[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 166 (Wednesday, December 15, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10275-S10279]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as chairman of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, I would like to address the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty--called New START--that is now before the Senate for 
ratification.
  This treaty has been carefully vetted. I am confident the Senate will 
come to the conclusion that this treaty is in our national interest and 
will cast the necessary votes for ratification. I strongly support 
ratification.
  Before speaking about intelligence issues related to this treaty, it 
is important to remind ourselves about the extraordinary, lethal nature 
of these nuclear weapons.
  I was 12 years old when atomic bombs flattened both Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The Hiroshima bomb, estimated to have been 21 kilotons, 
killed 70,000 people outright. You can see from this chart the absolute 
devastation this bomb caused in Hiroshima. The Nagasaki bomb, at 15 
kilotons--somewhat less--killed at least 40,000 people immediately. 
This is Nagasaki. Another 100,000 or so who survived the initial blasts 
died of injuries and radiation sickness. By the end of 1945, an 
estimated 220,000 people had lost their lives because of these two 
bombs.
  The horrible images of disfigured bodies and devastating ruins have 
stayed with me all my life. I was part of the generation of youngsters 
being raised who hid under our desks in drills about atomic bombs and 
atomic weapons being unleashed.
  So here is Nagasaki before the bomb, and here is Nagasaki after the 
bomb. It gives you a very good look at what it was like.
  Today, we live in a world with far more nuclear weapons and even more 
powerful destructive capabilities. In May of this year, the Pentagon 
made a rare public announcement of the current U.S. nuclear stockpile--
5,113 nuclear warheads, including deployed and nondeployed and not 
including warheads awaiting dismantlement. According to the Federation 
of American Scientists, Russia's stockpile includes 4,650 deployed 
warheads--deployed warheads--both strategic and tactical. Including 
nondeployed warheads, the estimate of Russia's arsenal is 9,000 
warheads, plus thousands more waiting to be dismantled.
  Many--and here is the key--many of these weapons are far in excess of 
100 kilotons or more than five times the size of the bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some are far, far larger. Many of these weapons 
are on high alert, ready to be launched at a moment's notice, and their 
use would result in unimaginable devastation.
  So I ask my colleagues during this debate to reflect carefully on the 
extraordinary, lethal nature of these weapons as we consider this 
treaty.
  This treaty is actually a modest step forward, not a giant one. It 
calls for cutting deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 30 percent 
below the levels established under the 2002 Moscow Treaty to 1,550 
each. It cuts launch vehicles, such as missile silos and submarine 
tubes, to 800 for each country. Deployed launch vehicles are capped at 
700--more than 50 percent below the original START treaty.
  According to the unanimous views of our Nation's military and 
civilian defense officials, this will not erode America's nuclear 
capability, our strategic deterrent, or our national defense.
  The United States will still maintain a robust nuclear triad, able to 
protect our country and our national security interests.
  As GEN James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and former head of the United States Strategic Command, stated:

       I think we have more than enough capacity and capability 
     for any threat that we see today or that might emerge in the 
     foreseeable future.

  Additionally, these reductions in this New START treaty won't have to 
be completed until the treaty's seventh year, so there is plenty of 
time for a prudent drawdown. But while its terms are modest, its 
impacts are broad, and I wish now to describe some of the benefits of 
ratification.
  I begin with the ways in which this treaty enhances our Nation's 
intelligence capabilities. This has been the lens through which the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has viewed the treaty, and I 
believe the arguments are strongly positive and persuasive. There are 
three main points to make, and I will take them in turn.
  They are, No. 1, the intelligence community can carry out its 
responsibility to monitor Russian activities under the treaty 
effectively. No. 2, this treaty, when it enters into force, will 
benefit intelligence collection and analysis. And No. 3, intelligence 
analysis indicates that failing to ratify the New START treaty will 
create negative consequences for the United States.
  My comments today are, of course, unclassified, but I would note that 
there is a National Intelligence Estimate on monitoring the New START 
Treaty available to Senators. I have written a classified letter to 
Senators Kerry and Lugar that spells out these arguments in greater 
detail. Members are welcome to review both documents.
  Following President Reagan's advice to ``trust but verify,'' and in 
line with all major arms control treaties for decades, New START 
includes several provisions that allow the United States to monitor how 
Russia is reducing and deploying its strategic arsenal, and vice versa.
  The U.S. intelligence community will use these treaty provisions and 
other independent tools, such as the use of national technical means, 
for example, our satellites, to collect information on Russian forces 
and whether Russia is complying with the treaty's terms. These 
provisions include on-the-ground inspections of Russian nuclear 
facilities and bases--18 a year; regular exchanges on data on the 
warhead and missile production and locations; unique identifiers, a 
distinct alphanumeric code for each missile and heavy bomber for 
tracking purposes; a ban on blocking national technical means from 
collecting information on strategic forces, and other measures I will 
describe later in these remarks.
  Without the strong monitoring and verification measures provided for 
in this treaty, we will know less about the number, size, location, and 
deployment status of Russian nuclear warheads. That is a fact.
  As General Chilton, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently 
said:

