[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 167 (Thursday, December 16, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10315-S10359]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Omnibus Appropriations
Mr. DURBIN. Madam President, I want to respond to what has been said
by my friend Senator Kyl from Arizona, as well as Senator McConnell of
Kentucky, about the appropriations bill, which we are going to consider
in a very short period of time.
I am a member of this Appropriations Committee. I remember what
happened, and I want to put it on the record right now so that some of
the things that have been said can be compared to what I think is the
reality. This is the reality: The Appropriations subcommittees--each
and every subcommittee of that full committee--met with Democrats and
Republicans and prepared a bill. I have the Subcommittee on Financial
Services and General Government. Senator Susan Collins of Maine worked
long and hard in preparation of that bill. Other subcommittee chairs
did the same thing. There was full bipartisan cooperation in the
preparation of each of these subcommittee bills--every single one of
them. And the appropriations bill that we will vote on is the
combination of all of that effort.
Let me also talk about the amount of money we are going to
appropriate to continue to fund the operations of our Federal
Government.
It is true, it is over $1 trillion. In fact, it is $1.1 trillion in
this bill. But what hasn't been said by Senator McConnell and Senator
Kyl is that is exactly the amount they asked for. Senator McConnell
came to the Senate Appropriations Committee and said Republicans will
not support this bill unless you bring the spending down to $1.108
trillion. That is exactly what we bring to the floor to be considered.
So to stand back in horror and look at $1.1 trillion and say, where
did this figure come from, well, it came from Senator Mitch McConnell
in a motion he made before the Senate Appropriations Committee. It
reflects the amount that he said was the maximum we should spend in
this current calendar year on our appropriations bills. He prevailed.
It is the same number as the so-called Sessions-McCaskill figure that
has been debated back and forth on this floor, voted repeatedly by the
Republicans to be the appropriate total number. So we have a bipartisan
agreement on the total number. Yet now the Republican leader comes to
the floor, stands in horror at the idea of $1.1 trillion--the very same
number he asked for in this bill. You can't have it both ways.
Secondly, they say, well, this is a 2,000-page bill. Well, allow me
to explain why.
When you take the work of 12 subcommittees, instead of separate bills
and put them in one bill, the total number of pages is going to
increase. Maybe the best thing we can give as a Christmas gift to the
Senate Republican Caucus is a speed reading course so they can sit down
and read these bills. It turns out their fingers get smudgy and their
lips get tired if you have more than 100 pages in a bill. Over and over
we are told, don't worry about the substance, just count the pages, and
if it gets up to a thousand pages, it is clearly a bad bill. Wrong.
This 2,000-page bill reflects the work of 12 subcommittees and 12
Republican Senators who helped to assemble and to devise the contents
of that bill. It is no surprise that it would reach that number when we
put all of the spending bills--the Appropriations subcommittee bills--
into one document.
Another point that is raised--what a surprise--we have this thing
thrown at us. We have not seen this before. We don't have time to look
at this.
This bill was posted 2 days ago, and will be available not only for
every Senator and every staff member but for every citizen of this
country to look at in detail. The reason Members have been coming to
the floor talking about its contents is they have access to it, and
have had for almost 48 hours, and will for an even longer period of
time before it is finally considered.
I also want to say that the schedule we are facing here now, which is
putting us up against some deadlines--deadlines for the funding of
government, a lot of personal family deadlines, which trouble all of
us, but we accepted this job and its responsibility--many of these
deadlines have come to be because of an exercise of the Senate rules.
Time and time and time again the Republican minority has forced us to
go into a cloture vote, into a filibuster--record-breaking numbers of
filibusters over the last several years.
If Members of the Senate were to go back home and ask the cable TV
viewers who watch C-SPAN what their impression of the Senate is, their
impression is an empty Chamber--an empty
[[Page S10316]]
Chamber because day after weary day we have had to put up with cloture
votes and filibusters from the Republican side, delaying us time and
time and time again while we burned off the hours on the clock instead
of rolling up our sleeves and actually getting down to business.
Now they come and tell us, well, we are going to threaten to start
reading bills. They have a right to do that under the rules. It is
really not needed, since all these bills have been posted and any
Senator who wanted to read them has now had 48 hours to read this
appropriations bill, if they wanted to. But they may burn off hours on
the clock again and then complain we are ruining Christmas for Members
of the Senate and their families. Well, unfortunately, their hands are
not clean.
When it comes to the things included in this bill, incidentally, I
have heard many Republican Senators come down here and talk about
specific elements in this Appropriations bill they disagree with, and
that is their right. But many of the same Senators who are criticizing
congressionally directed spending, or earmarks, have earmarks in the
bill. That is the height of hypocrisy--to stand up and request an
earmark, have it included in the bill, and then fold your arms and
piously announce, I am against earmarks. You ought to be consistent
enough to know if you are asking for an earmark one day and criticizing
it the next, your credibility is going to be challenged. That is a
fact.
As far as some of the things that have been talked about, one of them
brought up by Senator Kyl relates to drilling, and how quickly drilling
permits will be issued by the Federal Government.
Our Department of Interior has asked for 90 days to review
applications for drilling permits included in the bill. Why would we
want to be careful when it comes to drilling permits? America knows
why. We saw what happened in the Gulf of Mexico. We saw the damage
done. And we know for many businesses and many families and many
people, and for a very fragile environment, things will never be the
same. Let us avoid that from happening in the future. Waiting 90 days
instead of 30 days is hardly an onerous burden to make sure that what
is done is done properly and done in a way that won't come back to
haunt us.
Finally, to argue this is disrespectful of the democratic process is
to ignore the obvious. Time and time and time again, when we have tried
to move the democratic process, we have run into a roadblock with
filibusters from the other side of the aisle--obstructionism.
I am glad we passed the tax bill yesterday. It was an amazing day. I
think the final vote was 81 to 18, which was an incredibly strong
bipartisan showing. Let's end this session on a bipartisan note. Let's
get away from lobbing bombs back and forth across the aisle. Let us
roll up our sleeves and get down to what we need to do.
Senator Kyl should come to the floor and offer his amendment on the
START treaty. He has talked about needing time to offer amendments.
Let's do it, and let's do it this morning. Let's start the amendment
process, let's have votes, let's not filibuster anything. Let's get to
the vote, vote on the substance, and let's bring it to an end. Then let
us bring up the Omnibus appropriations bill and the CR, let the Senate
work its will, and let's vote on it.
We have two or three other items we can complete, and if people don't
exercise delay tactics, we can get this done in a few days. I urge my
colleagues, in the spirit of what we did with the President's tax
package, let's return to a more bipartisan approach to completing our
business and going home to our families.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. What is the business before the Senate?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The START treaty.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. I wish to work with my colleague, the
chairman of our committee, to make time available to Senators. I see
the distinguished Senator on the floor.
Are you prepared, sir, to make a statement?
Mr. BARRASSO. Madam President, yes, I am.
Mr. LUGAR. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. BARRASSO. Madam President, I rise today to express my views on
the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, also known as New START. This
treaty is an extremely important and serious matter. New START
significantly impacts America's national security and nuclear
deterrent. As a result, I believe this treaty deserves adequate time in
the Senate--time to examine the issues, time to debate the many flawed
provisions, and time to vote on all of the amendments offered for
consideration.
The majority leader should not be piecemealing together segments of
time for debate on an issue as important as nuclear arms control. The
treaty should not be shortchanged and rushed through the Senate. The
treaty should not be jammed together with consideration of a 1,924-page
omnibus Federal spending bill. The treaty should not be considered
during a lameduck session.
Consideration of the treaty will require a substantial amount of time
in order to sufficiently address its many flaws. Like many of my
colleagues, I plan on offering amendments, amendments designed to
protect our national security. This debate concerns the national
security of the United States. It is critical that the United States
maintains a strong nuclear deterrent in order to defend our Nation and
provide assurances to our allies. I have major concerns about the
impact the New START will have on Wyoming and on national security.
While I have many issues with the New START, I want to address only a
few of my major concerns this morning. First, START straitjackets the
U.S. missile defense capabilities. Second, START offers no method to
make sure a historically noncompliant Russia state will keep its
promises. Third, the approach embodied by START is representative of an
outdated and simplistic view of the U.S. position on the world stage.
To begin, I wish to specifically discuss the limitations placed on
the U.S. missile defense by the New START. The treaty signed by
President Obama and Russian President Medvedev on April 8, 2010, places
explicit limitations on U.S. missile defense. The preamble of the
treaty--the preamble declares an interrelationship between strategic
nuclear offensive weapons and strategic nuclear defensive weapons. It
implies the right of Russia to withdraw from the treaty based on U.S.
missile defenses that are beyond ``current strategic'' capabilities.
The treaty preamble, the very preamble of the treaty, gives Russia an
opportunity to turn their backs on the treaty at the slightest sign of
a shift in American defensive strategy. This language is unacceptable
and needs to be removed.
I offered an amendment in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
to strike this language. The White House resists any attempt to amend
the preamble. The administration argues it is a nonbinding concession
to Russia. Russia clearly doesn't see it that same way. They have made
it quite clear they consider the preamble legally binding. A Russian
Foreign Minister stated the treaty contained ``legally binding linkage
between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons.'' The
Russians have wanted this language for a long time in order to have
grounds to claim that the U.S. missile defense program violates an
international agreement. This type of constraining language is not
unique to the preamble.
The treaty also places a legally binding limitation on missile
defense in article V of the treaty. Article V prohibits the
transforming of offensive strategic missile launchers into defensive
strategic missile launchers. As this Nation continues to face threats
from around the world, we should not take any action that will hinder
our missile defense options. We need to be able to defend ourselves.
Just like the preamble, the administration makes excuses as to why
they have made concessions to the Russians on our missile defense. The
current administration claims that they have no plans to use the
missile defense options
[[Page S10317]]
prohibited under the new START treaty. I believe that placing any
constraints on future U.S. defense capabilities should not even be up
for debate, let alone placed in a treaty on strategic offensive nuclear
weapons.
The purpose of New START was to reduce strategic nuclear weapons
between the United States and Russia, not limit the ability of the
United States to defend ourselves. It is outrageous that the
administration would make any concessions to Russia on our national
security.
The United States must always remain in charge of our own missile
defense--not Russia, not any other country. We should not be tying our
hands behind our backs and risking the security of our Nation and our
allies. Russia is trying to force the United States to choose between
missile defense and the treaty. The clear choice should always be to
protect the ability of the United States to defend ourselves. I believe
the administration's decision was a serious mistake.
I also have major concerns about the central limits of New START.
This treaty is a one-sided agreement aimed at only reducing U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is currently below the limit for
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the New START treaty. As a
result, Russia will not have to make reductions. The United States will
be the only party required to slash its forces.
Due to loopholes in the treaty counting rules, Russia could deploy
more than 1,550 warheads, go above that ceiling and still be in
compliance with the treaty. Russia may even be able to deploy more than
2,100 warheads under the treaty. Each deployed heavy bomber, regardless
of the actual number of warheads on it, only counts as one deployed
strategic warhead. If anything, the limits just tell Russia how many
weapons they are allowed to add to their strategic nuclear force. Why
would the administration enter into a bilateral treaty that only
requires the United States to make sacrifices? This is not acceptable.
New START offers us nothing in return, not even a robust verification
mechanism that enables us to make sure Russia is keeping its promises.
President Ronald Reagan regularly repeated the phrase ``trust, but
verify.'' He did it repeatedly regarding nuclear weapons. The
verification measures play an important role in analyzing the New
START. The New START has a weak verification regime.
Former Secretary of State James Baker made the exact point by
indicating the New START verification procedure provisions, he said,
were weaker than the original New START. Under New START, the U.S.
would be limited to 18 inspections per year as opposed to 28 in the
past. Under the original START treaty the United States conducted
approximately 600 inspections. Under New START the United States is
limited to a maximum of 180 inspections. This further plays into
Russia's favor due to there being 35 Russian facilities compared to
only 17 U.S. facilities to inspect.
The administration also dropped two key provisions from New START.
The United States will no longer have continuous monitoring at the
Russian nuclear missile assembly plant. We had it in START I. Why are
we giving up this important verification component in New START? The
United States also will not have full access to Russian nuclear
ballistic missile launch telemetry under New START. Under START I we
had unrestricted access. Why are we giving that up?
The treaty does not provide us with the verification mechanisms that
enable us to make sure Russia is keeping its promises. Instead, there
is a lot of trust and precious little verification.
A weaker verification system is even more dangerous due to Russia's
long history of noncompliance on arms control treaties. Russia has a
record of noncompliance and violations under the original START treaty.
Up until the end of the original START treaty in December of 2009,
Russia was continuing to engage in compliance violations. The
Department of State compliance reports from 2010 spell out the numerous
violations made by the Russians.
Finally, the treaty relies on the false premise that Russia is
America's only nuclear rival. This view of the world is outdated and
simplistic. Even if we could trust Russia there are numerous other
threats such as North Korea and Iran which have repeatedly shown
hostility to the United States and to our allies. We should never
abandon our defenses and sacrifice our deterrent in the face of
increasing international belligerence. It is the equivalent of asking
America to stare down the barrel of a gun without knowing whether the
gun is loaded, and then to trust the person holding it not to pull the
trigger.
In arguing for this treaty the administration has tried to have it
both ways. The treaty demands the United States reduce our nuclear
strike force by specific numbers. Yet the administration has only
offered a vague range of estimates regarding where these cuts would
take place. The President's force structure plan provides up to 420
intercontinental ballistic missiles, 14 submarines carrying up to 240
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and up to 60 nuclear-capable
levee bombers.
Even if the administration did cut the absolute maximum number of
weapons it has proposed to cut, it would still fail to live up to the
reductions demanded by New START. Instead of giving the Senate a
specific force structure, the President is repeating his health care
playbook and telling us to wait until after the United States ratifies
the treaty to find out the details.
It is wrong that the Senate is considering approving this treaty
without knowing these details, and these details matter.
The force structure of our nuclear triad is critical to maintaining
an effective deterrent. The nuclear triad of the United States spans
sea, air, and land. By working together, our nuclear triad complicates
and deters any attempt at a successful first strike by anyone on our
country. I believe the President's force structure proposal will weaken
our nuclear triad.
The American people deserve a full debate on the Senate floor on a
treaty of this magnitude. It is my hope that the Senate will take its
constitutional responsibility very seriously and provide the New START
with the scrutiny it deserves.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I understand the distinguished Senator on
the floor wishes to speak. I yield for Senator Udall.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. UDALL of Colorado. Madam President, let me start by thanking my
good friend from Indiana, not only for yielding the floor to me but for
his strong leadership on this crucial treaty before us here in the
Senate.
I rise in strong support of the New START treaty. I want to start by
reminding my colleagues that arms control treaties are an integral part
of this country's modern history, premised on a shared belief that a
world with fewer nuclear weapons is a safer world. Even as the Cold War
raged, it was Ronald Reagan who committed America to the ultimate goal
of eliminating these weapons from the face of the Earth.
Those are his very words. This goal has animated numerous arms
control agreements since then and it underpins the New START treaty, an
agreement I believe we cannot fail to ratify. The dangers of nuclear
proliferation have grown. As the Senator from Indiana knows well,
because this has been a part of his life's work, the threat of global
nuclear war has receded but the risk of nuclear attack has increased,
enabled by the spread of nuclear technology and the danger of materials
falling into the wrong hands.
I believe we cannot be seen as a credible leader of a nation strongly
committed to meeting our nonproliferation obligations unless we pursue
further nuclear arms reductions ourselves. The United States and Russia
have over 90 percent of the world's nuclear arms between us. Thus, we
have an obligation to verifiably decrease our nuclear stockpiles and
reduce this primary threat to global and national security. That is why
the New START treaty matters. It establishes limits for U.S. and
Russian nuclear weapons to levels lower than the 1991 START Treaty and
the 2002 Moscow treaty.
These limits have been validated by our defense planners and ensure
that we have the flexibility to meet our security needs.
[[Page S10318]]
The treaty also includes a strong verification regime, which
Secretary Gates called the ``key contribution'' of the agreement.
As we debate this agreement today, we should not only consider the
consequences of ratification but also the consequences of failure.
Because START expired over a year ago, we currently have no treaty and,
therefore no constraints on Russia's stockpile or verification of their
weapons.
The choice facing U.S. Presidents through the decades has been
whether we are better off signing arms agreement with the Russians or
pursuing an arms race. Historically, Presidents from both parties and
bipartisan majorities in the U.S. Senate have agreed that we are better
served by agreements.
Today is no different. As U.S. Strategic Command's General Chilton
testified, without a treaty, Russia is not constrained in its
development of force structure, and we have no insight into its nuclear
program, making this ``the worst of both possible worlds.''
Failure to ratify this treaty would make the broad ``resetting'' of
U.S.-Russian relations harder. The distrust it would engender would
also reduce or even eliminate the possibility of further bilateral
strategic weapons reductions. As former National Security Adviser Brent
Scowcroft--I think we would all agree he is one of the wisest Americans
about foreign policy--testified earlier this year, ``the principal
result of non-ratification would be to throw the whole nuclear
negotiating situation into a state of chaos.''
But we need to remember that this treaty is not just about Washington
and Moscow, it is also about the world community and our global
relationships. Failure to ratify this treaty would signal to the world
that America is not willing to constrain its own weapons arsenal, even
as we ask other countries to restrict theirs or avoid joining the
``nuclear club'' altogether.
It would discourage multilateral cooperation on nonproliferation
goals and hinder our ability to lead by example. It would make global
cooperation on dealing with rogue states like Iran and North Korea more
challenging, tying our hands at a time when the threat from those two
countries is increasing.
Treaty opponents have tried to make the case that the dangers of
ratifying the agreement outweigh the advantages of ratification. They
are simply wrong.
They argue that the treaty limits our ability to develop missile
defense capabilities. The head of the Missile Defense Agency argued,
that the treaty actually reduces constraints on missile defense. And
countless military and civilian leaders, including the former
Secretaries of State for the last five Republican Presidents, have
publicly stated that New START preserves our ability to deploy
effective missile defenses.
Treaty opponents argue it inhibits our ability to maintain an
effective and reliable nuclear arsenal. It is true that this
administration inherited an underfunded and undervalued nuclear weapons
complex. But the President understands that the nuclear experts and
infrastructure that maintain our arsenal also help secure loose nuclear
materials, verify weapons reductions and develop technologies that
underpin our nuclear deterrent.
That is why the President's budget request provides $7 billion for
these programs this year, a 10-percent increase over last year. New
START would in no way limit these investments. And as treaty opponents
know well, the President has offered an even more robust investment in
modernization and refurbishment of our nuclear infrastructure over the
next 10 years, totaling $84 billion.
The importance of ratifying this treaty goes beyond politics. We know
that a lack of demonstrated bipartisan support could poison relations
with Russia and our allies. And we cannot risk the loss of American
leadership in the world that would ensue if we are perceived as too
entangled in our own internal politics to ratify a strategic arms
treaty that is clearly beneficial to our own security.
I know that some of my colleagues hope to amend this treaty and, in
so doing, kill it, since any changes will require the administration to
start from scratch and reopen negotiations with the Russians. I urge
them to reconsider and to think about what is at stake.
And I urge them and all my colleagues to listen to our military
leadership when they tell us that this treaty is essential to our
national security. As Senator Lugar pointed out yesterday in his
eloquent statement, ``Rejecting an unequivocal military opinion on a
treaty involving nuclear deterrence would be an extraordinary position
for the Senate to take.''
Let us not allow this to be the first time in history that the Senate
denies ratification to a treaty with overwhelming bipartisan support
and the endorsement of the full breadth of our military and civilian
leaders. I urge my colleagues to support this treaty and to support a
safer world.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I wish to thank the Senator very much for
his comments and his support. It is my understanding that Senator
Ensign was going to speak at this point in time. He is on his way. We
are happy to accommodate that.
Let me say to colleagues that we are open for business. We are ready
to entertain amendments people may have. We encourage colleagues to
come down here. Obviously, some people have raised the question of the
press of time, but it does not seem, from both yesterday and today,
that anybody is actually in a rush to bring an amendment.
We are prepared to vote on our side of the aisle. I want to make that
very clear. There are 58 Democratic Senators and Senator Lugar who
obviously are working to advance this treaty. We do not have any
amendments. We are prepared to vote. So if colleagues want to bring an
amendment, now is the time to do it, and we encourage them to do so.
Let me just say that I know Senator Barrasso just spoke with respect
to missile defense. I understand the legitimate concerns that have been
expressed by a number of colleagues about the question of missile
defense. I wish to make it as clear as possible, from all of the record
to date, that the treaty's preamble, first of all, requires nothing
legally whatsoever. There is no legal, binding effect of the preamble--
none whatsoever.
Secondly, Secretary Clinton said this and Secretary Henry Kissinger
said this: All it is is a statement of fact about the existence of a
relationship. It has no restraint whatsoever on our ability to proceed
with missile defense.
Moreover, the resolution of ratification could not be more clear
about that. There are pages within the resolution and several different
individual references to the fact that the missile defense is not
affected.
Let me read from it. This is from ``Understandings,'' and this is the
missile defense understanding No. 1:
It is the understanding of the United States--
This is what we will pass when we pass this, and I am quoting from
it--
that the New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on
the deployment of missile defenses other than the
requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START
Treaty, which states, ``Each Party shall not convert and
shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement
of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further
shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile
defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs
therein.''
It goes on to say that any New START treaty limitations on the
deployment of missile defenses beyond those specifically contained--and
I will speak to what they are in a moment--would require an amendment
to the New START treaty. That would require an entire new process of
ratification in order to live up to the requirements of the treaty
process itself.
Now, the specific, tiny, little limitation they are talking about in
there is one that the Secretary of Defense said: We don't want; that
is, the conversion of a current ICBM silo. There are four of them that
are grandfathered into existence here, but the military has determined
it is more expensive to do that than to simply build a new silo for a
ground-based missile, which is what we plan to do in the event we want
to--when we deploy.
So there is, in effect, zero limitation. Every single member of the
Strategic Command and the current command has said there is no
limitation. Secretary Gates has said there is no limitation. And I
believe we will be able to have even some further clarification of the
absence of any limitation.
[[Page S10319]]
The fact is, if you change that preamble now, you are effectively
killing the treaty because it requires the President to go back to the
Russians, renegotiate the treaty, and then you have to come back and go
through months and months of hearings and resubmission and so forth.
The important thing to focus on is the fact that--and let me quote
Henry Kissinger about the language Senator Barrasso has referred to. He
said, ``It is a truism, it is not an obligation.''
Secretary Gates also emphasized the fact that it has no impact
whatsoever on the United States. Secretary Gates reminded us in May
that the Russians have always reacted adversely to our plans for
missile defense, so they have tried a number of times to try to
interrupt that.
Secretary Gates said in his testimony:
This treaty does not accomplish any restraint for them at
all.
He also said:
We have a comprehensive missile defense program, and we are
going forward with all of it.
In addition to that, General Chilton reported on how he informed the
Russians in full about exactly what program we were going forward with,
including the recently agreed on deployment at Lisbon for the
deployment of missile defense in Europe.
They understand exactly what we are doing, what our plans are, and,
notwithstanding that, they signed the treaty. So I think the comfort
level of all of our military, of all of those involved with the
laboratories, and all of those involved with the Strategic Command
ought to speak for itself.
I see Senator Ensign is here.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nevada.
Mr. ENSIGN. Madam President, I rise today to talk about this New
START treaty. I have some very serious concerns about it.
I appreciate the work that has been done by my colleagues. This is an
incredibly serious issue. I do not question anybody's motives, but I do
think there are some serious flaws that lie not only within the four
corners of the treaty text but also speak to the manner in which this
administration has dealt with Russia. This policy of Russian ``reset''
has meant that the United States is making major concessions, while our
Russian counterparts give up virtually nothing.
Further, I have serious reservations about the manner in which the
Senate is considering this treaty. This body, the Senate, is supposed
to be the most deliberative body in the world. It is supposed to be a
chamber that respects the rights of the minority. Senators are supposed
to be afforded the right of unlimited debate and the right to have
their amendments considered. Rushing a treaty of this magnitude through
a lameduck session is not what the Founders had in mind when they gave
this body the power of advice and consent in these serious matters.
The American people sent a clear message in November to concentrate
on jobs, taxes, and the economy.
While I do not think this lameduck is the time to debate this very
important treaty, I do plan on offering multiple amendments to address
this treaty's flaws, as well as the resolution of ratification. My
colleagues on both sides of the aisle will also offer amendments with
topics ranging from how this treaty restrains our missile defense
capabilities to ceding the Senate's advice and consent power to the
flawed Bilateral Consultative Commission.
For example, there needs to be an amendment which addresses the
verification regime in this treaty, or lack thereof. Further, it is
astounding to me that tactical nuclear weapons were left out of the
treaty, considering that Russia has approximately a 10-to-1 advantage.
Additionally, we need to consider how the rail-mobile ICBMs are
counted, or not counted, and our Russian policy in a much broader
sense.
As the Senate moves forward in examining the intended consequences of
this treaty, we also need to pay careful attention to those
consequences that are unintended because that is where the danger truly
lies. In order to properly examine these, the administration needs to
provide the Senate with the full negotiating record which it has yet to
do. Only upon examination of this record can we accurately determine
how Russia views this accord to ensure that their understanding is the
same as ours.
On the topic of missile defense, this is clearly a case of the
administration wanting to have its cake and eat it too. There should be
zero--zero--mention of missile defense within 100 miles of this treaty.
Yet there it is, right in the preamble to New START, which clearly
recognizes an interrelationship between offensive nuclear weapons and
missile defense. I believe this is unacceptable.
Further, if we examine article 5, paragraph 3, of New START, missile
defense is again referenced, plain as day, in a provision prohibiting
the United States from converting ICBMs or sea-based launchers for
missile defense purposes. Where is the wisdom in removing such an
option from our toolkit for the whole life of the treaty? Russia must
understand that we will not limit our options for national defense
based on current plans, ideas, or technology. Should a breakthrough
occur in missile defense technology or launcher development we cannot
have already ruled out pursuing new courses of action.
In their attempts to persuade Republicans to support the treaty,
proponents have attempted to invoke the name of Ronald Reagan. Let's
remember that over two decades ago, President Reagan returned from
Iceland and made the following statement:
While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear
missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviet Union
insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny me and
future presidents for 10 years the right to develop, test and
deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of
the free world. This we could not and would not do.
This clearly states, in his own words, where Ronald Reagan would be
on this New START treaty. Another especially troublesome facet of the
New START is that it would establish a Bilateral Consultative
Commission with the authority to agree upon additional measures to
increase the effectiveness of the treaty. This seems like a broad and
vague purview for a commission, and it is unclear why the Senate would
delegate its advice and consent responsibilities to a commission. This
leads me to ask the question: Since missile defense has fallen under
the purview of this treaty, wouldn't it be logical that this commission
could make decisions as to what we can and cannot do with our missile
defense assets? We must make it clear this commission, the BCC, cannot
have the authority to further handicap our national defense as it could
otherwise do under this treaty without further scrutiny of the Senate.
I hope we agree as a body to insist that the workings of the BCC are
completely visible and accessible to the Senate and that we explicitly
make these changes to the treaty itself, not just the resolution of
ratification.
As we move forward in examining this treaty, a colleague of mine will
be sorely missed. The senior Senator from Missouri, Kit Bond, as vice
chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is the foremost
expert in the Senate and likely in all of Congress on matters of
intelligence. At least that is my opinion. I wish to quote my good
friend. The Select Committee on Intelligence has been looking at this
issue closely over the past several months.
As the vice chairman of this committee, I have reviewed the
key intelligence on our ability to monitor this treaty and
heard from our intelligence professionals. There is no doubt
in my mind that the United States cannot reliably verify the
treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed warheads. The administration
claims that New START is indispensable to reap the ``Reset''
benefits with Russia. If a fatally flawed arms control
agreement is the price of admission to the Reset game, our
Nation is better off if we sit this one out.
I could not agree more. It is naively optimistic to assume that a
world with fewer nuclear weapons is the same thing as a safer world.
Our security has long depended on a strong and flexible deterrent. New
threats are constantly emerging from every corner of the globe. This
has been recently demonstrated by Iran's resistance to denuclearization
and North Korea's increasingly violent saber rattling. The United
States must be able to rapidly adapt and respond to new threats to our
security. Now is the time for more flexible deterrent capability, not
less.
New START is riddled with U.S. concessions from which I can see
little gain. U.S. leadership in this arena will
[[Page S10320]]
be measured by how well we protect our ability to defend ourselves and
our friends, not by how quickly we agree to an imperfect treaty.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask my colleague from Nevada--he
mentioned he had some amendments, and we are ready to do amendments. Is
he prepared to go forward with his amendments?
Mr. ENSIGN. Let me check.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, let me speak to a couple points the
Senator from Nevada raised. He talked about the article V ban. I
discussed this a few minutes ago with respect to the conversion of ICBM
silo launchers. There is a one-paragraph restraint in the treaty with
respect to the conversion of those missile defense interceptors. The
Foreign Relations Committee, in the course of our hearings, pressed the
administration on this question very extensively. There were a lot of
questions asked by colleagues on both sides of the aisle. The record
unequivocally counters the argument just made by the Senator from
Nevada. The ban does not prevent us from deploying the most effective
missile defenses possible. I will be specific.
We will soon have some 30 missile defense interceptors in silos in
California and Alaska. We are going to have an additional eight extra
launchers in Alaska, if we need them. If we need more interceptors, the
Missile Defense Agency Director, LTG Patrick O'Reilly, who was
originally appointed to that post in the administration of President
Bush, told the committee: ``For many different reasons,'' they would
``never'' recommend converting either ICBM silos or SLBM launchers into
missile defense interceptor launchers.
What we are hearing is a completely red herring argument, sort of
throw it out there and say that somehow this is a restraint on missile
defense. Why is it not a restraint? One reason is cost. It is
intriguing to me to hear a lot of colleagues raise this particular
missile defense issue in the treaty, when they also raise the issue of
the deficit and how much we are spending and how we should not be
spending on things people don't want and the military doesn't want.
Here is something the military doesn't want. They don't want it because
the conversion cost of the last ICBM launcher at Vandenberg into a
missile defense interceptor launcher was about $55 million.
The average cost for a new hardened missile defense interceptor silo
in a new missile field is $36 million. The reason for that is because
the Missile Defense Agency has developed a smaller, more effective,
special purpose silo to meet its needs.
The annual operating cost for a separate converted silo, which is
what our colleagues are complaining about, is actually $2 million
higher per silo, and it is $2 million higher than a silo which the
military thinks is more effective and less expensive to maintain. As
Strategic Command General Chilton noted, we also don't want to force
Russia to make a split-second guess as to whether a missile that is
flying out of a U.S. silo field is either a missile defense interceptor
which may be aimed at a rogue missile or a nuclear-tipped missile aimed
at Moscow. That confusion is impossible to distinguish unless we have a
completely separate silo field. So converting an old ICBM silo in a
particular field where we can't distinguish between an interceptor or
an ICBM actually increases the potential of confusion and threat and
possibly a dangerous mistake and decision.
With regard to putting a missile defense interceptor in a submarine
launch tube, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen both said this is not a
cost-effective step, and it presents very unique operational
challenges. We need to take these red herrings off the table. Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen both noted it would make much more sense to
put missile defense interceptors on aegis-capable surface ships, which
is what they are doing, and that is not constrained by any treaty.
There is no constraint whatsoever in our ability to go out and do what
best meets the needs as defined by the military themselves.
The bottom line is, article V, paragraph 3 does not constrain us one
iota.
I yield the floor.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I plan to speak for about an hour for the
benefit of scheduling, although I will only scratch the surface of what
I will have to say about this treaty.
Let me begin by talking about 14 or 15 specific things I intend to
cover at some point when we have time during this debate and note that
there will be amendments proposed that deal with many of the items I am
going to be mentioning.
First, I think it is important for us to lay out what some of the
concerns are.
This morning when I talked about the fact that the Senate is going to
have to deal with the funding of the U.S. Government which expires on
midnight on Saturday, I noted the fact that the process the majority
leader has invoked, to dual-track or consider the START treaty along
with the Omnibus appropriations bill, is not a process that allows
adequate consideration of either, and the American people sent a signal
in the last election that they didn't want us to continue this wasteful
Washington spending spree we have been on. Yet the Omnibus
appropriations bill, which I am not sure I could lift, will do exactly
that.
We ought to be focused on a process by which that can actually be
considered with amendments. Under the way the majority leader has
outlined our schedule, that does not appear to be possible.
The first concern I have with respect to going to the START treaty at
this time is that we are putting the cart before the horse. Our first
job needs to be to ensure that the Federal Government doesn't run out
of money at midnight on Saturday. Yet the majority leader has turned to
the START treaty. Why? I think the obvious--at least one--answer is to
divert attention from this big pile of spending that I am pointing to,
6,700 earmarks. If we are talking about the START treaty, we are not
talking about the Omnibus appropriations bill. But the American people
are talking about government spending. That is what we should be
focusing our attention on.
The problem now is that we are on the START treaty, and those of us
who want to talk about this and want to amend it and believe we will be
denied the opportunity to do so will be accused of not wanting to talk
about the START treaty because that is what the majority leader has put
on the Senate floor. And he will say: Gee, you have had all this time
to talk about it. Why aren't you talking about it? That is part of what
is wrong with the process. That is one of the reasons I have been
saying you cannot do all these things and do them right.
In addition, the majority leader said this morning we have other
things he wants to consider before Christmas as well. There is no
earthly way to do all this within the time we have.
Let me mention some of the concerns I will be discussing with respect
to the START treaty. I think one thing you have to talk about, first of
all, is whether we are going to have sufficient time in order to do
what needs to be done to both amend the treaty as well as the
resolution of ratification and debate some of the issues, including the
issue that my colleague from Massachusetts was just talking about.
Secondly, what were the benefits of the treaty for the United States
vis-a-vis Russia? What were the concessions we made to Russia? What do
they get out of it? What do we get out of it? My own view is, they got
virtually everything out of it, and I do not know what we got out of
it, except for the President to say he made another arms control deal
with Russia.
Third, where will this treaty leave our nuclear forces, our delivery
vehicles, and our warheads in terms of the deterrent capability not
only for the United States but the 31 allies who rely on the U.S.
nuclear umbrella? We will have cut our forces to the bone. Yet,
interestingly, Russia will not be forced to make any reductions at all
in these delivery vehicles for the nuclear warheads.
Fourth--and there has been quite a bit of discussion in the media
about my work on modernization--where does the administration's
modernization plan end up relative to START? The point here is, if you
are going to bring your nuclear warheads down to a bare minimum number
or below that you
[[Page S10321]]
have to make darn sure every single one of them is safe, secure and
reliable and they will do what they are supposed to do and everybody
needs to know that. But all the experts agree the facilities we have
for taking care of our warheads and maintaining them are inadequate for
that purpose, and they have to be modernized.
Is the process and the amount of money that has been set aside for
that adequate? I will discuss my views on that and the questions that
remain about critical funding for the modernization of both our nuclear
weapons and the complex necessary to sustain them.
Fifth is the administration's uncertain commitment to the nuclear
triad. This I find troubling because while they have committed to a
modernization program, they have not yet committed to a program for the
modernization of the three legs of the nuclear triad: the delivery
systems, the ICBM force, the bomber force, accompanied by cruise
missiles and our submarine force. I will be discussing the areas in
which I think the commitments in that regard are insufficient and
dangerous.
Probably most interesting to a lot of people in this country, and
certainly to a lot of our colleagues, is the question of what has
occurred with respect to the relinking of strategic offense and defense
capabilities. This is the missile defense concern. There is
significantly divergent views between the United States and Russia on
this question of what the treaty does or does not do with respect to
missile defense. Both explicitly and impliedly, there are limitations
on U.S. missile defense activities in the treaty.
On the one hand, the Department of Defense has said the United States
has plans for developing and deploying missile defense systems that
will have adequate capability against ICBMs coming, for example, from
Iran. If they have capability against those missiles, they also have
capability against Russian missiles.
