will pivot in a few moments and move to the 
omnibus bill.
  I wish to take what time I have at this point to begin sharing my 
concerns over this treaty and the effect it might have on national 
security.
  Article II of the Constitution requires that the Senate ratify any 
treaty the President signs with a two-thirds vote. I take this 
responsibility very seriously, as I am sure all my colleagues do. This 
responsibility requires us to review any proposed treaty to ensure it 
is in the national interest of the United States of America.
  As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a member of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, I have participated in the review of 
this treaty to date. While I appreciate the efforts of my chairman and 
my ranking member, I am not convinced that the treaty, in its current 
form, is in the national interests of the United States of America.
  I might add I am not alone in this view. To hear debate on the floor 
from time to time today, one would think all the learned authorities, 
all the collective wisdom of the United States of America, present and 
past, are in favor of the hasty ratification of this treaty. I simply 
point out that there is a wide variety of information and opinion out 
there that should be brought to the attention of Members of the Senate 
and the American people.
  First of all, I point out to my colleagues an op-ed by former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, which appeared in the December 7, 
2010, issue of the Wall Street Journal, entitled ``New Start: Ratify, 
with Caveats.'' Secretary Rice is generally in favor of the direction 
we are headed in the ratification of the START treaty. But she does say 
we need two caveats before ratification takes place. First, she states 
that smaller forces make the modernization of our nuclear 
infrastructure even more urgent. She commends the valiant efforts of 
Members of the Senate, including Senator Jon Kyl, to gain more robust 
modernization of our nuclear weapons. Secondly, the former Secretary of 
State says the Senate must make absolutely clear that in ratifying this 
treaty, the United States is not reestablishing the Cold War link 
between offensive forces and missile defenses. She says it is troubling 
that New START's preamble is unclear in this respect.
  I wonder, if we do decide as a Senate to move toward consideration of 
this treaty, if we will be allowed to offer amendments to the preamble 
to address the concerns of our immediate past Secretary of State.
  Further, I commend to my colleagues a Wall Street Journal op-ed, 
dated November 15, 2010, by R. James Woolsey. As my colleagues know, 
and many Americans know, Mr. Woolsey has a distinguished record as a 
delegate at large to the START and defense-based negotiations, back 
during the mid-1980s, as ambassador and chief negotiator for the 
Conventional Armed Forces of Europe Treaty from 1989 to 1991, and was 
President Clinton's Director of Central Intelligence from 1993 to 1995. 
So this bipartisan, experienced, former government official lists four 
concerns that he has with regard to the New START treaty. No. 1, he 
wonders about this administration's commitment to modernization. No. 2, 
he says it needs to be made clear that the United States, in ratifying 
New START, will not be limited at all in its missile defense, and he 
does not believe that has been taken care of. No. 3, Director Woolsey, 
President Clinton's Director of Central Intelligence, says this treaty 
represents a step backward in the verification process between the 
United States and Russia. Finally, Mr. Woolsey cites the need for a 
binding resolution on Russian submarine-launched cruise missiles. So I 
think there is information Members of the Senate need to hear about and 
need to consider.
  Further, I will mention two opinion pieces. One is by Stephen 
Rademaker, an Assistant Secretary of State from 2002 to 2006. It is a 
Washington Post op-ed on Friday, August 20, 2010. Secretary Rademaker 
authored an opinion piece saying this is no way to approve the New 
START treaty. In his opinion piece, Mr. Rademaker said Senate critics 
of New START have largely been cut out of the process.
  I know this from personal experience as a member of the Foreign 
Relations Committee. He goes on to say that all but two Republicans on 
the Foreign Relations Committee formally asked the administration to 
share with them the negotiating record of the treaty. They were told 
no, even though there is precedent for accommodating such requests.
  A simple request--had it been accommodated--perhaps could have 
allayed some of the concerns we have.
  In another op-ed, Mr. Rademaker, on December 10 of this year, said 
START will not stop nuclear proliferation. He points out that the claim 
that progress in United States-Russian arms control will help stop 
countries such as Iran from getting nuclear weapons isn't just an 
argument offered in support of New START, it is also one of the key 
premises underlying President Obama's embrace of global nuclear 
disarmament. There is just one problem. He said the notion that faster 
disarmament will lead to greater progress against nuclear proliferation 
has never added up.
  Then, further, I will quote from a September 8, 2010, Wall Street 
Journal piece by John Bolton, a senior fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute and former Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005. Secretary Bolton 
observes that the treaty's return to outmoded Cold War limits on 
weapons launchers, which will require the United States but not Russia 
to dismantle existing delivery systems, is a problem. He goes on to say 
this could cripple America's long-range conventional warhead delivery 
capabilities, while also severely constraining our nuclear flexibility. 
He said: ``We will pay for this mistake in future conflicts entirely 
unrelated to Russia.''
  I say to my colleagues that the jury is still out on this issue. 
These are experienced public servants, experts, and current observers 
of the international scene and the nuclear negotiation process. They 
have given us words that give me pause. It makes me think there is no 
reason to rush into a hasty ratification of this treaty.
  With regard to the process, hearings first started in May of this 
year. I was one of the Foreign Relations Committee members to request 
nine witnesses we believed were important and necessary to cover the 
extent of our concerns.
  This request was denied. There is no reason such a request would have 
been denied. In 12 hearings, there were two witnesses who spoke in 
opposition to this treaty. Members of the minority party requested 
others, but it nowhere came anywhere near the normal precedent given to 
the minority to have at least one witness on each panel. I was 
concerned that no former National Lab Directors were invited to 
testify.
  It is essential that an appropriate amount of time be spent on the 
Senate floor considering this treaty. Members who have serious concerns 
must be permitted the opportunity to offer amendments that would 
address the full range of problems.
  I would simply point out, this is the last quote of this speech 
today. In endorsing the START treaty, the Washington Post, on November 
19, said:

       Positive steps had been made and the treaty ought to be 
     approved.


[[Page S10369]]


  But it went on to say, the Editorial Board of the Washington Post 
went on to say:

       But no calamity will befall the United States if the Senate 
     does not act this year.

  I could not agree more with the Washington Post. It will not be a 
calamity if we are given adequate time to fully discuss, to fully 
examine, to fully debate all of the ramifications about an issue so 
profound as our nuclear weapons capability. The worst thing this body 
could do is shirk our constitutional responsibility by rushing this 
through in the final days of this lameduck session simply to check the 
box before the new team, the newly elected team comes to Washington and 
takes office in January.
  I ask unanimous consent that the Wall Street Journal article I 
referenced be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 2010]

                    New Start: Ratify, With Caveats

                         (By Condoleezza Rice)

       When U.S. President Bush and Russian President Putin signed 
     the Moscow Treaty in 2002, they addressed the nuclear threat 
     by reducing offensive weapons, as their predecessors had. But 
     the Moscow Treaty was different. It came in the wake of 
     America's 2001 withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
     Treaty of 1972, and for the first time the United States and 
     Russia reduced their offensive nuclear weapons with no 
     agreement in place that constrained missile defenses.
       Breaking the link between offensive force reductions and 
     limits on defense marked a key moment in the establishment of 
     a new nuclear agenda no longer focused on the Cold War face-
     off between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The real threat was 
     that the world's most dangerous weapons could end up in the 
     hands of the world's most dangerous regimes--or of terrorists 
     who would launch attacks more devastating than 9/11. And 
     since those very rogue states also pursued ballistic 
     missiles, defenses would (alongside offensive weapons) be 
     integral to the security of the United States and our allies.
       It is in this context that we should consider the potential 
     contribution of the New Start treaty to U.S. national 
     security. The treaty is modest, reducing offensive nuclear 
     weapons to 1,550 on each side--more than enough for 
     deterrence. While the treaty puts limits on launchers, U.S. 
     military commanders have testified that we will be able to 
     maintain a triad of bombers, submarine-based delivery 
     vehicles and land-based delivery vehicles. Moreover, the 
     treaty helpfully reinstates on-site verification of Russian 
     nuclear forces, which lapsed with the expiration of the 
     original Start treaty last year. Meaningful verification was 
     a significant achievement of Presidents Reagan and George 
     H.W. Bush, and its reinstatement is crucial.
       Still, there are legitimate concerns about New Start that 
     must and can be addressed in the ratification process and, if 
     the treaty is ratified, in future monitoring of the Obama 
     administration's commitments.
       First, smaller forces make the modernization of our nuclear 
     infrastructure even more urgent. Sen Jon Kyl of Arizona has 
     led a valiant effort in this regard. Thanks to his efforts, 
     roughly $84 billion is being allocated to the Department of 
     Energy's nuclear weapons complex. Ratifying the treaty will 
     help cement these commitments, and Congress should fully fund 
     the president's program. Congress should also support the 
     Defense Department in modernizing our launchers as suggested 
     in the recent defense strategy study coauthored by former 
     Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former National 
     Security Adviser Stephen Hadley.
       Second, the Senate must make absolutely clear that in 
     ratifying this treaty, the U.S. is not re-establishing the 
     Cold War link between offensive forces and missile defenses. 
     New Start's preamble is worrying in this regard, as it 
     recognizes the ``interrelationship'' of the two. 
     Administration officials have testified that there is no 
     link, and that the treaty will not limit U.S. missile 
     defenses. But Congress should ensure that future Defense 
     Department budgets reflect this.
       Moscow contends that only current U.S. missile-defense 
     plans are acceptable under the treaty. But the U.S. must 
     remain fully free to explore and then deploy the best 
     defenses--not just those imagined today. That includes 
     pursuing both potential qualitative breakthroughs and 
     quantitative increases.
       I have personally witnessed Moscow's tendency to interpret 
     every utterance as a binding commitment. The Russians need to 
     understand that the U.S. will use the full-range of American 
     technology and talent to improve our ability to intercept and 
     destroy the ballistic missiles of hostile countries.