       Without New START, we would rapidly lose insight into 
     Russian nuclear strategic force developments and activities, 
     and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy 
     would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, 
     we would unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses 
     regarding our own force requirements.

  That is what a ``no'' vote on this treaty means.
  Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin made the same point earlier 
this month. He said that if the United States doesn't ratify the 
treaty, Russia will have to respond, including augmentation of its 
stockpile. That is what voting ``no'' on this treaty means.
  So these monitoring provisions are key, as are the trust and 
transparency they bring, and the only way to get to these provisions is 
through ratification.

[[Page S10276]]

  In fact, we have not had any inspections or other monitoring tools 
for over a year, since the original START treaty expired, so we have 
less insight into any new Russian weapons and delivery systems that 
might be entering their force. The United States has essentially gone 
black on any monitoring, inspection, data exchanges, telemetry, and 
notification allowed by the former START treaty.
  Last November, Senator Kyl and I traveled to Geneva to meet with 
United States and Russian negotiating teams. We met at some length with 
Rose Gottemoeller, the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, 
Verification, and Compliance, who led the U.S. negotiating team. We 
also met with the senior members of her team, including her deputy, 
Ambassador Marcie Ries, Ted Warner, Mike Elliot, Kurt Siemon, and Dick 
Trout, who led the drafting efforts and represented the Departments of 
Defense and Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  These officials and many of the other members of the U.S. team were 
very impressive in their professionalism and experience. Several had 
participated in the negotiation of the original START treaty or the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces treaty, the INF treaty. Several were 
inspectors who had conducted on-the-ground inspections in Russia under 
START and INF, or were weapons system operators who had been 
responsible for hosting Russian inspectors at U.S. bases.
  This team was not composed of the uninitiated or of neophytes. They 
had both background and skill. They were acutely aware of the lessons 
learned over the past decades of arms control and negotiated this 
treaty with an understanding of what monitoring and compliance 
verification mean.
  Senator Kyl and I also met two or three times during our trip to 
Geneva with the Russian delegation led by Russian Ambassador Anatoly 
Antonov, who is an experienced diplomat and negotiator. His delegation 
included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense, the General Staff, and key agencies such as RosAtom and 
RosKosmos. Like the U.S. delegations, the Russian delegation had among 
its members inspectors and weapons systems operators, including those 
from the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force.
  The treaty was still being negotiated at that time, but the rough 
outlines were very much coming into focus. I mentioned to the U.S. and 
Russian delegations that it would be difficult to get 67 votes in the 
Senate for a resolution saying the sky is blue. In order to get an arms 
treaty through the Senate, it would have to have strong monitoring 
provisions.
  In a lengthy conversation over lunch with Russian Ambassador Antonov, 
I said that, as chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I would 
have to walk onto this very floor and assure my colleagues that the 
provisions in this treaty are sufficient for the U.S. intelligence 
community to perform its monitoring role. I believe that Ambassador 
Antonov clearly understood that, and 1 year later I am able to say on 
this floor that the Intelligence Committee has reviewed the question of 
monitoring the New START treaty at length. It is adequate.
  After the treaty was submitted to the Senate on May 13, 2010, 7 
months ago, the committee began its review of its provisions and annex. 
We reviewed past intelligence community analyses on monitoring previous 
treaties and the tools available to monitor Russian behavior under this 
New START.
  The intelligence community completed drafting its NIE on its ability 
to monitor the treaty's limits in June, 6 months ago. We received a 
copy on June 30, allowing members to review it before and after the 
Fourth of July recess. The committee held a hearing on the NIE with 