On the other hand, the U.S. official policy statement that
accompanied the treaty and subsequent briefings from the State
Department assures the Russians that the United States will not deploy
defenses that are capable of undermining the Russian deterrent. That is
important because of the way the Russians interpret the preamble and
other features of the treaty.
Misunderstanding and conflict between the parties is thus built into
the treaty if the United States intends to deploy more capable missiles
either to defend Europe or the United States, which it is our stated
policy to do. So are we to believe the administration will ever put
this treaty at risk over future missile defense plans? That is a
subject we will be exploring in-depth.
Seventh, the Senate gave advice to the administration not to limit
missile defense or conventional prompt global strike, which is a
capability that would permit us to deliver over long ranges,
intercontinental ranges, a warhead that is not a nuclear warhead,
something which this administration and I think are very important for
our future ability to deal with rogue states, for example.
Nevertheless, contrary to Congress's instructions, the administration
has subjected advanced U.S. conventional military capabilities to
limitations in this treaty, and we will discuss that.
Eight is something else. There are people who say there is nothing
that stands between us and a nuclear-free world. It is called zero
nuclear, the President's stated goal of a world without nuclear
weapons. Some say this treaty needs to be adopted, ratified in order to
permit us then to take the next step, which is to achieve that great
goal. I submit that goal is neither feasible nor desirable, and that to
the extent this treaty is deemed as a stepping stone toward that, it is
a bad step to take.
Moreover, it is an unwelcome distraction from addressing the true
nuclear dangers the President has made very clear are his top
priorities; that is, the dangers of proliferation and terrorism.
Ninth is a question about verification, something Senator Bond has
talked a great deal about and I am going to be speaking some about
because of issues that arose during my trip with Senator Feinstein to
Geneva during the time our negotiators were working on this treaty with
their Russian counterparts.
It is very clear that with lower force levels, we need better
verification. But this New START treaty has substantially weaker
verification provisions than its predecessor, START I. Of course,
Russia has a history of cheating on every arms control treaty we have
ever entered into with them, which amplifies the concern.
There are some comparisons, and I would suggest they are false
comparisons, to the SORT treaty, which is the 2002 treaty. It is called
the Moscow Treaty; that is, the treaty that deals with our strategic
offensive weapons after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of the
Soviet Union, and the determination by the United States and Russia
both to simply bring down our nuclear forces. We did not need anymore
the nuclear forces that existed during the Cold War.
There are some false comparisons there that I think are very
important for us to talk about as it relates to this treaty before us.
I think we also need to talk about the New START and Russian reset. I
will talk about that a little bit when I begin discussing the reasons
for trying to act so quickly here. But I think it also requires some
further discussion because, frankly, Russia is threatening a new arms
race if the Senate does not ratify this treaty. Is that the reset the
President is so fond of talking about, this new wonderful relationship
with the Russian Federation?
Twelfth, I think we need to talk about tactical nuclear weapons. The
treaty did not deal with tactical nuclear weapons, and respected
Members of this body, including the Vice President of the United
States, then a Senator, made clear that after the last treaty the next
item on the agenda had to be to deal with tactical nuclear weapons. It
should have been, but it was not done here.
Thirteenth--and this deals with some of the amendments that are going
to be necessary--there is a Commission in here that somewhat like
previous treaty commissions--it is called the Bilateral Consultative
Commission--and the treaty delegates to this Commission the ability,
even in secret, to modify terms of the treaty--a group of Russians and
a group of U.S. negotiators. There is some reference in the committee's
resolution of ratification, but, in my view, it is inadequate for the
Senate to be able to react in time to notification by that Commission
of things it is intending to do in time for the Senate to provide its
advice and consent, if those are necessary.
Then, as I mentioned, it is also important for us to determine how
this treaty is distracting attention from what the President has said,
and I agree, is our top priority; that is, dealing with proliferation
and terrorism. This treaty does not do anything to advance our goals in
that respect, and I think it would be much better if we could have
spent part of the last 2 years better focusing on the illegal nuclear
weapons programs of Iran and North Korea and why that should be our top
agenda item right now.
Those are some of the things I am going to be talking about. I will
not have time to deal with all of them during this first hour. But let
me at least briefly talk about the question of adequate time. I do not
think Senators are quite aware of some of the procedures that exist
with respect to treaty ratification. Because of precedent in the
Senate, when cloture is filed, it will close off debate both on
amendments to the treaty and the preamble, as well as amendments to the
resolution of ratification.
I think it is important to note there are amendments that Members, at
least on our side, have that go both to the treaty and preamble and
also amendments that deal with the resolution of ratification. In fact,
I think there are many more that deal with the latter subject. We are
going to have to be able to deal with both of those subject matters. So
when Members talk about filing cloture, I think it is important to
realize that would cut off debate on every additional change, even if
we have not been able to complete work on the amendments to the
resolution of ratification.
Also, I think it should be clear that there have been numerous
letters sent to our leadership in the Senate and to the committee
leadership from Republican Members of the Foreign Relations Committee,
other Republican Senators, the 10 Republican Senators-
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elect, Representatives from the House Armed Services Committee, and
others, indicating this is not the appropriate time or way to deal with
this treaty.
Incidentally, I happened to be watching Chris Matthews the other
night--a television program--and Lawrence Eagleburger, one of the
people who support the treaty, was asked by Matthews what the fuss was
about getting it done now and, among other things, this is what
Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State, said:
They want to do it before these lame duckers are out there.
That's not the way to move on this issue.
I agree with that. There are a lot of serious things to consider, and
the rush to do all the business this lameduck session has is not the
best way to get that done.
The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday expressed
the view that we had plenty of time to do this, comparing the work we
have here to the START I treaty. The START I treaty is the predecessor
to this New START treaty, though there was the intervening 2002 Moscow
Treaty I mentioned before. But just to make two quick points on this:
When we dealt with START I, we did not have all the competing
considerations, the dual tracking with an Omnibus appropriations bill
and the votes we are going to have to take on that, as well as the
other items the majority leader has mentioned. Secondly, if we are to
talk about an analogous treaty, the START treaty was not considered by
the Senate until September of 1992, and the analogy would be that this
treaty before us now would be appropriate to bring to the Senate next
May, May of 2011. That is how much time elapsed between the two.
I am not suggesting we need that much more time, but I am simply
pointing out the fact that it is not analogous. Probably a better
analogy would be the INF Treaty. That is a treaty that took the Senate
9 days of floor time. We had no intervening business of any kind. There
were 20 votes on amendments and plenty of time to work out
consideration of other amendments.
So the idea that, well, some treaties have not taken that long,
therefore, why can't we do this one, is a specious argument, and I
think when we see the serious issues that need to be considered, our
colleagues will appreciate the need to take adequate time on this
agreement.
One of the curious arguments is, we have to do this quickly because
the verification provisions of the predecessor START I treaty have
lapsed and, as a result, we have a situation that is untenable. As a
matter of fact, Robert Gibbs, the Press Secretary, believing that the
Senate yesterday was reading the treaty, which did not happen,
nevertheless put out a statement, obviously prematurely, and one of the
things he said was:
Every minute that the START Treaty is being read on the
Senate floor increases the time that we lack verification of
Russia's nuclear arsenal.
Well, apart from the fact that he was wrong about the reading of the
treaty, he is also wrong about the urgency because of the lack of
verification of the Russians. First of all, I am confused by the two
main arguments to support the treaty.
No. 1, we have this wonderful relationship with the Russians that has
been reset and we are cooperating on all of these things. By the way,
we can't trust those guys so we quickly have to put these verification
measures in place. There is something that doesn't quite connect there
as far as I am concerned.
But I go back to why we don't have verification right now. This story
reminds me a little bit about the trial of a fellow who killed both of
his parents and then pled for mercy from the court because he was an
orphan. This problem of verification was created by the administration.
It has nothing to do with action by the Senate, and they have nothing
but themselves to blame for whatever verification procedures are not in
place.
How did that come about? Well, the START treaty had perfectly good
verification provisions in it that could have been continued for
another 5 years if the United States had taken the view with Russia
that that is what we should do. But the administration said, no, we are
going to deliver the START treaty on time so there won't be any hiatus
there, so we don't need to continue the verification provisions of
START I.
Here is what was said in a joint statement between President Barack
Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, on
April 1 of 2009:
The United States and the Russian Federation intend to
conclude this agreement before the treaty expires in
December.
Originally, we had nothing to worry about because the new treaty
would be done by then. It soon became evident that wasn't going to
happen, the negotiations were dragging, and the treaty would expire.
Did this administration decide to try to continue the existing treaty--
which it could have done? It just takes the United States and Russia
agreeing to do it, no Senate action required. No, it didn't do that.
Several of us began to express concerns about this. The Republican
ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee even
introduced legislation to provide the necessary legal framework for
verification to continue even though the two treaties had lapsed, and I
cosponsored that legislation. The administration said, well, what we
are going to do is get a bridging agreement with Russia that will
bridge the time between the time START lapses and the time the new
treaty is ratified.
Michael McFaul, the NSC adviser for Russia, in a press briefing on
November 15 of 2009 made that point. He said:
It does expire on December 5 and in parallel, we have a
bridging agreement that we are also working on with the
Russians, so there is no interruption. The key thing here is
verification. We just want to preserve the verification.
So that was the intention. Those of us who expressed concerns about
this were at least, I think, somewhat mollified, except that when I
went to Geneva, what we found was there had been no conversations
whatsoever, and it appeared to me--I came back to the floor and
actually called it malpractice--that our negotiators and the Russian
negotiators had not thought about, let alone begun, to negotiate what
kind of agreement would be put in place in the event the treaty expired
and nothing else was in place to provide for verification. But at least
they promised we would have this bridging agreement.
Then the administration said--when the treaty was signed and the two
Presidents spoke to the issue--that we would continue in the spirit of
the previous treaty so there would be no difference in action between
the two countries in whatever time period it took for the ratification
of the treaty to occur by the two countries' bodies. This is a
quotation from the statement of Presidents Medvedev and Obama:
We express our commitment as a matter of principle to
continue to work together in the spirit of the START Treaty
following its expiration, as well as our firm intention to
ensure that a New START Treaty and strategic arms enter into
force at the earliest possible date.
It is a complete mystery as to what happened. What happened to the
bridging agreement? What happened to this spirit of cooperation we were
going to continue in the spirit of the previous treaty? We are now told
it is an absolute emergency for the Senate to hurry up and ratify this
treaty because the Russians might cheat. Nobody has explained what
happened here and nobody has explained why it was important before, but
it never got done, and now we have the emergency.
There were documents that trickled in over time, but one of the
things we have asked for to try to explain what happened and what this
spirit is that the Presidents both talked about was the negotiating
record. We have absolutely been denied access to that negotiating
record. The Russians know what we said and what they said. The State
Department knows what we said and what they said, but Senators who are
asked to give their advice and consent can't be trusted, I guess, to
know what was said between the Russian and U.S. negotiators.
Numerous officials of the administration have said there is an
urgency to ratify the treaty because we lack verification measures with
Russia. That was the statement Senator Clinton made back in August and
others have said the same thing. Of course, we do have some
verification, but I don't want to get into in open session the national
technical means we have. We can discuss that in executive session.
[[Page S10323]]
But apart from the mystery about this bridging agreement and the
commitment of the two Presidents, this urgency is irrational if we are
to believe that we really reset this relationship with Russia. In fact,
administration officials have actually denied that the emergency
exists, a point that has been made by others. Gary Samore, who is
special assistant to the President, said:
I am not particularly worried near term, but over time as
the Russians are modernizing their systems and starting to
deploy new systems, the lack of inspections will create much
more uncertainty.
Absolutely true. I agree with that. But he is not worried in the near
term; that is to say, within the next few months.
The Washington Post I thought put it well. In an editorial they said:
But no calamity will befall the United States if the Senate
does not act this year. The Cold War threat of the nuclear
exchange between Washington and Moscow is, for now, almost
nonexistent.
So I don't think it is a valid argument to rush this treaty through
in the week before Christmas, that somehow this is an urgent need and
that our national security is threatened if we don't do that. I also
reject the argument that the only choice for us is this treaty or no
treaty. Obviously, there are other choices. When it comes to
verification, both countries have the ability to have agreements with
each other that provide for the kind of inspection regimes that would
be appropriate.
Let me conclude at this point. Ian Kelly, who is a State Department
spokesman, made a comment that I think sums it up. He said:
Both sides pledge not to take any measures that would
undermine the strategic stability that the START has provided
during this period between the expiration of the START treaty
and entering into the force of the new treaty, which will
take some months.
He is right. But I think the argument that the Senate has to act
now--right now--or else our national security is going to be
jeopardized by lack of verification is specious, and it certainly
raises questions if we are to examine what the real basis is and what
the result of this new reset relationship with Russia is. That is the
argument: We have to do this now, because otherwise we won't be able to
verify what the Russians are doing. The other argument is that we reset
our relationship with Russia and, therefore, if we don't do this, it
will make the Russians mad and they will not continue to cooperate with
us on important matters they have cooperated with us on. I think it is
important to both examine that allegation as well as the question of
what the two countries got out of this treaty.
Let me speak for a moment about what the Russians got out of the
treaty and what the United States purportedly gets out of the treaty,
most of it characterized in this reset language. Russian politician
Sergei Kurginyan said:
Russia could not have an easier partner on the topic of
nuclear arms than Obama.
He is referring to President Obama.
What exactly did the Russians get out of this? Some said, Well, even
though they are no longer a powerful nation they need the superpower
status, and entering into a treaty such as this, such as the kinds of
treaties that used to be entered into during the Cold War, gives them a
feeling of superpower status along with the United States. So it is
important for us to do that. First of all, I am not sure you treat a
serious reset partner that way, but apart from that, obviously, the
Russians felt that if they could negotiate a good treaty with the
United States, it would be to their benefit, and I don't question their
intentions in doing that.
But what we got out of this in terms of the primary feature of the
treaty is to reduce the nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. The
delivery vehicles are the most important thing, in my view. But only
the United States reduces its strategic delivery vehicles under this
New START treaty. The Russians don't. They currently have about 560
delivery vehicles. These are ICBMs, bomber capability, and submarine
capability. The United States has 856. The treaty takes you down to 700
of deployed delivery vehicles. So even under the treaty, Russia can
build up to that level by adding 140 launchers they don't currently
have, while the United States must cut our forces by 156. One says,
Well, why shouldn't it be exactly equal? The United States has
obligations beyond those of Russia. Russia has a need to defend its
territory. The United States has 31 other countries relying on the U.S.
nuclear umbrella. Therefore, the targets we must hold at risk and the
concerns we have about adequate delivery vehicles are much different
than Russia's. Nonetheless, we have agreed to a parity number here of
700. So they can build up to that number; we have to build down. That
is not exactly a great victory, in my view. In fact, it is the first
time since the very disastrous Washington naval treaties with Germany
and Japan before World War II that the United States has agreed to one-
sided reductions in military might.
I mentioned the bridging agreement before. Where that fell through
the cracks, I don't know. The administration was apparently pushing for
it. It didn't get it. We still don't know what happened because we
haven't been given the record.
On mobile missiles, this is a matter that exercised the Russians when
the committee dealt with it in a very modest way in its resolution of
ratification. You see, the Russians have had rail mobile missile plans
and don't know exactly what they are going to do in the future with
rail mobile, but when the committee deigned to speak to this, the
Russians reacted like a scalded dog: Well, we recommend the Duma not
approve the treaty if we are going to be talking about rail mobile
missiles. What about the United States in contention? We shouldn't be
talking about U.S. missile defense. No, that is OK, but we don't want
to talk about rail mobile missiles. So the Russians successfully
prevented any revisions on that and there is maybe a concern now that
we made a mistake in not including that. Obviously, the concession
makes it much harder to monitor their forces if they go with rail
mobile forces.
In addition, we limited the monitors of missile production at
Votkinsk. Votkinsk was the missile production facility in Russia that
produced many of the missiles the Russians used and this was required
by the START I treaty. The Russians didn't want this anymore. I can
understand why. If we are going to understand what they are producing
in their factory and see what happens when they roll them outside the
factory, then we will have a better idea of whether they are cheating.
The Russians said from the very beginning, We are not going to let you
do that anymore. So they got something very important with regard to
verification. Again, the argument is we have to do verification.
Understand that verification in this treaty is much weaker than the
verification that existed under START I and that could have been
continued for another 5 years if the administration had taken that
position.
Very troublesome is a reverse in course by the United States and
Russia both with regard to MIRVing of ICBMs. We have been working
against MIRVing for a long time and finally achieved in the last treaty
a recognition of the fact that MIRVed missiles; that is to say,
missiles that have numerous warheads on top, are very destabilizing
because it creates a situation where you basically have to use them or
you lose them. If we attack a missile silo and kill eight warheads all
at once with one strike, that is a major loss. So the idea is that
strategic offensive weapons with those MIRVs on them need to get off
before they are hit by an incoming missile. Very destabilizing.
So both countries agreed we would move toward a single warhead
missile. Well, in this treaty, that all goes by the boards. The United
States is going to continue to provide for single warheads, but not
Russia. In fact, it is believed that 80 percent of the Russian ICBM
force in the future will consist of MIRVed ICBMs. I don't know why the
administration walked back from that. Again, we don't know because we
don't have the negotiating record.
The SLCM is the submerged launch cruise missile. Now, the START I
treaty had a side agreement that limited submerged launch cruise
missiles. But this new START treaty ends that side agreement and says
even though the United States is retiring our submerged launch cruise
missiles, as we intended to do under START I, it appears that Russia is
developing a new
[[Page S10324]]
version of such a missile, with a range of up to approximately 5,000
kilometers, which is a longer range than some ballistic missiles
covered by the treaty.
Again, why do we allow a relinkage of a subject as important to us as
missile defense with strategic arms limitations and yet not limit rail
mobile, SLCMs, and so on? It is a very lopsided result in the
negotiations, it seems to me.
I mentioned missile defense. Russia not only achieved a recognition
of its position that missile defense is related to strategic offensive
systems in the preamble of this treaty, but it negotiated limitations
on U.S. missile defense in article V. Importantly, it added some what I
will call ``bullying'' language in the unilateral statement
accompanying the treaty. These achievements came after the U.S. gave
away ground-based European systems and promised the Senate there would
be no treaty limitations on defensive missiles.
Missile defense targets is another area in which the U.S. gave
ground. There is ambiguous treaty language which I believe will
constrain U.S. ability to maximize the affordability of our missile
defense targets. We are not going to be able to reuse old targets.
Telemetry is a big issue the U.S. fought hard on but apparently caved
on. We don't have the record, so we don't know what kind of quid pro
quo could have been gotten for this. Under START I, one of the most
valuable collection methods was the unencrypted telemetry from missile
tests by the Russians. They got that from our missile tests. We both
knew the capability of each other's missiles. In a sense, that is
stabilizing. But under New START, which is supposed to be improving the
situation with regard to certainty, unencrypted data from almost every
ballistic missile flight will be not subject to sharing with the other
side. At best, five flights a year will be shared. But Russia can
choose to never share flight test data from new missiles they are
currently developing and testing. They can say here is data from five
tests of old missiles, but they don't have to share data as to any of
their new missiles. None of our intelligence people will tell you that
is an improvement or a good situation.
Here is another disparity in the treaty: conventional prompt global
strike. Remember I mentioned the Russian potential plans for rail
mobile or cruise missile submarine launch. I think the United States
has a very good idea about moving forward with something we call
conventional prompt global strike. It is not even a nuclear program. It
is a sensible way to deal with some of the emerging threats around the
world today, where we may have a need, in a very quick time and over a
long distance, to send a conventional warhead to a country. We may not
want to have to send a nuclear warhead--Heaven knows what that would
start--but it makes sense to have a conventional capability to do this.
The Russians have fought that. It is a little unclear why, since it
would totally be aimed at other countries, certainly not Russia. In a
treaty nominally about nuclear weapons, we have a specific limitation
on the U.S. plans for conventional prompt global strike. It would limit
the capability we are seeking to address WMD and terrorist threats by
requiring that any such missiles be counted against the already-too-low
limit of 700 missiles for delivery of nuclear warheads.
Let's say we were going to deploy 24 of these missiles--to decide a
number. That means you have to reduce the 700 by 24. That provides a
huge disincentive to deploying these conventional prompt global strike
missiles and a dangerous reduction from a negotiated 700 launcher limit
in the treaty.
I am not going to get deeply into inspections and verifications. That
will have to be dealt with in executive closed session where we can
discuss classified matters. Suffice it to say here, in discussing the
disparity between what the Russians got and what we got, in a number of
inspections this new treaty cuts the number of inspections by more than
half compared to START I.
Part of the problem is that none of the inspections that are
permitted will ever enable us to have a good sense of the total number
of warheads. So that is different from the START I treaty. We are never
going to be able to monitor, under this treaty, whether the Russians
are complying with the overall limit on warheads. Again, we will have
to get more into that in executive session.
I talked about tactical nukes. I mentioned the fact that when he was
a Senator, Vice President Biden made remarks during ratification of the
2002 Moscow Treaty. He said:
After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a
handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms
control and nonproliferation objective of the United States
Government.
Well, here it is 8 years later, and not only is there no further
progress toward that--and I agree with the Vice President--but this
treaty, at the insistence of the Russians, has not one word about
tactical nuclear weapons. I will be discussing that in more detail
later on. I just mention it here to illustrate yet another area where
it seems to me there is a great disparity.
I didn't count up all of these things, but there have to be 10 or 12
areas in which the Russians have gotten very much what they bargained
for. The question is, What did we get?
We are told that we benefit for the following reasons: We can resume
inspections in Russia. As I said, we could have done that by extending
the START I treaty. That is a problem of our own making. By allowing
that to expire and not renewing or putting into place a bridging
agreement or enforcing the joint statement the two Presidents put
together in working together in the spirit of START I, the inspections
are significantly weaker, as I said.
I will quote Senator Bond. He said:
The administration's new START Treaty has been oversold and
overhyped. If we cannot verify that the Russians are
complying with each of the treaty's three central limits,
then we have no way of knowing whether we are more secure or
not. There is no doubt in my mind that the United States
cannot reliably verify the treaty's 1,550 limit on deployed
warheads.
Senator Bond is exactly right. We will discuss some of that in open
session and the rest of it in closed session.
I will conclude this point by noting that the Vice President and
others have also suggested that this treaty is important for the United
States because it is a valuable part of the so-called reset
relationship with the Russians.
I have to ask several questions about this. Why have we assumed this
has been such a great success?
My colleague, Senator Durbin, for example, stated a couple of weeks
ago that we need Russia's help in dealing with Iran because that nation
is about to bring online a new nuclear powerplant. I remind everybody
that Russia built and fueled that powerplant for Iran. So that is a
great benefit to this reset relationship.
We will have more to say about that as well. I will conclude this
part by quoting from Dr. Henry Kissinger, who believes the treaty
should be ratified. He said:
The argument for this treaty is not to placate Russia. That
is not the reason to approve this treaty. Under no condition
should a treaty be made as a favor to another country, or to
make another country feel better. It has to be perceived to
be in the American national interest.
So what are the two big arguments for the treaty? We have to get this
verification regime in place because the Russians may cheat. Well, I
guess they are our new best friends and we have to keep it that way or
else they will get mad. Dr. Kissinger wrote before about this matter of
what should motivate us to do an arms control treaty. He said every
arms control treaty has to be justified within its own four corners.
You can never say a reason to do it is to make the other country feel
better or to gain some kind of leverage with the other country or to
gain its cooperation in some way. A, it is illegitimate; and, B, it
doesn't work. He made that point precisely with respect to this. He is
saying that is not a reason to endorse this treaty.
I conclude that the two big arguments are not arguments at all, and,
in point of fact, the Russians got a lot more out of this treaty than
the United States ever would.
I spoke a little bit about the treaty limits because this is the
central idea of the treaty--to reduce the number of
[[Page S10325]]
warheads and delivery vehicles. I wanted to discuss that in this
context because there are a lot of people who believe--and I certainly
understand the argument--that it seems like a good idea if both
countries are reducing nuclear weapons forces and warheads. That was
exactly the theory under the Moscow Treaty of 2002. We didn't need that
many warheads and delivery vehicles.
The United States said: We are just going to reduce ours; and Russia
said: We have to reduce ours, too, so why don't we have a treaty. The
United States said: We can have one, but we don't need one; we are
going to do this out of our own best interests because it costs a lot
of money. As a favor to Russia, we said: If you want to do a treaty,
fine, but we will not make any concessions to do it.
Now we are cutting into the bone and getting the level of delivery
vehicles down to 700 could jeopardize our ability to carry out our
missions. That is my assertion. There are experts in the administration
who have briefed us, who can show exactly where the targets are, where
our missiles are, how many we would need, and so on. They say actually
we still have enough to do the job.
I am willing to accept their, first of all, patriotic motivations,
expertise, and judgment on this issue. But I also note that when you
read all of the statements that all of them made, they appreciate that
this is it--this is the limit beyond which we don't dare go. It rests
upon several assumptions, including the assumptions that the Russians
are never going to break out or cheat. It rests on the assumption that
we don't have new targets that we have to worry about.
I suggest, especially with respect to the Chinese development and
modernization of its nuclear force, and the role it is beginning to
play in the world militarily, it is not necessarily a valid assumption
that the targets that existed during the Cold War are all that we will
ever have to worry about.
Let me talk briefly about this matter of how we have brought down the
number of warheads and missiles, and why it is not necessarily the
great thing that the proponents are cracking it up to be. The first
point I will reiterate: We did all the giving; they did the taking. We
have to reduce the number of our delivery vehicles, and they can
actually build up theirs.
At the signing of the treaty, Russia had a total of 640 strategic
delivery vehicles, with only 571 of them deployed. That is according to
the Moscow defense briefing in 2010 about their missiles and delivery
vehicles. Aleksey Arbatov, a former deputy chairman of the Duma Defense
Committee said:
The new treaty is an agreement reducing the American and
not the Russian strategic nuclear forces. In fact, the latter
will be reduced in any case because of the mass removal from
the order of battle of obsolete arms and the one-time
introduction of new systems.
We believe his statement is correct. I am worried that we have gotten
very close to the line. Nothing has changed since 2008 except that the
Chinese have been working hard at their modernization. That is when the
Bush administration testified that the current level--the levels we
have today, not the levels we are going down to--were necessary for
deterrence.
I could quote from Secretary Bodman and Secretary Gates who spoke to
that issue in September of 2008 to make that point. General Cartwright,
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who supports the treaty, testified
that in 2009 he would be concerned about having fewer than 800 delivery
vehicles. I am quoting:
From about 1,100 down to about 500--500 being principally
where the Russians would like to be, and 1,100 being
principally where we would like to be, now the negotiation
starts. I would be very concerned if we got down below those
levels, about midpoint.
Secretary Schlesinger said:
As to the stated context of strategic nuclear weapons, the
numbers specified are adequate, though barely so.
Those are the views of experts.
Dr. Kissinger, who testified in support of the treaty, said this:
[T]he numbers of American and Russian strategic warheads
and delivery systems have been radically reduced and are
approaching levels where the arsenals of other countries will
bear on a strategic balance, as will tactical nuclear
weapons, particularly given the great asymmetry in their
numbers in Russia's favor.
There are two things he is talking about. First, as Russia and the
United States bring our forces down, there is a certain point--I am not
suggesting we are there yet, but there is a certain point that
countries, such as China, for example, can say: Wait a minute, there is
now not that much difference between where Russia and China are--Russia
and the United States are and where we are, and therefore, if we just
build ours up somewhat, we can be at virtual parity with Russia and the
United States, and, voila, instead of having two powers with a large
number of nuclear warheads, you then have three. So there is an
incentive for countries like that to build up once we get down to a
certain point.
The other point he makes is with respect to tactical weapons.
Tactical does not really relate to the amount of boom the weapon makes,
its destructive capabilities, so much as the delivery vehicle it is on.
The Russians have a significant advantage in that, as Secretary
Kissinger pointed out. So there is an asymmetry that exists both with
respect to warheads and delivery vehicles.
General Chilton, when he talked about support for New START,
predicated it on no Russian cheating or changes in the geopolitical
environment. I would like to read his quotation. He said:
It was decided . . . we would just fix that [Presidential
guidance] for our analysis of the force structure for the
START negotiations. And so that's how we moved forward. . . .
The only assumptions we had to make with regard to the new
NPR, which was, of course, in development in parallel at the
time [with the START treaty] was that there would be no
request for increase in forces. And there was also an
assumption that I think is valid, and that is that the
Russians in the post-negotiation time period would be
compliant with the treaty.
He assumes they are going to be, in other words. But those are the
two assumptions on which we had to base a reduction down to this level.
I think Senators should ask themselves whether they agree with these
assessments in light of the facts that Russia does continue to
modernize its force, as does China; that more nuclear forces in those
countries necessarily means more potential targets for the United
States to hold at risk; and that Russia has violated practically every
arms control treaty it signed with the United States; and taking into
account what hangs in the balance--the commitment of the United States
not only to our 31 allies and the nuclear umbrella we have but also the
protection of the United States with our nuclear deterrent. We have
little to gain and much to lose if we can't be certain the numbers in
New START are adequate.
Let me conclude this point by talking about some counting rules. This
is a little esoteric and gets down into the weeds, but it is important
to understand in the context of what I am talking about.
Under the treaty, strategic stability may be weakened because there
is not a specified loadout of reentry vehicles per missile. That is
what we used to have. The counting rules in the treaty present
opportunities for allowable cheating that the United States is not
likely to pursue--in fact, I would say we will not pursue--but which
could give Russia an advantage.
While the United States improves stability in our ICBM force by
eliminating the MIRVing I talked about before, Russia will become more
reliant on MIRVed ICBMs, and, again, that is destabilizing because it
encourages first-strike planning for fixed silo weapons--the ``use it
or lose it'' problem.
The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, said:
The United States will ``de-MIRV'' the Minuteman III ICBM
force to a single warhead to enhance the stability of the
nuclear balance.
So why would we, then, encourage the Russians to go exactly the
opposite direction in this treaty?
Let me quote again. This is from a Russian forces blog, November 30,
2010:
The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Lt.-General
Sergei Karakayev, announced today that all new mobile Topol-M
missiles will carry multiple warheads. This modification of
the missile is officially known as the Yars or RS-24. The
first three RS-24 missiles were deployed in Teykovo earlier
this year.
That is what I was referring to before, and that promotes strategic
instability, not stability.
[[Page S10326]]
Finally, due to the bomber accounting rules, at least one Russian
military commentator has noted:
Under the treaty, one nuclear warhead will be counted for
each deployed heavy bomber which can carry 12 to 234 missiles
or bombs depending on its type. Consequently, Russia will
retain 2,100 warheads.
Might I inquire how close I am to using the 60 minutes I had intended
to speak?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator has about 10 minutes
remaining on the hour he asked for, but there is no time limit.
Mr. KYL. I appreciate that there is no time limit on my speaking and
I appreciate there is no time limit on my time, but I have an
engagement at noon and, second, I did not want to be out here on the
floor talking for too long.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. I wish to ask the Senator, if I can--I don't want to
interrupt him, but I wanted to inquire, get a sense here--I appreciate
a lot of the comments he has made. First of all, let me say that I have
appreciated working very closely with Senator Kyl on this for months
now. We have had an enormous amount of dialog; we have had a lot of
meetings; we have gone back and forth. I think he would agree that we
have tried very hard and in good faith to address many of the concerns
he has raised, notwithstanding the ones he just raised in his speech,
many of which I will speak to as we go along.
But I would like to sort of get a sense from him. He mentioned
amendments, others have, but we are now almost at lunchtime, and we
don't have an amendment. I would like to get a sense of when we might
anticipate really being able to do the business on the treaty.
Mr. KYL. I will be happy to respond. Part of the business of the
Senate on the treaty is to expose its flaws and to have a robust debate
about those flaws, which can provide the foundation for amendments
which we intend to offer.
I was struck by the seriousness and importance, at least in my mind,
of the two-page list of amendments my staff acquired from colleagues.
As my colleague knows, we actually shared a list of 10 or 12 amendments
that I had thought about, and actually some of my colleagues--in fact,
we had a couple-of-hour conversation about that one morning to see if
we could reach agreement on any of them, which we were not able to do.
But there are some very serious amendments, most of which go to the
resolution of ratification, and a few go to the treaty or the preamble
itself.
I note that yesterday my colleague said--I think I am quoting him
correctly--``Make no mistake, we will not allow an amendment to the
treaty or the preamble.'' Maybe there are the votes to not allow that.
But I do think it is important for us, in this discussion, before
offering such an amendment, to appreciate why we believe such an
amendment would be important.
As my colleague well knows, there is a great deal that can be said
about this. I am trying to say it in as succinct a form as I can.
Mr. KERRY. I appreciate it.
Mr. KYL. But there is a great deal of discussion that needs to occur
for a predicate for the amendments we intend to offer.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I completely respect what the Senator
from Arizona has just said, and we obviously want to give him time to
lay any predicate to whatever he may perceive to be a flaw. For
instance, as he raises the question about the MIRVing, as he just did--
and later, I will go through each of these points--but the fact is, the
reason the Russians are MIRVing--which we all understand, and there are
plenty of letters from the Strategic Command and elsewhere that will
articulate the way in which they do not see that as a threat--the
reason they MIRV is because they cannot afford to do some of the other
things with respect to the numbers of missiles, so they put more
warheads on one missile.
We have preserved a very significant breakout capacity here. As
General Chilton and others will point out, it is not a flaw at all. It
is actually an advantage which is maintained in this treaty for the
American strategic posture. I will go into that later. What the Senator
describes as a flaw from his point of view I think the record will well
state is sort of a preserved American advantage.
That said, I respect, obviously--we want to get this joined. I think
what the Senator has just laid out is very helpful. It will help us
join the debate. But I do want to impress that the sooner we can get to
some of these amendments, the more we can really discover whether
something is, in fact, a flaw or is not a flaw and has been adequately
answered.
Mr. KYL. I appreciate my colleague's comment. I note that I think the
reason the Russians are going to MIRVing is--at least the primary
reason is exactly as Senator Kerry has stated. They have financial
limitations on what they can do here, but I don't think one can deny
that the result of it is strategic instability compared to moving
toward a single warhead missile, such as the United States has been
doing and will continue to do.
What I wanted to do in this segment of my remarks before I conclude--
and I will advise my colleagues that the next thing I intend to be
talking about is the administration's commitment to the nuclear triad,
but I don't think I am going to have time to get to that. I would like
to conclude now with some comments about modernization.
It has been well known that I have been involved in negotiations with
the administration regarding modernization. My colleague and friend,
Senator Kerry, has been very helpful, I might say, in occasionally
restarting those conversations when they got bogged down a little bit
and was helpful--and I specifically have complimented him before and
will do it again--in ensuring that the President's increase in the
budget for our nuclear modernization program that was in his budget
this year will actually be carried out in the funding the Congress
does. We had to do a continuing resolution back in September, and I
think it was largely due to Senator Kerry's efforts that that funding
was included.
I just note that we have had a lot of concern back and forth about
whether there is a real commitment to get that done over the years.
Obviously, both of us appreciate the fact that no one can guarantee
anything, but there is a certain amount of good will and commitment
involved here, and certainly the administration needs to be very
actively involved in ensuring that the funding required for its
modernization program actually comes to pass.
I note that the continuing resolution as passed by the House of
Representatives unfortunately conditioned this funding Senator Kerry
and I were responsible for--conditioned it on the ratification of the
START treaty, saying: If you don't ratify the treaty, you are not going
to get the money. Thankfully, a couple of administration officials
relatively quickly pushed back on that and said: No, that is not right.
The treaty stands on its own, and the modernization program stands on
its own, and this funding is necessary.
That is the kind of pushback on what might otherwise be rather petty
politics that is going to be required by all of us who understand that
modernization is critical in the future.
With that belief predicate, let me state what the problem has been
and generally how we went about trying to correct or solve the problem.
