[Congressional Record Volume 156, Number 166 (Wednesday, December 15, 2010)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10265-S10269]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            NEW START TREATY

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the new START 
treaty. We undertake this debate at a time when almost 100,000 American 
military personnel are fighting a difficult war in Afghanistan. More 
than 1,300 of our troops have been killed in Afghanistan, with almost 
10,000 wounded.
  Meanwhile, we are in our seventh year in Iraq--a deployment that has 
cost more than 4,400 American lives and wounded roughly 32,000 persons. 
We still have more than 47,000 troops deployed in that country. 
Tensions on the Korean peninsula are extremely high, with no resolution 
to the problems in North Korea's nuclear program. We continue to pursue 
international support for steps that could prevent Iran's nuclear 
program from producing a nuclear weapon. We remain concerned about 
stability in Pakistan and the security of that country's nuclear 
arsenal. We are attempting to counter terrorist threats emanating from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, east Africa, Yemen, and many other locations. We 
are concerned about terrorist cells in allied countries, and even in 
the United States. We remain highly vulnerable to disruptions in oil 
supplies due to national disasters, terrorist attacks, political 
instability, or manipulation of the markets by unfriendly oil-producing 
nations.
  Even as we attempt to respond to these and other national security 
imperatives, we are facing severe resource constraints. Since September 
11, 2001, we have spent almost $1.1 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
We are spending roughly twice as many dollars on defense today as we 
were before 9/11. These heavy defense burdens have occurred in the 
context of a financial and budgetary crisis that has raised the U.S. 
Government's total debt to almost $14 trillion. The fiscal year 2010 
budget deficit registered about $1.3 trillion, or 9 percent of GDP.
  All Senators here are familiar with the challenges I have just 
enumerated. But as we begin this debate, we should keep this larger 
national security context firmly in mind. As we contend with the 
enormous security challenges of the 21st century, the last thing we 
need to is to reject a process that has mitigated the threat posed by 
Russia's nuclear arsenal.
  For 15 years, the START treaty has helped us to keep a lid on the 
U.S.-Russian nuclear rivalry. It established a working relationship on 
nuclear arms with a country that was our mortal enemy for 4\1/2\ 
decades. START's transparency features assured both countries about the 
nuclear capabilities of the other. For us, that meant having American 
experts on the ground in Russia conducting inspections of nuclear 
weaponry.
  Because START expired on December 5, 2009, we have had no American 
inspectors in Russia for more than a year. New START will enable 
American teams to return to Russia to collect data on the Russian 
arsenal and verify Russian compliance. These inspections greatly reduce 
the possibility that we will be surprised by Russian nuclear 
deployments or advancements.
  Before we even get to the text of the new START treaty and the 
resolution of ratification, Members should recognize what a Senate 
rejection of new START would mean for our broader national security. 
Failure of the Senate to approve the treaty would result in an 
expansion of arms competition with Russia. It would guarantee a 
reduction in transparency and confidence-building procedures, and it 
would diminish between cooperation and Russian defense establishments. 
It would complicate our military planning.
  A rejection of new START would be greeted with delight in Iran, North 
Korea, Syria, and Burma. These nations want to shield their weapons 
programs from outside scrutiny and they want to be able to acquire 
sensitive weapons technologies. They want to block international 
efforts to make them comply with their legal obligations. Rogue nations 
fear any nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia 
because they know it limits their options. They want to call into 
question our own nonproliferation credentials and they want Russia to 
resist tough economic measures against them.
  If we reject this treaty, it will be harder to get Russia's 
cooperation in stopping nuclear proliferation. It could create 
obstacles on some issues in the United Nations Security Council, where 
Russia has a veto. It might also reduce incentives for Russia to 
cooperate in providing supply routes for our troops in Afghanistan. It 
would give more weight to the arguments of Russian nationalists who 
seek to undermine cooperation with the United States and its allies. It 
would require additional satellite coverage of Russia at the expense of 
their use against terrorists.
  With all that we need to achieve, why would we add to our problems by 
separating ourselves from Russia over a