       Russia should be reassured by the fact that its nuclear 
     arsenal is far too sophisticated and large to be degraded by 
     our missile defenses. In addition, the welcome agreements on 
     missile-defense cooperation reached in Lisbon recently 
     between NATO and Russia can improve transparency and allow 
     Moscow and Washington to work together in this field. After 
     all, a North Korean or Iranian missile is not a threat only 
     to the United States, but to international stability broadly.
       Ratification of the treaty also should not be sold as a way 
     to buy Moscow's cooperation on other issues. The men in the 
     Kremlin know that loose nukes in the hands of terrorists--
     some who operate in Russia's unstable south--are dangerous. 
     That alone should give our governments a reason to work 
     together beyond New Start and address the threat from 
     tactical nuclear weapons, which are smaller and more 
     dispersed, and therefore harder to monitor and control. 
     Russia knows too that a nuclear Iran in the volatile Middle 
     East or the further development of North Korea's arsenal is 
     not in its interest. Russia lives in those neighborhoods. 
     That helps explain Moscow's toughening stance toward Tehran 
     and its longstanding concern about Pyongyang.
       The issue before the Senate is the place of New Start in 
     America's future security. Nuclear weapons will be with us 
     for a long time. After this treaty, our focus must be on 
     stopping dangerous proliferators--not on further reductions 
     in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals, which are really 
     no threat to each other or to international stability.
       A modern but smaller nuclear arsenal and increasingly 
     sophisticated defenses are the right bases for U.S. nuclear 
     security (and that of our allies) going forward. With the 
     right commitments and understandings, ratification of the New 
     Start treaty can contribute to this goal. If the Senate 
     enters those commitments and understandings into a record of 
     ratification, New Start deserves bipartisan support, whether 
     in the lame duck session or next year.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. CARDIN. Madam President, as we take up the consideration of the 
New START, we not only have the opportunity, but also an obligation to 
provide consent on the ratification of this treaty. It is long overdue. 
We need to regain our ability to provide boots-on-the-ground 
verification of the Russian nuclear complex.
  Over the past 8 months, we have all had ample opportunity to review 
the documents and reports related to the New START. We have conducted 
20 hearings, taken over 900 questions. They were questions asked by 
Members of the Senate, mainly to the administration, in which those 
answers have been provided; 900 questions, over 900 for the record.
  In short, we have given significant consideration to the ratification 
of New START. I know my colleagues on both sides of the aisle are 
committed to guaranteeing the security of our country and also 
recognize the obligation to ratify this arms control agreement 
immediately.
  I want to take you back a little bit because I hear my colleagues 
talking about not having enough time. I want to take you back to a hot 
day this summer in the Foreign Relations Committee, where--Madam 
President, you were at that meeting in which those who are now saying 
we do not have enough time, asked for just a little bit more time, 
during the impending recess, so we could orderly consider the 
ratification process.
  That was a hot summer day. It is now a snowy day in December, and 
they are still saying the same thing: Just give us more time. We have 
had plenty of time.
  I compliment Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar for the manner in which 
they have considered this treaty. This is a very important treaty for 
America, and they have made sure that the Senate has had, and each 
Senator has had, ample opportunity to get all of the information we 
need--all of the information we need from administration individuals or 
from experts or from anyone. They have been very open in this process.
  They have also given every Member of the Senate ample time to get 
every question answered, to get all of the material they need, and it 
is now time for us to take on our responsibility; that is, to take up 
this treaty for ratification and vote it up or down.
  I certainly hope my colleagues will vote to ratify this treaty. I 
think it is critically important to our national security. In addition 
to its contributions to American security, one of the most compelling 
reasons we should ratify this treaty, and do so before we recess, is to 
regain our insight into Russia's strategic offensive arms.
  Since START I expired over a year ago, we have had no comprehensive 
verification regime in place in order to help us understand Russia's 
strategic nuclear force. We need the transparency to know what Russia 
is doing to provide confidence and stability, and we need that 
confidence and stability to contribute to a safer world. We will