The United States, believe it or not--and this is the fault of
Republican and Democratic administrations and Republican and Democratic
Members of Congress--it is a negligence, I would say a gross negligence
on all of our parts. I take some of the blame for not having yelled
about this more than I have. But at the same time that every other
nuclear power is modernizing its forces, both its facilities and its
capability to maintain its weapons, its weapons, and, in the case of
the Russians and the Chinese, their delivery systems as well--while
every one of them has a capacity to do that, to actually produce a
warhead to put back into production when one comes out of production,
the United States does not. The country that literally invented these
weapons with the Manhattan Project is still using Manhattan Project--
that is 1942, in case you have forgotten--era buildings to take care of
these most sophisticated weapons. If you were to liken it to a car, it
would be like a Ferrari race car or Formula 1
[[Page S10327]]
race car, highly technical--I don't think you would want to refurbish
those in somebody's old backyard garage.
The bottom line is that these facilities have to be brought up to
modern standards to be able to modernize our weapons over time. Why do
the weapons have to be modernized? Generally speaking, these are
weapons that were designed in the 1970s, built in the 1980s, and built
to last 10 years. Do the math. We are still relying on those weapons.
What we found, even though we have cut way back on the funding for
what we call surveillance--that is to say, taking a look at several of
these weapons every year, taking the skin off, looking down inside,
seeing what is rusty and what is loose and so on, to use an analogy to
a car maybe--what we found is that there are significant issues with
these weapons that need to be addressed if our commanders and labs are
to continue to be able to secure them as safe, secure, and reliable, as
they must.
So we need the facilities in which to bring these sophisticated
weapons in, take them apart, make sure they are put back together
properly with all the requisite either new parts or reused parts or
whatever is necessary to continue to allow them to work and get them
back into production.
The timeline on this is more than critical. Suffice it to say in this
open session of Congress that we dare not waste any more time at all. I
think that is one of the reasons why the President's advisers from the
laboratories and the Department of Defense and Energy presented this to
the President and his nuclear posture review. In the modernization plan
he developed, there is a very firm commitment on his part to move
forward with this, because no time can be wasted.
To give you one illustration, when we left one of the facilities we
had examined--we have been to each of these facilities and we have
talked to the people there, and we were given a little souvenir from
one of them. It is encased in plastic, a little vacuum tube. It is a
vacuum tube such as those that came out of our black-and-white TVs back
in the 1960s, I guess. It is still being used in a component of one of
our weapons, and they are replacing it with circuit boards, of course.
That is the kind of thing that needs to be modernized in these
weapons. So what is it going to take to do it? Well, the Congress,
understanding that we had to get about this, in the last Defense bill
put in a requirement that the President prepare a plan. It is named
after the section of the bill, which was 1251. That section of the bill
now is the nomenclature for the plan, the 1251 plan for modernizing our
forces.
This followed a speech Secretary Gates made. Let me quote from the
speech and then get into a little bit of the detail here. He said:
To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a
credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our
stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile
or pursuing a modernization program.
That was pretty much the genesis, that and the so-called Perry-
Schlesinger Commission, which ran the red flag up the flagpole to get
this program moving. So in fiscal year 2010, the Obama administration
devoted $6.4 billion to nuclear weapon activities, but it has
acknowledged that that is a loss of purchasing power of about 20
percent, from 2005--this is by the administration's own calculations.
So we knew from the very beginning there was not enough money in the
plan to get the job done.
In December, a year ago, 41 Senators--this is before Scott Brown, I
might add, joined us--wrote a letter to the President stating:
Funding for such a modernization program beginning in
earnest in your FY 11 budget is needed as the U.S. considers
the further nuclear weapon reductions proposed in the START
follow-on negotiations.
To make a long story short, the administration had a 10-year plan in
place that was becoming pretty apparent would not be adequate. That 10-
year plan called for about $7 billion a year over 10 years, to
basically operate the facilities. I have said, it is like the money to
keep the lights on, but not money for this new modernization of our
nuclear warheads or most of it would not have gone to that.
They realized they needed about $10 billion, at least according to
their initial calculations. They got about half of that from the
Defense Department, the other half they figured they would get from
savings from recalculating interest costs in the latter years of the
budget. So they added a $10 billion slug onto the $70 billion that was
already budgeted for general operation of the system, and said that is
our $80 billion modernization program. But based upon work that had
done by laboratories earlier, by other study groups and so on, a lot of
experts agreed, including all of the former lab directors, that that
slug of $10 billion would never be adequate for the costly items that
needed to be performed over the next decade. Most of us estimated it to
be about double that cost or about $20 billion. I think that is
essentially where we are going to end up, by the way.
In any event, the two biggest drivers are two new buildings,
facilities that have to be built, one for plutonium work at Los Alamos
Lab in New Mexico, the other for uranium work at the so-called Y-12
plant at Oak Ridge, TN. Those two buildings alone could end up costing
over $10 billion. As a result, as I said, we went to the administration
and said, we appreciate this modernization plan, but you need to update
the plan and incorporate a lot of new costs.
We showed them a lot of areas in which there were deficiencies,
including deferred maintenance that had to be performed. We even
pointed out there was a billion-dollar unfunded pension liability that
would have to be dealt with in order for the scientists to continue to
work. I will not go into the quotations here. Vice President Biden
acknowledged the same thing in a statement he made. I appreciate the
fact that, by the way, they complimented our work and our staff for
pointing out a lot of these things, which were the bases then for the
administration coming back and doing an update to the 1251 plan, which
at least incorporated funding for some of the items we had talked
about.
There has been some talk about an additional $4.1 billion, and I know
Senator Kerry will confirm this. It grates on me, and I am sure it does
on him as well, to hear people referring to this in negotiation terms:
Well, they gave Kyl another $4.1 billion. That should be enough.
That is not the point here. This is an ongoing, evolving process. The
administration has also identified about another $2 billion likely to
have to be spent within 6 years, but they were only looking at a 5-year
process, so that $4 billion pertains to 5 years. My guess is, there
will be another $6 billion over the last 5 years, and we will
ultimately look at about $20 billion, more or less.
The point is, I did not believe the administration had been
sufficiently careful in defining the requirements and identifying the
amount of money that would be needed. I have said to many people,
including my colleague Senator Kerry, we better not underestimate this
for the appropriations Members of Congress. We better let them know
upfront, this is going to be pretty costly, and get that out on the
table.
To their credit, the administration has now put out new figures. As I
will discuss in more detail later, but to summarize here, while that is
a big step forward and very welcome, and I will support it all, there
are other things that need to be done. One of the biggest concerns I
have is that it achieves this objective in part by simply extending the
date to complete these two big facilities I mentioned by another 2
years. They would not be complete until 2023 for one and 2024 for the
other one.
That has the advantage of getting them outside the 10-year budget
window, so you do not count any new money, but it extends the time by
which these facilities can be done. And every year we were told it is
about a $200 million expense to keep the existing facilities operating.
So we are losing a lot of money every year that we do not get these
two new buildings constructed so we can move into them and get the
modernization done. That is the biggest concern I have. I will talk
about some others later.
But let me conclude here with a couple of quotations that I think
illustrate the importance of doing what we need to do here.
[[Page S10328]]
Tom D'Agostino, who is the Deputy NNSA Administrator said:
Our plans for investment in and modernization of the modern
security enterprise are essential, irrespective of whether or
not the START treaty is ratified.
He and I think all of us agree, it is even more important if we go
down to the lower numbers in the START treaty. But this is important
either way. I note that former Energy Secretary Spence Abraham wrote a
column in Weekly Standard recently that made the same point, that
regardless of what is done on the START treaty, this modernization
needs to move forward.
I made the point earlier about how the House Democrats conditioned
the funding on ratification of START. I hope in the comments that are
made on the floor here, it may be the subject of an--in fact, it
probably will be the subject of at least one amendment to the
resolution of ratification. But this is a place where the debate we
have, the comments we make, may be as important as an amendment,
because it is a statement of our intention as Senators. I think you
will find that republican Senators who support the START treaty, and I
am sure Democratic Senators who support the START treaty, will all say,
one of the things that has to happen is the modernization of our
facilities, along the lines of this updated 1251 plan, and the
statements that the administration, as well as we, have made.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, would the Senator yield?
Mr. KYL. I will yield.
Mr. KERRY. I want to compliment the Senator, and confirm on the
record that Senator Kyl indeed brought to the attention of the
administration and to all of us several points which the laboratory
chiefs agreed were in deficiency. And he is absolutely correct, that
while it is not directly within the four corners of the treaty, the
modernization, per se, obviously if you contemplate reductions, you
have to also be able to understand you are maintaining the capacity of
your existing force. Senator Kyl has been diligent in pursuing that.
I also applaud the administration for responding, and I think he
would too, and acknowledging that. So he is correct, that I think this
part of the record is an important one. We have met separately with
Senator Inouye, with Senator Feinstein, and they have agreed with
Senator Kyl, that they accept the need to continue down to the levels
that the administration has put on the table, and they are committed to
doing that.
That said, let me also place in the Record a letter from our three
laboratory leaders, Dr. George Miller at Lawrence Livermore, Dr.
Michael Anastasio, who was just referred to at Los Alamos, and Dr. Paul
Hommert at Sandia. I will read the relevant portion. I will put the
whole thing in the Record. But here is what they say:
We are very pleased by the update to the Section 1251
Report, as it would enable the laboratories to execute our
requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable and
effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan. In particular, we are pleased because it
clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others
have voiced in the past about potential future-year funding
shortfalls, and it substantially reduces risks to the overall
program. We believe that, if enacted, the added funding
outlined in the Section 1251 Report update--for enhanced
surveillance, pensions, facility construction and Readiness
in Technical Base and Facilities among other programs--would
establish a workable funding level for a balanced program
that sustains the science, technology and engineering base.
In summary, we believe the proposed budgets provided adequate
support to sustain the safety, security, reliability and
effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent within the limit
of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads established by the new
START Treaty with adequate confidence and acceptable risk.
I think it is very important to sort of do that. I would think we
have adequately addressed it, because there is also language in the
resolution of ratification that embraces the modernization component.
So I thank the Senator from Arizona. I think that has been a
constructive component to helping us to be in a position to be able to
ratify the treaty.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I appreciate my colleague's comments.
Rather than read the remainder of this, I ask unanimous consent that at
the conclusion of my remarks here there will be additional quotations
on the need for modernization by former lab directors Dr. Miller,
Secretary Schlesinger, and several others.
I would conclude by emphasizing what the lab directors also
emphasized in this correspondence. ``As we emphasized in our
testimonies, implementation of the future vision of the nuclear
deterrent will require sustained attention and continued refinement.''
The outyears are very important. That is why the record we create in
this debate is important to ensuring that those who come after us will
appreciate our intentions as we move forward here that we never again
take our eye off the ball and allow the deterioration in our nuclear
forces to occur, as we have, so we can continue to support them as
called for in this modernization plan. I will ask unanimous consent to
have those printed in the Record at this point, and then make the
remainder of the statement at another time when I have not taken up all
of my colleagues' time.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Additional Quotes on Modernization
Former laboratory directors: ``However, we believe there
are serious shortfalls in stockpile surveillance activities,
personnel, infrastructure, and the basic sciences necessary
to recover from the successive budget reductions of the last
five years.'' \47\
Dr. Michael Anastasio: ``I fear that some may perceive that
the FY11 budget request meets all of the necessary
commitments for the program . . . I am concerned that in the
Administration's Section 1251 report, much of the planned
funding increase for Weapons Activities do not come to
fruition until the second half of the ten year period.'' \48\
Dr. George Miller: ``In my opinion, there is no `fat' in
the program of work that has been planned and, in fact,
significant risks exist; therefore, there is no room for
error.'' \49\
Secretary Schlesinger: ``I believe that it is immensely
important for the Senate to ensure, what the Administration
has stated as its intent, i.e., that there be a robust plan
with a continuation of its support over the full ten years,
before it proceeds to ratify this START follow on treaty.''
\50\
Secretary Baker: ``Because our security is based upon the
safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons, it is
important that our government budget enough money to
guarantee that those weapons can carry out their mission.''
\51\
Secretary Kissinger: ``As part of a number of
recommendations, my colleagues, Bill Perry, George Shultz,
Sam Nunn, and I have called for significant investment in a
repaired and modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and
added resources for the three national laboratories.'' \52\
Under Secretary Joseph: ``New START must be assessed in the
context of a robust commitment to maintain the necessary
nuclear offensive capabilities required to meet today's
threats and those that may emerge . . . This is a long-term
commitment, not a one-year budget bump-up.'' \53\
Under Secretary Edelman: ``a modernized nuclear force is
going to be essential to that. As Secretary Gates suggested
in October 2008, it's a sine qua non for maintaining nuclear
deterrents.'' \54\
Secretary Gates: ``I see this treaty as a vehicle to
finally be able to get what we need in the way of
modernization that we have been unable to get otherwise.''
``We are essentially the only nuclear power in the world that
is not carrying out these kinds of modernization programs.''
\55\
Secretary Gates: ``This calls for a reinvigoration of our
nuclear weapons complex that is our infrastructure and our
science technology and engineering base. And I might just
add, I've been up here for the last four springs trying to
get money for this and this is the first time I think I've
got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear
arsenal.'' \56\
NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino: ``The B61 warhead is
one of our oldest warheads in the stockpile from a design
standpoint. And actually warheads [are] in the stockpile . .
. that have vacuum tubes . . . We can't continue to operate
in this manner where we're replacing things with vacuum
tubes. Neutron generators and power supplies and the radar
essentially are components that have to be addressed in this
warhead. Also I think importantly this warhead, the work on
this warhead, will provide our first real opportunity to
actually increase the safety and security of that warhead for
21st century safety and security into that warhead. So when
we work on warheads from now on I'd like to be in the
position of saying we made it safer, we made it more secure,
we increased the reliability to ensure that we would stay
very far away from ever having to conduct an underground
test.'' \57\
ENDNOTES
\47\ ``Harold Agnew et al., Letter from 10 Former National
Laboratory Directors to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. May 19, 2010.
\48\ Dr. Michael It Anastasio, Director, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, July 15, 2010.
\49\ Dr. George Miller, Director, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Testimony
[[Page S10329]]
to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Response to QFR, July
15, 2010.
\50\ Secretary James Schlesinger, Testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. April 29, 2010.
\51\ Secretary James Baker, Testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. May 19, 2010.
\52\ Secretary Henry Kissinger, Testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. May 25, 2010.
\53\ Under Secretary Robert Joseph, Testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. June 24, 2010.
\54\ Under Secretary Eric Edelman, Testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. June 24, 2010.
\55\ Secretary Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee. June 17, 2010.
\56\ Secretary Robert Gates, Testimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee. June 17, 2010.
\57\ NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino, Testimony to the
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, April
14, 2010.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I look
forward with anticipation to when he returns to the floor with an
amendment. We look forward to moving on that. I also regret that he
will not be here, because I would like to be able to answer some of the
concerns he raised, because I think there are answers to them. I think
it is important obviously for that part of the record.
Some of the questions that were raised were questions about
verification. I will not take a long time, because I know the Senator
from Nebraska and the Senator from Georgia are waiting to speak. In a
letter from the Secretary of Defense to us regarding this issue of
verification--and we may well have a closed session where we will
discuss that to some degree. But in the letter, Secretary Gates writes
to me, and, through me, to the Senate, saying:
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and I assess
that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily
significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both
the New START verification regime and the inherent
survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. Strategic
force structure.
They have confidence in this verification regime. We need to have
confidence in the leadership of our military, national security
agencies, the intelligence agencies, and the strategic command, all of
whom are confident we have the capacity to verify under this treaty.
I ask unanimous consent to have that printed in the Record.
The Secretary of Defense,
Pentagon,
Washington, DC, Jul 30, 2010.
Hon. John Kerry,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: (U) As the Senate considers the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia, I
would like to share the Department's assessment of the
military significance of potential Russian cheating or
breakout, based on the recent National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on monitoring the Treaty. As you know, a key criterion
in evaluating whether the Treaty is effectively verifiable is
whether the U.S. would be able to detect, and respond to, any
Russian attempt to move beyond the Treaty's limits in a way
that has military significance, well before such an attempt
threatened U.S. national security.
(U) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and I assess
that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily
significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both
the New START verification regime and the inherent
survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic
force structure. Additional Russian warheads above the New
START limits would have little or no effect on the U.S.
assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite stable
deterrence. U.S. strategic submarines (SSBNs) at sea, and any
alert heavy bombers will remain survivable irrespective of
the numbers of Russian warheads, and the survivability of
U.S. inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would be
affected only marginally by additional warheads provided by
any Russian cheating or breakout scenario.
(U) If Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage
by cheating or breakout, the U.S. will be able to respond
rapidly by increasing the alert levels of SSBNs and bombers,
and by uploading warheads on SSBNs, bombers, and ICBMs.
Therefore, the survivable and flexible U.S. strategic posture
planned for New START will help deter any future Russian
leaders from cheating or breakout from the Treaty, should
they ever have such an inclination.
(U) This assessment does not mean that Russian compliance
with the New START Treaty is unimportant. The U.S. expects
Russia to fully abide by the Treaty, and the U.S. will use
all elements of the verification regime to ensure this is the
case. Any Russian cheating could affect the sustainability of
the New START Treaty, the viability of future arms control
agreements, and the ability of the U.S. and Russia to work
together on other issues. Should there be any signs of
Russian cheating or preparations to breakout from the Treaty,
the Executive branch would immediately raise this matter
through diplomatic channels, and if not resolved, raise it
immediately to higher levels. We would also keep the Senate
informed.
(U) Throughout my testimony on this Treaty, I have
highlighted the Treaty's verification regime as one of its
most important contributions. Our analysis of the NIE and the
potential for Russian cheating or breakout confirms that the
Treaty's verification regime is effective, and that our
national security is stronger with this Treaty than without
it. I look forward to the Senate's final advice and consent
of this important Treaty.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates.
Mr. KERRY. One last quick comment. Senator Kyl knows these materials
very well. He is an effective advocate for a point of view. But that
does not mean that by saying those things, all of them have a factual
underpinning or that they are, in fact, the best judgment as to what
our military thinks or the national intelligence community thinks about
the components of this treaty. Let me give an example. Senator Kyl has
raised concerns about the conventional prompt global strike capacity.
What he didn't say is, Russia very much wanted to ban strategic range
conventional weapons systems altogether. We rejected that approach. The
Obama administration said: No; we are not going to ban all conventional
capacity. In effect, they decided to proceed along the same approach we
used in START I.
Ted Warner, the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the
negotiation, testified in the Foreign Relations Committee, saying we
agreed to a regime whereby conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs--for the
folks who don't follow this, those are the intercontinental ballistic
missiles or submarine-launched ballistic missiles--would be permitted.
But, yes, they did agree to count them under the strategic delivery
vehicle and strategic warhead ceilings. Senator Kyl sees that as a
problem. All of our folks who negotiated this treaty and our military
and our strategic thinkers see that as an advantage for the United
States. That protects us. We are better off that way. Why? Because it
would be extraordinarily difficult to verify compliance with a treaty
that limited nuclear-tipped ICBMs and SLBMs but didn't count and,
therefore, didn't inspect identical conventionally armed ICBMs and
SLBMs. We couldn't tell the difference between them. We would be
absolutely foolish on our part to allow the Russians to deploy
additional ICBMs and SLBMs based exclusively on their assurance that
they are not nuclear armed. How would we know? It is only by putting
them under the counting that we, in fact, protect the interests of our
country rather than creating a whole sidebar arms race which would make
everybody less safe. Not counting those missiles would, in fact, create
a new risk--the risk of breakout, that we allow the other side, Russia,
the opportunity, even if there were no cheating, to simply leave the
treaty and arm those missiles with nuclear warheads on very short
notice, and we would all be worse off.
In fact, what Senator Kyl was complaining about is something that
makes us more stable. If we did what he is sort of hinting he might
like to do, we could actually create greater instability, and it would
be clearly much more likely to kill the treaty altogether.
Some of these things get raised and they sound like there is
reasonableness to them. But when we put them in the overall context of
strategic analysis and thinking and the balance, the sort of threat
analysis that attaches to any treaty of this sort, what we are trying
to work through is sort of reaching an equilibrium between both sides'
perceptions of the other side's capacity and of what kind of threat
that exposes each side to. That is how we sort of arrive at that
equilibrium. That is what has driven every arms control agreement since
their inception. The Pentagon has made very clear that the global
prompt strike is going to be developed, but it is going to be developed
as a niche capacity. They think it is too expensive to do in huge
numbers. It is
[[Page S10330]]
also very clear that under the best circumstances, it is going to be a
long time before that is ready to deploy.
We have boost-glide vehicles still in the proof-of-concept test
stage. Nobody has any imagination as to whether they will be ready in
10 or 15 years. The life of this treaty is 10 years. So we are looking
beyond the life of the treaty for when they might or might not be
ready. There are a host of other concepts out there about this. We are
going to get a report from the Pentagon next year on what technologies
they think are most promising. It is going to be exceedingly difficult
to imagine bringing them online within the 10-year life of this treaty.
Any concept of sort of revising things that make this treaty subject to
some component of that is, in effect, a guise to try to kill the
treaty. I say that about this one component of it. There are many
others, many other similar kinds of arguments raised in the last hour.
As we go forward, if an amendment arises, we will deal with each of
them.
I want colleagues to be aware there is more underneath some of these
red herrings than may appear to the eye at first blush.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Hagan). The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. ISAKSON. May I inquire if there is a scheduled recess at 12:30?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are not under that order.
Mr. ISAKSON. Madam President, I was on the floor last night and
addressed my significant concerns with the omnibus and the dual-track
process we are on right now. That statement has been made. I come this
morning to address the START treaty, the New START treaty. I voted for
it to come out of the Foreign Relations Committee to the floor. I want
to go through my reasons for having done so. I wanted to talk about
what the New START treaty is, not what it is not.
First, I want to pay tribute to Dick Lugar. He has been a bastion of
strength on nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation issues for
years. I thank Senator Kerry for the time he gave us to go through hour
after hour after hour of hearings and hour after hour after hour of
secure briefing in the bowels of the new Visitor Center, where we read
the summary of the notes of negotiations on the treaty, where we read
the threat initiative and the estimate of the terrorism threat
initiative and all the classified documentation about which we cannot
speak on this floor. These things are critical to our consideration as
we debate this treaty.
I wish to talk about two Senators, one a Democrat and one a
Republican. With all due respect to the chairman, it is not he. It is a
Democrat by the same of Sam Nunn from Georgia, who chaired the Armed
Services Committee, who, along with Senator Lugar, put together Nunn-
Lugar and the cooperative threat initiative. I sought out Senator Nunn
and Senator Lugar in my deliberations during the committee debate and
my consideration of what I would do in terms of that committee vote and
later a vote on the floor. I wish to make a couple notes about the
success of the Nunn-Lugar initiative. Nunn-Lugar is a commitment to see
to it that nuclear materials are secure. It is a commitment to see to
it that loose nukes around the world don't fall in the hands of those
who would kill my grandchildren, your grandchildren or all of us in the
United States. I don't think it has been mentioned, but as a result of
the Nunn-Lugar initiative, since 1991, since its formation, they have
reduced the number of loose nukes in the world by 7,599.
Belarus, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan no longer have nuclear arsenals.
Through that comprehensive threat initiative, they have destroyed the
weapons, and they have turned weapons of mass destruction into
plowshares that are powering powerplants. The nuclear threat initiative
does not mean we get out of the business of having a nuclear arsenal.
It means we get in the business of security for the nukes that are
there and establish goals toward nonproliferation which to all of us is
critically important.
My history as far as this goes back to the 1950s. It goes back to Ms.
Hamberger's first grade class, when I remember getting under the school
desk once a week to practice what we would do if a nuclear attack hit
the United States. My history with this goes back to October of 1962
when, as a freshman at the University of Georgia, I stood in fear with
all my colleagues and watched what was happening in Cuba, watched the
blockade, watched the strength of John Kennedy, who faced the Russians
down and ultimately prevented what would have been a nuclear strike
against the United States and ultimately our strike against them in
Cuba as well as in Russia.
Then I remember the night in October of 1986, when I had the honor to
introduce Ronald Reagan in Atlanta the night before he flew to Iceland
to begin negotiations on nuclear treaties at that time. In one speech
made today, it has been referenced that Reagan rejected what Gorbachev
offered at Reykjavik. That is correct. Reagan rejected not doing
research and development and building a nuclear arsenal. But what he
did insist on was verification of what both countries were doing so we
could never have a situation of not having transparency, not having
intelligence, and not knowing what the right and left hand were doing.
It was out of that rejection and at his insistence that the beginning
of the negotiations for the START treaty began. They were ultimately
signed in 1991, under the administration of George H.W. Bush.
Until December 5 of last year, that START treaty had been in place.
For those years, the United States had transparency. It had
verification. It had cooperative communication back and forth between
the two countries that controlled 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in
the world. My history with this goes all the way back to climbing under
a school desk, to introducing President Ronald Reagan, to 1 year
serving on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.
My decision to support the treaty coming out of the committee were
based on four principles. The first is inspections. It has been said
the inspections have been reduced. What has not been said is the number
of sites to inspect have also been greatly reduced. The number of
inspections correspond with what is necessary to inspect the Russian
arsenal and know whether they are complying with the treaty.
Inspections are very important. We learned on 9/11 what happens when we
don't have human intelligence on the ground where we need it. What
happens is we get surprised. What happened to us on 9/11 is almost
3,000 citizens died at the hands of a heinous attack by radical
terrorists because we didn't have as good intelligence as we needed to
have. That is why I don't want to turn my back on the opportunity to
have human intelligence on the ground in the Russian Federation
verifying that they are complying with a mutual pact we have made with
them and, correspondingly, the transparency they have to inspect our
nuclear arsenal in the United States.
The second point I wish to make that caused me to come to the
conclusion it was the right thing to do to support the treaty in
committee was the verification process. I have heard some people say
this verification process is not as good as the old verification
process. I am not going to get into that argument, but this
verification process is a heck of a lot better than no verification
process at all, which is exactly what we have today.
Since December 5 of last year, we haven't had the human intelligence.
We couldn't verify. Verification is critically important because with
verification comes communication. With communication comes
understanding, and from that understanding and communication comes
intelligence. While our inspections are to make sure the quantity of
the nuclear arsenal and the warheads and the delivery systems are
within compliance, it also gives us interaction to learn what others
may know about nuclear weapons around the world that are not covered by
this treaty.
That brings me to one other point. It has been said by some that
bilateral treaties are no longer useful in terms of nuclear power; we
need multilateral treaties. I have to ask this question: If we reject
the one bilateral treaty over nuclear power, how will we ever get to a
multilateral treaty? We will not do it. I think it is important to have
a bilateral treaty between the two countries that controls 90 percent
of the weapons so we see to it, as other countries gain nuclear power,
we can bring
[[Page S10331]]
them into a regimen that requires transparency and accountability
too. You will never be able to do that if you reject it between
yourself and the Russian Federation.
Now, the third thing I want to talk about for a second--I mentioned
Senator Nunn before. He served as Armed Services chairman, and so did
John Warner, who is a distinguish retired Republican Member of this
Senate. They released a joint statement not too long ago and raised a
point I had not thought of. If you will beg my doing this, I will read
on the floor of the Senate one of the points they made that was
supportive of this treaty. I quote from Senator Nunn and Senator
Warner:
. . . Washington and Moscow should expand use of existing
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers--which we--
Meaning Warner and Nunn--
and other members of Congress--
Meaning Dick Lugar--
established with President Ronald Reagan to further reduce
nuclear threats.
For example, to improve both nations' early warning
capabilities, the centers could exchange data on global
missile launchers. Other nations could be integrated into
this system. It could provide the basis for a joint
initiative involving Russia, the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization on a missile defense
architecture for Europe that would help address other key
issues, like tactical nuclear weapons vulnerable to theft by
terrorists. Indeed, when the centers were proposed, they were
envisioned to help prevent catastrophic nuclear terrorism.
These initiatives can go forward with a New START Treaty.
I thought that observation was very telling and looking prospectively
into the future about, again, having the two nations--the Russian
Federation and the United States--bring in other people, such as NATO,
to be a part of a treaty and a missile defense system that is agreeable
with all parties. The absence of negotiation, the absence of
transparency, the absence of cooperation ensures that cannot happen.
My fourth point is this: The thing I fear the most as a citizen, the
thing I fear the most as a Senator, and the thing I fear the most,
quite frankly, as the father of three and grandfather of nine is a
nuclear fissionable material getting into the hands of a radical
terrorist. That is the fear that all of us dread.
It is critical, when we look at what the Nunn-Lugar initiative has
done in the destruction of loose nukes--7,599--what the original START
treaty, the foundation it gave us, to begin to reduce nuclear weapon
proliferation without reducing our ability to defend ourselves and to
launch strikes that are necessary to protect the people of the United
States of America.
But I worry about one of the radical terrorists getting hold of one
of these materials, and I fear in the absence of transparency,
verification, and inspection, we run the risk, unwittingly, of playing
into their hands and making that type of a material more and more
available.
What is known as the Lugar Doctrine is very important to understand
at this stage of the debate. In doing my research on the treaty, and
the work that Dick Lugar and others have done on nonproliferation, I
came upon what is known as the Lugar Doctrine. I would like to read it
because it answers the question I just raised about a loose nuke
getting into the hands of a rogue terrorist:
Every nation that has weapons and materials of mass
destruction must account for what it has, spend its own money
or obtain international technical and financial resources to
safely secure what it has, and pledge that no other nation,
cell, or cause will be allowed access or use.
That is as clearly and as succinctly as you can state the future fear
that all of us have for this country and what might happen with nuclear
weapons.
So in closing my remarks, I went through interviews with Sam Nunn,
listened to the chairman and the ranking member, listened to the
testimony, Ms. Gottemoeller, and all the others, read the
documentation, which everybody else can read in the secure briefing
room, and I came to the conclusion that verification is better than no
verification at all; that inspections and transparency are what
prohibit things like what happened on 9/11 from ever happening again,
and that you can never expect multilateral negotiations with other
countries that have some degree of nuclear power if the two greatest
powers refuse to sit down and negotiate and extend the understanding
they have had since 1991.
Only through setting the example, without giving in or capitulating a
thing, do we hopefully give hope to the future that my grandchildren
and yours can live in a world that will not be free of nukes but will
be secure; that loose nukes are not in the hands of bad people; and we
have transparency and accountability while still having the capability
to defend ourselves and execute the security of the people of the
United States of America.
It is for those reasons I supported the New START treaty in the
committee, and I submit it for the consideration of the Members of the
Senate.
I yield back my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. NELSON of Nebraska. Madam President, I rise to discuss the New
START treaty. In the last 40 years, our country has participated in
numerous arms control and nonproliferation efforts. They are a critical
element of our national security strategy.
If done right, arms control agreements can enhance U.S. national
security by promoting transparency and information--sharing that can
inform us about the size, makeup, and operations of other military
forces.
They also provide other countries with information about our force
and capabilities, and that promotes a strategic balance and discourages
an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
Transparency and information sharing enable our military planners to
better prepare for a real threat. Without such agreements and
understandings, our military and the military of countries like Russia
must prepare for worst-case scenarios.
That leads to inefficient, runaway defense spending. If that sounds
familiar, that is because we have been down that road before--it was
called the arms race.
The U.S. and the former Soviet Union poured massive resources into
building not only vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons, but also on the
expansive systems needed to defend against incoming bombers and
missiles.
Since the late 1960s, arms control agreements and other measures have
worked to reduce nuclear forces and systems that support them.
I would note that former President Ronald Reagan, who accelerated
nuclear modernization and launched the Star Wars missile defense
effort, overcame his initial distaste for arms control agreements.
Working with Soviet Premier Gorbachev, Reagan laid the foundation for
today's START treaty.
In July 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the START I treaty
and the Senate later approved it on an overwhelming and bipartisan vote
of 93 to 6--a vote which concluded after 4 days of floor debate.
Nebraska's Senators at the time, Jim Exon and Bob Kerrey both supported
the START 1 treaty.
As we consider New START, it is our constitutional duty to address
today's concerns and the treaty's merits.
Now I have heard five main concerns during debate.
They are: No. 1, treaty limitations on missile defense; No. 2,
sufficiency of modernization plans for nuclear enterprise; No. 3,
adequacy of treaty verification measures; No. 4, force structure
changes resulting from treaty reductions; No. 5, and the timing of the
Senate's deliberations of the treaty.
First, the New START treaty won't affect any current or planned U.S.
missile defense efforts. Some point to language in the treaty's
preamble and the inclusion of unilateral statements. But they are not
legally binding. And changing the preamble would unravel the treaty.
The only binding restriction on missile defense systems arises in
article V. It prevents conversion of ICBM silos into missile defense
launchers. That has no practical effect because converting silos is
more expensive and less desirable than building new silos.
Second, some have questioned the administration's commitment to
modernize our nuclear facilities and forces. As the chairman of the
Armed Services' Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I held three hearings
this year addressing the health of our nuclear weapons complex.
I would note that the administration asked for $7 billion in Fiscal
Year 2011
[[Page S10332]]
for stockpile sustainment and infrastructure investments.
That is roughly 10 percent more than 2010 funding.
The administration also plans to invest $80 billion in the next
decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex. That is
the biggest commitment to the nuclear enterprise in more than a decade.
On top of that, the administration recently offered an additional $4
billion toward modernization goals.
Third, some argue that verification measures are less rigorous than
for START I.
Its verification measures expired last December. So, as of today, we
have gone 376 days without onsite monitoring and verification in
Russia.
The less we are allowed to see for ourselves the more uncertainty we
will feel about Russian forces.
New START includes verification measures allowing 18 onsite
inspections annually. We determine where and when to go, with very
little advance notice to the Russians.
As many of you know, this treaty counts every warhead and delivery
system and tracks them with unique identifiers. That is a tremendous
advancement in transparency over the previous system of attribution.
And it certainly is better than no verification system, which exists at
the present time.
Fourth, some express concern about the treaty's impact on the nuclear
triad--our strategic bombers, missiles, and ballistic missile
submarines.
In testimony and in direct conversations with me, our military
leaders have assured that the New START retains the triad.
Proposed reductions by the Pentagon aim to spread across all systems
and minimize impacts to any one system or base, thus retaining a safe,
secure, and effective triad.
Finally, some indicate that considering New START now prevents the
Senate from spending adequate time to consider the treaty, or that we
would be rushing judgment on the treaty.
New START was signed in April of this year, and the Senate has had it
for consideration since May.
Together, the Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and Armed Services
Committees have held 21 hearings and briefings related to the treaty.
The truth is that the Senate has been actively deliberating New START
for 7 months.
By comparison the 2002 Moscow Treaty took 9 months to complete and
START I took a little more than a year. When it came to floor debate,
the 1991 START I treaty required 4 days of debate, while START II, the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the 2002 Moscow Treaty each took 2
days.
I am confident that the Senate has fulfilled its responsibility to
fully consider and deliberate on New START, and our actions are
entirely consistent with the past actions of this body in considering
previous arms control agreements.
Those are concerns that have been raised. Now let's look now at the
merits.
In recent months, I have spoken about this treaty with key military
leaders including Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright,
and General Chilton.
Each has expressed full support and participation in this treaty.
They also fully support the proposed reductions to the nuclear arsenal
and the continued sustainment of the nuclear triad.
In addition, Secretary Clinton and every living former Secretary of
State--nine in total--have all publically voiced their support. Five
former Secretaries of Defense on both sides of the aisle have endorsed
the treaty. Seven former Strategic Command commanders have endorsed the
treaty. STRATCOM, headquartered in my State in Omaha, NE, in the
Bellevue area, oversees America's strategic nuclear, nonnuclear and
cyber defenses.
Also, it is important, I believe, that the U.S. Strategic Command
actively played a key role in negotiating the treaty. With that
experience, the former STRATCOM commander in chief General Chilton who
is recently departed, said:
Our nation will be safer and more secure with this treaty
than without it. What we negotiated to is absolutely
acceptable to the United States Strategic Command for what we
need to do to provide the deterrent for the country.