[[Page S10266]]

treaty that our own military wants ratified? Our military commanders 
are anxious to avoid the added burden and uncertainties of an 
intensified arms competition with Russia. They know such competition 
would detract from other national security priorities and missions. 
That is one reason they are telling us unequivocally to ratify this 
agreement. They also have asserted that the modest reductions in 
warheads and delivery systems embodied in the treaty in no way threaten 
our nuclear deterrent.
  Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff ADM Mike Mullen have testified that they have no doubts the new 
START treaty should be ratified. GEN Kevin Chilton, who is in charge of 
our strategic nuclear forces, has said the treaty `` will enhance the 
security of the United States.'' GEN Patrick O'Reilly, who is in charge 
of our missile defenses, endorsed the treaty saying flatly that it'' 
does not constrain our plans to execute the United States missile 
defense program.''
  Moreover, seven former commanders of Strategic Command--the military 
command in charge of our strategic nuclear weapons--have backed the new 
START treaty. Members of the Senate--Republicans and Democrats alike--
have taken pride in supporting the military and respecting military 
views about steps necessary to protect our Nation.
  Rejecting an unequivocal military opinion on a treaty involving 
nuclear deterrence would be an extraordinary position for the Senate to 
take. The military is supported in this view by the top national 
security officials from past administrations. To date, every Secretary 
of State and Secretary of Defense who has expressed a public opinion 
about the new START treaty has counseled in favor of ratification. This 
has included 10 Republicans and 5 Democrats. All five living Americans 
who served Ronald Reagan as Defense Secretary, Secretary of State, or 
White House Chief of Staff have endorsed the new START treaty. The list 
of endorsers includes: President George H. W. Bush, George Shultz, Jim 
Baker, Jim Schlessinger, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Colin 
Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Steven Hadley, Howard Baker, Lawrence 
Eagleburger, and Frank Carlucci. Many of these officials served at a 
time when the stakes related to Russian nuclear arms were even higher 
than they are today.
  During the Cold War uncertainty over Russia's intentions and weapons 
advances--and this cost us tens if not hundreds of billions of 
dollars--an academic industry developed that was devoted to parsing 
Soviet military capabilities. This was one of the biggest, if not the 
biggest, expenses of our intelligence budget each year. The fact that 
we could not accurately judge Soviet military capabilities led us to 
elevate our spending on weaponry out of a sense of caution. These times 
were dominated by contradictory risk assessments and rumors about 
dangerous new Soviet weapon systems. We were constantly worried about 
missile gaps, destabilizing arms deployments, or Soviet technology 
breakthroughs. And all of this came at a tremendous cost to the 
American taxpayer and the psyche of a nation which lived under the 
threat of mutual assured destruction.
  I firmly believe our staunch opposition to an aggressive Soviet state 
was absolutely necessary and led directly to the achievement of freedom 
for tens of millions of people in Eastern Europe. It also set the stage 
for dramatic breakthroughs in international cooperation. But that does 
not mean the Cold War was a benign experience or that we want to revive 
nuclear competition, carried out in an environment without verification 
or basic limits on weapons.
  I am not suggesting that we are on the brink of returning to the Cold 
War. Reality is far more complicated than that. But we should not be 
cavalier about allowing our relationship with Moscow to drift or about 
letting our knowledge of Russian weaponry atrophy. Few Americans today 
give much thought to the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union. 
Americans have not had to be concerned in the same way as they were 
during the Cold War years. But large elements of that arsenal still 
exist and still threaten the United States. Whether through accident, 
miscalculation, proliferation, or any number of other scenarios, 
Russian nuclear weapons, materiels, and technology still have the 
capability to obliterate American cities. That is a core national 
security problem that commands the attention of our government and this 
body.
  I relate these thoughts about where we have been in part because most 
Senators entered national public service after the Cold War ended, and 
even fewer were serving in this body when we were called upon to make 
decisions on arms treaties.
  Only 21 current Members were here in 1988 to debate the INF Treaty. 
Only 15 current Members were serving in the Senate during the Geneva 
Summit between President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. 
Only 11 Members were here in March 1983 when President Reagan delivered 
his so-called ``evil empire'' speech. And only 7 of us were here when 
the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In a few weeks, these numbers 
will decline even further.
  The fundamental question remains as to how we manage our relationship 
with a former enemy and current rival that still possesses enormous 
capacity for nuclear destruction. What the START process has done, 
since it was initiated by President Reagan, is manage an adversarial 
relationship that previously had been cloaked in volatile uncertainty 
and accompanied by enormous financial costs to our own society.
  One can take the view, I suppose, that unrestrained competition with 
Russia is the best way to ensure our security in relation to that 
country. But that has not been the view of the American people and 
there is no indication that this is what Americans were voting for in 
November.
  It certainly was not Ronald Reagan's view. It was President Reagan 
who began the START process. His team coined the term ``START,'' 
standing for ``Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,'' to reflect President 
Reagan's intent to shift the goal of nuclear arms control from limiting 
weapons build-ups to making substantial, verifiable cuts in existing 
arsenals. On May 8, 1982, President Reagan made the first START 
proposal during a speech at Eureka College in Illinois, calling for a 
one-third reduction in nuclear warheads. For the rest of his 
Presidency, he engaged the Russians on numerous arms control proposals 
that reduced weaponry an established tough verification measures to 
prevent cheating. He personally conducted five summits with Russian 
leaders, which primarily focused on arms control. He produced the INF 
treaty, signed in 1988, which greatly reduced nuclear weapons in 
Europe. His efforts also led to the original START Treaty which was 
signed during the first President Bush's term in 1991.
  The cornerstone of President Reagan's arms control agenda was 
verification. His interest in verification is frequently summed up by 
his oft-quoted line ``trust but verify.'' But what the United States 
and Russia have done through the START process is far more than just 
verification. START has provided the structure and transparency upon 
which unprecedented arms control and nonproliferation initiatives have 
been built, most notably, the Nunn-Lugar program. The stability that 
came with a long-term agreement and the commitment implicit in a treaty 
approved by both the Russians an American legislatures, has been 
indispensable to the success of Nunn-Lugar and other nonproliferation 
endeavors with Russia.
  Over the course of almost two decades, the Nunn-Lugar program has 
joined Americans and Russians in a sustained effort to safeguard and 
ultimately destroy weapons and materials of mass destruction in the 
former Soviet Union and beyond. The destruction of thousands of weapons 
is a monumental achievement for our countries, but the process 
surrounding this joint effort is as important as the numbers of weapons 
eliminated. The U.S.-Russian relationship has been through numerous 
highs and lows in the post-Cold War era. Throughout this period, START 
inspections and consultations and the corresponding threat reduction' 
activities of the Nunn-Lugar program have been a constant that has 
reduced miscalculation and has built respect. This has not prevented 
highly contentious disagreements with Moscow, but it has meant that we 
have not