senior intelligence officials in July. Not a single one of them 
questioned the validity or the judgments of the estimates.
  Following the hearing, the committee submitted more than 70 questions 
for the record and received detailed responses from the intelligence 
community. Those are obviously classified, but they can be seen.
  In addition, the committee undertook its own independent review of 
the NIE and the treaty's implications for the intelligence community. 
Committee staff participated in more than a dozen meetings and 
briefings on a range of issues concerning the treaty, focusing on 
intelligence monitoring and collection aspects.
  Based on the committee's review, after reading the NIE and other 
assessments, and having spoken to Directors of National Intelligence 
Dennis Blair, David Gompert, and Jim Clapper, it is clear to me that 
the intelligence community will be able to effectively monitor Russian 
activities under this treaty.
  For the record, I wish to describe the monitoring provisions in this 
treaty, many of which are similar to the original START treaty's 
provisions.
  No. 1, the treaty commits the United States and Russia ``not to 
interfere with the national technical means of verification of the 
other Party.'' That means not to interfere with our satellites and 
``not to use concealment measures that impede verification.''
  This means that Russia, as I said, agrees not to block our satellite 
observations of their launchers or their testing. Without this treaty, 
Russia could take steps to deny or block our ability to collect 
information on their forces.
  Let me make clear, they could try, and perhaps block our satellites.
  Like START, New START requires Russia to provide the United States 
with regular data notifications. This includes information on the 
production of any and all new strategic missiles, the loading of 
warheads onto missiles, and the location to which strategic forces are 
deployed. Under START, these notifications were vital to our 
understanding. In fact, the notification provisions under New START are 
stronger than those in the old START, including a requirement that 
Russia inform the United States when a missile or warhead moves into or 
out of deployed status.
  Let me repeat that. There is an obligation that Russia inform us when 
a missile or a warhead moves into or out of deployed status.
  Third, New START restores our ability to conduct on-the-ground 
inspections. There are none of them going on, none have been going on, 
for over a year. New START allows for 10 so-called type one on-site 
inspections of Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber bases a year. The 
protocols for these type one inspections were written by U.S. 
negotiators with years of inspections experience under the original 
START treaty. Here is how they work.
  First, U.S. inspectors choose what base they wish to inspect. Russia 
is restricted from moving missiles, launchers, and bombers away from 
that base.
  Second, when the inspectors arrive they will be given a full briefing 
from the Russians, to include the numbers of deployed and nondeployed 
missile launchers or bombers at the base, the number of warheads loaded 
on each bomber--this is important--and the number of reentry vehicles 
on each ICBM or SLBM.
  Third, the inspectors choose what they want to inspect. At an ICBM's 
base, the inspectors choose a deployed ICBM for inspection, one they 
want to inspect. At a submarine base they choose an SLBM. If there are 
any nondeployed launchers, ones not carrying missiles, the inspectors 
can pick one of those for inspection as well.
  At air bases, the inspectors can choose up to three bombers for 
inspection.
  Fourth, the actual inspection occurs, with the U.S. personnel 
verifying the number of warheads on the missiles or on the bombers 
chosen. As I mentioned earlier, each missile and bomber is coded with a 
specific code, both numerically and alphabetically, so that you know 
what you have chosen, and they cannot be changed.
  Under this framework, our inspectors are provided comprehensive 
information from the Russian briefers. They are able to choose 
themselves how they want to verify that this information is accurate.
  The treaty also provides for an additional eight inspections a year 
of nondeployed warheads and facilities where Russia converts or 
eliminates nuclear arms.
  Some people have commented that the number of inspections under New 
START, that is, the total of 18 I have just gone through, is smaller 
than the 28 under the previous START treaty. This is true. But it is 
also true that there are half as many Russian facilities to inspect as 
there were in 1991 when START was signed.