[[Page S10370]]

only regain that transparency by ratifying this treaty, and we are in 
dangerous territory without it.
  Let me repeat. We need this treaty for verification. We need this 
treaty to know what Russia is doing, so we can verify what Russia tells 
us, to make sure, in fact, that it is true. Not only will this treaty 
enhance the national security of the United States, it will serve as a 
significant step forward in our relationship with Russia, a key partner 
in the overall U.S. strategy to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons 
worldwide.
  Let's be perfectly clear about this. There are still two nations that 
have the majority of the nuclear weapon capacity in this world; it is 
Russia and the United States. Working together, we can make this world 
safer. Working together, we can move forward with reductions in 
strategic arms around the world. Working together, we provide the 
leadership so we can move forward against proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. In fact, we have done that.
  But the failure to ratify this treaty could have a major negative 
impact on the leadership of the United States in this area. The U.S. 
relationship with the Russian Federation is key in our efforts to 
curtail Iran's nuclear ambitions. In June, Russia voted for the latest 
U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran and later canceled the sale of 
an advanced arms defensive missile system.
  The ratification of New START is essential in reinitiating 
verification inspections and, more importantly, for the United States 
and Russia to lead the way in reducing the world's nuclear arms 
stockpile. This is for leadership. We all talk about making sure Iran 
does not become a nuclear weapons state. Ratifying the New START treaty 
will help us in making sure Iran does not become a nuclear weapons 
state. It keeps the United States and Russia focused on strategic arms 
reduction and focused on nonproliferation.
  The failure to ratify this treaty is a setback in our ability to 
effectively stop Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state. New START, 
the first treaty with Russia in almost a decade, calls for both sides 
to reduce their deployed warheads modestly from 2,200 to 1,550. The new 
treaty would restore verification, inspections, and other exchanges of 
information about the American and Russian arsenals. New START could 
pay dividends not only by improving nuclear security but by paving the 
way to greater cooperation between the two powers in dealing with such 
hot spots as Iran and Afghanistan.
  Let me just point out one other part, if I might; that is, previous 
arms treaties have been ratified with overwhelming bipartisan support. 
START I was passed 93 to 6 in 1994. The Moscow Treaty passed 95 to 0 in 
2003. Legislators recognized then that arms control agreements between 
Russia and the United States are not just good for the security of our 
two nations but can lead the way to the world to reduce proliferation 
of nuclear weapons.
  During last month's NATO Summit in Lisbon, the NATO Secretary General 
stated:

       The New START treaty would also pave the way for arms 
     control and disarmament initiatives and other areas that are 
     vital to Euro-Atlantic security.

  So I think this is a key moment in the history of the Senate. I know 
there are many important votes that we take in the Senate. There are 
many votes we take that have very significant consequences. The 
ratification of this treaty is just one of those moments. It keeps us 
on path and enhances our credibility to make the world safer, and does 
it in a way that enhances the security of the people of the United 
States of America.
  This is a treaty that needs to be ratified and needs to be ratified 
now. I urge my colleagues to vote in the interests of national 
security, to move swiftly, and pass this treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I understand Senator Thune is the next 
to speak on the Republican side. I ask unanimous consent to follow him 
after he has spoken, and Senator Chambliss would then follow me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from South Dakota.
  Mr. THUNE. I thank the Senator from Illinois for locking in the time. 
I want to start by saying here we are, jammed against the Christmas 
break with the majority using Christmas as a backstop to rush through 
an arms control treaty with the Russians and a trillion-dollar spending 
bill on a dual-track basis.
  What that means is that we are considering, at the same time, two 
documents encompassing thousands of pages with very little ability to 
offer meaningful amendments or devote meaningful time to consider the 
full impact of these documents that will have a far-reaching and long-
term impact on our Nation.
  As I wrote recently in an op-ed that appeared in National Review 
Online:

       New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain 
     a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To 
     remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the 
     Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for 
     debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the 
     Russians.