[[Page S10267]]

had to wonder about the make-up and disposition of Russian nuclear 
forces during periods of tension. It also has reduced, though not 
eliminated, the proliferation threat posed by the nuclear arsenal of 
the former Soviet Union,
  This process must continue if we are to answer the existential threat 
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Every 
missile destroyed, every warhead deactivated, and every inspection 
implemented makes us safer. Russia and the United States have the 
choice whether or not to continue this effort, and that choice is 
embodied in the New START Treaty before us.
  The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees held 18 
hearings on the treaty with national security leaders who have served 
in the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George 
W. Bush, and Obama administrations. These hearings were supplemented by 
dozens of staff and Member briefings, as well as nearly 1,000 questions 
for the record.
  We know, however, that bilateral treaties are not neat instruments, 
because they involve merging the will of two nations with distinct and 
often conflicting interests. Treaties come with inherent imperfections 
and questions. As Secretary Gates testified in May, even successful 
agreements routinely are accompanied by differences of opinion by the 
parties.
  The ratification process, therefore, is intended to produce a 
Resolution of Ratification for consideration by the whole Senate. The 
resolution should clarify the meaning and effect of treaty provisions 
for the United States and resolve areas of concern or ambiguity.
  On September 16, 2010, the Foreign Relations Committee approved a 
Resolution of Ratification for the New START treaty by a vote of 14-4 
with important contributions from both Democratic and Republican 
members. This resolution incorporates the concerns and criticisms 
expressed over the last several months by committee witnesses, members 
of the committee, and other Senators. It will be further strengthened 
through our debate in the coming days.
  With this in mind, I would turn to specific concerns addressed in the 
Resolution of Ratification.
  First of all, missile defense.
  Some critics of the New START treaty have argued that it impedes U.S. 
missile defense plans. But nothing in the treaty changes the bottom 
line that we control our own missile destiny, not Russia. Defense 
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and GEN Patrick O'Reilly, who is in 
charge of our missile defense programs, have all testified that the 
treaty does nothing to impede our missile defense plans. The Resolution 
of Ratification has explicitly reemphasized this in multiple ways.