[[Page S10277]]

  In addition, inspections under New START are designed to cover more 
topics than inspections under the prior START agreement. In testimony 
from the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or DTRA, 
Kenneth Myers, the agency doing these inspections, said:

       Type One inspections will be more demanding on both DTRA 
     and site personnel, as it combines the main parts of what 
     were formerly two separate inspections under START into a 
     single, lengthier inspection.

  That is important. The inspections are going to be better. So while 
the absolute number of inspections is down from 28 to 18, the ability 
to monitor and understand Russian forces is not lessened. I am 
confident we can achieve our monitoring objectives with 18 inspections 
a year. I also urge my colleagues to review the New START National 
Intelligence Estimate which addresses these issues in detail.
  Let me discuss a couple of monitoring provisions that were included 
in the expired START treaty but are not in the treaty we are now 
considering. First, under START, the U.S. officials had a permanent 
presence at the Russian missile production facility at Votkinsk. You 
will hear about Votkinsk.
  Inspectors could watch as missiles left the plant and were shipped to 
various parts of the country. New START does not include this 
provision. In fact, the Bush administration had taken this provision 
off the table in its negotiations with the Russians prior to leaving 
office.
  New START does, however, require Russia to mark all missiles, as I 
have been saying, with unique identifiers so we can track their 
location and deployment status over the lifetime of the treaty, so it 
is not necessarily to have a permanent monitoring presence at Votkinsk.
  The treaty also requires Russia to notify us at least 48 hours before 
any missile leaves a plant. So we will still have information about 
missile production without the permanent presence. Our inspectors and 
other nuclear experts have testified that these provisions are, in 
fact, sufficient.
  Secondly, START required the United States and Russia to exchange 
technical data from missile tests--that is known as telemetry--to each 
other but not to other countries. That telemetry allows each side to 
calculate things such as how many warheads a missile could carry. This 
was important as the START treaty attributed warheads to missiles. If a 
Russian missile could carry 10 reentry vehicles, the treaty counted it 
as having 10 warheads. Information obtained through telemetry was, 
therefore, important to determine the capabilities of each delivery 
system.
  New START, however, does away with these attribution rules and counts 
the actual number of warheads deployed on missiles; no more guessing 
whether a Russian missile is carrying one or eight warheads. With this 
change, we do not need precise calculations of the capabilities of 
Russian missiles in order to tell whether Russia is complying with the 
treaty's terms. So telemetry is not necessary to monitor compliance 
with New START.
  Nonetheless, as a gesture to transparency, the treaty allows for the 
exchange of telemetry between our two countries only, up to five times 
a year if both sides agree to do so.
  In fact, it should be pointed out that if the treaty included a 
broader requirement to exchange telemetry, the United States might have 
to share information on interceptors for missile defense, which the 
Department of Defense has not agreed to do.
  Third, there has been a concern raised about Russian ``breakout'' 
capability, a fear that Russia may one day decide to secretly deploy 
more warheads than the treaty would allow, or to secretly build a vast 
stockpile that it could quickly put into its deployed force. I do not 
see this as a credible concern.
  According to public figures, Russian strategic forces are already 
under or close to the limits prescribed by New START, and they have 
been decreasing over the past decade, not just now but over the past 
decade.
  So the concern about a breakout is a concern that Russia would 
suddenly decide it wants to reverse what has been a 10-year trend and 
deploy more weapons than it currently believes are needed for its 
security. They would also have to decide to do this secretly, with the 
significant risk of being caught. Because of the monitoring provisions, 
the inspections, our national technical means and other ways we have to 
track Russian nuclear activities, Moscow would have a serious 
disincentive to do that.
  Moreover, instead of developing a breakout capability, Russia could 
decide instead to simply withdraw from the treaty just as the United 
States did when President Bush withdrew from the antiballistic treaty.
  Finally, even in the event that Russia did violate the treaty and 
pursue a breakout capability, I am confident that our nuclear 
capabilities are more than sufficient to continue to deter Russia and 
to provide assurances to our allies. The bottom line is that the 
intelligence community can effectively monitor this treaty. If you vote 
``no'' on this treaty, there will be no monitoring.
  As I noted earlier, a second question relevant to New START is 
whether ratifying the treaty actually enhances our intelligence 
collection and analysis. This is above and beyond the question of 
whether the intelligence community will be able to fulfill its 
responsibility to monitor Russian compliance with the treaty's terms.
  While I am unable to go into the specifics, the clear answer to this 
question is, yes. The ability to conduct inspections, receive 
notifications, enter into continuing discussions with the Russians over 
the lifetime of the treaty, will provide us with information and 
understanding of Russian strategic forces that we simply will not have 
without the treaty. If you vote ``no,'' we will not have it.
  The intelligence community will need to collect information about 
Russian nuclear weapons and intentions with or without a New START 
treaty, just as it has since the beginning of the Cold War. But absent 
the inspector's boots on the ground, the intelligence community will 
need to rely on other methods.
  A November 18 article in the Washington Times noted that:

       In the absence of a U.S.-Russian arms control treaty, the 
     U.S. intelligence community is telling Congress it will need 
     to focus more spy satellites over Russia that could be used 
     to peer on other sites, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, to 
     support the military.

  Put even more simply, the Nation's top intelligence official, 
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, was recently asked 
about ratification of the New START treaty. He responded:

       I think the earlier, the sooner, the better. You know my 
     thing is: From an intelligence perspective only, are we 
     better off with it or without it? We're better off with it.

  So Members should realize that if they vote ``no'' to ratify this 
treaty and lose out on its monitoring provisions, that means we are 
going to have to spend much more, and it is going to be much more 
difficult if not impossible to get certain information about Russian 
forces.
  The final intelligence-related question on the New START treaty is, 
what impact ratification--or failure to ratify--will have on our other 
foreign policy objectives. I think this is important. We live in a 
different world today where there are nonstate actors, where there are 
two nations, Iran and Korea, moving to develop a nuclear weapon, and it 
is very important to be able to achieve a working relationship with the 
large powers that give confidence to other nations to stand with us.
  This question can be addressed largely through open source 
intelligence. There have been numerous news reports and press 
conferences in the recent weeks about the broader effects of ratifying 
New START. Many supporters of the New START treaty have noted that 
ratification is a key achievement and symbol of the ``reset'' in 
Russian relations that Presidents Obama and Medvedev have sought.
  But beyond generalities of an improved relationship, the Senate's 
rejection of New START would not only undermine our understanding of 
Russia's strategic forces, it could derail or disrupt a host of other 
U.S. policies objectives.
  In Russia today, there is a heated debate over whether Moscow is 
better served by domestic reforms and engagements with the West, or by 
hard-line behavior that rejects cooperation

[[Page S10278]]