  I ask unanimous consent that the op-ed I wrote for National Review 
Online entitled ``Don't Force New START,'' dated December 9, 2010, be 
printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1)
  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, the Nation's attention is fixed firmly on 
this travesty of an omnibus trillion-dollar appropriations bill which 
we should be debating now because the current funding resolution for 
the government ends tomorrow. We should not be debating a significant 
arms control treaty at this late date and trying to dual-track what I 
said earlier are thousands of pages of documents that need appropriate 
time on the floor of the Senate.
  I want to speak, if I might, briefly today to the substance of the 
START agreement and my concerns about that agreement in its current 
form. First of all, I want to speak to the issue of missile defense.
  The New START treaty not only contains specific limitations on 
missile defense in article V but also reestablishes an unwise linkage 
in the preamble to the treaty between offense and defense that was 
broken when the ABM treaty came to an end.
  Moreover, Russia's unilateral statement that the treaty ``can operate 
and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from 
developing its missile defense capabilities, quantitatively or 
qualitatively'' is extremely troubling.
  When viewed together, the New START treaty's preamble and Russia's 
unilateral statement amount to a Russian attempt to find a leverage 
point and exert political pressure upon the United States to forestall 
deploying a robust missile defense capability, by threatening to 
withdraw from the treaty if we seek to increase our missile defense 
capabilities.
  The remedy for this concern is for the Senate to strike the offensive 
preamble language. That is why I would wholeheartedly support an effort 
to strike the preamble as well as an amendment to strike paragraph 3 of 
article V of the treaty.
  Now, with regard to delivery vehicle modernization, and I want to 
speak specifically in that regard to bombers, nearly 2 years ago I 
began to have serious concerns about the administration's commitment to 
developing a follow-on bomber aircraft and its overall commitment to 
the triad of nuclear delivery vehicles. These concerns were aggravated 
by the administration's decision to terminate the development program 
for a new bomber and reexamine the need, the requirement, and the 
technology.
  I was also troubled by Secretary Gates's statement on April 6, 2009, 
that we will examine all of our strategic requirements in light of 
post-START arms control negotiations, which leads me to be concerned 
that this administration would allow the Russians to have a say in 
whether we would develop a new bomber.
  I was gratified to see that the Nuclear Posture Review determined 
that the United States should sustain the nuclear triad for decades.
  However, as the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
recently stated in a report entitled, ``Sustaining America's Strategic 
Advantage in Long-Range Strike,'' the triad is in

[[Page S10371]]

danger of becoming a dyad by default because nearly half of the bomber 
inventory of the United States, 47 percent, predates the Cuban missile 
crisis, and the only aircraft the United States possesses today with 
reach and survivability to have a chance of successfully executing 
missions more than 1,000 nautical miles into enemy territory from the 
last air-to-air refueling are 16 combat-ready B-2 bombers.
  Madam President, the B-2 was designed in the 1980s and achieved 
initial operational capability over a decade ago, and they will 
eventually lose their ability to penetrate advanced air defense 
systems. The need, the requirement, and the technology for the next-
generation bomber is well understood. The need for a new long-range 
strike capability is urgent because the conflicts of the future will 
likely feature heavily defended airspace due in large part to the 
proliferation of relatively inexpensive but extremely sophisticated and 
deadly air defense systems. We have heard testimony before the Armed 
Services Committee from intelligence officials that Russia is the 
developer of most of these advanced air defense systems and is 
exporting those systems both to China and to other countries in the 
world.
  Various past and present combatant commanders of the Pacific Command, 
Strategic Command, and Joint Forces Command have each testified in 
support of the capability the next-generation bomber will provide.
  As Senator McCain summarized in his letter to the Foreign Relations 
Committee on the treaty, the 1251 plan and even the updated plan lack 
critical details about decisions related to the follow-on ICBM, the 
next-generation bomber, or a follow-on air-launched cruise missile.
  General Chilton, the most recent STRATCOM commander, has spoken about 
how conversations about these matters need to start now.
  Development of replacement delivery vehicles for all three legs of 
the triad need to begin during the life of New START. Decisions need to 
be made and development needs to begin within the next 10 years or 
replacement systems will not be available when current systems reach 
the end of their service lives. There is no assurance that the next 
long-range bomber will be nuclear capable. Therefore, I plan to offer 
an amendment which will require the administration to certify that the 
President has made a commitment to develop a replacement heavy bomber 
that is both nuclear and conventionally capable.
  With regard to delivery vehicle numbers, on July 9, 2009, at an Armed 
Services Committee hearing, I asked GEN James Cartwright, the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, about the administration's commitment at 
that time to reduce our strategic delivery vehicles to somewhere in the 
range of 500 to 1,100 systems and to specify at what point in this 
range would he become concerned that delivery vehicle reductions would 
necessitate making our nuclear triad into a dyad. General Cartwright 
responded, ``I would be very concerned if we got down below those 
levels about midpoint,'' meaning he would be concerned if the 
negotiated number fell below 800 delivery vehicles. This treaty caps 
delivery vehicles at 700--substantially below the number General 
Cartwright stated a year and a half ago.
  The administration makes this odd distinction between deployed and 
nondeployed delivery vehicles and points out that the total cap for the 
treaty is 800 deployed and nondeployed systems. Of course, there is a 
letter from General Cartwright in the Record stating he is comfortable 
with the distinction between deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles 
and the overall limits to delivery vehicles. But the real number we are 
working with here is 700.
  I think it is worth noting that former Defense Secretary Schlesinger 
testified to the Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, that, 
``as to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the numbers 
specified are adequate, though barely so.''
  With regard to this limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, I find 
it very troubling that the administration has yet to articulate how it 
will deploy a nuclear force conforming to the number of 700. The 
administration has informed the Senate how it might field a force of 
720 delivery vehicles, which Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen 
acknowledged in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
June 17, 2010, would still require further reductions to meet the 
treaty's central limits.
  They went on to argue that because the United States will have 7 
years to reduce its forces to these limits, they did not find it 
necessary to identify a final force structure at this point, meaning 
the Senate will commit the United States to a delivery vehicle force of 
700 without knowing how that force will be composed. This problem is 
compounded by the fact that the treaty was so poorly negotiated, that 
for every ICBM or SLBM deployed with a conventional warhead, one less 
nuclear vehicle will be available to the United States.
  The treaty essentially requires the United States to make unilateral 
reductions in delivery vehicles, as Russia is already well below the 
delivery vehicle limits and would drastically reduce its arsenal with 
or without this treaty. As the Congressional Research Service writes:

       Russia currently has only 620 launchers, and this number 
     may decline to around 400 deployed and 444 total launchers. 
     This would likely be true whether or not the treaty enters 
     into force because Russia is eliminating older missiles as 
     they age and deploying newer missiles at a far slower pace 
     than that needed to retain 700 deployed launchers.

  Therefore, in light of all these facts, I will seek to offer an 
amendment or two regarding the delivery vehicle numbers in this treaty. 
I am also working on several other amendments that I may seek to offer 
regarding prompt global strike and other issues.
  Ultimately, this is a very significant treaty that deserves full and 
fair consideration, and we should not be jamming the consideration of 
this treaty up against the Christmas break. As I have indicated, there 
are substantial issues here that need to be fully vetted, and we 
obviously do not have the time to consider these issues this year. We 
should wait until next year to fully consider this treaty and have a 
full, free, and wide-open debate on this matter, with no restrictions 
on amendments.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the National Review, Dec. 9, 2010]

                         Don't Force New Start


        The treaty should not be a Christmas present for Russia

       Twenty-four years ago, Pres. Ronald Reagan traveled to 
     Reykjavik, Iceland, to negotiate an arms control treaty with 
     the Soviet Union. When the Soviets insisted that the treaty 
     must limit America's missile defense program, which was 
     designed to guard against intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles, Reagan walked away. He later explained, ``We prefer 
     no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United 
     States.''
       Apparently times have changed. President Obama wants to jam 
     a deeply flawed arms-control treaty with Russia, known as New 
     START, through a lame-duck session of the Senate just to rack 
     up an accomplishment before the end of the year.
       New START misses one opportunity after another to maintain 
     a stable nuclear relationship between our two countries. To 
     remedy this will require significant time on the floor of the 
     Senate. Trying to force it through without ample time for 
     debate and amendments would amount to a Christmas gift to the 
     Russians.
       First and foremost, missile defense remains a major point 
     of disagreement between the United States and Russia, and 
     this treaty only makes the situation worse. Russia has 
     threatened to withdraw from the treaty if we expand our 
     missile-defense capabilities. It made a similar threat when 
     the original START was completed under the first President 
     Bush. At that time, President Bush said directly that our 
     missile-defense activities have no bearing on Russia's arms-
     control obligations. I am concerned that President Obama's 
     response to the Russian threat this time is weaker.
       Moreover, the treaty contains a direct limitation on U.S. 
     missile-defense-system deployments. Why does a treaty 
     ostensibly about offensive weapons mention missile defense at 
     all? It appears to have been included only to appease Russia.
       Treaty proponents argue that New START furthers the legacy 
     of Ronald Reagan's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. 
     Let's be clear about one thing: President Reagan never would 
     have sacrificed missile defense on the altar of arms control.
       Second, Russia has an estimated ten-to-one advantage over 
     the United States in tactical nuclear weapons, a situation 
     that was not addressed at all by New START. These are the 
     kinds of weapons that are most susceptible to theft or 
     diversion to emerging threats, including terrorists and rogue 
     nations such as North Korea and Iran. They are the weapons 
     Russia has reportedly moved closer to our NATO allies. One of 
     our top