  Some commentators have expressed concern that the treaty's preamble 
notes the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic 
defense. But preamble language does not permit rights nor impose 
obligations, and it cannot be used to create au obligation under the 
treaty. The text in question is stating a truism of strategic planning 
that an interrelationship exists between strategic offense and 
strategic defense.
  Critics have also worried that the treaty's prohibition on converting 
ICBM and SLBM launchers to defensive missile silos reduces our missile 
defense options. But General O'Reilly has stated flatly that it would 
not be in our own interest to pursue such conversions because 
converting a silo costs an estimated $19 million more than building a 
modern, tailor-made missile defense interceptor silo. The Bush 
administration converted five ICBM test silos at Vandenberg Air Force 
Base for missile defense interceptors, and these have been 
grandfathered under the New START treaty. Beyond this, every single 
program advocated during the Bush and Obama administrations has 
involved construction of new silos dedicated to defense on land--
exactly what the New START treaty permits. General O'Reilly said a U.S. 
embrace of silo conversions would be ``a major setback'' for our 
missile defense program.
  Addressing whether there would be utility in converting any existing 
SLBM launch-tubes to a launcher of defensive missiles, GEN Kevin P. 
Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated ``[T]he missile 
tubes that we have are valuable, in the sense that they provide the 
strategic deterrent. I would not want to trade [an SLBM] and how 
powerful it is and its ability to deter, for a single missile defense 
interceptor.'' Essentially, our military commanders are saying that 
converting silos to missile defense purposes would never make sense for 
our efforts to build the best missile defense possible.
  A third argument concerning missile defense centers on Russia's 
unilateral statement upon signature of New START, which expressed its 
right to withdraw from the treaty if there is an expansion of U.S. 
missile defense programs. Unilateral statements are routine to arms 
control treaties and do not alter the legal rights and obligations of 
the parties to the treaty. Indeed, Moscow issued a similar statement 
concerning the START I treaty, implying that its obligations were 
conditioned upon U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. Yet, Russia did 
not in fact withdraw from START I when the United States withdrew from 
the ABM Treaty in 2001. Nor did it withdraw when we subsequently 
deployed missile defense interceptors in California and Alaska. Nor did 
it withdraw when we announced plans for missile defenses in Poland and 
the Czech Republic.
  Russia's unilateral statement does nothing to contribute to its right 
to withdraw from the treaty. That right, which we also possess, is 
standard in all recent arms control treaties and most treaties 
considered throughout U.S. history.
  The Resolution of Ratification approved by the Foreign Relations 
Committee reaffirms that the New START treaty will in no way inhibit 
our missile defenses. It contains an understanding that the New START 
treaty imposes no limitations on the deployment of U.S. missile 
defenses other than the requirement to refrain from converting 
offensive missile launchers. It also states that Russia's April 2010 
unilateral statement on missile defense does not impose any legal 
obligations on the United States and that any further limitations would 
require treaty amendment subject to the Senate's advice and consent. 
Consistent with the Missile Defense Act of 1999, it also declares that 
it is U.S. policy to deploy an effective national missile defense 
system as soon as technologically possible and that it is the paramount 
obligation of the United States to defend its people, armed forces, and 
allies against nuclear attack to the best of its ability.

  In a revealing moment during Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearings on the Treaty, Secretary Gates testified:

       The Russians have hated missile defense ever since the 
     strategic arms talks began, in 1969 . . . because we can 
     afford it and they can't. And we're going to be able to build 
     a good one . . . and they probably aren't. And they don't 
     want to devote the resources to it, so they try and stop us 
     from doing it. . . This treaty doesn't accomplish that for 
     them. There are no limits on us.