with the West. Russians view New START as a signature product of the 
reforms. This is the signature product of Russian reform and the new 
Russian President. They view the fate of New START in this Senate as a 
crucial test of the reformists' claim that Russia and America can work 
together. If we, the Senate, reject this treaty, we can confirm what 
Russian hard-liners have been saying all along, the United States is 
not a viable partner.
  Here are a few real-world examples. Russia has been allowing the 
United States and other members of the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan to transport material into Afghanistan 
over Russian territory. This has assisted our war efforts, especially 
in light of recent attacks against convoys crossing through Pakistan.
  Russia has withheld delivery of the S-300 advanced air defense system 
to Iran and supported the United Nations Security Council sanctions 
against Tehran. Tehran wanted to buy this sophisticated air defense 
missile defense system. Russia was going to sell it to them. Russia has 
withheld that sale.
  That is a major achievement. Also, Russia and NATO partners agreed at 
the recent summit in Lisbon to a new missile defense system in Europe. 
This is an agreement for a missile defense system which Russia has 
fought violently over the past decade.
  At that same summit, Foreign Ministers from Denmark, Lithuania, 
Norway, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Hungary spoke out in support of the New 
START treaty. As neighbors to Russia and the former Soviet Union, they 
praised New START as necessary for the security of Europe but also as 
an entrance to engage in tactical nuclear weapons treaties which pose 
an even greater threat from state or nonstate use.
  There is no quid pro quo here. Russia has not agreed to support 
initiatives of the United States around the world if only the Senate 
would ratify the New START treaty. But as every Senator knows, when we 
are trying to get things done, relationships matter.
  The relationship between the United States and Russia has been 
critical since we fought together in World War II and it will continue 
to be so. This is an unparalleled opportunity to enhance that 
relationship and to say, by signature and by ratification of this 
treaty, that, yes, the United States of America wants to work with 
Russia; yes, the United States and Russia have mutual goals; and, yes, 
with respect to Iran and other trouble spots, the United States and 
Russia can, in fact, stand together.
  Let me move on to the nonproliferation reasons to ratify this treaty. 
New START demonstrates to the world that the two nations possessing 
more than 90 percent of the planet's nuclear weapons are capable of 
working together on arms reduction and nonproliferation. A ``no'' vote 
says we are not capable of doing that.
  I believe this will pave the way for more multilateral efforts to 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons as well as restrictions on tactical 
nuclear warheads that could fall into the hands of terrorist 
organizations.
  Let us not forget the centerpiece of our nuclear nonproliferation 
regime, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It is based on a clear 
bargain. Those with nuclear weapons agree to eventually eliminate them, 
and those without nuclear weapons agree to never acquire them. With the 
signing of the New START treaty, the Presidents of the United States 
and Russia are showing the other parties to the NPT that we are living 
up to our end of the bargain. Without New START, with a ``no'' vote on 
New START, we do not do this.
  This will strengthen the resolve of other nations to maintain their 
commitments and uphold the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime, to hold violators such as Iran and North Korea accountable and 
subject to sanction.
  In fact, we are already seeing the benefits of commitments made in 
the New START agreement. The latest review conference of the NPT in May 
of this year ended with 189 parties recommitting themselves to the NPT 
after the 2005 conference collapsed. On June 9, the United Nations 
Security Council passed a fourth sanctions resolution on Iran for its 
violations of its commitments under the treaty with the support of 
China and Russia.
  Ratification of New START also opens the door to further arms control 
agreements, both to further arms reductions and to address tactical 
nuclear warheads--the smaller yield devices that are in some ways more 
dangerous than the strategic weapons with which we are dealing now.
  Ratification moves us down the path to a world without nuclear 
weapons as envisioned by Presidents Obama and Reagan. For years, the 
idea of a nuclear-free world was ridiculed as a fantasy. This may now 
be beginning to change. Don't turn it down. Republicans as well as 
Democrats have come around to the idea that eventual nuclear 
disarmament is not only desirable, but it is, in fact, doable and is 
consistent with our national security interests. Former Secretaries of 
State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger have joined forces with former 
Senator Sam Nunn and former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to make 
this case.
  In a January 4, 2007, op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, they called 
for U.S. leadership in building a ``solid consensus for reversing 
reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to 
preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and 
ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.''
  We can now do our part to build that consensus and help ensure that 
we never again see the destruction caused by nuclear weapons.
  Once again, I return to these charts. I was 12 years old when I saw 
these pictures. I was 12 years old when I realized what a 21-kiloton 
and a 15-kiloton bomb can do. Many of the bombs in the U.S. and Russian 
arsenals are well in excess of 100 kilotons today. The number is 
classified but, trust me, they are well in excess. We can destroy the 
planet Earth with these weapons.
  They are deployed and they are targeted. This treaty gives us the 
opportunity to reduce our arsenals--the U.S. and Russian stockpiles 
that now make up 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. It is 
a big deal. To say no to this treaty is, in fact, to say we want to go 
back to the days of suspicion, of not working together, of the Cold War 
ethos that we will succumb to the Russian hardliners and take this 
first major test of Russian reform and effectively trash it. We must 
not do that.
  Mr. President, with the months of debate over this Treaty, a small 
number of objections have been raised. I would like to address them 
now.
  First, some Senators infer that our nuclear weapons will become 
unreliable over time. They say they won't vote for this treaty unless 
it is linked to modernization of the arsenal.
  Let's be clear. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
Energy have certified that our arsenal is safe and reliable in each of 
the past 14 years. The head of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, Tom D'Agostino has assured me of the surety of the 
stockpile. Our top scientists have told us that these weapons will 
remain safe and reliable for decades to come.
  In fact, an independent group of scientists known as the JASONs, who 
advises the government on nuclear weapons, has reported that the 
National Nuclear Security Administration is successfully ensuring the 
arsenal's safety and reliability, through weapons ``lifetime extension 
programs.''
  Their September, 2009 report said that through such programs, 
``Lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades, 
with no anticipated loss in confidence . . . ''
  And President Obama has made a significant commitment to ensuring 
that we maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal by providing the 
necessary resources for as long as we have nuclear weapons.
  The President's fiscal 2011 budget asks for $11.2 billion for the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, a 13.4-percent increase over 
the fiscal 2010 budget.
  This includes $7 billion for weapons activities to maintain the 
safety, security, and effectiveness of the arsenal, an increase of 10 
percent, or $624 million from fiscal year 2010.
  The President has submitted a plan calling for $80 billion over the 
next 10 years. In November, he added an additional $4.1 billion over 
the next 5 years alone to that enormous sum.
  Modernization of the nuclear stockpile is surely a major priority, 
and I will fight to make sure these funds are