[[Page S10372]]

     goals going into negotiations on this treaty should have been 
     to close that gap, so why wasn't it mentioned? Because the 
     Russians didn't want to talk about it.
       Third, treaty proponents argue that the Senate must rush 
     consideration of New START because we now lack the ability to 
     verify what Russia is doing. This would make sense if the 
     verification provisions in the treaty were something to be 
     celebrated and worth rushing into place.
       However, New START's verification provisions are much 
     weaker than what we had under the previous treaty. This is a 
     serious concern, because experts say Russia has essentially 
     cheated in one way or another on pretty much every major 
     arms-control treaty to which it is a party.
       What's more, as the expiration date of the previous START 
     approached last year, the administration promised it would 
     come up with some sort of ``bridging agreement'' to keep 
     verification efforts going until the new treaty could be 
     ratified. The parties never finished that agreement, and so 
     any verification gap has been created by the administration.
       The Senate has a responsibility to consider treaties 
     thoroughly to ensure they are in our country's best interest. 
     It should not rush its duty now to make up for the Obama 
     administration's mistakes. We lose nothing by postponing 
     consideration of this treaty until the new Congress convenes 
     in a few weeks.
       This flawed treaty has too great an impact on America's 
     national security to be taken lightly or rushed for the sake 
     of political pride.

  Mr. THUNE. Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, before the Senate at this moment is the 
New START treaty, an agreement between the United States and Russia. 
This is an effort to try to make this a safer world, to make certain 
that the nuclear weapons that are in this world are carefully 
monitored, that they are watched and inspected, and that we reduce any 
urge to expand nuclear weaponry. It is an attempt to make this is a 
safer world.
  The President worked long and hard on this. He brought it for 
consideration months ago, almost 7 months ago, and we have had 
hundreds--at least 200 hearings. I am sorry, let me restate that. We 
have had many Senate hearings--I don't have the exact number before me, 
but I will get it--on this matter. We have had many efforts at every 
level to bring experts from across America and from around the world to 
support our effort and bring this matter before us.
  What troubles me, Madam President, is the same thing we discussed 
earlier at a press conference. We brought this matter to the floor of 
the Senate over 24 hours ago. Yet speaker after speaker on the 
Republican side has used this time on the floor of the Senate to come 
and complain that they do not have any time to speak on the floor of 
the Senate. They can't have it both ways. They can't come and give a 
speech about the treaty, yet say the reason we shouldn't take it up is 
they don't have an opportunity to speak on the treaty. They do have an 
opportunity to speak on the treaty, and they have had it for more than 
24 hours.
  I asked Senator Kerry, as he left the floor: I know the Republicans 
want to offer amendments to this treaty. How many amendments have been 
filed?
  He said: I will check, but I think only one amendment has been filed.
  His staff has said that is the current situation--one amendment by 
Senator McCain. Here we are, 26 hours into this debate, and one 
amendment has been filed and no amendments have been called. Yet 
speaker after speaker comes from the Republican side of the aisle and 
says: The problem with this treaty is we don't have time to speak--as 
they speak--and we don't have time to offer amendments--as they fail to 
offer amendments.
  So one has to step back and say that maybe the problem is not a 
problem of time; maybe the problem is they just don't want to see this 
treaty passed.
  Thank goodness for Senator Lugar of Indiana, who has spoken up in 
favor of this treaty. I said earlier at the press conference and would 
say again with him on the floor that there aren't a handful of people 
in America who are as expert as he is on this issue of nuclear arms and 
the safety of those that currently exist. There was a time when people 
across America thought his name was Senator Nunn-Lugar because they 
kept hearing Nunn-Lugar, Nunn-Lugar. It was a time when Senator Sam 
Nunn, a Democrat from Georgia, and Senator Lugar, a Republican from 
Indiana, really led this Nation and this world in taking an honest look 
at nuclear weapons to see how we can make sure they are safe and don't 
threaten our future. Senator Lugar knows--because he said as much 
publicly--that this treaty moves us in the direction of a safer world.
  During the height of the Cold War, there were enough nuclear weapons 
on our planet to destroy all life many times over. Thank goodness the 
Soviet Union is gone and we are in a new era, a more peaceful era. 
Still, 20 years later, both Russia and the United States have thousands 
of nuclear weapons in their arsenals--far more than either side needs 
for maintaining security.
  In an era of terrorist threats, we are faced with new challenges, 
including a nuclear-armed Pakistan with al-Qaida operating within its 
borders and countries such as Iran and North Korea pursuing their own 
nuclear programs.
  This week, we have a chance to make a difference--to reduce the 
number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons in a way that not only makes 
us safer but also strengthens America's authority in persuading other 
nations around the world to halt their destabilizing practices.
  Senator Lugar said:

       START would strengthen our nonproliferation diplomacy 
     worldwide, limit potential arms competition, and help us 
     focus our defense resources effectively.