I wholeheartedly agree.
I am prepared to vote to ratify the New START Treaty because it
promotes our national security and can make America and the world
safer. It increases transparency between nuclear nations. It promotes
cooperation and not suspicion. And it reduces the possibility of a
nuclear exchange and still enables America to respond to the terrible
threats that continue in the nuclear age.
I would like to elaborate.
America will be stronger if we can continue to look under Russia's
hood, and they under ours. Trust but verify still works.
This treaty will help U.S. Strategic Command accomplish its
absolutely vital mission for our Nation.
Further, as the chairman of the U.S. Senate--Russia
Interparliamentary Group, I have held many meetings with my Russian
counterparts about this treaty. It is a step in the right direction to
encourage further cooperation between the U.S. and Russia. As we work
toward cooperation, the treaty reestablishes verification measures and
increases transparency considerably.
That will reduce uncertainty about Russian forces, and increase their
predictability. Without this treaty, our understanding of Russian
nuclear forces will continue to deteriorate.
We would have a tendency for U.S. forces to overcompensate for what
we don't know.
That is a losing strategy in an era of large budget deficits and
needed fiscal constraint. Entering into this treaty demonstrates our
commitment to modernizing the nuclear stockpile by making the most of
what we have to spend and to keep our country safe.
The New START treaty offers the possibility of providing our military
with insights needed to efficiently and successfully provide a safe,
reliable, and secure nuclear deterrent.
At the end of the day, the New START treaty builds on successes from
previous treaties, and paves the way for further bilateral agreements
between the United States and Russia.
It moves us further away from a nuclear war no one wants. Even as it
does, we will retain a powerful and effective deterrent capability.
And finally, ratification also will send a strong message to those
around the world opposed to proliferation and those seeking to
proliferate.
For these reasons, I support the New START treaty and I believe the
Senate should ratify it as soon as possible.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I would like to speak briefly on the
New START treaty and state the reasons I believe the Senate should go
ahead and ratify this treaty.
Let me highlight some key points on, first, what the treaty
accomplishes. Let me mention four things.
No. 1, it reduces the number of deployed nuclear warheads by a
relatively small number; that is, it takes us from 2,200, which is what
we were required to reduce to under the Moscow Treaty, down to 1,550.
Second, its counting regime is not based on attributing a number of
warheads to a launch system but, instead, like the 2002 Moscow Treaty,
this treaty actually requires the counting of deployed warheads.
Third, this treaty reestablishes a verification regime of inspectors
on the ground. This is something which lapsed a year ago when START I
lapsed.
Fourth, this treaty still maintains a credible nuclear deterrent
against Russia, against China, against anyone who might threaten our
country.
Before discussing some of these points in detail, let me put the New
START treaty in some historical perspective, at least as I see it.
As this chart graphically demonstrates, at the peak of the Cold War
some 30 years ago there were about 60,000 nuclear warheads. That is
clearly an astounding number given that a single warhead would destroy
most major American cities and most major cities anywhere in the world.
From 1991, when the first START treaty was signed, until 2002 when
the Moscow Treaty was signed, the number of warheads declined
dramatically from about 50,000 to a little over 20,000, or about 10,000
for the United States and 10,000 for Russia. This includes spare and
deployed warheads not just those that were deployed. The Moscow
[[Page S10333]]
Treaty took this count further down and allowed 2,200 to 1,700 deployed
warheads. Additional spares of about 3,300 were included, and the
number rises to somewhere between 5,500 and down to 5,000 warheads for
each nation. If the New START treaty is ratified as shown on this
chart, down here where this arrow is in the right-hand bottom corner,
in 2010, it will take the number of deployed warheads to 1,550 from the
Moscow lower limit of 1,700 that was in the Moscow Treaty. That is a
very modest reduction compared to what has been done in previous arms
control agreements.
After the Cold War ended 20 years ago, it was clear we had an
astounding and excessive number of nuclear weapons. I believe it was
the hope and the expectation of most Americans that there would be deep
reductions in nuclear weapons at that time. That reduction, in my view,
has been slow in coming. Our government has declassified the number of
nuclear warheads we have in our active stockpile, and that number is
5,113. If asked directly, I believe most Americans would be surprised
to know at the end of 2010 we still have over 5,000 nuclear warheads,
and we have 2,200 that are deployed.
Today we have a treaty before us that achieves a modest reduction
from the Moscow level of 2,200 deployed warheads. As I indicated
before, this treaty will take us down to 1,550. Quite frankly, I am
surprised some are arguing for having a drawn-out debate over the
treaty. START I took about 4 days of floor debate and lowered the
number of warheads between Russia and the United States from about
50,000 to 20,000, a 60-percent reduction. The Moscow Treaty lowered the
total number of U.S. warheads from about 11,000 to today's level of
about 5,000. That took 2 days to debate. That involved a 55-percent
reduction. Yet with a relatively modest reduction called for in this
treaty, we still have people proposing a floor debate that could extend
into the next Congress.
Let me turn to a number of substantive issues associated with the New
START treaty that I believe weigh in favor of its ratification by the
Senate. First, we have been briefed by the military commanders about
the 1,550 deployed warheads that will still be in place once this
treaty is approved. This total is comprised of about 700 deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs and about 800 total heavy bombers and launchers.
I urge my colleagues to obtain the classified briefing on the treaty.
I believe it is clear the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command has
analyzed in detail the strategic nuclear force structure of each side
under this treaty and is confident we can maintain our deterrence
against Russia and China, who hold 96 percent of the world's strategic
nuclear warheads.
The resolution of approval as reported by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee speaks to this issue, noting in condition 3 that
before any reductions in deployed warheads are made below the current
Moscow Treaty level, the President must notify Congress that such
reductions are in the ``national security interests of the United
States.''
The second point is that the intelligence community has judged that
we are better off with this treaty and its inspection regime than we
are without it. Monitoring and verification under START I, which has
now expired, was based on counting strategic launch systems and then
attributing a number of warheads to each submarine, each airplane, each
missile. This counting rule overestimated the number of warheads
carried on U.S. strategic systems. The New START treaty is much more
specific than START I. It counts only the actual number of warheads
carried by each deployed missile. In fact, this is the same counting
rule as in the Moscow Treaty which was developed by the prior
administration and subsequently approved in the Senate 95 to 0.
Moreover, under this treaty we have the ability to inspect on the
ground, with short notice, to determine whether uniquely coded
launchers actually carry the declared numbers of warheads. Contrary to
what some have claimed, short notice inspections of uniquely identified
launchers combined with other intelligence assets give us a high
probability of detecting cheating such as uploading more warheads,
which would take days to months for Russia to achieve.
Condition 2 of the resolution of approval out of the committee speaks
to the monitoring issue by requiring the President to certify that our
National Technical Means or other intelligence assets, combined with
our on-the-ground verification capability, is ``sufficient to effective
monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.''
Third, there is a larger policy issue of strategic stability. This
treaty provides a framework of transparency through inspections and
accountability of warheads and launchers. If we are worried about
unchecked growth of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, not now but 5
years from now, it makes great sense to approve this treaty.
Many have criticized the treaty because it does not deal with
Russia's numerical advantage and tactical nuclear weapons, such as
gravity bombs or submarine launched cruise missiles. I would point out
that none of the previous nuclear arms control treaties have dealt with
tactical nuclear weapons. While I agree we should have discussions with
Russia on tactical nuclear weapons, we need this treaty to restart the
process of negotiations if we are ever going to achieve the goal of
reducing tactical nuclear weapons.
This treaty lays the groundwork for a subsequent negotiation to
address tactical nuclear weapons, many of which are deployed close to
our NATO allies. If we cannot demonstrate we have the ability to enter
into binding obligations on strategic nuclear forces, which are the
most easily verifiable, how can we advance to the next step with Russia
on reducing their tactical nuclear weapons, which number in the
thousands and which are the most easily concealed of the weapons?
The fourth point: Let me turn to the issue of modernization of our
own nuclear arsenal. Despite our unsustainable budget deficit--and I
notice the Senator from Alabama is on the Senate floor today. He and I
both voted against the tax bill. I don't know all of his reasons. One
of mine was the unsustainable deficits faced by this country today. But
despite these unsustainable budget deficits, this administration is
committing an additional $14 billion over the next 10 years for a total
of $84 billion to modernize our nuclear weapons enterprise to ensure
that as we draw that nuclear arsenal down, reduce the numbers in the
nuclear arsenal under New START, we will be capable of maintaining
those weapons we do rely upon.
Now, this chart shows the 10-year projection for weapons stockpile
and infrastructure funding, and my colleagues can see there is a very
substantial commitment of funds by this administration to maintain the
reliability of our stockpile.
The fifth point I wish to make is that concerns have been raised
regarding the nonbinding Russian unilateral missile defense statement.
This is separate from the binding provisions of the treaty. This is a
nonbinding statement that Russia made that considers the treaty
effective only where there is, as they put it, ``no qualitative or
quantitative buildup of the missile defense capabilities of the United
States of America.''
In testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Secretary of State
Clinton stated unequivocally the treaty does not constrain our missile
defense efforts. Secretary Clinton went on to say:
Russia has issued a unilateral statement expressing its
view. But we have not agreed to this view and we are not
bound by it. In fact, we have issued our own statement making
it clear that the United States intends to continue improving
and deploying effective missile defense.
In the same hearing, Secretary of Defense Gates said:
The treaty will not constrain the United States from
deploying the most effective missile defense possible, nor
impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses.
Secretary Gates then goes on to say in that hearing:
As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review
and budget makes clear, the United States will continue to
improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed
forces and our allies and partners against ballistic missile
threats.
From a historical perspective I would note that similar unilateral
statements on missile defense were made by Russia in connection with
START I and in connection with START II, both of which treaties were
approved by the Congress.
[[Page S10334]]
Consistent with the statements by Secretaries Clinton and Gates, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's resolution of approval contains an
understanding included in the instrument of ratification that ``it is
the understanding that the New START Treaty does not impose any
limitations on the deployment of missile defenses other than the
requirement of paragraph 3, article V.''
That section of the treaty prohibits the use of existing ICBM and
SLBM launchers for missile defense or the conversion of missile defense
launchers for ICBMs except for those that have been converted before
the treaty was signed.
On the question of whether we should vote on ratification in this
Congress or leave this to the next Congress to consider, some Senators
claim that we simply need more time and that other treaties have laid
before the Congress for much longer periods. This is simply not the
case. Arms control treaties since the ABM Treaty in 1972 were either
taken up, debated and ratified within the same Congress or, in the
cases of START II, the Moscow Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Treaty
were taken up, debated and approved within the Congress from which the
Foreign Relations Committee reported a resolution of approval. This
historical precedent on the ratification of arms control treaties runs
counter to what some of my colleagues are advocating. It is this
congressional session of the Senate that received the treaty, held 21
hearings and briefings and submitted over 900 questions as part of the
advise and consent process and it should be this congressional session
of the Senate that should finish the job.
Let me conclude with where I started on the New START treaty, it is a
relatively modest treaty in terms of reducing the number of nuclear
warheads. Our military commanders have analyzed the force structure
under the treaty and have concluded it maintains our nuclear deterrent
and that it provides on the ground intelligence through verification
that the intelligence community believes we are better off with than
without. Finally, it is clear that it does not impede our missile
defense programs.
In my opinion there is no credible argument that the ratification of
this treaty undermines our national security. I urge my colleagues to
vote for the ratification of the New START treaty. I thank the chair
and yield back any remaining time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coons). The Senator from Alabama is
recognized.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. President, as we begin consideration of the New
START treaty, we must understand that the proposal is not made in a
vacuum. In one sense, it is an important part of our Nation's strategic
policy. I have served as chairman, ranking member, and a member of the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, subcommittee of the Armed Services
Committee, for 12 years in the Senate. Thus, on these matters of
nuclear policy and missile defense that have been before us so many
times, I have had a front-row seat on it.
Our President, whose work and proposals absolutely deserve fair and
just consideration in the Senate, after appropriate debate, has stated
that this treaty is a critical part of his approach to strategic
issues, repeatedly insisting that it is needed so the United States can
set an example and show leadership in moving toward what he has often
stated to be his goal--a nuclear-free world.
This treaty now comes at a time when our Nation is the world's only
nuclear power. We are the only nuclear power to have no nuclear
production facility ongoing at this time. It will have to be
reconstituted. That has been a sore spot in this Congress for quite a
number of years, but it has not happened.
For over a decade, the Senate's efforts to modernize our aging
weapons stockpiles--which our scientists have told us are getting to a
point where they have to be fixed--have been blocked by House
Democrats, mostly, and some Republicans there. We have gotten bills out
of the Senate to do this, but they have failed in the House. It has
been an article of faith on the left in America and abroad on the
international left that our goal must be to eliminate all nuclear
weapons from the world. President Obama and his administration have
often used that rhetoric. But our modernization capability hasn't been
started, and that is a troubling situation. As Secretary Gates has said
about modernization, we cannot continue at this rate.
In 2008, I sponsored legislation to create a bipartisan commission of
experienced statesmen to do a study of our nuclear posture. The
legislation passed and the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
United States did its work. It was headed by Dr. William J. Perry and
James R. Schlesinger, a former Defense Secretary of this country--a
Democrat and Republican. They reached a consensus on a number of key
issues. They concluded that we could reduce our nuclear stockpile more
than the current number, but that ``modernization is essential to the
nonproliferation benefits derived from the extended deterrent.'' So
they said it was essential to have a modernization program.
I know a lot of the discussion has been ongoing about that. I do
believe Senator Kyl has done an excellent job in raising this issue,
and the administration responded positively in some regards. The
Commission also, nicely, in diplomatic language, deflected the
administration's goal of zero nuclear weapons by saying:
It's clear that the goal of zero nuclear weapons is
extremely difficult to attain and would require a fundamental
transformation of the world political order.
I think that is about as close as you come from a bipartisan
commission expressing serious concerns about this policy. Meanwhile,
China, Russia, Pakistan, and India continue to expand their stockpile,
while rogue, outlaw nations, such as North Korea and Iran, posing great
risk to world peace, advance their nuclear weapons programs.
We will need to talk about this more as this debate goes forward. It
is quite clear that the greatest threat to world peace and nuclear
danger arises from the rogue nations and other nations that have less
secure situations than the Russians do. While it could be very
beneficial to have a good treaty with the Russians, this is not the
core of the danger this Nation faces today.
We have had very little work, very little success, in getting the
kind of robust support from Russia and China that we should have
regarding North Korea and Iran. It is inexplicable to me why they would
jeopardize their reputation as a positive force in the world to curry
favor with rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea. But this
administration has been unsuccessful in gaining the kind of support to
ratchet up the sanctions to get those countries that could perhaps make
a difference.
The Russians are steadfast in their nuclear program. They have
absolutely no intention of going to zero nuclear weapons. I had an
opportunity to talk to some of their people, and it is pretty clear to
me they thought it was outside the realm of good judgment to discuss
going to zero nuclear weapons. They were never going to zero nuclear
weapons. They have a 10-to-1 advantage over the United States in
tactical nuclear weapons--more maneuverable--and this treaty does
absolutely nothing to deal with that situation. The Russians may make
some changes in the future, perhaps, but I don't think they are going
to do much on tactical nuclear weapons. It is a critical part of their
defense strategy.
We understand Russia is willing and has plans at this time to reduce
their strategic nuclear stockpile, which is what this treaty deals
with, not the tactical weapons, and that is because it represents a
necessary economic move for them. Frankly, I don't think they see the
United States or Europe as the kind of strategic threat they used to
be, and they are willing to pull down those numbers. It is a good
thing, and we should celebrate what gains we can obtain.
Some close observers believe this treaty curtails the U.S. programs,
such as missile defense, while not curtailing certain Russian
modernization programs of the systems they want to advance. In short,
the Russians seem to have negotiated more effectively than the United
States in this treaty. That is my observation. We wanted it too
desperately. I warned our negotiators that they were too committed, too
desperate to get this treaty. It would make more difficult the
negotiation also with the Russians. I think that has proven to be true.
[[Page S10335]]
Let me be plain about my overall concern. First, the idea that it
should be the goal of this country to move toward the total elimination
of nuclear weapons is not just a fantasy, a wild chimera or some
harmless vision; I think it is dangerous. It can only raise questions
about the quality of the judgment that underlies our strategic policy.
The question arises, is the fierce determination of this
administration to get a treaty a part of their stated goal of moving to
zero nuclear weapons and setting ``an example'' for the world? Is the
United States of America, under whose nuclear umbrella resides a host
of free and prosperous nations, no longer reliable as a nuclear power?
We know many other nations that are part of our nuclear umbrella are
worried about our nuclear policy. I can understand that. How far, how
low does this world leadership role take us? How few weapons should we
go to? Down further from 1,500, as this treaty would have it--and that
might be a sustainable number--to 1,000 or 500? Well, not 500, somebody
would say. But I note that Mr. Jim Hoagland, writing in the Washington
Post on December 10, declared that the treaty fails, in his view,
because the numbers are not low enough. He says that ``500 or fewer''
would be sufficient.
Well, will this example of reducing our weapons cause other nations
to follow our good example? I think not. If Iran and North Korea risk
their security and their financial soundness on building a nuclear
arsenal today, will our example cause them to stop? I think not.
Rather, I must conclude it will embolden them. As our weapon numbers
fall lower and lower, these rogue nations can begin to see clearly
their way to being a peer nuclear competitor of what is now the world's
greatest military power. Why would we want to encourage them in that
fashion? I think it is a risky goal.
Thus, to the extent that the treaty is an effort to advance the
stated goals of this administration--a nuclear-free world--the treaty
will be counterproductive and dangerous, I think. If that is what it is
about, it is counterproductive, and it will enhance and encourage other
nations to have nuclear weapons, and any country that has advanced
under our nuclear umbrella who does not now have nuclear weapons may
decide they have to have their own, further proliferating nuclear
weapons.
At the Halifax International Security Forum a few weeks ago,
supported by the German Marshall Fund, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Michele Flournoy repeated the administration's goal of zero
nuclear weapons, and further stated, ``It is a vision. It's an
aspiration.'' She acknowledged, ``It may not happen in our lifetimes.''
I can tell you it is not happening in our lifetimes, with a high degree
of certainty.
The name of the panel, by the way, had a little bit of an irony to
it. It was ``A World Without Nukes, Really?'' Good question. So some of
my Democratic colleagues may say these statements about ``no nukes''
or, you know, they are just rhetoric, you have to say those things to
keep the President's political left in line. The President is not
really serious about it. It is not a real goal of his.
Well, I do not know. America leaders usually mean what they say. He
has not renounced the policy. Secretary Flournoy was repeating it a few
weeks ago at an international conference. I've got to say, a lot of
people were not too impressed with that policy, frankly, from our
allies around the world.
Even if the President is not telling us accurately what his
philosophy is, these words do not mean anything. He is throwing out
astonishing visions about what he would like to happen, the lamb lying
down with the lion. What else is he not serious about as we consider
this treaty? If one is not accurate about matters as significant as
nuclear weapons, we have a grave problem of leadership in this country.
Does it mean the President favors modernization of our stockpile? He
says so. But, in essence, he has conditioned that support on passing of
the treaty when we need to modernize the stockpile whether or not we
have a treaty.
Does this give me confidence that the President is clearheaded about
our nuclear policy when the Secretary of Defense and former Secretary
of Defense and the laboratory directors and the top military people
have, without exception, said we need to modernize our nuclear forces,
and he is only going to support it if this Congress ratifies the
treaty? I do not feel good about that. A lot of people have opposed
modernization. They think modernization is a step toward more nuclear
weapons, in their mind, and we ought to eliminate nuclear weapons, not
have more.
That is, frankly, where the President's political ancestry is. That
is where he came from politically. So forgive me if I am not real
comfortable about this. Does the President mean it when he says he has
not compromised and will not compromise our ability to deploy strategic
missile defense systems in Europe?
There is a rub here. Some in this relativistic, postmodern world may
not have the slightest concerns that our Commander in Chief's words are
ambiguous on matters such as this. They do not believe much in the
authority of words anyway. But call me old fashioned. I think words are
important. These words that I am hearing worry me. So these views that
are fantastical place a cloud of unreality over this entire process.
Secondly, I am not persuaded that this administration has not
retreated on nuclear missile defense to a significant degree. I am not
persuaded that that has not occurred. For example, the latest WikiLeaks
reveal that the administration negotiated away President Bush's plan
for a forward missile defense site in Poland in exchange for the
Russian cooperation. The New York Times summarized these cables on
November 29:
Throughout 2009, the cables show, the Russians vehemently
objected to American plans for a ballistic missile defense
site in Poland and the Czech Republic. . . . In talks with
the United States, the Russians insisted that there would be
no cooperation on other issues until the European site was
scrapped. . . . Six weeks later, Mr. Obama gave the Russians
what they wanted: he abruptly replaced the European site with
a ship-borne system.
So it makes me a bit nervous. We had a plan to place that in Europe,
a two-stage system instead of the three stage we have in the United
States, to give us redundant coverage from Iranian attack, and the
Russians did not like it. They did not want a missile defense system on
their border, even though, at best, it would have only minimal support
against a massive number of missiles that they have. We were only going
to put 10, I think, in Poland. But they objected. They objected. The
Bush administration stood firm. They got the last treaty by standing
firm. Indeed, former Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith wrote
an article in one of the major newspapers, an op-ed, I think the Wall
Street Journal, saying that they said no, and eventually the Russians
agreed to sign.
He raised an important issue. I want to share this with my colleagues
whom I know believe so deeply we have to have this treaty or all kinds
of bad things will happen. Mr. Feith told the Russians: We do not have
to have a treaty with you. We do not have a treaty with other nations
that have nuclear weapons. If it is not a good treaty, we are not going
to agree to it.
Eventually the Russians agreed. He said the very same insistences,
the positions they asserted at that time against the Bush
administration that they rejected were demands acquiesced in by this
administration in this treaty.
So forgive me if I am a bit dubious about how wonderful this treaty
is. I asked the State Department about those cables, and we have not
heard any information on them. So there are many more things we need to
talk about with regard to the treaty and the overall strategic
situation we find ourselves in.
Are we making the world safer? I am worried that we are not. I am
worried that this approach may not make us safer. I am well aware that
some of our best allies are worried now about the constancy of the
United States, the commitment of the United States to a defense, even
if, God forbid, nuclear defense of our world allies, that we will not
follow through, and so they may have to have their own nuclear weapons.
I know there is a good bit more to discuss in this debate. I
encourage this body to be deliberative in its consideration of the
treaty. I am not happy that it is being shoved at this point in
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time. I was so hopeful and expectant that we would be able to give a
firm date to start the debate early next year, and we could have a
robust debate, not only about the treaty but how it fits into our
overall nuclear strategic posture, what are we going to do about
missile defense, what are we going to do about updating our stockpile,
and what about our triad and delivery systems, what are we going to do
about those. Now it is being jammed in here. I understand why. They
have got more votes they think now, and the likelihood of it passing is
greater now. I think it has a realistic chance of passing next year.
But, more significantly, I think the administration wishes to avoid a
full debate about the strategic nuclear policy of the United States. If
that is successful, then I think the American people will be the
losers, as will the security of the United States.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. I wanted to ask the Senator before he leaves, it is now
1:30 in the afternoon, and we have yet to have one amendment presented
to us. I recognize there is a value to having some of these comments
help frame it, but it also can be done in the context of a specific
amendment.
I would ask the Senator if he has an amendment he is prepared to
offer that could help us move forward?
Mr. SESSIONS. Well, it is difficult to amend a treaty, as the Senator
knows, once it has been signed. There are things that can be done. I
think, first and foremost, we need to ask ourselves, is this a good
thing for the country? Will it advance our interests? I believe we need
a pretty big discussion about that and where we stand.
I know Senator Kerry has been supportive of modernization--I believe
you have--at least as this treaty has moved forward, if not in the
past. And we need to do that. But I am a bit uneasy that the President
is basically saying, if you do not pass my treaty, we are not going to
modernize, when I think modernization is critical to the security of
our country. I also want to know how it fits into our overall strategic
policy.
So that is kind of my biggest concern, I say to Senator Kerry. I do
not know that the numbers that the treaty takes us to, the reduced
numbers themselves are dangerous. Some people say they think it is a
bit dangerous, but most experts do not think so. I am not inclined to
oppose a treaty on whether it is 1,550 or 1,700 or 1,800. But I think
if it is part of a trend to take our numbers down further--perhaps you
saw Mr. Hogan's article saying it ought to be 500 or lower. That would
make me very concerned and I think would cause serious ramifications
internationally. Would you agree? If this treaty would be, say, for
500, it would definitely create some concern and angst around the
world?
Mr. KERRY. Well, let me say to my friend--and I appreciate his desire
to try to be thoughtful about what the numbers are and about the treaty
as a whole. I appreciate that. A couple of comments I want to make. No.
1, the administration is not linking modernization to the treaty. I
think it is clear now to Senator Kyl. I read a letter before the
Senator started speaking from the directors of the three laboratories
expressing their satisfaction and gratitude with the levels of funding
that have been put in there.
I acknowledge that Senator Kyl was correct in finding some
inadequacies in the original funding levels, and the administration, in
good faith, has made up for those. What happened over in the House,
happened over in the House. It was not instigated by the
administration. In fact, the administration has countered that and made
it clear that modernization is necessary as a matter of modernizing, in
order to keep our arsenal viable.
The second point I wish to make to the Senator, I hope the Senator
does not vote against this treaty because he thinks somehow this is a
step to some irresponsible slippery slide that takes us to ``zero''
nuclear weapons without all of the other things that very intelligent,
thoughtful statesmen have talked about in the context of less nuclear
weapons.
But I should point out to the Senator, Dr. Henry Kissinger, who is an
advocate for this concept, not as something we are going to do tomorrow
or in the next, you know, 10 years perhaps, 20 years, 30 years, but as
an organizing principle, as a way of beginning to think differently
about how we resolve conflicts--because whatever you do that moves you
toward a world of less nuclear weapons, because we have to get 67 votes
here, clearly would build the kind of consensus that says we are doing
things that make us safer. So it would have to be accompanied by the
other country's transparency, by other countries taking part.
It would also, I would say to the Senator, almost necessarily have to
be accompanied by something that today is way out of reach, which is a
kind of restraint on conventional weapon growth and involvement and the
way in which we try to resolve conflicts between countries.
It is no accident that George Shultz, Bill Perry, and Sam Nunn, as
well as both of the 2008 Presidential nominees, Senator McCain and
President Obama, have all agreed this is a principle worth trying to
move toward. One thing is for certain: The road to a reduced number of
nuclear weapons in the world, which would reduce the amount of
fissionable material potentially available to terrorists, certainly
doesn't pass through a nuclear Tehran. So if we are going to have our
bona fides to be able to leverage North Korea and Iran, we need to at
least prove we can put together a bilateral agreement between the two
countries that have 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.
I would hope my colleague would not view this--given all of the
signoffs that have accompanied it, from our national security
establishment, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from military leaders,
from the national intelligence community, from our laboratory
directors, our strategic commanders--all of them have agreed 1,550, the
current number of launchers we have, the 800--this is going to permit
the United States to maintain the advantages we feel we have today.
I hope my colleague would look hard at sort of how Henry Kissinger
and George Shultz and Bill Perry have framed this concept of moving in
that direction as an organizing principle. I don't expect it in my
lifetime. I doubt the Senator does. But I wouldn't vote against this
treaty that provides a window into what the Russians are doing,
provides verification, reduces the threat, and creates stability. I
wouldn't link the two, and I would hope the Senator would not.
I see the Senator from Arizona has arrived.
Mr. SESSIONS. May I ask, I believe earlier today the Senator made the
point:
Make no mistake, we are not going to amend the treaty
itself. We are willing to accept resolutions that don't kill
the treaty.
I think I understand that. But I do assert that, as we both know,
amending a treaty is not something that is easily done. So we have to
deal with whether we think the treaty is helpful. We can do some things
through the amendment process to make it more palatable and acceptable
to people who have concerns. I do not dispute that. But I do believe
that, fundamentally, this day ought to be about discussing the overall
strategic impact of the treaty.
I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator. We have incorporated into the
resolution of ratification some 13 different declarations,
understandings, and conditions. We certainly would welcome more if they
are constructive and are not duplicitous. We have already addressed the
missile defense issue, the rail-mobile issue, the verification issue.
All of those have been addressed. But I welcome and look forward to
working with the Senator in the next days to see if we can do that.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, we are discussing the New START treaty at
this time. I look forward to continued debate and discussion on this
vital and important national security issue. I wish to, however, remind
colleagues that, as with any other issue that relates to this treaty
and the Russians, it
[[Page S10337]]
can't be totally considered in a vacuum. Events that have transpired in
the last several years in Russia should bring great concern and pause
to all of us.
I will speak about the situation in Russia today and specifically the
continued imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his associate,
Platon Lebedev, and the imminent verdict by a Russian judge to likely
extend that imprisonment which was delayed from yesterday to December
27. If we needed any more reason to know what verdict is coming, this
is it.
The Russian Government seems to be trying to bury some inconvenient
news by issuing it 2 days after Christmas and after this body will
probably be finished debating the possible ratification of a treaty
with the Russian Federation. Some may see this as evidence that the
Russian Government is accommodating U.S. interests and desires. I would
be more inclined to believe that if these prisoners were set free.
Until that time, I will continue to believe that when Prime Minister
Putin says Khodorkovsky should sit in jail, as he said yesterday, that
this is exactly the verdict the Russian court will deliver.
The fact is, the political fix has been in for years on this case.
Mr. Khodorkovsky built one of the most successful companies in post-
Soviet Russia. And while I am under no illusions that some of these
gains may have been ill-gotten, the subsequent crimes committed against
him by the Russian State have exceeded the boundaries of human decency,
equal and lawful justice, and the God-given rights of man.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article in
Yahoo from yesterday that says ``Russia's Putin: Khodorkovsky `should
sit in jail'.'' That is what the Prime Minister of Russia said about an
ongoing judicial situation.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From Yahoo! News]
Russia's Putin: Khodorkovsky `Should Sit in Jail'
(By Lynn Berry, Associated Press)
Moscow.--Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared
Thursday that former oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a
proven criminal and ``should sit in jail,'' a statement
denounced as interference in the trial of a Kremlin foe whose
case has come to symbolize the excesses of Putin's rule.
Putin's judgment gave ammunition to government opponents
who claim Khodorkovsky is being persecuted by Putin and his
allies.
Khodorkovsky is serving an eight-year sentence after being
convicted of tax fraud and is awaiting a verdict in a second
trial on charges of stealing oil from his own oil company
that could keep him in prison for many more years.
Putin was in his first term as president when Khodorkovsky,
then Russia's richest man, was arrested in 2003 after funding
opposition parties in parliament and challenging Kremlin
policies.
Khodorkovsky's lawyers and supporters said Putin's comments
during his annual televised call-in show would put undue
pressure on the judge as he deliberates and exposed Putin's
role as a driving force behind the seven-year legal
onslaught.
One of his lawyers, Karinna Moskalenko, said Putin's
statements indicate that the judge will find Khodorkovsky
guilty.
In addition to saying Khodorkovsky was guilty of economic
crimes, Putin once again suggested the former oligarch had
ordered the killings of people who stood in his way as he
turned Yukos into Russia's largest oil company. Khodorkovsky,
whose oil company was taken over by the state, has not been
charged with any violent crime.
Putin reminded television viewers that the former Yukos
security chief was convicted of involvement in several
killings.
``What? Did the security service chief commit all these
crimes on his own, at his own discretion?'' he said.
Putin said Khodorkovsky's present punishment was ``more
liberal'' than the 150-year prison sentence handed down in
the U.S. to disgraced financier Bernard Madoff, who cheated
thousands of investors with losses estimated at around $20
billion.
``Everything looks much more liberal here,'' Putin said.
``Nevertheless, we should presume that Mr. Khodorkovsky's
crimes have been proven.''
Speaking to reporters afterward, Putin said he had been
referring to the conviction in the first case, a distinction
he did not make during the televised show.
He insisted the second case would be considered objectively
by the court, but said it involved even higher monetary
damages than the first case, implying no leniency should be
shown.
``I believe that a thief should sit in jail,'' Putin said.
With more than a touch of sarcasm, Khodorkovsky's lead
lawyer, Vadim Klyuvgant, thanked Putin for speaking his mind
``because it directly and clearly answers the question of
who, with what aims and with what power is putting pressure
on the court as the judge is deliberating.''
Judge Viktor Danilkin is scheduled to begin reading the
verdict on Dec. 27.
If convicted, Khodorkovsky and his partner Platon Lebedev
face prison sentences of up to 14 years, which could keep
them in prison until at least 2017.
Putin has not ruled out a return to the presidency in 2012,
and critics suspect him of wanting to keep Khodorkovsky
incarcerated until after the election.
The case has been seen as a test for President Dmitry
Medvedev, who has promised to establish independent courts
and strengthen the rule of law in Russia.
Mr. McCAIN. Quoting:
I believe that a thief should sit in jail.
With more than a touch of sarcasm, Khodorkovsky's lead
lawyer, Vadim Klyuvgant, thanked Putin for speaking his mind
``because it directly and clearly answers the question of
who, with what aims and with what powers is putting pressure
on the court as the judge is deliberating.''
In 2003, when Mr. Khodorkovsky became increasingly outspoken about
the Russian Government's abuses of power, its growing authoritarianism,
corruption, and disregard for the law, he was arbitrarily arrested and
detained under political charges. His company was stolen from him by
authorities, and he was thrown in prison through a process that fell
far short of the universal standards of due process. Mr. Khodorkovsky
was held in those conditions for 7 years, and when his sentence was
drawing to a close, new charges were brought against him which were
then even more blatantly political than the previous ones.
Mr. Khodorkovsky, along with Mr. Lebedev, was charged with stealing
all of the oil of the company that had been so egregiously stolen from
them. The trial has now concluded. So what will happen next? It seems
rather clear. After spending 7 years in prison, Mr. Khodorkovsky will
likely face many more, which I fear is tantamount to a death sentence.
This case is a travesty of justice for one man, but it is also a
revealing commentary on the nature of the Russian Government today.
Yesterday, the Senate voted to take up the New START treaty. To be
sure, this treaty should be considered on its merits to our national
security. But it is only reasonable to ask--and I ask my colleagues
this question--if Russian officials demonstrate such a blatant
disregard for the rights and legal obligations owed to one of their own
citizens, how will they treat us and the legal obligations, be it this
treaty or any other, they owe to us?
What is worse, the sad case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky now looks like
one of more modest offenses of corrupt officials ruling Russia today.
I would like to quote from a recent article in the Economist dated
December 9, 2010, entitled ``Frost at the core,'' which I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Economist, Dec. 9, 2010]
Frost at the Core
dmitry medvedev and vladimir putin are presiding over a system that can
no longer change
On December 15th, in a small courtroom in central Moscow,
Viktor Danilkin, a softly spoken judge, is due to start
delivering a verdict. Its symbolism will go far beyond the
fate of the two defendants, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon
Lebedev, former principal shareholders in the Yukos oil
company. Both men have been in jail since 2003 on charges of
tax evasion. Their sentences expire next year. In order to
keep them in prison, the government has absurdly charged them
with stealing all the company's oil.
Neither the first nor the second trial had much to do with
the rule of law. But there the similarity ends. In 2003 Mr.
Khodorkovsky personified the injustice and inequality of the
1990s, when tycoons wielded enormous power over a state that
could not even pay pensions and salaries on time. Seven years
on, Mr. Khodorkovsky is a symbol of the injustices
perpetrated by corrupt bureaucrats and members of the
security services, who epitomise the nexus between power and
wealth. As Mr. Khodorkovsky said in his final statement,
``They turned, us, ordinary people, into symbols of a
struggle against lawlessness. This is not our achievement. It
is theirs.''