[[Page S10279]]

appropriated. But these questions and concerns have now been addressed, 
and should not hold up this treaty.
  Second, critics have claimed that New START will impede current and 
planned missile defense efforts.
  They point to language in the preamble of the treaty that notes the 
inter-relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms.
  They point to the unilateral statement issued by Russia upon signing 
the treaty indicating that our missile defense plans could prompt 
Moscow to withdraw from the agreement.
  And they note that the agreement prohibits both countries from 
converting additional ICBM silos or submarine launch tubes for missile 
defense interceptors.
  These arguments are without merit.
  First, the preamble language simply acknowledges what we all know: 
that there is a relationship between strategic offensive and defensive 
arms. It will not inhibit our missile defense efforts in any way.
  Similar language can be found in the original START agreement, and it 
has not inhibited our missile defense efforts over the past two 
decades.
  Second, the Russian unilateral statement is not a part of the 
agreement, and the United States is not bound by it in any way. In 
fact, the United States issued its own unilateral statement clearly 
stating that it will move forward with its missile defense plans.
  Again, it should be noted that the Soviet Union issued a similar 
unilateral statement when START was signed and it had no impact on our 
missile defense plans.
  Finally, regarding the prohibition on converting additional ICBM 
silos and SLBM launch tubes for missile defense interceptors: simply 
stated, our military has no plans to do so. This doesn't block the 
United States from anything it plans or wants to do.
  It is actually cheaper to build new missile defense launchers than to 
convert existing launch tubes or silos. And the treaty places no 
constraints whatsoever on that construction.
  The Secretary of Defense, the uniformed military leadership, and the 
head of the Missile Defense Agency have testified this treaty will not 
harm missile defense.
  These concerns have been raised, debated, and answered. It is time 
for ratification.
  Mr. President, the choice before us is not New START and the treaty 
that some of my colleagues would prefer to have. Rather, the choice is 
between New START and no arms control treaty at all. To me, that choice 
is easy.
  Either we make progress on reducing our nuclear arsenals and lay the 
foundation for further reductions including on tactical nuclear weapons 
or we do not.
  New START is in our Nation's national security. Every day that passes 
without ratification is another day without inspectors on the ground in 
Russia and a decrease in mutual transparency and trust.
  The Senate has a long tradition of overwhelming support for treaties 
like this one: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was 
approved 93-5; the 1991 START agreement which was approved 93-6; and 
the 2002 Moscow Treaty which was approved 95-0.
  There is nothing in this treaty to suggest that the vote on its 
ratification should be any different. This should be an easy step for 
the Senate to take, a step that should be taken in the spirit of 
protecting our Nation and the world from the devastation of a nuclear 
war.
  I urge my colleagues to support this agreement.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Franken). The Senator from Georgia.

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