  I would paraphrase the Secretary's blunt comments by saying simply, 
that our negotiators won on missile defense. If, indeed, a Russian 
objective in this treaty was to limit U.S. missile defense, they 
failed, as the Defense Secretary asserts. Does anyone really believe 
that Russian negotiating ambitions were fulfilled by nonbinding 
language in the Preamble? Or by a unilateral Russian statement with no 
legal force? Or by a prohibition on converting silos, which costs more 
than building new ones? These are toothless, figleaf provisions that do 
nothing to constrain us.
  Moreover, as outlined, our resolution of ratification states 
explicitly in multiple ways that we have no intention of being 
constrained. Our government is investing heavily in missile defense. 
Strong bipartisan majorities in Congress favor pursuing current missile 
defense plans.
  What the Russians are left with on missile defense is unrealized 
ambitions. At the end of any treaty negotiation between any two 
countries, there are always unrealized ambitions left on the table by 
both sides.
  This has been true throughout diplomatic history.
  The Russians might want all sorts of things from us, but that does 
not mean they are going to get them. If we constrain ourselves from 
signing a treaty that is in our own interest on the basis

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of unrealized Russian ambitions, we are showing no confidence in the 
ability of our own democracy to make critical decisions. We would be 
saying that we have to live with the end of START inspections and other 
negative consequences of rejecting this treaty to prevent a U.S. 
Government in the future from bowing to Russian pressure on missile 
defense. If one buys into this logic, it becomes almost impossible to 
seek cooperation with Russia on anything.
  Let us be absolutely clear, the President of the United States, the 
U.S. Congress, and the executive branch agencies on behalf of the 
American people control our own destiny on missile defense. The 
Russians can continue to argue all they want on the issue, but there is 
nothing in the treaty that says we have to pay any attention to them.
  The New START treaty's verification regime has also been the subject 
of considerable debate. The important point is that, today, we have 
zero on-the-ground verification capability given that START I expired 
on December 5, 2009, more than 1 year ago. Under START, the United 
States conducted inspections of weapons, their facilities, their 
delivery vehicles and warheads, in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 
Belarus. These inspections fulfilled a crucial national security 
interest by greatly reducing the possibility that we would be surprised 
by future advancements in Russian weapons technology or deployment. 
Only through ratification of New START will U.S. technicians return to 
Russia to resume verification.
  Under New START, the United States and Russia each will deploy no 
more than 1,550 warheads for strategic deterrence. Seven years from its 
entry into force, the Russian Federation is likely to have only about 
350 deployed missiles. This smaller number of strategic nuclear systems 
will be deployed at fewer bases. It is likely that Russia will close 
down even more bases over the life of the treaty.
  Both sides agreed at the outset that each would be free to structure 
its forces as it sees fit, a view consistent with that of the Bush 
administration. As a practical economic matter, conditions in Russia 
preclude a massive restructuring of its strategic forces.
  The treaty, protocol and annexes contain a detailed set of rules and 
procedures for verification of the New START treaty, many of them drawn 
from START I. The inspection regime contained in New START is designed 
to provide each party confidence that the other is upholding its 
obligations, while also being simpler and safer for the inspectors to 
implement, less operationally disruptive for our strategic forces, and 
less costly than START's regime.
  Secretary Gates recently wrote to Congress that ``The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic 
Command, and I assess that Russia will not be able to achieve 
militarily significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to 
both the New START verification regime and the inherent survivability 
and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure.'' We 
should not expect that New START will eliminate friction, but the 
treaty will provide for a means to deal with such differences 
constructively, as under START I.
  The Resolution of Ratification approved by the Foreign Relations 
Committee requires further assurances by conditioning ratification on 
Presidential certification, prior to the treaty's entry into force, of 
our ability to monitor Russian compliance and on immediate 