The chances that Mr. Khodorkovsky will be found not guilty
are slim. If he were, it would be a sign that the system of
Vladimir Putin, Russia's former president and current prime
minister, was beginning to come
[[Page S10338]]
apart. That system, which tolerates corruption and violence,
has just received the endorsement of FIFA, which has awarded
Russia the prize of hosting the 2018 football World Cup. But
its evolution had much to do with Mr. Khodorkovsky's story.
In the 1990s, when businessmen bribed the courts, both
parties knew they were in the wrong. After Mr. Khodorkovsky's
case, a judge taking instructions from a bureaucrat felt he
was in the right. The Russian state not only flagrantly
flouted the law for its own interests, but also sent a
powerful signal to its bureaucracy that this practice was now
okay.
According to Alexander Oslon, a sociologist who heads the
Public Opinion Foundation in Moscow, Mr. Putin's rule ushered
in a breed of ``bureaucrat-entrepreneurs''. They are not as
sharp, competitive or successful as the oligarchs of the
1990s, but they are just as possessed by ``the spirit of
money'' in Mr. Olson's phrase, the ideology that has ruled
Russia ever since communism collapsed. By the end of the
1990s the commanding heights of the economy had been largely
privatised by the oligarchs, so the bureaucrat-entrepreneurs
began to privatise an asset which was under-capitalised and
weak: the Russian state.
Unlike businessmen of Mr. Khodorkovsky's type, who made
their first money in the market, the bureaucrat-entrepreneurs
have prospered by dividing up budget revenues and by
racketeering. ``Entrepreneurs'' who hire or work for the
security services or the police have done especially well,
because they have the ultimate competitive advantage: a
licence for violence.
No one worries about conflicts of interest; the notion does
not exist. (Everyone remembers the special privileges given
to party officials for serving the Soviet state.) As American
diplomats are now revealed to have said, the line between
most important businesses and government officials runs from
blurry to non-existent. Putting Mr. Khodorkovsky in jail, or
awarding a large contract to one's own affiliated company,
could be justified as a public good. Indeed, more people were
in favour of locking up Mr. Khodorkovsky, even though they
knew it would benefit only a few Kremlin bureaucrats.
In 1999 the oil price started to climb and petrodollars
gushed into Russia, changing the mindset of the political
class. Mr. Oslon points out that the most frequently used
word in Mr. Putin's state-of-the-nation address in 2002 was
``reform'' and its variants. A few years later the most
frequently used word was ``billion''. Divvying up those
billions has become the main business in Russia. Corruption
no longer meant breaking the rules of the game; it was the
game.
Unlike private businessmen, who started to invest in their
core businesses (Yukos among them) in the late 1990s,
bureaucrat-entrepreneurs have little incentive to do so.
Their wealth is dependent on their administrative power,
rather than newfangled property rights. The profits are often
stashed away in foreign bank accounts or quickly spent: on
luxury property in European capitals, or on their children's
education in British private schools. All this is inevitably
accompanied by anti-Western rhetoric and claims of Russia's
resurgence.
The message of Krasnodar
On November 4th, National Unity Day, in the small town of
Kushchevskaya in the Krasnodar region, eight adults and four
children were killed in a house. They were the family of a
wealthy farmer and his guests.
The youngest child, nine months old, suffocated when the
killers set the house alight.
Terrible murders can happen in any country. This one stood
out because it was the work not of a maniac but of a well-
established criminal gang, which has terrorised the region
for nearly 20 years. More than 200 trained thugs do its work,
including dozens of murders and rapes. Its boss, Sergei
Tsapok, was a deputy in the local council and had links with
the chief law-enforcement agencies, the tax police and local
government. The gang first emerged in the early 1990s,
racketeering and carving up valuable plots of land. In 2002
it began to ``legalise'' and incorporate itself into local
state power structures.
Mr. Tsapok's agricultural firm received massive state
credits and grants. It employed the head of security of the
local prosecution service as its in-house lawyer. In 2008 Mr.
Tsapok boasted that he was among the guests at the
inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia's president,
according to Novaya Gazeta, an independent Russian newspaper.
The gang ran the region not only under the gaze of
government, but also in its stead.
When the chief Russian investigator into the murders
arrived a few days later from Moscow, he was besieged by
complaints from all over the region. Alexander Tkachev, the
governor, seemed dismayed by all the fuss: ``Such a crime
could have happened in any part of the region. Unfortunately,
such gangs exist in every municipality.'' Despite what
happened, he remains in his job.
In the past such bespredel (extreme lawlessness) was mostly
restricted to Chechnya and a few other parts of the north
Caucasus. But violence has spread, and Kushchevskaya has
caused horror not only because of the child victims, but
because it presented a threatening model of a crumbling
state. The government used to mask its problems with a thick
layer of money. But as this layer gets thinner, the problems
become more obvious.
a shrinking pie
Corruption was also excessive in the 2000s, but it was
compensated for by strong economic growth and fast-rising
incomes. This, and soothing television pictures, created a
sense of stability. But the global financial crisis hit the
Russian economy harder than that of any other large
industrial country, exposing its structural weakness. As
Vladislav Inozemtsev, an economist, argues in a recent
article, the improvement in living standards was achieved at
the cost of massive under-investment in the country's
industry and infrastructure. In the late Soviet era capital
investment in Russia was 31% of GDP. In the past ten years
Russia's capital investment has been, on average, about 21.3%
of GDP. (For comparison, the figure over the same period in
China was 41%.)
Despite rising oil prices and a construction boom, Mr.
Inozemtsev says, in the post-Soviet period Russia has built
only one cement factory and not a single oil refinery. The
Soviet Union used to build 700km of railways a year. Last
year, it built 60km. ``We have lived by gobbling up our own
future,'' he argues. Peter Aven, the head of Alfa Bank, the
largest private bank in the country, thinks today is like the
late Soviet period: ``Once again the main source of wealth is
oil and gas, which is being exchanged for imported goods. The
state today is no better than Gosplan was in the Soviet
Union.''
Russia's trade surplus is shrinking. As imports grow, so
does pressure on the rouble. The government is now running a
budget deficit. Mr. Aven says Russia's budget balances at an
oil price of $123 a barrel. Three years ago it balanced at
$30. For all the talk of stability, only 6% of the population
can imagine their future in more than five years' time, which
may explain why only 2% have private pension plans.
To keep up his approval rating, particularly among
pensioners and state workers, Mr. Putin has had to increase
general government spending to nearly 40% of GDP (see chart).
To pay for this he has raised taxes on businesses, which are
already suffocating from corruption and racketeering. While
Russia's peers in the BRIC group of leading emerging
economies are coping with an inflow of capital, $21 billion
fled out of Russia in the first ten months of the year.
Unlike foreign firms such as Pepsi (see article), Russia's
private firms are too nervous to invest in their own economy.
That economy is growing by less than 4% a year. This would
be respectable in many Western countries, but as Kirill
Rogov, an economic and political analyst, argues, it is not
enough to sustain the political status quo. When the pie of
prosperity was expanding, dissension within the elite made no
sense. However, now that money is scarcer and the world is
divided into ``Mr. Putin's friends and everyone else'', as
one businessman put it, conflicts are inevitable.
A sense of injustice is now growing in many different
groups. Private businessmen and even oligarchs complain about
the lack of rules and bureaucratic extortion. Middle-class
Muscovites moan that officials in their black luxury cars,
with their flashing blue lights, push them off the road and
occasionally run them over. People in the north Caucasus feel
they are treated like aliens rather than Russian citizens.
Everyone is fed up with corruption.
The discontent does not register in Mr. Putin and Mr.
Medvedev's joint popularity ratings, which remain at 70%. But
growing numbers of the elite feel that the present political
and economic model has been exhausted and the country is fast
approaching a dead end. ``The problem is not that this regime
is authoritarian, the problem is that it is unfair, corrupt
and ineffective,'' says one leading businessman. ``Corruption
will erode and bring down this system.'' The paradox is that
few Russian government officials disagree with this.
At a recent government-sponsored conference on Russia's
competitiveness, everyone agreed that the system does not
work. Russian politicians sometimes sound like opposition
leaders, and Mr. Medvedev makes pledges as if he were a
presidential candidate. If Mr. Putin has stopped lamenting
the level of corruption in Russia, as he used to, it is only
because he believes this is futile and that other countries
are the same.
In a democracy, such confessions of impotence from top
officials would probably prompt their resignations. In Russia
it leads to a discussion of how best to preserve the system.
Which tactics work better will be the subject of a
conversation between Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev when they
decide, probably next summer, which of them will become
Russia's next president. As Mr. Putin said, the decision will
be made on the basis of what is best for Russia. (``Think of
them as co-heads of a corporation,'' Mr. Oslon suggests.) The
aim is the same, but the styles vary.
Mr. Medvedev calls for innovation and technical
modernisation to revive growth. He is appealing through
the internet to the most enterprising people in Russia,
and is inviting Russian and foreign scientists to come and
innovate in a specially created zone, called Skolkovo,
which would be protected against the rest of the country
by a high security wall and honest police.
The president, who is keen to keep his job after 2012, will
try to persuade Mr. Putin that it is in the interests of the
corporation, and of Mr. Putin as one of its main
stakeholders, for his predecessor not to return to the
Kremlin. He could cite the need for better relations with the
West to legitimise the
[[Page S10339]]
financial interests of the Russian elite, and the
inefficiency of the security services as a support base. But
even if Mr. Putin would like to retire, can he afford to?
The two men may belong to the same system and want the same
thing, but they are formed by different experiences. Mr.
Putin, despite his belligerence about the 1990s, is the very
epitome of that period. He operates by informal rules and
agreements rather than laws and institutions. He became
president at the end of a revolutionary decade, when the job
carried more risks than rewards. He is cautious, dislikes
making decisions and rarely fires anyone, putting loyalty and
stability above all else.
Mr. Medvedev, on the other hand, was installed as president
after nearly a decade of stability, when the political
landscape was cleared of opposition and the coffers were full
of money. He is a stickler for formality, though he is a lot
less careful, and makes decisions that can destabilise the
system--such as firing the previous mayor of Moscow, Yuri
Luzhkov. But he is also weaker than Mr. Putin, and may not be
able to hang on to power.
The likeliest outcome is that the two will try to preserve
their tandem one way or another. Kremlin officials dismiss
talk of dead ends as pointless whining and alarmism from
liberals. The prevailing view is that the system works and
everything will carry on as usual. That may be wrong,
however. ``Mr. Putin can return to the Kremlin technically,
but he cannot do so historically,'' Mr. Rogov argues. His
popularity may be buoyant, but the historic period of
stabilisation and restoration which he initiated is coming to
an end. Mr. Putin always took great care over symbols,
marking the beginning of his rule with the restoration of the
Soviet anthem. At the time, it was a symbol of continuity and
greatness. Today it sounds increasingly archaic.
As stability turns into stagnation, Mr. Putin is becoming a
symbol of the bygone 2000s. Mr. Medvedev, on the other hand,
with his tweets and his iPad, has absorbed hopes of change
among the younger, more restless set. He has done nothing to
justify this; as a recent editorial in Vedomosti, a Russian
business daily, argued, ``Medvedev is strong not because of
his deeds, but because he rides an illusion.'' Nonetheless,
the wish for change is real.
Dissenting voices
This is reflected in the media. Glossy lifestyle magazines
are becoming politicised; one has even put Lyudmila Alexeeva,
an 83-year-old human-rights activist, on its cover. The
beating-up of Oleg Kashin, a journalist from Kommersant, a
mainstream newspaper, troubled the well-heeled more than the
murder of Anna Politkovskaya did three years ago, precisely
because Mr. Kashin--unlike her--did not oppose the regime or
write about Chechnya. And recently Leonid Parfenov, a stylish
Russian TV presenter, caused a scandal when, at an awards
ceremony attended by Russia's most powerful media executives,
he said that Russian television reporters have turned into
servile bureaucrats. ``Our television'', he said, ``can
hardly be called a civic or public political institution.''
It was not what Mr. Parfenov said that was news, but the
fact that he said it at all. He used to steer clear of words
like ``civic'' or ``duty'', and argue that Russian liberalism
was not found in politics, but in fashion boutiques and
Moscow coffee shops. Many young, successful Russians shared
his view. Mr. Parfenov's speech reflects a change of mood
among them, as well as a growing interest in politics.
Although state television has enormous sway over older
Russians, the young, urban and educated get their news and
views from the internet, which remains largely free of
Kremlin propaganda.
Stanislav Belkovsky, a political commentator, sees a
similarity between Russia's situation and the period of
Perestroika reform under Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s.
As then, a large part of the elite has realised that the
system is ineffective and is no longer willing to defend it.
When ordinary people come to share this view, the system is
in grave danger.
That moment may be some time away: the Russian economy is
more flexible than the Soviet one, the elite is more diverse,
the borders are open and there are safety valves to release
dissatisfaction. But as Mr. Khodorkovsky said in a recent
interview from jail, the tensions between the declining
performance of the Russian economy, the expectations of the
population and the corruption of the bureaucracy will erode
the system, whoever is president.
With Mr. Putin in power, Russia may suffer deep stagnation,
but a collapse of the system would be all the more dramatic.
With Mr. Medvedev stagnation may be shorter, but his grip on
power would be weaker. This may matter little in the long
run, but it makes a big difference for Russians living now--
not least for Mr. Khodorkovsky himself.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Khodorkovsky, the Economist writes, is a symbol of
the injustices perpetrated by corrupt bureaucrats and members of the
security services who epitomize the nexus between power and wealth.
The article goes on to describe the staggering scale of corruption in
Russia today.
Shortly before his arrest Mr. Khodorkovsky estimated state
corruption at around $30 billion, or 10% of the country's
[gross domestic product]. By 2005 the bribes market,
according to INDEM, a think-tank, had risen to $300 billion,
or 20% of GDP. As Mr. Khodorkovsky said in a recent
interview, most of this was not the bribes paid to traffic
police or doctors, but contracts awarded by bureaucrats to
their affiliated companies.
I go on to quote from the Economist:
Their wealth is dependent on their administrative power,
rather than newfangled property rights. The profits are often
stashed away in foreign bank accounts or quickly spent: on
luxury property in European capitals, or on their children's
education in British private schools.
Unsurprisingly, surveys now show that the young would
rather have a job in the government or a state firm than in
private business. Over the past 10 years, the number of
bureaucrats has gone up by 66%, from 527,000 to 878,000, and
the cost of maintaining such a state machine has risen from
15% to 20% of GDP.
Other figures point to the same conclusion as the Economist. In its
annual index of perceptions of corruption, Transparency International
ranked Russia 154 out of 178 countries--perceived as more corrupt than
Pakistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The World Bank considers 122 countries
to be better places to do business than Russia. One of those countries
is Georgia, which the World Bank ranks as the 12th best country to do
business with.
President Medvedev speaks often and at times eloquently about the
need for Russia to be governed by the rule of law. Considering the
likely outcome of Mr. Khodorkovsky's show trial, it is not surprising
that President Medvedev himself has lamented that his anticorruption
campaign has produced, in his words, ``no results.''
Russians who want better for their country and dare to challenge the
corrupt bureaucrats who govern it are often targeted with impunity.
One case that has garnered enormous attention both within Russia and
around the world is that of Sergei Magnitsky, a tax attorney for an
American investor who uncovered the theft by Russian officials of $230
million from the Russian treasury. Because of Mr. Magnitsky's
relentless investigation into this corruption, the Russian Interior
Ministry threw him in prison to silence him. He was deprived of clean
water, left in a freezing cell for days, and denied medical care. After
358 days of this abuse, Sergei Magnitsky died. He was 37. Not only has
the Russian Government held no one accountable for his death, several
officials connected to Mr. Magnitsky's imprisonment and murder have
actually received commendations.
Then there is the tragic case of Russia's last remaining independent
journalist. Last month, Russian journalist Oleg Kashin, who had written
critically of a violent youth movement associated with the Kremlin, was
beaten by attackers who broke his jaw, both his legs, and many of his
fingers--a clear political message to other writers.
No one has been charged for this crime, and writing in the New York
Times this Sunday, Mr. Kashin suggests that no one ever will.
``[I]t seems indubitable,'' he writes, ``that the atmosphere of
hatred and aggression, artificially fomented by the Kremlin, has become
the dominant fact in Russian politics, the reset in relations with the
United States and talk of economic modernization notwithstanding. . . .
A man with a steel rod is standing behind the smiling politicians who
speak of democracy. That man is the real defender of the Kremlin and
its order. I got to feel that man with my own head.''
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent this entire article be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Dec. 11, 2010]
A Beating on My Beat
(By Oleg Kashin)
On the night of Nov. 6, I was attacked by two young men
armed with steel rods. The assault occurred a few feet from
the entrance to my house, which is just a 10-minute walk from
the Kremlin.
A month later, I am still in the hospital. One of my
fingers has been amputated, one of my legs and both halves of
my jaw have been broken, and I have several cranial wounds.
According to my doctors, I won't be able to go back to my job
as a reporter and columnist at Kommersant, an independent
newspaper, until spring.
A few hours after the attack, President Dmitri Medvedev
went on Twitter to declare
[[Page S10340]]
his outrage, and he instructed Russia's law enforcement
agencies to make every effort to investigate this crime. But
no one has been apprehended, and I do not expect that the two
young men will ever be identified or caught.
Three theories quickly emerged about who was behind the
attack--which was, I believe, an assassination attempt. The
first holds that it was the municipal authorities of Khimki,
a town between Moscow and St. Petersburg. I had written
several articles criticizing a proposed highway between the
two cities that would run through the town, something the
local authorities want but many residents oppose.
The second theory is that it was Andrei Turchak, the
governor of the Pskov region, who was upset by a blog posting
of mine arguing that he had his position only because of his
ties to the Kremlin.
And the third theory is that the perpetrators came from
Nashi, a youth movement I have criticized. The group's
appearance on the public scene has accompanied a new level,
and acceptance, of violence in Russian politics; members are
called ``Nashists'' by their opponents, as a pun on
``fascists,'' for good reason.
Nashi is closely tied to the Kremlin, which founded the
group five years ago in response to fears that Ukraine's
Orange Revolution could inspire similar uprisings in Russia.
When newspapers reported that Vasily Yakemenko, its former
leader and now the minister for youth affairs, might have
been involved in the attack on me, he was granted an
unscheduled meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Was
this meant to show that the authorities didn't share such a
suspicion--or that they didn't care whether the accusation
was true?
What strikes me about the theories is that, in each case,
the ultimate perpetrator is the state. And for some reason
that seems acceptable to most Russians: practically no one
here has questioned the right of the state to resort to
extra-legal violence to maintain power, even against
journalists.
I don't mean to compare myself to Anna Politkovskaya or
Paul Klebnikov, journalists who were killed probably because
of their investigative work. But in a way the attack against
me is more disturbing. Unlike most of the reporters who have
been attacked in Russia in recent years, I have not engaged
in any serious investigations into corruption or human rights
abuses. I have not revealed any secret documents or irritated
influential figures with embarrassing material.
What I have done, though, is criticize Nashi. Indeed, all
this year I have called attention to the violence that
accompanies the group's every public activity. Even at their
legally sanctioned events the members trample--and this is no
exaggeration; they literally stomp with their feet--portraits
of Russia's ``enemies,'' including human rights activists,
politicians and journalists.
I also believe they were the organizers of anonymous acts
aimed at the opposition: fabricated video clips, hacker
attacks and physical assaults. Some of them were symbolic;
for example, an unidentified man once hit Garry Kasparov, the
former world chess champion who is an opposition leader, on
the head with a chess board.
But even when there is strong evidence of official Nashi
involvement, members have gone unpunished. In the summer of
2005 a group of hooligans with baseball bats invaded an
opposition meeting and savagely beat the participants. The
police detained the attackers, and a list of their names,
including some ``Nashists,'' appeared in the papers. But all
of the detainees were immediately released, and the case has
never gone to court.
Nobody knows for certain whether there is a direct link
between the flourishing of Nashi and the increased violence
against critics of the state. But it seems indubitable that
the atmosphere of hatred and aggression, artificially
fomented by the Kremlin, has become the dominant fact in
Russian politics, the ``reset'' in relations with the United
States and talk of economic modernization notwithstanding.
A man with a steel rod is standing behind the smiling
politicians who speak of democracy. That man is the real
defender of the Kremlin and its order. I got to feel that man
with my own head.
Mr. McCAIN. An earlier New York Times news story, dated May 17 of
this year, and entitled ``Russian Journalists, Fighting Graft, Pay in
Blood,'' describes the fate of other independent journalists in Russia.
One is Mikhail Beketov, who exposed corruption in a Moscow suburb. This
is what happened to him.
"Last spring, I called for the resignation of the city's
leadership,'' Mr. Beketov said in one of his final
editorials. ``A few days later, my automobile was blown up.
What is next for me?'' Not long after, he was savagely beaten
outside his home and left to bleed in the snow. His fingers
were bashed, and three later had to be amputated, as if his
assailants had sought to make sure he would never write
another word. He lost a leg. Now 52, he is in a wheelchair,
his brain so damaged that he cannot utter a simple sentence.
No one has been charged or held responsible for this crime either.
The same article mentions another journalist, Pyotr Lipatov, who was
attacked while covering an opposition rally. As he was leaving, the
article says:
[T]hree men pushed him to the ground and punched him
repeatedly on the head. ``Even when I was unconscious, they
didn't let me go,'' Mr. Lipatov said. This beating was
recorded on video by protesters. Mr. Lipatov's colleagues
used the video to track down the men who beat him. They were
police officers. While Mr. Lipatov, 28, was recovering in the
hospital, he said two other police officers visited and urged
him to sign a statement saying that he had provoked the
attack. . . .
Officials later acknowledged that police officers had been
involved in the attack, but they still brought no charges.
Instead, they raided Mr. Lipatov's offices, seized computers
and brought a criminal extremism suit against him. They
asserted that he had sought to foment ``negative stereotypes
and negative images of members of the security forces.''
Fearing for his safety and more criminal charges, he quit.
Sadly, I could go on and on like this, to say nothing of the many
unsolved murders. So I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, May 17, 2010]
Russian Journalists, Fighting Graft, Pay in Blood
(By Clifford J. Levy)
Khimki, Russia.--Mikhail Beketov had been warned, but would
not stop writing. About dubious land deals. Crooked loans.
Under-the-table hush money. All evidence, he argued in his
newspaper, of rampant corruption in this Moscow suburb.
``Last spring, I called for the resignation of the city's
leadership,'' Mr. Beketov said in one of his final
editorials. ``A few days later, my automobile was blown up.
What is next for me?''
Not long after, he was savagely beaten outside his home and
left to bleed in the snow. His fingers were bashed, and three
later had to be amputated, as if his assailants had sought to
make sure that he would never write another word. He lost a
leg. Now 52, he is in a wheelchair, his brain so damaged that
he cannot utter a simple sentence.
The police promised a thorough investigation, but barely
looked up from their desks. Surveillance videos were ignored.
Neighbors were not interviewed. Information about
politicians' displeasure with Mr. Beketov was deemed
``unconfirmed,'' according to interviews with officials and
residents.
Prosecutors, who had repeatedly rejected Mr. Beketov's
pleas for protection, took over the case, but did not seem to
accomplish much more. Mr. Beketov's close colleagues said
they were eager to offer insights about who in the government
had been stung by his exposes. But no one asked.
Eighteen months later, there have been no arrests.
In retrospect, the violence was an omen, beginning a wave
of unsolved attacks and official harassment against
journalists, human rights activists and opposition
politicians around the region, which includes the Moscow
suburbs, but not the city itself. Rarely, if ever, is anyone
held responsible.
One editor was beaten in front of his home, and the
assailants seized only copies of his articles and other
material for the next day's issue, not his wallet or
cellphone. Local officials insisted that he sustained his
injuries while drunk.
Another journalist was pummeled by plainclothes police
officers after a demonstration. It was all captured on video.
Even so, the police released a statement saying that he had
hurt himself when he was accidentally pushed by the crowd.
These types of attacks or other means of intimidation,
including aggressive efforts by prosecutors to shut down news
media outlets or nonprofit groups, serve as an unnerving
deterrent. And in a few cases in recent years, the violence
in the country has escalated into contract killings.
Corruption is widespread in Russia, and government often
functions poorly. But most journalists and nonprofit groups
shy away from delving deeply into these problems.
The culture of impunity in Russia represents the most
glaring example of the country's inability to establish real
laws in the two decades since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. And this failure radiates throughout society, touching
upon ordinary men and women who are trying to carve out lives
in the new Russia, but are wary of questioning authority.
Russia's president, Dmitri A. Medvedev, has bemoaned the
country's ``legal nihilism.'' Yet under Mr. Medvedev and
Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, it has persisted. And among
the major beneficiaries have been the governing party's
politicians.
Threats, Then a Beating
Boris Gromov, the governor of the Moscow region, commanded
the 40th Army during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and his
opponents believe that he governs with a general's sense of
order. Mr. Gromov, appointed by Mr. Putin, has in turn seeded
local government with fellow Afghanistan veterans, including
the Khimki mayor, Vladimir Strelchenko.
Mikhail Beketov often referred to Mr. Gromov and Mr.
Strelchenko as ``army boots,'' and did not think much of
their honesty.
[[Page S10341]]
Mr. Beketov was brawny like a boxer, fast-talking,
perpetually late and prone to latching onto causes. He
himself had been an officer in the army paratroops, but then
switched to journalism, working as a war correspondent in
Afghanistan and Chechnya. His experiences left him with a
distaste for overbearing military officials.
He established his newspaper, Khimkinskaya Pravda (Khimki
Truth), in 2006. He wrote regularly about what he considered
corruption among local officials, who were often members of
Mr. Putin's governing party, United Russia.
He financed the newspaper himself. It had a circulation of
only about 10,000 copies, but it garnered a large following
in Khimki, which has a population of 185,000, and the
surrounding cities, especially after Mr. Beketov grabbed hold
of two topics.
His articles resonated nationally when he questioned why
the city had demolished a monument that contained the remains
of Soviet fighter pilots. The work was done to widen a road.
And he relentlessly focused on the fate of the Khimki
forest, a pristine expanse of old-growth oaks and wild
animals, including elk and boars, improbably close to Moscow.
With little public notice, the government had planned to
build a major highway to St. Petersburg through the forest.
Mr. Beketov suspected that officials were secretly profiting
from the project.
Local officials, unaccustomed to such criticism, lashed out
publicly. Privately, Mr. Beketov received phone threats. He
asked the authorities for help, but was rebuffed, his
colleagues said. He returned home one day to discover his dog
dead on his doorstep. Then his car was blown up.
Instead of investigating the explosion, prosecutors opened
a criminal inquiry into his newspaper. His friends said that
Mr. Beketov told them that one city official had warned him
about his articles.
But he did not relent. ``You can imagine what kind of money
the authorities plan to fleece from this so-called
infrastructure,'' he wrote about the highway plan.
``For four years, I have observed our authorities,'' he
said. ``I have closely interacted with many senior officials,
including Strelchenko himself. Given how the authorities have
collected scandals with frightening regularity, I have come
to a regrettable conclusion: They are shameless.''
On a November evening in 2008, Mr. Beketov was assaulted,
most likely by several people, outside his home. He was
discovered by a neighbor the next day.
Even as Mr. Beketov later lay in a coma at the hospital, he
was not safe. A threat was phoned in: We will finish him off.
His friends and colleagues grew so alarmed that they moved
him out of the Khimki hospital to a better, more secure one
in neighboring Moscow.
Both the police and prosecutors found the case tough to
crack.
Yuliya Zhukova, a spokeswoman in the Moscow region for the
investigative committee of the prosecutor general's office,
said the office had conducted a thorough inquiry, but
ultimately had to suspend it for lack of evidence. She said
that investigators needed to interview Mr. Beketov to make
progress, but that his doctors would not allow that. (Mr.
Beketov has been unable to communicate since the attack.)
Yevgenia Chirikova, a leader of a local environmental group
who worked closely with Mr. Beketov on his articles about the
highway, said that she was eager to help, but that
investigators did not contact her.
``I waited and waited and waited,'' Ms. Chirikova said. ``I
knew that according to the rules, they are supposed to
question those closest to the victim.''
She said she decided to approach the investigators herself.
They questioned her for several hours, asking her about her
motivations for getting involved in the case, she said.
Ms. Zhukova criticized allies of Mr. Beketov and some
journalists for assuming that the attack was related to Mr.
Beketov's work.
``Very often, unfortunately, they have presented erroneous
information, and misled people regarding the course of the
investigation,'' she said.
Governor Gromov and Mayor Strelchenko declined to be
interviewed for this article. After the attack, Mr.
Strelchenko said he had played no role in it, but also
complained that it was getting too much attention.
``I don't want to say that it was good what happened to
Mikhail,'' he said. ``But I want you to separate truth from
untruth.''
Attacks on Two Editors
To the north on the M-10 highway from Khimki is a city
called Solnechnogorsk, where a newspaper, Solnechnogorsk
Forum, was publishing exposes about how local politicians
were seeking to do away with elections to maintain power.
The newspaper's editor, Yuri Grachev, is 73. In February
2009, several men assaulted him as he left his home, putting
him in intensive care for a month with a severe concussion, a
broken nose and other wounds.
Police officials first said he was drunk and fell down.
Then they said he had been the victim of a random robbery,
though all that was taken was a folder with material for the
newspaper's next issue. The muggers have not been found, and
politicians from the governing party, United Russia, said the
attack had nothing to do with Mr. Grachev's work.
``Maybe it was hooligans or maybe it was by chance,'' said
Nikolai Bozhko, the local party leader, who is also an
Afghanistan war veteran. ``The idea that it was ordered--I
don't believe that.''
Prosecutors had better luck finding evidence that
Solnechnogorsk Forum had committed libel. They have brought
charges against the paper, aiming to shut it down.
``The system will stop at nothing to break you,'' Mr.
Grachev said.
Farther up the M-10 Highway is Klin, where an opposition
rally was held in March 2009 to protest corruption and
increases in utility rates.
As Pyotr Lipatov, editor of an opposition newspaper called
Consensus and Truth, was leaving the rally, three men pushed
him to the ground and punched him repeatedly on the head.
``Even when I was unconscious, they didn't let me go,'' Mr.
Lipatov said.
This beating was recorded on video by protesters. Mr.
Lipatov's colleagues used the video to track down the men who
beat him. They were police officers.
While Mr. Lipatov, 28, was recovering in the hospital, he
said two other police officers visited and urged him to sign
a statement saying that he had provoked the attack. He
refused. The police then issued a statement.
``According to Lipatov, filming the meeting with his
camera, he found himself in the middle of a reactionary
crowd, was pushed and fell to the ground,'' the statement
said. Two videos of the demonstration show a different
sequence of events.
Officials later acknowledged that police officers had been
involved in the attack, but they still brought no charges.
Instead, they raided Mr. Lipatov's offices, seized computers
and brought a criminal extremism suit against him. They
asserted that he had sought to foment ``negative stereotypes
and negative images of members of the security forces.''
Fearing for his safety and more criminal charges, he quit.
``Everyone was against me--the judges, the police, the
prosecutors, everyone,'' he said. ``I took over Consensus and
Truth because I supported Prime Minister Putin's call to
fight corruption. But look what happened. The machine here
did everything possible to defeat us.''
Promises, but No Arrests
After the attacks in Khimki, Solnechnogorsk, Klin and
elsewhere, the authorities, apparently concerned that the
region had developed a reputation as a danger zone for
journalists, vowed to protect them.
``Attacks on journalists, naturally, create a special
resonance,'' Governor Gromov's office said. ``The regional
government believes that every case of an attack on
journalists must be thoroughly investigated.'' Even so, no
arrests have been made in any of the cases.
And the harassment has not let up.
On March 31, The New York Times interviewed Ms. Zhukova,
the spokeswoman for the investigators, about Mr. Lipatov. The
next day, investigators approached him in the central market
of Klin and said they urgently wanted to question him about
the beating, he said.
The session lasted more than six hours. Mr. Lipatov said
they tried to pressure him to sign a statement saying that he
had wanted to lead a mob to storm city buildings, thereby
justifying the police beating. He said he declined to do so.
Back in Khimki, a new opposition newspaper, Khimki Our
Home, was established to help continue Mr. Beketov's work.
The editor, Igor Belousov, 50, is a deeply religious man.
He publishes the Russian Orthodox calendar in his newspaper.
Before turning to journalism, he was a senior city official,
but he resigned because of what he described as pervasive
corruption.
Not long after the publication got started, Mr. Belousov
was accused of criminal libel by prosecutors and civil libel
by Mayor Strelchenko. In February, the police, without any
notice, arrested him on charges of selling cocaine. Court
documents show that the case is based exclusively on the
testimony of a drug dealer from another city who could not
recall basic details of the alleged crime.
``We used to have so many journalists here, but they have
all suffered and have all given up,'' Mr. Belousov said.
``Only I remained, and now I am giving up.''
Mr. McCAIN. Russia's beleaguered political opposition, unfortunately,
fares no better than its journalists. I have met a few times this year
with former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who organizes peaceful
political rallies to protest a lack of democracy in Russia, a right
granted under the Russian Constitution. But these rallies are often
targeted and violently broken up by Russian authorities.
Considering that this is how Russian officials treat their fellow
citizens, it is not hard to see a profound connection between the
Russian Government's authoritarian actions at home and its aggressive
behavior abroad. The most glaring example of this remains in Georgia.
Over 2 years after its invasion, Russia not only continues to occupy 20
percent of Georgia's sovereign territory, it is building military bases
there, permitting the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in South Ossetia,
and denying access to humanitarian missions--all in violation of
Russia's obligations under the cease-fire agreement
[[Page S10342]]
negotiated by President Sarkozy. In a major recent step, President
Saakashvili even renounced the use of force to end Russia's occupation,
pledging only to defend nonoccupied Georgia in the event of a Russian
attack. And yet Russian officials responded hostilely and dismissively.
I ask my colleagues, when the Russians illegally, in violation of all
international law, occupy a sovereign nation--a sovereign nation--and
have recognized these two provinces within the international boundaries
of Georgia as independent nations, how in the world are we going to
trust them to adhere to a treaty?
I have met with the people in Georgia who have been displaced from
their homes--the sorrow and the misery inflicted on them. President
Sarkozy of France flew in and arranged for a cease-fire. The Russians
agreed to it. They are in total violation of it. They are occupying 20
percent of the country of Georgia. I think Nicaragua and one other
country have also recognized these two ``independent'' states in which
the Russians are now carrying out ethnic cleansing and stationing
Russian military. But not to worry, we can trust the Russians to adhere
to solemn treaties and abide by international law.
When we consider the various crimes and abuses of this Russian
Government, it is hard to believe that this government shares our
deepest values. This does not mean that we cannot or should not work
with the Russian Federation where possible. The world does not work
that way. What it does mean is that we need a national debate about the
real nature of this Russian Government, about what kind of a
relationship is possible with this government, and about the place that
Russia should realistically occupy in U.S. foreign policy. The Senate's
consideration of the New START treaty offers a chance to have this
debate, as does Russian accession to the WTO. Some may want to avoid
it, but we cannot.
I believe we need a greater sense of realism about Russia, but that
is not the same as pessimism or cynicism or demonization. I am an
optimist, even about Russia. I often find sources for hope in the most
hopeless of places. Mikhail Khordokovsky has languished in prison for 7
years, and on December 27, he will likely be forced to endure many
more. Yet, in a final appeal to the judge in his case, Mr. Khordokovsky
gave one of the more moving speeches I have heard in a long time.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Full Transcript of His Final Words
I can recall October 2003. My last day as a free man.
Several weeks after my arrest, I was informed that president
Putin had decided: I was going to have to ``slurp gruel'' for
8 years. It was hard to believe that back then.
Seven years have gone by already since that day. Seven
years--quite a long stretch of time, and all the more so--
when you've spent it in jail. All of us have had time to
reassess and rethink many things.
Judging by the prosecutors' presentation: ``give them 14
years'' and ``spit on previous court decisions'', over these
years they have begun to fear me more, and to respect the
law--even less.