  What a succinct description of a critically important measure before 
us. Yet day after day--2 days now--hour after hour, Senate Republicans 
come to the floor and say we just don't have time to do this.
  Efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons have always been 
bipartisan in the past, and they should be bipartisan today. As they 
say, partisanship should end at the water's edge whether the President 
is a Democrat or a Republican. If it is good for America, if it makes 
us safer; if it moves us forward in the goal of a more peaceful world, 
we should stand together with both parties working on it. 
Unfortunately, the opposition we have heard over and over on the floor 
has been from the other side.
  I thank Senator John Kerry. I tell you, this man is a dogged and 
determined legislator, and he has been working this issue harder than I 
have ever seen him work anything in my life, for the last several 
weeks, to get to this moment where we bring it up on the floor. He 
understands that last December when the START I treaty expired, it left 
the United States without key inspectors in Russia and reduced 
important security transparency.
  I would say to Senator Kerry, the modern patron saint of the 
Republican Party is Ronald Reagan, and Ronald Reagan, in a few words, 
summarized his view when it came to negotiating: Trust, but verify. For 
376 days, we have been unable to verify what is going on in Russia with 
their nuclear weapons. We don't know if they are being held safely--
treaty compliant. We just don't know. How can we be safer as a nation 
in blissful ignorance of what is happening?
  This New START treaty President Obama brings to us will put 
inspectors on the ground in Russia and in the United States to make 
certain both sides live up to the treaty obligations. That is 
essential. It is something Russian President Medvedev called a ``truly 
historic event.'' President Obama said at the signing that this is ``an 
important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation, and for 
U.S.-Russia relations.'' I couldn't agree with them more.
  Here is the number I was searching for earlier. The Senate has 
conducted 21 hearings and briefings on the New START treaty--a 
significant number of opportunities to debate and assess the treaty.
  In September, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
overwhelmingly approved the treaty on a bipartisan basis. The people 
supporting this treaty across the board, Democrats and Republicans, 
represent the best minds in America in recent history on the 
subject. They include current administration officials, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, as well as Madeleine 
Albright, former Senator Chuck Hagel, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Colin 
Powell, James Schlesinger, George Shultz, Brent

[[Page S10373]]

Scowcroft, and John Warner. At least seven generals and admirals who 
commanded our nuclear forces feel the same way.

  This does not restrict the United States when it comes to missile 
defense. It is very clear it does not. It is one of the things that has 
been said, but the people who say it ignore the obvious. It was several 
weeks ago when we had a NATO meeting on missile defense moving forward 
to make our Nation safer, and the Russians were engaged in that dialog. 
It was a historic breakthrough. They ignored that when they raised that 
issue.
  As Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said, the new treaty will 
impose ``no limits on us'' when it comes to missile defense.
  There is a concern, as well, expressed that the treaty does nothing 
to address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, where the Russians 
apparently outnumber us. I agree it is a serious issue that needs to be 
addressed, especially from a nonproliferation viewpoint, since many of 
these weapons are deployed in undisclosed locations. However, this 
treaty, like the Moscow Treaty and the original START agreement, 
deliberately and rightly focuses on strategic nuclear weapons.
  Bipartisanship on issues of national security has been the hallmark 
of our Nation. Even in the toughest of times and in the most desperate 
political circumstances we have come together.
  For example, in 1992, just after the Cold War came to an end, the 
Senate ratified the first strategic arms reduction treaty by an 
overwhelming vote of 93 to 6. Of my Republican Senators who are still 
here today who were in attendance for the vote--Senators Bond, Cochran, 
Grassley, Hatch, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, and Shelby--all voted in 
support.
  In 1996, the Senate voted 87 to 4 in support of START II, including 
the votes of Republican Senators Bennett, Bond, Cochran, Grassley, 
Gregg, Hatch, Hutchison, Lugar, McCain, McConnell, and Snowe.
  In 2002, the Senate voted 95 to 0--that is right, 95 to 0--in support 
of the Moscow Treaty, and 26 of the 27 Republicans there at the time 
are still here today and they voted in support of that treaty.
  At the peak of the Cold War, the stockpile of nuclear weapons held by 
all nuclear weapons states was some 70,000 warheads, 1.6 million times 
the power of the bomb at Hiroshima. We have reduced the number of those 
weapons by more than two-thirds. Yet today the combined nuclear weapon 
capability is still equal to 150,000 of the nuclear bombs used in World 
War II.
  Today we have an opportunity to further reduce this threat in a 
responsible bipartisan way. I do not know when this session will end 
tonight, but I will say to my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle: You have ample opportunity to debate. You have ample opportunity 
to offer amendments.
  Time is not a good excuse. We have been in session now, this day and 
yesterday--we started at about 3:30. Only one amendment has been filed 
on the Republican side. If they truly want to engage us in an important 
debate about this treaty issue, do it now. Don't put it off. We have to 
reach the point where we can verify what is being done in Russia to 
make this a safer nation and to move us toward a more peaceful world.

                          ____________________