consultations should a Russian breakout from the treaty be detected. 
For the first time in any strategic arms control treaty, a condition 
requires a plan for New START monitoring.
  Some have asserted that there are too few inspections in New START. 
The treaty does provide for fewer inspections compared to START I. But 
this is because fewer facilities will require inspection under New 
START. START I covered 70 facilities in four Soviet successor states, 
whereas New START only applies to Russia and its 35 remaining 
facilities. Therefore we need fewer inspections to achieve a comparable 
level of oversight. New START also maintains the same number of ``re-
entry vehicle on-site inspections'' as START I, 10 per year. Baseline 
inspections that were phased out in New START are no longer needed 
because we have 15 years of START I Treaty implementation and data on 
which to rely. Of course, if New START is not ratified for a lengthy 
period, the efficacy of our baseline data would eventually deteriorate.
  New START includes the innovation that unique identifiers or ``UIDs'' 
be affixed to all Russian missiles and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. 
UIDs were applied only to Russian road-mobile missiles in START I. 
Regular exchanges of UID data will provide confidence and transparency 
regarding the existence and location of 700 deployed missiles, even 
when they are on non-deployed status, something that START I did not 
do.
  The New START treaty also codifies and continues important 
verification enhancements related to warhead loading on Russian ICBMs 
and SLBMs. These enhancements, originally agreed to during START I 
implementation, allow for greater transparency in confirming the number 
of warheads on each missile.
  Under START I and the INF Treaty, the United States maintained a 
continuous, on-site presence of up to 30 technicians at Votkinsk, 
Russia to conduct monitoring of final assembly of Russian strategic 
systems using solid rocket motors. While this portal monitoring is not 
continued under New START, the decision to phase out this arrangement 
was made by the Bush administration in anticipation of START I's 
expiration. With vastly lower rates of Russian missile production, 
continuous monitoring is not crucial, as it was during the Cold War.
  For the United States, the New START treaty will allow for flexible 
modernization and operation of U.S. strategic forces, while 
facilitating transparency regarding the development and deployment of 
Russian strategic forces.
  With regard to warhead counting, New START improves on the rules used 
in both START I and the Moscow Treaty. Under START I, each deployed 
missile or bomber was attributed a maximum number of weapons, for which 
it always counted. Each launcher of a missile or weapon also counted 
regardless of whether it still performed nuclear missions or contained 
missiles. This resulted in inaccurate counts of warheads, missiles, and 
launchers. Under the Moscow Treaty, there was never agreement on what 
constituted an operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead. 
Consequently, the parties used their own methodology for counting which 
warheads fell under the Treaty's limits. Under New START, one common 
set of counting rules will be used by both parties regarding deployed 
and non-deployed IBCMs, SLBMs and bombers, and deployed warheads on 
missiles and bomber weapons, so that the data exchanged under this 
treaty will more accurately reflect modern deployment of the parties' 
strategic forces.
  New START's bomber counting rules are also different from START I. 
Under New START, each heavy bomber is attributed one nuclear weapon, 
despite the aircraft's ability to carry more, which reflects the modern 
fact that neither party maintains bombers loaded with nuclear weapons 
on a continual basis.
  This rule is not an invention of New START. It is consistent with 
President Reagan's negotiating position. He proposed that bombers not 
be counted at all because they are not first-strike weapons and, thus, 
not destabilizing. It was a concession to Moscow to include heavy 
bombers as strategic offensive arms in START I, but President Reagan 
never agreed to count their maximum capacity, as the Soviets sought. 
Those who have inexplicably criticized New START's bomber counting 
rules are advocating the historic position of the Soviet Union, not our 
own.
  The Department of Defense plans to maintain up to 60 nuclear-capable 
bombers under the New START treaty, including a large number of B-52s, 
each capable of carrying up to 20 ALCMs. Maintaining this standoff 
delivery capability will enable the United States to field a 
substantial number of penetrating weapons in the bomber leg of our 
triad. Flexible counting of one weapon per each B-52 gives us immediate 
and powerful deployment flexibility, something President Reagan 
protected, as does New START.