The first time around, they at least went through the
effort of first repealing the judicial acts that stood in
their way. Now--they'll just leave them be; especially since
they would need to repeal not two, but more than 60
decisions.
I do not want to return to the legal side of the case at
this time. Everybody who wanted to understand something--has
long since understood everything. Nobody is seriously waiting
for an admission of guilt from me. It is hardly likely that
somebody today would believe me if I were to say that I
really did steal all the oil produced by my company.
But neither does anybody believe that an acquittal in the
YUKOS case is possible in a Moscow court.
Notwithstanding, I want to talk to you about hope. Hope--
the main thing in life.
I remember the end of the '80s of the last century. I was
25 then. Our country was living on hope of freedom, hope that
we would be able to achieve happiness for ourselves and for
our children.
We lived on this hope. In some ways, it did materialise, in
others--it did not. The responsibility for why this hope was
not realized all the way, and not for everybody, probably
lies on our entire generation, myself included.
I remember too the end of the last decade and the beginning
of the present, current one. By then I was 35. We were
building the best oil company in Russia. We were putting up
sports complexes and cultural centres, laying roads, and
resurveying and developing dozens of new fields; we started
development of the East Siberian reserves and were
introducing new technologies. In short,--we were doing all
those things that Rosneft, which has taken possession of
Yukos, is so proud of today.
Thanks to a significant increase in oil production,
including as the result of our successes, the country was
able to take advantage of a favourable oil situation. We felt
hope that the period of convulsions and unrest--was behind us
at last, and that, in the conditions of stability that had
been achieved with great effort and sacrifice, we would be
able to peacefully build ourselves a new life, a great
country.
Alas, this hope too has yet to be justified. Stability has
come to look like stagnation. Society has stopped in its
tracks. Although hope still lives. It lives on even here, in
the Khamovnichesky courtroom, when I am already just this
side of 50 years old.
With the coming of a new President (and more than two years
have already passed since that time), hope appeared once
again for many of my fellow citizens too. Hope that Russia
would yet become a modern country with a developed civil
society. Free from the arbitrary behaviour of officials, free
from corruption, free from unfairness and lawlessness.
It is clear that this can not happen all by itself; or in
one day. But to pretend that we are developing, while in
actuality,--we are merely standing in one place or sliding
backwards, even if it is behind the cloak of noble
conservatism,--is no longer possible. Impossible and simply
dangerous for the country.
It is not possible to reconcile oneself with the notion
that people who call themselves patriots so tenaciously
resist any change that impacts their feeding trough or
ability to get away with anything. It is enough to recall
art. 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian
Federation--arresting businessmen for filing of tax returns
by bureaucrats. And yet it is precisely the sabotage of
reforms that is depriving our country of prospects. This is
not patriotism, but rather hypocrisy.
I am ashamed to see how certain persons--in the past,
respected by me--are attempting to justify unchecked
bureaucratic behaviour and lawlessness. They exchange their
reputation for a life of ease, privileges and sops.
Luckily, not all are like that, and there are ever more of
the other kind.
It makes me proud to know that even after 7 years of
persecutions, not a single one of the thousands of YUKOS
employees has agreed to become a false witness, to sell their
soul and conscience.
Dozens of people have personally experienced threats, have
been cut off from family, and have been thrown in jail. Some
have been tortured. But, even after losing their health and
years of their lives, people have still kept the thing they
deemed to be most important, human dignity.
Those who started this shameful case, Biryukov, Karimov and
others, have contemptuously called us ``entrepreneurs''
[<>], regarding us as low-lifes, capable of
anything just to protect our prosperity and avoid prison.
The years have passed. So who are the low-lifes now? Who is
it that have lied, tortured, and taken hostages, all for the
sake of money and out of cowardice before their bosses?
And this they called ``the sovereign's business''
[<>]!
Shameful. I am ashamed for my country.
I think all of us understand perfectly well--the
significance of our trial extends far beyond the scope of my
fate and Platon's, and even the fates of all those who have
guiltlessly suffered in the course of the sweeping massacre
of YUKOS, those I found myself unable to protect, but about
whom I remember every day.
Let us ask ourselves: what must be going through the head
of the entrepreneur, the high-level organiser of production,
or simply any ordinary educated, creative person, looking
today at our trial and knowing that its result is absolutely
predictable?
The obvious conclusion a thinking person can make is
chilling in its stark simplicity: the siloviki bureaucracy
can do anything. There is no right of private property
ownership. A person who collides with ``the system'' has no
rights whatsoever.
Even though they are enshrined in the law, rights are not
protected by the courts. Because the courts are either also
afraid, or are themselves a part of ``the system''. Should it
come as a surprise to anyone then that thinking people do not
aspire to self- realisation here, in Russia?
Who is going to modernise the economy? Prosecutors?
Policemen? Chekists? We already tried such a modernization--
it did not work. We were able to build a hydrogen bomb, and
even a missile, but we still can not build--our own good,
modern television, our own inexpensive, competitive, modern
automobile, our own modern mobile phone and a whole pile of
other modern goods as well.
But then we have learnt how to beautifully display others'
obsolete models produced in our country and an occasional
creation of Russian inventors, which, if they ever do find a
use, it will certainly be in some other country.
Whatever happened with last year's presidential initiatives
in the realm of industrial policy? Have they been buried?
They offer the real chance to kick the oil addiction.
[[Page S10343]]
Why? Because what the country needs is not one Korolev, and
not one Sakharov under the protective wing of the all-
powerful Beria and his million-strong armed host, but
hundreds of thousands of ``korolevs'' and ``sakharovs'',
under the protection of fair and comprehensible laws and
independent courts, which will give these laws life, and not
just a place on a dusty shelf, as they did in their day--with
the Constitution of 1937.
Where are these ``korolevs'' and ``sakharovs'' today? Have
they left the country? Are they preparing to leave? Have they
once again gone off into internal emigration? Or taken cover
amongst the grey bureaucrats in order not to fall under the
steamroller of ``the system''?
We can and must change this.
How is Moscow going to become the financial centre of
Eurasia if our prosecutors, ``just like'' 20 and 50 years
ago, are directly and unambiguously calling in a public trial
for the desire to increase the production and market
capitalisation of a private company--to be ruled a criminally
mercenary objective, for which a person ought to be locked up
for 14 years? Under one sentence a company that paid more tax
than anyone else, except Gazprom, but still underpaid taxes;
and with the second sentence it's obvious that there's
nothing to tax since the taxable item was stolen.
A country that tolerates a situation where the siloviki
bureaucracy holds tens and even hundreds of thousands of
talented entrepreneurs, managers, and ordinary people in jail
in its own interests, instead of and together with criminals,
this is a sick country.
A state that destroys its best companies, which are ready
to become global champions; a country that holds its own
citizens in contempt, trusting only the bureaucracy and the
special services--is a sick state.
Hope--the main engine of big reforms and transformations,
the guarantor of their success. If hope fades, if it comes to
be supplanted by profound disillusionment--who and what will
be able to lead our Russia out of the new stagnation?
I will not be exaggerating if I say that millions of eyes
throughout all of Russia and throughout the whole world are
watching for the outcome of this trial.
They are watching with the hope that Russia will after all
become a country of freedom and of the law, where the law
will be above the bureaucratic official.
Where supporting opposition parties will cease being a
cause for reprisals.
Where the special services will protect the people and the
law, and not the bureaucracy from the people and the law.
Where human rights will no longer depend on the mood of the
tsar. Good or evil.
Where, on the contrary, the power will truly be dependent
on the citizens, and the court--only on law and God. Call
this conscience if you prefer.
I believe, this--is how it will be.
I am not at all an ideal person, but I am a person with an
idea. For me, as for anybody, it is hard to live in jail, and
I do not want to die there.
But if I have to I will not hesitate. The things I believe
in are worth dying for. I think I have proven this.
And you opponents? What do you believe in? That the bosses
are always right? Do you believe in money? In the impunity of
``the system''?
Your Honour!
There is much more than just the fates of two people in
your hands. Right here and right now, the fate of every
citizen of our country is being decided. Those who, on the
streets of Moscow and Chita, Peter and Tomsk, and other
cities and settlements, are not counting on becoming victims
of police lawlessness, who have set up a business, built a
house, achieved success and want to pass it on to their
children, not to raiders in uniform, and finally, those who
want to honourably carry out their duty for a fair wage, not
expecting that they can be fired at any moment by corrupt
bosses under just about any pretext.
This is not about me and Platon--at any rate, not only
about us. It is about hope for many citizens of Russia. About
hope that tomorrow, the court will be able to protect their
rights, if yet some other bureaucrats-officials get it into
their head to brazenly and demonstratively violate these
rights.
I know, there are people, I have named them in the trial,
who want to keep us in jail. To keep us there forever!
Indeed, they do not even conceal this, publicly reminding
everyone about the existence of a ``bottomless'' case file.
They want to show: they are above the law, they will always
accomplish whatever they might ``think up''. So far they have
achieved the opposite: out of ordinary people they have
created a symbol of the struggle with arbitrariness. But for
them, a conviction is essential, so they would not become
``scapegoats''.
I want to hope that the court will stand up to their
psychological pressure. We all know through whom it will
come.
I want an independent judiciary to become a reality and the
norm in my country, I want the phrase from the Soviet times
about ``the most just court in the world'' to stop sounding
just as ironic today as they did back then. I want us not to
leave the dangerous symbols of a totalitarian system as an
inheritance for our children and grandchildren.
Everybody understands that your verdict in this case--
whatever it will be--is going to become part of the history
of Russia. Furthermore, it is going to form it for the future
generation. All the names--those of the prosecutors, and of
the judges--will remain in history, just like they have
remained in history after the infamous Soviet trials.
Your Honour, I can imagine perfectly well that this must
not be very easy at all for you--perhaps even frightening--
and I wish you courage!
Mr. McCAIN. This is how Mr. Khordokovsky saw the broader implications
of his trial:
I will not be exaggerating if I say that millions of eyes
throughout all of Russia and throughout the whole world are
watching for the outcome of this trial. They are watching
with the hope that Russia will after all become a country of
freedom and of the law. . . . Where supporting opposition
parties will cease being a cause for reprisals. Where the
special services will protect the people and the law, and not
the bureaucracy from the people and the law. Where human
rights will no longer depend on the mood of the tsar--good or
evil. Where, on the contrary, the power will truly be
dependent on the citizens and the court, only on law and God.
For me, as for anybody, it is hard to live in jail, and I do
not want to die there. But if I have to I will not hesitate.
The things I believe in are worth dying for.
That there are still men and women of such spirit in Russia is a
cause for hope. Eventually maybe not this year, or next year, or the
year after that, but eventually these Russians will occupy their
rightful place as the leaders of their nation--for equal justice can be
delayed, and human dignity can be denied, but not forever.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I want to thank and congratulate the
Senator from Arizona for his important and impassioned comments about
the situation in Russia regarding the rights of Mr. Khordokovsky, and I
would associate myself with those comments.
I would say to him, though, one thing. He asked the question, how do
you trust Russia? That is precisely why this treaty is so important. A
treaty is not built on trust. No one taught us that more than in those
famous words of President Reagan: Trust, but verify. We do not have
verification today. We are sitting here with no verification. We are in
a forced position of ``trust,'' where we do not necessarily. So the
sooner we get this treaty ratified, the sooner we provide a foundation
underneath the important questions Senator McCain asked; which is, if
you cannot trust them, you have to have verification. The whole point
is, you build a relationship even in the worst of times so your
country--our country--is more stable and more protected.
During the worst of the Soviet Union, during the worst years of
confrontation, we still built up a series of treaties of arms
agreements and various other kinds of agreements in order to try to
tamp down the potential for hostility. Our hope is, obviously, that we
can do that as soon as possible here.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wish to address a couple of points raised
by Senator Kyl earlier, and I will address a good number more as the
debate goes forward. Let me be very clear for the record ahead of time,
because he opened his floor remarks this morning by asserting we don't
have time to be able to consider this treaty before the end of the
year. Then he said that even though the START I treaty--which I
referred to yesterday and he specifically referred to my comments--he
said even though it was completed in 4 days--maybe 4 plus, slightly--he
said it wasn't done under the same circumstances. It didn't have to
compete with other legislation and so forth. Well, that is incorrect.
So let's set the record straight.
On the same day the Senate held a cloture vote on the START I treaty
and votes on two amendments related to the treaty, on that same day, it
voted on the final passage of a tax bill. The following day, when the
Senate voted on another amendment related to the treaty, it also agreed
to the conference report on Interior appropriations, passed the DC
appropriations bill, and debated and held two rollcall votes on the
Foreign Operations appropriations bill. The following day, it
[[Page S10344]]
completed the final passage vote on the START treaty. So if our
predecessor Senate had the ability to do START I while it passed three
or four other bills and held four or five separate votes on those other
items, I think it is very clear we have the ability here to be able to
do this treaty in the next days.
More importantly, the Senate has been considering this treaty not
just for the day and a half we have now been on it. We went on this
treaty yesterday and some people chose to not even come to the floor
and talk about it. Now we are back here waiting for amendments and no
one has yet chosen on the other side to come and bring an amendment. We
are ready to vote on the treaty. Fifty-eight Democratic Senators are
ready to vote on the treaty. The only thing we are waiting for is the
people who say we don't have time, who haven't brought an amendment to
the floor. I clearly smell a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy strategy
going on here. But they have to know that when flights are disrupted
next week or people can't get home, we are here to do business, and I
think it will be clear why we are not able to. So we are going to stay
here. We have made that clear. The majority leader has made it clear,
and the President and the Vice President made it clear. We are prepared
to proceed forward on any amendment with respect to understandings,
declarations, or conditions they wish to bring, and certainly to have a
robust debate.
I will also reiterate that starting in June of last year, the Foreign
Relations Committee was briefed at least five times during the talks
with the Russians. That is while the talks were going on. So we have a
group of Senators almost 60 strong who at one time or another over a
year and a half have been following these negotiations very closely.
They have been briefed down in the secure facilities. They have been
briefed by the negotiators, by the military, by the intelligence
community. The Intelligence Committee has weighed in. The Armed
Services Committee has weighed in. The National Security Group has had
an opportunity to work on this. Since the treaty was submitted, there
have been 12 open and classified hearings with more than 20 witnesses.
The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Chairman, the Commander of the Strategic Command, and the
Director of the Missile Defense Agency have all urged us to pass this
treaty.
The question is beginning to be asked not why should we do it now;
the question is why aren't we doing it now. I hope we can get some
amendments and begin to proceed.
At this point I might share a couple of other thoughts while we are
waiting for a couple of other colleagues who requested time to speak.
Senator Kyl asked the question: What do we get out of this treaty? He
juxtaposed what he said the Russians get versus what we get and seemed
to imply we are not getting very much. Well, I can assure the Senator
from Arizona that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense, the leaders of our Strategic Command, and others
don't come before the Congress willy-nilly just to say, Hey, do this,
because we don't get anything out of it. Every single one of them has
articulated very clearly how they believe this treaty strengthens
America's national security, advantages our leadership in the world,
and positions us to be able to deal more effectively with Iran and
North Korea.
I have to say to my colleagues, you cede the right to come to the
floor of the Senate and talk seriously about Iran and North Korea if
you can't talk seriously about the ways in which this treaty enhances
our ability to be able to put leverage on those countries. Before we
pushed the so-called reset button with Russia, we didn't have their
cooperation with respect to Iran. In fact, the Russians were very
skeptical about the intelligence we were offering and putting on the
table. It wasn't until we sat down with them face to face and went
through that that they became alarmed and they began to see, indeed,
this question of how we respond to Iran is deadly serious. As a
consequence of that, Russia joined with the United States.
I agree with my colleagues, the mere fact they are joining us is not
a reason to embrace a treaty if the treaty doesn't do all the other
things you need to provide stability and enhance your security. But
when it does all those other things and you know the consequences of
turning your back on all of those achievements is going to create a
negative relationship, you ought to try to weigh that a little bit. It
seems to me when someone's point of view comes specifically from the
economic engagement, business world, somebody such as Steve Forbes
writes that this is important to the economic component of our
relationship and to that component of the reset button, I think we can
see the breadth of impact a treaty such as this can have.
Let me say a few more words about what we do get out of this. First
of all--and this is as significant as any reason there is to be
considering this--we get nuclear stability. The fact is that nuclear
stability enhances the relationship between the countries so we can do
a lot of other things that assist in stabilizing this important
relationship in a time of crisis. The fact is, as I mentioned earlier--
we all know this--the United States and Russia possess 90 percent of
the world's nuclear weapons. Any single one of those weapons
accidentally released, stolen, or the materials in them, has the
ability to be able to destroy any American city. That is a reality
today. So both countries have decided it is in both countries'
interests to reduce the dangers that arise when you have
misunderstandings or mistrust without the verification that builds the
trust, and it is important to establish limits on those weapons in
order to achieve that.
Predictability is what comes with this treaty. Transparency is what
comes with this treaty. Accountability comes with this treaty. Without
this treaty, we don't have the right to count their warheads. With this
treaty, we have a specific counting and identifying mechanism which
will provide for greater accountability and greater stability.
Secretary Gates said very clearly: ``Russia is currently above the
treaty limits in terms of its numbers.'' So they are going to have to
take down warheads. How could it not be in the interests of the United
States to have Russia reduce the number of warheads it has today?
There are many other reasons. I see my colleague from North Dakota
has arrived. I will go through a number of these others as the
opportunity presents itself later. But I think there are a host of
reasons that are very clear, and they are part of the record already
and we will highlight them as we go forward, as to what we get out of
this treaty and why this is directly in the interests of our country,
and that is the only reason the President of the United States is
submitting this treaty to the Senate. We need to pay close attention to
the rationale our military and intelligence community has laid out to
us of why they would like this treaty--as Jim Clapper, the head of the
intelligence community has said, the sooner the better, the quicker,
the sooner, the better.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to speak in
favor of the New START treaty and to do so strongly.
First let me say I have been listening to Chairman Kerry and Senator
Lugar discuss this treaty. I think they have been clear and compelling
with respect to the arguments they have advanced. I think Senator Kerry
has made abundantly clear why this treaty is entirely in the interests
of the United States.
This treaty simultaneously takes real steps toward reducing the
number of nuclear arms in the world while also recognizing the
important role these weapons play in our national defense. Above all
else, I believe this treaty is stabilizing, which should be the goal of
any action related to nuclear weapons.
I currently serve as chairman of the Senate ICBM Coalition. North
Dakota proudly hosts the only Air Force base in the country that has
two nuclear missions. Minot Air Force Base houses both ICBMs and
nuclear bombers. As a result, North Dakotans have a special
appreciation for the awesome power of these weapons and their critical
role in our national security. While most people approach the existence
of these weapons purely from an academic standpoint, we in North Dakota
are confronted with their reality on a daily
[[Page S10345]]
basis. Still, we as North Dakotans are only observers. I assure my
colleagues there is nothing more sobering than visiting a missile
facility and talking with the young men and women who stand every day
as the sentinels of our security, or talking with bomber pilots as they
prepare to fly halfway around the world to patrol the skies for our
protection, which I was fortunate to do this summer. Let me say
parenthetically, these young people are extraordinary. We can be
incredibly proud of the young men and women of our military. The
quality of these young people is extraordinary. These brave men and
women live the reality of nuclear deterrence and the stability and the
security it brings to our Nation.
As we approach this treaty, our first consideration must be its
implications for our ability to maintain deterrence and stability and
our overall national security. My colleagues on the ICBM Coalition and
I watched closely throughout the negotiation of this treaty. We
attended dozens of meetings and briefings to understand the impacts
this treaty would have on our national security. I even visited Russia
shortly after the treaty was presented to the world and met with many
of their top military leadership. After careful and thorough analysis
of this treaty, I can say with confidence that this treaty will
strengthen our national security. I have no doubt about that fact.
There is no question the treaty will reduce the number of launchers
that deliver nuclear weapons. This treaty has real cuts to those
forces--cuts that perhaps go even deeper than the ICBM Coalition
initially would have liked. But after speaking at length with our
military leaders, the men and women responsible for developing the
plans for the use of these weapons, it is clear to me the numbers
contained in this treaty remain sufficient to ensure the success of the
nuclear deterrence mission.
They tell me that while absolute numbers are important, there is no
precise number that assures our security and enhances our nuclear
stability. The bottom line is that we must maintain enough launchers to
have a credible and secure deterrent that promotes stability in times
of crisis. This treaty does that. It not only maintains our nuclear
deterrent, but enshrines it for coming decades.
Beyond protecting a sufficient, credible, nuclear deterrent, this
treaty advances our national security in other ways as well. President
Ronald Reagan famously said: ``Trust, but verify.'' However, for over a
year, we have been unable to inspect Russia's weapons. That is not in
our interests. It risks developments that harm our national security
going undetected or even misunderstandings that could lead to a
national security crisis. This treaty allows us to resume the extensive
and intrusive inspections that began under the first START treaty
signed by the first President Bush and ratified by this body on a vote
of 93 to 6.
This treaty also moves our nuclear security forward at a more
advanced level. Although I doubt we can ever rid the world of all
nuclear weapons, we are no longer in the midst of a nuclear arms race,
and thank God for that. By signaling our commitment to reducing our
nuclear arsenal while still maintaining a sufficient and credible
deterrent, this treaty will advance our interests in halting nuclear
proliferation.
The single biggest threat to our Nation would be a terrorist
organization with a nuclear weapon. This treaty will enhance our
ability to deter the development of nuclear weapons by rogue states,
and it will reduce the risk that nuclear arms races around the globe
destabilize regions of the world or create opportunities for terrorists
to acquire nuclear weapons.
Many treaty opponents argue this treaty may weaken our national
security. After closely reviewing their concerns and consulting with
experts, I do not find their arguments persuasive. Let's look at those
arguments in turn.
First, some opponents greatly inflate the importance of a short
phrase in the nonbinding preamble of the treaty to argue that it would
somehow constrain our missile defense abilities. This ignores the
remaining 17 pages of treaty text and 165 pages of protocol text. Let
me say, I have long favored missile defense. I have at many times been
in the minority on my own side on that question. If I believed this
prevented our creating a stable and secure missile defense, I would not
favor the treaty.
This treaty doesn't do that. I think it is as clear as it can be.
Other than limiting the conversion of existing ICBM launchers to
missile defense interceptors, which our military leaders have already
said would be more expensive than building new launchers--and more
important, in my view--would degrade our ICBM capability, there are no
restrictions on our missile defense--none.
Others argue the treaty will restrict future conventional missile
capabilities. That is simply not accurate. The treaty fully allows for
the use of conventional missiles. We as a nation are free to
unilaterally decide what conventional capability we want. We also hear
that Russia's tactical weapons should be included in the treaty. I have
also been one who has long favored restrictions on tactical nuclear
weapons. While I recognize the importance of addressing that threat, a
strategic arms treaty, by definition, is not the place to debate them.
Never in history have tactical weapons been included in treaties aimed
at strategic weapons. That hasn't stopped this Senate from ratifying
those agreements, nor has it stopped them for serving our national
security interests for decades.
I am quick to recognize that tactical weapons, at some point, can
become a strategic issue. The problem we confront is never before in
the context of a strategic agreement have we included tactical systems.
That is the reality.
Frankly, I would very much like to have tactical weapons included in
this treaty. That would be my preference. But that is not the reality
of the history of these negotiations.
Mr. President, some argue the number of total warheads goes too low.
However, the treaty allows nearly twice as many warheads as launchers.
More important, the number of total launchers available is a far more
important deterrence for our national security than the number of
warheads.
This treaty shows the administration understands the critical need to
maintain a sufficient number of launchers to assure continued nuclear
stability. With that said, like many other military and civilian
experts on our nuclear forces, I would be extremely wary of any efforts
to further decrease the number of our launchers. I have argued
repeatedly, as chairman of the ICBM caucus, against further reductions
at this stage. I believe that is a prudent position.
Finally, opponents argue that the administration has not committed to
an investment in the modernization of our nuclear weapons and
infrastructure. This argument completely ignores the dramatic increase
in the modernization funding the President proposed in his budget. As
chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, I can attest to the fact that
this increase is unprecedented. This commitment ensures that the
remaining launchers and warheads will be reliable and effective in the
event we ever need to launch them.
In short, the arguments advanced by those who claim this treaty would
hurt our national security are not convincing. That is not just my
conclusion; that is the conclusion of former Secretaries of Defense and
former Secretaries of State from both the Republican Party and the
Democratic Party and previous administrations, as well as current and
former military officers who have all publicly stated that this treaty
will advance, not harm, our national security.
Let me say I have two major Air Force bases in my State: Grand Forks
Air Force Base and Minot Air Force Base. I spend a significant amount
of time talking to our top Air Force leadership. I have consulted with
them closely on this matter, as chairman of the ICBM caucus. I am
absolutely persuaded by the best military thinking available to me that
this treaty is entirely in the national security interests of the
United States. I believe that is clear.
Mr. President, I am proud of my record in the Senate on national
security over the past 23 years, especially when it comes to our
nuclear arsenal. For generations, the young men and women who have
served at Minot and Grand Forks Air Force Bases have declared peace as
their profession, as they defended the United States from global
threats through nuclear deterrence. Though they may not be recognized
as publicly today as they were 50 years ago, the airmen who stand guard
at Minot remain at the vanguard of our
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Nation's most important military mission. I would never do anything to
undermine the mission they carry out every day.
After a careful review and discussions with our Nation's best nuclear
experts, both those in uniform and those who do not wear the uniform, I
am confident this treaty makes our Nation safer and more secure.
Mr. President, I will strongly support approving this treaty, and I
call on my colleagues to join me in that effort.
I want to conclude as I began, by thanking the chairman and the
ranking member for their leadership on this matter. It is in the
highest tradition of the United States Senate. Working together in a
bipartisan--really nonpartisan--way, Senator Lugar and Senator Kerry
have provided vital leadership to this body and this country. We are
all very deeply in their debt. I express my gratitude to them both for
the statesmanlike quality they have brought to this discussion and
debate.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as we are waiting for other Senators coming
to the floor, hopefully, to offer amendments to the new START Treaty, I
have some interesting information that I think is relevant to our
discussion today.
As has been suggested by other Senators, the so-called Nunn-Lugar
cooperative threat reduction program, in operation for the last 19
years, has made possible, through operations of U.S. military and U.S.
contractors, working with their counterparts in Russia, the destruction
of very sizable amounts of nuclear weapons--threats that we took very
seriously in 1991, and that I hope Americans take very seriously
currently.
I have just received a report that, since October--and that is
specifically during the month of November--we have eliminated eight
more SLBMs in Russia. We have secured 10 more nuclear weapon transport
trains and neutralized 100-plus more metric tons of chemical weapons
agent.
I mention this because I have been fortunate enough to receive
monthly, at least for the last 15 years, similar reports. I have a
scoreboard in my office that, in fact, illustrates, first of all, that
7,599 strategic nuclear warheads aimed at the United States have been
deactivated through the cooperative threat reduction program. Each one
of those warheads, as I have pointed out, without being melodramatic,
may have been sufficient to completely eliminate my home city of
Indianapolis.
I take seriously the treaty we are looking at now, not so much in
terms of the numbers of reductions the treaty calls for, but simply
even if 1,550 warheads are left on both sides, it is an existential
problem to both of our countries that we need to take seriously.
In any event, in addition to the 7,599 strategic nuclear warheads
deactivated, 791 ICBMs have been destroyed. These were the missiles on
which the strategic nuclear warheads were located. So by taking the
warheads off of the missiles, then taking down the 791 intercontinental
ballistic missiles and destroying them--and then 498 ICBM silos in
which these missiles were located were destroyed; 180 ICBM mobile
launchers were destroyed; 659 submarine launched ballistic missiles
were eliminated, SLBMs; 492 SLBM launchers were eliminated; 32 nuclear
submarines capable of carrying and launching ballistic missiles have
been destroyed; and 155 bombers were eliminated.
We are talking about so-called carriers. We talk in the treaty about
maybe 1,550 warheads left, 700 carriers on both sides. For those who
have not followed closely these arguments over the years, these are the
elements that have been aimed at us, and these are the vehicles that
would have made possible what they were doing.
Anecdotally, without taking the time of other Senators, I will say
that during one of my visits with former Senator Sam Nunn, from
Georgia, we went to a site in Siberia where, in fact, a missile had
been taken out of the ground. This was a missile that we were told had
10 warheads--the multiple reentry vehicle, where you could put multiple
missiles on one vehicle. We were in the silo. It was like a large tube
that had an elevator going down. I don't know on which floor we finally
arrived, but it was a floor in the silo where the Russians stayed as
guards or as watch officers. What authority they had was not clear in
terms of actually launching the missile or following the orders,
wherever they may have come from. But the impression I had from that
visit to the silo, before it was destroyed that very day--and we have
pictures of it being destroyed in the office. I explain that this is
not a nuclear weapon being destroyed, it was just a silo in the ground.
But around a table at which the Russians who were on duty sat were
pictures of American cities. These were ostensibly the targets of the
10 warheads. It has a chilling effect as you go around to discover
which cities they are.
Are they cities that I represent on the chart? The fact is, that was
the intent.
It was made known to us in the United States that our total
population--not the occasional nuclear terrorist attack--was at risk. I
mention all of this once again not as a melodramatic presentation on a
very serious treaty, but we are talking about something that is very
fundamental. During the course of the debate I have heard several of my
colleagues say--and I think they are mistaken--that right now the
American people are focused, as we all are, on how to create jobs, how
to make a difference in the economy, and how to bring new hope into the
lives of people whose confidence has been destroyed or badly shaken.
That is our paramount objective. But at the same time, these problems
occur in a world that does not necessarily wish us well and is prepared
to leave us in our domestic economy to work our problems out while the
rest of the world necessarily takes time out.
I am not one who envisions, after all of this time, a nuclear attack
using ICBMs and the carriers that we are talking about. I accept the
fact, as a practical matter, that by and large these weapons are
maintained for the security of the countries involved. But at the same
time, it seems to me to have been prudent throughout the years to have
taken the steps we could to take the warheads off of the missiles,
destroy the missiles, destroy the silos, and take up the cable in the
fields around them and, in essence, to eliminate a lot of the threat.
My scoreboard starts out with 13,300 nuclear warheads. Whether that
was the precise number, we are not sure. How did we arrive at that
number? We literally had boots on the ground. The subject was discussed
frequently today.
The dilemma I foresee, and I am not trying to borrow trouble, is that
the boots on the ground, in terms of specifics of the START treaty,
ended, as we now know, December 5, 2009. Most of us in the Senate knew
of that date. We lamented the fact that was occurring. But the fact is,
we have not been able to take action until today's debate to remedy
that. We must do so.
This is not a question of a discretionary treaty that somehow might
be held over to a more convenient time. The facts of life are that even
the program I have discovered, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program, has diminishing results because the Russians are waiting for
work on this fundamental treaty.
In due course, even though we may appropriate in our Defense budget,
as I hope we will, substantial moneys for the Nunn-Lugar program next
year, our ability to continue to work with the Russian military,
Russian contractors outside a situation in which there is no START
treaty, and which the Russians may feel there is no expectation of a
new START treaty, could mean the monthly reports I have cited today,
and most specifically the one for November of this year, may cease
coming to my office. The number of warheads removed, the number of
missiles destroyed and so forth may simply either stop or we may have
no idea what, in fact, the Russians have decided to do.
I appreciate in past debates some of my colleagues have said--and I
think they were mistaken, but I understand their point of view--this is
Russia's problem. Why were American taxpayer funds ever involved in
helping Russians take warheads off missiles, destroying missiles,
destroying submarines, in other words to destroy weapons that were
aimed at us?
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Phrased in those terms, that does not seem to be a sensible bargain;
that if you have cooperative threat reduction, and Russians now for 19
years have allowed us to work in their country on their sites where
these weapons were located, with not only transparency, an actual feel
of the hardware--the silo I was in was real. It was not by electronic
means that we found it or surveillance of leaks from diplomacy. It was
very real. So was the submarine base I was invited to visit at Sevmash
entirely out of the blue during one occasion in a visit to Russia.
Why was I asked to go there? Because they had a feeling, and
correctly, that if they presented to me the fact that there were in
existence then six Typhoon submarines, that each one of them had 200
missiles, small missiles on them, that even though Tom Clancy finally
discovered the Typhoons in the ``Hunt for Red October'' story, the
Russians may have been operating these submarines up and down our
eastern coast for as long as 20 years, whether we knew about it or
not--if you saw the submarines, the largest ever produced by any
country, and with the 200 warheads, there were chip shots into New York
or Philadelphia or any of our large eastern coast metropolitan areas--
whether citizens there ever knew there was a threat or not is
immaterial. There was--and a very substantial one. Yet the Russians
were inviting us to consider the destruction of these huge submarines
because the work is very complex, extraordinarily expensive, and it was
beyond their abilities at that point.
We could take a choice, to leave six Typhoons in the world that might
begin to cruise again, maybe someplace else, or work with them to
destroy them. I am here to say that even after several years, only
three of the six have been destroyed. It is an extremely complex
operation.
This is why we need to have treaty arrangements with the Russians. So
there are formal reasons why their government and our government might
be prepared to send our military personnel, our civilian contractors,
others who might wish to work with us on projects that we believe
mutually are important because--and I will give just one more
illustration--this is very subjective.
But on one occasion, I was surprised, although I should not have
been, that many nuclear warheads, when they are removed from missiles,
are not destroyed. It is difficult to destroy a warhead, very expensive
and complex, dangerous for the personnel involved in it.
The Russians did not have very many facilities to do this. So they
put many of these warheads into caves or caverns. I was invited into
one of these caverns on one occasion. I saw warheads lying there almost
like corpses in a morgue, which is what it reminded me of. There were
small captions at the top of each of those corpses, in essence, which
at least gave--and the Russians told me in translating what was on
there--a history of that warhead: when it had been created, what sort
of servicing it had received over the years.
I mention this because these particular warheads were not inert
matter like sporting goods material. For the safety of the Russians who
were involved, they require servicing, apparently, from time to time.
One of the reasons why Russians always ask U.S. military and
contractors to remove the oldest warheads first was that none of us
have had that much of a history as to how long these warheads survive
without potential ``accidents,'' something that could make a huge
difference in this particular case for those who were in proximity to
that particular cave.
It is a crucial matter for them and for us that we find solutions to
this. This is why, I believe, there is urgency in considering the New
START treaty, urgency in doing so right now, as a matter of fact, as
rapidly as possible, and reentering Americans onto the scene in Russia
and, in reciprocal manner, accepting Russians who will be interested in
our situation. Because this is important for our two countries, and it
is important for many innocent people who were never a part of the
designs of these weapons but could, in fact, be vastly affected in the
event that we make a mistake. We will make a mistake if we fail to act
promptly, knowing what we do about the situation.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I have said a couple times, during the
course of our opening comments and subsequently, what a privilege it is
to be working with Senator Lugar on this treaty. I listened to him
talk, as I have heard before, about his experiences of traveling over
to Russia and going through the process of establishing this
extraordinary program. But the country and the world owe him a huge
debt of gratitude for his leadership on this issue. His vision,
together with Senator Nunn, has made a global difference, and he is
properly recognized on a global basis for that.
So I thank him for his comments calling every colleague to focus on
this linkage of the threat reduction program to the START agreement and
to the relationship that comes out of it. I know Senator Inhofe is
here. I want to give him a chance. But I would like to say a few words
before he does about the verification.
I think it is important, as we go forward, to be very clear about the
verification components of this treaty. A number of colleagues have
requested the verification regime, and we may yet have further
discussion on it. So let me make as clear as I can, this treaty has
fully satisfied our intelligence community and our military community
and our stockpile verification folks as to the verifiability of the
treaty.
Is it slightly different from what we had before with START I? The
answer is yes. But, importantly, I wish to underscore why that
difference exists because one colleague sort of raised the issue a
little while ago. I think it was Senator Kyl who talked about why it
was we might not have gotten them to do an extension of the START I
treaty. Well, the reality is, it takes all parties to be party to that
extension.
The fact is, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus all dropped out of the
nuclear game, and all those weapons were deposited into Russia. They
were all party to that original agreement. But Russia made clear to the
Bush administration, long before President Obama came to power, that
they were not going to proceed with that same system anymore, and the
reason was, they saw it as a one-sided structure. They felt they did
not get anything out of it. We were the only ones who got something out
of it. As long as they were not getting something, they made us--put us
on notice, we are not continuing that one.
That said, the new START succeeds in streamlining verification and
tracking procedures, and it creates a new system, a state-of-the-art
inspection system, and very strict reporting guidelines. The compliance
and verification measures that are in the New START build on 20 years
of verification experience, and they appropriately reflect the
technological advances that have been made since 1991, as well as the
difference of relationships between the United States and Russia
because of the end of the Cold War.
So colleagues need to look at those changes and measure it against
the original benchmark, if you will. The fact is, New START's enhanced
verification measures have a five-pronged approach, five different
components.
One, invasive, onsite inspections.
Two, national technical means. We have always had that, but our
national technical means have improved significantly. Without
discussing them on the floor, I think colleagues are aware of the
capacity of our national technical means.
Three, unique identifiers that will be placed on each weapon. We did
not have that before. Now we are going to have the ability to track
each individual weapon, warhead, and count them. That is new. That is
increased.
Regular data exchange. We gain a great deal. They gain a great deal.
It is a mutual process of exchanging data, which provides stability and
assurances for both sides.
Finally, prompt notifications of the movement of any weapons.
The New START permits up to 18 short-notice, onsite inspections each
year, in order to determine the accuracy of Russia's data and to verify
the compliance. The fact is, this new system is every bit as rigorous
as the system that existed previously.
In fact, because of the change I described earlier, the Belarus,
Ukraine,
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Kazakhstan change--we had about 70 inspection sites previously, and
those were the nuclear facilities in each of those different countries.
But since three of them have now denuclearized, the result is, all the
former Soviet Union's remaining nuclear weapons are centralized in
Russia, and they are divided between 35 nuclear facilities.
So we go from 70 facilities that we used to have to inspect down to
35. Thus, the decreasing number of annual inspections from 28 in START
I to 18 in the New START is almost exactly the equivalent in terms of
those allowed under START I because we are inspecting fewer places, and
the inspectors are now allowed to gather more types of data during
those inspections. The United States is also allowed to use national
technical means, which would be reconnaissance satellites, ground
stations, ships, all of them, to verify compliance. The treaty
expressly prohibits tampering with the other party's national technical
means.
Third, Russia has to assign and inform the United States of the
specific unique alphanumeric identifiers that are designating the
deployed and nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers. This information gives us a great deal more inside look with
respect to the tracking patterns on Russian equipment throughout the
full life cycle of any of those specific systems.
Fourth, the treaty requires Russia to regularly provide to the United
States the aggregate data on strategic offensive forces, including
numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of deployed and
nondeployed strategic offensive arms.
Fifth, the New START establishes a comprehensive notification regime
allowing us to track the movement of Russia's strategic forces and any
changes in the status of their strategic weapons.
The fact is, this agreement employs an enormously aggressive,
forward-leaning, and effective verification system, and it has been
predicated on decades of our doing this very thing with the same
people. This is not new ground we are breaking. We know how to do this.
We have built up a certain understanding of each other's capabilities,
each other's idiosyncracies and resistances. We know how to do this.
The verification system designed for this treaty is specifically
designed to be less complicated, less costly, and more effective than
the one in the original START treaty.
I have a series of quotes, but I want our colleague to have an
opportunity to speak. I will wait and later share with colleagues the
number of different distinguished, respected, long-serving
personalities within the intelligence community--former LTG Jim Clapper
of the Air Force and others--all of whom have affirmed the ability of
this verification system to do the job and protect the interests of the
country.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from
Massachusetts for his endurance. I appreciate that.
I have to say also to the Senator from Indiana, my good friend, I am
kind of in a unique position as one who serves on both the Armed
Services and the Foreign Relations Committee. I disagree with most of
what was just stated by the senior Senator from Massachusetts.
One of the concerns I have had is that we have so many people who
want to be in on this, who should be in on this, who have been elected.
We have new Senators, one who is occupying the chair right now. We have
Senators Kirk and Manchin. We also have Senators-elect Blunt, Boozman,
Portman, Moran, Lee, Johnson, Hoeven, Ayotte, Paul, and Rubio. All of
them have signed a letter saying: This is very significant. We really
need to be a part of this. This is important.
It is important in a different way to me than it is to others. I am
opposed for a number of reasons. I am one of the few bad guys who came
out initially and said I opposed it.
We all know what a strategic arms reduction act is. Initially, when
we had two superpowers, it made a lot more sense to me. Frankly, I look
at this, and I see the concerns I have.
Verification--that sounds good. Yes, we will verify. Yet the number
of verifications, inspections, is like 18 per year in the New START as
opposed to some 600 over a 15-year period.
Modernization is one thing on which we all agree. We have to
modernize. But there has to be a way of doing it. We haven't done it
yet.
It was 3 years ago that Secretary Gates said:
No way can we maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the
number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting
to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.
That is an area where we all agree. How are we going to do that?
Right now, I think the generally agreed upon number that it would cost
over a period of 10 years would be $85 billion. We have right now about
$600 million that would be coming up in the next budget cycle. We all
know how things work around here. We can only commit funds for the next
cycle. There is no assurance at all that we would be able to come
through with the other $84.5 billion in that period. The modernization
is not set up in a way where we are in the current year demonstrating
the commitment we have to modernize our fleet.
The fact that we are handling this in a lameduck session--most of the
stuff we are trying to cram in right now is what we should have been
talking about all year long and have not been. They all fall into a
category where it looks as if things are going to change in the Senate.
We know the House, after the November election, is now a Republican-
dominated House. We know we have gained large numbers in the Senate. We
also know there are several of my good colleagues who are up for
reelection in 2012. I am not sure they all want to join in all of these
issues coming up at the last minute. This is one of them.
I look at the quotes we have--the missile defense issue has not been
addressed. I know it would take a lot of discussion. There are probably
potentially, with the new Congress coming in in January, 40 or 50
different amendments just addressing the missile defense issue. They
say: Well, no, this is not a problem. But anytime you have a unilateral
statement that was made--which was made by the Russians early on--that
this treaty can only operate and be viable only if the United States of
America refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities
quantitatively and qualitatively--that has been stated, and it has been
stated and reaffirmed more recently when Sergei Lavrov said:
We have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue and
we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the
two presidents. . . . correlate with the actions taken
unilaterally by Washington.
The problem is that when the American people look at this, they say
that maybe back during the Cold War and maybe back when we had two
superpowers, this thing made sense. Frankly, I was not as supportive of
this concept back then. But there is certainly justification for it.
Where are we today? Right now, we are probably in the most endangered
position we have been in as a nation. I say this from the experience I
have had on both of these committees. We have problems. There are
certainly problems with North Korea and what they have developed in
their capabilities, problems with Syria, certainly problems with Iran.
Our intelligence says--and it is not even classified--that Iran would
have the capability of sending a missile to Western Europe and the
Eastern United States by 2015.
One of the most disturbing things that happened at the beginning of
this administration, a year and a half ago, was when the President came
out with his budget and did away with our site in Poland which was a
ground interceptor site that would have given us the capability of
defending the geography I just mentioned. They took a risk. It wasn't
easy for Poland or the Czech Republic, in terms of their radar system,
to almost defy Russia, but they were willing to do it. I always
remember being a part of the negotiation over there when they said: Are
you sure, if we take this bold step, we start agreeing to build a
ground interceptor in Poland that would protect that area, are you sure
you will not pull the rug out from under us? I said: Absolutely. I had
no hint that this would happen, but it did. So in February, right after
the new President was inaugurated, of
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the many things he did that I found objectionable with our defense
systems, that was the most egregious.
We are talking about doing a type of strategic arms reduction with
Russia. I am not concerned about Russia; I am concerned about these
other places. The threat is there. The threat is real. I don't think
there are too many people around since 9/11 who don't know that the
terrorists would in a heartbeat come after the United States.
When we have something that is written in the preamble--statements
have been made over and over again that it would be a violation of this
treaty if we were to enhance our missile defense system. Yet we know
that Syria is going to have a capability by 2015. To me, that is mind-
boggling that people could be sitting around here worrying about this
treaty between two countries when I don't look at them as being a
threat.
Then we have the issue of force structure. I think we know that not
only do we have to have a weapon, we have to have a way of sending it.
We all know the triad and how they are not being enhanced by this. That
is my major concern.
I was against it from the very beginning. However, this is where we
are today. We are in the middle of it. I know I keep hearing on the
radio: You are going to be here until Christmas; you shouldn't do that.
I will be spending New Year's Eve with our troops in Afghanistan. I am
also concerned about what we are doing here in America. Why are we
waiting? Last year, we waited until Christmas Eve. I always remember
going home Christmas Eve. It happened to fall at the same time. It was
the worst snowstorm in the history of Texas and northeastern Oklahoma.
I barely made it in time to get home. Yes, I have 20 kids and
grandkids. I would kind of like to see them at Christmas. These are
things we could have been doing a long time ago. You wait until the
last minute. This is when you want to cram things through that the
American people don't want and that should take time. We beat up this
thing on this treaty for long enough.
But let's look at what we should be talking about now; that is,
running government into the next year so we don't have some type of a
stoppage, some type of a crisis on our hands. So the liberals have the
omnibus bill that they have up, a bill that is $1.3 trillion. Here we
are talking about we have come up with $2 trillion--$3 trillion--$2
trillion in the first 2 years. This is unheard of in terms of deficits.
Look where we are going right now with $9 billion more in spending than
last year, and we thought last year was an absolute disaster.
At the same time, where is the spending going? We have such things as
their agenda--$1.4 billion for a variety of climate change programs.
They are not going to give up on that. They are going to keep coming
forth trying to spend money. They are talking about the money for the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, talking about zeroing out the
efforts in Yucca Mountain. These are things that are in this bill.
What it does to the defense system--everything is enhanced except
defense. What is this aversion to trying to rebuild America's defense
system? Overall, the defense spending cuts in the omnibus bill amount
to $10.3 billion. That is from the President's request of 2011. It
includes the $450 million to include work on the second engine, the
alternate engine. We have already talked about that. We have been
discussing that in the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House
Armed Services Committee.
We decided, I believe justly--I was on the single engine side of that
argument because of the sheer cost. Yet I know the arguments on both
sides. We have already done that. We have already debated it. I don't
know why we have to come to the floor after we have made these
decisions and then look at a bill that cuts the proposed purchase of
the F-35s from 42 to 35.
Let's remember what happened a year and a half ago. They talked about
doing away with the F-22s, which are the only fifth-generation
capability we have. The justification was, look what we are doing with
F-35s. That is fine. But so it is going to be 42. This bill would cut
it down--further cuts.
So while we are talking about a bill of $1.3 trillion, it throws
money at every kind of social engineering, everything you could have
except defense.
The CERP--this program used to be called the commander's emergency
relief program. It was one that was my program. You talk to the
commanders in the field, and they will tell you they have a capability
of taking care of some of these needs. Whether it used to be Iraq, now
Afghanistan, they can accomplish so much more if they can do it right
now. That is called CERP. They are already bringing the funding of that
down in this bill. I look at over $1 trillion in funding to implement
the very unpopular health care law. If anybody is out there thinking
this is going to be an easy lift, I personally think we will be able to
defeat this omnibus bill. I think it will be defeated by almost all
Republicans and a few of the Democrats, particularly those coming up
for reelection in 2012. I would hate to be in a position where I would
say: What I am going to run on is the fact that I already voted to put
more than $1 trillion into funding this form of socialized medicine.
That is where we are right now. I do think we need to take a deep
breath and just figure that we have a new Congress coming in, a new
Senate coming in right after January. We will have plenty of time to
allow other Senators who were elected to weigh in on this very critical
issue of the New START treaty.
With that, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Franken). The Senator from Texas.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I would like to briefly join my colleagues
in explaining some of my concerns, first of all, about the process by
which we are taking up something as important as a treaty with regard
to nuclear arms. Of course, this is the second part of a two-part
constitutional process.
The President sent this treaty to the Senate, along with a
transmittal letter dated May 13, 2010, and here we are on December 16,
shortly before the Christmas holidays and adjournment, taking up a
treaty as important as this. Of course, under article II, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, a treaty cannot be ratified without the
vote of at least two-thirds of the Members of the Senate.
I know everyone--whether they are for this treaty, whether they are
against this treaty, whether they are merely questioning some aspects
of the treaty and are perhaps seeking to make some modifications--I
believe everyone is approaching this issue with the kind of seriousness
and gravity that should be required of a Senator approaching something
this serious.
But I have to make this observation: Here we are, as I said, on
December 16, 2 days--2 days--after having dropped on us a 1,924-page
Omnibus appropriations bill which calls for the Federal Government to
spend an additional $1.2 trillion. The idea that we would later today
take up the issue of funding the Federal Government and consider this
Omnibus appropriations bill while we would have to basically detour and
lay this treaty by the side--this is, to me, just irresponsible. I do
not know any other word to describe it.
We have, in fact, been in session 151 days during 2010. That is
right. You heard me correctly. The Senate has actually been in session
151 days this year. I think most people would love to get a paycheck
across America and only be expected to show up and do their job 151
days a year.
Now, I know when we go back home, we continue to work with our
constituents, to listen to their concerns and otherwise, but my simple
point is, when the President sends this treaty over on May 13, 2010,
and at the same time, simultaneously, we are being asked to consider
this huge Omnibus appropriations bill of $1.2 trillion--some 2,000
pages long--the idea that we would try to jam through or give expedited
consideration to the serious, substantive issues being raised by this
treaty is, as I said, poor time management, to say the least, and I
think irresponsible.
I want to raise some of the substantive concerns I have about the
treaty on which I know there will be further discussions.
First of all, I would point out that the treaty does not itself
address tactical----
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I have the floor.
[[Page S10350]]
Mr. KERRY. I know. I am just asking if the Senator would yield for a
question.
Mr. CORNYN. I would be glad, after I get through my remarks, to yield
for some questions.
Mr. KERRY. I appreciate it.
Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I would note, as others have noted, that
the treaty completely excludes consideration of a limitation on
tactical nuclear weapons, even though Russia possesses a significant
superiority in terms of numbers over the United States for these types
of weapons.
I would just note that some at the Department of Defense have noted
that the difference between strategic weapons and tactical weapons has
become somewhat muddled and less meaningful in recent decades. I
believe a legitimate cause for concern is why we would exclude tactical
nuclear weapons, that the Russians have numerical superiority of, and
not even seek to regulate or contain those at all, while we are focused
strictly on strategic nuclear weapons, of which the United States would
have to cut our current numbers and the Russians not at all in order to
meet the goals of the treaty.
I would say, secondly, I have concerns about the treaty's provisions
on verification. Of course, President Reagan was famous for saying we
should trust, but verify when it comes to this type of treaty. I would
point out that Brent Scowcroft, in 1997, pointed out the importance of
when we are actually reducing the overall number of weapons,
verification becomes that much more important. He said, in 1997:
Current force levels provide a kind of buffer because they
are high enough to be relatively insensitive to imperfect
intelligence and modest force changes. . . . As force levels
go down, the balance of nuclear power can become increasingly
delicate and vulnerable to cheating on arms control limits,
concerns about nondeployed ``hidden missiles'' and the
actions of nuclear third parties.
So we need to be extraordinarily careful, even more careful now than
perhaps we have been in the past with regard to the verification
measures.
We know the Russians have taken every advantage to cheat on previous
treaties and to be untrustworthy. According to the official State
Department reports on arms control compliance, the Russians have
previously violated--or are still violating, even as we speak--
important provisions of most of the key arms control treaties to which
they have been a party, including the original START treaty, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and Open Skies.
The New START treaty does not close that gap on verification
loopholes that the Russians are already exploiting or, in fact,
evading.
As my colleague, Senator Bond--who is, notably, the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence--has told us, the annual
10-warhead limit on inspections allowed under this treaty permit us to
sample only 2 to 3 percent of the total Russian deployed force and,
therefore, it will be impossible--it will be literally impossible;
limited to 10 annual warhead inspections over a 10-year treaty--to
inspect all, much less most, of the 1,550 limit on deployed warheads.
So why would we call this a robust verification provision if we are
only allowed to see 2 to 3 percent of the total Russian force?
The New START treaty, unlike its predecessor, permits any number of
warheads to be loaded on a missile. So even if the Russians fully
cooperated--which I do not believe they have in the past, nor can be
trusted to do so in the future--even if they do cooperate with all of
the provisions in the New START treaty, these inspections cannot
provide the sort of conclusive evidence that you would think would be
required given the gravity of the potential risk. They cannot provide
conclusive evidence that the Russians are, in fact, complying with the
warhead limit.
Third, the New START treaty handcuffs the United States from
deploying new capabilities we need to defend our Nation and our allies
from missile attacks.
I would just point out that this chart I have in the Chamber
demonstrates the ballistic missile threat that is presented in a map of
Europe and Africa and Asia. You will notice that Russia is not even on
this map. But you will notice a number of other ballistic missile
threats that could affect not only the United States but most certainly
our allies. This map is a compilation from the Missile Defense Agency
based on information from several agencies in the intelligence
community and shows that more than a dozen nations--more than a dozen
nations--have developed or are developing ballistic missile
capabilities. Several of these nations are notorious for that--North
Korea, Iran, and Libya, just to name a few. But we know others, such as
Yemen and Pakistan, have al-Qaida operatives or other extremist groups
operating within their borders.
The fact is, we need a robust missile defense capability, not to
protect us from Russian ballistic missiles but from ballistic missiles
from some of these other nations that have developed them, some of whom
have groups such as al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations there
that would love to get their hands on some of these weapons and use
them against America or our allies. That is why it makes absolutely no
sense to constrain our future missile defense options in exchange for
reductions in the strategic nuclear weapons of just one country, and
that is Russia.
Now, some of my colleagues may be arguing there are no limitations on
missile defense in the treaty and that the language in the preamble,
which ties our strategic offensive arms to our strategic defensive
arms--for the first time ever, by the way--that this preamble language
does not mean anything, does not operate as a constraint on our missile
defense programs.
But that is not what the Russians have said. That is not how they
read it. Of course, the Senate has been denied the negotiating record
by which we could actually clarify what was said by American
negotiators and Russian negotiators in coming up with this language.
Isn't that something you would think the administration would want
clarified, if they could clarify it by providing this information? But,
no, we have been stonewalled and told: You cannot have it, Senate, even
though under article II, section 2 of the Constitution, you have a
constitutional duty when it comes to treaty ratification.
I just think it is a very poor way to do business, to say the least,
and causes me to question whether there is a uniform understanding of
constraints on our missile defense system. Again, you can see that the
risk is not just from Russia, it is much more widespread,
unfortunately, than that.
Russia has also made a unilateral statement that it claims the right
to withdraw from the New START treaty if the United States does, in
fact, expand our missile defense capability. Doug Feith shed some light
on this issue earlier in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal.
Mr. Feith, of course, as you remember, is a former Under Secretary of
Defense under the Bush administration, and he helped negotiate the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the SORT treaty. He
says during those negotiations, the Russians were constantly trying to
get the Americans to negotiate away our right to defend ourselves from
missile attacks. The Bush administration rightly rejected those Russian
demands, and they got a good treaty anyway. But the Obama
administration, in this treaty, gave Russia what it wanted when it came
to our missile defense, among other concessions as well--a very serious
concern, I would say.
The New START treaty has other flaws, but even if it was an
outstanding treaty, I think the gravity of what we are about here--in
considering this treaty, and reductions in nuclear arms, and trying to
make the world a more secure and safer place--that it warrants more
careful and deliberate consideration of this treaty than we are going
to be able to give during this lameduck session.
I have heard people talk about, well, the fact that this is the
Christmas season--of course, we would all like to be with our families.
But we recognize the fact that we have important obligations to perform
in the Senate. I think all of us are willing to perform those. But the
problem is, we have had an election on November 2, and there are a lot
of people, as the Senator from Oklahoma said, who were just elected by
the American people who would be
[[Page S10351]]
denied an opportunity to let their voice be heard on such an important
issue if this treaty is jammed through during the waning days of the
111th Congress. Now, we know the legitimacy of our government itself
rests upon the consent of the governed. The fact is, during the most
recent election the American people said they don't like the direction
Washington is heading and they want us to change. The idea that we
would then--after the election takes place but before the new Senators
in Congress are actually sworn in--try to rush through such important
matters such as this treaty and deny them an opportunity, and the
voices of the people who elected them to be heard, to me, does not
speak well of this process, and I think indeed denies us the legitimacy
of the consent of the governed, or certainly many of them.
Let's be clear about what is happening. We know the administration
wants a vote on this New START treaty because they think they have a
better chance of passing it now than when these new Senators are sworn
in on January 5. There is no one I have heard who has suggested there
is a national security threat to the United States from delaying the
ratification of this treaty by a month. No one. I don't think they
could plausibly make such a contention.
I think there is a little bit of an attempt to focus our attention
away from the $1.2 trillion spending tsunami that was unleashed on
Congress just 2 days ago in which we are told Senator Reid, the
majority leader, is going to insist be voted on in just a few days. I
think a better alternative to that, and certainly a better alternative
than to go through this unnecessary drama about government shutdowns,
is to pass a one-page continuing resolution that would keep the
government operating until January or February, at which time these
newly elected Senators and House Members would be able to participate.
It would be the time when we could certainly take up this treaty and
give it thoughtful and careful consideration, the kind of debate and
amendment process I think our responsibility requires rather than
trying to move it through in this irresponsible manner.
This omnibus bill I mentioned earlier will no doubt be called up
later today, perhaps, and be attached to a continuing resolution and
then cloture filed, asking 60 Senators to agree to close off debate,
denying any opportunity for amendments and the kind of consideration I
think the American people would want us to have for a $1.2 trillion
spending bill.
We know Christmas is almost here and many Americans look forward to
celebrating that important holiday and reflecting on what comes with
the new year. I hope our friends on the other side of the aisle will
reconsider the tactics they are employing during this lameduck session
to try to gloss over or ignore the important substantive concerns many
of us have about this very significant treaty and to ram through
unpopular legislation just as happened last year on Christmas Eve with
the passage of the health care bill. Many Americans remember passing
that bill on Christmas Eve in the Senate, and they were outraged by the
process, by the back-room negotiations and deals that took place in
order to get over the 60-vote threshold.
So this year I would submit that millions of Americans want just one
thing from Congress, and that would be a silent night. Let's pray they
get it. If the Senator still has a question or two for me, I would be
glad to yield for that purpose.
I thank the chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wish to say to my colleague from Texas, I
am a little surprised to hear him be quite so harsh about the--I think
he used the word ``irresponsible''--about why we are here in this
predicament right now. I shouldn't have to remind him, but in this
session of Congress there have been more filibusters by his party than
at any time from World War I all the way through until the late 1970s.
We have nominees waiting to be passed who have sat there for months
who cannot get a vote. When we finally have a cloture vote to get 60
votes to get them out, they get 90, 95 votes in the Senate. They just
delay and delay and delay. I am not going to stand here and listen to
them come to the floor of the Senate asking why we are trying to do the
important business of the country at the last minute because all they
have to do is look in the mirror. That is all they have to do, and they
will see why we are here.
Then to say we can't do the important business of this treaty in the
amount of time we have is totally contradicted by history of every
treaty we have worked on. Earlier today we had a Senator say: Well, we
can't do that. We have to--we can't dual-track. I pointed out that
START I, which was a much more complicated treaty, took 4\1/2\ days. On
the day they passed it, they passed two or three other pieces of
legislation. On the day we went to it, we passed a tax bill and an
appropriations bill.
We have reached a new stage in America where we just say something.
It doesn't matter if it is based on the truth. Just say it, put it out
there, and somebody is going to believe it. Somebody will pick it up.
So I regret that. We have been here for a day. We still haven't had
an amendment, and all this talk about serious consideration. I am going
to release a breakdown of who has spoken and for how long because it is
interesting to take a look at what is going on.
By the way, why would we have to read something? I understand we may
have to read the appropriations bill for about a day and a half; have
the clerk up here just reading the bill. Now, there is an act of
stunning responsibility. Let's just chew up the time of the Senate,
keeping everybody up all night reading a bill rather than working on
it.
So I have said enough about it. I think what we need to do is do the
business of the country, and there is plenty of time to do it and still
plenty of time to get home for Christmas if we would spend our time
doing that rather than a lot of delay tactics.
Some Senators have also cited an early statement by General
Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggesting
he had some concern about the numbers. Let me make clear, here is what
General Cartwright said today: ``We need START and we need it badly.''
Now, are you going to listen to General Cartwright or are you going
to listen to some of these sort of vague and somewhat similar talking
points that keep coming to the floor without an amendment, without any
substantive work?
At this point I ask unanimous consent that at 6 p.m. today, the
Senate resume legislative session and the majority leader be recognized
at that time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I rise to object, and I will not. I just
want to make sure that at 3:30 I will be allowed to speak.
Mr. KERRY. We are staying on the START agreement at that time.
Mrs. BOXER. So is 3:30 a good time or 3:40?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I intend to yield the floor. I ask
unanimous consent that when I yield the floor, the Senator from
California be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask for your ruling on the unanimous
consent request with respect to 6 p.m. today we move to legislative
session and the majority leader be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I wish to thank my chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Kerry, with whom I have worked closely. I
thank also Senator Lugar, the ranking member, who at times has been my
chair. It does my heart good to see them working closely on this
matter. I was also elated to see the test vote we had on this already.
I hope that vote, that test vote, is indicative of where we are
going. We were almost at 67. My understanding is that one Member wasn't
there to vote. We should be at 67. I hope we can get this done at the
earliest opportunity because despite some of the protests of
[[Page S10352]]
our colleagues saying there hasn't been enough time, my understanding
is that we have been on this for 7 months. And no one could have worked
harder than our chairman and our ranking member on making sure that
every single objection to the New START treaty, every single problem
and challenge was heard and that a lot of this was already worked out
in the resolution of ratification. So, hopefully, we can get through
this.
I have had opportunities, as a member of the Foreign Relations
Committee in particular, to ask national security experts what keeps
them up at night, what is the one thing they worry about. Whether it
comes from the CIA or any other place within the intelligence
community, the answer comes back like this: What keeps them up at night
is the possibility that a terrorist could get hold of a nuclear weapon.
I have to say, that worrisome possibility is on the minds of many
Americans. The New START treaty makes this less likely. Therefore,
ratifying the treaty is in our national interest and, frankly, it is in
the interest of the world. The New START treaty requires a 30-percent
reduction of deployed strategic weapons on the Russian and American
side, with on-the-ground verification. That is key. It reduces delivery
systems to 800 per side.
I am not going to speak for very long, I say to my colleagues who
have come here, because so much has been said. I can't say it any
better. So what I am going to do for most of the remainder of my time
is quote from people, Republicans and Democrats, who have been quite
eloquent on this issue, in addition to Senators Kerry and Lugar.
It is clear Democrats and Republicans alike support this treaty. We
hear a lot of talk about not labeling each other and coming together.
Look, this is an area where we have come together, and all we have to
do is put the finishing touches on this ratification and complete this
very important work that is in front of us.
In addition to all of our NATO allies supporting this, including
those in Eastern Europe--which I think is very important to note--we
have the support of all of these American leaders on both sides of the
aisle. I will read some of their comments for the Record: ``I urge the
U.S. Senate to ratify the START treaty.'' This is a statement from a
few days ago from President George Herbert Walker Bush.
This is from Colin Powell, Secretary of State for George W. Bush:
I fully support this treaty and I hope that the Senate will
give its advice and consent as soon as possible . . . [T]his
treaty is in the best interest of the United States of
America, the best interest of the world, and frankly in the
best interest of the Russian Federation.
Howard Baker, former Senator, Republican from Tennessee, said just a
few days ago:
A world without a binding U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control
treaty is a more dangerous place, less predictable, less
stable than the one we live in today. . . . Trust, but
verify. Ratify this treaty.
George Shultz, a constituent of mine, Secretary of State for
President Reagan, wrote with Sam Nunn, a Democrat and former Senator
from Georgia whom we all respect on these issues:
Noting the full support of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
staff, and following our own review of the treaty, we urge
the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of
New START as early as is feasible.
I hope we don't have a lot of delaying, more delaying tactics around
here because it is not necessary.
I heard colleagues say, What is the rush? What is the rush? We have
had 7 months. Senators Kerry and Lugar have bent over backwards and
done everything possible to accommodate Senators, such as Senator Kyl,
who wanted certain assurances on the modernization of our nuclear
weapons. They did everything to answer every question. By the way, they
will continue to do that as we get to any other issues.
This is what James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense for Presidents
Nixon and Ford, said:
I think it is obligatory for the United States to ratify New
START. . . . For the United States, at this juncture, to fail
to ratify the treaty in the due course of the Senate's
deliberation would have a detrimental effect on our ability
to influence others with regard to, particularly, the
nonproliferation issue.
So James Schlesinger gets to the point of nonproliferation, the
worrisome fact that a terrorist or rogue state could get one of these
weapons.
Alan Simpson, an outspoken former Republican Senator from Wyoming,
said this:
Nothing in the treaty constrains our ability to develop and
deploy a robust missile defense system as our military
planners see fit. The idea that this treaty somehow makes
major concessions to the Russians on missile defense is just
simply not true.
I will quote Pat Buchanan, former White House Communications Director
for President Ronald Reagan:
Richard Nixon would have supported this treaty. Ronald
Reagan would have supported this treaty, as he loathed
nuclear weapons and wished to rid the world of them. And
simply because this treaty is ``Obama's treaty'' does not
mean it is not in America's interest.
I don't think I have ever in my life quoted Pat Buchanan on the
floor. I am just proving the point that this particular issue is
extremely bipartisan. It unites everybody, except apparently a few of
our friends on the other side.
Brent Scowcroft, LTG retired, National Security Adviser to Presidents
Ford and George H.W. Bush, said this:
New START should not be controversial no matter how liberal
or conservative you are.
That also makes the point.
Chuck Hagel, a former Republican Senator, made this statement--and I
will not read the entire statement. He ends it by saying:
This would be devastating not just for arms control but for
security interests worldwide [if we didn't deal with this
issue].
Henry Kissinger has a very long statement. I will not read the entire
statement, but he said this:
. . . for all these reasons, I recommend ratification of this
treaty. . . . I do not believe this treaty is an obstacle to
a missile defense program or modernization. . . . A rejection
of this treaty would indicate that a new period of American
policy had started that would have an unsettling impact on
the international environment.
So here you have somebody who has been deeply involved in foreign
relations for so many years saying, in essence--and I am not quoting
him here, but I am summing up what I read, that it would be a radical
departure from America's foreign policy if we were not to do this.
James Baker, former Secretary of State for President George H.W.
Bush, writes:
New START appears to take our country in a direction that
can enhance our national security. . . . It can also improve
Washington's relationship with Moscow regarding nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles, a relationship that will be
vital if the two countries are to cooperate in order to stem
nuclear proliferation in countries such as Iran and North
Korea. I agree with Secretary of Defense Bob Gates when he
wrote last week in the Wall Street Journal that the new
treaty provides verification that has been needed since START
I expired in December. An effective verification regime is a
critical component of arms control and I believe that the
world is safer when the United States and Russia are abiding
by one.
I will close with a couple of Democratic individuals who have also
joined their Republican friends in this.
President Bill Clinton said this:
The START agreement is very important to the future of our
national security and it is not a radical agreement. This is
something that is profoundly important. This ought to be way
beyond party.
He said that a couple days ago. William Perry, we remember well; he
was Secretary of Defense for President Clinton. He said:
The treaty puts no meaningful limits on our antiballistic
missile defense program. In fact, it reduces restrictions
that existed under the previous START Treaty. I recommend
ratification.
Former Senator Sam Nunn said this:
Delaying ratification of this treaty, or defeating it,
would damage United States security interests and United
States credibility globally.
He takes the same tack that I am taking. He is someone who supports
this. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, former strategic nuclear commanders,
and our intelligence community leadership all have stated that the
treaty is essential to our Nation's security.
I am hopeful the Senate will put our Nation's security
first by providing its advice and consent to this important
treaty.
That was Sam Nunn.
I will close with two more quotes, one from Vice President Joe Biden:
Failure to pass the new START Treaty this year would
endanger our national security.
[[Page S10353]]
We would have no Americans on the ground to inspect Russia's
nuclear activities, no verification regimes to track Russia's
nuclear arsenal, less cooperation between two nations that
account for 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, and no
verified nuclear reduction.
We all know Vice President Biden was the respected chair of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and it was my honor to serve with him.
Finally, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said this:
Failing to ratify the treaty would not only undermine our
strategic stability, the predictability, and the
transparency, but it would severely impact our potential to
lead on the important issue of nonproliferation.
I end where I started. What keeps the intelligence community people
up at night is the fear that we don't wrap our arms around nuclear
proliferation, and that a weapon gets into the hands of a terrorist or
rogue nation. New START is--as our chairman has said many times--not a
very broad treaty. It is pretty narrow. It is essential, but it doesn't
cover that much new ground. It ensures that we are going to have a
mutual reduction in these arms that we will be able to verify, and it
makes it less likely that we are going to have the type of
proliferation that keeps a lot of us up at night, including the
American people, I am sure. We need to take steps in this holiday
season toward peace. We need to take steps every day to make sure that
the threats we face in this difficult world, with all of our
challenges, are diminished.
Once again, I say to my chairman, his leadership has been
extraordinary on this. I was beginning to give up hope that we would be
able to get this done. He constantly said that we don't give up, we
keep pursuing this. It is the right thing to do. And he has done it
with Senator Lugar by his side.
This is a good day. I feel good that we are doing this. I feel that
the people, particularly at this time of the year, will feel much
better when we get this done in a bipartisan way. I know we will.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. BURR. Mr. President, are we working off of already arranged time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is no operating UC for time at this
moment.
Mr. BURR. I thank the Chair. I want to make some introductory remarks
about the START treaty this afternoon. My real interest lies in the
closed session that will take place on a later date. But this is an
important debate. I have deep respect for not just the chairman but for
the ranking member. But like all Members, I have a passion for this
issue. I want to make some general comments at this time about it.
The threat of nuclear engagement between the United States and Russia
has diminished greatly since we began arms reduction talks with the
Soviets in the 1970s. It is a credit to the agreements of past years
that the strategic relationship between the United States and Russia
has evolved to a point where Americans and Russians no longer fear a
war between NATO and Warsaw powers.
The world has changed in many ways for the better as a result of
those bilateral arms reduction efforts. But today, the United States
and our allies face emerging and destabilizing nuclear threats from
rogue nations and nonstate actors who have shown no willingness to
follow or accept international standards or adhere to nonproliferation
treaties.
While the new START treaty continues a historic dialog between two
great nations, I am concerned that negotiated language in this treaty--
especially wording in its preamble about ``existence of the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic
defensive arms''--may in fact signal a subtle yet troubling return to
the Cold War linkage between offensive and defensive weapons. Some
dismiss this wording as the flowery language of diplomats. But words
have meaning. Treaty language is not filler. I can only conclude that
this specific commitment reflects the current thinking of the President
and his administration, which is a departure from their predecessors in
past administrations, and offers the Russians a reason to leverage the
treaty to their distinct advantage with respect to our efforts to
improve upon our missile defenses.
Even if a treaty such as the New START had a place in today's world,
several key issues are lacking in the treaty that this body should and
would have to address. One, the treaty does not address Russia's
tactical nuclear weapons. Two, this treaty does nothing to address
stored warheads. Three, this treaty is silent on rail mobile ICBMs.
Four, this treaty allows the Russians to encrypt and hide missile test
data for all new nuclear weapons they develop.
This treaty places limits on our nonnuclear conventional global
strike weapons--unheard of in the past. This treaty submits and
subjects our Nation's objectives in missile defense to the review and
approval of the Kremlin. This treaty ignores the nuclear capabilities,
desires, ambitions, and plans of nations and non-nation actors who seek
to undermine and harm U.S. national security interests.