[[Page S10269]]

  Some opponents of New START also contend that the treaty should not 
be ratified because tactical nuclear weapons are not covered. But 
rejection of this treaty would make future limitations on Russian 
tactical nuclear arms far less likely.
  Some critics have overvalued the utility of Russia's tactical nuclear 
weapons and undervalued our deterrent to them. Only a fraction of these 
weapons could be delivered significantly beyond Russia's borders. 
Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union long ago 
destroyed intermediate range and shorter range nuclear-armed ballistic 
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, which have a range 
between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In fact, most of Russia's tactical 
nuclear weapons have very short ranges, are used for homeland air 
defense, are devoted to the Chinese border, or are in storage. A 
Russian nuclear attack on NATO countries is effectively deterred by 
NATO conventional superiority, our own tactical nuclear forces, French 
and British nuclear arsenals, and U.S. strategic forces. In short, 
Russian tactical nuclear weapons do not threaten our strategic 
deterrent. Our NATO allies that flank Russia in Eastern and Northern 
Europe understand this and have strongly endorsed the New START treaty.

  It is important to recognize that the size differential between 
Russian and American tactical nuclear arsenals did not come to pass 
because of American inattention to this point. During the first Bush 
administration, our national command authority, with full participation 
by the military, deliberately made a decision to reduce the number of 
tactical nuclear weapons we deployed. They did this irrespective of 
Russian actions, because the threat of massive ground invasion in 
Europe had largely evaporated due to the breakup of the former Soviet 
Union. In addition, our conventional capabilities had improved to the 
extent that battlefield nuclear weapons were no longer needed to defend 
Western Europe. In this atmosphere, maintaining large arsenals of 
nuclear artillery shells, landmines, and short range missile warheads 
was a bad bargain for us in terms of cost, safety, alliance cohesion, 
and proliferation risks.
  In my judgment Russia should make a similar decision. The risks to 
Russia of maintaining their tactical nuclear arsenal in its current 
form are greater than the potential security benefits that those 
weapons might provide. They have not done this, in part because of 
their threat perceptions about their borders, particularly their border 
with China.
  An agreement with Russia that reduced, accounted for, and improved 
security around tactical nuclear arsenals is in the interest of both 
nations. Rejection of New START makes it unlikely that a subsequent 
agreement concerning tactical nuclear weapons will ever be reached. The 
Resolution of Ratification encourages the President to engage the 
Russian Federation on establishing measures to improve mutual 
confidence regarding the accounting and security of Russian 
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
  Finally, I would like to turn to the nuclear modernization issue.
  The New START treaty will not directly affect the modernization or 
the missions of our nuclear weapons laboratories. The treaty explicitly 
states that ``modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms 
may be carried out.'' Yet Senate consideration of New START has 
intensified a debate on modernization and the stockpile stewardship 
programs.
  Near the end of the Bush administration, a consensus developed that 
our nuclear weapons complex was at risk due to years of underfunding. 
In 2010, the Senate approved an amendment to the Defense authorization 
bill requiring a report to Congress, known as the 1251 report, for a 
plan to modernize our nuclear weapons stockpile. The 1251 report 
submitted by the administration committed to an investment of 
approximately $80 billion over a 10-year period to sustain and 
modernize the United States nuclear weapons complex, which according to 
Secretary Gates, was a ``credible'' program for stockpile 
modernization. Pursuant to this report, the administration submitted a 
fiscal year 2011 request for $7 billion, a nearly 10 percent increase 
over fiscal year 2010 levels. The 1251 plan was recently augmented by 
an additional $5 billion in funding. The directors of our National 
Laboratories wrote on December 1 that they were ``very pleased'' with 
the updated plan, which provides ``adequate support to sustain the 
safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of America's nuclear 
deterrent'' under New START's central limits.
  The resolution of ratification passed by the Foreign Relations 
Committee declares a commitment to ensure the safety, reliability, and 
performance of our nuclear forces through a robust stockpile 
stewardship program. The resolution includes a requirement for the 
President to submit to Congress a plan for overcoming any future 
resource shortfall associated with his 10-year 1251 modernization plan. 
The resolution also declares a commitment to modernizing and replacing 
nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
  In closing, it is imperative that we vote to provide our advice and 
consent to the New START treaty.
  Most of the basic strategic concerns that motivated Republican and 
Democratic administrations to pursue nuclear arms control with Moscow 
during the last several decades still exist today. We are seeking 
mutual reductions in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles that 
contribute to stability and reduce the costs of maintaining the 
weapons. We are pursuing transparency of our nuclear arsenals, backed 
up by strong verification measures and formal consultation methods. We 
are attempting to maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenals and 
encourage global cooperation toward nonproliferation goals. And we are 
hoping to solidify U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security 
matters, while sustaining our knowledge of Russian nuclear capabilities 
and intentions.
  Rejecting New START would permanently inhibit our understanding of 
Russian nuclear forces, weaken our nonproliferation diplomacy 
worldwide, and potentially reignite expensive arms competition that 
would further strain our national budget.
  Bipartisan support for arms control treaties has been reflected in 
overwhelming votes in favor of the INF Treaty, START I, START II, and 
the Moscow Treaty. I believe the merits of New START should command 
similar bipartisan support.
  I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Manchin). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted 
to proceed in morning business for such time as I may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from California, 
Mrs. Feinstein, be recognized at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask to rescind that request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. And that at such time that the other side has had an 
opportunity to speak, Senator Feinstein be recognized for 1 hour.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Presiding Officer.

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