Many pundits have spoken about the urgent need to get the U.S.
inspectors on the ground in Russia to verify the state of their new
nuclear weapon systems and verify compliance. But when one examines the
inspection protocols within this treaty, it will be clear that we must
give such advance notification and jump through so many multiple hoops
just to get approval to visit a site, by the time an inspection begins
there is a high likelihood we will only see what the Russians want us
to see and nothing more.
Other supporters of this treaty contend that by ratifying New START
we further enhance our relationship and leverage with the Russians,
with respect to the destabilizing threats posed by North Korea and
Iran. But the Russians already recognize the problems posed by these
two countries, because they are along their borders. The Russians
should not require this treaty as an incentive to protect their own
regional interests.
For these reasons, I remain concerned that by ratifying New START,
the Senate would be allowing an outdated and narrow agenda to constrain
our defense flexibilities and capabilities at the very point in history
where we need a clear-eyed view of the real threats on the horizon.
There is no urgent need to ratify New START this week, next week, or
even next year. Given the numerous flaws in this treaty, to say nothing
of the flawed backward-looking process that developed it, it is prudent
for the Senate to work on ways to improve upon the treaty and how it
has been put forth in order to better ensure the strategic interests of
the United States and to make sure it is fully protected.
Mr. President, my colleagues, our Nation does need a new start in our
relationship with Russia. It needs a new approach. This treaty
represents an old approach, based on Cold War relationships. In my
estimation, it should be rejected by this body.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Shaheen). The Senator from New Jersey.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I rise in support of a treaty that I
actually think is of vital importance to our national security, to our
national interests, and to our international reputation in the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Let me first start off by recognizing Senator Kerry, the chairman of
our Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Lugar, the ranking member.
They have done an extraordinary job. I smile as I listen to some of my
colleagues say it has not been reviewed enough, it has not been vetted
enough. We have had an incredible number of sessions on the question of
what the treaty contains and flushing out all of its points and points
of view. In a very bipartisan way, the committee has worked assiduously
to bring us to this point so that Members can make an informed
decision. So I wish to salute the chairman for his incredible work in
that regard.
The original START treaty expired on December 5 of last year, 2009.
So as of today, December 16, 2010, it has been 376 days since the
United States lost the ability to conduct onsite inspections--lost it--
not knowing what has happened with those weapons. It has been 376 days
since we lost our ability to monitor and verify Russia's nuclear
arsenal.
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Now, I know some say our relationship with Russia has gotten a lot
better. Yes, but it is their arsenal that we care about. It is about an
arsenal that now has a Russian leadership that we are having better
relationships with, but we never know what that relationship will be
tomorrow. Good relationships are built on firm understandings, and the
treaty creates a firm understanding of our respective obligations. That
is why we need to move forward and ratify START.
Now, I agree, I have heard some of my colleagues suggest that there
are other nations--namely, Iran and North Korea--that presently present
maybe a greater threat to our security and the security of our allies,
but that is not the point. The point is that the threat of loose
nuclear materials anywhere in the world--anywhere in the world, whether
in Russia, Iran, or North Korea--is a major concern. The point is that
the severity of the threat from those nations does not diminish the
threat presented by the Russian nuclear arsenal. Those threats in no
way negate the need to continue our nonproliferation regime and
conclude a treaty with Russia and then move on to continuing to address
the serious threats presented by Iran and North Korea.
Let me just say that on one of those two, on Iran, since my days in
the House of Representatives, I have been pursuing Iran, well before
some people looked at Iran as a challenge. When I found out the
International Atomic Energy Administration was taking voluntary
contributions for the United States to help create operational capacity
at the Bushehr nuclear facility, I raised those issues and sought to
stem the use of U.S. taxpayer dollars going for that purpose. So I
understand about Iran and North Korea, but that does not diminish the
importance of knowing about this nuclear arsenal.
It is true that political developments in the past two decades have
greatly diminished the probability of nuclear war between our nations.
But the fact remains that Russia continues to have more than 600
nuclear launch vehicles and more than 2,700 warheads. It is because of
those numbers that this Chamber needs to do what is in our national
security interests and ratify START now. We need the ability to track
and verify Russia's nuclear arsenal. We need onsite inspections. We
need the enhanced flexibility of short-notice inspections of deployed
and nondeployed systems. We need to be able to verify the numbers of
warheads carried on Russian strategic missiles. We need the ability--
provided for the first time in this treaty--to track all accountable
strategic nuclear delivery systems.
We need a verification regime. Trust, but verify. Trust, but verify.
We know those words well. They have been spoken on this floor many
times by many of our Republican colleagues, some who are now willing to
turn their back on the truth of those words. The truth is that at the
heart of this treaty, the ability for this Nation to verify Russia's
nuclear arsenal remains paramount to our security. It remains paramount
to continued bilateral cooperation between the United States and
Russia.
For these reasons, START has broad bipartisan support, including
support from the Secretaries of Defense and State and National Security
Advisers for a whole host of Presidents--President Nixon, President
Ford, Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush.
All of those people have come together regardless of their partisan
labels or views, and they all believe this is in our national security
interest and necessary if we are to show the world that we demand as
much of ourselves as we ask of others.
So as we press the Iranian and North Korean Governments to come into
compliance, this treaty demonstrates to all nations that have nuclear
aspirations that we are willing to live by the rules; that
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is not an empty wish but a national
policy that is in our national interest and the interests of the world;
that our willingness to accede to oversight and monitoring of our
nuclear weapons and facilities, our willingness to reduce our nuclear
arsenal in the interest of global security, and our willingness to
cooperate with willing partners is part and parcel of American policy.
It is what we believe is right, what we will live by, and what we will
demand of all nations.
I hope that with respect to global nuclear security, we can see clear
to be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. Some have suggested
in this Chamber that we can't do that. We certainly can. We can ratify
START and continue to press Iran and North Korea.
You know, this is the one issue I would have hoped we--and we
certainly do in some respects, certainly in some of our leadership on
the committee, Senator Lugar and others--it is the one place the Senate
has always enjoyed a bipartisan effort. Put the country first in the
case of all of those in the world and understand that on this there is
no division.
It was Senator Vandenberg, a Republican from Michigan, who once
famously said:
To me, bipartisan foreign policy means a mutual effort to
unite our official voice at the water's edge . . .
He went on to say:
It does not invoke the remotest surrender of free debate in
determining our position. In a word, it simply seeks national
security ahead of partisan advantage.
But, sadly, I believe the efforts by some to derail START are
politically motivated, putting partisan advantage ahead of national
security. Nothing that protects us from the spread of nuclear weapons
should be politically motivated, not in this brave new world.
Let's be clear. This treaty does not in any way diminish our
commitment to keeping this Nation safe and strong. It imposes no limits
on current or planned ballistic defense programs by the United States.
In fact, the President has committed to a 10-year, $80 billion plan to
modernize our nuclear infrastructure, which represents a 15-percent
increase over current spending levels.
The truth is that the United States retains overwhelming strike
capacity under this treaty. Under this treaty, we will retain 700
deployed launchers and 1,550 deployed warheads. Keep in mind the
overwhelming strike capacity this represents to assure any adversary of
a devastating response to any attack on the United States or our
allies, which is at the heart of our deterrent posture. In real terms,
just to give us a sense of what this means, we will retain enough
strike capacity to end civilization as we know it and destroy the
entire ecosystem of the planet--far beyond the destructive power of the
weapons used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Let's keep in mind that one standard nuclear warhead has an explosive
force equal to 100,000 tons of conventional high explosives. The use of
1,000 nuclear warheads has a destructive power of 100 million tons of
dynamite and the ability to darken this planet in a nightmare nuclear
winter beyond our imagination.
So any argument to the contrary, any argument that we do not retain
an overwhelming nuclear strike capacity, is, in my view, a political
argument, and I believe that some who have come and said that we can't
do this--and then, in the midst of this discussion, in the midst of
this treaty debate, I hear omnibus discussions. I cannot believe that
something that is about the national security of the United States,
making sure future generations of Americans never face that nuclear
winter, somehow gets lumped in with all of the other political
conversations.
I know I have heard the leadership on the other side of the aisle say
their Number 1 goal is for this President to fail at all costs and to
make him a one-term President. But, my God, I thought this had nothing
to do with that. I thought this had nothing to do with that. I would
hope that on an occasion such as this where we are talking about the
Nation's security, the ability to verify, the ability to understand
what Russia's nuclear weaponry is all about goes beyond the success or
failure of this President. It is about the Nation being able to
succeed.
Finally, I have heard a lot of talk about how late this is and that
it is almost Christmas. I certainly want to be with my family as much
as anybody else, but I have to be honest with you, I want my family and
I want the family of every New Jerseyan I represent, of every American
for whom I am part of this Senate to have the security that they will
never face that nuclear winter.
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I cannot accept the statements I have heard here. I was not going to
include this in my remarks, but I have heard now several times that we
are here so late. Well, you know, this 2-year session of Congress has
been so challenging because, time and time again, colleagues--
particularly on the other side of the aisle--have used a procedure in
the Senate--a right they have, but it is a right that has clearly been
abused--to filibuster. What that means is that which we grew up
understanding as Americans from the day we were in a classroom and we
were taught about a simple majority rule--well, here in the Senate,
that simple majority of representing the people of the United States,
the 300 million people, is 51. But under the rules of the Senate, when
one Senator wants to object to moving forward, ultimately we don't need
that simple majority that Americans have come to understand; we end up
needing 60. Of course, since neither party possesses those 60 votes, we
often end up in a stalemate and are not able to move forward. That has
been used time and time again. I would have to do it over 100 times
just for the one session of the Congress, for the 2 years of the
Congress, to remind people why it is so late in the process--because,
time and time again, that process has been used to delay. Even when
that process has been broken and the 60 votes have been accomplished,
there have been votes that soar in the 80th or 90th percentile of the
Members of this body voting to support the proposition. But the time
was killed. It is the time not of the Senate but the time of the
American people.
Then I have to hear some of my colleagues, in the midst of a debate
about a nuclear treaty--understanding that we are trying to prevent and
to verify the possibility that weapons get out of the hands of those
who have the authority over them, among other reasons to have this
treaty--talk about the omnibus. Well, I just find it beyond my
imagination, especially when colleagues who are railing about on that
are part of asking for hundreds of millions of dollars in earmarks in
the omnibus. Then they come and say: Oh, this is a terrible thing, and
the treaty is being brought up at the same time, and somehow we should
not be able to move to this treaty because of that issue, even though
what they rail against is what they have blatantly participated in.
This issue is too important--too important to be wound up in that.
In the end, the purpose of this treaty and of U.S. efforts to thwart
other nations from going nuclear is to ensure that future generations
will not live with the specter of a nuclear winter and the destruction
of civilization as we know it.
We have an opportunity to move--and I would hope move quickly--to do
what is right, to ratify START, and lead the world by example. By
leading the world by example, then we can also make demands on the rest
of the world to make sure they obey and agree and ultimately concur and
ultimately live by the same example. That is our opportunity, and that
is an opportunity we should not lose.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I thank the Senator from New Jersey. He
is a valuable member of our committee, diligent and articulate on these
issues. I appreciate the comments he made, particularly reinforcing the
comments about the delay.
I remind colleagues that earlier the Senator from Arizona mentioned
it is sort of unfair to be doing this at the same time we are doing
something else. I remind colleagues that he said START I was completed
sort of on its own, freestanding. I wish to correct the record. START I
did not, in fact, go through freestanding. On the same day the Senate
held the cloture vote on the treaty on START I, it voted on two
amendments related to the treaty, and it also voted on the final
passage of a tax bill. They managed to do two things at the same time.
The following day, the Senate voted on another amendment related to
the treaty. It also agreed on that day to the conference report on
Interior appropriations. It passed the DC appropriations bill. Those
are two separate items. And it debated and held two rollcall votes on
the Foreign Operations bill. Those are four separate bills and items
dealt with at the same time they were dealing with START I. The
following day, it had the final passage on the START treaty, in about 4
days-plus-and-a-half, I think.
Also, I remind my colleagues, as I should have reminded the Senator
from Texas, 13 times colleagues came on the other side of the aisle to
Senator Lugar and asked him to slow down the process of the legislation
piece of the treaty because of the need to work on modernization. We
did that. Again, colleagues came to us. Way back last summer, we were
prepared to move the treaty out of committee so we wouldn't wind up in
this situation. Guess who came to us and said: No, it would be better
if we had a little more time. Our friends on the other side of the
aisle said: Please don't do that vote. I think it would be better for
the treaty if we took our time. So we provided another 6 weeks to file
questions, get answers, work on modernization, pull people together.
Frankly, it was a constructive process. I am not suggesting it didn't
provide some benefits. But we accommodated a request to slow it down to
meet the needs of our friends on the other side of the aisle. Then,
subsequently, when there were potential complaints that it would be
politicizing the Senate and this treaty to have the vote and this
debate before the election--we could have done that, but we didn't want
the treaty to get caught up in the election process--we voluntarily
delayed the process to meet and accommodate some of the concerns of
colleagues on the other side of the aisle. Then, when we come back
after the election, all of a sudden, we can't do it in a lameduck. We
have to do it down the road.
One colleague came to the floor defending the rights of people who
are not even sworn in as Senators to somehow weigh in on this treaty.
They are not Senators. They may have been elected in this election, but
they haven't taken part in the year-and-a-half-long effort of preparing
to deal with this treaty. Every Senator here has. All 100 of us walked
up to the well, raised our hands, swore to uphold the Constitution of
the United States. That Constitution gives us the specific
responsibility of advice and consent on a treaty. That is why we are
here at this moment. If I had had my druthers, we would have been here
weeks ago, but there was always a filibuster, always a delay, always
some longer period that some other piece of legislation was taking.
It is important for colleagues to be honest about that. We have had
125 cloture motions since January of 2009. That is as many cloture
motions as had been filed between 1919 and 1974, between World War I
and the Vietnam war. That is how many cloture motions we had filed
since last year alone. In addition, the Republicans came back to the
minority in 2007, and we have had to file 264 cloture motions to end a
filibuster since 2007. That averages out to 66 per year. In the first
44 years of the existence of this filibuster rule, it was only used
about once a year. For 44 years, it was used once a year. In the last
few years, it has been used 66 times a year. That is why we are here.
That is why we were delayed.
I, personally, look forward, when we return next year, to seeing us
adjust that rule. I respect the rights of the minority because I know
that is what the Founding Fathers intended. But nobody intended that we
have to vote twice to get to a bill, filibuster on the motion to
proceed, filibuster on the substance. It simply doesn't make sense, and
the American people do not support it. It negates the fundamental
concept of majority rule. I am willing to take my lumps, but I think
there is a way to not necessarily undo it completely and still create
responsible action in the Senate.
Since President Obama took office last year, the Senate has had
rollcall votes on 62 nominations. Of those 62, 27 were confirmed with
90 votes or more; 23 were confirmed with 70 votes or more. That means
that of the 62 nominations, fully 60 of them were confirmed with more
than 70 votes. Over 80 percent of the nominations we have taken votes
on have passed with overwhelming support, and almost all of those
votes, many of them anyway, took place only after an extraordinarily
lengthy delay. Many of these nominations sat on the calendar for
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over 100 days while people waited for the Senate to act.
On average, the Senate has taken more than five times longer to
confirm a circuit court nomination after it was favorably reported by
the Judiciary and so forth.
I don't want to chew up all our time going through that, but the
record should be fundamentally clear that nobody is rushing anything
here. The START treaty debate, the original START treaty began on
September 28, 1992, and amendments were proposed. As early as the first
day of the debate, they were debating amendments. There were two votes
on amendments on the second day of debate. On the third day, there were
three amendments, and they ratified the treaty. We ought to be able to
move here.
I wish to add a couple thoughts quickly on the subject of the
tactical nukes. A number of Senators have expressed concern about why
this treaty doesn't deal with tactical nuclear weapons. All of us would
agree, you have to acknowledge upfront there is an asymmetry, an
imbalance between the numbers of tactical weapons that the Russians
have and have deployed and what we have. Remember, first, we needed to
replace the original START agreement in order to get verification
measures back into place in order to take the steps then necessary to
go to sort of the next tier. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates
explained for the record:
A more ambitious treaty that addressed tactical nuclear
weapons would have taken a lot longer to complete, adding
significantly to the time before a successor agreement,
including the verification measures, could enter into force
following START'S expiration in December 2009.
Their fundamental judgment was, yes, we want to get there, but START
itself helps you get there. If we sit without those verification
measures in place that come with START, we make it much harder to
actually reach the agreement we are trying to get to on the tactical.
The logic said: Get this agreement back into place. Revitalize the
cooperation on arms control. That will empower you subsequently to be
able to achieve your goal.
That is not something the Obama administration dreamed up. I
emphasize that to our colleagues on the other side of the aisle. The
very respected former Secretaries of Defense, Secretary Bill Perry and
Secretary Jim Schlesinger, were part of a bipartisan commission. They
reported that the first step they thought necessary was to deal with
this. They knew nuclear tactical weapons were an issue. But they also
knew our military leaders made it clear they didn't need actual parity
on those weapons. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen both stated, in
response to a question:
Because of the limited range of the tactical weapons and
very different roles from those played by strategic nuclear
forces, the vast majority of Russian tactical nuclear weapons
could not directly influence the strategic nuclear balance
between the United States and Russia.
Donald Rumsfeld told the Foreign Relations Committee in 2002:
I don't know that we would ever want to have symmetry
between the United States and Russia. Their circumstance is
different and their geography's different.
What he is referring to is the vast gulf of the Atlantic Ocean and
then Western Europe that is in between Russia and us and the whole
original tactical decision of Russia in terms of the Warsaw Pact versus
NATO that existed for so many years in the course of the Cold War.
I don't want to be mistaken by my colleagues on the other side. Yes,
we want to limit Russia's nuclear tactical weapons. But a desire to
limit those tactical weapons is not a reason to reject the START
treaty. Frank Miller, who was a senior NSC staffer in the Bush
administration, testified to the Arms Services Committee on July 22:
I believe this Treaty is properly focused on the strategic
forces of both sides. . . . The tactical forces are clearly a
political and military threat to our allies. . . . But I
think throwing this treaty away because we haven't gotten our
hands on the tacticals is not the way to approach this. I
think we have to go after the tacticals separately.
That is exactly what President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary
Clinton, and the rest of our military establishment want to do, but
they want the START treaty as the foundation on which to build that
effort to try to secure something in terms of tactical weapons.
We should pursue a treaty on tactical nuclear weapons, one that can
give us adequate transparency about how many Russia has and that
ultimately reduces that number.
Let me say to my colleagues on the other side, that is precisely why
we put into the resolution of ratification declaration 11, which says:
The Senate calls upon the President to pursue, following
consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian
Federation that would address the disparity between the
tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation
and of the United States and would secure and reduce tactical
nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.
We address the issues of tactical nuclear weapons, and it was not an
oversight. It was a calculated, tactical decision to lay the
foundation, renew the relationship with Russia, renew our arms control
understandings, and lay the foundation to be able to reach an
agreement. That is what Secretary Gates said when he testified before
the Armed Services Committee on June 17. He said:
We will never get to that step [of reductions] with the
Russians on tactical nukes if this treaty on strategic
nuclear weapons is not ratified.
Secretary Gates, appointed by President Bush, said clearly: If we do
not ratify this treaty, we do not get to the treaty on tactical nuclear
weapons.
So I think the imperative could not be more clear.
The Eastern European leaders see this the same way. And they, after
all, are the ones more directly threatened by those weapons. Poland's
foreign minister wrote, on November 20, our NATO allies see ``New START
is a necessary stepping-stone to future negotiations with Russia about
reductions in tactical nuclear arsenals, and a prerequisite for the
successful revival of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.''
The Secretary-General of NATO said the same thing. He said that we need
``transparency and reductions of short-range, tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe. . . . This is a key concern for allies. . . . But we cannot
address this disparity until the New Start treaty is ratified.''
I hope our colleagues will stand with our allies and stand with
common sense and ratify this treaty so we can get to the issue of
tactical nuclear weapons.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, first of all, let me say that there are
big issues and small issues, some of substantial consequence, others
that are of minor importance that are debated here on the floor of the
Senate.
This is one of those big issues, one of significant importance, not
just to us but to the world. While we get involved in a lot of details
in this discussion, the question to be resolved in all of the efforts
that are made here dealing with nuclear weapons is, Will we be able to
find a way to prevent the explosion of a nuclear weapon in a major city
on this planet that will kill hundreds of thousands of people?
The answer to that question comes from efforts about whether we are
able to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to keep nuclear weapons out
of the hands of terrorists and rogue nations, and then begin to reduce
the number of nuclear weapons.
Let me read, for a moment, from Time magazine in 2002. It refers to
something that happened exactly 1 month after 9/11, 2001--the terrible
attack that occurred in this country by terrorists that murdered over
3,000 Americans.
One month later, October 11, 2001, something happened. It was
described in Time magazine because it was not readily known around the
rest of the country what had happened. Let me read it:
For a few harrowing weeks last fall--
Referring to October 2001--
a group of U.S. officials believed that the worst nightmare
of their lives, something even more horrific than 9/11, was
about to come true. In October, an intelligence alert went
out to a small number of government agencies, including the
Energy Department's top secret Nuclear Emergency Search Team
based in Nevada. The report said that terrorists were thought
to have obtained a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon from the Russian
arsenal and planned to smuggle it into New York City. The
source of the report was a mercurial agent code named
dragonfire, who intelligence officials believed was of
``undetermined'' reliability. But dragonfire's claim
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tracked with a report from a Russian general who believed
that his forces were missing a 10-kiloton nuclear device.
Detonated in lower Manhattan, a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb would kill
about 100,000 civilians and irradiate 700,000 more, flattening
everything--everything--for a half a mile in diameter. And so
counterterrorist investigators were on their highest alert.
I continue the quote:
``It was brutal,'' a U.S. official told Time magazine. It
was also a highly classified and closely guarded secret.
Under the aegis of the White House's Counterterrorism
Security Group, part of the National Security Council, news
of the suspected nuke was kept secret so as to not panic the
people of New York. Senior FBI officials were not even in the
loop. Former mayor Rudolph Giuliani said he was never told
about the threat. In the end, the investigators found nothing
and concluded that dragonfire's information was false. But
few of them slept better. They had made a chilling
realization: If terrorists had, in fact, managed to smuggle a
nuclear weapon into a city, there was almost nothing anyone
could have done about it.
Here is the number of nuclear weapons on this planet. The story I
just read was about one small nuclear weapon, a Russian 10-kiloton
nuclear weapon. There are roughly 25,000 nuclear weapons on this Earth.
I just described the apoplectic seizure that occurred over the
potential of one 10-kiloton nuclear weapon missing, potentially
acquired by a terrorist, smuggled to New York City, to be detonated in
one of our largest cities.
Russia has about 15,000 nuclear weapons, the United States about
9,000, China a couple hundred, France several hundred, Britain a couple
hundred; and the list goes on.
Now the question is, What do we do about all that? Will we just waltz
along forever and believe that somehow, some way, we will be lucky
enough to make sure nobody ever explodes a nuclear weapon in the middle
of a city on this Earth? Because when they do, all life on this planet
is going to change. What do we do about that? My colleagues say, let's
ratify the START treaty. I fully agree. And there is so much more that
needs to be done beyond that. The work that has been done here on the
floor of the Senate by my colleagues Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar is
extraordinary work.
Senator Lugar is here, and I do not know that he has been here
previously when I have done this--and people are tired of my doing it,
but it is so important--I have always kept in my desk a small piece of
the wing of a Backfire bomber that was given to me. Senator Lugar is
responsible for this. This is the piece of a wing of a Backfire bomber.
No, we did not shoot it down. Senator Lugar did not shoot it down, nor
did our Air Force. We sawed it up. We sawed the wings off the bomber.
How did that happen? It was done by a the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program in which we actually paid to destroy a Soviet
bomber. It makes a whole lot more sense than being engaged in warfare
to shoot down this bomber.
I have--and I will not show it--in my desk a hinge from a missile
silo that was in the Ukraine that contained a missile with a nuclear
weapon on its tip aimed at the United States of America. It is not
there anymore. Sunflower seeds grow where a missile once resided.
Because of Nunn-Lugar, the American taxpayers and, especially,
importantly, arms negotiations that work. We know this works. This is
not a theory. We know it works to reduce the number of nuclear weapons
by engaging in negotiations and discussions.
I have heard lots of reasons for us not to do this: too soon; not
enough information; not enough detail; more need for consideration--all
of those things. I have always talked about Mark Twain who said the
negative side of a debate never needs any preparation. So I understand
it is easy to come to the floor saying: Do not do this. Do not do this.
But it is those who decide to do things who always prevail to make this
a safer country when you are talking about weapons policies, nuclear
weapons, and arms reduction.
Let me describe why we should do this. First of all, this was
negotiated over a long period of time with the interests of our country
at heart and with substantial negotiation. I was on the National
Security Working Group here in the Senate, and we sat down in secret
briefings on many occasions, having the negotiators themselves come
back and say to us: Here is what we are doing. Let us explain to you
where we are in the negotiations. This treaty did not emerge out of
thin air. All of us were involved and had the ability to understand
what they were doing.
They negotiated a treaty, and we needed to negotiate that treaty
because the circumstances that exist now are that we do not have, given
the previous treaties' expiration, the capability to know what the
other side is doing--the inspection capability.
Let me describe who supports this treaty. Every former Secretary of
State now living, Republican and Democrat: Kissinger, Shultz, Baker,
Eagleburger, Christopher, Albright, Powell, Rice--all of them support
the treaty. They say it is the right thing for this country, it is
important for us to do.
Let me put up especially the comment of Henry Kissinger because he
said it this way:
I recommend ratification of this treaty. . . . It should be
noted I come from the hawkish side of the debate, so I am not
here advocating these measures in the abstract.
He said:
I try to build them into my perception of national
interest. I recommend ratification of this treaty.
I just mentioned my colleague Senator Lugar. He had a partnership
with our former colleague, Senator Nunn, and it is properly called
Nunn-Lugar, and we have talked a lot about it. I have talked about it
many times on the floor of this Senate. It is one of the things we
should be so proud of having done. I am sure Senator Lugar--I have not
talked to him about this--but I am sure he regards it as one of the
significant accomplishments of his career, the Nunn-Lugar program.
As a result of that program, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are
now free of nuclear weapons. Think of that--free of nuclear weapons.
Albania has no more chemical weapons. Madam President, 7,500 nuclear
warheads have been deactivated as a result of this program. The weapons
of mass destruction that have been eliminated: 32 ballistic missile
submarines, 1,400 long-range nuclear missiles, 906 nuclear air-to-
surface missiles, 155 bombers that carried nuclear weapons.
It is not hard to see the success of this. I have shown before--and
will again--the photographs of what Nunn-Lugar means and its success.
You can argue with a lot of things on this floor, but not photographic
evidence, it seems to me. Shown in this photograph is the explosion of
an SS-18 missile silo that held a missile with a nuclear warhead aimed
very likely at an American city.
The silo is gone. The missile is gone. The nuclear warhead is gone.
There are now sunflower seeds planted. It is such an important symbol
of the success of these kinds of agreements.
This next photograph shows the Nunn-Lugar program eliminating a
Typhoon class ballistic missile submarine.
We did not track it in the deep waters of some far away ocean and
decide to engage it and succeed in the engagement. We did not do that
at all. We paid money to destroy this submarine.
I have the ground-up copper wire in a little vial in this desk from a
submarine that used to carry missiles aimed at America.
Here is an example of what happened under Nunn-Lugar, dismantling a
Blackjack bomber. We paid to have that bomber destroyed. We did not
shoot it down. We did not have to.
Now this START agreement. ADM Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff--I want everybody to understand this because
there are some people coming to the floor saying: Well, from a military
standpoint, this might leave us vulnerable, short of what we should
have. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff says:
I, the Vice Chairman, and the Joint Chiefs, as well as our
combatant commanders around the world, stand solidly behind
this new treaty, having had the opportunity to provide our
counsel, to make our recommendations, and to help shape the
final agreements.
We stand behind this treaty, representing the best
strategic interests of this country.
Finally, with respect to the issue of funding, I want to make some
points about that because I chair the subcommittee that funds nuclear
weapons here in the Congress. There has been some discussion that there
is not ample funding here for modernization of our current weapons
programs. That is not the case. It is not true.
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Let me describe where we are with respect to funding, and let me
predicate that by saying Linton Brooks was the former NNSA
Administrator; that is, he ran the program dealing with nuclear
weapons, the nuclear weapons complex. Here is what he said:
START, as I now understand it, is a good idea on its own
merits, but I think for those who think it is only a good
idea if you only have a strong weapons program, this budget
ought to take care of that.
He said:
Coupled with the out-year projections, it takes care of the
concerns about the complex, and it does very good things
about the stockpile, and it should keep the labs [the
National Laboratories] healthy.
He says: ``I would have killed for this kind of budget.'' I would
have killed for this kind of budget. This is the man who understands
the money needed to make sure our stockpile of nuclear weapons is a
stockpile you can have confidence in.
So this notion that somehow there is an underfunding or a lack of
funding for the nuclear weapons life extension programs and
modernization programs is sheer nonsense.
Let me describe what we have done. As I said, I chair the
subcommittee that funds these programs. The President in his budget
proposed robust funding. While most other things were held constant--
very little growth, in many cases no growth at all; in some cases, less
funding than in the past--the President said for fiscal year 2011, he
wanted $7 billion for the life extension programs and modernization for
the current nuclear weapons stock, and that is because people are
concerned if we were to use our nuclear weapons, are we assured they
work. Well, you know what. I don't mean to minimize that, but the fact
is we have so many nuclear weapons, as do the Russians and others, that
if one works, unfortunately, it would be a catastrophe for this world.
In fact, if they are used, it will be a catastrophe. But having said
that, the proposal was $7 billion. That was a 10-percent increase over
fiscal year 2010.
So then the President came out with a budget for the fiscal year we
are now going to be in and he said, All right, in response to the
people in the Senate--there were some who were insisting on much more
spending--he said, All right, we did a 10-percent increase for that
year on the programs to modernize our existing nuclear weapons stock,
and we will go to another 10-percent increase for next year, fiscal
year 2012. So we have a 10-percent increase, and another 10-percent
increase.
I was out in North Dakota traveling down some county highway one day
and was listening to the news and they described how money from my
Appropriations Committee was going to be increased by another $4
billion for the next 5 years. I am thinking, that is interesting,
because nobody has told me about that: $4 billion added to this; first
10 percent, then 10 percent, now $4 billion more. And we have people
coming to the floor who have previously talked about the difficulty of
the Federal debt, $13 trillion debt, $1.3 trillion annual budget
deficit, choking and smothering this country in debt. They are saying,
you know what, we don't have enough money. We are getting 10-percent
increases, plus $4 billion; still not enough, we want more. And the
people who run the place say, I would have killed to get a budget like
that.
Someplace somebody has to sober up here in terms of what these
numbers mean. I swear, if you play out the numbers for the next 5
years, the commitment this administration has made for the life
extension programs and the modernization programs for our existing
nuclear weapons stock--there is no question we have the capability to
certify that our nuclear weapons program is workable and that we ought
to have confidence in it.
I don't understand how this debate has moved forward with the notion
that somehow this is underfunded. It is not at all. In fact, there is
funding for buildings that have not yet been designed. We don't ever do
that. In fact, the money for the nuclear weapons program was the only
thing that was stuck in at the last minute in the continuing
resolution. All the other government programs are on a continuing
resolution which means they are being funded at last year's level,
except the nuclear weapons program. That extra money was put in, in the
continuing resolution. Why? To try to satisfy those who apparently have
an insatiable appetite for more and more and more spending in these
areas. We are spending more than at any other time and so much more
than anybody in the world has ever spent on these things. So nobody
should stand up here with any credibility and suggest this is
underfunded. It is not. It is not. The people who understand and run
these programs know it is not, yet some here are trying to shove more
money into these programs for buildings that haven't even been designed
yet. We have never done that before. People know better than that.
Another issue: They say, Well, this is going to limit our ability
with respect to antiballistic missile systems. It does not. That has
long been discredited. There is nothing here that is going to limit
that. They say, Well, but the Russians, they put a provision in that
says that they can withdraw because of missile defense--yes, they put
that in the last START agreement as well. It doesn't mean anything to
us. It is not part of what was agreed to. There is nothing here that is
going to limit us with respect to our antiballistic missile programs to
protect this country and to protect others.
It is so difficult to think this is some other issue. It is not. One
day somebody is going to wake up if we are not smart and if we don't
decide that our highest priority is to reduce the number of nuclear
weapons and stop the spread of nuclear weapons, one day we will all
wake up and we will read a headline that someone has detonated a
nuclear weapon somewhere on this planet and killed hundreds of
thousands of people in the name of a terrorist act. When that happens,
everything about life on this planet is going to change. That is why it
is our responsibility. We are the leading nuclear power on Earth. We
must lead in this area. I have been distressed for 10 years at what
happened in this Senate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This
country never should have turned that down. We did. We are not testing,
but we still should have been the first to ratify the treaty.
The question now is, Will we decide to not be assertive and
aggressive on behalf of arms control treaties we have negotiated
carefully that have strong bipartisan support? Will we decide that is
not important? I hope not. It falls on our shoulders here in the United
States of America to lead the world on these issues. We have to try to
prevent the issues of Korea and Iran and rogue nations and the spread
of others who want nuclear--we have to keep nuclear weapons out of the
hands of those who would use them. Then we have to continue to find
ways to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on this Earth. My
colleague talked about tactical nuclear weapons. This doesn't involve
tactical nuclear weapons. I wish it did, but it doesn't. We have to get
through this in order to get to limiting tactical nuclear weapons. The
Russians have far more of them than we do, and the quicker we get to
that point of negotiating tactical weapons, the better off we are.
In conclusion, I was thinking about how easy it is to come to the
floor of the Senate and oppose. The negative side never requires any
preparation. That is the case. Mark Twain was right. Abe Lincoln once
was in a debate with Douglas and Douglas was propounding a rather
strange proposal that Abe Lincoln was discarding and he called it ``as
thin as the homeopathic soup that was made by boiling the shadow of a
pigeon that had starved to death.''
Well, you know, I come here and I listen to some of these debates. I
respect everybody. I do. Everybody comes here with a point. But I will
tell you this: Those who believe this is not in the interest of this
country, those who believe we are not adequately funding our nuclear
weapon stock, those who believe this is going to hinder our ability for
an antiballistic missile system that would protect our country, that is
as thin as the homeopathic soup described by Abraham Lincoln. It is not
accurate.
This is bipartisan. It is important for the country. We ought to do
this sooner, not later.
Let me conclude by saying, the work done by my two colleagues is
strong, assertive, bipartisan work that builds on some very important
work for the
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last two decades, Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar--I don't know whether
there will be ever be a Kerry-Lugar, but there was a Nunn-Lugar that
has been so important to this country and to the safety and security of
this world. I hope this is the next chapter in building block by block
by block this country's responsibility to be a world leader in saying,
We want a world that is safer by keeping nuclear weapons out of the
hands of those who don't have them, and then aggressively negotiating
to try to reduce the nuclear weapons that do now exist.
Some months ago I was at a place outside of Moscow where my colleague
Senator Lugar has previously visited, and that facility is devoted to
the training and the security of nuclear weapons. I suspect Senator
Lugar, because he knows a lot about this and has worked a lot on it for
a long time, thinks a lot about those issues, as do I. Are we certain
that these 25,000 nuclear weapons spread around the world are always
secure, always safe, will never be subject to theft? The answer to that
is no, but we are trying very hard. This treaty is one more step in the
attempt we must make to exercise our leadership responsibility that is
ours. So my compliments to Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar and to all
of the others who are engaged in this discussion and who have worked so
hard and have done so for decades on these nuclear weapons issue and
arms reduction issues.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
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